The Rhetoric of Fictionality

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My purpose in this chapter is to follow up on my objection, in chapter three, to the presumption that narrative, capable as it is of expression in several different media, is constituted by a medium-independent content and to advance instead a rhetorical model of its medium-contingency. I shall consider the nature and role of the medium against the background of a view of narrative as a cognitive faculty. My interest centres on the semiotic function of media and its place in a principled opposition between narrative and phenomenal experience, or more particularly, between fiction and illusion. This question is raised most pointedly in relation to iconic media, and so my main examples in this chapter are taken from the media of comics and film. Integral to my position is an emphasis on the self-reflexiveness of the narrative imagination in process, and it’s no coincidence that the examples I’ve chosen overtly thematize that self-reflexiveness; they serve both to illustrate and carry forward the discussion, and I shall attend to them in some detail accordingly. The subject matter of one (dreams) and the argument of the other (a parable of mimetic illusion) will lead me ultimately to some speculative reflection upon the relation between dreams and fictions in the light of the foregoing explorations.

Narrative Media and Narrative Cognition

The various notions of a medium in general usage tend to compound several overlapping senses, which have been helpfully teased apart by Marie-Laure Ryan: she draws a basic distinction between transmissive
and semiotic concepts of a medium, as a “channel of communication” or a “material means of expression” (2004: 16). Ryan argues that neither category alone can yield an adequate definition of medium. Transmissive senses represent media as merely the technological conduits of essentially autonomous meanings, whereas semiotic senses do not provide for the conceptual separation of medium and message that is necessary if we are to understand narrative as a structure independent of any medium, and transposable between media (17). However, the view I want to advance jet-tisons this second criterion, because it maintains that there is no conceptual level of narrative between the formlessness of mind-external data and the semiotic framework of representation, in which some medium is inherent, whether mental or technological: narrative ideation is itself medium bound, in the perceptual and conceptual apparatus of mental representation. Narrative, on this view, cannot be medium independent: it is always dependent on representation in some medium, although it is capable of harnessing several. In other words, my position implies that the semiotic sense of medium does indeed supply a necessary and sufficient definition of medium for the purposes of narrative theory, while the transmissive sense involves a range of more or less contingent, more or less technological extensions of the concept.

The sense in which the category of narrative transcends any particular medium, I suggest, is not to be conceived in deep structural terms, by invoking medium-independent notions such as fabula, or story grammar. It is a discursive matter—a communicative rhetoric that exploits certain representational capabilities that are common to a range of media. The alternatives to this view are that narrative structure can be conceived in the absence of representation, or that representation can be conceived in the absence of any medium. For narrative structure to be independent of representation, story logic would have to be innate in mind-external reality, the world itself already storied. On the other hand, it is possible to conceive of representation in the absence of a medium only by adopting an unjustifiably restricted definition of “medium,” for instance by regarding story grammars as mental representations, but independent of “medial realization,” which is then reserved for the process of “externalization” (Jahn 2003: 201). A medium, minimally, is a vehicle of semiosis, which is present at the ground level of cognitive processing, in the articulation of sense data in the perceptual system. The necessary condition for semiosis, here, is articulation, rather than communication in any restrictive “external” sense: semiosis is always, even within the mind, a contextually situated and dialogic process. The idea of representation is not intelligible
without a medium. The media of narrative mental representations, then, are the mind’s own perceptual and conceptual systems.

Resistance to this view may in part be a legacy of the structuralist analogy between narrative and language, which is itself indirectly buttressed in narrative theory by the privileged status often accorded to narratives in linguistic media. Ideas of narrative syntax, story grammars, and the general baggage of the linguistic analogy tend to contaminate more broadly cognitive terms such as “script” and “schema” (Schank and Abelson 1977). For my purposes, at least, the value of these concepts lies precisely in the extent to which they are irreducible to a linguistic paradigm, so it’s worth noting why that is so. Scripts are not particularized narratives, somewhat as grammars are not sentences; but unlike grammars, they are not generative, in the sense that they do not define what shall and shall not be a well-formed, or “grammatical,” narrative. Instead, scripts are heuristic: their value lies in the extent to which they facilitate the ongoing encounter between mind and temporal existence. Any heuristic will do until you encounter something that resists its explanatory or predictive power, at which point you have to revise the script. Grammars are medium-independent abstractions that can be used to characterize the structure of digital semiotic systems, such as language, which use discrete signifying units; but narrative is capable of articulation in both digital systems and analogue systems such as visual imagery, which are graded or scalar. Narrative, then, is not essentially a digital system, and it is not amenable to grammar. Narrative “grammars” themselves turn out to be limited heuristic devices. Scripts and schemata are not abstractions but templates, general-purpose representations, which serve as tools of the cognitive project of the narrative faculty. The narrative faculty, on this view, is not a species of the linguistic faculty, but something quite distinct, more inclusive and more elemental in its systemic logic.

In the discussion so far, I have silently run together two perspectives upon narrative representation that I now want to juxtapose more explicitly. In one perspective, a narrative is the object of interpretation; in the other, it is a means of interpretation. These alternatives are well captured in David Herman’s introduction to Narrative Theory and the Cognitive Sciences, where he distinguishes between “making sense of stories” and “stories as sense-making” (2003: 12–14). We differ slightly in our interpretation of the second category, which he takes to mean stories “as tools for thinking” (14), whereas I take it, more fundamentally, to mean “stories as sense-making processes.” That is to say, I want to place the emphasis on the narrative process as a basic, essential human sense-making activity, rather than on
the narrative product as a tool of sense-making. This process is inherently anthropocentric, and indeed anthropomorphic, not because stories are about people (though they usually are), but because they are by people; their frame of reference is human experientiality. We are capable of recognizing the partiality and distortion entailed by this horizon, and we have developed other ways of modelling the universe which have greater analytic and predictive powers in many contexts, but there is something irreducible about the limitations of narrative sense-making, because those same limitations are integral to narrative’s role in the production of human value. This elemental reciprocity between narrative process and narrative meaning is what I mean to capture in the word “articulation,” which means both the creation of significant relations between parts, and the expression of such relations; in narrative, fundamentally, these two are the same. This reciprocity can also be seen as the root of a recursiveness that I think is innate in narrative understanding generally, and crucial to the fictive use of narrative. The same recursiveness is latent in Herman’s distinction between making sense of stories and stories as sense-making: the correlation of these two perspectives expresses very well the point that, within the parameters of narrative, making sense of stories is making sense of sense-making. That is to say that, both across and within media, narrative representations are intelligible in terms of other narrative representations. Narrative sense-making always rides piggyback upon prior acts of narrative sense-making, and at the bottom of this pile is not the solid ground of truth, but only the pragmatic efficacy of particular stories for particular purposes in particular contexts.

In elaborating this view, I shall focus on two examples that make highly self-conscious use of the recursiveness of narrative representation in their respective media. The second of these, The Countryman and the Cinematograph, is a surprisingly artful relic from the early years of film, which plays with the idea of mimetic illusion in its own medium and so contributes directly to my argument here. The first example is taken from Neil Gaiman’s Sandman, one of the most interesting works in the comics medium to date, which is formally self-conscious about its own media and thematically self-conscious about the narrative imagination in general, for example in relation to the recurrent figures of Orpheus and Shakespeare, and more particularly through its emphasis on dreaming (the Sandman himself, Morpheus, is Lord of the Dreaming, and much of the narrative advances through or in reaction to the dreams and nightmares of the characters). The comics page reproduced in figure 1 comes from Sandman volume two, The Doll’s House, and represents the dreams of a lesbian
couple named Chantal and Zelda, residents of the boarding house to which the title of the volume partly refers. The page contains two parallel narrative strands, Chantal’s dream running across the top and Zelda’s along the bottom, both anchored by the central image of the sleeping couple.

Before I address the reflexivity of representation in these dream narratives, however, I want to show how my perspective upon narrative media bears upon an example of narrative articulation in sequential art. Consider the relation between two adjacent comics frames, where these delineate a simple event, for example, the lifting of the veil, at the bottom right of the page. Here we have two consecutive images of the same figure, the first with the veil lowered, the second with it raised to reveal a spider’s head. The spider, and indeed the veil, are elements of the couple’s gothic preoccupations: they are known in the boarding house as the spider women, and they claim to have “the largest collection of stuffed spiders in private hands on the Eastern Seaboard” (66). These associations help to explain why Zelda’s response at this point in her dream is not the reaction of horror we might have expected. My immediate concern, however, is how such a sequence of two images works in narrative terms. If you were to explain how we comprehend this sequence you might say, with Umberto Eco, “obviously the reader welds these parts together in his imagination and then perceives them as a continuous flow” (1987: 24). But is this obvious? It may to an extent be possible to do so, in the same sense that it is possible to use a fiction as the basis for imagining a fictional world, though there is considerable scope for doing so in different ways (in this case, is the movement slow and ceremonial, or abrupt and dramatic?). However, I would argue that such a process is in no way inherent in reading such a sequence, and furthermore that in terms of narrative comprehension, it would in fact be a retrograde move.

Consider the way Eco’s comment represents what happens in the interpretation of a comics sequence such as this veil example. It is conceived as a two-stage process, an imaginative welding followed by perceiving, by means of which the reader works back through the transformations of the creative process and arrives at a virtual experience of the originary stream of sense data that it is supposed to mediate. The assumed end point of the process, that perception of “a continuous flow,” is the focus of my objection. An undifferentiated flux of sense impressions may indeed constitute the raw material of experience, but as undifferentiated flux it is meaningless; only the cognitive exercise of representation makes sense of it, by articulating it—among other things, demarcating it into events. The lifting of the veil is articulated as an event, an act of revelation, by these two
Figure 1 [this and facing page]

The sentence spent most of last year
in Czechoslovakian for political reasons.
But it was recently translated
back into English.
In order to stop
the sentence being
deposed, Chantal
has arranged to
have it read into
the Library of
Congress.

However...

...when the time comes she discovers
that she can no longer read.
She has no
idea what
her sentence
is about.

Depressed
and hopeless,
Chantal
begins to
cry.

The Little Girl starts
laughing.

Okay, okay,
laughing.

Thank you, God.

Okay, okay,
laughing.
images, the two frames of the sequence. If we were really to respond to this sequence by subsuming it within a continuous flow, we would strip it of its status and meaning as an event. Event status, and narrative tellability, is not intrinsic in the temporal world, but evaluative, and always relative to some interpretative or communicative context (see the discussion of events in chapter three). There is a hint in Eco’s formulation of an analogy with film viewing, in which there is indeed a precognitive perceptual flow from frame to frame, but this is a conceptual transposition to another medium with different means of representation and narrative articulation. It should not obscure the point, precisely because it is a shift to another medium, not a reading through the medium. In the realm of narrative comprehension, there is always another medium, because without media there is no representation; this is as true inside the head as it is on the page or screen.

The relation between frames is also discussed by Scott McCloud, who is quite clear about the differences between its operation in comics and in film. Here too, though, the point that concerns me is, at best, obscured. McCloud explains how we bridge the gutter between frames in terms of closure, a concept that would work very well if he meant it in the narrative sense, which is congruent with the demarcation of events. His usage, however, draws upon the idea of visual closure, “observing the parts but perceiving the whole” (1994: 63), which makes it very prone to a conflation between representations and their objects. So while he says that “in the limbo of the gutter, human imagination takes two separate images and transforms them into a single idea” (66), a formulation I would happily accept, he also says that “closure allows us to connect these moments and mentally construct a continuous unified reality” (67), and “closure is comics’ primary means of simulating time and motion” (69). These are statements I want to resist, because they embody the basic assumption that I’m contesting: that is, the assumption that temporal existence is analogous to an object of representation, and so that representation simply provides for a reproduction, or simulation, of reality, temporality, and flux. Flux is what we encounter in the world, and there’s already plenty of it to keep us busy. Representation is one of the ways in which we busy ourselves, an encoding process of cognitive mapping which, as such, is semiotic: its power is that of assimilation, primarily by reducing the chaos of sense data to comprehensible terms. Representation always functions within some system of signs, the interpretants of which are not the real, but other signs. This pursuit of signs is a function of cognitive processing, and it could not lead beyond that frame of reference without ceasing to signify,
at which point it would also cease to have any pragmatic value as a means of understanding. The efficacy of representation depends on the fact that it begins and ends in the mind: its baseline is not the real but the percept, which is itself a representation and only functional as significant within the differential system of perception. Narrative representation has its roots here, in the articulation of change: it delimits the mutability of matter in time, producing event, cause and effect, agent and purpose.

My view of the articulation of narrative events fits within a sense of narrative as a cognitive faculty. The event is a product of narrative processing, an instance of cognitive chunking in which the mind negotiates with temporal phenomena. Narrative processing, then, is a mode of articulation of the data of experience; “articulation” must be understood to mean the production of meaning, the creation of structure, rather than the expression of some mind-independent content. What matters is this codification, the respect in which mental representations differ from their objects rather than merely reproduce them, because this is the respect in which they assimilate data. A map you can read, however crude or partial, serves human purposes in ways that the illegible terrain itself cannot. It goes without saying that the meaning-producing act of articulation is also potentially a communicative, or meaning-sharing, act: meaning is inherently part of a discursive economy, whether it circulates within the individual mind or between minds.

Reflexivity and Dreams

I suggested that the principle of narrative recursiveness is crucial to the distinctive rhetoric of narrative fictionality, and the reflexivity of my Sandman example provides a way to elaborate upon that idea. The comics page in figure 1 is representative of the Sandman series as a whole in exhibiting several kinds of self-reflexivity, but I want to make a broad distinction between two kinds: the first kind, overt self-consciousness, is a circumstantial (but not unusual) feature of this example, and one of the ways fictionality often advertises itself; but the second kind, implicit self-reference, is the more fundamental feature of narrative self-reflexivity, and it is the exploitation of implicit self-reference that most strongly correlates with the rhetorical stance associated with fictionality.

Sandman is extremely self-conscious in its relation to the narrative stockpile of several cultures, drawing for example upon classical, Norse, African, and Eastern mythologies, as well as ranging widely over the liter-
ary canon. It is equally self-conscious in its more specific invocation of the history of the comics medium, including stylistic allusions to such varied instances as Winsor McCay’s *Little Nemo in Slumberland*, EC horror comics of the fifties, and contemporary Japanese manga. It is also extremely self-aware and sophisticated in its use of the semiotic potential of the twin media channels of comics—image and text—both separately and in counterpoint to each other, and almost every page offers evidence of its rhetorical inventiveness in this regard. The overt self-consciousness in figure 1 is partly an instance of the way *Sandman* constantly indexes the literary and visual heritage of various cultural traditions. Here we have allusions to the gothic novel, *Melmoth the Wanderer* and *The Castle of Otranto* in particular, and the evocation of John Tenniel’s famous illustrations for *Alice in Wonderland*. Those are both features of Zelda’s dream, at the bottom of the page; but Chantal’s dream, at the top, also exhibits overt self-consciousness, in the way it manipulates the relation between the verbal and visual channels of the comics medium. Chantal dreams she is having a relationship with a sentence, and the sentence that tells us so, standing in for her lover-sentence (which we never get to read), is an embodiment of that odd elevation of language: the lettering emphasizes the materiality of the text (as in fact does the cursive script in the rest of Chantal’s dream, though to different ends), and the words form a monumental block filling half the frame, balancing the image of Chantal herself in the other half.

The verbal text of Chantal’s dream plays with the conceit of the lover-sentence in an overtly self-conscious way, but there is more going on in the images that complicates the story, and these effects depend on my second category of self-reflexivity, the implicit self-reference exploited by the rhetoric of fictionality (here, I’m referring to the fictionality of *Sandman*, not of Chantal’s dream narrative). This visual counternarrative begins at the juncture of text and image, with the letter Z, which appears to be the title of the book in Chantal’s dream; it is also, as Zelda’s dream reveals, the pet name Zelda’s mother used for her (and a central theme of Zelda’s dream is the structural interchangeability of her mother and Chantal). So it is significant that in the second frame Chantal kisses the book, as opposed to the sentence, and that in this frame, her head position and her anomalously dishevelled hair closely echo the image below, of their actual sleeping position, in which Zelda occupies the position of the book. These metonymic and metaphoric displacements (sentence to book, book to Zelda) imply that understanding the sentence is understanding Zelda, and they establish a web of signification that extends across narrative strands and narrative levels. As such, the visual counternarrative depends
upon discursive self-reference, rather than reference to any notional object of representation, and is sanctioned by our awareness of fictionality. But Chantal’s explicit dream narrative and this elaborated subtext work in tension with each other, and the next frame reasserts her idealized self-image, as represented by the full-face pose. The conflict involved in sustaining the surface narrative finds expression in the negative turn of events from this point on, and the direct gaze of Chantal’s ideal self-representation prepares the way for its fracture into shards in the last frame of the dream. This confirms it as a mirror image—or perhaps, since the “Z” is not reversed, as the Platonic self of whom the dreaming Chantal is herself only a broken reflection.

The *Sandman* series, as a whole, offers a wealth of material about dreams, but I’ve chosen to focus upon this page primarily because it offers a plausible, fairly literal representation of certain aspects of dreaming in process which open up interesting questions about the narrative quality of dreams. Cognitive approaches to dreaming are hampered by the inaccessibility of the primary empirical data, of course, and this is no answer to that problem: I’m not proposing to do anything so tendentious as to treat these fictional representations of dreams as if they were instances of actual dreaming. What I want to do, though, is to use some of the issues raised by the attempt at representation itself as an occasion to reflect upon certain features of dreaming, and in that context to relate the narrative quality of mental representations to that of the iconic (and semi-iconic) physical media of comics and film.

The two instances of dream representation in figure 1 respond to the challenge in different ways, which are manifested in their differing strategies of narration and focalization. Chantal’s dream is narrated in the third person, which might deter us from attending to her as dreaming subject, except for the strong sense of internal focalization—that is, of an alignment between the third person narration and Chantal’s own perspective. This is apparent in the text of the dream, and in the form of that text, the cursive script suggestive of Chantal’s own handwriting. It is also conveyed by the sense that, as I’ve already suggested, the frontal images of Chantal are mirror images, and hence that we are seeing through her eyes. The sense of Chantal’s dream that emerges is of a third-person self-narration, in which experience is continuously pushed to arm’s length, producing the cyclical, self-eluding self-consciousness that is central to Chantal’s characterization. A little later, her dreaming becomes an infinite regress in the form of spiralling repeated images with the text: “It was a dark and stormy night. And the skipper said to the mate, ‘Mate, tell me a story.’ And this
is the story he told: It was a dark and stormy night . . .” (191). Just as the substance of Chantal’s dream is an evasion of self-knowledge, then, the representation of that dream evades an ambiguity between dreaming as experience and dreaming as narration, even as it foregrounds it: the dream Chantal produces and consumes remains trapped in cycles of creation and reception, writing and reading.

Zelda’s dream is different in a number of ways. Firstly, the text is first-person narration, except in the very last frame. At the same time, the visual self-representation is even more dissociated than Chantal’s: it is not even a childhood self, but a cultural archetype of the young girl adrift in a strange world—Alice in Wonderland. There is a stronger sense here of a fluid, reciprocal relation between the generation of the dream narrative and the dreamer’s experience of it, a reciprocity conveyed by distributing its elements between the verbal and visual channels of the representation. The verbal narrative is a breathless monologue (the text is compressed so that there are no spaces between the words), which at times becomes a kind of metadiscourse, a running commentary on the visual articulation of the dream narrative: “That’s us”; “Let it be Chantal, not my Mom”; “Thank you God.” The visual channel, meanwhile, is both anticipating and responding to the verbal discourse. The iconography of mother and daughter in the second frame conflicts with the commentary identifying this as Chantal and Zelda, and leads into the anxious confusion of Chantal with Zelda’s mother that follows. Conversely, the verbal narrative of Zelda’s mother saying “Oh God Zee you’re sick listen Robert do you know what I saw in her room your daughter’s disgusting” is then elucidated via the image of an animal skull, the ornate picture frame of which marks it as a flashback, an image of a disturbed family history preserved on Zelda’s psychological mantelpiece. The perspectival fluidity of Zelda’s dream is even more apparent in the last three frames. The veil sequence is the only clear-cut example here of first-person experiential perspective, images in which the dream experience and dream narration coincide, whereas the detached third-person narration of the final frame removes us to a greater distance from the action than at any point previously. This frame can only continue to make sense as Zelda’s own dream perspective at the cost of a radical dissociation from her own self-representation—that is, a close analogue of the shattered mirror effect at the end of Chantal’s dream.

This problem of person and perspective in the representation of dreams is indicative of the dream’s ambiguous status between experience and narrative. The ambiguity is in part a question of the distinction between the dreaming mind and its self-representation within the dream—a distinction
manifest, for example, in any awareness that you are somehow not your-
self, as Zelda most obviously is not—but it is also, more broadly, a question
of consciousness in dreams. The difficulty in locating the self in dreaming
is the reason why it turns out that the most partial self-representation
here is the most direct one, the first-person experiential perspective of the
veil sequence. Conversely, the most rounded perspective emerges from the
most dissociated representation, the last frame, incorporating as it does the
interpretative idiosyncrasy of Zelda's affective response to her own dream.
Selfhood is never integral in a semiotic model of cognitive articulation,
which is both by and for the self: dreams tend to foreground this internal
division, by compounding the split between sender and receiver with a
split between narrator and protagonist, the self who creates and the self
who experiences the dream.

A Parable of Mimetic Illusion

The issue that lurks behind this ambiguity between narrative and experi-
ence is that of the relation between representation and illusion, and I
can best elucidate that issue by appealing to my second example, and the
medium of film. The sense of an affinity between dreams and film has
been frequently noted and is perhaps most obviously expressed in the
common epithet for the Hollywood studio system, the “dream factory.”
It predates Hollywood, though, as the most cursory survey of early film
subjects will confirm. Counting only British films up to 1910, for instance,
records survive of over thirty titles along the lines of “Let Me Dream
Again” (1900), “The Ploughboy’s Dream” (1904), “The Bobby’s Nightmare”
(1905), “Dreamland Adventures” (1907), “In the Land of Nod” (1908), or
“Saved by a Dream” (1909). The film I want to discuss, however, has a
more analytical relation to the issues underlying this association, because
it literally stages the relation between illusion and narrative representa-
tion, at stake in both dreams and film, and it does so in a strikingly self-
reflexive way.

The early development of a new medium, as with a new genre, is
always likely to be accompanied by a high degree of self-consciousness.
On the other hand, its semiotic function as a medium is potentially ob-
scured when it lays claim to public attention most compellingly because of
its unprecedented verisimilitude, which is to say its apparent immediacy.
Such was the case in the earliest days of the cinema, when the technology
of the moving image was put before the public as an innovation for the
recreation not just of movement, but of life (not just the Cinematograph and the Kinetoscope, but Vitagraphe, Bioscope, Zoograph, etc.). The communicative potential, and hence more specifically the narrative potential, of filmic representation necessarily had to wait for the emergence of a filmic rhetoric, and the consequent sense that the medium itself (rather than its representational content) was a way of articulating meaning, and not just a channel for transmitting phenomenological data. Normally, this filmic rhetoric is associated with the gradual development of editing conventions over the first twenty years of cinema history. My example suggests that its fundamental principles are being negotiated rather earlier, specifically in terms of the self-consciousness of filmmakers and the self-reflexive representations that characterize many of their early efforts. That is, I suggest that a fictive rhetoric of filmic representation, with its propensity for reflexiveness, can be seen to lead rather than follow the development of filmic narrative.

Of course, film producers and spectators were necessarily aware from the first that the filmic image, as such, is a representational product, which implies reciprocal assumptions about communicative agency and effect. The Lumière brothers, for example, dealt almost exclusively in actualities rather than overtly staged action, but their films exhibit a clear and deliberate use of the compositional principles of photography, both in spatial terms and, by extrapolation, in the management and selection of movement, most notably in their preference for strong diagonal movements towards and past the camera. One instance of this particular compositional technique is the subject of what has been described as “perhaps the oldest cliché of film history” (Kirby 1997: 62), the anecdotal story of how the first audiences of the Lumières’ L’Arrivée d’un train en gare de la Ciotat (1895) panicked and fled at the sight of the onrushing train. One obvious reason for scepticism about the supposed impact of L’Arrivée d’un train is that, as the title implies, it shows the train pulling into a station; anyone caught up in an illusionistic effect would feel themselves safe on the platform with the camera. But early cinema audiences may plausibly have been startled by some of the images presented to them, without this amounting to a triumph of mimetic illusion. Noël Burch, for example, sees no reason to doubt it, but he insists that mimetic illusion in any such sense has no place in the history of the cinema. Stephen Bottomore has shown that the cumulative evidence of reports of such reactions to early films (mostly, though not exclusively, of approaching trains) cannot be entirely explained away by reference to the enthusiastic hyperbole of reviewers, the self-interested publicity of exhibitors, or early audiences’ gratifying
projection of an unsophisticated other’s naïve response. He also offers an account, drawn from perceptual psychology, of a recognized reflex response to certain visual stimuli (the “looming” response), which is normally overridden by higher cognitive competencies, but which may well explain the flinching of some perceptually confused spectators in response to the novel stimulus of cinematic images (1999: 189–90). Nonetheless, I am most interested by the continuity between such stories about the reactions of early cinema audiences and a long tradition of equivalent tales, which might be labelled “parables of mimetic illusion.” One of the most ancient of these, recorded in Pliny’s Natural History, concerns the rivalry between the artists Zeuxis and Parrhasius:

This last, it is recorded, entered into a competition with Zeuxis, who produced a picture of grapes so successfully represented that birds flew up to the stage-buildings; whereupon Parrhasius himself produced such a realistic picture of a curtain that Zeuxis, proud of the verdict of the birds, requested that the curtain should now be drawn and the picture displayed; and when he realized his mistake, with a modesty that did him honour he yielded up the prize, saying that whereas he had deceived birds Parrhasius had deceived him, an artist. (1952: XXXV, 65–66)

Here the emphasis falls upon the power of art to deceive, to mimic nature so successfully that its artifice goes undetected by innocent nature itself, and even by the knowing artist. The model of creativity is competitive: artist versus artist, art versus nature. A contrasting example might be the myth of Pygmalion, in which art fuses with life under pressure from the sheer force of desire. Again, though, the emphasis is on creativity, not reception. The only audience is the artist himself, and so the implied model of art lacks a properly communicative, semiotic dimension. A closer analogy to the cinematic version of mimetic illusion would be the tradition of deluded responses to theatrical performance, as enacted in various plays within plays, or represented within the history of the novel by such as Cervantes in Don Quixote (1950: II: 26) and Fielding in Tom Jones. In Fielding’s play scene, the eccentric Mr. Partridge provides an ironic reversal of the classical ars est celare artem: he admires the bombastic actor playing Claudius, but he cannot perceive that the naturalistic Hamlet is acting at all (1966: XVI, 5; 759–60). Extrapolating from this version of the parable, we get a reception theory in which verisimilitude loses its value if it is not recognized as artifice. The best way to approach the cinematic
myth of mimesis, though, is through early cinema’s own versions of the parable, which both instantiate and reflect upon the rhetorical force of the medium and contemporary audiences’ attitudes of reception. R. W. Paul’s 1901 film, *The Countryman and the Cinematograph*, is probably the earliest of these cinematic parables of mimetic illusion. Only a fragment of the film survives, but the full narrative is recorded in Paul’s film catalogue:

This amusing novelty is a representation of an animated photograph exhibition and shows the stage, proscenium and screen. The first picture thrown on the screen is that of a dancer, and a yokel in the audience becomes so excited over this that he climbs upon the stage and expresses his delight in pantomime as the picture proceeds. The next picture (within the picture) is that of an express train, which rushes towards the yokel at full speed, so that he becomes frightened, and runs off at the wings. The last scene produced is that of the yokel himself, making love to a dairy maid, and he becomes so enraged that he tears down the screen, disclosing the machine and operator, whom he severely handles. (BFI Screenonline)

The surviving fragment runs from the end of the dancing scene to the beginning of the yokel and the dairy maid. The footage of the train provides a broad visual echo of the Lumières’ film—the point of view and direction of movement are the same—and while trains were a staple subject of early cinematic attractions, it is quite possible that the allusion is intentional. The yokel, however, is clearly not a representative member of the viewing public, but very much a stock character, a country bumpkin complete with smock, floppy hat, and neckerchief. He is a foil, like Fielding’s Partridge, and his function is not to represent the audience’s own attitude of reception, but to throw it, comically, into relief. The film was effective enough to attract the attention of the Edison Manufacturing Company, for whom Edwin Porter made a close copy, entitled *Uncle Josh at the Moving Picture Show*, the following year. Porter’s version uses inset film subjects from the Edison catalogue, including *The Black Diamond Express* (though not the extant version of 1896). The Edison train films are more dramatic than the Lumières’ offering and occasioned several stories of audience panic in their own right (Bottomore 1999: 181, 187). Uncle Josh, a country rube played by Charles Manley, had already featured in two Edison films, themselves part of a larger group of rube films from Edison and other producers. Manley’s Uncle Josh was also an established character in vaudeville, and the larger entertainment context of vaudeville and music hall helps
situate these encounters with the moving pictures. The countryman and
the moving pictures meet on stage: the framing theatrical setting is very
prominent in *Countryman*, and even more so in *Uncle Josh*, where the rube
(somewhat implausibly) has his own stage-side box. It is a kind of double
act between rival attractions, the comic turn and the screen, the more so
because the film within the film is an overtly fictional representation of
eyearly cinema, just as obviously as the countryman is a stock fictional char-
acter. The narrative requires this: the presented scenes must follow each
other in rapid sequence, without interruption for the changing of reels, or
for the oral presentations of the exhibitor (*Uncle Josh* risks undermining
the whole basis of the comedy by including intertitles, as well as some
preliminary self-promotion for the Edison Kinetoscope). Similarly, both
films place the projectionist behind the screen for the sake of the narrative
climax, when the screen is torn down to reveal the machinery of illusion;
this despite the fact that rear projection was never general practice, for the
obvious pragmatic reasons that this made it difficult for the projectionist
to also present the attractions, and it required considerable depth of space
behind the screen (in *Uncle Josh*, the Kinetoscope is clearly far too close
to the screen to project an image of the size shown). The manifest artifice
of this representation of cinema serves to accentuate the fictionality of the
countryman’s own naïve response, and it foregrounds the several respects
in which he fails to recognize the semiotic nature of the medium. In doing
so, this cinematic take upon the parable of mimetic illusion treats the
fundamentally anti-illusionistic nature of the rhetoric of film as axiom-
atic—and prior to any consideration of the conventions of editing, since
these films are presented as single-shot narratives, despite the elaborate
postproduction actually required to achieve their effects. In particular, I
suggest that these self-reflexive films draw attention to three aspects of
the iconic image and insist upon their semiotic function. These three fac-
tors are scale, perspective, and framing. They are, of course, implicated in
each other, but I shall address them in that sequence, moving from the
least to the most inclusive.

**Scale, Perspective, Frame**

Scale in the visual arts may be considered as the spatial equivalent of the
temporal concept of “duration” in narrative discourse, as formulated by
Gérard Genette (1980: 86–112). Just as it is possible to identify a vari-
able relation between discourse time and story time (rather figuratively in
the case of the linguistic media with which Genette was concerned, and literally in the case of temporally iconic media such as film), so it is possible to consider the visual image in terms of a variable relation between image size and object size. It is very striking that even into the 1910s the cinematic trade press would frequently recommend the use of a screen of about ten feet by twelve feet, in order to produce a “life-size” image (Brewster and Jacobs 1997: 165). This recommendation is unintelligible without the inference that theatrical staging was still regarded as a compositional norm for cinematography even at that date. On that assumption, a projected image of ten feet by twelve feet would indeed reproduce the actors at approximately life size, since they would be in full shot, some distance beyond the picture plane (which equates, in theatrical composition, with the proscenium), and so they would be about six feet high on the screen. The illusionistic potential of this arrangement, though, is compromised even in shots that conform to its compositional premise by the fact that it takes no account of the perspectival effect of the representation of depth within the image. The six-foot image of a figure apparently several yards beyond the picture plane is in one sense life size, but in another (perspectival) sense gigantic.

The issue of scale necessarily arises in Countryman and Uncle Josh, where the protagonist attempts to interact with the figures on the represented screen. In Countryman it is handled quite well: though the train seems a bit too small, the images of the dancer and the country couple are proportionate to their apparent distance from the yokel’s own position adjacent to the picture plane. In Uncle Josh, though, the country couple comes much closer to the camera, and as a result they seem huge behind the diminutive figure of Uncle Josh himself—though arguably this just adds to the comedy of his attempted assault. In any case, in both films the juxtaposition of the countryman and the screen highlights the awareness of scale, whether absolute or relative, that is basic to our competence as interpreters of images. The countryman’s inability to distinguish between image and object is in part a comic obliviousness to the negotiation between two-dimensionality and three-dimensionality by which we relate absolute image size on the screen to relative, diegetic object size. This consideration, of course, is inextricable from the question of perspective.

A necessary condition for the emergence of linear perspectival representation in the Renaissance was the assumption of a fixed viewing position, a single (and monocular) central point of view in relation to the picture plane—which the framed painting could specify in a way that the fresco could not (Heath 1976: 80). This premise enables a geometrical
mapping of three dimensions onto two, based on the points of intersection between the picture plane and light rays traveling from (actual or hypothetical) represented objects to that singular viewing position. Comprehension of perspectival representation depends on the ability of the viewer to correlate the plane of representation and the effect of represented depth in a reciprocal relation. The optical geometry of perspective remains unaltered by the mechanization of image production in photography, or its combination with movement in film: the cognitive exercise of interpreting a filmic image requires the same fundamental combination of two-dimensional and three-dimensional paradigms. The Countryman and the Cinematograph exploits this doubleness beautifully in the staging of its train gag to produce a witty double take upon the supposed reaction of audiences to the Lumière brothers’ train film (figure 2).

The yokel stands to the left of the inset screen, so although he must of course see what we see—a train traveling diagonally past the camera from right to left—we are also teased into visualizing the action in a way that makes better sense of his terror, by collapsing the film’s two levels of representation into one: from our perspective, the image of the train does indeed then rush directly towards the yokel. The comic timing here is perfect, with the yokel turning to flee at just the point when the edge of the screen breaks the illusion. It is a subtlety that the Edison version misses out on entirely, because while Uncle Josh also stands to the left of the screen, the footage of Black Diamond Express, though impressive in its own right, involves a diagonal movement past the camera from left to right—apparently away from the inexplicably panic-stricken rube.

Another element of the issue of perspective is being worked through in the recursiveness of these films. The perspectival logic of representation dictates that in terms of the diegetic universe we are not where we are (in the cinema) but in an imaginary spatial relation to the scene. The primacy of diegetic perspective goes hand in hand with the dominance of narrative in cinema; but at the time of Countryman and Uncle Josh this dominance was not yet established. Tom Gunning has characterized the dominant cinematic mode of this period as a “cinema of attractions,” in which the film action addresses itself directly to the audience, exhibiting itself rather than cultivating the sense of a self-contained diegetic universe (“Attractions” 56–62). The camera is treated in effect as a simple conduit between the space of performance and the space of exhibition (though this sense of immediacy was exploited through the elaborate use of stop motion and other devices by Georges Méliès and others). The cinema of attractions correlates with the fixed camera and frontal presentation typified by theatrical
Figure 2
staging, and it also reflects the common exhibition context of the period, in which film itself was often only one among several attractions. These features, as I’ve already suggested, are both embodied by and represented in *Countryman* and *Uncle Josh*, by virtue of their recursive nature: they are set on the stage. So, too, is another index of the cinema of attractions, the look at camera, which epitomizes that direct address. These mock country bumpkins perform their yokelry or rube-ishness towards the camera as much as towards the phenomena that occasion it, the images on the represented screen. But in this respect, the recursive nature of the mise en scène, instead of baring the device as it generally tends to do, has a rather contrary effect, since it introduces (and arguably foregrounds) a representational ambiguity: is the countryman mugging at us, the actual audience, or at the diegetic audience of the moving picture show he is disrupting? The question is undecidable, but the latter interpretation follows from the rhetoric of disavowal by which we are invited to distinguish between ourselves and the countryman: if we laugh at his confusion of actual and diegetic perspective, we are prompted by contrast to naturalize his address in relation to a diegetic audience, rather than to ourselves. The rhetorical insinuation of such a perspective intimates a more fully diegetic narrative cinema and further enriches the sense in which these films are reflexively probing the representational possibilities of their own medium.

The fixed perspective of the cinema of attractions is not restricted to the model of theatrical staging, but draws upon a number of other models in order to motivate the camera’s viewpoint. The traditional view of early cinema as primitive took such motivation of perspective as evidence of a reception context in which the presentation of unmotivated views (such as a close-up without prior establishment, within the diegetic universe, of the optical means for that view) would be cognitively disorienting for the audience. But although some early films did supply diegetic motivation for the views they presented (*Grandma’s Reading Glass*, 1900; *As Seen through a Telescope*, 1900), in general the perspectival motivation derives from other media of representation, such as the magic lantern screen and the comic strip frame, or from other genres of exhibition, such as the music hall genre of comical facial expressions (Gunning, “Primitive” 100). The teleological fallacy behind the old “primitive cinema” account of early film is thrown into relief by the self-conscious redoubling of theatrical staging in *Countryman* and *Uncle Josh*. The disorientation exhibited by the cognitively challenged countryman actually tends in the opposite direction to that assumed by the idea of a primitive stage of cinematic development: it is not a failure to comprehend the representations presented to him, but
a failure to recognize them as representations. That is to say, he all too readily naturalizes the images he encounters, but as phenomenological rather than semiotic facts. He does this, furthermore, irrespective of the perspectival motivation of the images presented. The theatrical presentation of the dancer is plausibly continuous with the countryman’s actual environment, but the view of the train is, or ought to be, unassimilable in phenomenological terms. And to this must be added his obliviousness to the entirely arbitrary and noncontinuous cuts between the three presented views (see Gunning, “Non-Continuity” 86–94). Clearly, there is no role here for perspectival motivation conceived as a way of naturalizing the presentation of diegetic phenomena. The countryman is an exemplary primitive, far behind the actual audience assumed by these films, but what he lacks is the ability to recognize moving images as images, situated within an established visual culture. It is this cultural frame of reference, above all, that is invoked by the exhibitional motivation of perspective in early film, in order to relate it to a larger context of visual signifying practices. Perspectival motivation is a matter of rhetorical orientation, not a concession to the supposed cognitive difficulty of assimilating the new and alien phenomenon of the moving image.

The most salient feature of moving images is, of course, movement, the interpretation of which once again involves both three-dimensional and two-dimensional cognitive frames: the train moves relative to the diegetic background, and it moves across the screen. A striking oddity among the early Lumière actualities shows a moving walkway in Paris (Exposition Universelle de 1900: Vue prise d’une plate-forme mobile II). To modern eyes, it appears at first to be a tracking shot, and only upon closer inspection does it become apparent that the camera is stationary and that the almost uniform movement across the screen is in fact diegetic. This momentary cognitive disorientation would not have arisen for the film’s first audiences, for whom the stationary camera and consequent interpretation of movement relative to a fixed frame were normative conventions. Once again, the example resists a teleological sense of the natural development of filmic representation; what it also makes clear is that perspectival interpretation of film also necessarily involves an awareness of the frame.

Consciousness of the frame reminds us that the image has edges, that it is not coextensive with the field of vision, but a bound and discrete unit of information. Countryman and Uncle Josh thematize the cinematic frame by representing it: the screen itself is part of the mise en scène, there on stage, framed by the theatrical proscenium. Our attention is directed to
this literal edge and its function of semiotic demarcation most obviously by the movement of the train towards it and out of shot. The representation of the screen and of its limits serves to illuminate the way in which these two, image and frame, always interact. The train, as an object of representation, does not exactly disappear or cease to move as it passes out of shot, since that would require signification, whereas what happens is precisely that it ceases to be signified. Diegetic continuity beyond the frame is a matter of inference and depends on a prior distinction between the space of representation and the space of exhibition. The countrymen, however, are unable to grasp this distinction, because what they perceive is a train, not the representation of a train. Indeed, the sense of continuity between diegetic space and the auditorium is explicitly foregrounded in some contemporary comments upon the effect of early train films. It is what impressed Méliès about L’Arrivée d’un train: “the train dashed towards us, as if about to leave the screen and land in the hall” (Bottomore 1999: 194); and a poster for the cinématographe by Abel Truchet represents a film screening in which the train tracks do indeed extend beyond the screen into the auditorium (195). Upon the basis of just such a sense of the frame-breaking potential of the train image, the countrymen take evasive action: Uncle Josh retreats hastily to his box; R. W. Paul’s yokel, with a surer sense of the comedy of reflexivity, flees out of shot. The audience is prompted to draw a contrast between the yokel’s understanding of the represented frame and their own understanding of the film’s actual frame; their own ability to negotiate between image and diegetic space versus the yokel’s inability to do so.

The frame is not essentially a literal, physical limit, however: representations may indeed be effectively coextensive with our perceptual field (as in dreams or virtual reality simulations) without ceasing to be representations. In such cases, the frame is conceptual, demarcating the boundary between dreaming and waking, inside and outside the simulation, irrespective of the evidence of our senses. But in fact the frame is always fundamentally a concept. Direct perception of the image boundary is not necessary, because the knowledge that it is there is inherent in our understanding that it is an image. The frame is a basic element of the conceptual apparatus of semiotic interpretation, a fact brought to prominence by the way a number of early films play with frame-breaking devices. Two well-known examples are Cecil Hepworth’s How It Feels to Be Run Over (1900) and James Williamson’s The Big Swallow (1901?). Hepworth’s film shows a car traveling directly towards the camera, until the frame is completely filled and goes black, and the film resorts to intertitles scratched into the
cellulose itself: “?? !!! Oh! Mother will be pleased.” Williamson’s film shows an expostulating gentleman whose response to media intrusion is to advance upon the camera until his mouth fills the frame, at which point the film cuts to a separate shot of a camera and cameraman tumbling into darkness, and then back to the gentleman happily chewing and smacking his lips. Neither film, of course, can actually break its own frame—hence the compromise representations of their climactic moments. The real target of their playfulness, however, is not so much the literal frame in itself as the concept of the frame, the sense in which the frame is not a representational feature of the narrative transmission, but a rhetorical feature of imaginative orientation (see chapter four).

The situation is different in Countryman and Uncle Josh, where the representation of a frame within the frame provides the opportunity for a literal enactment of frame breaking. There is a significant difference in the way each film conceives the narrative development towards that moment, however. Both present it in three stages, in terms of the responses elicited by three films. In the first, a dancer, an image in keeping with the countrymen’s actual environments, prompts them to participate—but in a kind of parallel play: there is no direct interaction, and the integrity of the frame is not tested. In the second film, an image entirely alien to the theatrical environment—a speeding train—threatens to intrude into it, and the countrymen flee. From this point onwards Uncle Josh’s progress diverges from that of his precursor, as the description from the Edison film catalogue makes clear:

He is no sooner seated than a country couple appear upon the screen at a well. Before they pump the pail full of water they indulge in a love-making scene. Uncle Josh evidently thinks he recognizes his own daughter, and jumping again upon the stage he removes his coat and prepares to chastise the lover, and grabbing the moving picture screen he hauls it down, and to his great surprise finds a kinetoscope operator in the rear. The operator is made furious by Uncle Josh interrupting his show, and grappling with him they roll over and over upon the stage in an exciting encounter. (American Film Institute Catalog A.16342)

Having learned nothing from his anticlimactic encounter with the image of the train, Uncle Josh attempts to intervene within the representational frame, inadvertently breaking that frame and becoming the baffled victim of the projectionist’s anger: he remains a dupe to the last. R. W. Paul’s countryman, on the other hand, encounters his own image (rather than
that of his daughter) in the third film. It is a revelatory moment, a kind of parodic mirror stage, in which the countryman himself is exposed to the self-reflexiveness that has informed the audience’s experience throughout, and upon which the whole film is predicated. This second self can only be an image, and furthermore a compromising image that the countryman would rather not have on public display: “he becomes so enraged that he tears down the screen, disclosing the machine and operator, whom he severely handles” (BFI Screenonline). In a flash of insight, the countryman comprehends the fact of representation, its rhetorical force, and the agency behind it, and his frame-breaking action is a deliberate intervention, not in the represented world, but in the process of representation.

As a cinematic version of the parable of mimetic illusion, then, The Countryman and the Cinematograph is a technically and rhetorically sophisticated, as well as amusing, contribution to the tradition. It provides occasion for reflection upon the elementary features of our interpretative orientation towards images in general, moving images in particular, and the rhetoric of narrative in visual media. It exhibits an emergent filmic rhetoric of fictionality, the foundations of which are anything but illusionistic and indeed would be entirely undermined by the viewer’s cognitive transportation within the representational frame. On the contrary, this rhetoric is not available except in respect of the medium’s function as a vehicle of semiosis, and the viewer’s recognition of its enabling artifice.

**Illusion, Fiction, and Dreaming**

It is a given that any parable of mimetic illusion will be self-reflexive in the overt sense that I outlined earlier. What I have tried to show is that the rhetoric of this self-reflexiveness itself redoubles and draws attention to the other, implicit sense of self-reference that constitutes a medium’s semiotic capacity, and that self-reference in this latter sense marks an irreducible difference between illusion and narrative representation. I hinted that this quality of narrative representation in general is also, more particularly, essential to the very possibility of fictive rhetoric. The foregrounding of implicit self-reference is characteristic of fictionality because it is intrinsic to the priority of discourse over reference in the narrative imagination: the fictive process generates narrative in response to anthropocentric imperatives (on several levels: instinctual/libidinal, emotional, ideological), which are available as values only within a discursive economy, whereas nonfictional narrative is generated under the presiding referential
imperative of accountability to extratextual sources. I’m not offering an empirical distinction between fiction and nonfiction here, since the difference ultimately rests only upon the contextually assumed presence or absence of a text-independent referential ground. The privileging of value over documentary fact in the fictive regime does not imply a substantial distinction, but a rhetorical one. All narrative semiosis unfolds in an evolving recursive process or feedback loop within the domain of discourse. Nonfictional narrative, however, is characterized by a rhetorical “direction of fit” in which semiosis is always approaching its represented object, only to arrive at another sign, whereas fictional narrative semiosis is always approaching achieved significance, only to arrive at further representation. This reversal of the direction of fit that prevails in the nonfictional paradigm is the rhetorical reorientation that an awareness of fictionality provides for, and that makes it possible to comprehend this distinctive use of narrative media. Fictive rhetoric exploits representation’s power of assimilation more than its modelling of an object. What matters (as far as a fiction’s fictive rhetoric is concerned) is the respect in which representations are not their objects but uses of a medium, because this is the respect in which they serve human needs. The fiction/nonfiction distinction is not fundamentally ontological, but pragmatic; not a distinction between referential worlds, but between communicative purposes.

I want to return with this sense of fictionality to the subject of dreams, and their status with respect to the opposition I have delineated between illusion and representation, or experience and narrative, and in doing so to pursue a little further the implications of a medium-contingent concept of narrative at the cognitive level. The ambiguity between experience and narrative, concerning consciousness in dreams, is a multilayered issue. Consciousness of self is one level of it, somewhere midway between the irreducible level of consciousness on which you experience the dream on the one hand, and on the other hand, the more occasional consciousness that you are dreaming, or even your conscious manipulations of the course of the dream narrative. All these coexist with the unconscious level on which dreams typically form themselves, independently of any conscious choice on the dreamer’s part. Conscious choice, however, is consciousness of a choice; it is not coextensive with choosing. The sequential character of dream development is a result of an ongoing process of “self-interpretation” in dreaming, which can be said to straddle the border of consciousness. Bert States has aptly characterized dreaming as a “first draft of thought,” in which an initially random collision of images prompts the sense-making effort of the dream-work (2001: 110). He notes a key
difference between dream thought and waking processes such as free association or daydreaming, which is that “the dream can’t revise. What comes to mind goes straight to the visual cortex” (112). The sequential development of dreaming can be seen as an effect of this constraint: it is a kind of revision on the fly.

My speculative thought resolves into the question, are dreams fictions? The answer would be trivial if it rested upon their referentiality; of course they are not true. But it rests more fundamentally upon the way we understand the mental apparatus of perception to be functioning as a medium in dream cognition. Percepts in general are already internal representations, certainly, but they are not innately narrative; the narrativity of dreams depends on the assumed sources of dream material. Is the selection of dream material itself a cognitive process, drawing purposively upon episodic and semantic memory? Or is the input to dream cognition an effect of other determinants (instinctual drives, sensory stimuli, recency effects, random brain activity), in which case the cognitive phase of the dream-work is the effort to make sense of this material, which is functionally equivalent to sensory data? The ambiguity is between fiction and illusion, or narrative and experience. It is clear, however, that whatever blend of these two aspects of dreaming applies, dreams cannot be purely illusional. At the higher levels of dream cognition, of course, there is an overt self-consciousness informing the creative process of the dream-work; but even at the most elemental unconscious level, the dream-work is a sequential, recursive process, in which every representation is influenced by the cognitive assimilation of the preceding one. Where the dream materials originate independently of cognitive processing, they have the status of data, even if not quite the external data of waking life; but where they arise out of cognition, they are subject to whatever imperative values inform that process (and this need not exclude desiderata of the same unconscious origin as some of the first type of dream material). To that extent, the dream conforms to the direction-of-fit rhetoric by which I have characterized fictionality—its representations generated discursively, out of prior representations, rather than referentially, in response to experiential data; and so to that extent, it can be understood as a, or even as the, protofiction.