Note to Chapter 1

1. The ten nations included in this book are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK. See table 1.2 for a list of parties.

Note to Chapter 2

1. Although the focus of this book is on opportunity structures within political parties, it is important to mention Karen Beckwith’s (2003) application of the restructuring of opportunities at the state level to women’s “parliamentary presence” (as she so aptly titles this issue) in Britain, France, and the United States. Beckwith argues that as power has shifted up to supranational bodies, and down through devolution, women have recognized and used these new points of access to press for greater representation.

Notes to Chapter 3

1. Kunovich and Paxton (2003) find that the degree of women among the party elite affects women’s numerical representation in parliament only in nonproportional representation systems. Their tempered support for the importance of women among party decision makers likely results from their worldwide analysis and their focus on national-level patterns. Rather than examining women activists at the party level, the authors average the percentage of women party elites for all parties in the system.

2. The data is arranged first by nation, then by party, and then by year, providing a stacked series of observations for each party over time.
Notes to Chapter 4

1. Parties have adopted not only candidate quotas, but internal quotas, as well. Intraparty quotas aim to increase the number of women in high-level party positions. Some parties have set gender quotas for their national executives (e.g., the Irish Workers’ Party), and others have set quotas for their party conventions (e.g., the U.S. Democratic and Republican Parties). The quota system has been much more commonly used within party structures than for legislative elections (IPU, 1994). However, these quotas are an indirect way to increase women’s parliamentary representation. In addition, several parties with internal quotas have essentially created token positions for women within the party. Candidate quotas are more comparable because they are standard across parties. While internal party quotas are important on their own, we will concentrate on candidate quotas and targets in this research.

2. Surprisingly, these three sources differed in some cases. For example, while the IPU data indicate that the Norwegian Christian People’s Party has a 50% quota on women candidates, the Katz and Mair data indicate that there is no candidate quota at all. Because of the inconsistencies among sources, my coding decision was to register a quota where one source cites a quota, even if another source mentions nothing about it.

3. The number of parties analyzed in this chapter is ten higher than the fifty parties analyzed in the rest of the book. The reason is that data on the proportion of women MPs by party is not published for all parties, limiting the scope of other chapters. However, I was able to obtain data on the adoption of candidate gender quotas for a broader spectrum of parties. In particular, this chapter adds the Austrian Socialist Party; Belgian Francophone and Flemish Socialist Parties, Christian Social, and Flemish and Francophone Ecology Parties; Irish Progressive Democrats and Greens; Dutch Radical Political and Green Left; and Swedish Environmental Party.

4. In my earlier research on gender quotas (Caul, 2001), Italy was part of my analysis, but it is not included here. The quota analysis of this book significantly updates and expands my early research. The Italian party system suffered a major shake-up in the 1990s, rendering updated, consistent analysis all but impossible.

5. For policy analysis, the standard practice is to use discrete-time models, which treat the unit at risk at predefined times (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997). These models are estimable using logit, and the interpretation of the coefficients is only slightly different.

6. The estimates are based on the following EHA model: ADOPT \(_{i,t} = \Phi (b_{1} \% \text{Women MPs National Level 1975}_{i,t} + b_{2} \% \text{Women MPs 1972 Party Level} + b_{3} \% \text{Women Party Leadership 1975}_{i,t} + b_{4} \text{Electoral System (District Magnitude)}_{i,t} + b_{5} \text{Year Quotas First Adopted in Party System}_{i,t} + b_{6} \text{Old Left Index}_{i,t} + b_{7} \text{New Left Index}_{i,t} + b_{8} \text{Level of Candidate Nomination}_{i,t} + b_{9} \text{Index of Institutionalization}_{i,t} + b_{10} \text{Age of Party (Year Founded)}_{i,t})\). The conceptual dependent variable, ADOPT \(_{i,t}\), is the probability that party \(i\) will adopt quotas in year \(t\), given that the party has not adopted quotas prior to this point. It is measured by a series of zeros up to the year in which quotas are adopted (if at all). The symbol signifies the cumulative normal distribution of the function.

7. When the index of New Left politics is substituted for Old Politics, the overall model remains significant (log likelihood = 82.5, \(p = .001\)), and the coefficient yield-
ed by New Politics is comparable to that of Old ($B = -.45$, $\exp(B) = .64$, $p = .02$). Thus, for every point toward the left on the New Politics scale, a party is 26% more likely to adopt quotas.

8. Because they were established after 1972, the parties not included in the analysis presented on table 4.2 are the Greens in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden, and the Danish CD, the Finnish KOK, the Irish PD, the Italian DP, the Dutch CDA, and the Norwegian SV and Progress Parties.

9. The same analyses were also run for a larger set of parties by only examining the years 1982 to 1995. As such, parties established after 1972 and before 1982 are added to the dataset. The results are similar to those in the model in table 4.2. The year quotas were first adopted by a party in the party system. New Left values and electorally large parties are still found to be significant and strong indicators of the likelihood a party will adopt quotas or targets. By limiting the time frame most Green parties are included in the analysis, the number of parties increases to fifty-eight, and 57% of the cases score as adopting quotas or targets. Further, the -2 (log-likelihood ratio) is 142.35 and is significant.

10. The transformation of the logit coefficient (raising the number $e$ to the $B$ power), displayed under the label “$\exp(B)$,” is the change in the hazard rate for a unit increase in the particular covariate. To find the percentage change as a function of a one-unit increase in the variable, one is subtracted from $\exp(B)$ and the difference is multiplied by 100. For dichotomous variables, this is called the “relative risk,” and it is the ratio of the estimated hazard for a case with the characteristic of interest to the case without that characteristic.

11. Parties other than the Greens that score highly in terms of their concern for New Left values are the Danish Socialist People’s Party and the Social Democrats; the Finnish People’s Democratic Party; the Irish Labour Party; the Italian Progressive Democrats, Communists, and Radical Party; the Dutch Communists, Labour, Pacifist Socialist, Radical Political, and Democrats 66; the Swedish Communist Party; and the British Liberal Democrats.

12. Further evidence for this 20% threshold is in Thomas (1991; 1994), who finds that when women constitute 20% of the legislature in the United States, the legislature is more likely to pass bills concerning women.

Notes to Chapter 5

1. Unhappy with Labour’s centrist drift, a faction of the party had broken away in 1981 and formed the Social Democratic Party (SDP). The SDP formed an electoral alliance with the Liberal Party, and those two parties finally merged to form the Liberal Democratic Party.

2. Data on gender and vote choice collected from the British Election Studies. See Appendix B for details.

3. Data on gender, support for the women’s movement, and partisan preferences were collected from the most comprehensive cross-national source possible in terms of availability over time—the Eurobarometer Studies. By using these studies it is possible to track gender and attitudinal differences in the vote for the entire period of this study, 1970 to 1997. The advantage of the Eurobarometer is its longitudinal breadth
and consistency. Appendix B details the full list of the specific questions, variables, and studies that were used, and the archives from which these studies were obtained. The gender gap in partisan preference is measured using respondent vote intention.

4. Kaplan (1992) contends that “second wave” may be a misnomer in the case of the British and Scandinavian feminist movements, because women made continuous organized efforts to push for women’s rights.

**Notes to Chapter 6**

1. Known as the Greens in their entrance into the German system in the early 1980s, the party’s name changed in 1993 to Bündnis 90/Die Grünen after unification because of the merger of the West German Greens, the East German Greens, and an East German Civil Rights group called Alliance 90.

2. The Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) entered the united German party system in 1990. For continuity’s sake, the PDS is not analyzed here.

3. Data on gender and vote intention collected from German Election Studies. See Appendix B for details.

4. Data on gender, feminist values, and partisan preferences were collected from the Eurobarometer Studies. The advantage of the Eurobarometers is its longitudinal breadth and consistency. Appendix B details the full list of the specific questions, variables, and studies that were used, and the archives from which these studies were obtained. The gender gap in partisan preference is measured using respondent vote intention.

**Note to Chapter 7**

1. Data on gender and partisan preferences were collected from the Finnish election studies. Appendix B details the full list of the specific questions, variables, and studies that were used, and the archives from which these studies were obtained. The gender gap in partisan preference is measured using respondent vote intention.

**Notes to Chapter 8**

1. Feminist attitudes among a party’s constituency might be a more powerful indicator of the proportion of women in their parliamentary delegation, yet this variable cannot be tested in a multivariate model because the long-term, consistent measures of feminist attitudes are not available for six of our ten countries.

2. The data is arranged first by nation, then by party, and then by year, providing a stacked series of observations for each party over time.

3. The sample size and resulting degrees of freedom allow for the legitimate use of ordinary least squares regression (OLS). I used a variety of time-series, cross-sectional methods. These same models were run with the dependent variable as the level of women MPs with a lag on the explanatory side of the equation (as presented), and with the dependent variable transformed into a first-differences measure. With the first-differences method, the dependent variable, the proportion of women MPs, was transformed into a measure of change from one election to the next. Through this process, most of the national-level variation is removed. Importantly, the results are fairly con-
sistent. In each model, women on the national executive committee, the gender gap, and a centralized party structure are the most important indicators. However, the model that transforms the dependent variable to a measure of change explains little of the adjusted variance.

4. Data is not published for some parties in certain years. Therefore, a pairwise deletion of missing cases is used, so that these cases are not dropped entirely from the analysis. Because data is missing from the gender gap variable for four countries, Models 1a and 1b were also run without the measure of the gender gap in votes. The results are similar to those in which the variable is included. Women on the national executive is the strongest predictor, followed by the measures of centralization and candidate nomination.

5. Country dummy-variables are not included in Models 1a or 2a, because the explanatory variable that describes the electoral system (district magnitude) is a national-level variable and appears to act as a dummy-variable. For the full model (1a and 2a), SPSS automatically drops the electoral system variable when the model is run with country dummies. Therefore, I present a scaled-down model without the insignificant electoral system variable. Dummy-variables for each country (minus one) can be included in Models 1b and 2b. Two of these country dummies are significant (Denmark and Finland). When the same model is run without country dummy-variables, the results are similar. The first-differences model was also run with and without country dummy-variables, and with dummy-variables for each year, as well (fixed-effects model). The results are consistent: again, the national executive, the gender gap, and centralization emerge as the most important.

6. A lagged increase in the proportion of women on the party’s national executive is used in this model, because the theory indicates that women newly elected to top party positions pressure the party to increase women’s parliamentary representation. The results of this pressure will not be observable until the next election. When a simple difference measure from one election to the next is used in the multivariate model, the indicator is insignificant.

**Notes to Chapter 10**

1. Under the new electoral system (additional member, AMS), Scottish voters elect a representative in their constituency, and there are additional “top-up” seats that complement this by adding a dimension of proportionality.

2. The twinning strategy certainly would not work in the House of Commons. This mechanism is most appropriate to a body with many open seats. Because of the single-member district system and the incumbency advantage, there is little turnover among MPs. Thus, vacancies are few and widely dispersed across the country. It would be nearly impossible to match up open seats.