Narrative Discourse

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Notes

Introduction

1. For a concise overview of some work in linguistic discourse analysis treating narrative, see Johnstone.

2. The following analyses will, however, use “discourse” alone when the context makes clear which variety is at issue.

3. For readers unfamiliar with the work, it is available over the Internet—just search using the title—and, being only one page long, it can be read in a few minutes.

4. Here and below, I will often use “literary” as shorthand for “literary and cinematic” or, in some cases, “literary, cinematic, and artistic,” when the scope of the intended reference is clear.

5. See Hogan, The Mind and Affective.

6. Personified narrators are simply narrators that in some way are represented as persons (see chapter 1 for discussion).

7. Joseph Diescho is listed as the author on the cover of the novel, and he is referred to as “the author” on the jacket flap. However, the title page reads “Joseph Diescho with Celeste Wallin,” and, on the jacket flap, Wallin is referred to as “the collaborator.” In the acknowledgments, Diescho explains that Wallin was his “collaborator . . . who, in the process of typing and editing each draft of the manuscript, contributed her valuable ideas and insights and, as such, co-wrote much of the story” (vii).

8. Normative emotions are, so to speak, the emotions presupposed by the work—more technically, the emotions of the implied reader, the emotions assumed by the implied author (see chapter 1 for these concepts). A given, real reader may or may not feel those emotions. For example, a reader of Uncle Tom’s Cabin is clearly supposed to grieve for Eva. A reader has interpreted the work badly if he or she fails to recognize this. But a given reader may find Eva’s idealization excessive and thus unsympathetic, even while recognizing that the work establishes grief over her death as a norm.
9. Kenneth Newell has argued that meaning and interpretation should be understood probabilistically. Though I cannot make clear sense of the idea of probability in this context, there is a sort of kinship between his idea and the notion of a profile of ambiguity.

Chapter 1

1. “Plot” may seem to suggest only the temporal sequence of events and not, for example, the descriptive elements, whose importance has been stressed by David Herman (see chapter 7 of his Story).

2. The “[embedded discourse [embedded story]]” has been added to the usual schema in anticipation of later discussions.

3. The inferred author seems to be what is of central concern to empirical narratologists such as Bortolussi and Dixon. They separate the implied author from the real author because “intentions that seem to be implied by the text need not actually be true of the historical author” (66). But their primary concern is not norms. It is, rather, what readers actually do—hence their reference to “intentions that seem to be implied” (thus intentions inferred by readers, whatever the facts may be). They subsequently shift to “the reader’s representation of the author” (76, italics in the original). When they return to the topic later, they suggest that “most of the time, readers do not clearly distinguish the characteristics and intention of the narrator from that of the implied or historical author” (239). They go on to indicate that, in order to follow through on a narrator/implied author distinction—thus engaging in a relatively professionalized form of interpretation—readers require training (see 250–51).

In a sense, the research of Bortolussi and Dixon is directly complementary to that of the present book. Bortolussi and Dixon examine the real readers with their propensities and inclinations, the readers who infer meanings. The present book examines the norms that may serve to evaluate those inferences.

4. As Peter J. Rabinowitz explains, authors “design their books rhetorically for some more or less hypothetical audience” (Before 21, emphasis in the original; see also Ong).

5. As is common in narratology, this and the following chapters will refer repeatedly to “storyworlds.” As Herman explains, “storyworlds are mental models of who did what to and with whom, when, where, why, and in what fashion” (Story 5). Here and below, “storyworld” is used normatively to refer to the storyworld of the implied author, a storyworld to which the storyworlds of other readers may be more or less similar. It is worth noting here that this account of the storyworld allows one to distinguish story from discourse without thereby committing oneself to the idea that the same story can be manifest in different discourses (on the problems with this idea, see, for example, Toolan, and also Herman Story 214). Presumably the precise manner in which a narrative is presented—thus the precise discourse—will make a difference to the storyworlds of readers and to the (normative) storyworld of the implied author. It is also important to note that the implied author’s storyworld has normative value only for particular interpretive purposes. Readers and critics are free to stipulate different purposes, thereby giving other storyworlds normative value (for discussion, see chapter 1 of Hogan On Interpretation). For example, a historical study of a work’s impact may aim at isolating the common understanding of the work, even if that contradicts implied authorial intent. In that case, the interpretive norm would be the common
understanding. Similarly, a study of the influence of a work on some author—say, the influence of *Moll Flanders* on James Joyce—may be concerned with Joyce’s understanding of *Moll Flanders*, however that is related to the implied authorial norms for that work.

6. I am leaving aside second-person narratives here. Clearly, a full treatment of the narratee would require a discussion of this important, if limited, genre of writing. For a discussion of some key points in second-person narration, see Richardson “Poetics.” For my differences from standard views on second-person narration, see the afterword of *How*.

7. This story has received some attention from narratologists, prominently Robert Scholes (*Semiotics* 110–26). For an illuminating discussion of the complex organization of plot in the work—an aspect of discourse not considered here—see Bundgaard and Østergaard. For an application of more recent narrative theories to the story, see Semino. For a broader discussion of the implied reader in Hemingway’s fiction, see Zapf.

8. A very nice instance of this duality is discussed by Semino in her treatment of the sentence “Luz would not come home until he had a good job and could come to New York to meet her.” As Semino points out, the first “come” has the soldier as the reference point, whereas the second “come” has Luz as the reference point (95–96). On “encoding . . . directionality of movement” generally, see Herman (*Story* 282–84). I should note that my use of “dual focalization” here is different from that of Phelan, for whom “dual focalization” refers to the particular case in which “a homodiegetic narrator perceives the perceptions of his or her former self” (Phelan and Booth “Narrative” 372).

9. Obviously, some readers do not draw the distinction at all. I am speaking here only of readers who do distinguish narrators, implied authors, and real authors. Put differently, here as elsewhere I am referring primarily to professional readers or critics.

10. One reader expressed concern about my treatment of sincerity; he claimed that “Authors of fiction are generally presumed not to be speaking sincerely, since everything they say in the text is just pretend.” I hope that the preceding comments clarify that I am not, first of all, speaking of sincerity with respect to the fictional world. On some issues of implied authorship in relation to fiction versus nonfiction, the reader may wish to consult Phelan’s “The Implied Author.”

11. Rabinowitz compellingly isolates a series of heuristics that guide interpretation. On the topic of rules and heuristics, it is worth noting that David Herman has sensibly argued for a particular theoretical understanding of such rules, drawing on Jackendoff’s idea of “preference rules” (*Story* 28; see also Jackendoff).

12. Several theorists have stressed continuities between the real and fictional worlds. They have pointed out that readers or viewers tend to assume the storyworld is like the real world in, for example, having the same referents for the names of cities (“New York”) and historical figures (“Abraham Lincoln”). Perhaps the best articulation of this is Marie-Laure Ryan’s treatment of the “Principle of Minimal Departure.” These formulations, however, concern the ideas people have about the real world before they read a narrative and whether they extend those ideas to the storyworld or not. The issue under consideration here moves in the opposite direction. It concerns the ideas readers derive from fictional narratives and then potentially extend to the real world.

13. Indeed, the phrase itself is ambiguous enough that its usage may vary considerably even in a single book by a single critic (see Darby 842–43 for a prominent example). It is important to note that such diversity of understandings applies to those who reject the notion of an implied author as well as to those who accept it. For a range of recent
views, see the special, Spring 2011 issue of *Style* (45.1) on the topic, particularly Richardson’s valuable “Introduction.”

14. The idea is in keeping with other analyses of the creative processes of artists. Thus Locher, drawing on work by Mace and Ward, writes that “As a result of evaluative processes, the artist decides at some point that the work is considered either ‘complete’ or as non-viable” (132). The point applies even to orature. As Innes explains, regarding Mandinka griots, “a griot in his younger days . . . listens to other griots and borrows . . . repeatedly modifying his own version until eventually he arrives at a version which seems to him the most satisfying” (118).

15. Here, I am connecting the implied author with what I have elsewhere referred to as “aesthetical intent.” For the implications of this idea in resolving some problems in aesthetic theory, see chapter 5 of Hogan *On Interpretation.*

16. Consider the famous experiment with young men put on a suspension bridge. They experienced autonomic system arousal due to the swaying of the bridge. However, they (partially) attributed the arousal to their conversation with a young woman and that person’s alluring qualities (see Oatley, Keltner, and Jenkins 23, 24).

17. A range of relevant cases may be found in emotion research—for example, in studies where test subjects are not aware of having seen an emotion-provoking image (i.e., information about the image does not enter working memory). However, it has clearly been processed because it has effects on the subjects’ subsequent responses within the experiment, effects they cannot explain (see, for example, Öhman and Soares, and Armony and colleagues).

18. This partial opacity of one’s own reasons and principles fits well with Booth’s view on intention and implied authorship. Specifically, Booth wishes to preserve the insight that “the author’s expressed intentions, outside the text, could be in total contrast to the intentions finally realized in the finished text” (“Resurrection” 75).

19. This receptive intentional account has some relation to both “actual intentionalism” accounts and “hypothetical intentionalism” accounts (for a lucid discussion of this distinction, see Kindt and Müller). It is a form of actual intentionalism; however, it avoids the intentional fallacy and limits the relevance of biography by specifying the nature of the intention involved. That specification ties the implied author to a form of hypothetical audience understanding. However, it grounds that hypothetical understanding in the author, thereby avoiding the ontological vagueness of hypothetical intentionalism.

20. See chapter 1 of Hogan *How* and “On the Origin.”

21. On the operation of memories in the anticipation of future events, see Schacter, Addis, and Buckner.

22. As early as Abhinavagupta, similar points have been made about the role of memories in the response of readers to characters and actions; for a recent treatment of memories and reader response, see Oatley “Emotions” and “Why.”

23. On authors’ feeling that this is what they are doing, see Keen 125–27 and citations. For a literary representation of this idea, including the possibility of authorial error, see Pirandello.

24. I have drawn the term from Bordwell *Narration*. Some authors use personalized (e.g., Margolin “Character” 56).

25. Jacques Lacan famously formulated this distinction as that between the subject (who constitutes) and the ego (that is constituted). (For discussion of Lacan’s distinction, see Hogan “Structure.”) In Lacanian terms, the distinction between a personified and a nonpersonified narrator is roughly the distinction between a subject and an ego. Cog-
native science draws much the same distinction, for instance in developmental studies concerning “self-concept” (Eysenck 284).

26. Theory of mind is generally understood as involving two practices—simulation and theory-based inference. For an outline of the distinction, see Doherty.

27. On literary imagination as simulation, see Oatley “Why” and chapter 1 of Hogan How.

28. In exploring the embedding of theory of mind in characters, I am indebted to Lisa Zunshine. Similarly, in stressing the rhetorical purposes, I am indebted to James Phelan.

29. The idea of a nonpersonified narrator that encompasses personified narrators reflects a point made by David Bordwell, though he drew an almost diametrically opposed conclusion. Discussing film and drawing on work by Edward Branigan, Bordwell notes that “personified narrators are invariably swallowed up in the overall narrational process of the film, which they do not produce. So the interesting theoretical problem involves an implicit, nonpersonified narrator” (61). The idea of embedding personified narrators within a nonpersonified narrator also reflects Hayman’s idea of a nonpersonified “Arranger” who selects and organizes the details of the various narrations and interior monologues in Joyce’s Ulysses. In certain respects, the present argument generalizes Hayman’s concept, which he characterizes as falling “somewhere between the narrator and the implied author” (122). Dancygier is, to some extent, getting at a similar idea when she treats narration in relation to an encompassing “story-viewpoint space” (chapter 3), though her development of this and related ideas is different from the approach presented here. For a characteristically precise and rigorous treatment of the issue of whether a narrator is ubiquitous, see Margolin “Necessarily.”

30. One reader objected to this point on the grounds that we are told he went to Chicago. In fact, we are told only that Luz wrote a letter to Chicago. A number of my students regularly assume that she is writing to the major in Chicago. The point is not that readers cannot figure out it is the soldier. They can figure this out. The point is that standard orientational devices would have introduced the information about his going to Chicago explicitly and early on. Contrast what the narrator tells us: “they agreed that he should go home to get a job,” with the more fully orienting alternative, “they agreed that he should go home to Chicago to get a job.” The narrator is treating the location of “home” as if it is familiar information, not new information. The same point holds for the reference to Luz’s letter to Chicago.

31. The general point is common enough. For example, Chatman writes that “every tale implies a listener or reader, just as it implies a teller” (Story 151). The difference here is the extension of a nonpersonified narrator to encompass even works with personified narrators. As Chatman suggests, the generalization of the (in this case, nonpersonified) narrator undermines the traditional distinction between putatively “mimetic” drama and “narrated” stories. Related points have been made by other authors in recent years. For example, Manfred Jahn argues that every drama has a narrator, an “agent who manages the exposition, who decides what is to be told, how it is to be told, . . . and what is to be left out” (“Narrative” 670; see also Richardson “Drama” 151–52). The idea is also consistent with van Peer’s isolation of “the perspective through which we are given the story” in Euripides’ Medea. McIntyre too touches on the topic, though his concern is more with shifting points of view than an encompassing narrative voice.

32. The final point partially agrees with “no-narrator” theory (see Banfield and citations) in that it recognizes the possible collapsing of narrator and (implied) author.
However, the crucial difference from no-narrator theory is that, by the present account, it is always possible for the narrator and the author to be distinguished. In this way, generalizing the narrator is the opposite of “making authors indistinguishable from narrators” (Banfield 396), which Banfield sees as the result of such generalization. In fact, generalizing the narrator means preserving a consistent distinction between narrators and authors—both real and implied.

33. I should note that Jahn allows that a narrator might have an “emotional stance” (“Focalization” 101). But, for Jahn, that is only one of many possibilities. The suggestion of the preceding analysis is that, if one takes seriously the notion of a narrator as a tacitly simulated speaker, one must always attribute emotion to the narrator—not sometimes as one possibility among many.

34. Peter Rabinowitz pointed out to me that it seems unlikely Luz wrote that she had never known Italians before. It is, I believe, possible to construe the line as the soldier’s inference from some statement in Luz’s letter (e.g., “Before, I never got to know the local population very well”). Nonetheless, the point is well taken. This particular sentence is readily interpretable as focalizing Luz. As such, it contributes to the narrational ambiguity of the work. In that ambiguity, there are points such as this that allow an interpretation of the story as having dual affective focalization, though the bulk of the story seems to favor a single affective focalization on the soldier.

35. Such an affective preference is arguably in keeping with some feminist responses to Hemingway, which see his work as not merely patriarchal, but in some cases even misogynistic (see Ferrero and citations)—though I personally do not view this story as either.

36. See, for example, chapter 2 of Hogan The Mind and Oatley “Emotions” and “Suggestion.”

37. In neurological terms, this sort of processing is commonly triggered when one part of the brain (anterior cingulate cortex) detects some contradiction or conflict in processing elsewhere. This, in turn, activates working memory (including dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), which allows the self-conscious consideration and adjudication of such conflicts. On these processes, see Carter and colleagues, MacDonald and colleagues, Lieberman and Eisenberger, and Kondo and colleagues.

38. One referee worried that I was “underestimat[ing] the resourcefulness of human engagement,” since men can imagine what it is like to have a child. My point is not at all that our empathy is confined to nearly identical emotional memories. The point is simply that empathic response involves emotional memories. As such, the presence or absence of intense, approximately parallel emotional memories is likely to enhance empathic response. Of course, I may be wrong about this particular case, and something else may account for the difference in my response to Lahiri’s novel.

39. Note that “readers” here include the (implied) author. Indeed, the normative task of critics is commonly one of isolating and explaining features of the text that are experienced, but not self-consciously recognized and understood by the author.

Chapter 2

1. For simplicity, this chapter will use the word “painting” to refer to a range of two-dimensional works of visual art, including, for example, ink drawings.

2. Some writers have treated connections between narratology and painting, primarily by reference to narrative painting. An interesting study that extends beyond
obviously narrative works may be found in Labruda. Peggy Phelan’s treatment of action painting and its relation to performance art provides another significant extension.

3. Indeed, film theorists sometimes treat the concepts of implied author and auteur as equivalent (see Murphet 83).

4. On emotional memories, see LeDoux; on mirroring, see Iacoboni.

5. There are also emotional and thematic consequences of style in both verbal and visual art. However, style requires separate treatment.

6. Instances of narrative paintings range from, for example, representations of Jesus’s Passion (see Derbes) to the “patua” scroll painting of Bengal (see Guha-Thakurta 12–13n.3 and 19).

7. See chapter 5 of Hogan The Mind.

8. The point was famously emphasized by Lessing, in a different theoretical context. It has recently been addressed by Kafalenos (“Implications”). The practice is not by any means confined to Western art. For example, a great deal of early modern Indian art focused on illustrating key moments from important narratives, such as the great Sanskrit epics (a point attested even by a brief look at the figures in Guha-Thakurta). In fact, the tendency to embed paintings in implicit narratives is so ubiquitous and fundamental that an unclear narrative context can lead to viewer disorientation. Thus Schwabsky explains that, initially, critics responded badly to Manet’s paintings. “What was missing, in the eyes of Manet’s contemporaries,” he explains, “was a coherent story holding together the people and things depicted in the paintings” (32). The point even extends to relatively abstract work. Thus, in a recent newspaper article, Vicenzo Trione characterizes Italian Transavanguardia painters as trying to produce “dream narrations” (26).

9. It is also worth noting that there are many storytelling traditions in which pictures serve a role (see, for example, Mair 5). Of course, after publication technology made possible the mass reproduction of pictures, genres arose that integrate pictures more fully with verbal narrative, as in children’s picture books and graphic fiction. Indeed, illustrations extend well beyond these genres. For example, illustrations of narratives were common in British India, as Guha-Thakurta’s work shows.

10. On the function of context in interpreting emotion expressions, see Carroll and Russell. See Kafalenos on photographs as “lend[ing] themselves to being interpreted as an event in a number of different stories” (“Photographs” 429).

11. Quoted in Robinson (49).

12. Readers of Rabinowitz will not be surprised at this. See Reading 58–65 on the orientational and interpretive function of titles. The disambiguating value of allusions is stressed by Wolf (432).

13. This and subsequent references to plates refer to Robinson.

14. See, for example, the description of the women’s quarters in “The Wife’s Letter” (208).

15. This is a common approach to Tagore’s paintings, particularly in relation to his sister-in-law; see Sen.

16. The value of locating a work in an authorial canon has, of course, been recognized by narratologists. For example, Rabinowitz notes that “The appropriate background group for a given text usually includes the previous works by the same author” (Reading 71). Nonetheless, the general idea of a cross-textual implied author is contrary to the usual usage of “implied author” in literary study. For example, Susan Lanser points out that “Narratologists have long maintained that an ‘implied’ author is the property of a single text, and cannot be extrapolated to a writer’s entire oeuvre” (see...
also Shen 178). Indeed, in his initial discussion of the implied author, Wayne Booth maintained that “regardless of how sincere an author may try to be, his different works will imply different versions” of himself (Rhetoric 71). This is part of the ambiguity of the concept in Booth’s work and elsewhere in narratology. In this section of The Rhetoric of Fiction, Booth is exploring implied authorship as a sort of authorial self-presentation, an author’s creation of an impression on readers. This is an important idea, but one very different from the implied author as an interpretive standard, particularly when this is understood in terms of consistency in receptive intent (as I advocated in chapter 1). In later work, Booth took up this idea of the author’s self-presentation, extending it across works, in his notion of a “career-author.” The idea may initially seem to have some similarity to the cross-textual implied author. However, Booth’s career-author is not the enduring set of cognitive principles that recur in receptive intents across a range of works. Rather, it is a “sustained character” who is “the sum of the invented creators” (Critical Understanding 270).

17. In keeping with this idea of pathos, Sen notes that critics such as W. G. Archer and K. G. Subramanayam link the “ovoid face” with “the desolate woman.”

18. On Tagore and attachment, see chapter 7 in Hogan What Literature and “Reading Tagore.”

19. Indeed, there are multiple interrelations between attachment and empathy. For example, Royzman and Rozin point out that sympathetic sorrow tends to foster attachment, while attachment is almost a necessary condition for empathic joy.

20. At a presentation based on this chapter, one audience member objected that this does not mean that the painting constitutes a “pregnant moment” in the way that, for example, the Goya painting does. That is true. A scene constitutes a pregnant moment if it has highly specific and proximate precedents and consequents. In other words, the immediately preceding and following events are well defined. For instance, in the Goya painting, the central figure will be shot and die in the next moment. However, the preceding argument indicates that narrative quality in visual art is not confined to pregnant moments. Rather, narrative quality extends across a range of degrees in precedent/consequent specificity and proximity. Tagore’s painting suggests precedents and consequents, but they have relatively low specificity and proximity.

21. The point applies to television narratives as well (see Huisman “Aspects” 156–60).

22. I am grateful to Ben Singer for suggesting this term.

23. Dutt’s first film, Baazi (1951), already shows some tendency toward interposition, and Murthy was not director of photography for that film. However, he was involved with camera operation, so the assignment of responsibility even in that film remains unclear.


25. On the necessity of stipulating a guiding intention, see chapter 1 of Hogan On Interpretation.

26. After formulating these ideas initially, I came upon Berys Gaut’s valuable essay, which happens to use the phrase “minimal auteurism.” However, Gaut defines standard auteurism very differently. Thus his notion of minimal auteurism is very different as well.

27. A recurring pattern in an author’s canon need not recur in every work. It need only recur sufficiently to distinguish the author from others.

28. Clearly, there are other contexts in which one can locate the film beyond that of the auteur. Wendy Doniger presents an analysis of the film in relation to recurring motifs
of doubling and identity. Vijay Mishra locates the play within generic considerations of
the “gothic.”

29. On some of the many instances of this recurring pattern in national allegory, see
Hogan Understanding Nationalism 134–36.

30. Guha-Thakurta gives an example of this sort from the visual arts. “The great
‘discovery’ of the Kalighat pats [scroll paintings] as a vibrant and original folk art form”
ocurred when “the living tradition had become defunct” (23).

31. On this recurring allegorical feature, see Hogan Understanding Nationalism 144–
47.

32. Actually, there are different accounts of karma in Hindu tradition. Popular ac-
counts tend to stress reward and punishment. However, Vedāntic philosophy stresses
the consequences of desire.

33. As one referee pointed out, it is also possible that expectations from across an
author’s works will mislead an interpreter. Indeed, it is quite possible that there will be
contradictions between the textual implied author and the cross-textual implied author.
(Presumably, in such cases, we defer to the former.) Moreover, one may isolate cross-
textual implied authors for subsets of an author’s canon—for instance, certain periods
or genres. I have not stressed discontinuities in implied authorship here since that is the
topic of the following chapter.

34. One reader worried that I am claiming all pictures tell stories. I hope it is clear
that I am not claiming any such thing. The argument here is, rather, that aspects of nar-
ратive discourse analysis may help us discuss painting more clearly and that a discus-
sion of painting may enrich narrative discourse analysis. The mutual benefits arise most
obviously from the notion of a cross-textual implied author. It is the case that such an
implied author will often lead us to locate the moment of a painting in a more or less im-
precise sequence of events, thus a sort of minimal story (e.g., longing for a child followed
by the birth and death of a child or a failure to conceive). However, not all elements of
the cross-textual implied author need be story-related. In any case, it should be clear
that a painting is not typically presenting a story itself. Indeed, that is the whole point
of requiring that events be filled in from elsewhere.

35. This distinctiveness criterion eliminates the problem of standard techniques
or “craft context” as well. Clearly, much of what a director, cinematographer, or other
auteur does will be standard in the profession. As such, it will recur across his or her
canon, but nondistinctively. This craft context is explicated with particular care in vari-
ous works by Bordwell (see, for example, Bordwell, Staiger, and Thompson).

Chapter 3

1. The distinction is drawn from Elizabeth Anscombe, though the following discus-
sion will develop it somewhat differently.

2. Unsurprisingly, other authors have noted something along these lines. See, for
example, Lanser “The ‘I,’” Rader, and Phelan’s discussion of “mask narration” in Living.

3. As the following discussion will make clear, this unity need not be ideal, which
is to say, found at all levels. Indeed, one main point of the present analysis is that the
unity will rarely if ever be ideal. Rather, the final receptive intent provides the possibil-
ity for isolating patterns across otherwise diverse, local attitudes, themes, and so forth,
even when those are contradictory. To anticipate the present argument slightly, a work
may shift back and forth in pro- and antiwar attitudes. However, this does not mean
that the only unity is at the level of local, implied—more technically, “implicated”—
authors (with one part unified in being prowar and another unified in being antiwar).
The encompassing implied author may implicitly unify these different views through a
pattern of tacit assimilation to World War II and the Vietnam War respectively. This is
far from an ideal unity. But it is a pattern that brings the work together with specifi-
cable consistency. Put differently, there may be profound contradictions in a work. The
unity treated here is the consistent pattern that explains the contradictions. Thus the
work may be prowar when the model of World War II is activated, but antiwar when the
model of the Vietnam War is activated. The alternation of these contexts and models
may be perfectly consistent across the work, giving the work unity at that level.

4. For instance, it is well established that people engage in very different cognitive
processing strategies depending on mood state (see, for example, Forgas “Introduction”
15–17 and citations).


6. In using “implicated” here, I do not have in mind Grice’s idea of implicature.
Rather, I am using the term in its more ordinary sense. When people say that someone is
implicated in a crime, they usually suggest that he or she had some ancillary role, rather
than a main role. Similarly, one may think of the local, implicated authors as ancillary
to the larger, encompassing, implied author.

7. This sort of discrepancy in terminology is not unusual. Apparently identical as-
sertions of implied authorial multiplicity may in fact mean something very different
from one another. For example, Nelles discusses some “unusual situations,” including
that in which a reader sees “multiple implied authors” (“Historical” 28). In fact, Nelles
means that the work has several inferred real authors, despite one name being given
on the cover of the book. This meaning becomes clear when he gives an example of
a critic who concluded that “Jane Eyre was the product of multiple authors” (29). The
point is entirely valid, but completely different from the notion of multiple implicated
authors presented above. Similarly, Klaiber talks about “multiple implied authors,” but
she is concerned with texts by multiple real authors. Somewhat differently, Richardson
addresses multiplicity in implied authorship in relation to an author’s creation of “dif-
f erent authorial persona[s]” (“Introduction” 6). On the other hand, Richardson’s brief
e xample of an apparent contradiction in Chaucer (Unnatural Voices 121) does seem to
move in the direction of the account presented here.

8. As discussed in chapter 1, people are very bad at explaining their own judg-
ments, even about such simple matters as plural formation in their native language.
Again, there is no reason to believe that authors are any more successful characterizing
the enormously complex principles that bear on literary narratives.

9. One could also differentiate implicated audiences in terms of themes. For ex-
ample, the “theme of northern moral complicity in slavery” (Walters 180) obviously has
a primarily northern implicated audience.

10. See, for example, Gregg Crane on the legislative impact of the novel.

11. Much of the discussion about the novel concerns the actual, biographical au-
thor, rather than one or more implied or implicated authors. This discussion is valuable,
but largely irrelevant to the present analysis. For example, there has been much inter-
 est in just what Stowe really knew about the South and about slavery (see, for example
Otter 17 and Pryse 134; but see also the research of Albion Tourgee cited in Cantave
98–99). Other writers have been concerned about her treatment of real black women,
pronominally Harriet Jacobs (see Logan 54–55). These are interesting and significant is-
 sues. But their relation to the novel is somewhat indirect at best. If they enter at all,
they do so in productive rather than receptive intent.
The work of Yuexin Liu seems particularly relevant to cases such as Stowe’s in suggesting why such biographical considerations are likely to be irrelevant to the understanding of the implied author. As Shen summarizes Liu’s argument, “the real author may be restricted by . . . various social relations, practical interests and pragmatic considerations, which make him or her vulgar and hypocritical. By contrast, in constructing a fictional narrative, the author can transcend . . . the confinement of social relations and pragmatic considerations” (“Booth’s” 171). Insofar as one is concerned with the biographical author, it may be that Leslie Fiedler has come closest to identifying those aspects of Stowe’s feelings and fantasies that motivated the book. Fiedler writes that Stowe “dreamed only of being able to die well under the extremest persecution, forgiving her persecutors,” even “converting them to a redeemed life.” “All of this,” he continues, “she projects onto Tom, who as her surrogate . . . does not reflect invidiously on Afro-American masculinity” (What 173).

12. See Nandy on the general use of childhood as a model for Africans; see chapter 4 of Hogan Culture on how particular models are associated with particular political tendencies.

13. See, for example, 402, 405, 409, 423, and 476; for critical discussion, see Donovan’s chapter, “Inferno: The Legree Plantation.”

14. George’s emigration to Liberia has been a point of controversy. A number of critics see this as evidence of Stowe’s racist desire to rid the United States of Africans. Ammons characterizes this as “Deportation” (74) to solve “the problem of dealing with demands for racial equality” (74). But this is a curious reading. The novel never advocates rounding up African Americans and shipping them to Liberia against their will (“deportation”). Moreover, Stowe has George indicate that blacks need a nation to defend themselves against the racism of a majority white population. Stowe’s attitude here seems more biased against whites than against blacks, since whites seem largely incorrigible (despite a few positive examples, such as Tom Loker [see Gillian Brown 84]).

15. Warhol illuminates some of the ways in which the misunderstanding of Uncle Tom came about (see “Ain’t I”).

16. On the nature and operation of positive and negative stereotypes, and empirical research on these topics, see Hogan Culture 129–30 and citations.

17. This is not to say that she is the only person to have asserted African spiritual superiority. As critics have noted, she was drawing in part on lectures by Alexander Kinmont (see Nuernberg 40 and citations).

18. As, for example, Railton stresses, “Stowe had, of course, to write for her readers,” who were almost entirely white (104).

19. This sort of appeal has been explored with rigor and insight by Warhol. See her influential essays “Toward a Theory” and “Poetics” and chapter 5 of Gendered.

20. An emphasis on the importance of attachment in the novel is broadly consistent with some previous interpretations, particularly Jane Tompkins’s important analysis, which stresses the novel’s utopian “vision” of “daily living” in “Christian love” as “revealed . . . in motherhood” (141). Understanding the multiplicity of Stowe’s implied authorship and locating her emotional orientations in the context of current affective science—particularly work on attachment—do not contradict this observation. Rather, these points extend and deepen Tompkins’s insights, particularly in relation to the “enabling contradictions” of the novel, as David Leverenz rightly called them (120).

21. Readers interested in this topic should consult Richardson’s essay, which presents a rigorous and wide-ranging treatment.

22. It is important to note that misdirection is not necessarily perfidious, as the preceding example may suggest. It does involve some degree of intentional deception.
However, that intentional deception may be in the service of protecting the real author from persecution (e.g., if he or she holds “heretical” religious views).

23. As the phrasing suggests, the present distinction cuts across that between on-screen and voice-over narration. For a clear summary of some uses of voice-over, see Kozloff.

24. In keeping with the analysis in chapter 1, “narrator” here refers to a potentially unreliable communicator of storyworld information, oriented by epistemic and emotional particularities. This does not mean that the narrator is necessarily a bodily presence at a particular point in space (e.g., a person who takes up the position of the camera). This is the primary sense in which Bordwell, quite rightly, objects to the idea of an invisible observer putatively guiding film narration (see *Narration* 3–15). The following discussion cannot cover all the varieties of film narrator. For an overview of film narration in relation to other standard narratological categories (e.g., homodiegetic or extradiegetic), see Murphet (see also Fulton 115). (For a diagram of some main narratological divisions, see Huisman “Narrative” 26.)

25. Here the internal access is perceptual (e.g., through point-of-view shots). Note that this access is clearly not something that can be communicated in the verbal narration of the frame story. Thus it is available to the viewer, but not to the narratee (i.e., Roshan).

26. The scenario is far from entirely fictional. As Chomsky points out, “There is . . . mounting evidence that Cheney–Rumsfeld torture created terrorists . . . directly,” citing the case of Abdallah al-Ajmi (*Hopes* 266). Within the film, the pattern is repeated when Zilgai experiences further humiliation and ends up killing a police officer, then committing suicide. Note that the point here is directly opposed to the view that former detainees “reengage” in terrorism (a widely cited argument against releasing Guantánamo prisoners; see Worthington). The point of the film is precisely that this is not “recidivism.” It is, rather, the creation of criminality. The proper response is not continuing to imprison the innocent—or simply abandoning them to the further humiliation faced by Samir—but helping them return to a normal life.

27. For example, his “stunning reversal” on Guantánamo, including a March 7 “executive order formalizing a system of indefinite detention for dozens of the 172 remaining detainees at Guantánamo, all Muslims and . . . the resumption of military trials” (“Abu Ghraib in America” 3).

Chapter 4

1. Along the same lines, Currie points out that “A newspaper article can be unreliable, meaning that it misleads us about what actually happened” (19).

2. A similar general point is made by Dancygier (chapter 3).

3. Readers familiar with Phelan’s account in *Living to Tell About It* will recognize that I am confining unreliability here to what Phelan calls “reporting.” Phelan has two further categories, “interpreting” and “evaluating.” However, interpretive and evaluative views can be reported as true or expressed as opinion (contrast “Smith was deceitful” and “I always felt that Smith was deceitful”). I would reserve the term “unreliability” (or, more precisely, “representational unreliability,” as discussed below) for cases where the narrator’s information is presented as true (within the storyworld), not as opinion—thus cases where the (mis)information is reported.
4. “Trust” here refers to the full spectrum of emotional confidence in the narrator. In other words, here and below, the word “trust” is not confined to “normative unreliability,” as found in some writers (see Nünning “Reconceptualizing” 93).

5. As noted in chapter 1, there is neurological research, specifically work on the monitoring of contradiction, that suggests a scenario of this sort.

6. One referee worried that resolving ambiguity here is a matter of understanding rather than motivation. The point is not that understanding is irrelevant to contradiction. It usually is relevant. Indeed, it is usually the means by which we resolve contradictions. The point is that readers experience a contradiction through their engagement with some process. The process in question may be, first of all, a matter of understanding. But it may also be a matter of, for instance, sustaining one’s positive view of a hero whom one likes or with whom one identifies. The process in question is always motivated. Without the motivation, we would not engage in the process and we would sense no contradiction—at least no contradiction that would itself motivate our effortful engagement in seeking a resolution.

7. This may seem to refer to a “source” rather than a “type.” In fact, one could refer to this entire hierarchy as one of “epistemic source” or “source of justification.” The important point is that this is different from the first category, the speaker’s location in narrative discourse.

8. Unsurprisingly, critics have noted this basic point about the novel. See, for example, Rigney 39. On the other hand, many critics have arguably underestimated the depth and extent of that unreliability. For example, can one really call the narrator “visionary” (Gray 132) when her “visions” appear to be hallucinations? The hallucinations are related to a spiritual quest, but the situation is at best complicated. More strikingly, can one trust her view that her dead mother left behind a jacket or seeds for her to find? (see Gray 132). It seems, rather, that the implied author views these as saliently unreliable claims.

9. Much of the criticism has been concerned with the narrator’s relations with her parents. On the figure of the mother, see, for example, Grace.

10. On the spiritual and shamanic resonances of the work, see, for example, Guédon and Josie Campbell.

11. For a summary of alternative views, see Bouson 59–60. As Bouson points out, “Some readers are optimistic about the fate of Atwood’s character,” including some critics who focus on her “visions.” In contrast, “Other critics . . . are troubled” (59)—sometimes faulting Atwood on this score (60).

12. On some resonances of this image, see Wilson 105–6. Wilson is treating the presence of folklore motifs in the novel. On this topic, see also Baer.

13. Many critics have noted the nationalist themes in the novel. Stein summarizes critical tendencies, noting that “Canadian critics looked at [Atwood’s] nationalism; American critics focused on her feminism” (50). As Kapuscinski points out, “a significant proportion” of the criticism on the novel “views the narrative as contributing to the development of a distinctive national identity” (105). Such approaches sometimes simplify the novel’s politics. However, as Kapuscinski stresses, the book manifests a “recognition of Canada’s ongoing history of violence” (114). Other writers have pointed to complexities in Atwood’s relation to nationalism (see, for example, Laura Wright).

There is a similar complexity in Atwood’s relation to feminism. It is therefore difficult to accept Bouson’s view that Surfracing is “A novel premised on the ideology of cultural feminism,” that it “rejects the masculinist culture,” including its “rationalist”
elements, and “idealizes a nature-identified femininity” (40; Bouson also claims that the work “undercuts its own romantic feminism,” which makes it difficult to see how it can be viewed as asserting romantic feminism).

Chapter 5

1. As this indicates, conjunctive parallel narrators may treat precisely the same events. In consequence, this use of the term “parallel” should be distinguished from that of writers such as O’Neill (see 368).

2. As Alan Palmer points out, “the formal or theoretical definitions” of interior monologue and stream of consciousness “vary widely” (“Stream” 570). The intent of the present discussion is to develop theoretically precise descriptive and explanatory ideas. This does not involve any claim that these are somehow the “right” definitions of these particular words. It would make no difference if other labels were attached to the concepts presented here.

3. In this sense, it is not “the ‘prespeech’ level of consciousness,” as Dorrit Cohn puts it (108). Rather, it encompasses the nonverbalized levels of consciousness. There are other important distinctions here as well, most obviously direct versus indirect discourse. (For a rigorous recent discussion of the latter, see Sharvit; for a clear overview of some influential distinctions, see Palmer “Thought.”) The set of distinctions in the present discussion of mentalistic narration, like those developed elsewhere in the book, is not meant to be exhaustive.

4. My account of interior monologue and stream of consciousness has obvious connections with that of Lawrence Bowling. However, Bowling does not seem to fully appreciate the operation of verbal encoding by the narrator, as Chatman points out, using different terminology (see Story 187–88).

5. Andráš Kovács argues that the cinematic “equivalent” to “stream of consciousness” is “travel [that] takes place . . . in a person’s mind” (103). Kovács presents a convincing case that the “mental journey” has a narrative function similar to stream of consciousness. But it does not commonly seem to be an instance of stream of consciousness.

6. As Ross puts it, “Faulkner distorts each brother’s narrative in order to explore the depths of the speaker’s mind not revealed through his straightforward storytelling.” This is possible because “the distortions each brother’s narration undergoes are appropriate to his psychological makeup” (169).

7. As this indicates, I see no reason to accept Ross’s view that Benjy is not only “physically” but also “mentally incapable of speech” (171). It seems clear that the idealized stream of consciousness incorporates a good deal of Benjy’s own subvocalizations. Indeed, it is clear that he is often “trying to say” (see 40) something and is prevented for purely physical reasons. Of course, his comprehension of speech is severely limited by his other cognitive deficits.

8. Some critics have recognized the general point, though they have developed it somewhat differently. For example, Matthews stresses the insularity of distinct moments for Benjy (36). Ross recognizes the limitation most directly by stressing the absence of “because” and “so” in Benjy’s speech (172). Some authors have traced peculiarities of the verbal style in this section to Benjy’s problems with cause and effect (see Jeffries and McIntyre 6 and citations).
9. Benjy’s relation with Caddy has been a focus of much analysis; see, for example, Baum, Page, and Wagner.

10. Critics have, of course, recognized Jason’s unreliability. However, they have formulated its reasons differently. For example, Kuminova claims that Jason’s bias is “towards oversimplifying and flattening out the complexities of the inner life” of other characters (50).

11. For example, at one point, Quentin thinks, “I can be dead in Harvard Caddy said in the caverns and grottoes of the sea” (136). But this expresses a mere possibility, evidently a metaphorical one, and one articulated by someone else.

12. The reasons for Quentin’s suicide have, of course, been of concern to critics. Labatt notes, for example, that the reader is given “several intermittently connected causes” (20), so various as to make the suicide “believable and yet inexplicable” (21). Labatt makes a good point. In terms of the present analysis, acts have, in effect, a profile of causal ambiguity.

13. This desire for unity presumably involves sexual desire. The crucial feature, however, is attachment dependency. Readers interested in the issue of Quentin’s sexual desire may consult Irwin or Matthews (48–49).

14. One referee worried that Mulholland Drive is “merely nonsensical if its narrations are parallel.” I hope the discussion makes clear that parallel narration does not make the work nonsensical in the sense of making the work gibberish. However, it does inhibit the possibilities for developing an encompassing resolution of the ambiguity of the work. At the same time, that lack of resolution may, in turn, serve emotional or thematic purposes that reestablish coherence and “sense” in a different way.

15. See Thomas 83. Critics have noted many of the basic interpretive points considered here. Thomas’s essay is particularly well developed and insightful regarding these points.

16. In an interesting interpretation, Bruckner examines the following narrative in terms of Rita’s head injury. For reasons of space, the following discussion will leave aside this possibility.

17. A point noted by critics (see Thomas 86).

18. Unsurprisingly, the bulk of interpretations of the film involve at least some psychoanalytic component. Beyond Thomas, McDowell, and Shostak, already mentioned, representative cases would include Schaffner, Restuccia, and Hageman.

19. The character is referred to as a man, but is played by an actress and is not clearly gendered in visual appearance.

20. Moreover, there is a link not only with theater, but with filmmaking, since, as Jean-Marc Lalanne points out, ending with the word silencio alludes to the ending of Jean-Luc Godard’s Le Mépris, which treats filmmaking. Readers interested in the cinematic background to Lynch’s film may wish to view Lalanne’s lecture, “Mulholland Drive, film matrice (2000–2010),” available on the internet at http://www.canal-u.tv/video/cinematheque_francaise/mulholland_drive_film_matrice_2000_2010_conference_de_jean_marc_lalanne.6432 (accessed 15 August 2012).

21. Needless to say, critics have remarked on the postmodernist affiliations of Lynch’s film. See, for example, d’Ocarmo.

22. Dreaming stream of consciousness is the equivalent of personified and embedded narration in this context because, in addition to being personified and embedded, the dreaming character’s mind becomes the possible source for epistemic or motivational unreliability in the narration. Indeed, to say that something is a dream is, in effect,
to say that it manifests particular sorts of epistemic and motivational unreliability tied to a particular person.

Chapter 6

1. This is not to say that the novel is beyond criticism. For example, there is some truth to the view that “Wanja embodies the features of a number of female stereotypes identified in African literature” (Lovesey 59; see citations 144n.14). Of course, observations such as this must be seriously qualified by a recognition of Wanja’s allegorical role. On the other hand, some critics have taken this into account and still found the novel problematic. Stratton offers a particularly compelling argument. However, Stratton seems to overstate her case. It seems clear that Ngũgĩ recognizes and rejects Wanja’s sexual exploitation even as he recognizes and rejects that of the nation. Moreover, Wanja’s main source of strength and knowledge is her grandmother, Nyakinyua, which hardly suggests that “The trope . . . excludes women from the creative production of the national polity” (122).

2. Some critics have also treated some aspects of narration in other of Ngũgĩ’s novels (see, for example, Mwangi on unreliable narration in Devil on the Cross).

3. On the significance of this and other names in the novel, see the linguistic glossary in Sicherman.

4. See Treister 268 on Wanja’s relation to Gikuyu ethnicity, as manifest in the relation of her name to three daughters of the great Gikuyu ancestor, Muumbi.

5. This seems to be the point where another resonance of Wanja’s name enters—its echoing of “Wanjiru,” the wife of Mau Mau leader Dedan Kimathi (see Sicherman 187–88 on Wanjiru).

6. The main exception is his participation in a group delegation from the countryside to the capital. But he seems to enter into this more or less by accident (see 114).

7. The role of Christianity in the novel is deep and complex, as critics have noted. See, for example, Sharma and Pagnoulle.

8. There has been relatively little discussion of collective narration by narratologists. An important exception is Margolin’s “Collective.”

9. Margolin notes that the reference of a narratorial “we” will often “shift in identity, scope, size, and temporal location in the course of the narration” (“Collective” 245).

10. This is one of the most common forms of idealization.

11. After drafting this chapter and deriving these options empirically, I came upon Margolin’s “Collective Perspective” essay and found that he reached distinct, but complementary conclusions through logical analysis (see 243). I would urge anyone interested in this topic to read Margolin’s insightful and thought-provoking essay.

12. The text also recurs to Munira’s testimony on 190, 224, 243, 269, 295, and elsewhere.

13. Though Diescho is a highly respected Namibian public intellectual and political commentator, his novel has generated almost no critical discussion. The MLA International Bibliography lists only two works treating Diescho. Both concern his other novel, Troubled Waters. Part of the purpose of the present analysis is to foster such discussion and, more generally, attention to Born of the Sun.

14. Some readers have seen this as related to Alan Palmer’s recent revival of Hege- lian idealism, specifically his claim that there is “intermental thought” (“Social Minds”). However, to say that people have a sense of direct access to other people’s thought is
quite different from saying that people do have such direct access. For a few of the problems with Palmer’s views in this area, see Hogan “Palmer’s.”

15. In the course of the novel, there is one very clear violation of the general pattern just outlined. That is when readers are given the internal thoughts of an Afrikaner minister (170). The passage highlights the inaccessibility of the white man’s thoughts to the Africans, and vice versa. This inaccessibility results from the fact that they never share common projects, easy cooperation, mirroring, and so on. However, the fact that the white man’s thoughts can be represented in the novel tends to discourage the sort of dehumanization that might have resulted from a complete confinement of interiority to blacks.

Afterword

1. This brief afterword is clearly not the place for an overview of the literature on these topics. There has certainly been valuable research in this area, as illustrated by the pathbreaking work of Prince (“Introduction”) and Iser. The standout recent treatment of the implied reader is Brian Richardson’s (“Singular Text”), already mentioned in chapter 3. More recent examinations of the narratee would include Phelan’s careful treatment of Prince’s ideas on the narratee and Rabinowitz’s conception of the narrative audience (“Self-Help”). Nonetheless, the relative neglect of the topics is illustrated by the differences between the entries for “Implied Reader” and “Implied Author” (a ratio of roughly one to six) as well as “Narratee” and “Narrator” (a ratio of roughly one to fourteen) in Herman, Jahn, and Ryan.

2. The basis of this translation is the text in Bahadur (44), supplemented by the version in Shantaram.

3. Or, rather, as Hawley and Juergensmeyer explain, this is how legend has it (124–27). Little is known about “the original” Mīrābāī, “if ever indeed she existed at all” (123). The biographical point holds whether the poem was written by Mīrābāī or in her name. The author of a pseudo-Mīrābāī poem would adopt the implied authorial position of a reader reading the poem as authored by Mīrābāī, a point suggested by the reference to “lady Mira.”

4. Here, again, the point holds whether the poem was authored by Mīrābāī or written in her name.

5. It is possible to use “we” for “I” in Hindi. However, this does not seem to be the case here, since Mira elsewhere uses “I,” and the plurality of “we” is prepared for in the plural images of the second stanza. I should note that Bahadur has “we” already in the moon and partridge line. I have chosen Shantaram’s version because it is more internally consistent, confining “we” to a single stanza. (I have also followed Shantaram in repeating the opening lines as a refrain and in a couple of small variants in wording.)

6. This line is not in Bahadur, but is included in Shantaram.

7. See, for example, the references to rasadhvani in Ingalls.