Notes

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

1. According to a Washington Post/ABC News Poll, 30 percent of respondents indicated that reforming election campaign finance laws would be "very important" in the 2000 presidential election. An additional 40 percent said the issue would be "somewhat important." Only 11 percent said that campaign finance reform would be "not important at all." The poll was based on 1,526 random telephone interviews conducted between August 30 and September 2, 1999.

2. Before the passage of McCain–Feingold, Congress voted to require that so-called 527s disclose donors. 527s are organizations, designated by the IRS tax code, that do not engage in electoral advocacy. Named after a provision in the tax code, 527s became politically popular because the groups did not have to disclose the identity of donors or the size of the contributions to the FEC, provided that they did not advocate the defeat or election of any specific candidate. Notably, this change was the first major one in campaign finance law in over two decades. The impact of the change is unclear. For one thing, the new law will not affect some groups operating under certain provisions of the tax code. In addition, the legislation does not stipulate when the disclosure of donors is supposed to occur. Finally, the law is likely to be subject to constitutional challenge. See, for example, Mike Allen, "Campaign Secrecy Law’s Impact Doubted," Washington Post, 1 July 2000, A6.


4. Of course, the consequences of McCain–Feingold depend upon the outcome of any court challenges which opponents, such as Mitch McConnell, have vowed to undertake. McCain–Feingold changed one major hard money component of federal law: contribution limits were increased and indexed to inflation. The Brookings Institute provides what is perhaps the best summary of the McCain–Feingold legislation, as well as recent developments in campaign finance. See, www.brookings.edu/dybdoc/oot/gs/cf/cf_hp.htm.


6. In the 2000 elections, clean money proposals in Missouri and Oregon were easily defeated. It is unclear whether their defeat means the momentum for reform has died down, or whether the opposition is now better organized.


8. Ibid.


10. In 1996 these limits were raised to $1,000 for any one election.

11. Unlike in most states, Kentucky makes a clear legal distinction between the funding period for the primary election and the funding period for the general election. As such, a
candidate cannot receive any contribution later than 28 days before the May primary. After the primary is over, a new accounting period starts and the candidate can once again receive contributions until 28 days before the November general election.

12. In many respects, the Registry in Kentucky has similar responsibilities to that of the Federal Election Commission, which has jurisdiction over federal elections.

13. The minimum threshold and maximum state subsidy are also adjusted by the consumer price index before each gubernatorial election.

14. Prior to the amendment, Kentucky governors were limited to one four-year term.


22. See Randall Partin, “Assessing the Impact of Campaign Spending in Governors Races” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Ga., September 1999). It should be noted that in the congressional elections literature the marginal effect of incumbent campaign spending remains in dispute; see, for example, Donald Green and Jonathan Krasno, “Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent.”


NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. Prior to the passage of the McCain–Feingold legislation, the only change in federal campaign finance laws in more than two decades was the requirement that tax code section 527 groups disclose donors. We contend that the change is relatively minor, though our characterization is certainly subject to dispute.

2. The tendency to focus on the national-level debate over campaign finance issues exists among the public and academics alike. Two important exceptions to this tendency are the works by Malbin and Gais, The Day after Reform; and Thompson and Moncrief, Campaign Finance in State Legislative Elections.

3. The state alone has the authority to regulate state elections, such as those for governor and the state legislature. In the case of federal elections to the U.S. House and Senate, state and federal powers are concurrent. States, for example, regulate primaries.

4. Forty-eight of the states have four-year gubernatorial terms of office and forty-nine states allow an incumbent governor to run for reelection at least once.

5. For a more complete history of campaign finance in the United States that focuses on nationwide developments, see chapter 2 in Goidel, Gross, and Shields, Money Matters.

6. There can be little doubt that the Watergate scandal of 1972–73 was the turning point in the debate over campaign finance regulations. After Watergate, the entire campaign finance system became the focus of national debate, and in 1974 Congress passed a series of provisions that represented the most comprehensive effort to reform and regulate campaign finance in our nation’s history. Many states soon followed suit and reformed their state campaign finance systems. Of equal importance is the fact that comprehensive reform remains part of the public agenda with numerous states experimenting with different reform packages. See Goidel, Gross, and Shields, Money Matters, 25–34.

7. In his first campaign for office, George Washington was said to have used liquor as a means to attract voters. See George Thayer, Who Shakes the Money Tree (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1973), 25.
8. The transportation of voters to the polls remains problematic in a number of states. In their book *Dirty Little Secrets* (New York: Random House, 1996), Larry Sabato and Glenn Simpson discuss problems associated with the use of so-called street money or walking around money.

9. The Tammany Hall campaign fund, for example, received 6 percent of all New York City employees’ weekly paychecks.

10. Civil service reform and attacks on the assessment system were critical components of the Progressive movement.


12. The link between the economically rich and powerful and needy candidates and political parties had been forged during the first half of the nineteenth century.

13. Scandals contributed to public cynicism. One national-level scandal, for example, found that a number of the nation’s largest insurance companies had been using policyholders’ money for various political purposes.


15. In some cases, states prohibited contributions from only particular types of corporations, such as regulated industries.


17. While the number of PACs began to increase during the 1950s and 1960s, their great expansion is really a post-1970 development. A brief discussion of the development and growth of PACs can be found in chapter 4 of Sorauf’s *Money in American Elections*.

18. Amendments to the Tillman Act placed expenditure limits of $5,000 and $10,000 on U.S. House and Senate campaigns, respectively. The Corrupt Practices Act of 1925 raised these limits to between $10,000 and $25,000 for U.S. Senate races and between $2,500 and $5,000 for U.S. House races.

19. One of the ongoing problems in such laws are questions of how one determines what is meant by acting on behalf of a candidate and who is responsible for controlling such activities. There are also fundamental legal and constitutional questions underlying such laws. For example, in 1916 the Wisconsin Supreme Court invalidated a law which attempted to regulate expenditures on behalf of a candidate (see Alexander and Denny, *Regulation of Political Finance*, 18).

20. See, for example, Overacker, *Money in Elections*, and Alexander and Denny, *Regulation of Political Finance*. Perhaps the greatest success involved limits on bribery, but even here problems often emerged.


22. See, for example, Overacker, *Money in Elections*, and Alexander and Denny, *Regulation of Political Finance*.


24. According to Overacker (*Money in Elections*, 327), in 1932 five states (Georgia, Maine, Montana, Nevada, and Oregon) published either campaign reports or summary campaign analyses.

25. Teddy Roosevelt and the Progressives stand as a notable exception.

26. Minnesota, for example, extends disclosure requirements to financial intermediaries, such as “bundlers” and “solicitors.” Bundlers are individuals or organizations that collect contributions and then hand them over to a candidate. Solicitors are individuals who convince others to contribute to a candidate. An increasing number of states require reports from organizations or individuals who engage in independent expenditures.
27. In the most comprehensive analysis of disclosure laws to date, Malbin and Gais report numerous difficulties in the operation of state-level disclosure laws. They report difficulties in the quality and integrity of the information that is received, in making useful information public; and in the use of information by the public. See Malbin and Gais, The Day after Reform.

28. During the 1990s, an increasing number of states also placed contribution restrictions on the candidates themselves, the candidate's family, and regulated industries. In fact, forty-seven states place some limit on contributions to gubernatorial campaigns from regulated industries.


30. Ibid.

31. Four states, Kentucky, Minnesota, North Carolina, and Rhode Island, provide public money to political parties and candidates. See Malbin and Gais, The Day after Reform, for a discussion of the various forms of public financing in American states.

32. It is not at all clear that the strategic allocation of contributions, among any set of contributors, necessarily results in higher average levels of competition, particularly if contributors engage in an access rather than an electoral strategy. See, for example, Goidel, Gross, and Shields, Money Matters.

33. Disparities in spending are most likely to be seen when there is an incumbent in the election. See, for example, Keith Gaddie, “Forgotten Races: Open Seat Congressional Elections” (unpublished manuscript, 1997).


36. A current court case in Vermont is testing this proposition.

37. Court challenges could reduce this number by the time of publication.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2


2. Ibid., 28.


4. Ibid., 142.


7. Ibid., 165.

8. See, for example, Rosenkranz, Buckley Stops Here; and Neuborne, Campaign Finance Reform and the Constitution.


NOTES


13. See Donnay and Ramsden, “Public Financing of Legislative Elections”; and Mayer, Campaign Finance Reform in the States.


15. For a fuller account of voter information levels and their implications, see Michael X. Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter, What Americans Know and Why It Matters (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University, 1996).

16. See, for example, chapter 7 in Goidel, Gross, and Shields, Money Matters.

17. See Sabato and Simpson, Dirty Little Secrets, 7.


21. See Wright, “Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting.”

22. See Wright, “Contributions, Lobbying, and Committee Voting”; and Interest Groups and Congress.


25. Ibid., 224.


28. See John Green, Paul Herrnson, Lynda Powell, and Clyde Wilcox, “Individual Con-
Notes


2. Throughout this book we focus on hard-money considerations. Until the mid-1990s, most research documenting the ever-increasing costs of elections has focused on hard money expenditures. If one were to consider soft money and independent expenditures, the rates of increase in campaign spending would be much higher than typically reported. For example,
it appears that soft money and other types of noncandidate expenditures in the year 2000 congressional, senate, and presidential races often equaled or exceeded candidates’ hard money expenditures. See David Magelby, *Election Advocacy: Soft Money and Issue Advocacy in the 2000 Congressional Elections*, report funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts (Salt Lake City: Brigham Young University, 2001).

3. Throughout this chapter we focus on the total amount of money spent in gubernatorial campaigns; that is, money spent in both the primary and general elections. One of the difficulties of analyzing spending in gubernatorial elections is that in some states there is a clear distinction between the monies that are spent in the primary and those spent in the general election, while in a large number of states there is no statutory distinction between the monies spent in a primary and those spent in the general election. Since we are mostly concerned in this chapter with setting out the overall parameters of spending in gubernatorial elections, we focus on the total amount of money spent in both primary and general gubernatorial elections.

4. Of this total, approximately $53 million was spent in the general election by the two major party candidates.

5. The thirteen states were: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Rhode Island.

6. These numbers represent total spending in actual dollar amounts. Of course, a good amount of this increase can be attributed to inflation effects over the period. Nevertheless, the 1998 election period represented a 215 percent increase of the 1978 period when measured in constant 1992 dollars.

7. One way to view the diversity among the states over the time period is to consider some descriptive statistics. For the thirty-six states that had gubernatorial elections in 1978, the mean cost was $2,732,136, with a standard deviation of $2,882,031. For the thirty-six that had gubernatorial elections in 1998, by contrast, the mean cost was approximately $13,000,000, with a standard deviation of $11,139,248.

8. When evaluating these averages, it must be remembered that both Vermont and New Hampshire are counted twice because they have gubernatorial elections every two years.

9. The four-year average was used to insure that the same states were used whenever making comparisons. If the four-year average were not used, there would be large fluctuations when moving from one year to the next merely because of the inclusion or exclusion of very large states such as California and New York.

10. Constant 1992 dollars are used throughout this text to control for the effects of inflation.

11. Even though all congressional elections are held every two years, averages were computed over a four-year period, or two sets of congressional elections. This double computation was done to insure greater compatibility with the four-year cycle used to compute gubernatorial averages. Also, it is well known that the cost of running for congress differs between the presidential election year and the off-year (see Goidel, Gross, and Shields, *Money Matters*). Computing averages over four years diminishes the effects of fluctuations resulting from the presidential election year-off-year cycle.

12. Senate averages are computed over a six-year period simply because it takes six years to insure that all of the states are included in the computations for a given data point. If the average were computed for just a two- or four-year period, then major fluctuations from one year to the next would likely be seen simply because of the particular subset of states used to compute any two- or four-year average.

14. The actual equation used to evaluate these trends lines was:
\[ Y = \alpha + \beta X + \varepsilon \]
where:
- \( Y \) = the average statewide expenditure for a given type of office for a given year;
- \( X \) = a counter from 0 to 17 associated with each year, 1981 = 0, 1982 = 1, 1983 = 2, etc.

15. For example, it could be the case that gubernatorial elections in state A cost $80 million in 1994 and $100 million in 1998, while the state’s U.S. Senate elections cost $10 million and $20 million in 1994 and 1998, respectively. State B’s cost of gubernatorial elections might be $60 million in 1994 and $70 million in 1998, while its Senate costs might be $12 million and $22 million in 1998. Under such conditions, the average cost of both types of elections increased from 1994 to 1998, but state A had more expensive gubernatorial elections, while state B had more expensive U.S. Senate elections.

16. In order to match up the elections for the correlation analysis, the statewide totals for the most recent set of U.S. House elections were used in the analysis if a state did not have a U.S. House election in the same year as a gubernatorial election. Likewise, if the state did not have a U.S. Senate election for the state’s senior senator in the same year as a gubernatorial election, then the most recent U.S. Senate election for the position was used in the analysis. The correlations are based on 62 to 93 cases. The correlation between spending in gubernatorial elections and spending in senate elections in those cases where there were concurrent gubernatorial and senate elections during the time period is .73.

17. The six states with the largest populations in the United States are California, Florida, Illinois, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas.

18. The seven least populated states are Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming. Of these seven, only Alaska does not show up as having one of the twenty least expensive gubernatorial elections. It should also be noted that seven of the twenty least expensive gubernatorial campaigns occurred in Vermont.


20. Five of the last seven U.S. presidents came from two of the six largest states: Nixon and Reagan from California and Johnson and both Bushes from Texas.

21. There is no exact method for determining the hypothetical pool of contributors, nor is it possible to determine the hypothetical amount of money that might be contributed. As the importance of out-of-state money grows, these unknowns become even harder to determine.

22. The total cost of gubernatorial elections is based upon constant 1992 dollars spent by all candidates in the primary and general elections. Population is measured in terms of the voting age population of a state. Total state personal income is based upon estimates from the U.S. Department of Commerce. Geographic size is merely the size of the state measured in total square miles.

23. The constant and the coefficient associated with the geographic size variable are statistically significant at the .001 level. The coefficient associated with the income per voting age citizen is not statistically significant at the .05 level (\( p = .53 \)). The r-squared value for the entire equation is .27.

24. If one were to compare the standardized regression coefficients for equation 3.1, the standardized coefficient associated with the geographic size variable is .51, while the standardized coefficient associated with the income variable is .03. If one were to add a series of twenty dummy variables, one for each year minus one, to equation 3.1 in order to take into account the effect of time, the coefficients associated with income and geographic size are not significantly changed from those seen in equation 3.1. For a discussion of the use of standardized variables to compare the importance of variables in a regression equation, see Donald A.

25. In fact, the correlation between total spending per voting age citizen in gubernatorial elections and personal income per voting age citizens is .02, which is not significant at the 0.10 level of significance. The correlation between the geographic size of a state and the total spending per voting age citizen in gubernatorial elections is .52, which is significant at the 0.001 level of significance.

26. If one only considers those senate elections which were held concurrently with gubernatorial elections, the correlation between the cost of gubernatorial elections per voting age citizen and the cost of senatorial elections per voting age citizen is .02 and not statistically significant. None of the correlations in table 3.5 associated with gubernatorial spending are statistically significant at the .10 level.

27. We also examined the importance of two other indicators of the overall economic well-being of a state to the cost of elections: the poverty rate and the unemployment rate. In neither case did they have a statistically significant effect on the per voting age citizen cost of gubernatorial elections, U.S. senate elections, or U.S. house elections.

28. Our analysis reinforces the arguments made by Partin (see “Assessing the Impact of Campaign Spending in Governors’ Races”).

29. It is not clear why geographic size had a positive and statistically significant effect on elections for the senior senator’s position and is not statistically significant, although still positive, in the case of elections for the junior senator’s position.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. There are individuals who do not see the rising costs of electoral campaigns as being especially problematic. In fact, there are those who would argue that, if anything, we ought to spend even more money on campaigns in America. For a discussion of these alternative views, see Smith, “Faulty Assumptions”; and Sorauf, Money in American Elections, 367–69.

2. See Malbin and Gais, The Day after Reform.

3. See Jewell and Cassie, “Can the Legislative Campaign Finance System Be Reformed?”


5. While our data set theoretically includes all gubernatorial elections for all states from 1978 to 1998, there are some missing data for some of our variables.

6. See Buckley v. Valeo. In all of the cases in which there are effective spending limits, one also finds public financing to candidates. In order to comply with court directives, public financing and other incentives are used to entice candidates into accepting spending limits.

7. While there are some violations, the contribution limits index conforms to a Guttman scale. The coefficient of reproducibility is .98, while the coefficient of scalability is

8. We also tried a number of alternative specifications for the contribution limit data. We tried placing the arbitrary contribution limit for states without actual contribution limit laws at $500,000. We tried taking the square root and logs of the two sets of contribution limits before running the correlations. And we tried setting the contribution limits on a per voter basis for the various specifications. In no case were the substantive conclusions significantly changed by the alternative specifications.


11. Using total spending by the losing candidates in the primary to analyze gubernatorial election costs is preferable to using the number of candidates in the primary because it is the financial competitiveness that is more likely to increase spending by the eventual nominee rather than the mere presence of potential challengers.


14. The exact nature of the relationship between political competition and campaign spending has been the subject of great debate. While there is general agreement that more competitive elections tend to be more expensive, the causal nature and specification of the factors that underlie the relationship have been extensively debated. See Goidel, Gross, and Shields, *Money Matters*, chapter 4.

15. Competition is an index based on the Democratic percentage of the vote in the most recent presidential and U.S. Senate campaigns and the Democratic percentage of the state senate and state house. The index is similar to that developed by Austin Ranney (see “Parties in State Politics,” in *Politics in the American States*, 3d ed., edited by Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines [Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1976]). We did not use the actual Ranney index because it uses outcomes in gubernatorial elections and we wanted a measure of the overall competitive environment outside of the current gubernatorial election. We began by developing a partisanship variable representing the average level of Democratic success in the five settings stated above. The partisanship variable is merely the sum of the five percentages divided by five. We then folded the index such that:

\[
\text{COMPETITION} = \text{absolute value of [partisanship} - (100 - \text{partisanship})]\]


16. Gary Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections*, 2d ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983). While we include year dummy variables to control for the electoral context, we do not provide substantive interpretations for the variables.

17. Including the dummy variables for separate years also controls for differences in presidential versus nonpresidential years, as well as for states that hold gubernatorial elections in odd numbered years.

18. In order for any of the contribution limit variables to be included in the equations, an arbitrarily high value would have had to be assigned to those states not having contribution limits.
limits. The designation of such a value would have made all six of the contribution limit variables highly colinear, with the resultant estimates being highly unstable.


While GLS has traditionally been used in pooled time series applications, Beck and Katz contend that GLS estimators understate the variability of the standard errors. Using Monte Carlo experiments, Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan N. Katz contend that instead of GLS, pooled time series models should be estimated using OLS with panel-corrected standard errors. The pooled time series estimates presented in this text are computed using OLS with panel-corrected standard errors (using STATA), under the assumption of heteroscedasticity across states. See Beck and Katz, “What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data,” American Political Science Review 89 (1995): 634–47.

21. While the dummy variables for each year are not included in the table for ease of interpretation, it should be noted that in four cases the coefficient was positive and statistically significant at the .05 level: 1983, 1988, 1989, and 1997.

22. Once again, it is important to remember that spending limits are almost always associated with public financing for candidates. As such, one must consider the effects of these two variables simultaneously.


24. In an earlier analysis covering fewer years we found that it was the Democrats who were more adversely affected by spending limits. It may be the case that the partisan consequences may depend upon factors which are simply beyond the data currently available to us. So, for example, Malbin and Gais contend that Republicans are more likely to opt out of public financing and associated spending limits (see The Day after Reform, 62–65). If Republican candidates are increasingly less likely to participate in public financing and associated spending limits, then spending limits will continue to become more disassociated from actual spending. Unfortunately, we do not have data on the number of candidates who opted out of the public financing and spending limits options.

25. For a discussion of the financial advantage of incumbents in congressional elections and associated concerns with the differential effects of campaign finance reforms, see Goidel, Gross, and Shields, Money Matters. In our data set, incumbents running for governor had a mean spending per voting age citizen value of 1.34, while challengers had a mean value of .85.

26. The dummy year variables 1983, 1988, and 1997 were statistically significant at the .05 level for challenger spending, while 1980, 1983, 1991, 1995, and 1996 were statistically significant for incumbent spending.

27. None of the dummy year variables were statistically significant at the .10 level for the spending difference equation.


29. Of course, other things are usually not always equal. So, for example, in order to compensate for the so-called incumbency advantage, recent legislation in Vermont actually had lower spending limits for incumbents than for nonincumbents. From this perspective, equal funding would give incumbents a natural competitive advantage. Whether or not one
accepts this view, the important point is that, in many cases, the ultimate goal is electoral competition. Numerous campaign finance reform proposals are merely a means to this end.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5


2. We should note that the figure includes both presidential and midterm election years, even though the number of incumbents running in presidential election years is quite small. We have excluded the handful of states that hold gubernatorial elections in odd-numbered years from this portion of the analysis.

3. For example, in 1978, the standard deviations for the margin of victory, the Democratic percentage of the vote, and the incumbent vote were 13.5, 10.5, and 8.4, respectively. Twenty years later in 1998, the standard deviations were 12.8, 11.4, and 8.4. See Gary Jacobson, “The Marginals Never Vanished: Incumbency and Competition in Elections to the U.S. House of Representatives, 1952–1982,” American Journal of Political Science 31 (1987): 126–41.


5. Once again, the regression results portrayed in table 5.3 were generated using OLS with panel-corrected standard errors. The variables are defined as explained in chapter 4. The dummy year variables for 1992 and 1996 were statistically significant.

6. To get the effect on the margin of victory, we first take the expected effect on candidate spending based on the regression coefficients presented in table 4.4. For example, with limits set at a $1.00 per voting age citizen, Democratic spending would be expected to increase by $.44, while Republican spending would increase by approximately $.11. We then multiply these coefficients by the estimates presented in table 5.3. So, for example, assuming an open-seat election and a $1.00 per voting age citizen contribution limit, the effect of public financing on the margin of victory would be estimated by the following equation: (1.7 X 0.44) + (–4.7 X 0.11) = +0.22. The result would indicate that, under this particular scenario, the margin of victory would be expected to increase by about a fifth of one percent.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

1. National trends are controlled for with the year dummy variables (see chapter 4), but are not included as part of table 6.2 so that the results are less cluttered by the year variables. The following years, however, are significant: 1985, 1991, 1996, and 1998.

2. The finding is similar to what has been observed in the congressional elections literature, and is likely to be subject to similar criticisms. That is, candidate spending is contemporaneously correlated with the error term of the regression model. Prior research has taken several different approaches to solving the simultaneity problem, but none has been universally embraced. Within the gubernatorial elections literature, Partin employed a two-staged model and found that incumbent spending and challenger spending were roughly equivalent in effect. The first-stage regression models, however, were limited in terms of the explanatory power, leaving open questions as to the adequacy of the instrumental variables. Within this analysis, we have utilized OLS regression estimates, while accounting for the pooled time series nature of the data. At least within the congressional elections literature, OLS estimates have generally been the most conservative, at least when it comes to the implications for

3. Even if we assumed that incumbent and challenger spending are relatively equivalent in terms of their effects, we still would find only moderate effects on the incumbent share of the vote. Assuming that incumbent spending exerted an identical impact as challenger spending ($b = 0.02$) but in the opposite direction, we would expect the incumbent percentage of vote to decline with restrictive limits, but increase with less restrictive limits. For example, assuming a $0.10 per voting age citizen limit, the incumbent vote would be expected to decrease by roughly 1.5 percent. Assuming a $1.00 per voting age citizen limit, incumbent spending would be expected to increase by 2.4 percent. With findings of equal spending effects, one would conclude that more restrictive limits better serve the objective of more competitive elections. Under findings of unequal effects (with incumbent spending relatively ineffective), one would conclude higher spending limits were more effective.

4. These estimates are obtained from the coefficients from chapter 4, using assumptions stated in the text. For example, the impact of providing public financing on incumbent spending is taken from the coefficient for public financing as presented in chapter 4 ($-0.54$), indicating that on average incumbent spending is $0.54 lower in states with public financing. We then combine this coefficient with the size of the limit (assuming, for example, a $1.00 per voting age citizen limit) multiplied by the coefficient for spending limits ($1.1$). The result is a total of $+56$, indicating that under this scenario incumbent spending increased by $56$. We then determine the impact of this change on the vote by multiplying the spending effect ($56$) by the coefficient for incumbent spending in the incumbent vote equation as presented in the current chapter. Finally, we do the same thing for challenger spending and then either add or subtract depending on the result. In this scenario, the result was a decline in the incumbent vote margin of just over a quarter of one percent.


7. The following years were significant: 1982, 1988, 1989, and 1990.

8. In an earlier work, we found that studies of the effects of money in U.S. congressional elections which relied on OLS estimates were least supportive of reform, while studies that relied on instrumental variable techniques (2SLS, 3SLS) were more supportive. As such, the OLS estimates reported, more than likely, reflect conservative estimates, at least of the indirect effects in those elections involving incumbents. See Goidel and Gross, “Reconsidering the Myths and Realities,” 129–50.

**NOTES TO CHAPTER 7**

1. The research on registration requirements has been substantial. See, for example, Raymond E. Wolfinger and Stephen J. Rosenstone, *Who Votes?* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980); Robert S. Erickson, “Why Do People Vote? Because They Are Regis-


NOTES


9. Voter turnout is computed as the percentage of voting age population. Because the population is always changing, it is difficult to get a precise estimate of the voting age population, particularly in the years between the censuses. We have estimated the voting age population using data from various issues of Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa’s *The Almanac of American Politics* (Washington, D.C.: National Journal) and Phil Duncan’s *Politics in America* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press).

10. See Patterson and Caldeira, “Getting Out the Vote,” 675–89.


16. See Wolfinger and Rosenstone, *Who Votes?*


18. The following years were significant in the first model (which included all elections): 1980, 1984, 1985, 1988, 1992, and 1996. In the model that included only nonpresidential election years, the following years were significant: 1985, 1989, 1993, and 1997.

19. We also examined presidential election years separately. As with the Robert Jackson study of statewide voter turnout, we failed to find much evidence of political mobilization when we considered these elections alone.

20. In other analyses, we included the percentage of the state with a college education, the median age, and the percentage of the state that is rural. Because the measures were incomplete for the entire time series, we have not included these measures in the analysis presented in the text. Notably, with these measures included and for only 88 total cases, candidate campaign finance provisions are still associated with voter turnout at the .10 level (t = 1.85, p = .068).

21. Unlike Jackson’s analysis of statewide voter turnout, we failed to find evidence of significant differences between incumbent and challenger spending. Presumably this discrepancy reflects differences in research design. Jackson utilized all fifty states in two election cycles, while we have included only states with gubernatorial elections, though we have done so over a broader time frame.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

1. According to a March 2001 poll conducted by the Gallup Organization, 51 percent of Americans strongly favor “new federal laws limiting the amount of money that any individual or group can contribute to the national political parties.” An additional 25 percent moderately favor such a proposal. Yet only 10 percent reported that they followed the debate over campaign finance reform “very closely.” The results of Gallup opinion polls on campaign finance are available at www.gallup.com/poll/indicators/indcamp_fin.asp.

2. According to an October 2000 Gallup poll, 34 percent of Americans place greater priority on “protecting the freedom of individuals to support political candidates and parties” than on “protecting government from excessive influence by campaign contributors.”


4. The exact nature of the bias is unclear. Similar findings at the congressional level have been used to justify the positions of both supporters and opponents of public financing and spending limits. One attempt to overcome the incumbency advantage is the law in Vermont which effectively places lower spending limits on incumbents than on challengers.

5. See Malbin and Gais, The Day after Reform.

6. The fact that spending did not seem to be affected by the level of a state’s contribution limits (see chapter 4) may be due to the fact that high-end contributors, those who give $500 or more, are a limited pool.

7. Another effect of contribution limits may be to further reduce the candidate pool to self-financed candidates who are able to exit the campaign finance system and spend their own money. However, to date the so-called debilitating effects of restrictive contribution limits have not been realized in the states, nor for that matter have the positive effects of unlimited contribution limits. Put simply, states with unlimited contribution limits are no more competitive than states with such restrictions.

8. While the results in this text are not as definitive as those in our book on congressional elections, in many ways, the conclusion is similar. See Goidel, Gross, and Shields, Money Matters.

9. One of the more innovative aspects of the Vermont law is that spending limits are effectively lower for incumbents than for nonincumbents.


11. Quoted in Green, “Clean Money in Maine.”

12. We do have estimates, but those are limited to individual states over a limited period of time. For example, in the 2000 legislative elections in Maine, about a third of all general election candidates opted for clean money. In races where they faced opponents who decided to forego the clean money option, over half of these candidates won election. As Malbin and Gais have reported, more Republicans than Democrats opted out of the Clean Money campaign finance system. See, for example, Green, “Clean Money”; Cooper, “Clean Money”; and Malbin and Gais, The Day after Reform.

13. See Green, “Clean Money”; and Cooper, “Clean Money.”