Introduction


3. “The problems which had dominated the critique of capitalism before the war, and which the Golden Age [from World War II to 1973, not the beginnings but the apogee of Fordism] had largely eliminated for a generation—‘poverty, mass unemployment, squalor, instability’—reappeared after 1973. Growth was, once again, interrupted by severe slumps, as distinct from ‘minor recessions,’ in 1974–75, 1980–82, and at the end of the 1980s.” Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes (New York: Vintage, 1996), 406. Meanwhile, the financial crisis that began in 2007 with the massive default on subprime mortgages, threatening a genuinely global collapse of banking with the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, certainly has appeared, despite state-funded rescue packages, to leave the world’s political and business elites without a clue as to how to avert a truly global crisis of unprecedented severity. This has, to say the least, made the real contradictions of globalization far more difficult to conceal. Indeed, as this crisis has unfolded, the slogans and official truths of neoliberalism, globalization chief among them, became, at one point almost overnight, the targets of officially sanctioned skepticism and anger. One must be extremely cautious, even and especially when day-to-day events appear to warrant them, not to deliver eulogies that may turn out to be premature. Nor must one lose sight of the fact that, in the view of many economists, not all of them on the left, the crisis at one point dubbed The Great Recession has its roots in the breakup of Fordism more than a generation ago, and in the transition to the finance-driven economy that itself gave us neoliberalism and ushered in what passes for the heroic age of globalization. The point, for purposes of the present work, is to analyze—with an eye to critique—cultural and intellectual phenomena beginning in the 1980s, in which globalization, as measured against the needs of shoring up Americanism, has exerted the latent force
of a crisis all along. What is certain about the chain of events beginning in 2007 is, in a sense, how powerfully they corroborate the “globalization anxiety” of dislocalism. The utopian universalism heralded by the neoliberal prophets of globalization beginning nearly three decades ago certainly now reveals more of its sinister and dystopian side than most could then have imagined. Globalization itself, it seems, has run the risk of becoming a casualty of its own master-narrative: has not it too appeared to be threatened with obsolescence?


6. I should also mention here that my work differs from scholarship on globalization that attempts a critical understanding of globalization as a process and that nevertheless regards that process as a fait accompli and then proceeds to map its effects on culture and its other quotidian realities. Here I have in mind especially work by critics such as Mike Featherstone, though many others could be mentioned. See, for example, John Tomlinson, Globalization and Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999) and Cultural Imperialism: An Introduction (London: Continuum, 2001); and Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Globalization and Culture: Global Melange (Lanham, MD: Rowman Littlefield, 2009).

7. Not least—if not only—because of the hyperabstraction and strangely neutralizing physicalism of the term “globalization” itself. As Justin Rosenberg writes: “The word ‘globalization’ is a geographical term, denoting a process over time of spatial change—the process of becoming worldwide. Twist and turn this word as you will, space, time and a reference to the shape of the planet are its only intrinsic concerns. Prima facie, it contains nothing else which can be drawn upon in order to explain any real-world phenomena it is used to describe.” “Globalization Theory: A Post Mortem,” International Politics 42 (2005): 11.

8. Studies of globalization have come to house discussions of contemporary politics, economics, culture, finance, technology, and so forth, with an increased emphasis on the “corporatization” of institutions. The term “global” thus comes to describe those institutions and institutional practices—such as global corporations—that stretch beyond the limits of a bounded national space. The term “transnational” functions in a similar way. “Global” is also sometimes used interchangeably with the term “cosmopolitan,” especially when qualifying groups of people. In “The Vanguard of Globalization,” James Hunter and Joshua Yates describe as “cosmopolitan” those elites that “travel the world . . . and see themselves as ‘global citizens’ who happen to carry an American passport” rather than as “U.S. citizens who happen to work in a global organization” (355–56). Timothy Brennan explains that in “marked contrast to the past, the term [“cosmopolitan”] has become less an analytical category than a normative projection complementing at once celebratory claims and despairing rec-
ognitions: the death of the nation-state, transculturation (rather than a merely one-sided assimilation), cultural hybridity (rather than a simplistic contrast between the foreign and the indigenous)” (At Home in the World, 2). Another closely related term is “glocal.” Used in different contexts, it generally refers to the way that local places are affected by global policies. Thus, cultural studies of local communities become a way of measuring how the global influences them. In “Glocal Knowledges: Agency and Place in Literary Studies” Robert Eric Livingston writes that understanding the “scenarios of globalization . . . requires resisting the impulse to set global and local into immediate opposition. Their intertwining may be more helpfully understood by what Japanese marketing consultants have termed dochakula, “glocalization” (148). Livingston argues that as opposed to the terms global and local, glocal emphasizes “constant, often conflictual, working and reworking of practices” (149).

9. Think here, for example, of the incorporation of the former Soviet bloc into a globalized, “free-market” economy, and the resulting collapse, especially in the Balkans, into civil war, “ethnic cleansing,” and the formation of microstates.


14. Questions such as who and what “Americans” and “America” are have never been simple. Benedict Anderson, in Imagined Communities (1983), has already shown the problems in designating the U.S. as “America.” Anderson argues that the geographical closeness between the centers of the original thirteen colonies, along with their tight-knit connections via print and commerce, allowed the U.S. to establish a version of nationalism different from that of South America. This also helped the U.S. to “eventually [succeed] in appropriating the title of ‘Americans’” (64). Anderson further shows that despite the tight connections between the centers, the “non-absorption” of Canada along with the “rapid expansion of the western frontier” serve as reminders that nationalism in the U.S., or what can be termed the project of “Americanization,” was never completed (64).

15. Yet, as David Harvey has noted, the U.S. “would not have been able to impose the forms of globalization that have come down to us without abundant support from a wide variety of quarters and places.” He nevertheless maintains that “globalization is undoubtedly the outcome of a geopolitical crusade waged largely by the U.S.” Spaces of Hope, 69, 68.


17. See, for example, Bauman’s Liquid Modernity (London: Polity, 2000).

19. This seemingly *sui generis* anxiety of obsolescence clearly has its extrinsic, fully objective basis, given the ways administrative budget cuts and restructuring have increasingly shifted priorities toward nonhumanistic disciplines such as business and the sciences. So, for example, in the words of Grant Farred, “the susceptibility [of the humanities] to corporatization includes . . . not only the ‘streamlining’ or ‘upgrading’ of academic or bureaucratic functions in the university but the ‘restructuring of academic curricula’ themselves.” Here of course such restructuring is, rightly, regarded as something that the humanities must resist.


21. See here again the previously cited work by American studies critics such as Rowe, Kaplan, and Pease.

22. Brazil, Russia, India, and China.

23. The title of Kaplan’s widely read 1994 *Atlantic Monthly* article (and, subsequently, a book of essays), which became a manifesto of sorts for neoconservatives such as Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama.


Chapter 1

1. Accounts of globalization, whether subscribed to by university administrations or by the humanities themselves, essentially function as narratives of obsolescence. In the Introduction, I have cited Evan Watkins, who in his *Throwaways* (1993) explains how the concept of the “obsolete” is itself the necessary creation of the discourse of the “new.” The rhetoric of obsolescence suggests that entire institutions can be rendered ineffective if they do not produce work useful in the context of globalization.


3. At the same time, it is also important to note here that this inverse mirroring of business and the humanities is an uneven one. While, spurred on by globalization, management theorists are turning to scholarship by critics such as Jameson, Derrida, and Lyotard, we have yet to see major literary and cultural theorists taking a serious interest in management theory *qua* theory. And as literary/cultural theorists engage with issues of economics and business, their work essentially retains a focus on culture and the cultural.

4. Though Tom Peters has some detractors in management circles, his ideas have influence and are in perfect congruity with the ways that organization studies and
management theory in general has seen a turn to issues of culture and postmodernism.

5. This comment appears in Tom Peters’s biography on his website and in virtually every biographical blurb publicizing his books and speaking engagements. http://www.tompeters.com/toms_world/press_kit/who_is.php.


10. Here, of course, I can only touch on a question too complex and wide-ranging for me to do full justice to in this space. See, foremost in this respect, the well-known arguments concerning globalization, capital, and space in the works of David Harvey, especially The Limits to Capital (1982/2006); The Condition of Postmodernity (1989); Spaces of Capital: Towards a Critical Geography (2001); and A Brief History of Neoliberalism (2005). See also, for an analysis that, although its terminology is not mine here, closely parallels and argues in much greater detail for the theory sketched out above, Bob Jessop’s “What Follows Neo-liberalism? The Deepening Contradictions of US Domination and the Struggle for a New Global Order,” chapter 4 in Political Economy and Global Capitalism: The 21st Century, Present and Future, ed. Robert Albritton, Bob Jessop, and Richard Westra (London: Anthem Press, 2007). See especially the section of this chapter entitled “The Ecological Dominance of Capitalism vis-à-vis World Society,” where Jessop writes as follows: “one could argue that the ecological dominance of capitalism is closely related to the extent to which its internal competition, internal complexity and loose coupling, capacity for reflexive self-organization, scope for time-space distanciation and compression, externalization of problems, and hegemonic capacities can be freed from confinement within limited ecological spaces policed by another system (such as a political system segmented into mutually exclusive sovereign territories). This is where globalization, especially in its neo-liberal form, promotes the relative ecological dominance of the capitalist economic system by expanding the scope for accumulation to escape such political constraints. Neo-liberalism promotes the opening of the world-market and reduces the frictions introduced by national ‘power containers’” (81). See also, for a fuller elaboration of this theoretical argument, Jessop’s The Future of the Capitalist State (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002.) On a more general plane see also Zygmunt Bauman’s many writings on globalization, including Globalization: The Human Consequences (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), especially chapter 3, “After the Nation-State—What?” (55–76), in which he develops the theoretical distinction between universalization and globalization, given what he terms the “extraterritoriality of capital.” “The very distinction between the internal and global market, or more generally between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ of the state,” writes Bauman, “is exceedingly difficult to maintain in any but
the most narrow, ‘territory and population policing’ sense” (65). He continues: “Due to the unqualified and unstoppable spread of free trade rules, above all the free movement of capital and finances, the ‘economy’ is progressively exempt from political control . . .” (66).

11. “Thus, while capital must on one side strive to tear down every spatial barrier to intercourse, i.e., to exchange, and conquer the whole earth, it strives on the other side to annihilate this space with time, i.e., to reduce to a minimum the time spent in motion from one place to another. The more developed the capital, therefore, the more extensive the market over which it circulates, which forms the spatial orbit of its circulation, the more does its strive simultaneously for an even greater extension of the market and for greater annihilation of space by time.” Grundrisse, 539

12. This was noted as long ago as the 1940s by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer in The Dialectic of Enlightenment.


14. Boston College School of Management offers a PhD degree in Organization Studies. See http://www.bc.edu/schools/csom/graduate/phdprograms/phdos.html.

15. Note that a desire for a simpler version of culture is also a theme in cultural anthropological writings. Take for example, Claude Lévi-Strauss (Tristes Tropiques, 1955), Ruth Benedict (Patterns of Culture, 1934), and Mary Douglass (Purity and Danger: An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo, 1966), all of whom studied non-Western groups of people in order to produce simpler, more diagrammatic patterns of culture. Their assumption was that Western societies were too complex to study and studying non-Western societies would be helpful in producing simpler patterns of culture. For a good analysis of the notion of culture for anthropologists, see Susan Hegeman’s Patterns for America, 1999. Business theorists have routinely borrowed anthropological notions of culture for their own purposes.

16. See, for example, the edited volume International Management and International Relations: A Critical Perspective from Latin America, ed. Ana Guedes and Alex Faria (New York: Routledge, 2010).


18. The course’s original creator is Robert Coles, a psychiatrist who was a long-time professor for both the Harvard Law and Business schools. He published an edited volume with coeditor Albert LaFarge in 2008 titled Minding the Store: Great Writing about Business from Tolstoy to Now (New York: The New Press).

19. Other examples of such management courses include “Managerial Ethics: Lessons from Literature and Film,” listed in the catalogue at NYU’s Stern School of Business. In the spring of 2006 this course required the students to read, inter alia, Sinclair Lewis’s If I Were Boss: The Early Business Stories and Shakespeare’s Henry
Virginia Wesleyan College lists a course in its business catalog titled “Management in Literature,” featuring a typical reading list that includes management standards such as Conrad’s Heart of Darkness and Henry IV, along with the Autobiography of Malcolm X and writings by Mahatma Gandhi.

20. For example, the journal Management Decision recently published an article—Islam Gazi and Michael J. Zyphur’s “The Sweetest Dreams That Labor Knows: Robert Frost and the Poetics of Work”—that analyzes Frost’s poetry in order to understand how work can be a “personally liberating but also [a] culturally stifling” tool. “The relation of poetic knowing to more mainstream forms of theoretical knowledge,” the writers argue, “is particularly poignant in the field of Management, where one of the greatest criticisms of organizational theories is that they do not resound with the everyday lived experiences of managers.” Gazi and Zyphur further posit that “because of the emphasis in poetic works on understanding as it appears from within a person’s own experience, the study of poetry is one way to integrate [management] theory with experience” (4–5).


22. See also, on the subject of fictional or “fictitious” capital, David Harvey’s The Limits to Capital, especially chapter 9. Here Harvey defines fictitious capital as the “money that is thrown into circulation as capital without any material basis in commodities or productive activity” (93). See also Harvey’s discussion of the category at numerous points in The Condition of Postmodernity (1989) and in “The Geopolitics of Capitalism,” in Spaces of Capital: Toward a Critical Geography (2001).

23. Here they draw upon the entry on fiction, written by D. Davies, for the 2001 edition of the Routledge Companion to Aesthetics.


25. See, for example, Peters, flamboyant and unabashed as always, in Re-Imagine: “Brits ruled the world, from a wee island, for hundreds of years. While I, an old Navy guy, admire the Royal Navy, I more admire the entrepreneurial British Trading Companies . . . that made it all possible . . . [and] funded the Royal Navy” (1). Heeding lessons learned from the old British Empire, American managers can build the “virtual” and “flexible” organizations that will deliver the world back to the U.S—a nostalgic replay of the days of Churchill and Roosevelt: “The Yanks tipped the balance in WWII . . . Greatest Weapons Producers . . . via the Greatest Economy? Yup” (ibid.).

26. This essay, published in the Handbook of Globalization, Governance, and Public Administration (ed. Ali Farazmand and Jack Pinkowski), is typical in the way that it attempts to take stock of the issues affecting development management. Jennifer Brinkerhoff is a faculty member at the Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington University. Derick Brinkerhoff is a researcher at RTI International, a corporate research organization located in the Research Triangle in North Carolina.


29. This motif of an automatic American self-distancing in relation to European colonialism is an old theme in American literature. See, for example, Herman Melville’s *Typee* and Mark Twain’s *Innocents Abroad*. Mary Louise Pratt, writing in *Imperial Eyes*, analyzes this gesture at length, observing the general tendency of travel writers to represent themselves as innocent of colonialism even as they are complicit with it. I will comment more on this aspect of travel writing in the third chapter.


Chapter 2

1. Janice Radway, in her 1998 Presidential Address to the American Studies Association, proposed changing the name of the Association and possibly dropping the term “American.” While in the 1950 and 1960s critics such as Henry Nash Smith and Warren Sussman sought to give the interdisciplinary formation of American studies spanning the diverse disciplines of history, English, sociology, and anthropology a loose unity via the term American, scholars today are working hard to decenter the very term while attempting to maintain some semblance of a unitary field.


4. This strategy is a broader phenomenon in the field of literary studies. In a very different spirit from that of Arac, who is attempting to work out the issues relating to globalization by displacing Americanist paradigms, Marjorie Perloff’s 2006 MLA Presidential Address makes a case for a return to aesthetics and the “merely literary,” advocating single-author studies by positioning Samuel Beckett as a global writer because his work is globally read and celebrated. A further example of the attempt
to globalize nationalist paradigms can be found in Stephen Greenblatt’s essay “Racial Memory and Literary History,” published in the January 2001 special issue of the *PMLA* titled “Globalizing Literary Studies.” Greenblatt makes an argument similar to Perloff’s for Shakespeare as “always already” a global writer: “Shakespeare may never have left England, yet his work is already global in its representational range” (59). Arguing what is superficially true, namely, that Shakespeare’s works are *read* globally, Greenblatt both makes room for the “global” and yet leaves the author’s centrality in the canon intact.

5. For a lengthier discussion of this issue see Walter Benn Michael’s *Our America* and Werner Sollers’s *Beyond Ethnicity.*


7. Inderpal Grewal has discussed this question at length in *Transnational America.*

8. Critics such as Immanuel Wallerstein and David Harvey have shown that, abstractly and formally speaking, the existence of economic interconnections between the various parts of the world is hardly anything new. Nevertheless, the present, globalized stage of capitalism does represent a qualitative change. Globalization entails the direct, immediate reproduction of capitalist relation of production on the level of the global, rather than, in composite fashion, on the level of the nation, as a “functional economic space.”

9. See, for example, the work of E. San Juan Jr., Michael Omi, Howard Winant, and Paul Smith in Gordon Avery and Christopher Newfield’s *Mapping Multiculturalism.*

10. Critiques of identity such as Lowe’s have shown the problems that arise when positioning the categories of identity—easily appropriated by capital—as though they were themselves outside and critical of the dominant social relations. Such critiques distinguish between identity as a politics of recognition and representation and other ways of analyzing identity.

11. See, for example, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s *Empire* and a critical review of the book by Timothy Brennan, “Empire’s New Clothes” published in *Critical Inquiry.*

12. A somewhat more nuanced version of this argument can be found in Stephen Greenblatt’s essay “Racial Memory and Literary History,” which I reference above.

13. One could add to this list the work of scholars whose work, now widely read within literary and cultural studies, reflects an even more immediate, activist engagement with the contemporary problems of globalization. See, *inter alia*, works such as Mike Davis’s *Planet of Slums*; Andrew Ross’s *Fast Boat to China* and *Low Pay, High Profile*; and Grace Chang’s *Disposable Domestics.*
14. Take, as only one further example of this, the 2005 volume *Writing the World: On Globalization*, ed. David Rothenberg and Wandee J. Pryor, featuring contributions from writers such as Naomi Klein, Arundhati Roy, and Frederick Buell. In the Introduction, “The World as We Found It,” the editors define the task of the book as the attempt to capture the world as it has changed with the onset of globalization. It claims to bracket off what it sees as familiar tales of exploitation and oppression, backed up by statistics or data, in favor of showing “how all of our lives are interconnected”—as though the real truth of globalization were hidden somewhere even beyond its immediately measurable or theorizable realities as typically understood (xiv). Much of the work in the book is in effect aimed at uncovering this hidden reality. Roy’s piece, “Ladies Have Feelings, So . . . Shall We Leave It to the Experts?,” argues that it is the elites that tend to buy into the “expert viewpoint” sympathetic to globalization projects such as dam building in India, while ignoring the reality of those adversely affected by such projects. This is, of course, perfectly true and politically crucial, but it implies that the deeper reality of those marginalized or disadvantaged by globalization resides beyond the reach of “experts,” and hence, perhaps, also of intellectuals and of theory themselves. Roy herself is an interesting figure in this respect, as she became famous as a result of her novel *The God of Small Things* but since then has primarily dedicated herself to writing in nonfictional genres.


17. I will elaborate on this matter later in the sections devoted to the criticism on Alvarez and Abu-Jaber.

18. One of many examples of this trend is the caption on the back cover of Jessica Hagedorn’s *Dogeaters* (1990), which states: “Welcome to Manila in the turbulent period of the Philippines’s late dictator. It is a world in which American pop culture and local Filipina tradition mix flamboyantly, and gossip, storytelling, and extravagant behavior thrive.”

19. It is, Beverley claims, not any factual inaccuracy but “the Big Lie of racism, imperialism, inequality, class rule, genocide, torture, oppression . . . that is at stake in testimonio” (*Testimonio*, 3)—thereby disavowing any connection between facts and the latter.

20. See, for example, Julie Barak’s “‘Turning and Turning in the Widening Gyre’: A Second Coming into Language in Alvarez’s *How the García Girls Lost Their Accents*”; Loes Nas’s “Border Crossings in Latina Narrative: Julia Alvarez’s *How the García Girls Lost Their Accents*”; and Jennifer Bess’s “Imploding the Miranda Complex in Julia Alvarez’s *How the García Girls Lost Their Accents*.”


22. This move on the part of both Suárez and Newton is reminiscent of the argu-
ments—discussed above—that were made in defense of Rigoberta Menchú’s renowned testimonio when she was accused of having fictionalized key parts of her story. The basic move here is to pull back from all strong claims to veracity and emphasize the constructed, that is, fiction-like, character of truth itself—even, in the case of Arturo Arias’s “Authorizing Ethnicized Subjects,” asserting the “potential inability of Westerners to grasp a subaltern testimonio” (77).

23. According to Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman’s The Washington Connection and Third World Fascism (Boston: South End Press, 1979), right-wing death squad activity during the period following the 1965 invasion, under the directly U.S.-backed Balaguer regime, well exceeded anything under Trujillo—a fact that the exceptionalizing “regime of terror” narrative would tend to obscure (243–44).

24. Other critical work on the The García Girls, such as Joan M. Hoffman’s “She Wants to Be Called Yolanda Now,” concentrates, as do many other readings of Latina texts, exclusively on how immigrant characters, in this case the Garcías, manage their lives in the United States. Hoffman writes: “All of these girls—Carla, Sandra, Yolanda and Sofía—do come to some trouble in the New World . . . As the title of the novel suggests, not only words but also the manner of speech is significant to the story of the García girls’ coming-of-age in America. The struggle to master a second language is a constant reminder to these girls of their weakened position as strangers in a new land” (21–22). Thus, on the one hand, Hoffman acknowledges that the girls suffer from a weakened position as result of being immigrants. Yet, on the other hand, she champions that same identity. The article ends with the following remark about Yolanda: “As troubled as it may be—by memory or failed love or fragmented identity or that precarious tightrope that is the immigrant’s life—Yolanda still has spirit in her, she still has her art, her writing, her refuge. With that she will always be able to invent what she needs to survive” (26). Hoffman makes a case for reading the novel almost exclusively along the lines of the U.S. rhetoric of individuality and individual immigrant spirit. She concentrates on what is most typical about immigrant struggles in the U.S. and ends with the suggestion that even though Yolanda is in a precarious position as an immigrant, she has become sufficiently Americanized to realize that she can “invent” her own life. Though Yolanda is neither Dominican nor U.S./American per se, the very fact that it is her “identity” that is foregrounded serves to keep the novel well within the horizons of a U.S. nationalist paradigm reproducing dominant ideologies.

25. This tendency to champion the tough, adaptive spirit of immigrants while defending their identity rights can be traced in socio-historical scholarship on (im)migration as well. For instance, Mary Chamberlain in her Introduction to the edited volume Caribbean Migration, a broad and instructive examination of the phenomenon of mobility from and through the Caribbean, states of the project that it “shifts the focus away from the causes of migration toward the nature and meaning of the migration experience, a shift that has radical implications for those concerned with the consequences of migration and its future.” This shift results in a form of analysis that attempts to capture what she calls the “vibrant culture of transnational and circular migration, in the home and the host countries” (10). In this shift, the focus on migrant culture can become celebratory—as signaled in the terms “vibrancy of culture.” Take here as another example Peggy Levitt’s cultural profile of Dominican (im)migrants in her book The Transnational Villagers. While the latter situates its findings within a
global economic and social context, it nevertheless exhibits a tendency to rely on the
descriptive language and metaphors of a more cosmopolitan narrative of (im)migration.
Emphasizing the continuous contact between the residents of the Dominican city
of Miraflores and Boston, she writes: “Though electricity goes off nightly for weeks at
a stretch, nearly every household has a television, VCR, or compact disc player. And
although it takes months to get a phone installed in Santo Domingo, the Dominican
capital, Miraflorenos can get phone service in their homes almost immediately after
they request it” (2). “Because someone is always traveling between Boston and the
Island,” she goes on to say, “there is a continuous, circular flow of goods, news, and
information. As a result when someone is ill, cheating on his or her spouse, or finally
granted a visa, the news spreads as quickly in Jamaica Plain as it does on the streets
of Miraflores” (3). There are a couple of points here that are especially worth consid-
ering. While Levitt does not state this, the mainland-island networks through which
flow the goods, news, and information mentioned above are not unlike the financial
networks connecting cities such as New York, London, and Beijing—networks that
appear to transcend unevenness within and across national boundaries so as to pro-
duce a culture of transnational cosmopolitanism. Invoking the gossip that travels faster
between Boston and Miraflores than between Miraflores and Santo Domingo, even if
unintentionally, feeds into this same cosmopolitan narrative of mobility. Emphasis is
placed on cosmopolitan interconnectedness rather than, say, on the uneven distribu-
tion of electricity.

Nevertheless, such metanarratives of (im)migration are still highly instruc-
tive when placed next to the critical metanarratives informing the scholarship on The
García Girls. The details provided by Levitt show the extent to which the lives of
Dominican immigrants in Boston are lived in continuous contact with the lives of those
who remain on the island—a reality elided in the fetishized, identity-based reading of
immigrant culture and in narratives of assimilation within the United States. Cham-
berlain’s edited volume, while tending to foreground the cultural with its focus on the
“intergenerational transmission of culture,” and its documenting of women’s stories
of adaptation and change in the face of an obligatory mobility,” nevertheless opens
up new ways to consider the “links between subjectivity and material life” (11). Take,
for example, Elizabeth Thomas-Hope’s contribution to the volume, “Globalization
and the Development of Caribbean Migration,” which situates the Caribbean colonies
“from the outset as part of the wider global political economy.” Thomas-Hope ana-
yzes the way that mercantilism, the transatlantic slave trade, and the plantation were
already signs of globalization. The essays in Caribbean Migrations, despite sharing
with the identity-based work on U.S. (im)migrant literary fiction a focus on the culture
of (im)migration, also help to bring to light the connections between the material and
the cultural.

26. See, for example, Russell Crandell, Gunboat Democracy: U.S. Interventions
in the Dominican Republic, Grenada and Panama (New York: Rowan and Littlefield,
2006).

27. Eric Williams, From Columbus to Castro: The History of the Caribbean
1492–1969 (New York: Vintage, 1984); Sherri Grasmuck and Patricia Pessar, Between
Two Islands: Dominican International Migration (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1991); Tom Barry and Beth Wood et al., eds., The Other Side of Paradise (New
York: Grove Press, 1984); James Ferguson, Far from Paradise: Introduction to the

28. Although earlier immigrant narratives also frequently made reference to the way images and narratives of the U.S. were already a distinct presence in preimmigration homelands (the protagonist of Abraham Cahan’s The Rise of David Levinsky, for example, says that in Russia he was told the standard tale of the U.S. as a land in which the streets were paved with gold), the actual passage to the U.S. in these narratives appears as absolute and final.


30. Such denationalization has, of course, its sinister correlate in the treatment meted out to Arabs and Muslims by the U.S.-led war on terror, most notably in the case of the extrajudicial detention and torture of suspects at the U.S. base at Guantanamo and elsewhere in secret U.S. detention/torture centers. Often suspected of a loyalty to Islam that supersedes any loyalty as American citizens, Muslims living within the U.S., regardless of their legal status, are rhetorically denationalized, considered to be possible terrorists at worst and resident aliens at best, and the legitimate targets, as such thinking goes, of constant monitoring. In ideological terms, American nationalism balks at the inclusion of the figure of the Arab/Muslim in a way that it does not in the case of certain other minorities. (For an extended discussion of this point see Evelyn Alsultany’s “Selling American Diversity and Muslim American Identity Through Non-Profit Advertising Post-911,” American Quarterly 59, no. 3 [Fall 2007].) As embodiments of Žižek’s “desert of the real,” Arab-Muslim immigrants to the U.S. are rhetorically and ideologically outside the latter’s borders even when they physically, and legally, reside within them.


32. Steven Salaita’s work in general deals with crucial historical and political complexities relating to questions of nation-state, colonialism, and the construction of Arab and Muslim identity. See, for example, The Uncultured Wars: Arabs, Muslims and the Poverty of Liberal Thought—New Essays (London: Zed Books, 2009); Anti-Arab Racism in the USA: Where It Comes From and What It means for Politics Today (London: Pluto, 2006); and The Holy Land in Transit: Colonialism and the Quest for Canaan (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2006).

33. A very typical claim is expressed by Tanyss Ludeshcer in “From Nostalgia to Critique”: “Arab American Literature is an understudied and undervalued area of ethnic literature” (95).

34. Fadda-Conrey also cites the edited volume Bridge We Call Home: Radical

35. Writing in Late Victorian Holocaus ts, Mike Davis has made the point that there is no link between food availability and famine. It is the ability of people to buy the food that determines whether they can eat it. Davis documents how the British in the nineteenth century had interlinked world markets and how the building of railways—for example, in India—made it possible for grain to be produced and shipped out of the region and sold in the markets in Europe. Phyllis Bennis, in “‘And They Called It Peace’: U.S. Policy on Iraq,” outlines how the U.N. sanctions against Iraq (since the early 1990s) that restricted the sale of oil made the country largely dependent on imports for food. And since then Iraq has become even more dependent on food from elsewhere.

36. For a thorough explanation of how corporate agribusiness, monocultural agriculture, is reducing the ability of farmers to feed themselves, see José Bové and François Dufour’s The World Is Not for Sale: Farmer’s Against Junk Food and Food for the Future: Agriculture for a Global Age.

Chapter 3

1. The fact that the remotest corners of the world have been turned into tourist resorts is, contrary to what might appear, not a reason to conclude, as Dean MacCannell speculated long ago, that modern consciousness is that of a tourist (The Tourist, 1976). When MacCannell aptly noted that the “empirical and ideological expansion of modern society [was] intimately linked in diverse ways to modern mass leisure, especially to international tourism and sightseeing,” tourism was well on its way to creating a service economy and to becoming an integral part of the project to repair societies left devastated by the failure of development projects (3). Places like South Africa are a prime example of this attempted repair.

2. While travel writers such as Theroux regularly lament the succumbing of travel to pervasive global tourism, travel books continue to appear consistently on The New York Times bestseller lists. Nearly every major daily newspaper carries a section on travel. Numerous magazines such as Travel and Leisure, Salon contain feature articles by travel writers. The popularity of books by writers such as Bill Bryson and Theroux are only a few instances among many to indicate that travel writing, judged quantitatively, is anything but a dying genre.

3. All three authors continue to publish works that essentially deal with the same issues analyzed in detail here. See, for example, Kaplan’s Imperial Grunts and Hog Pilots, Blue Water Grunts; Mary Morris’s The River Queen (2007); and Paul Theroux’s Blinding Light (2005).

4. I will discuss issues of gender and travel writing below in relationship to the work of Mary Morris.

5. The same is true of many of Kaplan’s other writings as well, notably his two recent books recounting his travels with the U.S. military, Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American Military, from Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond (2006) and Hog Pilots, Blue Water Grunts: The American Military in the Air, at Sea, and on the Ground (2008). In the former he writes that “by the turn of
the twenty-first century the United States military had already appropriated the entire earth and was ready to flood the most obscure areas” (3). Kaplan, a consistent proponent of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, has become even more blatant in his view that the U.S. is a benevolent presence as against “native” governance structures around the world. The distortions here, even in comparison to those in The Ends of Earth, are extreme to the point of caricature, especially as concerns the Islamic Middle East, and at one point they reach the extreme of advocating war with China. But Kaplan also considers the American empire to be in need of serious overhauling. He uses the “travel” writing and firsthand accounts in Imperial Grunts and Hog Pilots as a purportedly more credible platform from which to “view at ground level what it was that the U.S. was up against” (Imperial Grunts, 3) and to recommend how empire can be better managed. “The drama of exotic new landscapes,” he writes, “had always been central to the imperial experience.” Thus, in his words, “a series of books about the empire—at least to some degree—had to be about travel” (14).

6. Nothing to Declare appeared just three years before the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed in 1992, and several years before the treaty was implemented in 1994. The perception that Mexico is integrally connected to the U.S. is articulated by some of the language in the preamble to the NAFTA agreement:

The Government of Canada, the Government of the United Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America, resolved to: STRENGTHEN the special bonds of friendship and cooperation among their nations; CONTRIBUTE to the harmonious development and expansion of world trade and provide a catalyst to broader international cooperation; CREATE an expanded and secure market for the goods and services produced in their territories. . . . (NAFTA—Preamble, Capital Letters Original)

While the NAFTA language gestured toward what was already happening—the creation of an expanded market and cooperation of trade between the three signatory nations—the impending agreement prompted public rearticulations of the anxiety over the coming erasure of the boundaries between the U.S. and Mexico. The media exacerbated fears that hordes of Mexicans would stream across U.S. borders, demanding undeserved rights to jobs and money. The inclusion of Mexico in NAFTA provoked a resurgence of racist stereotyping, constructing Mexico as yet again the dangerous Other in the national imaginary of the United States. Though Morris does not speak directly about these ideas, her book, reflecting the public conversations at the time, also works to construct Mexico as a place of danger.

7. For a more detailed discussion of Quetzalcoatl, see Davíd Carrasco’s Quetzalcoatl and the Irony of Empire (2000).

8. Theroux’s novel Blinding Light (2005) also tells the story of a blocked writer, Steadman, with one, twenty-year-old, bestselling book to his credit. He travels to Ecuador to secure a drug he hopes will unblock his brain, but instead it temporarily blinds him. Thus here too the act of writing is frustrated, and travel is the result.

9. The genre of the fictional meta–travel narrative bestows on Theroux a kind of authority in much the same way that the notion of the firsthand account does on Kaplan. But nonfictional firsthand accounts of Hawaii are countless. In foregrounding the concept of perspective, Theroux’s book remains credible while still playing with
the boundary between fact and fiction. In fact, playing with the boundary between fact and fiction is precisely what critics of the genre of travel writing characterized it as doing. Much has been written about the way in which travel writers negotiate such boundaries, primarily as a way to caution against taking the often “firsthand” narratives of the travel books as “true.” Critics such as Mary Louise Pratt, Paul Fussell, and Terry Caesar continue to stress the way in which travel writers invent the world they claim to see. James Clifford has pointed to the need of ethnography to make clear distinctions between the literary travel writers and ethnographers themselves, primarily because travel writers are largely considered unaccountable for the highly entertaining narratives they produce of the places they visit. But travel writers themselves, if only so as to hold fast to the generic identity they have selected for themselves, must also doggedly hold on to the notion of “real” reporting. As I have shown, both Kaplan and Morris rely heavily upon the claim to firsthand veracity. And to reiterate, even The Sheltering Sky, one of the better-known of the travel novels that Paul Bowles was producing as early as the 1940s, transports the reader into imagining that there is an interior of Africa that exists outside of the book. Theroux's own earlier novel The Mosquito Coast (1982), the story of a utopian society project in Latin America that eventually goes sour, builds itself around a similarly constructed belief on the reader's part in the “there” of the fiction. Travel writing has also and long since discovered how to position itself close to the margins of the fictional when its claims to the veracity of the “firsthand” are endangered.

10. In an interview, with Barbara Lane for the Commonwealth Club of California, Theroux states: “it's a mistake to confuse the 'I' in a novel with the person writing the novel. Because writers are notoriously unreliable . . . the whole notion of writing—writing is invention, it's imagination. You improve things, or you might make it worse, but what you're doing is inventing the truth” (Commonwealth Club of California). And yet, embracing the confusion between him and his narrators, he says: “I can only write about a writer like myself, who has my habits. I can't imagine writing any other way except the way that I write. So when I think of a writer . . . my own experience is tried and true” (ibid.).

Chapter 4

1. The publication of Gourmet magazine ran from 1941 to 2009. The Gourmet brand continues to have a television and web presence.

2. All of these publications and programs have a presence through a variety of media. The magazines Food & Wine and Gourmet have a web presence. Anthony Bourdain's narratives find their expression on television shows, books, and the Internet.

3. Contemporary narratives about polar expeditions, such as Sarah Wheeler's Terra Incognita: Travels in Antarctica and David Campbell's Crystal Desert: Summers in Antarctica, still retain much of these risky and dangerous aspects, but even these lament the onset of tourism in polar zones. Campbell, for example, discusses the spoiling of natural surrounding by whaling and sealing. But for the most part, contemporary narratives do not chronicle tales of starvation or hunger for the narrator/traveler/tourist, but some do introduce risk in consuming the food itself. One example
would be television shows such as *Bizarre Foods with Andrew Zimmern* where Zimmern eats a variety of “risky” food—worms in Mexico, cow’s heart in Morocco, or lemon ants in Ecuador. Such media narratives take full advantage of the visual and audio technology to produce the riskiness associated with eating “bizarre” foods.

4. A comparison of food photographs in magazines such as *Redbook*, *McCall’s*, or *The Saturday Evening Post* during the mid-twentieth-century to late-twentieth/early-twenty-first-century publications, as well as in a variety of mass/social media, makes this point.

5. For a lengthy discussion of genetically modified food and standardized farming see José Bové and François Defour’s *The World Is Not For Sale: Farmers Against Junk Food* and Vandana Shiva’s *Stolen Harvest*.

6. More research needs to be done on the consumption of U.S. food around the world. Many anecdotes suggest that such consumption can become a way establishing prestige and status by association with the U.S. And in nations where this is a recent phenomenon, such as China, it also consumed as a novelty, and sometimes as a snack for children while the “real” food is consumed at home.


8. See chapter 1 for a discussion of how management theorists employ the idea of literature as timeless for dislocal purposes.

9. Though distinct historical forces have always produced regional foods, recently the ideas of regionality and locality have taken on a different sort of significance. Barbara and James Shortridge, in the Introduction to their edited collection, *The Taste of American Place*, attribute a renewed interest in what they call “neolocalism” to the fast-paced lifestyle that has eroded a sense of community and a “commitment to experiencing things close to home” (7). Contemporary regionalism and localism in relationship to food that emphasizes “local” ingredients is often politically positioned against the global trends of genetic modification, use of pesticides, and standardization. And “local” foods need not be produced “close to home.” In fact, “local” foods are marketed and sold to consumers living far way from the “originary” site of harvest and preparation.

10. What is missing from this quasi-historical account (as well as from the historical perspective of *Endless Feasts* overall) is the effect of Prohibition on the California wine industry. Repairing the wine business after Prohibition was lifted would indeed require pleas to potential consumers. For more detailed histories of California wine industries see James T. Lapsley’s *Bottled Poetry: Napa Winemaking from Prohibition to the Modern Era* (1996) and Thomas Pinney’s *A History of Wine in America: From the Beginnings to Prohibition* (1989).

11. For a lengthier discussion of the history of food production companies, see Harvey Levenstein’s *Revolution at the Table* (2003).

12. *In Spaces of Hope* (2001), Harvey explains that “globalization’ seems first to have acquired its prominence as American Express advertised the global reach of its credit card in the mid 1970s. The term spread like wildfire in the financial and business press, mainly as legitimation for deregulation of financial markets. It then helped make the diminution in state powers to regulate capital flows seem inevitable and became an extraordinary tool in disempowerment of national local working-class move-
And by mid 1980s it helped create a heady atmosphere of entrepreneurial optimism around the theme of the liberation of markets from state control” (13).

13. Wallerstein, in theorizing the idea of a “world culture,” points to the “dialectic of creating simultaneously a homogeneous world and distinctive national cultures within this world” and “the creating of simultaneously homogeneous national cultures and distinctive ethnic groups or minorities within these nation-states” (“The National and the Universal,” 99).

14. So, for example, in the June 2008 issue Sigal tells us in her “The Chef, the Pig and the Perfect Summer Party” that the jet-setting chef has time to throw a sophisticated barbecue in his home outside of Manhattan. He serves “sweet-tangy carrots flavored with pink peppercorns and a silken pea puree sparked with jalapeños,” and “spit-roasted meat” (23). The recipes are included for those wishing to try the food themselves, but because this is New York, fusion’s “native” land, the food alone can tell of his travels.

15. An athletic analog to this same phenomenon can be cited as well: the recruitment by Houston’s NBA franchise of Yao Ming, a Chinese basketball phenomenon over seven feet tall. This has as much to do with globalization as it does with winning games. Yao, as a mega-celebrity both in the U.S. and China, is clearly understood to be a gateway into China for companies that thereby help to sell not only Apple computers, credit cards, and Gatorade but also NBA paraphernalia to two billion Chinese. Of course, it is because Yao can play the game that he takes the court in Houston. The presence of international players in the NBA has become commonplace. But the game itself, more obviously than in the case of the space of culinary consumption, remains American.

16. *A Cook’s Tour* began to air in 2002. There were around thirty-five original shows produced and aired regularly until 2005. Weekly reruns of the show continue on the Food Channel, but Bourdain now has a similar show entitled *No Reservations* on the Travel Channel. In these programs, Bourdain samples food while visiting places both within and outside the U.S. He has also published books under the same title as his television series and has written numerous others, including works of fiction that feature prominently the theme of food. I have chosen to analyze *A Cook’s Tour*—with references to the book version as well—in part simply because it has been a relatively long running show and has made Bourdain into a well-known television personality. Food programming on television has come a long way since the PBS-based instructional cooking of Julia Child and Jeff Smith; it need not provide recipes for dishes and can function exclusively as a narrative.

17. Bourdain’s later television series *No Reservations* aired an episode in 2008 in which he visits Laos and the home of someone who lost a limb as he accidentally dug up a bomb dropped in the 1970s by the U.S., a bomb that was aimed at neighboring Cambodia. His injury occurred four decades later, while he was cleaning up around his house. Bourdain is appropriately contrite and apologizes on behalf of the U.S. as he partakes in the little bit of food the impoverished family has.

18. The New Orleans episode shows him getting kicked out of Emeril’s restaurant in New York, implying that it was for the unkind remarks he made about Emeril in his books—*The Kitchen Confidential* and *A Cook’s Tour*. *A Cook’s Tour* contains a section called “Full Disclosure” in which he says that he is uncomfortable doing *A Cook’s Tour* series and being associated with the Food Network because he has always made fun of the cooks associated with the Food Network.
Conclusion

1. Or perhaps management academics, similarly to others, generally do not think outside the box of their own disciplines except when the continued existence of that discipline itself, and hence their future employment, is at stake.

2. See, in addition to what has already been cited above from chapter 1, this adjacent passage:

In the third volume of Capital, Marx refers to the system of credit in general as “fictitious capital.” So, for example, the buying and selling of shares on the stock market neither creates new value nor injects increased capital into the firm whose shares are being traded. “Fictitious capital” is different from the money originally supplied for use in production. It is an additional amount of money that simply allows for the circulation of income or profit. In fact, this circulation represents claims to future, still unrealized surplus value, making it appear that the amount of capital has increased. Thus the increase in the price of shares, to take the most obvious example of fictitious capital, creates the illusion—the stuff of everyday economic life on Wall Street—that the stock market itself is creating value. Essentially, fictitious capital refers to a form of financialization—the listing of a given amount of prospective money capital on the books—that makes a claim on the future generation of real, nonfictional profits or surplus value.

None of this poses any real threat to the reproduction of capital as a whole as long as such claims themselves are eventually made good and fictional is converted into real capital. But what happens if—or when—a point is reached beyond which this realization (in more than one sense here) ceases to be possible, and, to avoid defaulting on the claims already lodged against fictional capital, still more fictional capital must be injected into circulation in the hopes of putting off the inevitable day of reckoning? Here one encounters what has become a major question in discussions of contemporary political economy, one to which I cannot do real justice here. The most recent U.S. financial crisis, triggered in 2007–8 by massive defaults on subprime home mortgages and the resulting deflation of what had been Wall Street’s latest, real estate–based speculative bubble, is only the latest indication that such a point—what we might term “hyper-fictionalization”—may have been reached.” (53, 54)

3. Here we also learn that, as is so often the case, terms later assumed to have been coined by Marx are in fact carried over into the conceptual system of Marx’s critique of political economy from the language of, in most cases, the British political economists and capitalists of the late eighteenth and early to mid-nineteenth century whom he studied assiduously, from Adam Smith to, in this case, W. Leatham, a Yorkshire banker who spoke of “fictitious capital” in a pamphlet published in 1840. As Marx’s brief citation of Leatham makes clear, the latter was referring to a fact that every banker knows: at any given moment a bank has more money-capital out on loan than it does on deposit, but this does not prevent the bank from listing its still-unpaid loans as assets, or from selling them as the commodities known, generally speaking, as “securities.” What counts as fictitious for Leatham is the supposition that the debt
will, at some point in the future, be repaid.

4. See, for example, chapter 29: “the capital of the national debt remains purely fictitious, and the moment these promissory notes become unsaleable, the illusion of this capital disappears. Yet this fictitious capital has its characteristic movement for all that . . .”; “interest-bearing capital always being the mother of every insane [verrückten] form, so that debts, for example, can appear as commodities in the mind of the banker . . .” (596); “Even when the promissory note—the security—does not represent a purely illusory capital, as it does in the case of national debts, the capital value of the security is still pure illusion” (597). Also see chapter 30: “These promissory notes which were issued for a capital originally borrowed but long since spent, these paper duplicates of annihilated capital, function for their owners as capital in so far as they are saleable commodities and can therefore be transformed into capital.” “But these titles similarly become paper duplicates of the real capital, as if a bill of lading simultaneously acquired a value alongside the cargo it refers to. They become nominal representatives of non-existent capitals” (608). “This kind of imaginary money wealth makes up a very considerable part not only of the money wealth of private individuals but also of banking capital, as already mentioned” (609) [my emphasis throughout].

5. To get at this deeper meaning would ultimately require, however, an attempt to come to terms with what will strike the contemporary reader of this particular section of volume 3 either as a case of inconsistent editing, or—more likely—as one of Marx’s more erroneous moments in the theory of “the role of credit in capitalist production.” Rather than take the time to map out this confusing problem here, however, I consign this task, for those who want the details, to this footnote and proceed directly in the body of the text to the one or two remarks which, if my own reading of Marx here is on the right track, are the clearest indications of this.

While observing, so far quite uncontroversially, that the formation of joint-stock companies results in “tremendous expansion in the scale of production” as well as the “transformation of the actual functioning capitalist into a mere manager, in charge of other people’s capital” (567), Marx adds:

Capital, which is inherently based on a social mode of production and presupposes a social concentration of means of production and labour-power, now receives the form of social capital (capital of directly associated individuals) in contrast to private capital, and its enterprises appear as social enterprises as opposed to private ones. This is the abolition of capital as private property within the confines of the capitalist mode of production itself. (ibid.)

This is followed, after a dense chain of reasoning that I cannot take the time to summarize here, by what seems an even more mystifying miscalculation on Marx’s part in which it is claimed that the separation of capital’s managerial function from capital ownership also becomes a point of transition in which labor itself is separated from capital as mere “money capital.” Thus the “result of capitalist production in its highest development [the joint-stock company] is a necessary point of transition back into the property of the producers, though no longer as the private property of individual producers but rather as their property as associated producers, as directly social property” (568). At this point, Engels himself interjects a passage, perhaps meant to correct for Marx’s error as concerns the future of the joint-stock company, a passage (familiar from Lenin’s Imperialism) observing the real “point of transition” latent in the latter
change in form of capitalist property: the creation of giant cartels and monopolies. And then—as if to compound the problem of what Marx ultimately saw as the historical possibilities latent in “fictitious capital”—the words are again Marx’s, and, after being stated once again that “this [presumably still the credit-enabled joint-stock company] is the abolition of the capitalist mode of production within the capitalist mode of production itself” (569), a strikingly different picture of such a dialectic (and the one which is my chosen point of departure above) is drawn:

It gives rise to monopoly in certain spheres and hence provokes state intervention. It reproduces a new financial aristocracy, a new kind of parasite in the guise of company promoters, speculators, and merely nominal directors; an entire system of swindling and cheating with respect to the promotion of companies, issue of shares and share dealings. It is private production unchecked by private ownership. (ibid.)

6. Edmund L. Andrews reported on Greenspan’s congressional testimony on October 23, 2008 in the New York Times, wherein Greenspan conceded that he was at least partially wrong in opposing regulation. He states: “Those of us who have looked to the self-interest of lending institutions to protect shareholder’s equity—myself especially—are in a state of shocked disbelief.” When questioned about his free-market ideology, Greenspan said: “I have found a flaw. I don’t know how significant or permanent it is. But I have been very distressed by that fact.” http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business/economy/24panel.html.

National Public Radio reported some of conversation between Greenspan and Rep. Henry Waxman (D-CA). Waxman: “In other words, you found that your view of the world, your ideology, was not right, it was not working.” Greenspan replied: “How it—precisely. That’s precisely the reason I was shocked, because I’ve been going for 40 years or more with very considerable evidence that it was working exceptionally well.” http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=96070766.

7. Not to be confused with his father, Paul Mattick Sr. (1904–81), a well-known German theoretician of the “council communist” movement, who later emigrated to the United States.


14. In the context of globalization theories, an immediate tendency in response to the above might be to question whether (referring to the first citation from Lukács) “the ability to look beyond the divisive symptoms of the economic process to the unity of the total social system underlying it” is now made possible by the existence of globalization. Not to dismiss that there might, in the end, be something to this, depending on how the historical changes referred to as “globalization” are themselves theorized, but rather to confer on globalization, whether in theory or in practice, anything like the potential to overcome reified consciousness, is, at best, to beg that question. And it has been the objective of the theory of dislocalism to demystify such notions. That the “unity of the social system” has increased enormously in scope and depth since the 1920s is beyond dispute, but so, along with this, has the weight and penetration of reification, and now not only on the level of the “divisive symptoms” but of ideologies of the whole—for example, dislocalism—that, as stated in the Introduction, “make it appear as though [the] erasure of the local were itself the meaning and content of ‘globalization.’”


16. Bret Benjamin, in his book Invested Interests, has suggested that we think about the stories that World Bank published as those of success as literary fiction. Utilizing the term World Bank Literature from Amitava Kumar’s edited volume of the same name, to which Benjamin also contributes, offers an interesting analysis of the ways in which we can understand the Bank as a social/cultural institution. My analysis looking directly at the material produced by management emphasizes the attempt to understand the ways in which the Bank (and management in general) itself understands what it is doing with storytelling.

17. He goes so far as to suggest the kind of stories that do the work. “As a storyteller who is aiming at eliciting organizational change through stories, one doesn’t need to tell the story with the panache of a Charles Dickens or a Mark Twain. With such writers, the explicit voice of the narrator is so large and generous and conveys so much enthusiasm and gusto for life that the reader is often swept along by it, and the stories become as real if not more real than life itself. In our context, it is more relevant to think about the minimalist stories of Raymond Carver. Remember that we are aiming to leave lots of space for the listeners to invent their own stories, and to fill in the blanks” (The Springboard: How Storytelling Ignites Action in Knowledge-Era Organizations, 181).


20. “Instead of ‘reducing’ cultural phenomena, the essay immerses itself in them as though in a second nature, a second immediacy, in order to negate and transcend the illusion of immediacy through its perseverance. It has no more illusions about the difference between culture and what lies beneath it than does the philosophy of origin. But for it culture is not an epiphenomenon that covers Being and should be destroyed; instead, what lies beneath culture is itself thesis, something constructed, the false society.” Adorno, “The Essay as Form,” Notes to Literature, vol. 1, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 19 (with the exception of “thesis,” italicized in the original, my emphasis).