Novel Professions
Ruth, Jennifer

Published by The Ohio State University Press


For additional information about this book
https://muse.jhu.edu/book/28183

For content related to this chapter
https://muse.jhu.edu/related_content?type=book&id=1177834
1. For an insightful discussion of the way the word “smart” operates in academic circles, see Jeffrey J. Williams. As Bourdieu writes, “Nothing classifies somebody more than the way he or she classifies” (“Social Space” 132).

2. See Dweck and Nicholls. See also Malcolm Gladwell’s essay “The Talent Myth” in which he discusses Dweck’s work.

3. See Wooldridge for a fascinating history of the IQ test. Wooldridge is uncritically liberal, however; for more critical accounts, see Gould, Kamin, and Gillian Sutherland. See Lemann for a discussion of the IQ test in America.

4. This tendency to turn “doing” into “being” annoys Punch as early as 1853 when the editors write, “We are continually hearing of some individual or other who is remarkable for what is called an ‘Enlarged Benevolence.’ We wish MR. DONOVAN would explain to us the meaning of this phrase, for though we sometimes hear of an enlargement of the heart, or of a newspaper having been permanently enlarged, we are puzzled to understand how there can be an enlargement of an individual’s benevolence.” “A Phrenological Puzzle.”

5. “The challenge posed to class analysis by the group in question,” Guillory has written, “is precisely that of a class in which the cultural constituent appears to be definitive, and in which its mode of cultural or ‘knowledge’ production is uniquely related to the system of production” (“Literary Critics as Intellectuals” 124).

6. Because, as Harold Perkin wrote, “it was chiefly in the civil servants . . . that the professional ideal began to diverge from the entrepreneurial,” I focus in Novel Professions on the civil service rather than the Oxbridge examinations, but the former were modeled upon the latter (Rise of Professional Society 428).

7. “To a much greater degree than is usually credited,” Hack writes, “authors . . . accept market exchange as one—if not the only—source of income that does not compromise one’s independence, and even to highlight their participation in the marketplace” (“Literary Paupers” 693).

9. In *The History of Sexuality*, Foucault writes, “The question I would like to pose is not, Why are we repressed? but rather, Why do we say, with so much passion and so much resentment against our most recent past, against our present, and against ourselves, that we are repressed?” (8–9).

10. See Guillory’s “Preprofessionalism” and also Lambert on Guillory’s essay.

11. In his critique of this narrative of decline, Bruce Robbins contrasts this perception of professionalization to “vocation”: “Vocation demands public-ness and progress [while] professionalization means privacy and regress,” he writes (*Secular Vocations* 121). For a fascinating analysis of how the “common tale of a Fall into Professionalism” haunts numerous disciplines in addition to literature, see Robbins’s “Less Disciplinary Than Thou” (11).

12. In *Literary Culture in a World Transformed*, William Paulson makes a similar (and similarly bleak) argument. “Literature’s overt value as cultural capital for the upper-middle class,” he writes, “has been declining for generations, to the point that it is futile either to try to prop up its archaic function as the font of refined, genteel discourse or to claim that one is striking a blow for democratic culture by debunking it” (14).

13. For examples in which Guillory is explicitly cited as an influence in the authors’ thinking, see David Laurence’s “The Latest Forecast,” Mary Poovey’s “Beyond the Literary Critical Impasse,” and George Levine’s “Two Nations.”

14. As John McGowan explains, the assault on professorial autonomy is “connected with the contemporary economy’s maximizing of productivity through use of a modified piecework system. Workers are only hired for the specific time and the specific tasks for which they are needed, and are not carried by the employer during slack times” (43).

15. The American Association of Higher Education is arguably one of the major players in the move to abolish tenure. Their “New Pathways” series is devoted to developing new ways to organize higher education, and, repeatedly, articles in this series recommend the abolishment of tenure. “The view espoused in this paper is that tenure may have made some sense in the 1920s, or in the 1960s,” begins one article, “but may not make sense as the dominant employment relationship in the 1990s or the decade beyond” (Breneman 2).

16. Since 1975, the number of non-tenure-track faculty has increased by 88 percent (Harris 27). At my own university, something like 70 percent of the English department’s student-credit hours are taught by non-tenure-line faculty. Not only are literature students taught by “casual labor” but much of our departmental service is performed by nontenure-line faculty. For example, our assistant chair is not tenure-line.

17. Tellingly, the implications of the very phrase “job market” have changed. Once, applying the phrase to the annual shuffle between departments and job seekers seemed to operate as mere analogy. After all, literary critics chose their profession in part to escape the market logic that presides over other employment sectors. In a second phase, the “market” is invoked ruefully and ironically—“look we’re just like everybody else after all, a big cut-throat game.” Now, little trace of irony remains as the phrase “job market” saturates our conversations, no longer as trope but as apparent reality. Marc Bousquet has argued persuasively, however, that the rhetoric of the “market” does not describe but rather obscures our current dilemma (“Rhetoric of ‘Job Market,’” “Waste Product”). The sense that large market forces are behind the job crisis leaves us less likely to resist the structural transformation of higher education, and the focus on the job market “diverts attention from the real problems of ‘demand’ (the willingness of administration to utilize nonde-

18. For an early articulation of the same logic by an Americanist, see Seltzer, who wrote in *Henry James and the Art of Power*, “Modern power arrangements of discipline and normalization aspire to a ‘double discourse’ of disavowal and reinscription. From this point of view, the assertion of literary autonomy or subversiveness appears not as an escape from power but rather as part of that power’s deployment" (174).

19. Poovey’s suspicion extends even to points incidental to her argument. She describes book reviewing, for example, as if professionals—notoriously unlikely to identify as a class because of professionalism’s emphasis on individual merit—were conspiring to guarantee one another’s value. Mentioning one review of *David Copperfield* in *Fraser’s Magazine* (a journal without any obvious stake in the novel’s success), she places “review” in scare quotes and claims, “like many other mid-nineteenth-century ‘reviews,’ this piece functions as an advertisement for the novel, but because it is presented as a critical evaluation, it generates the effect of describing the value it actually helped create” (108). Of course, there is some truth to this, and one could imagine an argument that illustrates all the diverse kinds of labor, some invisible, that go into the production of “value.” Poovey’s comment, however, reflects a thoroughgoing cynicism about the nature of professional practices.

20. With his usual clarity on the topic, Robbins makes the point that the “logic of self-constitution by means of exclusion cannot be taken for granted. It is true, of course, that credentials are only meaningful if someone else does not possess them. Yet there is a very long step from this truth to the more questionable notion that the unequal possession of credentials is necessarily unjust. There is another long step to the more dubious assumption that unequal credentialing is the central principle of injustice in our unjust society” (*Secular Vocations* 200).

21. In an essay on aesthetics and modernity, Harpham drew up a list of “norms and notions” central to aesthetics that chimes remarkably well with professionalism: “the privilege of disinterested assessment; the autonomy of the artifact from historical, social, or economic forces; the uncoerced liberty of the judging subject; the universability of subjective responses; the human capacity to imagine and create objects” (“Aesthetics and the Fundamentals of Modernity” 124).

22. For an example of a work written in the heyday of suspicion but which brilliantly kept art’s double position front and center, see Psomiades.

23. I should note that in her recent essay “Beyond the Current Impasse in Literary Studies” Poovey admits that she has been one of those critics who, among other things, “assum[ed] that neither literary texts nor other kinds of cultural artifacts belong to separate or autonomous domains” (368). As indicated here and in a handful of other places, Poovey might agree with some of the criticisms I forward here.

24. For an excellent explanation of why Bourdieu has been read this way, see Moi. Moi argues that critics accustomed to the poststructural seesaw of oppositions—“subject or object, activity or passivity, voluntarism or determinism” (503)—find it difficult to do what Bourdieu requires, which is to “grasp and hold both sides of the formulation ‘to make something of what the world makes of us’—our freedom as well as the necessity that constrains it” (503). As a result, poststructural critics tend to reduce Bourdieu’s work to mere determinism, absorbing it as “just another poststructuralist ‘theory’” (506).

25. James Chandler has recently suggested that literary critics need to “work toward a
better understanding of how the scheme of disciplines might be said to compose a system” (359). Pointing to Bourdieu’s work as a resource for such a project, Chandler continues, “my sense is that the totality of the disciplines at any given time should be articulated not as a set of territories, or even as a set of parallel functions, or box of tools, but as a network of relatively autonomous practices in asymmetrical relation to each other” (360).

26. A more detailed exploration of the differences between the French and English nineteenth centuries would help clarify the limitations of Bourdieu’s project for Victorianists, but here I am primarily concerned to use him to inspire a new line of inquiry. In a fascinating discussion of Victorian poetry and modernity, Ivan Kreilkamp asks a question relevant to my own project on the novel. Invoking the figure in Rules of Art second only to Flaubert, Baudelaire, he asks, “Why do we have no English Charles Baudelaire, no mid-nineteenth-century poet whose work participates, explicitly and consciously, in the early theorization of modernity occurring at the time in France and Germany and America? Is it possible that this lack is at least in part a by-product of the questions we ask of Victorian poetry?” (605). I suggest that our sacrifice of the Victorian professional has been a major factor prohibiting an analysis of the Victorian novel in relationship to aesthetic modernity.

27. Rather, he continues, “it is by increasing [intellectuals’] autonomy (and, thereby, among other things, their freedom to criticize the prevailing powers) that intellectuals can increase the effectiveness of political action whose ends and means have their origin in the specific logic of the fields of cultural production” (340).

28. There is perhaps a little self-loathing to Jameson’s sacrifice of the pompous-humble intellectual, a bizarre moment in which Jameson and Winston Churchill converge in Churchill’s remark that “the intelligentsia are the glittering scum on the deep river of production” (qtd. in Lubenow 8).

29. As David F. Noble explains, “With the commoditization of instruction, teachers as labor are drawn into a production process designed for the efficient creation of instructional commodities, and hence become subject to all the pressures that have befallen production workers in other industries undergoing rapid technological transformation from above” (Steal This University 39). Long before the University of Phoenix was even an idea much less a reality, Marx said, “A schoolmaster is a productive labourer, when, in addition to belabouring the heads of his scholars, he works like a horse to enrich the school proprietors. That the latter has laid out his capital in a teaching factory, instead of a sausage factory, does not alter the relation” (Capital 1: 16,509).

30. Here, and throughout Novel Professions, I tend to use Marxist vocabulary and concepts, but this image of creative labor that returns to its producer might just as easily be put in psychoanalytic terms as work that augments and integrates the ego rather than diminishes it. In D. W. Winnicott’s terms, it is the difference between “creative apperception” and “compliance.”

31. Paul Delany also criticizes “the predominant influence of Foucault” (5). “England and France,” he writes, “have such fundamental differences as to make it implausible that the Foucauldian model would have equal explanatory power on both sides of the Channel” (5–6).

32. As Mintz discussed at much greater length, “George Eliot examines both how far the conditions of the age made it possible for the impulse toward self-aggrandizing ambition and the impulse toward selfless contribution to society to be united in a single life,
and, in addition, how that union is supported by secularized versions of older Protestant ideas about a man’s calling in the world” (2).

33. This self-loathing is not the same as that identified by Stanley Fish in his notorious 1994 essay “The Unbearable Ugliness of Volvos.” The implicit self-glorification Fish identifies in academic martyrdom has largely evaporated, I would argue, now that we have become increasingly reliant upon exploiting adjunct labor.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. For key examples of the first argument, see Larson, Heyck, and Wiener. For what is perhaps the key example of the second, see Poovey’s “The Man-of-Letters Hero.”

2. The apparently contradictory position of the professional between labor and capital has been widely acknowledged since Barbara and John Ehrenreich’s seminal essay “The Professional-Managerial Class” in which they examined the professional’s ambivalent relationship to the capitalist interests he or she serves. I take the title of this chapter from Between Labor and Capital, a 1979 essay collection focused on the Ehrenreichs’ argument. For an important reworking of their premise, see Robbins’s “The Village of the Liberal-Managerial Class.”

3. One reason Brontë felt The Professor possessed more “substance” than Jane Eyre might have been that she perceived the former male-narrated novel to be primarily about work and only secondarily about romance while she saw the later novel to reverse these priorities. In other words, she may have been betraying her participation in her culture’s common sense that work is serious, substantive, and intrinsically masculine while romance is silly, ephemeral, and feminine. Nonetheless, one by-product of this novel’s production of a male professional is, as I will argue later, a rather rigorous refusal of the logic that assigns women to the play or non-work side of the labor/play divide.

4. For a more developed account than Guillory’s of the origins of aesthetic disinterestedness in eighteenth-century philosophy, see Stolnitz. For an excellent and fascinating discussion that places the origins of aesthetics in relationship to the rise of bourgeois state structures, see Lloyd. “My fundamental argument,” wrote Lloyd, “is that the discourse on the aesthetic supplies theoretical resolution to the antinomies of bourgeois politics, resolutions which inform not only subsequent ideological discourse but also its material institutions” (109).

5. For a discussion of Burke’s definitions, see Poovey’s “Aesthetics and Political Economy in the Eighteenth Century.”

6. See Armstrong and Tennenhouse for a discussion of Marx’s inability to account for intellectual labor.

7. The initial framing of the novel might be understood in this context not as a false start, as has often been argued, but as a reproduction of this structure. Beginning as a letter to an old school friend, the novel abandons this device as if the epistolary form were too tied to an older, obsolete economy of patronage. William tells us that the “time . . . which I intended to employ for his [friend’s] benefit, I shall now dedicate to that of the public at large” (47). But the modern mass-marketed commodity turns out to be an unacceptable form as well. While Crimsworth dedicates his story to the “public at large,” he quickly rules out a large public by adding: “My narrative is not exciting, and above all, not
marvelous [sic]; but it may interest some individuals, who, having toiled in the same vocation as myself, will find in my experience frequent reflections of their own” (47). The story is dedicated not to an undifferentiated, impersonal market, but to “individuals” on the same career path. The book’s relationship to the market is much like the modern professional’s: both circulated on the market, they nonetheless attempt to protect themselves from its universalizing and homogenizing effects.

8. Making a similar point, the Newcastle Commission reported in 1861, “Trained teachers do not dislike their work; there is no reason why they should; it is honourable, intellectual, and benevolent; but society has not yet learned how to value them. This they feel with all the sensitiveness that belongs to educated and professional men” (qtd. in Sturt 159).

9. A great deal of work has explored phrenology in its political and scientific contexts. As well as Cooter, see Shapin, Richards, Harrington, and Clarke and Jacyna. For discussions of Brontë and phrenology, see Shuttleworth and Dames (“The Clinical Novel”). For a discussion of professionalization and phrenology, see my “The Case of The Zooist.”

10. Critics have seen Crimsworth as a class hybrid but nobody has noticed that he is in fact a protoprofessional. Terry Eagleton has argued that the novel enacts “a marriage of identifiably bourgeois values with the values of the gentry or aristocracy” but his marriage metaphor obscures the hard work the novel performs as it rewrites the aesthetic and aristocratic versions of independence into a middle-class notion of professional autonomy (54).

11. If, as Dierdre D’Albertis has argued, “the principles of duty and self-denial intrinsic to professional identity on the one hand, and to gender classification on the other, undercut one another,” then it might be worth hypothesizing that Brontë’s refusal of the tie between disinterest and femininity is a strategy to make room for a representation of herself as a disinterested professional (4).

12. The tension between mental work and mental property that exists in the novel reflects a tension that existed within phrenology itself. Phrenology was popularly understood as a form of material determinism—one’s skull defined and delimited you—but, in fact, the phrenological movement at mid-century thought that one might exercise and improve one’s abilities. But the popular understanding was not simply a mistake but rather an acknowledgment that by stressing the structure of seemingly unchangeable matter, phrenology appeared to reduce one to one’s material property even as it argued for one’s self-improvement through labor.

13. In a novel that is anything but playful, one that in fact redefines play as labor, economic metaphors repeatedly miss their mark. Toward the end of the novel, Crimsworth says to Frances after having agreed to a request of hers, “Now as a reward for such ready consent, give me a voluntary kiss.” “She brought her lips into very shy and gentle contact with my forehead,” the novel continues; “I took the small gift as a loan, and repaid it promptly, and with generous interest” (251). We are to feel that Crimsworth and Frances’s relationship is governed by a logic so completely different from economics that economic terms are humorous when invoked between them. I would venture to say that for most readers this passage does not achieve its desired effect. It is not so much that the dialogue is cloying, though it is that, but that transforming a gift into a loan does not seem so playful when performed by a protagonist who has consistently taken things that should be outside the logic of exchange and placed them within the tit-for-tat of commerce.
14. Heather Glen wrote in her 1989 introduction to the novel, “Recent critics . . . often trac[e] the novel’s ‘flaws’ to the fact that it is the only one of Charlotte Brontë’s published works to adopt the point of view of the male narrator” (7). Glen herself argued that the novel is a satire of Victorian masculinity. While an ingenious way of accounting for the discomfort the novel provokes, this argument is not very persuasive, because, as Alan Rauch has more recently explained, “The Crimsworth family embodies an ideal that would have suited Brontë and many of her readers” (159). For his part, Rauch does not then try to account for readers’ dissatisfaction with the text, merely suggesting that “The Professor bears the mark of a first effort if only because it is optimistic and uncomplicated in a way that Brontë’s later novels are not” (159). Optimistic, perhaps, but the novel is certainly not uncomplicated. My argument suggests, in fact, that the novel’s failure is in part due to its quite complicated structure, one in which the two sides—labor and capital—collapse in on one another.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1. Miller and Poovey “continue to set the terms for discussions of the interpellative effects of Dickens’s fictions,” Rachel Ablow writes (40). Gareth Cordery’s 1998 essay “Foucault, Dickens, and David Copperfield” might be a case in point. “David simply exchanges one form of social discipline that is openly repressive and corporeal for another that is covert and internal,” Cordery writes, going on to show how Miller’s argument can account for even those parts of the novel Miller does not address (71).

2. Similarly, Amanda Anderson writes about Little Dorrit, “The suspicious approach cannot do justice to Dickens, who . . . not only critically acknowledges the unholy alliance between British nationalism and global capitalism, but conveys a highly complicated understanding of the gains and losses of detachment cultivated in the service of systemic critique” (66).

3. “Everything with him went as by clockwork,” Dickens’s housekeeper and sister-in-law Georgina Hogarth recalled of Dickens (qtd. in Ackroyd 561). Echoing Copperfield’s comment regarding his own timely “discharge” of literary duties, one of Dickens’s sons claimed of his father, “no city clerk was ever more methodical or orderly than he: no humdrum, monotonous, conventional task could ever have been discharged with more punctuality or more business-like regularity, than he gave to the work of his imagination and fancy” (qtd. in Ackroyd 561).

4. For discussions of time in Dombey and Son, see Greenstein and Baumgarten. For a fascinating survey of illustrations of watches and clocks in Victorian literature, with special consideration of those in Dickens’s novels, see Dillon.

5. “They mutilate the labourer into a fragment of a man,” Marx wrote; “they estrange from him the intellectual potentialities of the labour-process in the same proportion as science is incorporated in it as an independent power” (Capital 1: 604).

6. In addition to Roach, see R. J. Montgomery’s Examinations: An Account of Their Evolution as Administrative Devices in England. Montgomery wrote, “1850 marked the beginning of a decade in which examinations became really popular. Competitive examination, in particular, was held up as a panacea for many educational or social ills. So many systems were started in this period that it appears as a sort of spring or source, the sub-
stance of which comes rolling down in the years in the form of one famous public examination system after another” (41).

7. This “triumph” was so complete that J. G. Fitch could argue in a speech to the Social Science Association as early as 1858: “No phenomena in the educational horizon at all approach in importance the rapid extension of a system of examination hitherto almost exclusively confined to the students in the Universities—first to candidates for appointments in the military, naval, and civil service of the Crown; then, to alumni of mechanics’ institutions, by the Society of Arts; then, to the boys of middle-class schools, by the College of Preceptors, and by the Universities; and, lastly, to the children of National British and other elementary schools, in the form of prize and certificate schemes” (qtd. in Roach 73).

8. For an excellent article on the role of the examination in Our Mutual Friend, see Shuman (“Invigilating”). Like me, Shuman is interested in how the professional uses the examination to shore up his authority and carefully negotiate a relationship to the market; but, where I primarily address the problematic temporality of the examination, Shuman’s emphasis lies with the specifically gendered ways Dickens puts the exam to use.

9. See chapter 3 for a more in-depth discussion of this issue of distinguishing, as one article put it, “the quality of the mind [from] the quantity of the stores with which it is furnished” (Morison 538). Numerous articles on Civil Service and university examinations in journals such as Chambers Journal, Fortnightly Review, Cornhill Magazine, and Fraser’s Magazine discussed the “problem of cramming,” cramming being defined by one article as “the accumulation of undigested facts and second-hand theories to be reproduced on paper” (Sayce 838).

10. For a different reading of Mr. Dick’s copying, see Welsh, “Writing and Copying in the Age of Steam.” Welsh argued that at a time when mechanical reproduction was rapidly dissolving the difference between the original and the copy, the copy, in essence, rose in value. David Copperfield participates, then, in the “relatively straightforward Victorian celebration of writing and copying” (45). While this is an ingenious argument, it overlooks the fact that copying is distinctly associated in the novel with those who are limited in power, incapable of more imaginative pursuits.

11. We know a character in this novel by the way she or he treats time. Though he is very industrious, Traddles is, we realize, somehow fundamentally inadequate when the adult David see Traddles “looking at his plain old silver watch” and notes that it is “the very watch he once took a wheel out of, at school, to make a water-mill” (598). On the one hand, Traddles wears a watch, a good sign, but, on the other hand, he puts it to inappropriate uses, a telltale sign that something is wrong. Indeed, what ends up being wrong with Traddles is precisely that he is still wearing the same “old” watch; that is, Traddles, for the bulk of the novel, is very much stuck in time, a self-described “plodding kind of fellow” (383) for whom everything happens “after rather a long delay” (382), particularly his long-deferred marriage.

12. It is perhaps for this reason, this association with a grubbing middle class, that Steerforth, the one “Public School Man” in the novel, refuses to undergo the examination that will earn him a ranked degree. “‘You’ll take a high degree at college, Steerforth,’” David says to him, “‘if you have not done so already; and they will have good reason to be proud of you!’ ‘I take a degree!’ cried Steerforth. ‘Not I! my dear Daisy—will you mind my calling you Daisy? . . . ’ I have not the least desire or intention to distinguish myself in
that way . . . why should I trouble myself, that a parcel of heavy-headed fellows may gape and hold up their hands?" (276)

13. "Procrastination is the thief of time" (166), Mr. Micawber tells David. In always focusing on ends (money) and never on means (work), Mr. Micawber is as much a thief of time as the watch-stealing servant. More specifically, Mr. Micawber appropriates the time of his friend Traddles. Because he must make a certain amount of money in order to marry his sweetheart, Traddles thinks quite literally of his savings and investments in terms of buying time, bringing him closer in time to his future wife. When Mr. Micawber defaults on a loan he has asked Traddles to co-sign, forcing Traddles to forfeit his property, Micawber causes Traddles to lose the time he had "made" in his journey to marriage.

14. "Temporally," Patrick Brantlinger writes, "these new instruments of national debt and middle-class commerce were all future oriented" (22).

15. See Altick for a discussion of both the increasing public visibility of speculative pursuits in the mid-nineteenth century and Dickens's representations of these pursuits in his novels.

16. Joseph Payne is reported in the College of Preceptors minutes as saying, "he could not help thinking that many persons were going examination mad at the present moment" (qtd in Roach 268).

17. One sees the same collapse of time into mental property or capital in the following exchange between Francis Galton and his cousin Charles Darwin. After reading Galton's book Hereditary Genius (1872), Darwin wrote to him: "You have made a convert of an opponent in one sense, for I have always maintained that, except fools, men did not differ much in intellect, only in zeal and hard work." Galton replied: "Character, including the aptitude for hard work, is inheritable like every other faculty" (Memories).

18. In his essay "To Saunter, To Hurry: Dickens, Time, and Industrial Capitalism," N. N. Feltes also investigated the role of "factory time" in Dickens. He argued that Dickens attempted figuratively to resolve the conflict between laborers and the new time discipline by, among other things, representing Mr. Toodles in Dombey and Son as a man who "achieved equipoise" with mechanical labor. Feltes was not interested, however, in either the issue of intelligence or the problem of the professional.

19. "Novelists fighting for economic bargaining power in 1850," Lund wrote, "had given up a romantic notion of the writer as unconscious, effortless creator for the image of hard-working bourgeois businessman" (26). Lund provided a useful corrective to those critics quick to assume that the mid-nineteenth-century writer was as averse to the concept of waged or salaried labor as his earlier or later counterparts, but when he described the process as a straightforward substitution of one imaginary identity for another, he simplified what was in fact a complex, uneven, and contradictory process. Indeed, Lund simplified his own argument with its hints that the writer must identify as much as a "laborer" as he does as a "businessman." The Victorian writer did indeed reject the Romantic version of himself but in its place he substituted neither a laborer nor a businessman but an amalgam that rose above them both: the professional.

20. An author in the National Magazine wrote later in the decade, "Literary men . . . if we may judge by the sneers and innuendos of the press . . . have not a very high appreciation of total abstinence . . . [The literary men] will give to Bacchus the hours the mere man of business is devoting to his it may be ignoble yet useful calling" (19).

22. See Anita Levy’s essay “Gendered Labor, the Woman Writer and Dorothy Richardson” for what might be considered the evolution of this mid-nineteenth-century logic of professional domesticity. Levy argues that around the turn of the twentieth century both popular and modernist fiction depicted women who need to leave home and enter the professional world precisely so that they might qualify to return home.

23. My argument intersects with Nicholas Dames’s on this point. Dames writes, “David’s memory contains few seeds that fail to grow; very few events are without their companions and repetitions. The effect of all this chainlike concordance and integrity is, however, to reduce the capacity of experience to alter a life” (Amnesiac Selves 146).

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1. For discussions focused solely on the history of the examination, see Roach and Montgomery.

2. The Times’s interpretation exemplified this misunderstanding. On Feb. 9, 1854, it declared: “Nothing less is proposed than the creation of a new liberal profession, as freely open to all as the Church, the bar, of the hospital. From the time this measure receives the royal assent, it will be the fault of the people if the public service do not become their birthright, according to the talent, education, and industry of each, without any hindrance from those sinister influences which have hitherto, as a general rule, made access dependent on a powerful connexion or a seared conscience” (qtd. in Evans 113).

3. Nicholas Dames’s “Trollope and the Career: Vocational Trajectories and the Management of Ambition” was published as I was revising this chapter. While not on The Three Clerks, in particular, Dames’s argument about Trollope overlaps with mine on a number of points, though his tends to be framed in Foucauldian terms (“The figure of ‘career,’” he writes, “managed to create linear, ordered sequences out of the disruptive energies unleashed by the spread of professionalism” (248)).

4. Charley’s lack of grand ambition, his acceptance of himself as a mere hack, helps ensure his honesty. See Kucich for a discussion of the relationship between ambition and dishonesty in Trollope (“Transgression”).

5. Since writing this, Lauren Goodlad’s Victorian Literature and the Victorian State has appeared, which also offers an analysis of The Three Clerks, some of which overlaps with points I make here.

6. Recognizing this as central to Trollope’s refusal of the logic of “unbought brains,” Robert D. Aguirre writes in his excellent discussion of An Autobiography, “Trollope’s accounting does not signal the failure of autobiography but the recognition of its inseparability from the material conditions of authorship itself” (569–70).

7. And Trollope has been called the “quintessential bourgeois” novelist (Praz 265).

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1. In 1997, Andrew Ross could yet write, “it is still a novelty to speak of academic labor” (“Labor behind the Cult of Work” 140), and, in 1998, Philip Altbach could still declare that although “there is a vague sense of unease,” there is “little sense of crisis among
academics, and most are unaware of the magnitude of the problems facing American higher education” (113). In the last five years, however, an outpouring of books, articles, and even websites (see “workplace: a journal for academic labor” and “Invisible Adjunct”) has polished our vague unease into hard concern.

2. “The literary and artistic world is so ordered that those who enter it have an interest in disinterestedness,” he writes (“Field” 321).

3. I am indebted throughout my discussion of Woodmansee to Kaiser’s excellent review.

4. George Levine makes a similar point when he comments at the beginning of Dying to Know, “I have found myself wanting to argue . . . that the hermeneutics of suspicion and the insistence on the primary values of localism and particularism have done what good work they can, and are now—often destructively—playing into the obsessive individualism of contemporary economic and social structures” (14).

5. In his introduction to Day Late, Dollar Short; The Next Generation and the New Academy, Peter C. Herman addresses both the new self-consciousness as well as its implicit voluntarism by observing, “there is the further irony in how the arguments for the importance (read continued funding) of the humanities often reiterate precisely the language that the new historicism and its allied approaches made so unstylish. Whereas the previous generation invented ‘strategic essentialism,’ the next generation might have to adopt ‘strategic conservatism’ simply in order to survive” (10). Unlike some other critics who have called for a reinvigorated formalism, Bell at least does admit that the solution is not to “resacraliz[e] the literary text” (488).

6. “Defensive interventions into the discourse of value, and . . . attempts to reclaim value by defining a new place for the aesthetic in contradistinction to the old conservative definitions of high culture,” writes Isobel Armstrong, “would be regarded by Bourdieu as made possible by a number of related shifts in the field, opened up by, to hypothesize, mass education, global capital, post-modern repudiations of the grand narrative, and electronic media which have displaced the centrality of what we traditionally call the humanities” (Radical Aesthetic 155). See Harvey’s Condition of Postmodernity for an account that explains the economic changes thoroughly and see Jameson’s Postmodernism for one treating the cultural dynamic in more detail.

7. This move by which the politics of recent work is implicitly dismissed by linking it to the pressure of productivity is becoming common. Speaking of “the next generation” of literary critics, Jessie Swan claims that “for the sake of publishing . . . we are . . . pressured into the sexy over the arduous since we all can deconstruct, expose the dynamics of colonial power exploits, champion the subaltern, and reveal latent sexual desires in any text—from coupons to Paradise Lost—in far less time than it takes to understand the vicissitudes of the textual histories of authors and their work” (116). Geoffrey Galt Harpham, to take another example, follows a paragraph detailing recent criticism’s domination “by sex, especially homose; by race, especially minorities; by culture, especially material culture; by performance, especially the performance of identity” with one that makes the following statement: “literary scholars today don’t feel the need to read anything else in literary studies—they just need to write” (“The End of Theory” 195).

8. Guillory’s fatalism recalls Allen Dunn’s argument about Bourdieu’s sociology, the primary intellectual influence on Guillory. Dunn writes, “if there is a scandal to be found in Bourdieu’s sociology of art, it is in the implication that we can attain freedom only by
assuming the position of spectators who witness the spectacle of human misery without being able to intervene, without being able to translate sociological knowledge into social practice” (“Who Needs a Sociology of the Aesthetic?” 90).

9. In yet another piece worrying about junior scholars who “reduce critical practice to exercises in political positioning,” George Levine writes, “Literature remains a subject worth studying ‘in its own right’ (however complicated that idea has become)” (“Reclaiming the Aesthetic” 2,16). Levine distances himself from the very heart of his argument by placing “in its own right” in both scare quotes and giving it a self-conscious parenthetical. If, even as he argues for it, he is embarrassed by the idea that a critic could divorce a text from its material circumstances—studying it “in its own right”—then what chance do we as a profession have of recuperating this ideal in any sincere way?

10. Part of what I am trying to do is take seriously Kathleen McCormick’s recent complaint that assessments of our “crisis” exhibit “a recurrent inability to engage dialectically with the past.” She continues: “On the one hand there are those who seem to think that everything will be all right if we just go back. On the other, there are those, rather on the brink of despair, who seem quite sadly unable to find a way of redeeming the humanities. . . . Both of these perspectives are unable to find productive ways to understand the past in relation to the present” (137).