CHAPTER 6

Conclusion
(Including Enduring Love)

*Shared minds create all we know.*
—Colwyn Trevarthen

This final chapter is divided into four parts. In the first, I comment briefly on some of the issues that would arise from a rigorously diachronic approach to the study of social minds in the novel. The second part consists of an analysis of the intermental thought to be found in Ian McEwan’s novel *Enduring Love.* In the third section I discuss possible future developments in the study of social minds in narratives in other media. The fourth and final section is, as promised in the first chapter, a rhetorical flourish.

A HISTORY OF SOCIAL MINDS

It is an obvious truth that historical periods are necessarily arbitrary. The novel form does not, of necessity, change utterly at the beginning of each century to suit the classificatory needs of future literary historians. Indeed, it is always necessary to complicate and question such easy and neat categories as “the nineteenth-century novel.” On the other hand, though, it is possible to paint a picture of the history of the English novel that does, as it happens,
fit quite neatly into divisions into centuries. There was a change at the beginning of the nineteenth century, due in the main to the genius of Jane Austen, and it is possible to trace a satisfying line of descent from Austen through Edgeworth and the Brontës to Dickens and Collins, Gaskell and Eliot, and then on to Conrad and James. There was then a very different change at the beginning of the twentieth century with the beginnings of the modernist movement. Many features of the English novel will not fit comfortably into this satisfyingly schematic picture. However, from the externalist perspective on social minds with which this book is concerned, the picture is a genuinely illuminating one. The novel of this period explores the tensions between the internalist and externalist perspectives, between social and private minds, in ways that are noticeably different from both the eighteenth-century novel and the twentieth- and early-twentieth-century novel. This is not to say that the novels of other periods are not interested in social minds. The differences lie in the degree of interest, and the ways in which this aspect of the novel is presented and examined.

The standard story for the historical development of the representation of consciousness follows what might be termed the *speech category trajectory* (see chapter 1 for a definition of the term *speech category approach*). Roughly, this begins with the reliance of narratives before Jane Austen on authorial thought report. Then, from Austen onwards until, say, Henry James, novels are marked by a growing preponderance of free indirect discourse. With the modernist novels of the early twentieth century, stream of consciousness and interior monologue become the dominant speech category modes. Leaving aside any quibbles regarding the accuracy of this history (its possible overestimation, perhaps, of the amount and importance of free indirect discourse at the expense of thought report), it is an indispensible aid to an understanding of the history of the novel. However, if we want a *complete* picture of the historical development of the representation of *whole* fictional minds, then the speech category trajectory has to be supplemented by others such as the history of social minds. This narrative might well intersect at a number of points with the speech category account. It could be, perhaps, that Jane Austen was the first great English novelist of social minds, just as she was the first of free indirect discourse. That sounds quite likely to me.

Given that the history of social minds that I envisage would study all of the novelists discussed in this book, as well as many others, as historically embedded figures, several questions would arise. These might include the following: Are the workings of social minds more salient in the novels of the authors examined here than in the other authors of the same period who are not here for reasons of space? And are they more salient than in the novels of earlier and later periods? If the answer to the second question is yes, then further questions arise: Was the nineteenth century a privileged
moment in which these great writers caught the *universal* condition that we all share and that has since been obscured by assumptions that have limited the power of narrative to expose the full extent of this condition? Or, alternatively, were social minds a unique characteristic of the nineteenth-century British society that was the subject matter of those authors?

Kate Summerscale, the author of *The Suspicions of Mr Whicher or the Murder at Road Hill House*, a work of popular history that was a bestseller in the UK, suggests that the mid-Victorians were fascinated by the idea that faces and bodies could be “read”, that the inner life was imprinted on the shapes of the features and the flutter of the fingers. Perhaps the fascination stemmed from the premium placed on privacy; it was terrifying and thrilling that thoughts were visible, that the inner life, so jealously guarded, could be instantly exposed. (2008, 84–85)

Her theory is that these concerns arose out of the intense public interest during this period in the ability of detectives, both real and fictional, to read suspects’ faces and body language for clues. I am sure that equally plausible alternative explanations could be found. Clearly, any attempt to address the questions asked in the previous paragraph will have to be a major cultural studies research project.

I think that it may eventually be possible to construct historical arguments along these lines in terms of the relationship between narrative technique and cultural conceptions of the self. Such scholarship might involve a revaluation of Dickens as the novelist who captures perhaps more vividly than any other the universal, *trans-historical* fact that, in cognitive terms, we spend almost all of our lives on the surface, on the outside, and who is therefore undeserving of the condescension accorded him by advocates of the more internalist Henry James. On the other hand, it will also have in mind that Jane Austen, George Eliot, Anthony Trollope, and other novelists of the period were also acutely attuned to the workings of social minds. I say that it may eventually be possible to construct these sorts of arguments because, while I think that this sort of perspective will be of great value in aiding our understanding of the historical development of the novel, it should only be employed once the necessary detailed textual work has been done on the operation of social minds in a wide chronological range of novels. Once the evidence has been assembled, then such historical patterns will probably become apparent. But it would be unwise, in my view, to theorize too widely and too soon in advance of the textual evidence.

The sort of theorizing that I have in mind could be taken in a number of different directions, social, historical, and cultural. In this context, *The Tragic Muse* makes an interesting comparison with the other, earlier nineteenth-
century novels. Like them (in the main and apart from Dickens), it portrays a homogenous social group—the leisured upper-middle classes. I mention this because being of the same social class seems to be one of the enabling factors for the formation of social minds. Others include being of the same age; characters liking or loving each other; knowing each other for a long time; the absence of solipsistic characteristics, and so on. This is not to say that these factors guarantee social minds, only that they make them a little more likely. But how then can we explain the reasons for the stark differences in perspective between the James novel and the others? The two obvious reasons are that they are written by different people and at different periods of time. But how can we know which factor is the more important? Is it the difference between two aspects of British upper-middle-class society, or simply the difference between Dickens, Eliot, and the others and Henry James? That is assuming, of course, that the novels discussed in this book are typical of their authors, and they may not be; other Henry James novels may be less internalist than *The Tragic Muse*.

Fictional social minds have many other ideological, gendered, historical, and cultural implications that I hope will be explored in the future but cannot be addressed here for reasons of space. One single book cannot go in all the directions that will, I am sure, have occurred to readers of this book. There are many studies of nonverbal communication from a variety of perspectives (anthropological, sociological, sociolinguistic, and so on) that I have not referred to. As an illustration of one important future direction, at the end of the discussion of *Enduring Love* in the next section I refer to the need for a rhetorical and ethical perspective on analyses of social minds. Also, attribution theory can be used to differentiate between the techniques of characterization formation and consciousness representation that are characteristic, not just of different historical periods, but also of genres, authors, and types of characters. Finally, I will discuss later in this chapter my belief that the externalist perspective can fruitfully be applied to narratives in other media such as films and graphic novels. However, any comparative study of the fictional minds realized by contrasting narrative styles, periods, genres, and media should, I propose, pay as much attention to the large number of underlying and persistent similarities as to the marked and undeniable differences.

A history of social minds in the novel will, I am sure, show that an interest in them did not end with the beginning of the twentieth century. This is James Joyce’s characteristically playful take on the subject:

> What, reduced to their simplest reciprocal form, were Bloom’s thoughts about Stephen’s thoughts about Bloom and about Stephen’s thoughts about
Bloom’s thoughts about Stephen?

He knew that he thought that he was a jew whereas he knew that he knew that he knew that he was not. (Ulysses, 558)

Social minds play an important role in another, very different modernist novel: Ford Madox Ford’s The Good Soldier. The unreliable narrator of that novel appears at first to be describing an intermental unit formed by two couples: he and his wife, Florence, and Edward and Leonora Ashburnham. He refers in the second sentence of the novel to their “extreme intimacy” (1) and later to “the swiftness with which intimacy had grown up between us” (40–41). However, he reveals later that, in reality, he knew nothing at all of the true nature of the relationships within this foursome (in particular, that his wife was having an affair with Ashburnham) until after his wife’s suicide. The actual intermental unit comprised the other three, who all shared their knowledge of the real state of affairs. When the focus of attention then moves onto the relationship between the Ashburnhams and their ward, Nancy, the narrator remarks that “that wretched fellow [Ashburnham] knew—by a curious instinct that runs between human beings living together—exactly what was going on” (217). In the final scene of the novel, the narrator is aware that Ashburnham is going to commit suicide but decides not to stop him. “When he saw that I did not intend to interfere with him, his eyes became soft and almost affectionate” (229; my emphasis). There are social minds of a sort in this novel, but, as you would expect of a modernist classic, they are partial, fractured, and deeply dysfunctional.

The twenty-first-century novel has so far been characterized by an explicit interest in the workings and, in particular, the malfunctionings of characters’ minds. The first half of Ian McEwan’s Atonement is about the development of the thirteen-year-old Briony’s theory of mind and her growing ability to attribute mental states to others. She frequently muses self-consciously on the subject: “Was everyone else really as alive as she was? . . . If the answer was yes, then the world, the social world, was unbearably complicated, with two billion voices, and everyone’s thoughts striving in equal importance and everyone’s claim on life as intense, and everyone thinking they were unique, when no one was” (36). Within two paragraphs, the text refers to “three points of view” (40), “separate minds” (40), “other minds” (40), “different minds” (40), and again to “other minds” (40). Unfortunately, though, catastrophe results from a misattribution by Briony to Robbie. She thinks that Robbie wants to attack Cecilia when in fact he loves her. In contrast to this part of Atonement, which shows how Briony’s mind is opening up and acquiring some knowledge of the exis-
tence of other minds (although what knowledge she has does not prevent her from fatally misreading Cecilia's and Robbie's minds), in the epilogue, many years later, she realizes that, because of her progressive dementia, “my brain, my mind, is closing down” (354).

The modernist novel is characterized by a move away from the heterodiegetic narration that is typical of the realist novel and toward an experimental and impressionistic emphasis on subjectivity, inner states of consciousness, and fragmentary and discontinuous character construction. These sound like deeply internalist preoccupations. And my guess is that, when the companion volume to this one comes to be written on the twentieth- and twenty-first-century novel, the presence of social minds will be found to be much patchier than in the nineteenth century. However, David Herman's chapter on the modernist novel in his edited collection *The Emergence of Mind* illuminatingly examines the modernist novel in terms of situated or distributed cognition. In any event, it should be stressed that the absence of social minds is as significant as their presence. If social minds in twentieth- and twenty-first-century fiction are fractured, attenuated, or even absent, then that, in itself, is an important fact.

I have maintained throughout this study that both perspectives, the internalist and the externalist, are necessary for a full picture of the workings of fictional minds in novels. In my view, this is as true of the twentieth- and twenty-first-century novel as it is of the nineteenth. The purpose of the discussion in the following section is to enrich, deepen, and complicate the picture of social minds that was presented in the earlier chapters on nineteenth-century canonical novels. I will now jump to the contemporary period in order to show that the concerns of the previous chapters are still relevant. I do this by giving a single example of a social-minds analysis of a modern novel. I have chosen Ian McEwan's *Enduring Love* for this purpose. McEwan is a good choice because his work reflects an interest in the whole history of the novel, even as he works in both modernist and postmodernist ways to represent fictional consciousness. As shown above, he is a novelist who has a self-conscious interest in fictional minds. The energy of *Enduring Love* is keyed to the subject of intermentality and, in particular, to the attribution breakdown within the intermental unit formed by the couple at the heart of the novel (Joe and Clarissa). We readers, as interpreters, are drawn into this breakdown if we assume, from the beginning, that the relationship between Joe and Clarissa will be robust enough to withstand the shock caused by the eruption of a mad person into their lives. It may well be that pressures and shocks of this sort will be found by a history of fictional social minds to be characteristic of the modern novel.
ENDURING LOVE

The character-narrator of this novel, Joe, is a popular science writer who, following a hot-air balloon accident in which a man dies, is stalked by a young man, Jed Parry. Jed is in love with Joe and believes that Joe is in love with him. Joe comes to understand that Jed is suffering from de Clerambault's syndrome or erotomania (a real complaint), which causes the sufferer to fall in love with someone who is usually older and of a higher social status, and who, sufferers often think, sends them signals of their love, for example by drawing their curtains. Sufferers typically stalk their victims and often attack them when they are rejected. However, Joe's partner, Clarissa, does not take Jed seriously, is skeptical of Joe's concerns, and thinks that Joe should have handled Jed better. The police are also unhelpful. After an unsuccessful attempt on Joe's life, Jed threatens Clarissa with a knife and Joe shoots and wounds him. Jed is then detained in a psychiatric hospital. At the end of Joe's narrative he and Clarissa are separated. The novel ends with an academic paper on the case (apparently thought to be genuine by some reviewers) which mentions briefly and in passing that Joe and Clarissa are later reconciled.

My purpose in discussing this novel is to examine the nature of the attributions of madness to Jed by Joe and Clarissa, and to show how these attributitional differences cause the breakdown of that couple's interpersonal unit. I conclude the discussion with an analysis of Clarissa's character—and, in particular, the question of whether her behavior is sufficiently motivated or not—from a number of different aspects: characterization theory, empathy, rhetorical and ethical criticism, and gender studies. It is in this way that I will be looking at the process by which attributions (a cognitive term) become judgments (an ethical term). Put bluntly, I think McEwan's treatment of the character of Clarissa does not work. This section is, therefore, intended in part to show that a social-minds approach can form the basis of aesthetic appraisals of texts that bear a greater resemblance to mainstream literary criticism than the earlier, rather formalist and descriptive treatments of the nineteenth-century novels. (For a persuasive and highly productive disagreement with my position on Clarissa from a rhetorical perspective, see James Phelan's “Cognitive Narratology, Rhetorical Narratology, and Interpretive Disagreement: A Response to Alan Palmer's Analysis of Enduring Love” [2009].)

I referred in chapter 1 to the debate about whether people regard their lives as narratives and whether this is a good thing. Enduring Love contributes to this debate by repeatedly and explicitly drawing attention to its char-
acters’ attempts to make sense of and control their experiences by turning them into narratives. Four different perspectives on the storyworld of the novel are directly presented in the text:

- Joe (the bulk of the text consists of his first-person narrative);
- Clarissa (one chapter is written by Joe but focalized through her; and her letter to Joe is also reproduced within Joe’s narrative);
- Jed (two of his letters to Joe are also reproduced); and
- the authors of the academic article that follows Joe’s narrative.

These perspectives comprise narratives that, in different ways, account for, and try to make sense of, the events that occur in the storyworld. Unsurprisingly, it emerges that life is aspectual. The words *narrative* and *story* recur continually, and even rather heavy-handedly, as ever-present reminders of aspectuality throughout the text. A minor character, Mrs Logan, has a “story” (122), “a narrative that only grief, the dementia of pain, could devise” (123). Joe asks whether Jed believes “in his private narrative” that he was sparing Clarissa’s feelings (144). “It was only when they reached us that our story could continue” (173). “I had my story” (196). “I want to hear this story at first hand” (224). “I know what I know” (224). “There could be no private redemption in objectivity” (181); and, “Besides, there isn’t only ever one system of logic” (214). This point becomes particularly significant when Joe’s reliability as a narrator of the events in the storyworld is called into question.

Both Joe and Clarissa obsessively retell the story of the accident. They turn it into a narrative. They are shown to be “circling it, stalking it, until we had cornered and began to tame it with words” (29). Reinforcing the need to “tame” events by means of narrative, Joe says later that, “Over the days and weeks, Clarissa and I told our story many times to friends, colleagues and relatives” (36). During this period, “our story was gaining in coherence; it had shape, and now it was spoken from a place of safety” (36). (Incidentally, this process is rather reminiscent of Briony’s narrativizings, her continual and self-conscious retellings and reshapings, of the events in *Atonement*.) When describing Jed’s request that they pray together, he tells “the prayer story as comedy” (30). The need to narrativize the accident lessens once the event has been tamed: “Talking the events over with friends no longer seems to help because, she thinks, she has reached a core of senselessness” (80).
Joe also likes to narrativize other events. Just before the murder attempt in the restaurant, Joe confesses that “I would have liked to tell the story of my encounter with Inspector Linley, spice it up a little and squeeze some amusement from it” (164). His need to narrativize is also apparent after the restaurant shooting: “A day or so later it became a temptation to invent or elaborate details about the table next to ours, to force memory to deliver what was never captured. . . . It also became difficult to disentangle what I discovered later from what I sensed at the time” (166). So much so that some of the details that he gives to the police are later contradicted by others.

As Joe is a popular science writer, his job consists of narrativizing science: “I can spin a decent narrative out of the stumblings, back-trackings and random successes that lie behind most scientific breakthroughs” (75). But he is ambivalent about his work because he wants to be a “real” scientist and occasionally makes unsuccessful attempts to get back into serious science. In particular, he feels revulsion at the professional necessity to narrativize his subject: “Narrative—my gut tightened at the word. What balls I had written the night before” (56). He feels guilty about his dishonest methodology: the use made of a small number of convenient examples together with a total disregard for the many other counterexamples. In his science writing, as with his urge to spice up and tell as comedy his narratives of the events in his life, he is imposing an arbitrary and aspectual framework on the inchoate flux of facts and events.

Because of his occupation, Joe has a tendency to come up with scientific explanations for things. Some of these relate to the question of attribution. When Joe is waiting at the airport for Clarissa and looking at the other people in the crowd, he decides that the expressions on their faces confirm Darwin’s contention that the many expressions of emotion in humans are universal, genetically inscribed” (4). Later, there is a long and general scientific discussion on the age-old question of whether we can ascribe behavior to nature or nurture (70–77). These discussions form a context for the specific attributional problems that are caused by madness. The notion of madness arises from the difficulty in reliably projecting mental states onto others. To say that behavior is obsessive, mad, or insane is to admit that it is not possible to ascribe reliable motives, reasons, and intentions for actions, and so other explanations must be found. When the standard process does not work, the default explanation is “he must be mad.” Mad people have unreadable minds; they do not have social minds. There is a significant emphasis in the text on madness as a complete, self-contained, solipsistic world that sane people cannot enter: Jed’s “world was emotion, invention and yearning” (147); “His was a world determined from the inside, driven by private necessity, and this way it could remain intact. . . . He illuminated the world with his
feelings, and the world confirmed him at every turn his feelings took” (143). “He was inviolable in his solipsism” (144). The scientific paper explains that, as a “well-encapsulated delusional system” (238), “erotomania may act as a defence against depression and loneliness by creating a full intrapsychic world” (239).

As Joe is initially unable to narrativize Jed’s behavior according to the usual rules, he characteristically seeks a scientific explanation. At the first mention by Jed of Joe drawing his curtain, it is apparent to Joe that the curtains have an *attributional* significance for him. “A curtain used as a signal. Now I was closer than before. I almost had it” (92). Joe has a faint memory of the importance of the signal from the “lover” for de Clerambault sufferers, but cannot quite place it at first. Finally he remembers the existence of de Clerambault’s syndrome: “The name was like a fanfare, a clear trumpet sound recalling me to my own obsessions. There was research to follow through now and I knew exactly where to start. A syndrome was a framework of prediction and it offered a kind of comfort. I was almost happy . . . It was as if I had at last been offered that research post with my old professor” (124; my emphasis). He is deeply relieved when he is able to attach a scientific label to this disruptive and inexplicable event in his life. He sees Jed’s behavior as “a love whose morbidity I was now anxious to research” (127; my emphasis). The point is reinforced even more strongly a little later: “Studying Parry with reference to a syndrome I could tolerate, even relish, but meeting him yet again, in the street, especially now that I had read his first letter, had frightened me” (130; my emphasis). Although “comfort,” “happy,” and “relish” are odd words to use in this context, the reader knows why he uses them. He feels reassured by his knowledge: “I had read the literature and knew the possibilities” (153). He now has some control over the situation. Also, he makes it explicit that part of the reason for his frantic scientific study of Jed’s madness is to bring him closer to Clarissa again: “What could I learn about Parry that would restore me to Clarissa?” (128). And he feels better even though the conclusions are not necessarily reassuring in themselves, and do not appear to suggest that any such control is going to be possible: “Well over a half of all male de Clerambaults in one survey had attempted violence on the subjects of their obsessions” (142).

Having found a coherent narrative that can serve as an explanation for Jed’s behavior, it is also important for Joe that, in addition, it be narrativized as criminal. Joe stresses that “Parry’s behaviour had to be generalised into a crime” (73). However, it is noticeable that this move is always resisted by everyone else associated with the case. Clarissa certainly does not see Jed as a criminal, and she never takes seriously the possibility that he might become violent. Joe’s narrative also differs from the official one. After Joe describes Jed’s behavior to a policeman, he is told that it is not possible to establish
that what Jed is doing is against the law. The response is that “There’s nothing here that’s threatening, abusive or insulting as defined by Section Five of the Public Order Act” (157). The aspectual nature of the narrative that Joe has constructed for Jed is thereby given additional emphasis.

Joe’s theoretical or scientific interest in Jed’s mental illness may in part explain his dilemma over how to deal with the madman. Joe frequently engages with Jed and then immediately experiences a marked desire to disengage. Their encounters are characterized by a continual seesawing of movement toward him, then withdrawal. “What do you want?” Even as I said the words, I wanted them back. I did not want to know what he wanted, or rather, I did not want to be told” (59). Sometimes Joe gives in to his undeniable feelings of curiosity and also pity. At other times he withdraws and refuses to humor him in any way. He agonizes a good deal over this recurring pattern. “I was quite interested to know, although I also wanted to get away” (64); “I should have walked on, but his intensity held me for the moment and I had just sufficient curiosity to echo him” (65); and “I had decided to say nothing more to him, but I couldn’t help myself” (68). Joe’s ambivalence has serious consequences for his relationship with Clarissa when she accuses him of leading Jed on. Joe links the two issues of scientific curiosity and attributional failure when he says that “When this story was closed it would be important to know something about Parry. Otherwise he would remain as much a projection of mine as I was of his” (60). There is a laudable awareness here of one of the chief pitfalls in the attribution process—the temptation to project one’s self into others. This is the concern that Clennam has about turning Little Dorrit into a “domesticated fairy.” It could even be argued that Joe goes too far in this direction because, when encounters with Jed go badly wrong, he seems to imagine himself “accused” of “a failed extension into mental space” (128). He appears to feel guilty that he does not realize immediately that Jed is mad. But why? This seems to me to be an overreaction. It is surely praiseworthy to be reluctant to attribute madness too quickly.

Meetings between the two men tend to revolve around the issues of control and intimacy. Jed remarks, “It’s all about control, isn’t it?” (62). Joe is understandably disturbed at the apparent closeness of their relationship. He finds himself “talking to a stranger in terms more appropriate to an affair, or a marriage on the rocks” (67). To his horror, he thinks, “I’m in a relationship” (73). In an oddly intimate form of words, Joe refers to Jed as “my de Clerambault” (207). The use of the possessive when referring to Jed strikes a jarring note. The issues of power, control, and intimacy become an important element in the conflicts between Joe and Clarissa when she begins to have doubts about Joe’s handling of the situation: “Was I giving her the impression that I was secretly flattered by Parry’s attention, or that I was unconsciously leading him on, or that without recognising the fact, I was enjoying
my power over him, or—perhaps she thought this—my power over her?” (102).

It is hardly surprising that the group of people including Joe and Jed who are suddenly thrown together in the hot-air balloon accident at the beginning of the novel do not form an intermental unit. What is more surprising, though, is the fact that the narrative explicitly draws attention to the absence of intermentality. Joe states, “I should make something clear. There may have been a vague communality of purpose, but we were never a team” (10). The point is an important one, because he repeats it a few pages later: “But as I’ve said, there was no team, there was no plan, no agreement to be broken” (14). Nevertheless, the academic article that follows Joe’s narrative speculates that Jed’s participation in this loose social unit, however fleeting and ephemeral it may have been, has a profound psychological effect on him. The authors suggest that “Such a transformation, from a ‘socially empty’ life to intense team-work may have been the dominating factor in precipitating the [de Clerambault’s] syndrome” (239; my emphasis). The article is proposing that Jed’s participation in what he thinks is an intermental unit (although Joe does not agree and it is doubtful whether any of the other participants would either) is the proximate cause of his descent into madness. Whether or not this is a plausible theory in this specific case, it is a telling acknowledgment of the power and importance of intermental units.

At the start of the novel, Joe and Clarissa form a fairly well-functioning unit. Initially, their attributions of states of mind to the other appear to be accurate and successful. There was nothing, Joe says, until the Jed affair, that “threatened our free and intimate existence” (8). However, as with most relationships, there are some fine, potential fault lines. One is Joe’s desire to become a real scientist again. Clarissa finds Joe’s occasional unsuccessful attempts to do so rather upsetting because they are doomed to failure and they disturb the equilibrium of their relationship. Another is Clarissa’s inability to have children. Both of them would like to have a family. When these fault lines crack wide open on the impact of the invasion into their lives of a madman, then their relationship ceases to be intermental. The reason for the split is that they attribute different states of mind to Jed. They narrativize him intramentally. They never achieve a stable consensus on this issue. Joe’s attributions, as we have seen, construct a double cognitive narrative for Jed as a threatening, dangerous, potentially violent madman. Clarissa initially denies that Jed is mad at all. She narrativizes him as a joke, implies that Joe is unreliable in his accounts of Jed’s behavior, and trivializes the matter as a nuisance. Then, once she does accept the reality, she sees him as capable of being, in effect, tamed and domesticated. She also alleges that, in any event, it is all Joe’s fault (56–58).
Clarissa's views on Jed, are, on the whole, focalized through Joe. To put the point another way, Joe is exercising his theory of mind on what Clarissa thinks of Jed. Clarissa is only able to speak for herself directly when she writes her letter to Joe, but this letter is placed near the end of Joe's narrative. Joe refers frequently to what he thinks (reliably, in my view) is Clarissa's view of Jed, and tries hard to be convinced by it: “Clarissa was right, he was a harmless fellow with a strange notion, a nuisance at most, hardly the threat I had made him out to be” (61). While in general Joe sees Jed as dangerous, he is constantly aware that Clarissa regards him as harmless and he pays careful attention to her views. “Then he [Jed] represented the unknown, into which I projected all kinds of inarticulate terrors. Now I considered him to be a confused and eccentric young man who couldn’t look me in the eye, whose inadequacies and emotional cravings rendered him harmless. He was a pathetic figure, not a threat after all, but an annoyance, one that might frame itself, just as Clarissa had said, into an amusing story” (69; my emphasis). Later, Jed’s first letter to Joe appears to Clarissa to be “such an unfaked narrative of emotion” (101; my emphasis) that she is convinced that it is Joe who is at fault. However, despite Joe’s attempt to reconcile the two narratives, they soon diverge. Trying on Clarissa’s attributions does not work for Joe for long. In the next passage, written by Joe but focalized through Clarissa, the note of skepticism is unmistakable: “She thinks she understands Parry well enough. A lonely inadequate man, a Jesus freak who is probably living off his parents, and dying to connect with someone, anyone, even Joe” (81). She has constructed a detailed life story for Jed that is fairly accurate, but what she leaves out is his potential for violence.

Joe’s awareness of Clarissa’s ambivalence about Jed’s madness is well caught in this passage: “She seemed to agree with me that he was mad and that I was right to feel harassed. ‘Seemed’ because she was not quite wholehearted, and if she said I was right—and I thought she did—she never really acknowledged that she had been wrong. I sensed she was keeping her options open, though she denied it when I asked her” (100). The reliable mind reading on which any successful intermental unit is based is under threat here. It has become dangerously intermittent. Joe knows that something is not quite right, but he is simply not sure of the extent to which Clarissa’s views on Jed diverge from his own. In particular, he is not sure what Clarissa’s “options” might be. Perhaps the divergence with the greatest impact on their relationship is Clarissa’s insistence on holding Joe responsible, at least in part, for Jed’s obsession. Joe thinks that Clarissa is fooled by Jed’s “artful technique of suggesting a past, a pact, a collusion, a secret life of glances and gestures” (100). In other words, Jed has constructed a (nonexistent) narrative that Clarissa finds plausible. Multiple levels of theory of mind
result: Joe thinks that Clarissa believes that Jed knows that Joe loves him too. In a key statement in her letter near the end of the novel, Clarissa writes to Joe, “I accept that Parry is mad in ways I could never have guessed at. All the same, I can understand how he might have formed the impression that you were leading him on” (218). This is in part because “You went your own way, you denied him everything, and that allowed his fantasies, and ultimately his hatred, to flourish” (218). These first-person views show that Joe was right all along to think that Clarissa had strong reservations about his handling of the affair. Both these statements put a good deal of the blame for the harm caused by Jed’s actions on Joe. What is noticeable about them is how intolerant they are of Joe’s perceived shortcomings. Clarissa certainly cuts Joe no slack whatsoever. I will come back to this point later.

As a result of these intramental divergences, the unit is put under great pressure. The two individuals start to separate. They both acknowledge that it is Jed who has caused the divide. Joe says of the period before he invaded their lives, “Now I could not quite imagine a route back into that innocence” (127). Understandably, he is reluctant to talk to Clarissa about Jed: “Another reason for not talking now of our problem was that we would be bound to let Parry into our bedroom” (145). Clarissa also knows that they are drifting apart: “She remembers too that they love each other and happen to be in very different mental universes now, with very different needs” (82). However, intermentality is still a factor in their relationship. During their row, she realizes that, despite her best efforts, “She has let herself be drawn into Joe’s mental state, his problems, his dilemmas, his needs” (85). Nevertheless, Joe refers to “the fine crack of estrangement that had appeared between Clarissa and me” (99). Their attributions of states of mind to each other become judgmental and confrontational. In Joe’s words, “We were hardly at war, but everything between us was stalled . . . To her I was manic, perversely obsessed, and, worst of all, the thieving invader of her private space. As far as I was concerned she was disloyal, unsupportive in this time of crisis, and irrationally suspicious” (139).

Any attempts at communication are inconclusive because they have less knowledge of the other’s mind than they used to: Joe “felt that we had been denied a conclusion . . . I thought that there remained between us an unarticulated dispute, though I wasn’t certain what it was” (101). Joe’s illicit and totally unjustified reading of Clarissa’s letters seems to her to be “a statement, a message, from you to me, it’s a signal. The trouble is, I don’t know what it means” (132). Clarissa tells Joe that a “stranger invaded our lives, and the first thing that happened was that you became a stranger to me” (218). However, it is noticeable from these statements that some vestigial traces of intermental thought remain, even though the gaps between them
widen. They know what they do not know. In Donald Rumsfeld’s phrase, these are known unknowns. What would be even worse, I suppose, would be unknown unknowns: not knowing that they do not know what the other is thinking, and assuming that everything is still fine when it is not. Given these pressures, it is inevitable that, toward the end, they drift apart. Joe refers to the “speed with which this mate, this familiar, was transforming herself into a separate person” (221). He talks slightingly of her letter: “I disliked its wounded, self-righteous tone, its clammy emotional logic, its knowingness that hid behind a highly selective memory” (222). As far as both of them are concerned, “The matter of our differences was unbroachable” (223). (However, as stated in a brief aside in the academic paper, they are eventually reconciled and adopt children.)

A powerful irony operating in the novel is the fact that, when the perfectly sane Joe is faced by the mad Jed, both Clarissa and even Joe himself develop doubts about Joe’s own sanity. At one point Joe feels like a “mental patient at the end of visiting hours. Don’t leave me here with my mind, I thought” (58). Clarissa feeds these fears. In the chapter in which Joe speculates about what Clarissa thinks about how his mind is working, he writes (from her point of view): “The trouble with Joe’s precise and careful mind is that it takes no account of its own emotional field. He seems unaware that his arguments are no more than ravings, they are an aberration and they have a cause” (83; my emphasis). Clarissa is wondering hard about Joe’s mental health: “Perhaps Parry, or the Parry as described by Joe, does not exist.” During their row, she says, “You were so intense about him as soon as you met him. It’s like you invented him” (86). “You ought to be asking yourself which way this fixation runs” (86). During another exchange, she exclaims, “I’m talking about your mind.” When Joe replies, “There’s nothing wrong with my mind,” she responds, “Don’t you realise you’ve got a problem” (148). Joe decides that “Now it was settled in her mind I was unhinged” (150). “Clarissa thought that her emotions were the appropriate guide, that she could feel her way to the truth, when what was needed was information, foresight and careful calculation. It was therefore natural, though disastrous for us both, that she should think I was mad” (150). That “therefore” is surely a stretch. Why should Clarissa relying on her emotions and feeling her way to the truth necessarily cause her to think that he is mad?

His alleged mania is linked to his growing sense of loneliness. Because the intermental unit has been broken and Clarissa has doubts about Joe’s sanity, he is alone: “We continued to live side by side, but I knew that I was on my own” (149). “Clarissa thought I was mad, the police thought I was a fool, and one thing was clear: the task of getting us back to where we were was going to be mine alone” (161). “I was on my own” (175). “I felt my iso-
lation and vulnerability” (177). This isolation is self-reinforcing. The more alone he feels, the more Clarissa feels it too: “Your being right is not a simple matter . . . Shoulder to shoulder? You went it alone, Joe” (216). “You were manic, and driven, and very lonely” (217). These discussions about Joe’s sanity and the emphasis on his aloneness will reinforce any doubts about the reliability of Joe’s narration.

*Enduring Love* is an instructive lesson in the aspectuality of narrative and of life generally. It turns out that Joe was right all along to think that Jed was a dangerous madman and that Clarissa was wrong not to take Joe’s views seriously. He was a reliable narrator. Clarissa does not know at the time that Joe is right. Fair enough—we all make mistakes. But for me, the issue is not Clarissa being wrong. It is whether she should believe in Joe more at the time and trust in him more than she does. From her aspectual view of the storyworld, what she undeniably does know is that they have a loving, trusting relationship and that he is intelligent and reliable. So why does she not believe him? Why does she not accept his narrative and, instead, create one of her own? Why does she not accept his attributions to Jed and replace them with hers? What evidence (what T. S. Eliot called the “objective correlate”) is there that this character, Clarissa, would behave in this way? What would justify such a breach of faith by such an intelligent person within such a trusting relationship? How likely is it that this character, Clarissa, would think that this character, Joe, would wish to lead Jed on or even make it all up? How likely is it that she would be so unyieldingly critical of him? Why did she not make allowances for the fact that he is being stalked by a madman? Putting the question even more tendentiously: Is Clarissa’s why-didn’t-you-just-invite-this-homicidal-maniac-in-for-a-cup-of-tea? strategy meant to sound as utterly stupid, inadequate, and pathetic as it does to me?

This discussion of Clarissa’s behavior, and in particular the talk of evidence for the workings of characters’ minds, raises interesting questions about characterization. The evidence that I have been discussing comprises the data that readers slot into the cognitive characterization frame that they create for the Clarissa character. My frame is as follows: a highly intelligent, sensitive, self-aware, and conscientious person who loves her partner, tries hard to behave well, and has a considerable degree of insight into herself, other people, and the mechanics of relationships generally. So, can I account, within this frame, for a person who would immediately be so utterly distrustful of the man that she loves that she instantly jumps to the conclusion that he is making things up? Would not the character that I have created give him some considerable benefit of the doubt? So, what happens next? Should another frame be created? But I am not sure what that other frame would be, given that it would contain data that, to me, seems inconsistent with what is
already there. So perhaps we simply say that this is a characteristic of the text of this novel that we should simply accept. OK, people are inconsistent, they are complex. We’re not robots. But even though I know this to be true, why do I find it unsatisfying as an answer in this case?

In order to explore this question further, I will summarize Clarissa’s criticisms of Joe as follows:

1. Joe may be making it all up.
2. Joe is guilty of leading Jed on.
3. Joe does not show sufficient empathy for Jed: if Joe had invited him into the house he may not have become violent.
4. Joe cuts himself off emotionally from Clarissa and goes his own way.
5. Joe reads her letters.

The last point is easily dealt with. He is wrong to read her letters. This is something that Joe should not have done. It was a morally indefensible act. However, her lack of trust in him had begun before then. The other criticisms deserve closer examination. (1), (2), and (3) appear to be contradictory. If he is making it up, then the possibilities of leading Jed on and not dealing with him properly do not arise. (2) and (3) are equally at odds. Surely, showing more empathy and inviting him into the house would be the clearest possible case of leading him on. As for the substance of (2), Joe is certainly ambivalent about how best to deal with Jed, but whether he can then be said to be “leading him on” seems to me to be debatable. With regard to Joe going off on his own (4), this looks like a chicken-and-egg situation in which, if Clarissa had been more supportive, Joe would not have felt the need to go it alone.

It is sometimes said that the relations between men and women are made difficult by the fact that they are governed by two completely different impulses: men by shame and women by fear. The typical dynamics of arguments between men and women can, it is argued, be explained in these terms. This view might be applied to this case by suggesting that Joe feels shame at the growing closeness and intimacy of his relationship with Jed, and Clarissa feels fearful that Joe is drifting away from her and she is losing the person she loves. “It’s always been a fear that she’ll live with someone who goes crazy. That’s why she chose rational Joe” (83). In addition, there are the underlying tensions in the relationship that I referred to earlier: Joe wanting to go back into real science while Clarissa knows that he has left it too late; and Clarissa’s inability to have children. Perhaps these latent conflicts can explain Clarissa’s behavior, especially if she perceives Joe as irre-
sponsibly attempting to avoid the problems in their relationship by throwing himself into the research into Jed’s condition?

It may help at this point to focus on one particular event: Jed’s first phone call. Joe errs in not telling Clarissa about it at the time and waiting for a day or two before he mentions it. “It may have been exhaustion, or perhaps my concealment was protective of her, but I know I made my first serious mistake” (37). He also explains the delay by saying that it was because he could not cope with it at that time so soon after the balloon accident and he did not want to disrupt the intermental equilibrium that they had only just managed to recover following this accident. (“Would it have been right then . . . to intrude upon our happiness with an account of Parry’s phone call?” [53].) Let us look at this issue first in terms of empathy. (See Suzanne Keen’s *Empathy and the Novel* [2007] for an extended treatment of this topic.) If I were to put myself into Clarissa’s position, I would find Joe’s explanation satisfactory. I suppose this is because I do that sort of thing myself. I sometimes wait before I tell someone something because I need time to process it myself first. But it seems to me that this is not what empathy is: it is not me trying to imagine being *myself* in that position; it is me trying to imagine being *Clarissa* in that position. And to do that, we have to ask: What caused her to behave in the way that she did? In other words, the reader must attribute reasons, causes, motives, and intentions to her actions, bringing us back, once again, to the question of evidence. So we need to return once more to attribution theory.

Our well-researched tendency to overvalue the reasons for actions that focus on the individual (“he did that because he’s that kind of person”) and undervalue those that focus on the context (“he did that because that’s what everybody tends to do in that kind of situation”) is referred to by psychologists as the *fundamental attribution error*. Within this attributional framework, it is possible to see Joe’s decision not to report the call in situational or contextual terms. That is, “Well, anyone in his situation—tired, stressed, wanting a little respite—would have done the same.” It is equally plausible, though, to see the decision as an example of a dispositional fallibility: his need to control the narrative. The combination of Joe’s personality flaw and Clarissa’s understandable fear of loss of intimacy might form the beginnings of an ethical justification of her behavior. But is it enough to set against the contrary case? Is not her distrust a distinct overreaction both to her fear of Joe drifting away and to Joe’s apparent faults? After all, there are worse things in life than being rather controlling. In any event, how much of a control freak is Joe? Agreed, his disposition is to use narrative as a controlling device, but don’t we all? He may have an ambivalent attitude toward Jed because he is curious about the syndrome, but this hardly seems to me to amount to an illegitimate exercise in power and control. And the careful and
respectful attention that he pays to Clarissa’s initial views on Jed is anything but controlling.

At this point I have to confess that, when I read this novel for the first time, and again when I was studying it for the purpose of writing this chapter, I found myself getting angry with Clarissa. This is shaming to admit, but true nevertheless. I thought to myself, How dare she distrust and undermine Joe and leave him, a man alone, to face this homicidal maniac! Why was she not by his side? (My reaction, as you can see, had a rather “High Noon” flavor.) On the other hand, I have been equally conscious of a parallel, contradictory response: this is to doubt that Clarissa’s behavior is sufficiently motivated by McEwan the novelist. I have discussed some of the possible reasons for her behavior—her fear of losing the man she loves, her concern over Joe’s desire to be a serious scientist, her pain at not being able to have children with Joe. Nevertheless, I personally am not convinced by them. For me, they do not fully explain her behavior cognitively (as well as not justifying it ethically). These instabilities do not seem to me to constitute sufficient causes for the dramatic widening of the hairline cracks in their relationship under the impact of Jed’s madness. And, in particular, I simply do not see what evidence Clarissa has for thinking that it may be Joe who is the madman. So, if I cannot find the evidence to explain or justify Clarissa’s behavior, then it seems to me that the choices are these:

- I am an incompetent reader;
- McEwan is an incompetent author; or
- Clarissa is an unethical character.

In other words, the evidence is in the text but I cannot see it, so I am incompetent. Or the evidence is not there and this lack is unintended. This is therefore an aesthetic fault in McEwan the novelist and so he is incompetent. Or the evidence is not there, this is intended, and it therefore shows that Clarissa behaves in an unethical way. She is unjustified in behaving as she does. The question to ask can be simply put: Does Joe do enough wrong? On balance, I would say: no. A more nuanced question is this one: Does McEwan miscalculate in trying to set up a context within which Clarissa’s mistrust of Joe can be understood and even forgiven? I would say: yes.

I wish to end this discussion with a tentative speculation that will take what is already a wide-ranging discussion into the area of gender studies. It is that I suspect that there may be a gender divide in readers over Clarissa’s behavior. That is, I suspect that women readers may tend to sympathize with Clarissa’s concern over what she perceives to be Joe’s erratic behavior and her fear of losing him, while men may be more likely to identify with Joe and his anger at what he perceives to be Clarissa’s disloyalty. The aspectual view
of the novel’s storyworld adopted by most women readers may have more in common with Clarissa’s perspective than Joe’s, and vice versa for male readers. This hypothesis might benefit from some empirical investigation.

SOCIAL MINDS IN OTHER MEDIA

Narratology studies the nature, form, and functioning of all narratives irrespective of their mode or medium of representation. Indeed, many narratological concepts are particularly suited to multimodal analysis (Ryan 2004). As is well known, the story of Cinderella can be told in any number of different discourses or media (a short story, a film, a play, a ballet, a cartoon) and still remain the same story. In considering whether the study of social minds is applicable to narratives in other media, I conclude that it is surprisingly adaptable and is just as revealing about fictional minds across a range of media as it is about written texts. I say that the approach is surprisingly adaptable because it was built specifically for written narratives and, before I undertook this exercise, I expected it to be geared far more specifically to novels than in fact it is. In particular, I think that the sort of approach to narrative outlined in this book is well suited to graphic novels and related narrative forms. In his article “Presenting Minds in Graphic Narratives” (2008), Kai Mikkonen argues that the medium of graphic novels “stimulates the viewer’s engagement with the minds of characters by recourse to a wide range of verbal modes of narration in a dynamic relation with images that show minds in action” (2008, 302). Mikkonen is extremely successful in exploring the nature of that relation. In addition, it strikes me that a social-minds perspective would work really well in film studies. I will now briefly indicate what such a study might look like by commenting on two scenes in The Godfather Part I and a scene from The Usual Suspects.

In The Godfather Part I, Sollozzo, “the Turk,” while putting a business proposition to Don Corleone and his associates, mentions that the rival Tattaglia family will be able to guarantee security. The Don’s son, Sonny, starts to object to the implicit slight to the Corleone family, but the Don stops him with a motion of his hand. (After the meeting, the Don tells him, don’t ever again tell anyone outside the family what you’re thinking.) Following the gesture, there are three split-second close-ups showing the reactions of Sollozzo and two others, Tom Hagen and Clemenza. These lightning-quick shots show in an instant that all three understand perfectly what has just happened: the insiders Hagen and Clemenza know that the outsider Sollozzo knows that Sonny has been humiliated and shown to be an unreliable hothead who is unsuitable to become the eventual head of the family, and
that the Don has been forced to acknowledge this weakness publicly; Hagen and Clemenza are embarrassed by their knowledge; Sollozzo is wondering what use he can make of such knowledge, and so on. And the viewer learns about this substantial amount of mental functioning from a section of the film that lasts about a second.

Later in the same film, another son, Michael, is standing at the entrance to the deserted hospital where his seriously ill father is recovering from an assassination attempt. Michael is with a young baker who happened to be visiting at the same time. Although both are unarmed, they successfully pretend to be gunmen and so the car containing the men who have come to kill the Don drives past. Once the crisis is over, the baker is unable to light his cigarette because his hand is shaking so violently. Michael lights the cigarette with a perfectly steady hand and then pauses for a second, looking with surprise and interest at the steadiness of his hand. The self-attributitional process in this case involves the sort of external physical evidence relating to body language that is usually thought to be characteristic of third-person attribution. Michael is taking the advice offered by the psychologist Timothy Wilson in chapter 2 and is deducing the nature of his hidden mind by looking outward at his behavior. He has just discovered something about himself from observing his own body, and this discovery is of great teleological importance to the narrative (he knows now that he has the courage to become the leader of the family). And again, the shot lasts little more than a second.

My other film example is included here in order to illustrate how postmodern and unnatural narratives can complicate, disrupt, and subvert the creation and maintenance of social minds in a fictional storyworld. In the famous climax to The Usual Suspects it is revealed that the confession being given in a police station by Verbal Kint, an apparent loser, was untrue in many respects and that he is, in fact, the master criminal Keyser Söze. His interrogator discovers this by seeing that many of the details of Verbal’s story were taken from the office notice board. As much of the film consists of flashbacks illustrating Verbal’s story, viewers find themselves in a similar position to readers of Atonement. As an apparently authoritative world-creating narrative has been revealed to be unreliable, how then do we know what really happened?

Let us approach the question systematically. Some of the film is authoritative because it is independent of Verbal’s narrative, in particular the investigation into the shootout on the ship. Of the content of his story, some of the detail is unimportant—his singing in a barbershop quartet and going to Guatemala. Of the rest, two of the characters in the story are revealed to have made-up names inspired by objects in the police station: Kobayashi and Redfoot. Interestingly, though, we see “Kobayashi” drive Verbal/Söze away
from the police station, so, even though his name cannot be “Kobayashi,” we do at least know that he exists within the whole film storyworld. But what about Redfoot? Does this character exist at all in the film storyworld? Are the scenes that feature him pure fantasy? Or does he exist under another name? We do not know. Also, the gang, the usual suspects of the title, must exist in the storyworld because the police investigators refer to them. But we do not know about the conversations between them that Verbal describes, or about the power relations between them. Most importantly, was Keaton really the leader of the gang, as Verbal portrays him? So, the fictional minds presented in the film have been radically destabilized. We do not know whether some of these minds existed at all (Redfoot), and we do not know whether others operated in the way that the film shows (Keaton). Oddly, these ontological and epistemological uncertainties tend to be forgotten when, for example, Keaton’s characterization is being discussed by film critics. Can we say with any certainty where Keaton’s identity is situated, when nearly all of what we know about him is told to us by a proven liar? For the same reason, we cannot know the extent to which the gang of usual suspects ever became a social mind.

Another area in which I believe this sort of cognitive analysis would have rewarding results is in the study of narratives about real minds: history, biography, and autobiography. Once you are alerted to the internalist/externalist divide, surprisingly explicit references to it crop up in the most unexpected places. The British politician Leo Amery said of the prime ministers David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill: “LG was purely external and receptive, the result of intercourse with his fellow men, and non-existent in their absence, while Winston is literary and expressive of himself with hardly any contact with other minds” (Times Literary Supplement, page 14, 25 September 2009). It is significant that the so-called group biography is currently becoming fashionable. These books are based on the premise that it can be at least as informative to write biographies of groups as of individuals. The author Richard Holmes made his name by writing conventional biographies of Shelley and Coleridge, but his book The Age of Wonder (2008), which won the 2009 Samuel Johnson Prize, is a group biography that examines the life and work both of the scientists of the Romantic age who laid the foundations of modern science and of the Romantic poets who responded to the new science.

My final example of internalist and externalist perspectives in media or genres other than fiction is pure self-indulgence. It is simply an excuse to refer to my first love: American popular music such as blues, jazz, country and western, soul, and gospel music. Consider the highly contrasting worldviews of two famous country gospel songs. First, the opening verse of a beau-
tiful song made famous by the Carter Family called “Lonesome Valley”:

You’ve got to walk that lonesome valley  
You’ve got to walk it by yourself  
Ain’t nobody here can walk it for you  
You’ve got to walk it by yourself

This is internalism taken to a chillingly Beckettian conclusion. By contrast, enjoy the thrillingly externalist chorus of an equally wonderful, and rather more typical, gospel song called “Farther Along”:

Farther along we’ll know all about it  
Farther along we’ll understand why  
Cheer up my brother and walk in the sunshine  
We’ll understand it all by and by

CONCLUSION

In his foreword to a book titled *The Shared Mind: Perspectives on Intersubjectivity* (2008), from which the motto for this chapter was taken, Colwyn Trevarthen asserts that “human life and culture is incomprehensible without intersubjective processes” (2008, vii). His conclusion is that “We need a science of the imaginative fictions persons so easily share” (2008, vii). Trevarthen is actually talking about the real-mind sciences. To take his reference to “fictions” more literally, it could be argued that we already have a “science of imaginative fiction”: it is called narratology. The purpose of this book has been to attempt to add the last four words of his statement to the existing science.

When a phenomenon is identified that does not fit within a well-established paradigm, an anomaly is created. And, as Thomas Kuhn explained in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*:

Discovery commences with the awareness of anomaly, that is, with the recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced expectations that govern normal science. It then continues with a more or less extended exploration of the area of anomaly. And it closes only when the paradigm theory has been adjusted so that the anomalous has become the expected. (1996, 52–53)

The widespread and pervasive existence of fictional social minds and inter-
mental thought constitutes an anomaly within the traditional narratological paradigm for the presentation of consciousness in the novel. The proof is the invisibility of intermental thought within the current theory. However, following a more or less extended exploration of this area and of all of the other aspects of the whole of the social mind in action, the paradigm theory can be adjusted to take full account of their importance. Social minds in the novel will then be anomalous no longer; they will be expected.