Eschatological Subjects

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CHAPTER 2

A Particular Judgment

The Case of Deguileville’s Pèlerinage de l’âme

I. Introduction

As the Devil’s Rights tradition shows, the courtroom drama is not a recent invention, nor is it confined to legal proceedings on earth. Texts like L’advocacie Nostre Dame and Pierre le changeur fill the scene of divine judgment with outraged prosecutors, silver-tongued attorneys, and controversial defendants whose eternal souls hang in the balance. In the middle of the fourteenth century, Guillaume de Deguileville (1295—after 1358), a Cistercian monk at the royal abbey of Chaalis, developed in further detail the legal intrigue of this eschatological tradition.

Around 1356, Deguileville wrote his Pèlerinage de l’âme (PA). The speaker of the poem—or self-designated pèlerin—narrates a dream in which he dies and travels through heaven, hell and purgatory. Deguileville’s narrator-pilgrim is no passive observer of the world beyond, since the dream begins with his own soul’s judgment in the heavenly court. At the conclusion of this trial scene, the soul is sentenced to a term in purgatory, from which the narrator has a close-up view of hell’s punishments, before travel-


ling upward again to discover heaven’s mysteries. In my discussion of PA, however, I will focus mostly on the scene of the pilgrim’s judgment, which occupies roughly the first quarter of this 11,000-verse poem.

The trial of Deguileville’s narrator closely follows the pattern of the Devil’s Rights. PA begins as the narrator dies. His soul ascends from its body and immediately encounters its guardian angel, who intends to take it to heaven. But just as quickly, Satan appears and claims that the pilgrim’s soul is rightfully his. Agreeing to present their cases to the heavenly court for judgment, the three then continue upward to the gates of paradise. When they arrive, a formal trial begins. Although the pilgrim’s view of the courtroom is blocked by a large curtain, he can clearly hear the proceedings as a case is mounted against him. Satan, aided by Raison, Justice and Verité, faces off against the pilgrim’s defense team, led by Misericorde (Mercy). Both sides rely on the testimony of formidable witnesses: for the defense, the pilgrim’s guardian angel, the Virgin Mary and Saint Benedict. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, need just one witness—the pilgrim’s own conscience, in the form of the hideous worm-woman Synderesis. The trial is adjudicated by the archangel Michael, whom God has appointed to preside over the judgment of souls prior to the Resurrection:


4. Before his view is obstructed, however, the pilgrim is bathed in celestial light and feels intense joy—a momentary glimpse of the beatific vision which the 1336 bull Benedictus Deus had confirmed as doctrine. Through this gesture, the pilgrim is judged one of the saved before the trial even begins. At the end of the poem, once he has spent his term in purgatory, and immediately before waking up from his dream, the pilgrim is afforded another, slightly longer such vision (vv. 11002–13).

5. Conscience and synderesis are not exactly the same thing. Synderesis is usually understood in medieval discourse as the general inclination toward the good possessed by everybody and incapable of making a mistake. Conscience, on the other hand, consists in the application of this inclination to particular circumstances and can be mistaken. See Linda Hogan, Confronting the Truth: Conscience in the Catholic Tradition. Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2000. 66–87. See also Pomel, Voies, 355. I use the term “conscience” to translate the character Synderesis for the sake of convenience.
Deguileville's insistence on the particular judgment of the individual soul, before the *grans assises*, is crucial to an understanding of the author's importance in the history of eschatological representation and authorial subjectivity. The opening to *Pèlerinage de l’âme* was one of the first, and certainly one of the most influential, depictions of the particular judgment, which had assumed more doctrinal importance than ever by the middle of the fourteenth century, following the 1336 papal bull *Benedictus Deus*. With the miracle play *Pierre le changeur* in the early fourteenth century, I have already discussed one dramatization of the particular judgment. But while *Pierre* illustrates a shift in the identity of the defendant from mankind to a specific man, Deguileville’s most important addition to the Devil’s Rights scenario was in making this individual defendant speak in the first person, and in the name of the author himself.

The resemblance of Deguileville and his defendant is confirmed during the trial when Justice enters into evidence against the pilgrim a letter which had been written to him by his mentor Grace Dieu (Grace of God). As Justice alleges, Grace Dieu had sent the letter to warn the pilgrim that he must repent or risk damnation, but he took no heed of the admonition. We may be sure, Justice asserts, that this incriminating document was addressed to the pilgrim and to none other, since the first letters of its twenty-four stanzas spell out his Latinized name: *Guillermus de Deguilevilla* (vv. 1593–784). This is one of four acrostic signatures in Deguileville’s body of work, and one of two such signatures to appear in a scene where the pilgrim is put on trial. For Deguileville, authorial *subjectivity* is double-sided: the *Je* takes shape as a grammatical subject, but only as a response to the accusations of the other, to whose judgments it is always already subject.

Not that the response comes easily. As in the Devil’s Rights, the ability of the defendant to receive any kind of representation is a central point of

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7. For more on how this letter both accuses and individuates the pilgrim, see Pomel, *Voies*, 406.

8. The second of these scenes takes place in the 1355 version of *Pèlerinage de vie humaine*, and is discussed below, 84–87.

9. In a similar way, Dante names himself only once in the *Commedia*—at the head of Beatrice’s long accusation against him (*Purgatorio* 30.55). See above, Chapter 1, 41–42.
contention in the trial. In *Pèlerinage de l’âme*, Satan and Justice both object vociferously to the defendant being allowed to argue now that the Judgment is at hand,\(^{10}\) and they are especially concerned that the pilgrim’s words will “toute exciter” (v. 1090), stirring up passion in the heavenly court, where it doesn’t belong. But the plaintiffs’ objections are neatly overruled. Saint Michael grants the defendant the right to respond and, indeed, places this decision beyond argument:

\[
\begin{align*}
\ldots & \text{Bien est chose digne} & \ldots & \text{It truly is a worthy thing} \\
\text{Que responde le pelerin} & \quad & \text{that the pilgrim speak for himself,} \\
\text{De sa voie et de son chemin,} & \quad & \text{responding about the path he has taken} \\
\text{Des ouvrages quë il a fait} & \quad & \text{and the deeds he has done,} \\
\text{Et que n’ait d’autre chose plait,} & \quad & \text{and that on this there be no more debate,} \\
\text{Car ceste court ainsi le veult.} & \quad & \text{because this court wills it thus.} \\
\end{align*}
\]

(vv. 1119–24)

And in the end, Deguileville’s pilgrim defends himself more than adequately. Although he initially admits to great anxiety about securing representation or assembling a defense (vv. 701–38), Guillermus manages to talk his way out of Satan’s grip. In a first speech (vv. 739–1074), an elaborate, inset lyric-prayer, the pilgrim implores the heavenly court to provide him with their advocacy and the spiritual “alms” he needs to afford such high-powered attorneys as they. He calls directly upon individual members of the court, including Christ, Mary, and the Cistercian saints Benedict, Bernard and Guillaume de Bourges, pleading with them for assistance. Later, he takes the floor again (vv. 1406–84) to speak more directly in his defense: while recognizing that he did commit grave sins, in the same breath he displaces a large measure of responsibility for those sins onto Satan and the illusions of the world, whom he claims deceived him into wrongdoing. In response to Guillermus’s pleas, Misericorde and the Virgin intercede with Christ on his behalf and Benedict provides the court with written evidence of the pilgrim’s good deeds during his years as a Cistercian. Finally, Christ is moved to issue a special formal pardon (“Un don de grace especial,” v. 2383) to all the wretched pilgrims of the world (“les pelerins chetis,” v. 2381) who, like Deguileville’s narrator, have recognized the error of their ways, even at the very end. Guillermus will go to purgatory, not hell.

While he uses it to request saintly assistance, it is the pilgrim’s own legal and poetic rhetoric which really takes center stage in this eschatological
logical drama. Pleading eloquently with the saints, Deguileville’s narrator showcases the verbal dexterity of the author himself, who, a fourteenth-century *rhétor divinus*, insists on his instrumentality in the process of intercession, and on the inseparability of prayer and second rhetoric. As prayer, the pilgrim’s oratory reminds us that Deguileville was a Cistercian monk, part of whose job it was to pray for intercession. As second rhetoric, the pilgrim’s speeches insist on his status as a poetic substitute for the author, skilled in the composition of devotional, vernacular verse. In particular, Guillermus’s first address to the court (vv. 739–1074) is one of many inset lyric poems found throughout Deguileville’s body of work, all of which serve to put into relief the pseudo-autobiographical presence of the poet.11 As is the case with the narrators of Guillaume de Machaut and Jean Froissart, whom I discuss later, Deguileville’s pilgrim symbolically performs the author’s own act of poetic creation within the narrative.12 For Deguileville as for his forerunners in the *puys* of northern France, the poetic, legal and eschatological aspects of rhetoric came together in the figure of Mary, advocate for mankind and patron of the Cistercian order. As Deguileville adapted the Devil’s Rights model to the narrative of his own unique persona, he too saw the Virgin as the ultimate exemplar for using language persuasively, and it is the Virgin who is finally responsible for securing Christ’s mercy in *Pèlerinage de l’âme*.

The difference with Deguileville, once again, concerns the voice of a first-person subject: as the defendant speaks for himself, the role of the saintly advocate is diminished. Indeed, as I have shown in a previous article, Deguileville went so far in *Pèlerinage de l’âme* as to reassign some of Mary’s most powerful arguments from *L’advocacie Nostre Dame* to himself, and to reduce her presence to behind-the-scenes only.13 While other poets had suggested that their powers of composition drew inspiration from the Virgin’s lawyerly rhetoric, Deguileville stepped straight into the role of divine orator. In *Pèlerinage de l’âme*, Deguileville stepped straight into the role of divine orator. In *Pèlerinage de l’âme*, this does not lessen Mary’s importance, but rather shifts the dramatic focus to the Cistercian poet as intercessor with the intercessors.

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11. The most famous of these inset lyrics is the ABC-poem from *Pèlerinage de vie humaine*, which Chaucer later adapted. On the importance of the ABC-poem, and on Deguileville’s neglected lyric insertions in general, see Helen Phillips, “Chaucer and Deguileville: the ABC in Context.” *Medium Ævum* 62.1 (Spring 1993): 1–19.


13. Moreau, “‘Ce mauvais tabellion.’”
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The defendant Guillermus de Deguilevilla functions as a literary persona for the author through his name and through his identity as a divine rhetorician. As I demonstrate in this chapter, a still stronger resemblance between poet and narrator emerges once we consider how the heavenly trial scene allows Deguileville to address controversies involving his own writing. These controversies center around another long vision poem by Deguileville, the *Pèlerinage de vie humaine*, which had appeared prior to *PA* in two distinct versions (c. 1330–31 and 1355), and in which the same first-person speaker—the pilgrim Guillermus—had also been the narrator.\(^{14}\) In the majority of manuscripts in which *PA* has been copied, it is preceded by the first version of *Pèlerinage de vie humaine*, although a small group of copies place after it the second; in turn, *PA* is often followed by Deguileville’s third and final major poem, *Le Pèlerinage Jhesucrist*.\(^{15}\) The three pilgrimage narratives constitute the bulk of Deguileville’s extant work,\(^{16}\) and their customary coexistence as a unified whole makes the Cistercian an important figure in the history of single-author compilation, even if it cannot be shown conclusively that he was directly involved in manuscript production.\(^{17}\)

In *PA*, as he represents his namesake defeating the studied arguments of the Devil, Deguileville also speaks to readers—and to a readerly God—in order to defend himself against accusations surrounding *Pèlerinage de vie humaine*. In that, the poet’s rhetoric constitutes a defense not only of the narrator or author’s *anima*—his soul—but also of the *corpus*—the entire body of work for which that soul is answerable.\(^{18}\) In *Pèlerinage de l’âme*,

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14. He is not yet called Guillermus in the first version of *Pèlerinage de vie humaine*. The pilgrim is, however, named indirectly in *PVHt* through his father, Thomas de Deguileville (v. 5965).

15. For the most comprehensive summary of Deguileville’s manuscripts, see Géraldine Veysseyre, Julia Drobinsky, and Émilie Fréger, “Liste des manuscrits des trois *Pèlerinages*,” in Duval and Pomel, eds., *Guillaume de Digulleville: les Pèlerinages allégoriques*, 425–53. *Le Pèlerinage Jhesucrist* does not occur with the same frequency as *PVH* or even *PA*, and it is sometimes positioned as the first text in the trilogy rather than the last.


17. The most problematic aspect of this question is the dating of Deguileville’s manuscripts, most of which were produced after the middle of the fourteenth century. On these dates, see, again Veysseyre, Drobinsky, and Fréger, “Liste des manuscrits des trois *Pèlerinages*.” For a good analysis of how one manuscript may have reflected the author’s designs, see Graham Robert Edwards, “Making Sense of Deguileville’s Autobiographical Project: The Evidence of Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France MS Latin 14845,” in Nievergelt and Kamath, eds., *The Pèlerinage Allegories of Guillaume de Deguileville*, 129–50.

18. I owe much of my thinking about the pseudo-autobiographical corpus to Laurence De Looze, as I have discussed in the Introduction (11–12). Maupeu (*Pèlerins de vie humaine*, 193) makes a similar point about Deguileville when he compares the pilgrim’s injured body to Alain de Lille’s *liber experientiar* and later, to the broken book-body of Pierre Abélard (*Pèlerins de vie humaine*, 208).
as never before, the particular judgment became a forum for dramatizing
the author’s responsibility to readers, and his ensuing work of assembling a
spiritually whole self-image through the composition of a unitary Book.\footnote{On the idea of authorial responsibility in PA, see Pomel, \textit{Voies}, 413–14.}

The “other scene” of this heavenly trial—the way it reflects the ethical
relationship between author and audience—is revealed through a complex
and often puzzling set of allusions embedded in the text. In his thor-
roughly pseudo-autobiographical narrative, Deguileville suggested many
points of comparison—often quite subtle—between the soul’s judgment
and the author’s ongoing dialog with readers. Recall, for example, Saint
Michael’s judgment that the pilgrim be allowed to speak for himself and
for the “ouvrages quë il a fait” (v. 1121). The archangel’s use of the term
“ouvrages” should be understood in its double sense—both morally con-
sequential deeds and literary texts. Indeed, for Deguileville, this is less of
a play on words than it is a matter of belief which invests literary produc-
tion with ethical weight. In that he is a first-person narrator who speaks in
Deguileville’s name, the pilgrim must respond both for what he has done
and for what the author has written. Thus, although Deguileville’s work is
steeped in complex allegorical imagery, the judgment of his narrator’s soul
by God does not function so much as an allegory for Deguileville’s judg-
ment by readers, as it demonstrates how divine and readerly deliberation
inevitably come together in the later medieval author’s trial.

Before it can be fully understood just how this trial stages the par-
ticular judgment of a literary controversy or the difficult elaboration of
a poetic corpus, it is necessary to examine the case of Deguileville’s first-
person defendant in its entirety, which is to say Deguileville’s \textit{ouvrages},
the poetry he wrote before \textit{PA}. To provide a thorough account of the
potential literary judgments to which the defendant Guillermus de Degui-
levilla may have been subject by the second half of the 1350s, when \textit{PA}
appeared, I turn now to Deguileville’s two redactions of his \textit{Pèlerinage de
vie humaine}.

In addition to providing important context for the circulation and
criticism of Deguileville’s poetry, these earlier narratives already begin to
describe the author’s work and its reception through episodes of accusation,
self-defense, and judgment. And well before he reaches the heavenly court,
the narrator Guillermus expresses his awareness that the judgments of this
world—literary as well as juridical—are forever exposed to the Judgment
from on high. Punctuated with incriminations, justifications, and coun-
teraccusations, \textit{PVH1} and \textit{PVH2} constitute a kind of case file,\footnote{Fabienne Pomel has investigated the thoroughly juridical character of the many documents...} which is to
be reopened before the heavenly court in *Pèlerinage de l’âme*, and in which the author must face his divine and human judges all at once. The evolving narrative of the *Pèlerinages* gives us a consistent picture of Guillermus de Deguilevilla as a legal subject who must answer for the sins of the author.

I begin, therefore, by considering the apparent controversies of Deguileville’s career, and the ways in which the Cistercian poet already used his earlier work to stage his relationship to readers and critics in terms of an ongoing legal and eschatological procès. Having taken into account the complex literary background of this case, I am then able to return to the scene of judgment in *PA* in the second half of the chapter, in order to demonstrate how Deguileville’s earlier writing reemerges there as a matter for eschatological scrutiny and self-defense.

II. *Des ouvrages quë il a fait: The First Two Pèlerinages*

In 1330 or 1331, Deguileville completed the first version of a long allegorical dream vision, the *Pèlerinage de vie humaine* (*PVH*). In *PVH*, the author cast his first-person narrator (still unnamed) as a pilgrim on the way to the heavenly Jerusalem, just as he would do again in *PA*, when Guillermus is halted before the gates of the city of God by Satan’s accusation. *PVH* recounts the pilgrim’s difficult journey through life, from birth to death. This includes, most memorably, his troubled wanderings on the left-hand side of the enormous Hedge of Penitence, which stretches the length of his pilgrimage route. On this, the wrong side of the hedge, the pilgrim is repeatedly attacked by vicious personifications of the seven deadly sins. At last, with the help of his patient guide Grace Dieu, the narrator makes it alive to the Ship of Religion—the monastic life—which promises to convey him safely across the perilous sea of worldly existence (*La Mer du Monde*) to the heavenly Jerusalem.

The first *Pèlerinage de vie humaine* became one of the most popular literary works of medieval Europe. In its original form, it was copied into no fewer than sixty-four extant manuscripts,\(^{21}\) translated into numerous lan-

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\(^{21}\) See Maupeu, *Pèlerins*, 270. See also Veyseyre, Drobinsky, and Fréger, “Liste des manuscrits des trois *Pèlerinages*.”
guages, regularly reworked in French verse and prose, and used as the basis for a vast tradition of allegorical texts. But in 1355, a quarter of a century after PVH had first appeared—and immediately prior to the appearance of PA—the now sexagenarian Deguileville gave the world a drastic revision of PVH1. The second Pèlerinage de vie humaine (PVH2) is significantly longer than the first, and contains many noteworthy amplifications, additions, and omissions.

In a new prologue, Deguileville introduces PVH2 by explaining that, as is often the case when one dreams, he did not remember his vision all at once; only little by little did it come back to mind (vv. 1–8). Claiming that PVH1 was but a preliminary draft jotted down upon awakening, he laments that it had been copied widely before it was ready to be diffused. He blames this on a nameless person (later designated simply as “celui,” v. 49) who had stolen the text from him:

Sans mon sceü et volenté
Tout mon escript me fu osté,
Par tout divulgué, et scet Dieu
Que je ne le tien pas a gieu,
Quar a mettre et a oster,
A corriger et ordener
Y avoit mout, si com perceu
Apres quant bien esveilé fu.
(vv. 31–38)

Without my knowledge or consent
my whole text was taken from me,
made known everywhere, and God knows
that I do not consider this a pleasant thing,
for much was left to add and to remove,
to correct and to put into good order,
as I realized after,
when I had awakened fully.

The author says that he made a thorough effort to search out the unauthorized, prematurely circulated copies of PVH1 and correct them (vv. 39–42). This being unsuccessful, Deguileville wrote PVH2, which he describes as a sort of placard to be hung around the neck of the first version in order to announce the corrections to readers already familiar with the text of 1330–31:

22. The French portion of the tradition after Deguileville is discussed at greatest length by Maupeu in his Pèlerins de vie humaine. For the manuscript and early printed edition history, see 267–338. For later reworkings of Deguileville’s allegory by other French authors, see 339–589.
23. For summaries of the changes made in the second redaction, see Faral, “Guillaume de Diguileville,” 29–47; Maupeu, Pèlerins de vie humaine, 64.
24. Quotations and citations of the prologue are taken from Maupeu, Pèlerins de vie humaine, 55–57, where Maupeu has edited the first 94 lines of PVH2. All other quotations and verse citations from PVH2 in this chapter are from my own close observations of the text as it appears in ms. BNF fr. 829.
Et iceluy amendement  And, as it is, this amendment
Quel qu’il soit et adrecement  and this putting-to-rights
Tout entour le couli pendray, I will hang around his neck,
Pour ce que veoir le vouray for I would like it to be seen
Par tous les lieus ou a esté in all the places he has been
Sans mon vouloir et sans mon gré. without my consent or will.

(vv. 63–68)

This strange image suggests that Deguileville conceived the revised pèlerinage as an act of literary penance, that his narrator was to perform a ritual return to the places he had already been—in the world of readers as much as along the allegorical hedgerow—to announce the sins he had committed in the first pilgrimage.

The revised prologue is startling and obscure. It has left Deguileville’s modern interpreters with a host of questions. To begin with, for what must the pilgrim atone? I think the answer lies partly in the failure of the PVH1 narrator to provide a suitable example for Christian readers. Not only does the pilgrim initially choose the wrong side of the hedgerow (that is, he avoids repentance), but while there, he repeatedly fails to ward off the attacks of the sins. And he consistently ignores the advice of Grace Dieu about how best to defend himself—notably, by donning his heavy spiritual armor, which the personification Memoire is good enough to carry for him everywhere he travels. The pilgrim is prevented by arming himself by the character Peresce (Sloth), who captured him at the beginning of his journey. If Deguileville’s narrative is meant to represent the journey of a Christian through life, it cannot be thought very exemplary, except as a model of what not to do. For most of the poem, the pilgrim learns precious little from his long-suffering mentor Grace Dieu, displays an almost comical lack of resolve, and is literally beaten by the sins time and again. His entry onto the Ship of Religion seems like a last resort, born of a failure to exercise his free will and defend himself against Satan’s influence in the world.

A negative model, or repoussoir, may have been what Deguileville had in mind with PVH1. In the poem’s explicit, the author explains that his narrative has been a cautionary tale which Christian readers should use to avoid leaving the right-hand path to the city of God, presumably as his narrator-pilgrim had done:

Nulle erreur je ne vourroie I should like to sow no error
Maintenir par nulle voie, in any way, by any means,
Mes bien vourroie et ai voulu but rather wish and have wanted
Que par le songe qu’ai vœu
Tous pelerins se radrecassent,
Et de fourvoier se gardassent.
(vv. 13525–30)

But perhaps PVH had proved too much of a negative example. The author may have been motivated to return to his text in 1355 after twenty-five years because he felt readers were unable to separate the disastrous detours made by his first-person narrator from the overall spiritual lesson he intended the narrative to convey. The repeated failures of the narrator to keep to the straight and narrow may have offered a spectacle for prurient amusement which threatened to eclipse the text’s didactic purpose. Or more simply, Deguileville, older by a quarter of a century, may have felt that the original speaker was lacking in maturity and required some updating.

Whatever Deguileville’s reasons for rewriting, his narrator comes off significantly better in the second version: unlike the narrator of PVH, the revised pilgrim initially chooses the less attractive but correct (droite) path along the hedgerow—that of Labour—instead of opting for the seductive and spiritually lethal left-hand route of Huseuse (Idleness). The narrator of PVH only crosses to the hedgerow’s senestre side later when Jeunece (Youth) forcibly carries the pilgrim there on her back. In addition, the pilgrim displays more bravery and resourcefulness during his time on the left side of the hedge. While he is beaten by all of the seven deadly sins in PVH, he manages to fight most of them off in PVH2 by heeding Grace Dieu’s advice to don his armor, thus escaping from the clutches of Sloth.

It is not only a question in PVH2 of greater spiritual brawn, but also of brains. In the first Pèlerinage, the pilgrim is forever asking Grace Dieu stupid questions and failing to grasp most of what she has to teach him. But in PVH2, the pilgrim is a more accomplished student. When he meets the rest of the sins who lie in wait for him after he breaks free of Sloth—and there are considerably more in the second version—he is able to defeat them by drawing on his impressive knowledge of doctrine.

26. The pilgrim refutes the claims of Astrologie and Idolatry, for example. See Philippe Maupou, “La tentation autobiographique dans le songe allégorique édifiant de Guillaume de Deguileville: Le pèlerinage de vie humaine,” in Songes et songeurs (XIIe–XVIIIe siècle). Ed. Nathalie Dauvois, Jean-Philippe Grosperrin. Québec: Les Presses de l’Université Laval, 2003. 65. As I discuss below (84–87), the pilgrim is viciously attacked by the same sins he first vanquished after escaping from Sloth—Envie, Trahison and Detraction, plus Conspiration—further along in PVH2. This, however, does not seem to be the pilgrim’s fault, as it refers instead to treachery the author would have faced from among the brethren of Chaalis.
Improving his conduct from one version of the poem to another, the pilgrim becomes a more positive exemplar for readers to follow, his story no longer just a cautionary tale. But it is not the narrator alone who must make a revised pilgrimage to repent for his actions. Apostrophizing his original text in the new prologue, Deguileville designates the Pèlerinage itself as a pilgrim in the world:

Ne t’avoie pas apelé
Pieça ‘pelerin’ et nommé
Afin qu’a cheval ne a pié
Alasses hors sans mon congîé,
Mes pour ce que te menasse
Avec moy quant je alasse
En Jerusalem la cité
Ou d’aler estoie exité:
C’est ou je tent, ce est la fin
Ou doit tendre tout pelerin.

Hadn’t I called you
long ago ‘pilgrim’
so that neither on horseback nor on foot
you would go forth without my leave,
but rather that I might bring you
with me when I went
into Jerusalem, that city
where I was stirred to go.
That’s where I’m headed, and it’s the end
to which every pilgrim should aspire.

(vv. 77–86)

A wayward pilgrim, PVHI has strayed from its intended goal, or has been lured from the narrow path by those who copied and disseminated the text without the author’s permission, before it had a chance to be perfected. Like the narrator, PVHI must also wear the penitential placard—the revision—to announce its errors to the world.

Deguileville himself is, however, the most important pilgrim to appear in these verses, for it is he who will bring his book—his fellow pilgrim—with him to the heavenly city when he goes (vv. 81–82). The image implies that Deguileville’s book will be opened and considered again at the Judgment. Like Rousseau four centuries later, the author will stand before God with his work in hand. Or rather, he must stand with it hanging around his neck, and he fears that the unrevised poem may not represent him in the best light. He must regain control of his disobedient text and his defiant narrator, who are to accompany him to the New Jerusalem, and to whom he is bound for all eternity. Beginning all over again, the author must now

27. On the multivalent identity of Deguileville’s pilgrim, see Maupeu, Pèlerins de vie humaine, 62. Similarly, Maupeu (“Tentation,” 52) notes the three identities of the first-person subject: 1. dreaming narrator in bed at Chaalis, 2. allegorical dream-pilgrim, and 3. stand-in for the author. Maupeu (Pèlerins de vie humaine, 207–8) further points out that manuscript rubrics identify the narrator sometimes as “le pelerin,” sometimes as “l’auteur” or “l’acteur.”

guide his text and narrator back in the direction of his original intention in writing, that end “ou doit tendre tout pelerin” (v. 86).29

Whether or not his text had truly been taken from him, Deguileville insisted on the theme of authorial responsibility, on the poet’s duty to answer even for the most unintended consequences of writing.30 We must therefore consider what the author’s perceived transgressions may have been, in addition to those of his narrator. Although his new prologue does not specify the nature of the corrigenda, the changes Deguileville made in PVH2 have led scholars to a number of possible solutions. First, it has frequently been suggested that the 1353 revision may have been prompted by criticisms of Deguileville’s poem by other monks in the abbey at Chaalis. As Fabienne Pomel notes, statements potentially critical of king and clergy have been omitted from the second version, while much more of the pilgrim’s time is spent fighting enemies of the Church, with the addition of a host of personified sins not featured in PVH1, such as Hérésie, Nigromancie, Astrologie, Géomancie, Idolâtrie and Sorcerie.31 In Pomel’s words, “Guillaume aurait donc réécrit son texte pour le rendre plus conforme à une idéologie politique et religieuse, vraisemblablement à l’instigation de certains de ses proches ou supérieurs” (“Guillaume would thus have rewritten his text in order to make it conform better to a certain political and religious ideology, seemingly in response to certain of his peers or superiors.”)32 According to Philippe Maupeu, Deguileville’s reasons for rewriting may have included a need for more doctrinal precision on matters concerning the Trinity, original sin, grace and free will.33 While it is difficult to say with certainty what elements of PVH1 would have prompted objections from Deguileville’s readers, we may indeed consider many of the revisions as attempts to elaborate points of doctrine more clearly, if not to avoid charges of heterodoxy. The pilgrim’s improved behavior—particularly his new ability to refute the personified enemies of the Church—seems to


30. Pomel writes that PVH2 is part of the beginning of a “débat sur la responsabilité morale et idéologique de l’auteur et sur le statut du texte littéraire” (“Enjeux,” 466). Pomel makes the same point elsewhere, more briefly, about PA (Voies, 413–14). See also Badel, Le Roman de la Rose, 371.


32. Pomel, “Enjeux,” 460. See also Badel, Le Roman de la Rose, 367. Faral (“Guillaume de Digulleville,” 53) has suggested that Deguileville’s motives for revision may have been doctrinal in nature. On the question of orthodoxy, see also Maupeu, Pèlerins de vie humaine, 80–84.

33. Maupeu, Pèlerins de vie humaine, 83–84. See also Badel, Le Roman de la Rose, 375.
echo the position Deguileville himself may have needed to defend against critics.

In a broader sense, *PVH*₂ stands out as a more erudite work than *PVH*₁, a facet of the revision which has likewise not gone unnoticed by prior scholarship.³⁴ The prologue of *PVH*₁ addresses a diverse congregation of listeners, rich and poor, male and female, lay and religious. As Deguileville announces it in the early 1330s, the endeavor of *pèlerinage* is the human condition in its entirety, the common legacy of the Fall and the collective journey back to God. Deguileville’s audience is everyone, his pilgrim an allegorical stand-in for humankind facing tribulation. Apparently in order to reflect the author’s project of lay evangelization, manuscript frontispieces for *PVH*₁ usually depict a tonsured speaker at a podium addressing a large crowd gathered outdoors.³⁵ *PVH*₁ is, furthermore, divided into four books which correspond to four days during which the dream vision is to be read aloud to the pilgrims of this world.³⁶

These nods to orality and public preaching are by and large omitted in *PVH*₂, which reads as being addressed to a more educated, more ecclesiastical (and more male) readership, rather than to a congregation of lay listeners. It is certainly questionable what use *PVH*₁ would have been to laypersons, since it highlights at every turn the inherent wickedness of worldly life and suggests that the pilgrim’s debarkation onto the Ship of Religion is the only good solution to his problems. Now, the text seems destined more consciously for a monastic audience. *PVH*₂ includes several additions in Latin and macaronic verse as well as one in Latin prose, and introduces a host of theological topics not covered in *PVH*₁. The new prologue no longer refers to a mixed audience of *pelerins et pelerines*, the text is no longer divided into four books/days, and the *PVH*₂ frontispiece is typically that of the tonsured author alone in his cell, dreaming of the heavenly Jerusalem in bed or writing at his desk. The enthusiastic worldliness of the pilgrim has been considerably toned down. It is the same worldliness which Deguileville makes an effort to disclaim in the new prologue, when he announces his intent to rescue and redeem the pilgrim following his premature wanderings outside the walls of Chaalis. We might well wonder if Deguileville had been criticized for public preaching or the suggestion of

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³⁵. See Maupeu, *Pèlerins de vie humaine*, 270.

it, and thus now wished to portray himself as a more traditional, cloistered Cistercian.

Deguileville’s efforts to move his narrator to the right side of the hedgerow, and to distance himself from suspicions of worldliness, are also reflected in an apparent about-face concerning one of his major source texts for *PVH*—the *Roman de la Rose* of Guillaume de Lorris and Jean de Meun. Here the potential controversy of Deguileville’s work may be considered in light of the ultimate literary controversy of the Middle Ages, the Querelle de la Rose. While it is difficult to speak of a fully blossomed Querelle in the 1350s, Deguileville’s *PVH* is the earliest known document providing evidence of readers’ polemical reaction to the thirteenth-century text.\(^\text{37}\)

In the prologue of *PVH*1, Deguileville had singled out the “biau roumans de la Rose” (v. 11) as his most important influence. The *Rose*’s intertextual presence in both versions of *PVH* cannot be ignored, beginning with the choice to frame the narrative as a first-person allegorical dream vision.\(^\text{38}\) Some of Deguileville’s personifications, like Huisuse and Raison, are directly borrowed from Guillaume’s *Rose*,\(^\text{39}\) while their grotesque appearances—and the way they overwhelm the narrator along his journey—owe more to Jean’s continuation than to Guillaume’s beginning. Like the *Rose*’s narrator, called Amant, Deguileville’s pilgrim has set his sights on a hard-won object on the other side of a heavy fortification. While for Amant, this object is the vaginal Rose, Guillaume de Deguileville’s pilgrim strives instead for the heavenly Jerusalem. Deguileville’s narrator particu-

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37. Faral (“Guillaume de Digulleville,” 37 n1) considers that *PVH* is the first text that bears witness to the *Rose* controversy, later to escalate with Christine de Pizan and Jean Gerson. Badel (Le Roman de la Rose, 363, 372) offers the same opinion, as does Maupeu (“Bivium: l’écrivain nattier et le Roman de la Rose,” in Duval and Pomel, eds., Guillaume de Digulleville: les Pèlerinages allégoriques. 32). John Fleming argues that *PVH* does not provide evidence of a full-scale attack on the *Rose*, as, according to Fleming, the Querelle de la Rose cannot be said to begin until the polemics by Christine and Gerson (“The Moral Reputation of the Roman de la Rose before 1400.” Romance Philology 18.4 [May 1965]). However, even Fleming concedes (433) a certain degree of criticism aimed at Jean de Meun by Deguileville.


larly resembles the final incarnation of Jean’s Amant, who is transformed into a pilgrim at the end of the poem as he approaches the long awaited Rose. Amant carries a pilgrim’s staff and purse (his genitals) and uses them to gain entrance to the Rose’s reliquary, between whose columns (thighs) lies the object of his desire.\(^{40}\)

For Deguileville’s pilgrim, the staff is Hope, and the purse Faith. With \(PVH_{1}\), the author had meant to reappropriate and sanitize the popular image of Jean de Meun’s erotic pilgrim for a Christian audience, producing what has been called a “contrepartie religieuse” and “édifiante” of the \(Rose\).\(^{41}\) But at times, Deguileville’s protagonist of 1330–31 seems all too similar to the oversexed Amant, his tale not so much a moralizing contrepartie as another continuation. Both pilgrims fall under the violent influence of Venus and abandon the guidance of Raison, while Deguileville’s narrator aggravates the situation by also departing from God’s grace—his teacher Grace Dieu.

In its uncomfortably close resemblances to the \(Rose\), then, \(PVH_{1}\) may have provoked the censure of those who saw a potential moral threat in any such use of a profane text. Pierre-Yves Badel affirms that Deguileville’s poem and its rewriting should be viewed in the context of a general suspicion which attached itself to late medieval vernacular literature, namely that “la littérature de fiction, plus apte à satisfaire les désirs des hommes qu’à exhorter les pécheurs à la repentance ou à édifier les croyants, a rencontré de réelles résistances et la réprobation de moines et de clercs qui refusaient tout compromis avec le monde” (“The literature of fiction, more apt to satisfy worldly desire than to exhort sinners to repentance or instruct believers, encountered considerable resistance and the disapproval of monks and clerics who refused all compromise with the world.”)\(^{42}\) In other words, in \(PVH_{1}\), Deguileville would have associated himself too closely with the seductive, purely entertaining aspects of the \(Rose\), failing to produce a sufficiently edifying text or a suitably exemplary narrator.

Or, from the opposite perspective, by 1356 Deguileville may have felt diminished confidence in his audience’s abilities to correctly interpret the ambiguities of a fictional, allegorical text; he may have felt that readers had failed to grasp his intentions. Whatever the reasons, modern critics have generally agreed that the revised \(Pèlerinage\) reflects Deguileville’s attempts

\(^{40}\) Badel (Le Roman de la \(Rose\), 65) notes the negative impact such parallels may have had on the reception of Deguileville’s poem. See also Maupeu, \(Pèlerins de vie humaine\), 85, 119.

\(^{41}\) Badel, Le Roman de la \(Rose\), 365. The same terminology is later reconsidered by Steven Wright in “Deguileville’s \(Pèlerinage de vie humaine\) as ‘contrepartie édifiante’ of the \(Roman de la Rose\).” \textit{Philological Quarterly} 68.4 (1989): 399–422.

\(^{42}\) Badel, Le Roman de la \(Rose\), 371.
to put distance between himself and the *Rose*. While the prologue of the first version begins by crediting the “biau roumans de la Rose” (v. 11), the 1356 prologue omits all mention of the text. In the second redaction, Deguileville’s narrator now refuses to enter the left-hand path attended by Huiseuse, the very same character who guards the gate to the pleasure garden into which Amant enters as Guillaume de Lorris’s *Rose* begins. And in an added dialog between the pilgrim and Venus, the rewritten pilgrim denounces both the goddess of love and Jean de Meun, whom Venus claims as “her clerk” (“mon clerc escrivain,” *PVH* 2, v. 8632):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Toy donc, dis, et ton escrivain} & \quad \text{You then, I say, and your writer too,} \\
\text{Estes de grant mauvaistié plain.} & \quad \text{are full of great evil.}
\end{align*}
\]

(\textit{vv. 8765–66})

These conspicuous revisions strongly suggest that the *Rose* in its most thoroughly profane aspect had proven an undesirable influence on the reception of Deguileville’s text, despite the author’s intentions in adapting it to Christian allegory.

Deguileville thus had numerous possible reasons for facing censure, all of which could have prompted his rewriting of *PVH*. All of the potential criticisms of *PVH* 1, moreover, speak to an underlying conception of the ethical relationship between author and reader. For Deguileville, this relationship was conceived, above all, as pastoral and didactic, as his expressed goal was to keep pilgrims on the right track and away from spiritual detours (*PVH* 1, vv. 13525–30). In *PVH* 2, the author seems to have shied away from the image of public preacher, and purposefully limited his audience. These gestures, too, may articulate a certain pastoral obligation, inasmuch as they speak to Deguileville’s concern that the uninitiated had not understood his allegory and risked being led astray by appearances.

But while he assumes a heavy responsibility toward readers and describes his rewriting as a literary penance, Deguileville’s attitude toward

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44. Deguileville’s Huiseuse declares her love of “roumans et choses mencongables” (*PVH* 1, v. 6856). On the diverging path (\textit{bivium}) of Huiseuse and Labour, see Maupeu, *Pèlerins de vie humaine*, 122–26. Maupeu (126) sees the figure of Labour (represented as a \textit{nattier}, or weaver) as an emblem of the good writer, while Huiseuse becomes a potential allegory for the first *PVH*, which had made too many concessions to the worldly pleasures of reading. See also Maupeu, “\textit{Bivium},” especially 22–32.
the various criticisms surrounding his work can hardly be defined as sub-
missive. Instead, Deguileville’s approach is best understood as apologetic 
in the fullest sense: as a carefully crafted defense of his project, in opposi-
tion to certain kinds of reading and certain kinds of readers. As we will 
see, Deguileville gave this apologetic rhetoric its most grandiose expression 
in *Pèlerinage de l’âme*, by implanting it into a representation of eschat-
ological judgment. Yet the trial scene of *PA* is only the most dramatic legal 
episode in Deguileville’s body of work. Well before the pilgrim appears in 
Saint Michael’s court, he is already the object of an ongoing series of judg-
ments, at once legal and eschatological, staged in both versions of *PVH*. In 
these instances of judgment, the author’s efforts at self-defense are already 
addressed to God and the reader at once, preparing us for the way in which 
the trial scene of *PA* works to apply spiritual justice to literary problems.

III. Preliminary Judgments

In both versions of *PVH*, as he is just starting out on his journey, the 
pilgrim encounters the hulking *villain* Rude Entendement (Vulgar 
Understanding):45

> Un grant villain mal façon,  
> Ensourcillie et reboule,  
> Qui un baston de cournoulle  
> Portoit et bien mal pautonnier  
> Sembloit estre et mal pelerin.

*(PVH1, vv. 5095–99)*

Lumbering at the pilgrim, Rude Entendement accuses him of presumption 
(“outrecuidance,” v. 5120), since he is carrying a pilgrim’s staff and purse 
despite Christ’s directive to his apostles (Matt. 10:10, Lk. 9:3) not to carry 
these items when they go out into the world.

The pilgrim describes the scene as a legal dispute. Just as he will be 
initially dumbstruck at the beginning of his trial in *PA*, the pilgrim cannot 
come up with the words to counter Rude Entendement’s accusation, and

45. In *PVH1*, the scene occurs at vv. 5093–632; in *PVH2*, at vv. 6880–7217. Rude Entendement 
resembles the character Dangier from the *Roman de la Rose*, who is first described in Guillaume de 
Lorris’s text as a hulking and poorly-shaped villain (vv. 2918–22). On this episode in Deguileville, 
it’s treatment of allegory and its correspondences to the *Rose*, see Huot, *Medieval Readers*, 218–20; 
Stephanie A. Viereck Gibbs Kamath, “Unveiling the ‘I’: Allegory and Authorship in the Franco-
complains that he will not be able to find a suitable advocate to speak for him:

Quant ces paroles j’entendi, When I heard these words,
Plus que devant fu esbahí; I was even more startled than before,
Quar response nulle n’avoie for I had no response
Ne que respondre ne savoie. and did not know how to answer.
Un advocat eusse loue I would have happily hired a lawyer
Volentiers, se l’eusse trouve, if I could have found one,
Quar bien en avoie mestier, for I truly did need one,
Se l’eusse sceu ou pourchacier. had I only known where to seek one out.

The pilgrim need not worry, however, for the personified lady Raison quickly appears and accuses Rude Entendement of waylaying pilgrims. Although not an advocate, Raison is identified as an *enquesteresse* (“officer of inquest,” v. 5176), and her legal action, which is carried out under orders from the court of heaven, protects the pilgrim against the accusations of Rude Entendement.

Raison, heaven’s *enquesteresse*, proceeds to serve Rude Entendement a kind of cease and desist order from Grace Dieu, and because this peasant is illiterate, the pilgrim must read it aloud to him (vv. 5219–56): the letter commands Rude Entendement to stop bullying pilgrims with his heavy club, Stubbornness (*Obstination*), and to stop trying to take away their staffs and purses. Grace Dieu’s letter concludes by threatening to summon Rude Entendement to judgment before God should he fail to heed her injunction:

Et se de rien il s’opposoit And should he refuse anything
Ou obeir il ne vouloit, or not wish to obey,
Jour li donnasses competent may you give him his day in court
Aus assisses du jugement. before the seat of Judgment.

46. Soon after his meeting with Rude Entendement, the pilgrim complains that his own body has begun a vicious trial against him:

Contre moy pour guerroier To make war against me
Il est advocat devenu. he has become a lawyer.

Grace Dieu had already identified the pilgrim’s body as his “grans anemis” (*PVHs*, v. 5748). Thus, Guillermus’s body (his *corpus*) is closely connected to the Enemy, Satan, who will sue him in *PA*. 
Rude Entendement, however, refuses to listen to Raison, questioning her authority over him by bringing up the contemporary scholastic debate over names and things. Rude Entendement claims that Raison is a false name, since millers habitually cheat their customers by using a deceptive measure (raison) for grain. Raison calmly explains that it is one thing to be her and quite another to have her name (vv. 5293–94). But Rude Entendement will not relent and continues to assert that Raison must also be false, since she shares her name with the miller’s measure (vv. 5315–36). Raison retorts that Rude Entendement obviously knows how to put forward subtle arguments and nice examples (vv. 5341–42), but that his own name is perfectly apt, since his understanding of the world is severely limited. This shuts him up for a time, and he can only sneer and grind his teeth (vv. 5392–94) at Raison and the pilgrim.

The debate about names recalls a well-known—indeed, notorious—section of Jean de Meun’s Roman de la Rose, where Jean’s own version of Raison argues with Amant concerning her prerogative to name things as she sees fit. In the Rose, the word in question is not raison, but couilles (“balls,” v. 5533), which Raison had used when she told Amant the story of Saturn’s castration. When Amant objects to Raison’s use of such a vulgar term, she defends herself by noting that God endowed her with the power to name, and that names in themselves are not the same as what they describe. Thus, Raison says, she might just as well have called testicles “reliques”—the word would still refer to exactly the same thing (vv. 7100–20).

In the argument Deguileville stages between Raison and Rude Entendement, the issue is quite similar: whether or not the signifier should be identified absolutely with the signified. Raison says no, while the stubborn peasant continues to insist otherwise. Since he cannot read and lacks a basic understanding of sign theory, Rude Entendement is also poorly disposed to comprehend Scripture, and he brings the discussion back to the accusation he had first made against the pilgrim: that Christ prohibited his apostles from carrying a staff or purse. Raison reviews the relevant passage of the New Testament and reminds Rude Entendement that shortly before Christ’s death, he had changed his commandment (Lk. 22:36) to reflect the new and more difficult circumstances in which the apostles would find themselves: they should now take along a purse and a sword if they have them. The pilgrim is therefore perfectly in the right (vv. 5419–704). Ever obstinate, Rude Entendement refuses to acknowledge that God could ever change his commands (vv. 5517–26), and Raison again criticizes his inability to read Scripture deeply (vv. 5527–40). When Rude Entendement still fails to understand, and refuses to stop threatening pilgrims, Raison notes
that he is only capable of digesting the outer covering of things, their chaff ("hauton," v. 5587). By this, Raison means that Rude Entendement does not know how to properly sift the outer covering of words from their true intention and meaning. He is a bad interpreter of everyday reality and Scripture, because he puts more stock in the forms and names things take than in what they are meant to signify.

By the same token, it is clear that Rude Entendement represents a certain undesirable reading of Deguileville’s text, a reading that would confuse the covering of allegory—the signifying integumentum or chaff—with its deepest signification, or grain. The rude peasant is identifiable with readers, particularly among the laity, who would either accuse Deguileville’s allegorical narrative of being too worldly, or who would find in it only matter for amusement and fail to profit from the salutary substance that it encloses. The identification of Rude Entendement with irresponsible readers is especially pertinent given that the episode evokes Jean de Meun’s *Rose* and Reason’s treatment of names and allegory in that text. While Rude Entendement objects to the pilgrim’s carrying a staff and purse because of his bad reading of Scripture, it is difficult to put out of mind the erotic signification which attaches to these objects at the end of Jean’s *Rose* and which would have been their most immediate reference for many medieval readers.

Raison’s condemnation of Rude Entendement, who sees only the surface elements of Deguileville’s narrative, cautions readers against the same kind of superficiality which would lead them to snickeringly identify the pilgrim’s staff and purse as a penis and testicles, or perhaps to enjoy the pilgrim’s spiritual mistakes more than his successes. When Raison finally tires of arguing with Rude Entendement, she makes good on Grace Dieu’s command to summon him to God’s judgment if he won’t stop attacking pilgrims:

‘O,’ dist Raison, ‘maintenant moi que plus n’ai a parler a toi
Que plus n’ai a parler a toi
Fors toi citer tant seulement
Aus assises du jugement,
Je t’i semont sans plus targier,
Viens i sans nul autre envoier!’

(vv. 5627–32)

47. On Rude Entendement as a figure for the bad reader, see Maupeu, *Pèlerins de vie humaine,* 127, 135. See also Moreau, “‘Ce mauvais tabellion,’” 123.
At the Judgment, the winnowing time, Raison is confident that Rude Entendement will be condemned once and for all, and burned with the chaff.\(^\text{48}\) That Rude Entendement’s accusation against the pilgrim is turned around on him insists that literature is an enterprise with reciprocal, if asymmetrical, ethical demands. While the author’s intentions are a matter for judgment on earth and in heaven, audience members are warned that reading or understanding texts in the manner of Rude Entendement may bring dire consequences for them in the next world. The scene begins to construct in Deguileville’s corpus as a whole an eschatological context for judgment on the literary work, in which divine scrutiny is immanent, and in which the author already prepares his rejoinder against the real or potential accusations of readers.

The apologetic character of Deguileville’s text—the way the narrator finds himself in the middle of controversies about the author and his work—is still more evident in the second \textit{Pèlerinage de vie humaine}, as is the tendency to measure the judgment of readers against the judgment of God. When read in its entirety, \textit{PVH\textsubscript{2}} stands out not so much as a penitential work—as its prologue might suggest—but rather as a document written by Deguileville in his own defense. At times, \textit{PVH\textsubscript{2}} even becomes a raging tirade directed against the author’s unnamed critics, those who, like Rude Entendement, had failed to appreciate the spiritual value of \textit{PVH\textsubscript{1}}.

The combative aspect of the rewritten text is most evident in a startling new scene added to the Ship of Religion section of \textit{PVH\textsubscript{2}}. Once aboard ship, the pilgrim tells us that he wants to recount something that really happened to him and to none other. In order to make this pseudo-autobiographical identification as clear as possible, he will narrate the episode in a French and Latin macaronic poem spelling out his name—\textit{Guillermus de Deguilevilla}—with the first letters of twenty-four eight-line stanzas. As he will do in the heavenly trial scene of \textit{PA}, Deguileville winks at the connection between his narrator and himself by framing the inset narrative with a signature-acrostic. This is the first time the poet names himself directly in his work, and it signals an important change of tone from \textit{PVH\textsubscript{1}}, where the pilgrim’s resemblance to the author is somewhat less obvious.\(^\text{49}\)

The story told by the acrostic poem of \textit{PVH\textsubscript{2}} is this: after Guillermus had already been on the ship for some time, he was brutally attacked by a cabal of personified sins—Envie, Traison, Detraction and Conspiration.

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48. For the origins of this eschatological image, see Matt. 3:12, Lk. 3:17.
The sins set out to destroy the pilgrim and succeeded in badly injuring his leg, killing his trusty horse Renommé (Good Name), and forcing his exile from the ship (he is later reinstated). Although we know nothing about any real events this mysterious episode may reference, the episode makes several allusions to a legal case—perhaps one brought under canon law at the abbey of Chaalis—and a case which the pilgrim lost to his opponents. For instance, the pilgrim describes how the personification Conspiration (or “Scilla”) “pursued” him like a helpless beast:

Me persequens indefesse
La tres cruelle veneresse,
Ac violenter me subsesse
Fist a ses chiens hors de lesse,
Sicque clamare ncessse
Bien me fut, pour yssir de presse,
Sed si potuit prodesse,
N’est pas bien ceste chose expresse.

Pursuing me without relent,
the very cruel huntress
let her dogs loose
in order to bring me down violently,
so that I had to cry out
in order to free myself,
but whether this was successful
is not completely clear.

Although Deguileville colors his scene with hunting images, evocative of the Acteon myth, to accentuate the violence done to his person and his good name, the verb persequens (v. 16206) also suggests that Guillermus de Deguilevilla was the defendant in a legal action that his detractors brought against him. It seems, moreover, that he either spoke out on his own behalf (clamare, v. 16210) or initiated a counter-suit against his opponents. Later in the acrostic poem, the juridical aspect of the attack against Guillermus is further supported by mention of Detraction and her accomplice Murmure swearing testimony (“asseruntque de iure,” v. 16234) damaging to the pilgrim and to others in the monastery.

To describe the added scene, Philippe Maupeu has adopted Gisèle Mathieu-Castellani’s expression “scène judiciaire de l’autobiographie,” which informs my own reading of the fourteenth-century poets in this study. Indeed, the judgment of PVH2 seems to refer at once to the real-
life legal struggles of Deguileville—whatever they may have been—and to the more figurative trial he faced at the hands of a readership much larger than his abbey. During the course of the episode, Deguileville provides several clues that the pilgrim was pursued by his enemies for literary transgressions. As Maupeu has shown, Deguileville’s story of persecution at Chaalis is modeled partly on Pierre Abelard’s *Historia calamitatum*, a narrative in which Abelard recounts a double misfortune: his castration and the 1121 burning of his *Theologia* for heretical propositions. The parallels with Guillermus de Deguilevilla’s own problems are interesting: Guillermus seems also to have been maliciously deprived of a lower body part or its use (his leg), while Deguileville begins *PVH 2* by complaining of the loss of his book (to unnamed copyists). Moreover, the nature of the 1355 revisions hint that the first version of *PVH 1* may have been accused of doctrinal imprecision, or even heterodoxy, as was the case with Abelard’s burned book.

This is not the only reference Deguileville makes during the episode to another author’s literary scandal. After he is savagely attacked and exiled from the ship, Guillermus is honored with a visit of consolation by none other than the poet Ovid. Ovid generously offers to the pilgrim his own *Ibis*, a series of acid curses in elegiac couplets, written during his exile on the Black Sea. Guillermus places some of these donated Latin verses directly within his own narrative of personal tribulation (vv. 16109–25), making it likely that Deguileville identified with the Roman poet as one who had been harshly treated and banished for something he wrote, the infamous “carmen et error” (“poem and error”) which got him sent to the edge of the empire. It has generally been assumed that the *carmen et error* in question was Ovid’s *Ars amatoria*, a satirical handbook on seduction. Particularly because the *Ars amatoria* was also a major source for Jean de Meun’s *Rose*, it might be inferred that Deguileville was likewise facing official sanction, and was forced to leave the Cistercian order for a time, due to backlash against his worldly first *Pèlerinage.*

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55. On Ovidian connections, see especially Pomel, “Les écrits pérégrins.” While pleading with the Emperor Augustus in *Tristia* (2.103–6), the exiled Ovid compares himself to Acteon, who accidentally saw too much. Deguileville’s mention of being hunted down by dogs also vividly recalls the Acteon myth. According to Simone Marchesi, Dante would have used Ovid’s Acteon similarly, to identify himself as having been unjustly exiled from Florence in *Inferno* 21 and 22 (“Distilling
Crippled, ostracized, and humiliated, Deguileville cuts short Ovid’s proposed poetic vengeance and takes solace instead in the faith that the false accusations against him at Chaalis will be rectified by God “au Jugement / que par devant le Roy atent” (“at the Judgment which awaits before the king,” vv. 16132–33). Deguileville thus prepares us for PA, when the pilgrim’s case is retried in heaven, albeit with Saint Michael presiding as God’s lieutenant. And at the end of the soul’s trial in PA, Lady Justice will fulfill Guillermus’s hope for exoneration, expressed near the end of his acrostic poem in PVH:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Legi quodam volumine,} & \quad \text{I read in a certain volume,} \\
\text{Quant fait est bien examiné} & \quad \text{that when the facts are well examined} \\
\text{Justicie libramine,} & \quad \text{in the scales of Justice,} \\
\text{Qui a tort, est tantost miné;} & \quad \text{Whosoever is at fault is just as soon destroyed;} \\
\text{Et iustus non redit sine} & \quad \text{And the just man does not remain without} \\
\text{Honneur quant le plait est finé.} & \quad \text{honor when the plea is finished.}
\end{align*}
\]

Although Justice is Guillermus’s opponent and Satan’s ally in the heavenly court, her scales cannot lie, and the judgment will indeed be returned in Guillermus’s favor after the arguments have concluded (“quant le plait est finé,” v. 16331), just as he predicts.

Deguileville, apparently obliged to the readership to correct his mistakes after twenty-five years, also uses the occasion to replay an obscure legal event. In the recounting of the event, he pleads his innocence, lashes out at his unnamed critics, and finally, promises an appeal—a sequel—before the gates of paradise. The higher Judgment which the pilgrim awaits is focused especially on literary production, and it will provide the author with a new opportunity to respond to the criticisms of his audience. As I now turn back to reexamine the trial scene of PA, when Guillermus’s appeal is heard, it is possible to show in greater detail how Deguileville’s pilgrim speaks for the author’s larger body of work.
IV. Satan v. Guillermus de Deguilevilla

PA picks up where PVH, in both of its redactions, leaves off. Aboard the Ship of Religion, the pilgrim falls ill and is visited by Death, sickle in hand and open casket at the ready to collect his body. Grace Dieu, at the pilgrim’s bedside, informs him that his soul will soon be judged worthy or unworthy to enter the long-awaited city of God. The dreamer does not proceed directly to his judgment, but awakens to the sound of the abbey bells chiming matins, at which point PVH ends. As PA begins, Guillermus has returned to bed, full of anxiety over the fleeting nature of human existence. He tosses over onto his other side (“sus l’autre couste,” v. 24) and has another dream.57 Thus begins the particular judgment scene, where the soul of Guillermus de Deguilevilla must answer for all three manifestations of the pilgrim: author, text, and narrator. As the “other side” (“l’autre couste”) of the first dream vision and its re-vision, the eschatological scene of PA stages a retrial of the pilgrim’s case in a new and more perfect forum.

I have already outlined the basic shape of this judgment scene, which Deguileville adapted from the Devil’s Rights tradition with a first-person narrator who shares both his name and his ability to use language persuasively. Resemblances run much deeper than that, however, because Deguileville cleverly included a number of specific allusions to his own career and reception in this reworking of the Devil’s Rights trial scene. These allusions further confuse the boundaries between the narrator’s soul and the author’s. Moreover, they conflate Deguileville’s evolving corpus with the traditional documents of the eschatological record, such as the Book of Conscience. As it becomes a dispute about the historical author’s guilt or innocence, Guillermus’s cosmic trial also points to issues surrounding the reproduction and compilation of his work in manuscript form, and the author’s ability or inability to control the circulation of his writing.

First, it is important to note that the evidence introduced by Satan and Justice against the pilgrim is drawn directly from the events of PVH1, which most often precedes PA in manuscripts.58 As Satan claims,

Onques bien ne pelerina,        Never did he make a good pilgrimage,
Par bonne voie onques n’ala,    Never did he take the good path,
Par Orgueil et par Envie,        But through Pride and through Envy,
Par Venus et Gloutonnie;         Through Lust and Gluttony,

57. This prologue to PA does not occur in all manuscripts. For example, BNF fr. 829 transitions more swiftly between PVH (in its second version) and PA.
58. On this point, see Moreau, “‘Ce mauvais tabellion,’” 119–22.
Ire, Avarice, Paresse
A este tous jours s’adrece.
(vv. 685–90)

The Devil is not making things up. As readers follow Guillermus on his continued pilgrimage from the hedgerow to the gates of heaven, from one text to the next in the compiled corpus, they are forced to acknowledge the truth of Satan’s position: in PVH1, the pilgrim really did fail to take the good path—the right side of the Hedge of Penitence—time and again, and was defeated with little resistance by all of the seven deadly sins. Likewise, Justice recalls how Grace Dieu had instructed the pilgrim precisely on how to use his spiritual armor, which he also failed to do:

Quel excusance puet avoir, What excuse can he have,
Quant Grace Dieu en son manoir when Grace Dieu in her house
Les armëures li bailla gave him his armor
Et l’aprist et endoctrina and taught and instructed him
Comment soustênir les devoit in how to wear it,
Et comment armer s’en devoit and how he should put it on
Contre tous ses adversaires, against all his adversaries,
Et coment ne prisa gaires and how he did not care at all
Quanque li dist, car n’en fist rien. about anything she said, for he did nothing.
Je le vi et m’en souvient bien. I saw it and remember well.
(vv. 1559–68)

Deguileville’s medieval reader, too, would have remembered how the pilgrim failed to act on Grace Dieu’s instructions about his armor.

But this is only part of the story, or rather a different story entirely for that smaller group of medieval readers who would have traced the pilgrim’s adventures in the compiled corpus from PVH2 to PA, instead of from PVH1. In PVH2, the pilgrim is still beaten by Gluttony and Venus, and then captured by Peresce; but soon he remembers Grace Dieu’s teachings and breaks free of Sloth (vv. 10448–93). Confronted with Envie, Orgueil and their kind, the pilgrim manages to resist them; these personifications only succeed in harming him after he has boarded the Ship of Religion. And here, we recall, the attack seems not to be the pilgrim’s fault, but is rather the result of an evil conspiracy against him reflecting events in Deguileville’s own life. After defeating Envie and Orgueil along the hedgerow, the pil-

59. See Maupeu, Pèlerins de vie humaine, 191.
grim of 1355 also withstands Ire and escapes from Avarice, before going on to triumph over the enemies of the Church. Satan and Justice left these details conveniently out of their account.

The tendency of the plaintiffs to rely primarily on the narrative of PVH1 for their evidence stands out sharply, since PVH2 had appeared so soon before PA to offer an alternative version of the pilgrim’s life. One conclusion that might be drawn from this bias is that the heavenly trial was for Deguileville a way of staging the confrontation of his two Pèlerinages as they were received by readers. After all, despite any attempts the author made to the contrary, PVH1 not only stayed in circulation but remained much more popular than PVH2. The earlier version’s centrality to the accusations against the pilgrim attests to the fact that most readers, like Satan and Justice, would have known only the original—especially in 1356.60

In the legacy of his wayward text, which he cannot expunge from the literary or eschatological record, Deguileville also faces his personal book of spiritual accounts, equally indelible. The Book of Conscience motif appears most powerfully in PA through the star witness for the prosecution, the worm Synderesis, who represents the pilgrim’s own neglected conscience.61 Like the accusations of Satan and Justice, Synderesis’s testimony is also seemingly drawn from the events of PVH1. Unlike the speeches of Satan and Justice, however, the narrator does not reproduce most of what Synderesis says verbatim. This is because, the narrator claims, it would take him too long, and would cause him unnecessary anguish:

Et saches bien certainemment
Quë onques tant celeement
Rien je ne pensai ne ne dis
Et onques nul mal je ne fis
Que ne dëist en presence
De tous et en audience.
Longuement le mist a dire,
Et je aussi a ce escrire
Trop longuentem y mectroie,
Faire aussi ne le vourorie,
Car ce seroit irrision
A moi et grant confusion.
(vv. 1373–84)

And know in certainty
that there was nothing I ever thought or said,
no matter how secretly,
and no sin I ever committed
that she did not bring up
in the presence of everyone assembled.
She took a long time to say it,
and I would take
too long to write it all down.
Moreover, I wouldn’t want to do so,
for it would be harmful
to me and disturbing.

60. See Moreau, “’Ce mauvais tabellion,’” 122.
61. For more on Synderesis, see Pomel, Voies, 354–56.
Yet a more likely reason for the narrator skipping over Synderesis’s testimony is that this information would be superfluous to the reader, who has been following the pilgrim throughout his journey from PVH. Synderesis’s testimony is already written down and available for all to read: it is the pilgrim’s own first-person narrative which now stands before the court (en audience) to accuse him.

Synderesis is a dark reflection of Deguileville’s tripartite image as a pèlerin: author, narrator and book bound together and responsible for each other. The pilgrim describes her as a shriveled hag’s head perched atop a worm’s tail. Her teeth have been worn down to nothing from gnawing at the pilgrim’s unrepentant heart. Her repulsive, flapping gums are living proof that the pilgrim had been repeatedly warned by his own conscience but failed to pay attention. She is hideous only because, as she tells the pilgrim, he has made her so:

Mes tu t’es tout deffigure, But it was you who disfigured,
Deffourme et defaiture deformed and defaced yourself,
Par mains peches et par divers, by many and diverse sins,
Par mauvais dis et fais pervers. by bad things said and perverse works.
(vv. 1317–20)

Synderesis claims that her profound ugliness is a transparent record of the pilgrim’s soul, his personal Book of Conscience, which overlaps significantly with Deguileville’s own book. If the pilgrim-narrator had committed “many and diverse sins,” isn’t the author just as responsible for his conduct?

In this sense, Synderesis’s choice of words in the above passage—“par mauvais dis et fais pervers” (v. 1320)—makes a good pun. As the plural of dit, “dis” can mean “things said,” denoting the ways in which Deguileville’s narrator may have committed various sins of the tongue, such as blasphemy. But dit is also a medieval designation of poetic genre which, although fairly loosely applied in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, always means some kind of a first-person narrative poem, usually in octosyllabic rhyming couplets. Very often in fourteenth-century literature, dits appear in the form of dream visions and contain intercalated lyric poetry. According to these characteristics, all of Deguileville’s extant works are dits, as are the texts by Machaut and Froissart that I examine in the chapters to follow. 62 As part of Synderesis’s testimony, then, the term has particular

62. Along with the two versions of PVH and the Pèlerinage Jhesucrist, Deguileville’s Roman de la fleur de lis can be classified as a dit. Jean de Meun more explicitly used the term dis to repent for earlier writing—namely, the Rose—in his Testament (v. 5). See above, Introduction, 21.
resonance not only for the sinful things the narrator may have said, but also for the mauvais dis of the author, and especially for Deguileville’s first redaction of PVH.

Synderesis’s ugliness is both the mirror image of the pilgrim-soul’s spiritual deficiency and a startling image of the work of art looking back at its creator, a first-person record which now stands to condemn the author “through his own words” (Matt. 12:37). Inasmuch as she is a personification of the poet’s conscience, she is also a figure of Deguileville’s earlier work, which continues to circulate despite any efforts that he may have made to stop it. Synderesis is a ver: she is the proverbial worm of conscience which gnaws at the sinner’s heart, warning him to repent before it is too late. But she is also a vers (verse) of the pilgrim’s own making which has returned to bear witness against him.

As we trace the contours of Deguileville’s heavenly courtroom scene, it is essential to consider that Synderesis’s testimony is recorded dutifully by the court’s tabellion, or notary. Surprisingly, this is a role fulfilled by Satan, who is also the lead plaintiff suing for ownership of Guillermus’s soul:

Le Sathanas de bout en bout
En .i. grant papier escrit tout.
Aussi tost com celle parloit,
Tout aussi tost il escrisoit.

The Adversary from end to end
on a great scroll of paper wrote everything.
As soon as she [Synderesis] would speak
just as quickly would he write it down.

(vv. 1385–88)

One might well object that it would prejudice the court’s record to allow the plaintiff to transcribe it; but like Synderesis, Satan protests his objectivity: he is “tant seulement tabellion,” just writing down exactly what the pilgrim’s own conscience testifies (v. 1360).

This is not the first time that Deguileville, or his narrator, claim to have problems with scribes. In his new prologue to PVH2, remember, the author had accused a nameless person of having copied and circulated PVH1 before it was ready. There is an echo of the same wicked copyist in Deguileville’s Satan, who duplicates the events of the pilgrim’s life (the first Pèlerinage de vie humaine) for all to read, just as soon as Synderesis utters them. As he copies from the mouth of conscience, Deguileville’s Satan recalls an ethical question which had already been broached in the prologue to PVH2: if PVH1 confused readers or caused scandal, who is at fault: the anonymous

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63. On Deguileville’s Satan as tabellion, see Camille, “The Devil’s Writing,” 356; Moreau, “Ce mauvais tabellion.”
scribe who allegedly stole Deguileville’s draft, or the author whose own troubled conscience produced it? Is Satan merely a stenographer, as he says—“tant seulement tabellion”? Or is he to blame for making public what should have remained private?64

Deguileville’s judgment scene raises many such questions about the ethical stakes of the author’s literary enterprise, more than it can claim to answer with certainty. In any event, the representation of the Devil as “just a scribe” highlights yet another of Deguileville’s borrowings consistent with the Devil’s Rights tradition: Satan’s association with a strict, immutable interpretation of texts and individual lives, as opposed to Mary’s more creative, “lawyerly” interpretation of them.65 The Devil’s Rights tradition characterizes the Adversary as a Pharisaical proponent of an unchanging Law and a rigid depiction of individual conduct. As he relies more heavily on the evidence of PVH1, the un-retouched version of the pilgrim’s life, Deguileville’s Satan too proves himself a stickler for the letter of the law and for the oldest textual precedent available. The pilgrim’s life was the narrative of PVH1 and nothing more can be added to it.

Satan’s traditional literalism, represented in his role as tabellion, may also have relevance for the particular problem of allegorical narrative. The inability of readers to interpret the allegorical lessons of Deguileville’s first Pèlerinage, specifically in its liberal borrowings from the Rose, may well have been foremost on the minds of the author’s critics.66 If so, Satan’s characteristic inability to distinguish sign and signifier—which he shares to some extent with the chaff-eating villain Rude Entendement—may refer to the tendency of Deguileville’s enemies, or his most problematic readers, to neglect the deeper meaning of allegory.67

In PA, as in the Rude Entendement episode of PVH, the archetypal bad reader finds his accusations turned back against him, since Guillermus claims that Satan deceived him into sinning:

Car ce mauvais tabellion
Qui ores a mes maux esquis
M’a en tout temps si de pres prins
Que pas n’ai eu grant lesir
De bien deles le mal choisir.
(vv. 1426–30)

For this wicked scribe
who has written down my wrongdoings
has always taken such evil advantage of me
that I have not had much freedom
to choose the good instead of the evil.

64. See Moreau, “‘Ce mauvais tabellion,’” 124.
65. See Ibid.
66. See, again, Badel, Le Roman de la Rose, 371.
67. See Moreau, “‘Ce mauvais tabellion,’” 123.
The defendant’s specific strategy of counteraccusation is drawn from *L’advocacie Nostre Dame*, where the Virgin contends that the Devil wrongfully acquired his rights over mankind by tricking Adam and Eve. But although the pilgrim is ostensibly referring to Satan, the Devil also reveals the more human faces of the reader and copyist, who are implicated for perpetuating a worldly or overly literal reading of *PVH*.68

While the plaintiffs assert the chain of events contained in the original text, Deguileville’s defendant shifts the blame to his accusers through a series of implicit references to the revised narrative of *PVH*₂, especially including his unjust condemnation and exile.69 For example:

> Par mes annemis decêu, By my enemies I was deceived,
> Si comme tu Dieux l’as scêu, just as you knew, God,
> Et pour qui sui en jugement, and for this reason I now stand in judgment,
> Puis qu’en povrete sui chêu since into poverty I fell,
> Et qu’ai trouve ve et hêu and since I found misfortune and anguish,
> Qui me maistroient durement. which roughly governed me.

(vv. 751–56)

Although the pilgrim’s ostensible line of argumentation is that he was deceived by Satan and his minions, his “annemis” could also be Envie, Treason, Detraction, and Conspiration, those false accusers who set upon Guillermus in *PVH*₂.70 In the same vein, Guillermus reminds the court of the crutch (“potence,” *PA*, v. 763; “jambe de fust,” *PVH*₂, v. 16079) he is now obliged to use after being attacked by Envie, Traison, Detraction, and Conspiration. He then tells the court that he has been reduced to begging, since his enemies have broken his “instrument” (his leg? his book? his quill?):

> Point ne scai d’autre vielle, I know no other instrument—
> Mes annemis l’ont quassee. My enemies have smashed mine.

(vv. 785–86)

As his foes cite the first draft of Deguileville’s poem—the most incriminating version of the pilgrim’s life—Guillermus displaces culpability onto his

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68. See Ibid.
69. See Ibid., 126–27.
70. As Satan reminds us in his own arguments, Envie and Traison are his “creatures” (*PA*, vv. 108–9). See also Moreau, ”’Ce mauvais tabellion,’” 126–27.
detractors, suggesting that the negative image of himself and his Pèlerinage was their fault as readers, and perhaps as copyists.

Along with Deguileville’s debt to the Devil’s Rights, there is evidence that he also knew Guillaume d’Auvergne’s Rhetorica divina, which I have discussed in the previous chapter as a text of primary importance for understanding how prayer and the rhetoric of legal self-defense became closely associated in later medieval discourse. As Deguileville was a Cistercian, he had good reason to identify with Rhetorica divina, which treats the order and its most important abbot, Bernard de Clairvaux, as exemplary practitioners of divine rhetoric. I have noted at least two allegorical images, both of them occurring in PVH, that Deguileville probably drew from Rhetorica divina: the personified representation of Prayer as a messenger sent to God, and the pilgrim’s immersion in a bath of tears flowing from the rock of penitence—a bath which directly follows Deguileville’s most well-known act of divine rhetoric, his “ABC-prayer” addressed to the Virgin.

While such borrowed images suggest the familiarity of Deguileville the author with Rhetorica divina, Guillermus’s strategies of self-defense in PA also seem to take inspiration from that Latin text. This is especially the case in that Guillermus throws himself on the mercy of the court, pleading guilty just as Rhetorica divina advises; and just as Guillaume d’Auvergne describes, an impassioned guilty plea before the heavenly court causes the subject to be separated from his sins as he becomes their accuser. Through divine grace, the defendant adopts a prosecutorial role in the service of divine justice, just as Guillermus turns the accusation back against his annemis.

But while Deguileville is clearly working within the rhetor divinus tradition, he has gone much further in his practice of it than Guillaume d’Auvergne’s Rhetorica divina recommends. Self-defense is no longer just

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71. See Chapter 1, 54–56.
72. See, for example, Guillaume d’Auvergne, Rhetorica divina, ch. 29 (ed. Teske, 224–25); ch. 36 (258–59); ch. 45 (346–47). See also Francesco Santi, “Guglielmo D’Auvergne e l’Ordine dei Domenicani tra Filosofia Naturale e Tradizione Magica,” in Morenzoni and Tillette, eds., Autour de Guillaume d’Auvergne († 1249), 148.
74. See Guillaume d’Auvergne, Rhetorica divina, ch. 27 (ed. Teske, 208–9) and ch. 28 (220–21); Guillaume de Deguileville, PVH, vv. 10894–1342.
75. See above, Chapter 1, 55.
an unsparing and tearful confession because the defendant’s opponents are no longer just his sins, or even just the Devil; rather, they insistently point to the presence of real accusers in Deguileville’s world, as obscure as their identity remains.

As they contest the plaintiffs’ side of the story, Guillermus’s arguments for his soul also make a case for the validity of Deguileville’s rewritten text, and thus for the preferability of manuscript compilations that contain the newly “authorized” PVH2. It is especially striking, for instance, that one of the major issues of the trial in the heavenly court is whether the pilgrim’s requests for mercy come too late.76 As Justice claims, “Trop tard vient a faire son cri” (“He comes too late with his plea,” v. 1098). The accusation that the pilgrim has run out of time to excuse or amend himself refers not only to the fact that he is supposedly dead, but also calls to mind Deguileville’s tardy revision of PVH1, some twenty-five years after the original. In his opening address to the court, the pilgrim himself admits that he has been negligent about repenting (“Et trop a tart a merci vieng,” v. 825), but he claims that there were extenuating circumstances, since he was coerced and deceived into sinning by Satan.

The heated conflict of two texts, two versions of the same life, is also reflected in the final section of the trial, where it is precisely a question of weighing documents against each other.77 After arguments have been made and witnesses heard, written records are collected on all sides. Justice stands atop a high platform and readies her balance scale, fulfilling the pilgrim’s pronouncement of faith in divine judgment, made in PVH2 after his crushing defeat on the Ship of Religion (PVH2, vv. 16326–31).78 In the left-hand pan of Justice’s scale is placed the record of everything the pilgrim’s soul did wrong, Synderesis’s testimony which Satan has transcribed onto a long scroll. Into the right-hand pan are placed documents in the soul’s favor, notably Saint Benedict’s written testimony for his Cistercian son Guillermus. At first, the scales tip dangerously to the left, and things do not look good for the pilgrim. But at last, Misericorde produces Christ’s special letter of pardon, which outweighs all of his sins.79

76. See Moreau, “‘Ce mauvais tabellion,’” 124.
77. Another notable writerly detail is that, according to the Devil, the pilgrim’s sins are written on his face (“Escrit li est emmi le vis,” v. 620), like the seven P’s traced on the face of Dante’s narrator in Purgatorio 9.112–14.
78. For the quote, see above in this chapter, 87.
79. The ritual weighing of souls, or psychostasis, has a long history which well predates the Christian tradition. As Catherine Oakes shows, psychostasis was depicted especially frequently in Cistercian manuscripts, including in D4 (“The Scales,” 26). See also Oakes, Ora Pro Nobis: The Virgin as Intercessor in Medieval Art and Devotion. London: Harvey Miller, 2008. 129–66; Zaleski,
Following Christ’s directive for clemency, Michael consigns the pilgrim to a term in purgatory, until such time as the disputing parties Mercy and Justice are reconciled. The sentence is faithfully carried out, although this enrages Satan and Justice, who promise to appeal at the “grant jugement derrain” (v. 2616), when the pilgrim’s body and soul will be reunited and judged together by Christ himself. After being led away by his guardian angel, the pilgrim is immersed in purgatorial fire; but Deguileville does not spend many verses documenting his suffering. Instead, the narrator’s sentence becomes an occasion for visiting all the realms of the afterworld under his angel’s guidance. He spends the rest of P4 detailing the terrible punishments meted out to sinners in hell and examining celestial mysteries such as the Redemption and the liturgical calendar. Effectively, although the pilgrim must endure purifying flame, the outcome of the trial is also a triumphant gesture which authorizes the poet to keep working. As is the case in Dante’s eschatological saga, Deguileville strives for paradise but is most at home in purgatory. It is a space for constant change where, as in earthly life, more poetry is always to come, where authors and their texts must pass continually through a refiner’s fire of revision and recompilation.

Nor does Deguileville stop at defending his name through this otherworldly trial; he also makes sure that those who wronged him are properly dealt with. When the pilgrim’s guardian angel shows him the torments of hell, he sees Envy and her children being tortured (vv. 4565–694); these are the same personifications who attacked the pilgrim aboard ship. Further along in hell, Trahison is depicted as falsely donning the robes of religion (“en religion vestue,” v. 4814; “de faus mantel affubleee,” v. 4816), lending additional support to the idea that the author had been betrayed by members of the community at Chaalis and that he intended P4 to help clear his name and punish his opponents.

For the enemies who pursued him and who remain nameless today, Deguileville asks no mercy. Like Rude Entendement, the classic bad reader,
they are to be burned with the chaff. But for himself, the author speaks eloquently in order to offer a more transformative version of events. Just as in the Devil’s Rights, lawyerly pleading causes the account books of individual lives to be radically rewritten, confounding the strict legalism of Satan. Following Saint Michael’s judgment that the pilgrim be granted a forum in which to respond for his *ouvrages*, Deguileville demands that he too, be allowed to represent himself in the court of reader opinion. Although he takes a much more hell-fire approach to the ethics of *reading*, Deguileville suggests that it is only right for the author to be allowed to make major changes in his work, even twenty-five years after the fact.

Today, Deguileville’s trial is still ongoing, in process, in the always evolving interpretation of the readership. From this perspective, it is crucial to remember that *PA* does not depict the Last Judgment, the “grans assises,” or “Jugement / que par devant le Roy atent” that is anticipated several times in both versions of *PVH* and in *PA* itself. The judgment scene here represents only the particular judgment of the soul, or rather, only a dream of it, experienced by the narrator while sleeping in his cell at Chaalis, after having been reinstated into the order. It is a vision of how his life would be judged only were he to die then, at the moment of the dream. Deguileville reminds us often of this provisional aspect of his judgment scene, as when the angel Cherubin expresses anxiety over the possibility of *getting it wrong*:

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Quant ci apres le temps venra For afterward the time will come
Que notre bon roy jugera for our good king to judge
Et tendra ses assises grans and hold his great tribunal
Et se monsterra tous puissans, and show himself all-powerful,
Honte seroit, se retraictier it would be a shame if it were necessary
Failloit ce quë as a jugier. to retract the judgment that you have to make now.
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(vv. 521–26)

Although it vindicates the pilgrim in a higher court than the one he faced at Chaalis, and confirms his privileged status as divine rhetorician, the trial scene of *PA* is not the last judgment to which the pilgrim-soul will be subject. For soon he will enter into a bitter dispute with his body over which of them are most at fault for sin (vv. 4052–352)—a reworking of the prolific medieval genre of body-soul debates.81 The resolution of this disagreement is likewise put off to the Resurrection, when body and soul will be reunited.

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and stand judgment as one. Nor was this Deguileville’s last pilgrimage, for he would follow *Pa* in 1358 with his *Pèlerinage Jhesucrist*, a text that repeats the scenario of a legal dispute between Justice and Mercy, and between the Old and New Laws, all over again in its dramatization of the Redemption. 82

By repeatedly calling attention to the provisional nature of the divine judgment to which he is exposed, Deguileville suggests that literature is likewise an ongoing process of evaluation and reevaluation, no less eschatological for being resistant to closure. Literature belongs to the judgment of each moment, during which texts are constantly held up to scrutiny, subject to the changing opinions of readers, and of the author himself. Impishly—if not impiously—writing himself a favorable judgment on high and torturing his most critical readers in hell, Deguileville also acknowledged literature as a serious ethical enterprise. In more than an allegorical sense, writing is eschatological: its effect on the audience must be measured before the author can be justly evaluated by God, and so the author must be answerable to the particular judgments of all his readers—the Satans, the Trahisons and the Rude Entendements of the world included. Faced with a formidable collection of adversaries, Deguileville’s means of defense lay in the ability he claimed to keep writing, to alter what he had made previously and to transform his own textual image in response to accusation. Even if Deguileville had little control over his text once it entered readers’ hands, and even if he failed to change the course of its circulation, his efforts to advocate on behalf of his body of work constitute a unique and compelling justification of poetic authority. It is an authority that rests in part on the miraculous oratorical expertise inherited from the thirteenth-century *rhetor divinus*, and in part on the author’s hyper-awareness of his compiled corpus as an extension of himself.

While *Pa* is an exceptional example of heavenly rhetoric used to defend a literary text, Guillermus’s trial and its outcome are also indicative of much wider trends at work in the development of later medieval vernacular poetry. The trial demonstrates that, in the fourteenth century, the concept of vernacular poetic authority was both ethically important enough and contentious enough to figure at the center of the scene of divine judgment. At the same time, the trial insists on the need for authority to be constantly performed as it is claimed. The highly stylized legal and rhetorical performance of Deguileville’s narrator reveals at least four crucial, if often implicit bases for literary authority which underlie so many other later

medieval texts. First, there is the creation of a pseudo-autobiographical, first-person persona whom audiences can identify with the flesh-and-blood author and who must stand trial in his place. Second, this persona allows the author to embed performances of poetry, rhetoric, and prayer within the text, simultaneously establishing his technical expertise and spiritual worthiness. Third, the first-person persona allows the author to conduct an ethical dialog with audiences, who perform necessary interpretive work on the text and must ultimately pass the judgments through which the author’s identity is confirmed. Fourth and finally, the audience’s recognition of the authorial persona, and its continued participation in the negotiation of meaning, allow the emergence of an œuvre which reflects the life of the author and testifies to his coherence through time as an individual artist.

Because of the vagaries of medieval book production, reception, and taste, and because of the embryonic nature of vernacular poetics, the question of just what should constitute the œuvre—and just who is responsible for it—inevitably becomes the most difficult point for judgment. While the author must recognize that his authority derives from that of his judges, and that his legacy is dependent on their reading of the text, he must also work to balance the public’s reception with a carefully crafted program of intention, guarding the text from those who would seek to deform its essential meaning and—most problematically of all—reserving the right to alter and build upon his own work once it has already been absorbed by the public.

Deguileville’s Pèlerinage de l’âme was the popular apogee of one major strand of eschatological representation, the Devil’s Rights. Likewise, Deguileville exploited more fully than perhaps anyone else the dramatic and literary possibilities of the vernacular poet as rhetor divinus. But as the most personalized example of the celestial legal drama, PA stands in relative contrast with the texts I explore in the second half of this study, narrative dits by Guillaume de Machaut and Jean Froissart. That is because these authors did not make the same use of the heavenly court as a representational space. Instead, their scenes of judgment invest earthly acts of reading and writing with eschatological qualities. Rather than projecting the specific ethical problems of the author-reader relationship into a traditional mise en scène of divine judgment like the Devil’s Rights, these authors showed the Judgment to be always already at work behind the author-reader rela-
tionship. In particular, the texts I examine next take us from the heavenly court, and its saintly patrons, to earthly courts and their princely and aristocratic patrons. Because of this difference, which represents something of a new development in literary treatments of divine judgment, I consider Guillaume de Machaut’s *Jugement dou roy de Navarre* after Deguileville’s *PA*, even though the former poem is older by half a dozen years.

For not staging their judgments directly in the heavenly tribunal, the courtly poets Machaut and Froissart drew a significant measure of inspiration from the kind of eschatological scene imagined by Deguileville. Like Deguileville, these poets portrayed the author’s dialog with the reader—and especially with the patron—as an encounter with the world beyond, with the immanence of the divine judge, always present as the third party (*tiers*) between poet and audience. Like Deguileville, they also depicted the judgment of readers with strong parallels to God’s own reading of human souls as texts. This aspect is particularly important for Machaut because of the revolutionary way that the poet’s manuscript compilations privilege a unified conception of authority and narrative voice. More even than Deguileville, Machaut expressed anxiety over the difficult *procès* of assembling an authoritative and coherent corpus, and like Deguileville he did so through reference to judgments both human and divine which obliged the author to become an advocate for his body of work. If Machaut was less of a *rhetor divinus* than Deguileville, this participant in the *puys* of northern France nevertheless preserved a strong element of legal rhetoric in his verse, in which the divine tribunal remains the “other scene” of both courtroom pleading and readerly accusation.

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83. Here, I draw especially on the pioneering studies by Kevin Brownlee (*Poetic Identity in Guillaume de Machaut*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984) and Sylvia Huot (*From Song to Book*).