IN THE PRECEDING chapter, I set out a series of parameters that govern the hierarchization of identity categories. In this chapter, I examine each of those parameters in greater detail, considering some of the standard practices that serve to establish the national category as preeminent. I refer to these practices as “techniques of nationalization.” Some of these techniques are self-consciously deployed by nationalist activists for the express purpose of fostering patriotism. Others arise more spontaneously through the interaction of individuals and institutions in societies where national identity categories are becoming important. In each case, the crucial thing is not the individual intent with which a given action is performed. Rather, the crucial thing is the effect of the action. Suppose Doe is killed in Iraq. Jones may urge that the town put up a monument to Doe’s memory. Perhaps he wants to honor a dead friend. Perhaps urging such a thing seems an effective way of getting votes in the next election. For our purposes, these motives do not matter. Whatever the motives may be, the establishment of a monument to a soldier in a national war serves as a technique of nation-
alization, operating through salience and affectivity, and perhaps through other parameters as well.

I will consider each of the parameters in turn, examining relevant techniques under each heading.¹ I have not tried to cover every technique of nationalization. I have, rather, sought to present a broad range of the most widespread and effective techniques. There are two particularly crucial techniques that I do not consider in the present chapter—metaphor and narrative. They are pervasive and highly consequential. Moreover, they have not been explored in detail by other authors. For these reasons, I give them—particularly narrative—a fuller, separate treatment in the remaining chapters of the book.

In order to give the discussion a clearer shape, I have divided the treatment of most parameters into techniques bearing on ordinary life and techniques bearing on extraordinary events. The division is rough. Some events are recurrent, thus not precisely extraordinary, but also not exactly part of everyday life. Nonetheless, the broad division is useful in calling to mind the fact that techniques of nationalization are ubiquitous. They are, of course, bound up with large and highly dramatic events, such as war. But they are no less bound up with our quotidian routines. The only exception to this division is in the final section on affectivity. It is, I believe, more useful to organize emotions by reference to their objects, which, in this case, fall into four main groups—other in-group members, the in-group hierarchy, the national out-group, and the land.

**SALIENCE**

Salience may at first seem to be the least important of the five parameters. But that is only because its necessity is so obvious. If we are oblivious to our national category, it simply will not play much of a role in our thought and action. More technically, if there are not multiple and strong connections between our national category and other, ordinary items in our semantic and episodic memories (roughly, our memories of ideas and of events), then the national category is unlikely to be activated and we are unlikely to think about the world, our lives, our feelings in relation to that category. Far from being unimportant, the cultivation of salience is fundamental to the cultivation of nationalism.

¹. Needless to say, most techniques operate on more than one parameter. Thus, there will necessarily be some overlap in the discussion of those different parameters.
As I have just suggested, it is crucial that the national category become highly salient in ordinary life. In part, this is because subnational categories, such as race, are likely to be salient on their own. It is also because it is important that we spontaneously interpret events in nationalistic terms. For example, people could easily have interpreted the September 11 bombings in several ways. They could have interpreted them as an attack on commerce, on wealth, on the Judeo-Christian world, or—as is most accurate—on the policies of the U.S. government and those who accept such policies. (Obviously, it was a terrible crime, murdering thousands of people who have no particular responsibility for the deaths in Iraq or Palestine. To say that the bombers had a particular motive is not to say that the motive justified the crime.) But people rarely interpreted the bombings in any of these ways. Americans interpreted them as an attack on their nation. A rare critic argued that the motives were not some vague, generalized hatred of Americans or the American way of life, but anger over specific U.S. government policies. However, the position of these writers was both distorted and immediately appropriated toward nationalistic ends. Noam Chomsky and others who tried to determine just what led to the bombings were referred to as the “blame America first” group. But, of course, their point was not to blame America. It was to argue that the U.S. government had followed destructive policies in Iraq, Palestine, and elsewhere, policies that gave rise to anger and despair throughout the Muslim world. That anger and despair led to the bombings. Thus, the policies help to explain the bombings. They do not serve to justify them. After all, part of the point such writers made is that murder is wrong, whether it is Americans murdering Iraqis or Arabs murdering Americans. Yet the argument seemed impossible for most people to follow. In part, this was because the national category was so salient that the event itself, and any response to the event (e.g., an attempt at analyzing its origins), were immediately interpreted in terms of national categorial identity.

Perhaps the most obvious way of making the national category salient is by displaying the national flag. The presence of the flag above public buildings, outside private homes, at rallies and sporting events, on pins, on clothing, on cars is a constant reminder of the nation. Even in ordinary times, it is difficult to walk through any American city without having one’s national category repeatedly primed (i.e., partially activated and thus made readily available for use in interpretation, causal attribution, etc.). The display of flags proliferated after the September 11 bombings. This
contributed to the way people thought about the bombings and thus to the consolidation of a nationalist interpretation of the events.²

Of course, the salience of the national category, both before and after September 11, was due not only to the display of flags. It was the result of many factors in daily life. A number of these, like displaying the flag, involve a simple physical presence that serves to remind us of the nation. As several writers have stressed, monuments have an important role in this regard. Thus, Anderson writes that “No more arresting emblems of the modern culture of nationalism exist than cenotaphs and tombs of Unknown Soldiers” (9). In his extremely important discussion of nationalist “invention of tradition,” Hobsbawm isolates “three major innovations,” one of which was “the mass production of public monuments” (“Mass-Producing Traditions” 271). The same general point holds not only for monuments per se, but for national buildings (e.g., government facilities), parks, and other national public objects.

All national public objects become part of ordinary life and thus serve as constant reminders of the national identity category. In addition, many of them also call to mind particular ideas about the nation—narratives, metaphors, associated feelings, and so forth. Wachtel gives a striking example of a single work that had a significant place in the formation of Yugoslav national identity, the Kosovo Temple of Ivan Meštrović. Wachtel quotes one of Meštrović’s contemporaries, who wrote that “Meštrović’s temple has deep national significance” (56). Specifically, the temple is in “close touch with the national soul . . . our soul, the Yugoslav soul” (59). The work is noteworthy in many ways. Its two names—“Kosovo Temple” and “St. Vitus Day Temple”—commemorate an historical event, the Battle of Kosovo, thereby enhancing a sense of national durability as well as salience. The structure “combined Catholic and Orthodox elements” (55),

². One reader of this discussion complained that the flag is not in fact very salient. It is true that the ordinary display of the flag may not draw self-conscious attentional focus. However, it seems fairly clear that we do perceive the flag and thus experience effects from that perception even in the normal course of events. For example, I suspect that at least many people would notice if, say, the confederate flag were substituted for the U.S. flag at their local post office. Many people do notice when a flag is flown at half mast. If we notice these changes, there must be some degree to which we are experiencing the presence of the flag in ordinary circumstances. Thus, it seems fairly clear that we do indeed perceive the flag. Given this, and given the general principles of human cognition, we can be confident that its presence has the usual consequences for memory, semantic activation, etc. Specifically, it serves to prime (or partially and implicitly activate) national associations. Moreover, in times of crisis or nationalist fervor—whether after events such as those of September 11 or after a national team’s victory in some international sporting competition—the multiplication of flags makes their presence highly salient.
thus forestalling a subnational identification with the work by either of these religious groups. Meštrović’s “figures [were] inspired by the heroes of South Slavic Oral poetry” (55), hence bound up with national narratives. Meštrović himself said that he “tried to give a single synthesis of the popular folk ideals and their development,” memorializing “the greatest moments and most significant events in our history” and doing so in such a way that “The temple cannot be dedicated to any one confession or separate sect” (quoted in Wachtel 59).

National public objects perform their salience-enhancing function most obviously for people living near them. This is particularly true in capitals, which often serve as insistent reminders of the national category through their general design and multiplication of nationalist sites. For example, Cannadine refers to the “large-scale rebuilding of capital cities, as the great powers bolstered their self-esteem in the most visible, ostentatious manner” (126). In relation to this, he refers to the U.S. capital, mentioning “the Washington Memorial, the White House extension, the Union Station, the Lincoln Monument and the scheme for grand government buildings surrounding the Capitol” (127). He also refers to London, where “monumental, commemorative statues proliferated” (128; here as elsewhere commemorative works enhance not only salience, but our sense of the endurance of the nation through time). Beyond this, he explains that the relevant aspects of capitals are not confined to monuments and buildings, but include their broad avenues, squares, and related aspects of city design (126).

On the other hand, the salience-enhancing effects of monuments, buildings, and so forth are not confined to local inhabitants. They enter into the ordinary lives of people from across the nation in many ways. One of the most important is tourism. In general, the “sights” visited by tourists tend to be national or religious. The latter is unsurprising, since the premodern parallel to tourism was the pilgrimage, which also had an identity function. To a great extent, however, nationalism has displaced religion even in the case of religious sights. Thus, today religious monuments tend to take on a national coloring. For example, I suspect that most visitors to the Chartres cathedral view it not only as Catholic, but also—and perhaps more importantly—as French.

The contribution of tourism to national saliency is not confined to monuments, public buildings, and other artifacts. It commonly extends to national geography as well. The landscape of a place may be understood explicitly or implicitly as specifically national land. When this occurs, a tour of the countryside can serve to make the national category more
salient. It can also foster an affective relation to the national land, thereby enhancing the affectivity of national categorical identification. For example, discussing the case of Wales, Morgan explains that there was “a wide movement which tried to make the Welsh understand that their landscape must be cherished.” In consequence, “each stick and stone” was assigned “historical . . .interest” (86). In these cases, the national landscape was not merely a general reminder of the national category. It was a reminder of historical particulars bearing on the nation. Thus, it contributed not only to salience, but to the sense of durability as well. Morgan goes on to explain that this nationalizing of the landscape was bound up with tourism in the eighteenth century (see 87).

Returning to artifacts, we find that the same points hold, not only for statues, buildings, and parks, but also for much smaller items. These include national heirlooms and symbols, such as the throne of a past monarch, the original copy of the constitution, a letter written by a past president. Even ordinary roads and squares can enhance saliency, most obviously through their names (e.g., Abraham Lincoln Highway, Constitution Plaza). New buildings can stand on memorial spaces, marked by plaques of the “George Washington slept here” variety. Particular types of tree (e.g., the maple in Canada), flower, arrangement of foliage (e.g., an English garden) can have the same sort of effect. None of this has to have been developed by self-conscious nationalist design. It strikes someone as a good idea to memorialize where Washington slept (perhaps he or she owns the shop next door and hopes for some extra business) or to rename a road in honor of a president. Who would disagree? The plaque is set on the spot or the road is given its name and that plaque or name functions to recall our national category, and to support our sense of the durability of the nation, whatever the initial intent.

For the most part, public objects of this sort are stationary. Even the smaller items tend to be housed in museums or otherwise located in a fixed place. For the relevant cues to activate national categories, people have to experience the objects. Again, this is often a matter of people seeing the objects directly, thus visiting national historic sites. In other cases, however, saliency is enhanced by reproductions—on postcards, newscasts, television programs or films, or through the mass-marketing of miniatures (e.g., tiny replicas of the White House).

François, Siegrist, and Vogel point out that techniques for “symbolic integration” of the nation operate through “identification and affective binding with ‘national’ symbols,” including “material symbols such as memorials, buildings, and landscapes, as well as works of art and ordinary
Among ordinary objects, they stress “coins and postage stamps” (“Die Nation” 19; my translation). They are right to do so. Money and stamps are the two “most universal” forms of “public imagery,” as Hobsbawm puts it. They serve to bring the national category into our everyday lives in wholly unexceptional ways, as part of our most basic routines. They do not require us to travel to the capital, but only that we buy something in the market or receive a letter. Moreover, the nationalist effects do not result solely from their function in national economic and postal systems (i.e., from the mere fact that they are the national currency and national postage). Their designs involve a series of representations that themselves have nationalist associations, such as depictions of presidents and national heroes or inscriptions of nationalist slogans. Cannadine points out the bearing of special commemorative stamps on nationalism (155). From our perspective, such stamps clearly enhance salience. They may also foster a sense of durability, if the event commemorated involves historical reference, as in a bicentennial. In keeping with this, Hobsbawm explains that anniversaries “often provided for the first issue of historical or similar images on postage stamps” (“Mass-Producing” 281). Beyond this, postage stamps may contribute to the metaphorical unification of the nation, as when they feature a representation of the nation as a person (a standard form of nationalist metaphor, as we will discuss in the next chapter). For example, Hobsbawm cites the case of “‘Germania,’ who played no notable role in sculpture,” but “figured extensively on postage stamps” (“Mass-Producing” 276). Stamps may even enhance (however slightly) the heroic emplotment of national aspirations, if they happen to commemorate war heroes or battles.

National media are, of course, important to the enhancement of salience as well, and not only in reproducing images of national landmarks. Perhaps most significant, newspapers (and other news media) commonly orient reporting toward a particular national audience. They focus on news relevant to Americans, Germans, or Indians, depending on whether they are American, German, or Indian newspapers. This may seem unremarkable. But there is nothing in the nature of newspapers that requires this. We do have newspapers geared toward workers, toward professions, toward particular ethnic groups. So a non-national orientation toward news reporting is certainly possible. But these newspapers are seen as specialized, as catering to an unusual audience. The common view is that the nationally oriented newspaper (or news broadcast) is the norm. What this means is that newspapers and other news media almost invariably present the news from the perspective of the nation, thus from the perspective of national
interests. American news media report stories that involve Americans, that bear on the American economy, and so forth. As such, they serve to make the national category highly salient. At the same time, the national organization of news reporting gives national categorization a sense of normalcy or naturalness. News appears to be national by its nature. Alternatives (e.g., ethnic or class-based news) are defined against national news as the norm or default. In this context, it is unsurprising that newspapers are often bound up with the earliest development of widespread national identification. Thus, Glanmor Williams writes of “The experience of a Galician peasant,” that “neither he nor many of his fellows had fully realised that they were Poles until they started reading books and newspapers” (122).

The same point also holds for various routine collective activities. In some cases, the content is not greatly significant. In other cases, it is. Obvious instances of the latter would include the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance—“a daily ritual in the country’s schools” (Hobsbawm, “Mass-Producing” 280)—and the singing of the national anthem at sporting events. The singing of the national anthem is particularly interesting. During domestic contests, the entire crowd sings the anthem. It thus serves to remind them of their common identity even as some other form of identity difference (e.g., by city) is suggested by the contest itself. This sense of national identification may be enhanced still further if the sport in question is a “national” sport, such as American football or baseball (see Hobsbawm, “Mass-Producing” 300, on the development of national sports). Specifically, national sports render the national category more salient by the simple fact that they are seen as national. Moreover, by their differentiation from the national sports of other nations (e.g., Gaelic football’s difference from English football), they may enhance opposability as well. In contrast with domestic contests, the national anthems of both sides are played

3. The same point holds for history. History appears naturally to be national. Other forms of history are then defined against the national norm.

4. One might object here that news may be local also. That is perfectly true. The point isn’t that all news operates at the national level of organization. The point is that there are many sorts of news that might be of interest to people. Local news is an obvious case of this. Moving outside of local news, what larger units might we expect to find? We might expect to find, say, union-related news, or professional news, or ethnic news. But typically what we find above the level of local news is national news. Moreover, even local news is selective, and a large part of that selection is national. For example, if a local newspaper reports on local representatives, it will far more commonly report on local representatives to the national government—not to unions, professional societies, ethnic pride groups, language revival societies. Even local news often focuses on local government, which is, of course, part of the national system. In other words, even a great deal of apparently purely local reporting has an implicit national orientation.
during international competitions. Fans of one national team sing one national anthem; fans of the other national team sing another national anthem. In this way, the anthem serves to define the contest in national terms and to recruit the contest to nationalist ends, first of all by rendering the national category more salient and opposable.

Events

The repetitive rituals of a daily pledge or a weekly song are still part of ordinary life. That is what makes them routine. There are also extraordinary events, such as the September 11 bombings, that provide an occasion for enhancing the salience of national categories. Less frequent periodic rituals and “common collective practices” (as Hobsbawm puts it; see Nations 71) serve as a sort of transition between the habitual and the truly extraordinary. In being nonquotidian, they serve as moments of particular nationalist intensity. In this way, they are similar to the emotion spikes that are necessary to sustain a mood (see Greg Smith 37–44). Indeed, they often include such moments of strong national feeling. At the same time, they are highly routinized. They are not the huge shocks of September 11 or the unique celebrations that mark the end of a war. Their impact is more controlled.

Clear examples of this sort may be found, first of all, in the nationalist organization of the calendar. As Anderson has discussed, nations make national festivals in the way religions do. They commemorate battles, births and deaths, and other events with particular national significance. An obvious case from the United States would be Presidents’ Day. Being released from work to celebrate Washington and Lincoln serves to emphasize the national category, and to imbue it with positive emotion. Since the process has become so ingrained, we may not recognize that it could be otherwise. Imagine instead a society in which we were given days off to celebrate, say, Louis Pasteur and Edward Jenner for developing a vaccination against smallpox. One might say that the addition of Martin Luther King Day is somewhat comparable. But, in fact, Martin Luther King Day is a nationalist holiday as well. It serves to incorporate King—and thus African Americans more generally—into national unity. Insofar as he has been honored by a national holiday, King is perhaps less readily available for

5. There is not merely a parallel, but an historical connection between religious and nationalist practices (see François, Siegrist, and Vogel, “Die Nation” 24–27, and the essays by Vogel, Maas, Ben-Amos, Ackermann, and Abélès, as well as Berezin 88–90).
subnational appropriation. Labor Day in the United States operates similarly. It takes up a day putatively celebrating a transnational group, workers, then nationalizes the day, in part by shifting it away from the international day of labor solidarity, May 1.

The nationalistic operation of Memorial Day is no less explicit than that of Presidents’ Day. It is obvious that the parades on that day serve to make the national category salient. With their strings of veterans of different ages and from different wars, Memorial Day parades also stress the durability of the nation. In terms of affectivity, the mere presence of a crowd may foster a “yielding” or “submission response” (see Tan and Frijda 53, 54, 62–63). In a nationalist context, such a response would involve a sense of “losing oneself,” not merely in “something greater” (62), but specifically in the greater national community. Finally, Memorial Day incorporates all this into a tacit heroic emplotment of the national purpose, for it is necessarily a day celebrating the nation at war.

The connection between national holidays and war is, of course, not unique to Memorial Day. National celebrations routinely involve the military. Military parades, displays of weaponry, and so forth contribute in obvious ways to the salience of the national category, to the sort of heroic emplotment just mentioned, and to a sense of national unity across regions, races, religions, and other subnational categories (due to the constitution of the armed forces). For example, examining Germany and France in 1871–1914, Jakob Vogel writes about “the ascent of the army to a central symbol of the nation.” He explains that, “Regularly held, public military parades developed at this time into the most important rituals, through which the state leadership not only propagated a national cult around the army, but, going further, celebrated the nation as a unified, battle-ready community as well” (199; my translation).

The most obviously nationalistic American holiday is Independence Day, a day of communal festivities, a huge birthday party for the nation, ending with fireworks from Maine to Hawaii and the singing of nationalist songs. Here, too, the national category is highly salient—as people dress in red, white, and blue; children have their faces painted with the flag; and hundreds of thousands of people join in singing the national anthem. There is also emotional arousal—feelings of attachment to the group, and heroic thrill at the fireworks that harmlessly mimic the many battles we as a nation have fought against our enemies.

Before going on, it is worth pausing for a moment over communal song and other coordinated collective activities. Song is often involved in the establishment of a sense of in-group identification, as is dance. Goodwin
and Pfaff point out the value of song in fostering a sense of unity (291; see also Barker 187). François, Siegrist, and Vogel note that, “In gymnastic festivals, parades, and mass dancing, the nation . . . embodied itself in forms and in synchronous movement” (“Die Nation” 28; my translation). Conversely, one main purpose of song and other coordinated activities is to inhibit any sense of subnational difference. We find a nice example of this use of coordinated activity in the Commemoration of the Leipzig People’s Battle of 1813, discussed by Hoffmann. As Hoffmann explains, Ernst Moritz Arndt proposed the remembrance of this battle on October 18 and 19, with October 18 “a pure folk festival . . . to symbolize the unity of all Germans and to make it something that can be experienced through the senses.” In order to accomplish this, “in the evening, on nearby mountains or hills throughout Germany celebratory fires should be lit.” This coordinated exhibition of “signs of love and joy,” Arndt claimed, would “announce . . . that now all German people have only one feeling and one thought.” Thus, “social differences will be overcome . . . to stress the unity of the nation” (113; my translation). In cases such as this, the national category is rendered salient through the unexpected coordination of practical identities among citizens. (This also contributes to opposability, for reasons that will become clear below.)

Of course, not all recurrent collective activities are so narrowly political. For example, some serve nationalist ends through arts or culture. Thus, speaking of Welsh nationalists, Glanmor Williams explains that “Two of their most typical activities were to celebrate the national day—Saint David’s Day (1 March)—and to organise eisteddfodau. The eisteddfod (an assembly for competitions in literature and music) was an exceptionally lively institution in nineteenth-century Wales,” including “the national Eisteddfod held once a year” (122).

Perhaps the most obvious ritual day in democracies is not annual. Rather, it takes place at longer (sometimes regular, sometimes irregular) intervals—election day. Elections serve to make the national identity category more salient, to homogenize the national in-group (no citizen has more than one vote), to polarize in-group and out-group (here, noncitizens, who have no vote), to memorialize the continuity of the system, to stress the functionality of citizenship, and to create a sense of emotional involvement in the nation. Finally, elections have the specific effect of reinforcing the social hierarchy by linking it with popularity.6

6. Nondemocratic rituals, too, can operate to support hierarchy. (For some examples from India and Africa, see Cohn 172 and Ranger 221.)
FUNCTIONALITY

These references to democracy and voting rights lead us nicely to the topic of function. The functionality of the national category—its bearing on access to opportunities, services, and goods—is fairly self-evident. For that reason, I will treat it only briefly. However, before treating this topic, I should note that there is an ambiguity in the way we understand the concept of national identity category. We tend to equate national identity category with citizenship. In most cases, this is perfectly reasonable. However, suppose Smith is an Australian citizen, but has been raised in the United States and currently lives there. If someone asks about his nationality, he may say something like, “Well, I’m officially an Australian citizen. But I’ve lived most of my life in the U.S.” Statements of this sort show that our national identity categories are not confined to our citizenship. This is particularly consequential for the functionality of that national category. Both in daily life and in unusual events, my relation to a nation may be highly functional even if I am not a citizen.

Daily Life

Once a national state is established, the functionality of the national hierarchy usually supersedes that of all other group categories in a broad range of areas. The obvious place where the nation shows its functionality is in law. Virtually everything we do is in some way qualified by the laws of the state. The functional impact of other identity group structures—ethnic, religious, racial, regional, linguistic—is very limited in comparison. Where I live is governed by housing codes; how I live there is governed by laws pertaining to ownership, construction, taxation; when I drive to work, laws of the road structure my trip (along with laws bearing on the ownership of my car and national policies relating to oil); at work, I am governed by labor laws, laws relating to interaction with my coworkers, laws regarding contracts; when I return home, even my most private moments are qualified by law—rules governing possible sexual partners, laws governing where I can perform certain bodily functions. There are laws governing dress, food, comportment, interaction with others. These laws may be oppressive or they may serve to protect us (e.g., against unsanitary practices in restaurants). But, in any case, they are pervasive. And they are largely national laws. Even when the laws are local, they must be the sort of laws permitted and, indeed, underwritten by the national legal structure.
For the most part, the legal system is an area in which my national identity category is most importantly a matter of where I live, rather than what my citizenship status might be. But, of course, there are areas of law where this is not the case. Indeed, the entire apparatus of citizenship makes the functionality of the national category still clearer. The use of passports—which became compulsory in the United States only in 1918 (Higgins and Leps 122)—and the resulting restriction on freedom of international movement provide a striking case of the extension of national functionality (for a discussion of the history and nationalist functionality of passports, see Higgins and Leps). Indeed, citizenship law is broadly illuminating with respect to the functionality of national identity categories, which is hardly surprising. There have generally been two criteria for citizenship, *jus sanguinis* (or law of blood) and *jus soli* (or law of territory). The former defines citizenship by parentage. It served initially to align the national identity category with an ethnic identity category. *Jus soli*, in contrast, takes up one distinctive feature of nationhood—its relation to a geographical place—and defines citizenship in terms of birth in a particular area. For example, until recently, Benhabib explains, “most German citizenship was granted only if one parent—usually the father—was a German, a vivid continuation of the *jus sanguinis*, which had been formalized in 1913 to withhold citizenship from Polish guest workers and East European Jews.” In 1999, a law was passed that “grants German citizenship to almost anyone born on German soil to parents who have resided and worked in the country for at least eight years, potentially including the children of millions of *Gastarbeiter*” (6). Such cases demonstrate—and increase people’s awareness of—the functionality of the national category.

Another option for citizenship is naturalization. This is an interesting case also, for naturalization involves complex qualifications and formal procedures. For example, in the United States, to be naturalized as a citizen, one must satisfy a series of requirements, including a particular “period of continuous residence and physical presence in the United States”; “an ability to read, write, and speak English”; “a knowledge and understanding of U.S. history and government”; “good moral character”; “attachment to the principles of the U.S. Constitution”; and “favorable disposition toward the

7. The awareness of functionality is crucial. Again, functionality does not enhance national identification if that functionality is simply present. People have to believe that nationality is functional—even if they are mistaken. On the other hand, making nationality functional in reality is usually a very good way of producing a belief in its functionality.
United States” (website for the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, http://www.uscis.gov). The final two require, among other things, an Oath of Allegiance, which includes renunciation of “any foreign allegiance” and an agreement to “bear arms for the Armed Forces of the U.S.” None of this is required for those who are citizens by birth, whether by *jus sanguinis* or *jus soli* criteria. Thus, in some ways, the functionality of the nation is enhanced and made particularly salient by naturalization. This is true most obviously for the new citizens who go through the process of naturalization. But it is true to a lesser degree for those who are citizens by birth, for they are commonly aware, at least in a general way, of the processes involved in naturalization and of the requirements and exclusions that these processes involve.

Thus, it seems impossible not to recognize the functionality of the nation in one’s daily life, and, in most cases, its overwhelmingly greater functionality than that of other identity groups.

*Events*

A range of events may express the functionality of the nation—particularly, the nation as hierarchically structured in a state. We may see the functionality of the nation-state in certain sorts of international agreements, temporary internal changes (e.g., states of emergency), and the like. However, the most significant events of this sort are, commonly, wars. Indeed, one might argue that the functionality of any group identity is largely a matter of the degree to which the group is able to exert and control violence through its hierarchy. The nation-state commonly claims a monopoly or near monopoly on physical violence within its boundaries. This is established, first of all, through the legal system. Nations in effect claim a monopoly on international violence as well. This is bound up with the virtually universal claim that “our” decision to go to war is a defensive response to the illegitimate aggression (or threatened aggression) of the enemy. War is obviously inseparable from a whole series of other national structures and practices that also manifest functionality—the armed forces, the draft, and so forth.

We will consider nationalism and war in more detail in subsequent chapters. Here, the crucial point is simply that war brings home the functionality of the national category. The ways in which it does this are, I take it, too obvious to require enumeration.
OPPOSABILITY

Opposability involves two things: (1) polarization or near polarization of in-group and out-group and (2) categorial unification of the in-group and, to a lesser extent, categorial unification of the out-group.

By “polarization or near polarization,” I mean simply that opposability increases to the degree that it reduces the number of in-group/out-group oppositions. The highest opposability comes with full polarization, that is, opposition of the in-group to a single out-group. However, polarization is often too simple for actual national relations. Thus, national in-groups frequently define themselves against two out-groups. An obvious case is the opposition between the United States, the Soviet Union, and China during parts of the Cold War. This is “near polarization.” It involves a lower degree of opposability. However, it allows for greater ideological and practical flexibility. Specifically, a fully polarized opposition tends to establish the enemy as eternal and immutable. It does not allow much leeway for diplomacy or for spontaneously changing relations resulting from shared interests. In a triadic division, it is commonly the case that one of the two enemies is viewed as more antagonistic than the other. This difference can be used strategically, as was obviously the case with the United States, USSR, and China. In some cases, the division into two out-groups recurs, in a slightly different form, within a single national enemy. For example, in colonial situations, the colonizer often divides the colonized populace into two groups, the smaller of which serves as a sort of buffer between the colonizer and the majority of the colonized population. Thus, in the Caribbean and in South Africa, whites distinguished between full Africans and people with mixed racial ancestry. The latter had a status intermediate between that of the whites and that of the majority black population.

Again, such triadic divisions do not give the same degree of opposability as a dyadic division. However, they allow practical benefits over pure dualism. Generally, these benefits diminish with the introduction of further out-groups. Moreover, the loss of polarization becomes more consequential. As a result, it seems fairly uncommon for a nation to consistently represent itself as opposed to three main enemies, and virtually unheard of for it to define itself against four or more groups.

By “categorial unification,” I mean the occlusion of sub- and transnational categories of the in-group or, equivalently, the minimization of situations in which sub- and transnational categories would become obtrusive. Thus, a national category has greater opposability to the extent that racial,
ethnic, religious, or similar non-national categories are unlikely to be recognized or invoked. This is primarily important for the in-group. Subdivisions in the out-group are significant for in-group self-categorization only insofar as they are connected to transnational identifications with members of the in-group, or insofar as they are recruited to divide the enemy, as already noted. In other words, as far as the in-group’s self-identification goes, religious, racial, ethnic, and related differences in the out-group are insignificant in themselves. They affect in-group national identification only when they mirror such differences in the in-group, and thus might give salience to those in-group differences, or when they may be viewed as defining two out-groups that may be set against one another.

All national identifications are fragile. Some nations appear to have aligned national, racial, religious, and other identity categories. However, as I have already noted, this is never entirely true. If India rid itself of Muslims, Christians, and Sikhs, then Vaiṣṇavites and Śaivites or different castes could form subnational identity groups. If the United States were all white and Christian, then Catholics and Protestants, northern and southern Europeans, and other identity rifts could open up. In other words, all nations have subnational divisions. Thus, every nation faces the task of creating a sense of homogeneity.

Crude as it may seem, the best way to foster a sense of in-group homogeneity is simply to divert attention from subnational categories. There are two obvious ways of doing this, one negative, the other positive. The negative way is to avoid occasions when subnational divisions would become salient, functional, and so forth. This is the purpose of homogenizing practical identities. As discussed in the preceding chapter, any conflict in practical identities is likely to draw attention to relevant categorical differences (or even, in some cases, irrelevant differences). The positive way is to lead attention to some other identity division. This is why polarization and the creation of internal categorial identification come together in opposability. Part of opposing ourselves to the national enemy is a matter of thinking of “us” as falling under a single identity category. Part of thinking about “us” as a single identity is thinking not about our various differences from one another, but instead about our collective difference from the national

8. Moreover, our spontaneous, un-self-conscious assumption is that out-groups are highly homogenous, indeed virtually uniform. As Duckitt points out, we assume out-groups are “less complex, less variable, less individuated” (81). We will return to the point below in connection with emotion.

9. For example, a European American and an African American may experience a conflict in practical identities that is related to purely individual idiosyncrasies. However, they may understand that conflict in racial terms.
enemy. (It should be clear why, in this context, the unity of the enemy figures is unimportant in itself.)

In sum, an identity category will have the highest degree of opposability, and thus contribute most powerfully to the privileging of that category in identity hierarchies, in circumstances where it is contrasted directly and definitively with one or, perhaps, two out-groups, where the practices of its members are coordinated, and where the attentional focus of those members is on the out-group. The homogenization of practices is most obviously a function of daily life, though it may be enhanced by particular events (e.g., there are ways in which practical life becomes more homogenous during wartime). The diversion of attentional focus to the out-group is most obvious during periods of crisis, such as war, though it may occur outside that context as well.

Before going on, I should stress once again that when I refer to “homogenizing” practical identities, I do not mean making them all the same. Rather, I mean coordinating them so that they work smoothly together. We all have certain capabilities and certain expectations about how society will operate. The general patterns of the expectations, and our understanding of the ways in which these fit with individual capabilities, should be roughly the same. However, this does not mean that everyone has the same capabilities or that everyone is subjected to the same expectations. For example, part of a homogenous American culture is seeing certain sorts of intrusive medical examination as normal and even necessary. This does not mean that everyone is capable of performing such exams or is expected—or allowed—to do so.

Daily Life

The most obvious and probably most crucial area of practical identity coordination in daily life is language. There is nothing that is more disruptive of shared identification than an inability to communicate. Indeed, even lesser forms of linguistic discontinuity—due to regional differences in vocabulary or idiom—can make subnational categories obtrusive. This is why nationalists almost invariably assert the importance of national language. This is true not only of English advocates in the United States. It is true of the Yugoslav nationalists who worked to homogenize Serbo-Croatian, Turkish nationalists who criminalized the use of Kurdish (see Chomsky, New 52), Chinese nationalists who “forced . . . standard Mandarin as the official language of everyday communication” in Taiwan (Chun
Needless to say, these efforts are not always successful. Indeed, suppression of a language, as in the case of Kurdish, serves to make use of the language more functional even for polyglot speakers (i.e., in this case, even for Kurdish speakers who are fluent in Turkish). If being a Kurdish speaker can land you in jail (for speaking Kurdish), the category is clearly very functional (i.e., very consequential for one’s access to opportunities, services, and goods). Moreover, these sorts of repression are likely to increase the affectivity, opposability, and salience of the language category. The only thing they may not enhance is the sense of durability—though even here the threat to the language, the danger to its continuation, may bring to mind its ancestry. In any case, such acts of suppression often have the opposite effect from that desired. This does not mean that linguistic homogeneity is not valuable for nationalism. It simply means that coercive suppression of non-national languages—with their associated identity categories—is most often not a good way of advancing that homogeneity.

In contrast, education, particularly literacy education, may be effective in fostering linguistic homogeneity. Judit Kádár-Fülop explains that, “Literacy education has three interrelated functions.” Two are relevant here. The first is “to diminish language distance between the members of society by developing communicative competence in at least one standard written language: the language of national literacy.” This is, precisely, national linguistic coordination. Kádár-Fülop’s second function is “to develop language loyalty toward the language of literacy” (31–32). In our terms, this is a form of language-based categorial identification. Such identification serves nationalist purposes if and only if language and nation are aligned. She goes on to explain that, “State school systems were established in many countries in the hope that instruction and education in the standard written language would diminish language barriers between communicants. The history of nations and languages shows that these were not unrealistic expectations” (32). Haugland provides an apt example from Norwegian nationalism, explaining that “the greatest effort for the cause of Landsmal [Norwegian national language] came from the Folk High Schools through their influence on thousands of young pupils. When the boys and girls returned home from these schools, many had become keen Landsmal adherents” (28).

Needless to say, the effects of education in homogenizing practical identity go well beyond language coordination. Thus, Hobsbawm maintains that, “The standardization of administration and law within it, and, in particular, state education, transformed people into citizens of a particular country” (“Mass-Producing” 264). There are countless examples. For instance,
Cullen points out that, “The precise character which Irish nationalist aspirations acquired is closely tied up with the impact of school teaching. Teachers were in fact of immense importance in the growth of nationalism” (101). As Chua and Kuo explain, Singapore instituted a “national system” in education. Specifically, “Common curriculum and syllabi were introduced.” As a result, “The possibility of forging a common political, economic, and social orientation among the population through education was in place for the first time,” in contrast with earlier “vernacular schools,” which were “divided along political, cultural, and linguistic orientations” and thus had “divisive effects on the population” (50).

The coordination of practical identities is, of course, not confined to education. It touches almost everything in daily life. For example, food commonly operates to enhance opposability. National cuisines establish commonalities of taste and consumption within a nation and differences of taste and consumption between nations. Sometimes the differences lead people from one culture to find the cuisine of another culture inedible—too hot, too bland, even simply disgusting. Indeed, sharing food is one of the most fundamental ways of bonding personally. When one does not share a cuisine, it may be difficult to share food. When one does not share food, it may be difficult to form personal bonds across identity divisions. In some cases, the separation of cuisines and the nonsharing of food are formalized in food taboos. For example, the strict dietary restrictions on Orthodox Jews helped to prevent the commingling of Jews and gentiles by restricting the possibilities for sharing meals. This in turn helped to strengthen the identity category of “Jew,” by making it more salient, functional, and opposable. The same point could be made for Hindus in relation to Muslims, or caste Hindus with regard to untouchables. (Steven Pinker has discussed this aspect of food taboos insightfully; see 385.)

Food taboos are relatively rare for nations. Moreover, today many nations are becoming increasingly cosmopolitan in food. However, the opposability of national cuisines still operates and has effects. French haute cuisine has not disappeared with the introduction of Vietnamese restaurants and Kentucky Fried Chicken. Indian food continues to be the mainstay of Indians even if they occasionally stop in McDonald’s. Indeed, even McDonald’s in India has been partially Indianized, through the introduction of such items as Chicken McCurry and McAloo Tikki (see www.mcdonaldsindia.com). Such variations on McDonald’s standard menu serve the same nationalizing function as a more purely national cuisine.10

10. One reader of this manuscript objected that in Maine McDonald’s serves lobster rolls. I suppose the point is that not everything McDonald’s does contributes to national identifica-
Moreover, for simple practical reasons, there is virtually always some close relation between the diversity of cuisines in a nation and the ethnic diversity in the nation. Of course, here as elsewhere, a nation may pursue a policy of alignment. However, it is unlikely that a nation will institute policies that allow diverse ethnic groups to enter a nation while excluding the cuisines of those groups. Thus, it is commonly the case that initially foreign cuisines are simply incorporated into the national cuisine. For example, in the United States, spaghetti and egg rolls are as much part of the national cuisine as roast beef. Such incorporation diminishes opposability along one axis, reducing differences between the national in-group and national out-groups (in these cases, differences between the United States and China or Italy). However, it increases opposability by homogenizing the practical identities of the in-group (e.g., making all Americans into consumers of spaghetti and egg rolls). Moreover, the “indigenization” of the various cuisines partially restores national differences, as when Chinese or Italian food is Americanized.

The preceding point is obviously parallel to the Indianization of McDonald’s, though McDonald’s spread to India due to economic globalization and is not associated with a nationalized ethnic group. However, an in some ways more revealing variation on the incorporation of different national cuisines did occur in India. As Appadurai discusses, the definition of a national Indian cuisine has involved the simultaneous definition of regional cuisines. The latter is an important part of the process whereby the great diversity of cultural practices in the area is organized into manageable units and made the common property of the nation. Here, too, opposability is both inhibited and enhanced, though in a way that is slightly different from the transnational case. The definition of regional cuisines (e.g., through selection out of diverse local and even familial practices) does make regional subnational categories more salient. However, the integration of these regional cuisines into a national cuisine compensates for this by coordinating the practical identities of Indians (as eaters of many types of “regional” food).¹¹

There are also aspects of housing that operate to cultivate in-group identification, including opposability. However, these are commonly sub-

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¹¹. A similar point applies to Maine and lobster.
national. Consider, for example, the organization of neighborhoods. The racial ghettos of the United States are an obvious instance of the way housing patterns may enhance subnational identification. But the phenomenon is hardly unique to the United States. Nandy et al. point to a similar pattern that has developed recently in Jaipur (147). Here, the division is religious, thus a matter of the major subnational opposition in India. Hindus and Muslims have increasingly divided into distinct neighborhoods. The division is inseparable from the communal riots that have pitted these groups against one another. Thus, it results from a form of subnational opposability, but it also intensifies that opposability.

In some cases, nationalists have tried to inhibit or reverse such developments. An interesting case of this may be found in Singapore. Chua and Kuo explain that the Singapore government set up a policy of demolishing squatter settlements, which were ethnically based, and setting up public housing that prevented the clustering of ethnic groups (53). Indeed, the government set up quotas at the level of the block. “One is constrained to sell only to a household from the race that is not already over-represented in the block” (54). The policy is also interesting for it highlights a paradox that is inherent in some self-conscious nationalizing techniques. The policy makes ethnicity highly salient and functional at the time of sales in order to reduce its saliency and opposability at other times.

Of course, some nations actually pursue neighborhood division. We find this in Nazi Germany, Apartheid South Africa, and the segregationist southern United States. It may seem that in these cases the nationalists are incoherently fostering subnationalism. However, these are in fact cases where the nationalists in question are pursuing a policy of alignment. Rather than occluding ethnic, racial, or other differences, their goal is to make the nation identical with a particular race or ethnicity. In order to do this, the nationalists need to cultivate opposability not only externally, with respect to other nations, but internally with respect to putatively non-national ethnic or racial groups. Put simply, “Aryan” Germans are unlikely to support the extermination of Jewish Germans if they simply consider the members of both groups to be Germans (i.e., if they consider them to be members of one identity group, rather than two). It is crucial that the “Aryans” distinguish themselves sharply from the Jews. Neighborhood division contributes to such internal opposability.

Another aspect of daily life that has functioned to foster opposability is dress. Trevor-Roper explains that Scots asserted “national identity” through the kilt (15). This enhanced not only opposability, but the sense of durability as well, for Scottish nationalists claimed the costume was of
ancient provenance, though in fact “the kilt is a purely modern costume” (22), “a recent English invention” (23). Moreover, the contribution of Scottish nationalist dress to the opposability of the national category was furthered by the British outlawing of Scottish national dress—“imprisonment without bail for six months and, for a second offense, transportation for seven years” (24). Obviously, this made the clothing, and thus the national category for which it stood, highly functional as well. Similar points apply to Welsh national dress. In the nineteenth century, Augusta Waddington thought that there should be a Welsh national “costume which would be distinctive and picturesque” (Morgan 80). She and some colleagues “evolved a homogenized national costume from the various Welsh peasant dresses.” Opposability was fostered by its homogeneity and distinctiveness. This was combined with salience, through “an enormous red cloak . . . and a very tall black beaver hat” (80). The effect on identity categorization was further enhanced by the implication of durability—for example, through “a sprig of mistletoe” used to show “connection with the Druids” (81).

The point extends throughout Europe (see, for example, Laver 82 and 86 on differences between English and French dress in the eighteenth century). Moreover, it is not at all confined to Europe. For instance, Ghurye explains that there was a gradual influence of Western clothing on Indian dress. This development tended to inhibit opposability. However, while the East/West synthesis “was on its way to stabilize itself,” an “upsurge of national feeling” led to the rejection of “some of its features as non-national” (210). In connection with this, Mahatma Gandhi “proclaimed the need for the use of a cap of white cotton cloth called ‘khadi’ as a national symbol.” This “was avidly taken up not only by strict adherents” of the nationalist Congress party, but also “by some other sections of the population” (211). Ghurye goes on to discuss the issue of defining a “national dress” that is “sufficiently distinctive” and that combines “aesthetics with functionalism, tradition with modernity, and grace with martial appeal” (213).12

12. Most often, distinctive clothing serves to coordinate practical identities (as with official uniforms) and/or to render the national category salient. In some cases, it may operate to draw attentional focus to the out-group. However, this is likely to occur only when a dominant in-group, committed to a policy of alignment, is living in one society with a subordinated out-group. In these cases, the clothing of the out-group may be distinctively homogenized, rather than that of the in-group. In this way, the practice is the inverse of that employed in the fashioning of a national costume for the in-group. The obvious instance here is the Nazi requirement that Jews wear a star of David. But this was not a unique occurrence. The New Standard Jewish Encyclopedia notes that “Moslem rulers, from the 7th cent., ordered that Jews and Christians should wear special clothing to distinguish them from ‘believers.’ . . .
The final point is worth emphasizing. Martial appeal is an important aspect of national clothing. Indeed, the standardized and distinctive uniform of a national military is one of the most important forms of dress contributing to opposability. This is obviously true in times of war, but it applies generally—for example, in military parades on national holidays. I take it that both the homogenization and polarization in this case are too obvious to require comment.

Events

The reference to military uniforms leads us to the topic of events. The crucial events affecting opposability are events of intergroup conflict. Once again, the most intense version of such events comes in war, though we find more temperate versions ranging from diplomatic controversies to sporting contests. I will not discuss war, as its relation to opposability is self-evident. However, there are a few points worth mentioning on other events.

Sporting contests between national teams are a good case of vacuous categorial identification in general and a striking instance of opposability in particular. First, the entire point of, say, a soccer or basketball team is that it behaves in a coordinated way, the various members working together against a common enemy. Insofar as the team is successful, individual members have integrated their practical identities (their complexes of procedural schemas, etc.) with one another. Moreover, this homogenization has incorporated a strict hierarchy of authority. Perhaps even more important, the fans have integrated their practical identities. Whatever their individual idiosyncrasies or sub- and transnational affiliations, they largely behave in the same way. They cheer or hiss at the same moments and in more or less the same manner. They sing the same songs, chant the same chants. It may seem that sporting contests do not involve attentional focus on the out-group. True, we pay attention to our own team. However, I suspect that our attention is more likely to be drawn to out-group fans rather than to fans on our own side. Certainly, this is what occurs when violent conception was officially introduced into Christian Europe by the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) which ordered that Jews (and other infidels) should be distinguished from Christians by their clothing” (Wigoder 105). In these cases, the distinction was obviously religious, not national, but the principle is the same. In early South Asian society, parallel instances may be found in certain prescriptions regarding caste. For example, the “ornaments” of untouchables “should be made of black iron” and, in general, untouchables should be “recognizable by distinctive marks,” as one ancient law text had it (Laws 242). In each case, the distinguished group is distinguished as in some sense outside the society.
clashes take place after a game. The responses of the rival team’s spectators—their cheers and boos—may be experienced as a sort of provocation. Our own cheers and boos may go almost unnoticed, at least insofar as they are properly coordinated (e.g., when everyone in our part of the bleachers stands at the right moment to produce a “wave”).

Diplomatic differences also provide an interesting case. In its decision to invade Iraq, the United States came into conflict with a number of countries. However, the popular imagination of this disagreement in effect polarized conflict within the United States, pitting the U.S. virtually alone against France.

**DURABILITY**

It is well known that one of the primary tasks of nationalists is to project the nation back into the past, to create a sense that the nation has an enduring existence. In many cases, this goes so far as to present the nation as having always existed, even if it has not always been recognized or allowed to exist in its proper form. Perhaps it was divided or conquered, dispersed or subsumed, but it has always been there. Obviously, this does not hold for all nations. For example, the United States does not follow this particular pattern of projection into the indefinite past. Indeed, some aspects of U.S. nationalism result in part from the fact that the nation did not always exist. In any case, there is always some projection into the past—even if it is only a projection of ideals coming to realize themselves in the course of history. In this way nationalism is bound up with “the invention of tradition,” as Hobsbawm and Ranger put it. In his novel, *Midnight’s Children*, Salman Rushdie makes the point very well. Speaking of the nationalist imagination on the eve of India’s independence, Rushdie explains that “a nation which had never previously existed was about to win its freedom, catapulting us into a world which, although it had five thousand years of history, although it had invented the game of chess and traded with Middle Kingdom Egypt, was nevertheless quite imaginary” (129). The other side of this idea is that the nation, once properly instituted, will always exist in the future.

*Daily Life*

Though it may seem that our daily lives are entirely divorced from history, this is not in fact true. Rather, our daily lives repeatedly lead us to encounter history. This is most obvious in our experience of monuments.
Monuments are designed to last into the future and they usually come to us from the past. Their own enduring character is bound up with the enduring character of the nation. More important, they often memorialize historical events or persons—founding fathers, great battles, and so on. A similar point may be made about museums. First, the mere existence of national museums is important, even for people who never visit any of them. Second, museums are visited by millions of people every year. Still more are affected by them through television, books, or word of mouth. For example, the Smithsonian Museums (which include the National Portrait Gallery, the Smithsonian American Art Museum, and the National Museum of American History) saw 20.4 million visitors in 2004. There were 78.8 million visitors to their website (see www.si.edu, including their 2004 annual report, entitled “Uniquely American”). There are also national historical sites that operate in much the same way as museums. An American example is Gettysburg. An Indian instance is the Taj Mahal. Maas discusses a late nineteenth-century example from Germany. As part of a drive toward legitimating its annexation, “the battlefields of Lothringen [Lorraine] were systematically made out as national pilgrimage sites” (218).

Perhaps even more obviously, written histories—including popular works, such as biographies of presidents—enhance the sense of national durability. In addition, there are historical novels, historical films, televised histories. Collectively, these are probably the major source of our sense of national durability today. Obviously, films and television are modern developments. Greenfeld outlines some earlier instances of the same sort. Among the Elizabethans in England, “A whole new class of people emerged whose main preoccupation was to do research and write—chronicles, treatises, poems, novels, and plays—in English about England” (67). At this time, “The Society of Antiquaries was formed. Holinshed, Warner, Camden, and others wrote general histories of England and histories of specific periods. Playwrights—whose number included Shakespeare and Marlowe—dramatized episodes of national history” (67).

As this suggests, literature is crucial to this process. So is literary history. The writing of national literary history and the related development of national literary canons are important for creating a sense of national durability. The establishment of national literary paradigms—such as Shakespeare in England, Homer in Greece, Vālmīki in India—has been particularly consequential. Even if one never reads Homer, his mere existence serves to foster a sense of the ancientness of the Greek nation. The same point holds for Vālmīki and India. Shakespeare is, of course, more recent. But, by adopting the right models or metaphors, nations can accom-
moderate variations in the narrative of duration. For example, by drawing on the model of an individual life, nationalists can suggest that relative youth implies a longer and more vigorous future. If Greece and India are older, that only means that they are “past their prime,” unlike England. In keeping with this, Ashis Nandy has discussed the ways in which the putative adulthood of English national society was contrasted with the supposed senescence of Indian national society, invariably in such a way as to support British colonial domination (see Intimate 16–18 and Traditions 39).

In addition to literature proper, orature was often particularly important for establishing national ancestry. Thus, myths and ancient poetic forms were often recruited to nationalist ends. A well-known example of this is Ireland in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Writers of the Irish Renaissance drew extensively on Irish myth, some preserved in ancient texts, some preserved in oral tradition. Another apt example is Finland. In his article on the “Birth of Finland's National Culture,” Klinge discusses the project of making a “compilation of Finnish Mythology” (70).

Perhaps the most important means of conveying nationally functional historical information (or pseudo-information) is formal education. We have already seen that education is critical for increasing practical homogenization. It operates equally to communicate national or other in-group narratives (thus fostering affectivity and opposability), to enhance the salience of the identity category—and to expand the sense of durability. This function may be discerned at virtually every educational level, and in different types of institution. For example, Anderson links the spread of modern nationalism with the development of history as a university discipline including “academic chairs” and an “elaborate array of professional journals” (194).

*Events*

Events too have important effects on our sense of the durability of a nation. The events that operate in this way are often recurring celebrations or memorials that recall some historical occurrence—a battle, the birth of a national leader, or the like. Thus, people in the United States have celebrated Columbus Day as the discovery of America. (These celebrations have been toned down recently as they were inflaming some subnational divisions, due to the simple falsity of the claim that Columbus discovered
America, and due to the fact that his arrival led to genocide.) The nationalist function of the celebration has been in part a matter of establishing durability. The same point holds for Thanksgiving, which in part commemorates the joining of settlers and Native Americans at a shared feast in 1621. The holiday serves to memorialize an historical event in a way that enhances the sense of national durability—extending it back well before national independence—while also occluding subnational categorial conflicts. The annual celebrations of Independence Day and Presidents’ Day have the same general function.

Needless to say, the United States is by no means unique in ritualizing historical events in this way. For example, Kerr and Chifunyise point to “historical re-enactments” in southern Africa that undoubtedly served the purpose of enhancing the sense of durability. They mention in particular the Umutombo ceremony of the eighteenth-century Lunda empire and the Swazi Incwala ceremony, also from the eighteenth century, which reenacted early Swazi life (272). (Both ceremonies also served to reaffirm political hierarchies.)

Major anniversaries may be particularly powerful in promoting a sense of durability. Cannadine cites celebrations for “the six hundredth anniversary of the Hapsburg monarchy” in Austria, “the millennium of the kingdom of Hungary,” and “the tercentenary celebration of the Romanov dynasty” in Russia (127–28). He goes on to “republican régimes,” citing “the centennial of the revolution” in France and the “lavishly commemorated” U.S. anniversaries that marked the “centennial of the revolution and the four hundredth anniversary of Columbus’s discovery of America” (128).

Inaugurations and coronations are relevant and effective here as well, for they simultaneously commemorate an entire history (of inaugurations or coronations) and continue that history. Malinowski discusses the coronation of George VI, maintaining that it promoted “an increased feeling of security, of stability, and the permanence of the British Empire” (quoted in Cannadine 149). All three properties—security, stability, and permanence—involce durability. Similarly, Harold Nicolson describes the Silver Jubilee of George V as “a guarantee of stability, security, continuity” (quoted in Cannadine 156).

More generally, one great value of emphasizing national tradition is that the mere existence of tradition shows the durability of the nation. This is one primary reason that it is so important, and so common, for nations to invent traditions, as Hobsbawm and his collaborators have discussed.
AFFECTIVITY

Affectivity is the infusion of emotion into our ideas about identity. It is the fundamental motivational parameter. Without emotion, the other parameters would have no practical effects. At the same time, emotion is, at least in certain respects, much more cognitively complex than the other parameters. At one level, it is a matter of direct experiential triggers and emotional memories, which is to say memories that make us feel the relevant emotion again (see LeDoux, *Emotional* 182, and Schacter 171–72). For example, sudden explosions (direct experiential triggers) are frightening and recollections of a friend’s death (emotional memories) are sad. But emotions occur in larger trajectories as well. They are inseparable from hopes, plans, expectations. As Oatley puts it, “emotions depend on evaluations of what has happened in relation to the person’s goals and beliefs” (*Best* 19) and “Emotions emerge at . . . significant junctures in plans” (25). Put differently, emotions are involved with narrative—specifically, our ongoing narratives of our own lives. In Martha Nussbaum’s words, “Emotions . . . have a narrative structure. The understanding of any single emotion is incomplete unless its narrative history is grasped” (*Upheavals* 236).

In a very narrow sense, emotions are punctual. They are stabs of fear, bursts of joy, flashes of embarrassment. But those momentary emotions are not what is most crucial for large patterns in social life, such as the development of national identity. In the case of such patterns, more sustained and systematically organized emotions are crucial. Sustained emotions are no doubt marked by periodic spikes of momentary intensity, as for example, Greg Smith has argued. However, they are not a matter of random spikes. These emotionally intense moments are systematically organized, integrated with goals and efforts. That organization is largely a matter of narrative. This is why emotion in nationalism is crucially bound up with the narrative structures we will consider in later chapters.

On the other hand, to say this is not to say that we cannot examine nationalism and emotion at all outside the context of narrative analysis. In this section, I wish to consider the most important emotions in the development and operation of nationalism. I will indicate some of the techniques that bear on these emotions, other than narrative and metaphor. Perhaps the best way of organizing these emotions is by their primary object. Any functioning identity group (e.g., an ethnic identity group) must foster certain emotional attitudes in its members toward two distinct objects—first, toward other members of the in-group; second, toward members of the
out-group. A specifically national identity group must add emotional attitudes toward the in-group hierarchy or the authorities in that hierarchy and toward the national land. I will consider each in turn. I conclude with a brief section on the incorporation of religion into nationalism because such incorporation is a particularly powerful and widespread technique for enhancing affectivity. In fact, this incorporation may bear on our response to all the objects of national emotion.

 Needless to say, the list of emotions that might have a role in nationalism is quite long. Indeed, anything from acrimony to zeal might be cultivated for nationalist purposes. I will concentrate on a more confined set of emotions. Specifically, I have argued in *The Mind and Its Stories* that there is a limited set of protoemotion systems that are innate (see 253–64). Protoemotion systems develop into full-blown emotion systems through maturation and individual experience, including, of course, cultural experience. These innate systems are happiness and sadness (emotions bearing on outcomes of actions and events in the context of goals); hunger, lust, and disgust (emotions bearing on things); anger, affection, and fear (emotions bearing on agents); boredom/curiosity, wonder, and sensitivity (emotions bearing on ambient conditions). In the following analysis, I will focus primarily on the fundamental emotions of these emotion systems (leaving aside only boredom/curiosity and sensitivity, which play more limited roles in nationalism). This does not mean that other emotions—complex emotions, derived from the interaction of these innate systems with experience—are irrelevant for nationalist identification. In fact, they are often relevant. However, I will consider these only when they have a particularly important and constant role in nationalism, as they do in the cases of pride, shame, and awe.

**In-Group Members**

The most obvious dilemma for the development of a functional in-group is the reconciliation of in-group members with one another. Individually, we have different and often contradictory interests. Moreover, a large in-group, such as a nation, must reconcile contradictions among subgroups,

13. This is not to say that they play no role whatsoever. For example, there is a degree to which some people become enthusiastic about war simply because it is novel, thus stimulating, thus a change from the tedium of normalcy. However, these emotions are not usually of central importance for the cultivation of national over other allegiances, or even for the cultivation of any particular national allegiance.
such as ethnic communities, that themselves involve sometimes intense emotional attachments.

As Benedict Anderson has famously stressed, a nation is an imaginary community. It is not a “face-to-face” community in the manner of a village (or a family). As I will discuss in chapter 4, we have a default tendency to distrust anyone who is strange or unfamiliar. Numerous empirical studies demonstrate that we have a more positive response to the familiar than the unfamiliar. For example, as Zajonc explains, “when a particular stimulus is shown over and over again . . . it gets to be better liked” (35). The point applies to people as well (with some disturbing exceptions; see Oatley’s *Emotions* 73, on the persistence of racial bias even after repeated exposure). The first emotional barrier that national identification must overcome is this default distrust. Put differently, if we are to have a functional national identification, we must have that minimal form of attachment that we call “trust.” The dilemma comes from the fact that the national community cannot be familiar. It is necessarily composed almost entirely of strangers.

The distrust of strangers cannot be entirely overcome. However, it can be mitigated. The diminution of national strangeness may be developed in two areas. First, it may be developed in relation to actual interactions among citizens. This occurs primarily through the sorts of homogenization discussed earlier. If I share language, dress, food, and various habits with my fellow citizens, unknown individuals will appear less unfamiliar to me. If our practical identities mesh without disruption, my tendencies toward suspicion will be minimized.

The second area of mitigation is general rather than particular. When I imagine any group, I will have some sort of attitude toward that group. This is true if I imagine engineers, faculty at Harvard, or Canadians. In each case, my attitude will be affected by two sorts of cognitive structure—prototypes and exempla. Again, the prototypes are roughly average or standard cases of a given category. With respect to national categories, prototypes are most often stereotypes. Exempla are instances of a given category. If I imagine Canadians, my emotions will be affected by my prototype of a Canadian (white, moderately liberal, competent) and by any salient exempla of Canadians (e.g., Margaret Atwood). Personally, I tend to have relatively warm feelings for Canadians since I support national health care and like Margaret Atwood’s novels and poetry.

One way in which feelings of national trust—and, indeed, feelings of national affection—may be developed is through the cultivation of prototypes and exempla that inspire these feelings. Exempla seem particularly
crucial in this regard. For instance, when I think of Canada, my evaluation of the country is bound up with such issues as national health care. However, my feelings are much more closely connected with my response to Atwood's writings. Exempla bring us almost invariably to narrative. Traditionally, one function of nationalist history has been to associate our thought about the nation with emotionally powerful exempla—for instance, leaders and soldiers who protect us, thus figures that we can trust and admire. Much early education, when developed in a nationalist framework, involves the cultivation of such national prototypes and exempla, emotion-triggering ideas and memories that will arise in our minds spontaneously when we think about the nation. Insofar as we understand, imagine, respond to the nation as a whole through these more particular cognitive contents, our emotional relation to the nation as a whole will be bound up with our emotional relation to those particular contents. If “America” brings to mind Abraham Lincoln, then my emotional response to Lincoln—that particular American with his particular life (as developed through narratives)—will affect my emotional response to America as a whole, and thereby to other individual Americans. Indeed, in many ways, it does not matter how I interact with real, individual Americans. My response to national issues will be more a matter of my emotional attitude toward individuals that I think of as exemplary of America. Lincoln is no more of an American than the people I interact with at a restaurant. But, cognitively, my idea of Lincoln and my emotional response to Lincoln are bound up with my judgments about and actions regarding America. This is not true of the waitress at Pizza Hut or the teller at Wells Fargo.

Exempla in fact allow us to go beyond trust to more motivationally imperative forms of empathy. It may seem that empathy is a difficult and rare thing. In fact, we have a strong, neurocognitive propensity toward empathy. For example, “mirror neurons” in our brains “fire when a certain type of action is performed, but also when another agent is observed performing the same type of action” (Hurley and Chater 3). Because of this coordination, “sensations and emotions displayed by others can also be empathized with, and therefore implicitly understood, through a mirror matching mechanism” (Gallese 114). Among other things, mirror systems apparently help foster an inclination to mimic the movements of people we witness (see Brothers 78, and Prinz 274). It is well-established that certain imitations of this sort tend to induce emotions that parallel those of the person imitated. Thus, as Plantinga points out, “Viewing the human face,” as well as human posture, action, and so forth, may “elicit an emotional response in the viewer” through “the processes of ‘emotional contagion’
as induced by ‘affective mimicry’ and ‘facial feedback’” (242; emphasis in original). Affective mimicry is our “tendency automatically to mimic and synchronize expressions, vocalizations, postures, and movements with those of another person” (Hatfield, Cacioppo, and Rapson 48). Facial feedback is our tendency to feel the emotion that we imitate through facial expressions (see Plantinga 243). When we are conversing with someone and he or she laughs, that inclines us to laugh as well. If he or she screams in fear, we may or may not scream, but we partially imitate his or her expression, experience a moment of fright, and become more inclined to feel afraid.

Obviously, many factors may override this empathy, just as many factors may enhance empathy. Perhaps the most fundamental factor in both enhancing and overriding empathy is our preliminary categorization of agents into benevolent and malevolent, along with the related (but not identical) categorization into opportunities and threats. The establishment of broad, *prima facie* trust for the in-group fosters the categorization of in-group members as benevolent. It thus “uninhibits” our propensity toward empathy. Conversely, an enhanced distrust of the out-group will foster the categorization of out-group members as malevolent. (As Horowitz points out, “general attitudes of distrust are correlated with inter-ethnic antipathy” [194]; the point presumably applies to other identity groups, such as nations, as well.) A categorization as malevolent will, in turn, intensify the inhibition of our empathic tendencies. Indeed, in the case of certain emotions, the categorization of someone as hostile may change our response to an opposite or complement of the emotion he or she is expressing. For example, if the putatively hostile out-group member expresses anger, this is likely to provoke fear or antagonistic anger, not empathic anger.

Neurocognitive research reported by Ambady et al. may point toward this sort of attitude adjustment. A study by Chiao and colleagues showed that Caucasian subjects had greater amygdala activity when faced with “Caucasian and Asian American faces showing fear” than African American faces showing fear (Ambady et al. 213). Thus, Caucasian subjects experienced a parallel emotion (here, fear) when faced with other Caucasians or Asian Americans. This was not the case when they saw African American faces. A separate study found that Caucasian test subjects “detected angry expressions most accurately in African American and Caucasian faces relative to Asian American faces.” This sensitivity may result from experiencing a complementary emotion with the African Americans. Unsurprisingly, in this context, “neutral expressions were recognized equally well across the three racial groups” (213).
On the other hand, there are some emotions for which categorization has only very limited consequences—primarily emotions that inhibit or disable aggression, such as grief. Suppose I have categorized someone as hostile due to his membership in a particular out-group (e.g., another nation). That categorization will change my relation to his or her anger or fear. It is likely to have a much more limited impact on my response to his or her pain. This is particularly true if the pain is disabling, so that he or she cannot act on hostile impulses—that is, so that I no longer categorize him or her as a threat.

Yet, even here, there are complications. Empathic grief is likely to overcome malevolent categorization only if I directly experience or concretely imagine the other person’s expression of pain—cries, body movements, facial contortions. (Decety and Chaminade point out that “empathy and sympathy most commonly arise when people directly perceive individuals in trouble” [132]. However, imagination can produce a version of the emotions ordinarily triggered by direct experience, since it activates the same brain areas as direct experience; see Kosslyn 295, 301, 325, and David Rubin 41–46, 57–59.) The concreteness is crucial. Innate emotion triggers are tied closely to concrete features of the environment. Moreover, our own emotional memories are usually activated only by particulars. Put differently, statistics do not, most often, frighten or sadden us. A concrete experience of someone’s terror or grief, however, does. As a result, our empathy will be inspired by someone’s emotional expressions when we experience those expressions directly or imagine them concretely. It will not be inspired if we do not experience them directly and imagine them only vaguely and inconsistently. Moreover, such vague and inconsistent imagination is particularly likely when one is experiencing fear (see, for example, Preston and de Waal 8, on fear and the inhibition of taking other people’s perspective). This includes fear due to out-group categorization. Preston and de Waal give a striking example. As they explain, “In experiments with adults, human subjects who witness” shocks to other people “offer to take the shocks . . . if their similarity is manipulated with demographic descriptions.” In other words, they offer to take the shocks themselves if they believe that they share categorial identity with the person receiving the shocks. “If they do not feel similar”—that is, if they do not feel categorial identification—“they only offer to take the shocks if they have to watch the [other person] receive the remaining shocks” (16). In short, test subjects are willing to take someone else’s pain in two types of case. First, when they share a categorial identification with the person and second, when they directly perceive the person’s suffering.
This brings us to a simple, common, and obvious technique for enhancing empathy with the in-group and inhibiting empathy with the out-group—the presentation of concrete images or detailed accounts of the emotions of in-group members, and the occlusion of details of the emotions of out-group members. For example, after the bombings on September 11, 2001, the *New York Times* ran a series of articles on the victims. This fostered a deep sense of empathy with those who died and with their bereaved families, as the stories delved into the particularity of the people involved, triggering our own emotional memories and encouraging us to imagine each loss concretely. In contrast, as Howard Zinn pointed out, the “[v]ictims of our bombing in Afghanistan have not been humanized in the same way” (33). More generally, he asks, “what if all those people who declare their support for Bush’s ‘war on terrorism’ could see the real human beings dying under our bombs . . . ? What if they learned . . . the names of the dead, images of the villages that were bombed, the words of a father who lost his children, the ages of the children?” (34). We do not imagine any of this concretely. We do not imagine the dead; we do not imagine their families’ grief. Again, this is not simply because our empathy is inhibited by categorizing these people as enemies. It is also because their particularity has been occluded. Speaking of the Malvinas/Falkland Islands war, Kevin Foster puts the point this way: “The first-hand accounts of those who actually confronted and combated one another are full of equivalent moments of mutual recognition, when the fabricated antagonisms of politics and nationalism fall away in the face of the irresistible empathy of the troops and the inescapable likeness of the enemy” (145). He cites a particular case where a soldier “found that his personal responses to the enemy were more complex than the ritualised antagonisms of the training ground. His natural empathy for a frightened and wounded man threatened his ability to discharge his professional responsibilities” (145; see also 147).

Of course, such empathy-inspiring particularity is not confined to sorrow. We also share the joy of other Americans—through television pictures and interviews, through stories that present happy events concretely and in such a way as to provoke detailed imagination. We lack that experience for other nations. When an American soldier escapes from enemy captivity, we see the rejoicing troops, family, and the soldier himself or herself. In contrast, if an Iraqi or Afghani soldier escapes from American detention, we are likely to have only vague details about the escapee, along with images of the somber, angry officers who discuss the escape.

Here, someone might object that I am asking too much. After all, news reports cover what is of interest to the home audience. “Our” soldiers—
thus American soldiers, in the case of the United States—are of interest to
the home audience; enemy soldiers are not. In fact, the reasons for such
dissymmetrical reporting are more complex than this suggests. However, if
one accepts the basic claim about reporting, it only indicates again that the
media are nationalist by their very organization and that national identity
categories usurp broader human identifications.

The sharing of joy leads us to one of the complex emotions that are
particularly important for in-group identification—pride. I take pride to
be a sort of joy derived from imagined superiority to others, first of all in
emotionally consequential areas, such as greater power, which itself bears
on both anger and fear. Pride can be confirmed and thus enhanced by suc-
cessful activity (e.g., in a competition). Conversely, it can be undermined
by failure. Depending on the intensity of the failure, the gradient of change
from expected success to failure, and other factors, such undermining may
produce shame. Pride is most obviously an individual emotion. However,
it is crucial in group definition as well. Indeed, it seems reasonable to say
that one does not have a socially functioning in-group or identity group if
the members of the group do not have a strong sense of group pride. (One
may have a functioning coalition or alliance without pride, but a coaliti-
ion is different from an identity group.) Insofar as it operates nationally,
pride is inseparable from heroic narratives. Similarly, insofar as it operates
nationally, shame is inseparable from sacrificial narratives. But, as with
emotion generally, that does not mean there is nothing to say about iden-
tity-based pride and shame outside of those narratives.

The development of in-group pride appears natural and straightforward
for a species that engages in cooperation or is, as Keith Oatley puts it,
“cognitively specialized for interacting with other cognitive beings in joint
plans” (*Best* 13). Whenever we engage successfully in a joint project, we
share pride at least to some extent. But things are more complex than this
suggests. Perhaps most important, our sense of self has a great deal of plas-
ticity when it comes to pride and shame. We may feel ashamed of having
failed to resist our own cravings. In this case, we define our self very nar-
rowly so that the self includes only our deliberations, and not our appetites.
(After all, appetite is what “I” failed to resist when I ate that jar of fudge.)
On the other hand, we may feel proud of our children’s success in their
professions. Then, we are implicitly expanding our sense of self to our off-
spring. The case of the children may seem to suggest that such expansion
must involve some causal connection, starting with me as the cause. My
children have my genes. Moreover, I raised them. Therefore, I am to some
extent responsible for their success. But this is not, in fact, necessary. I may
also feel proud of my parents or my siblings—or my father-in-law, or my college's football team. Causal relations are not crucial. There are, rather, two important factors in the extension of pride. The first is simply shared joy. In order to be proud of my father-in-law, it is important that I be able to share my father-in-law's joy when he achieves something. The second factor is a function of the social distribution of prestige. I am likely to be proud insofar as my father-in-law does something that will cause other people to respect me. Put differently, I am likely to be proud insofar as having an accomplished father-in-law has some comparative social value or can be seen as suggesting my own superiority. This goes along with our converse tendency to limit our sense of self in cases of reduced prestige. It is nicely illustrated by the study of pronoun usage and college sports cited above. That study showed that college students were more likely to refer to the football team as “we” when the team won, but “they” when the team lost (Cialdini et al.).

The techniques used by nationalists to foster shared pride are largely straightforward in this context. We commonly share the joys of other Americans, particularly when these joys involve superiority over members of national out-groups. Obvious examples of this include international sporting events, such as the Olympics, where media coverage is nationally oriented in obvious ways (e.g., through constantly updated tallies of medals won by one’s nation, the ranking of one’s nation in the medal count, and so forth). More important, we are all socially recognized for such accomplishments. This recognition is often self-produced. Americans feel buoyed up after defeating other nations in the Olympics. They then announce enthusiastically to one another that “We’re number one!” Whether other nations share this enthusiasm is largely irrelevant. The same point holds for wars, both current and historical. Celebrations of past victories serve not only to make the national identity category salient. They serve equally to foster shared pride by socially affirming the superiority of all citizens with respect to the historically defeated enemy. Moreover, victory enhances the in-group’s power in obvious ways, thus its ability to provoke fear. (Again, pride is most importantly a matter of superiority in emotionally consequential areas, such as power.)

The national cultivation of shared pride is not confined to such obviously competitive and emotional events as wars or sports. In fact, nations show remarkable ingenuity in creating occasions for national pride. For example, in the United States, an election provides the occasion for months of self-congratulatory assertions about American democracy. Political parties and nonpartisan groups cite the electoral process as evidence that the
United States is the greatest nation on the earth. In the 2004 election, this proved particularly valuable as we had gone to war against two nations that did not have democratic institutions. The assertions about “our” greatness as a democracy fostered collective national pride, and helped extend that pride to those national conflicts, so that we could be proud of spreading democracy to other parts of the world.

Perhaps the most basic way of establishing such pride is through simple assertion, removed from any context, as in bumper stickers that say “Proud to be an American.” This is part of the symbolism of the flag as well. The flag does not merely call to mind the nation. It suggests pride. (For those who display the flag, flag burning may then suggest shame, which begins to indicate why it gives rise to such angry and, at times, violent opposition.) Every such assertion of national pride serves to enhance the social valorization of national identity. In other words, every time someone affirms national pride, that affirmation serves to tell others that their national identity has social value, that it is something to be proud of. It thereby fosters the spread of national pride. Of course, this is largely vacuous. Some people are proud to be Americans because other people are proud to be Americans, because still other people (or perhaps even the same people) are proud to be Americans, and so on. But, then again, vacuity is a standard part of national identification.

The Land

Before going on to treat the in-group hierarchy and the out-group, we should briefly consider the cultivation of emotions toward the nation as a physical place. Herb points out that, “Territory is vital to national feeling” (17). In keeping with this, “All national anthems make reference to the special qualities of their natural environment to underline their unique character” (18). It may at first seem odd to speak of enhancing affectivity regarding territory rather than regarding people. However, the two are in fact inseparable. Our fundamental feeling of trust and attachment, the feeling that defines our automatic division of the world into benevolent and malevolent agents, applies equally to places. We automatically divide the

14. Peter Rabinowitz pointed out to me that this may be an overstatement. “The Star-Spangled Banner” does not seem to make any reference to the “special qualities of their natural environment,” if this refers to distinctive physical features (e.g., the Grand Canyon). On the other hand, it does refer to special political and spiritual qualities of the natural environment by stressing “the land of the free” and the “Heav’n-rescued land.”
world into home and away, safe and unsafe places. For example, flight is not only a flight from malevolent attackers toward benevolent protectors, it is equally escape from an unsafe place to security. As Nesse points out, “The direction of flight” is both toward “trusted kin” (or, more generally, in-group members) and toward “home” (77S). Indeed, this sense of place is not peripheral, but central to our emotional lives. As Panksepp points out, “separation-distress systems may be evolutionarily related to ancient mechanisms of place attachment” (Affective Neuroscience 265) or, as he puts it elsewhere, “it is possible that the ancient mechanisms of place attachment provided a neural impetus for the emergence of social attachments” (407n.93). Oatley notes that one primary function of the corpus striatum, one of the evolutionarily older parts of the brain, is “the establishment of a home site” (Emotions 64). Nationalism draws on this sense of home. The difficulty is getting us to extend our sense of home to the entire national territory. As Edward Said put it, “space acquires emotional . . . sense by a kind of poetic process, whereby the . . . anonymous reaches of distance are converted into meaning for us here” (Orientalism 55). But how does this occur?

As we just discussed, familiarity is crucial to the emotional relations among citizens. Compatriots should not see one another as strangers. They should relate to other citizens with a sense of comfort and trust, thus a mild form of attachment. There is a direct parallel with the land. Again, the citizenry is too numerous to experience in the way one experiences a family or a small village. Similarly, the physical space of the nation is too large for one to experience it as home. One aspect of promoting nationalist identification is making the nation familiar as a physical space. This will not produce the intense attachment of one’s familial home. However, here as elsewhere, familiarity fosters fondness and trust. Strange places are as suspicious as strange people. The “framing” of national landscapes through painting, photography, film, songs, poems, novels, school geography lessons, and so forth serves to make the nation familiar in a way that fosters a sense of security and builds affection. Herb explains that, in poetry and history, “The soil is soaked with the blood of national heroes, the mountains are sacred, the rivers carry the national soul” (19). Of course, the investment of the land with feeling is accomplished by direct experience as well. Tourism guided by natural beauties or wonders, such as the Grand Canyon, familiarizes us with the national land, creating emotional associations and attachments.

Following most writers on the topic, I have been referring to the national “land.” However, monuments and skyscrapers can be familiar markers of
place as well. Indeed, many people felt this way about the twin towers in New York. In addition to the terrible loss of life, the September 11 bomb- ings constituted a destruction of something familiar, and in that sense a violation of home. I myself remember seeing a television program a few weeks after the bombings. The program had evidently been filmed over the preceding summer. It began with a panorama of Manhattan. My eyes fixed on the towers and I thought how fragile home is—something many Iraqis must have felt when surveying the ruins in Basra or Baghdad.

Of course, our relation to the national place is not solely a matter of familiarity and attachment. It is also a matter of pride. If our skyscrapers are bigger or our canyons deeper, if our temples are more exquisitely crafted or our rivers more sacred—if there is any way we can see our physical space as superior to that of an out-group, then we take pride in it. Here, as elsewhere, nations are tremendously resourceful in finding ways of imagining their land or monuments, their rivers or houses, their mountains or palaces to be better than those of everyone else.

Finally, the land, and even artifacts, inspire a particular emotional attitude that we rarely have toward fellow citizens—what I have referred to as “wonder.” Wonder is a pleasure in the experience of ambient conditions that do not elicit a desire for the alteration of those conditions or for our relation to those conditions.\footnote{Of course, the word “wonder” may be used for other emotions. I am using it for this particular emotion, without any claim that this is the single correct usage of the word. Indeed, I do not believe that there is a single correct usage of this or any other word.}

For the most part, emotions lead to actions. For example, fear makes us withdraw from an object, while anger makes us approach it. Wonder interrupts our ongoing activities, not so that we will act in another way (e.g., fleeing out of fear), but rather so that we may continue experiencing passively what is before us or around us.\footnote{Of course, as with any emotion, we become habituated to conditions that might elicit wonder, when our experience of those conditions is repeated. Thus, the experience of wonder, like the experience of other emotions, is bound up with expectation, novelty, and other variables. But those are not distinctive features of wonder.} Aesthetic appreciation is a version of wonder. We may experience it before a painting or in a musical performance (either of which may, in a particular case, be national). Most important for our purposes, we may experience it before landscapes, mountains, rivers, forests, or national monuments and buildings. Thus, nationalism cultivates an aestheticization of the nation as a physical place, first of all as a landscape. It fosters a sense of wonder, focused on selected sights.

Indeed, in isolating objects or scenes for wonder, a nation helps to define natural beauty for its citizens, focusing it on mountains of a certain
magnitude, rivers of a particular force, heaths and moors, fields of amber grain. One thinks, for example, of James Joyce's wondrous attachment to the Liffey. This attachment is manifest clearly in *Finnegans Wake*, a paradigmatic nationalist work, whatever Joyce's self-conscious political beliefs, affiliations, or intentions. But to an outsider—someone whose paradigmatic river is, say, the Mississippi—the Liffey is unimpressive. When the nationalist fostering of wonder is effective, our attachment to the national place is like our attachment to Mom's home cooking. It is not a matter of intrinsic qualities alone; it is also a matter of just how our taste has developed.

**The Out-Group**

Affection links us with other people in obvious ways, and wonder ties us to places. Pride, too, when developed socially, binds citizens together. Happiness and sorrow do so as well. As Pindar put it, “We have all kinds of needs for those we love—/most of all in hardships, but joy, too,/strains to track down eyes that it can trust” (*Nemean* VIII.42–44; quoted in Nussbaum, *Fragility* vi). In relation to this, it is unsurprising that nationalism tends to inhibit these binding emotions (e.g., empathic experiences of joy or sorrow) when they might be directed at members of out-groups.

But that is not all. Lust and hunger serve to bring people together as well. National identification is probably not fostered by the direct triggering of these emotions. (One is unlikely to be thinking patriotic thoughts when hungry or sexually aroused.) However, nationalism is fostered by shaping the longer-term specification of our innate protoemotions in these cases.

For instance, ideals of beauty develop somewhat differently in different cultures. To a certain extent, this happens spontaneously. Our sense of beauty is, in part, a matter of weighted averaging. For example, as numerous studies have shown, the most beautiful face is, roughly, the most average face (see Langlois and Roggman). But there are other factors as well, such as socially developed expectations about clothing, build, tone of voice. In all these cases, nationalist identification may be fostered by national specifications of beauty, which tend to limit the degree to which one sees members of out-groups as attractive. In some cases, this affects our response to real individuals. For example, until recently, white Europeans considered black skin and African hair to be unappealing. In other cases, the limitation of intergroup attraction operates by way of
prototypes. The German language and a German accent are, supposedly, ugly. The French, in one common stereotype, try to conceal repulsive body odor with perfume. Jews, too, in anti-Semitic belief, are smelly.\textsuperscript{17} In these cases, aesthetic preferences are likely to inhibit our general openness to sexual or romantic relations with members of the out-group. To put the point rather crudely, if our stereotype tells us that members of a particular out-group are smelly, we are less likely to put ourselves in such close proximity that we will find out. Thus, we are less likely to cross over identity categories in romantic or sexual relations.

The same point holds for national cuisine and hunger—or, more exactly, national cuisine and desiring to eat a food, finding a food “appetizing” (as opposed to the related, but distinct bodily need to fill one’s stomach). For example, Catherine Gallagher and Stephen Greenblatt have discussed the historical rejection of the potato by the English poor, even when hungry—“the poor would accept nothing but white bread even at the height of scarcity” (124). They have tied this rejection to the association of the potato with the Irish diet (see chapter 4 of Gallagher and Greenblatt). If we do not find the out-group’s food appealing, we are less likely to share food with them, thus to enter into their ordinary lives in personal relations.

Of course, our emotional attitude toward national out-groups does not result solely from the inhibition of emotions that might otherwise have brought us together. Some emotions operate more directly to separate or oppose us—specifically, fear, anger, and disgust. Just as the binding emotions are crucial for our relation to the national in-group, these distancing emotions are crucial for our relation to the national out-group.

As I have already indicated, low-level wariness is part of the attitude of distrust with which we commonly respond to out-groups. It is limited enough in intensity that it is unlikely to serve as the sole motive for any significant action, such as violence. However, it provides a constant basis for the development of full-blown fear, with its more severe responses. For example, out-group distrust is one reason why a black man reaching for a cell phone might be shot by police, whereas a white man reaching for a cell phone would not. The distrust does not by itself motivate shooting. However, it contextualizes ambiguous behavior such that the act of reaching into one’s pocket may be more readily imagined as reaching for a weapon. In this way, distrust prepares us to respond to an out-group with fear.

On the other hand, as the reference to imagination suggests, intense fear is not the product of the events alone, even in the context of prior

\textsuperscript{17} Intra-European stereotypes of this sort were much more important when national opposability in Europe was primarily a matter of other European nations. They have declined in importance as the national enemies have shifted to other parts of the world.
constant distrust. For example, European American police officers may distrust Asians as an out-group. However, they would be unlikely to shoot an Asian man reaching for a cell phone because they would not distrust him in precisely the same way that they distrust black men. Fear, then, results, not only from general distrust, but from our understanding of events. That understanding is clearly prejudiced by factors beyond the mere attitude of out-group distrust, factors such as prototypes (or stereotypes). The point holds even more obviously for events that we do not experience directly, but through media representations, which often serve quite clearly to manipulate our emotional responses. Indeed, such media representations are the usual way in which we experience events of consequence for national feeling.

Consider, for example, the bombings on September 11, 2001. It may seem that the widespread reaction of fear was simply a reasonable response to the events themselves. In part, that is true. Three thousand people were killed. It was undeniably a major tragedy. Moreover, it was not an accident. It was a deliberate, planned attack. However, it is possible to imagine several different ways of treating the bombings. It would have been perfectly possible for the government and the news media to present it as a massive criminal act that required such extensive planning that it would be unlikely to be repeated in the near future. The group responsible for the attacks had made attacks in the past, and these had typically taken several years to develop. Moreover, the government could have acted more quickly than it did in strengthening airport security. Thus, it could have minimized panic while enhancing actual safety. Instead, we were faced with a continual barrage of new warnings and an astonishing aggrandizement of Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. In the weeks and months after the bombings, we not only saw the images of the towers collapsing again and again, we heard that our water supply would be infected with smallpox, that our nuclear plants would be used against us in the same way as the airplanes, that another attack by air would soon hit another major city. Bill Fletcher referred to “a situation of perpetual anxiety” in the United States (93). Eliot Weinberger wrote that “America doesn’t feel like America any more. The climate of militarism and fear, similar to any totalitarian state, permeates everything. . . . Every few weeks there is an announcement that another terrorist attack is imminent, and citizens are urged to take ludicrous measures, like sealing their windows, against biological and chemical attacks, and to report the suspicious activities of their neighbors.”

18. Bernardine Dohrn notes that the condition of fear did not arise simply from the bombings. It is bound up with institutional practices—for instance, practices in schools—that have developed over a longer period of time (as one would expect, given the general nature of
country was kept in a constant state of anxiety through the activation of traumatic memories and through the imagination of scenarios filled with powerful triggers of fear. Such feelings are not slight or inconsequential simply because we experienced the events indirectly. Berkowitz points out that “events portrayed or reported on television, radio, or in the press” bring “ideas . . . actively to the viewers’ minds, and these persons . . . have feelings, memories, and even action tendencies that are associated with the depicted occurrences” (“Towards” 22).

The nationalist function of panic in the case of the September 11 bombings—and subsequent wars—is clear. Such emotional extremity is unnecessary for ordinary national coherence. It is, however, important for national mobilization. Fear, in this context, has at least three relevant consequences. First, it intensifies the sense of in-group coherence. As Frijda puts it, “Social affiliation is sought with increased intensity under threat” (351). Second, it dehumanizes the out-group and eliminates whatever concern we might have for their well-being. If we truly believe that some other agents are threatening us, we are likely to wish to stop the threat by whatever means are available (not only whatever means are necessary)—most obviously, by destroying those threatening agents. This is why we repeatedly heard cries to “nuke the Arabs” after September 11 (see, for example, Ismail on people at a cable news network calling “let's kill them all,” “let's get those fuckers” and “let's just nuke everyone”; 25). These calls were delivered with great bravado, often by people who characterized any less violent approach as “cowardly.” However, these calls showed a profound fear.

The third result of fear is that it leads us to seek protection. When afraid, we are not only inclined to distrust the out-group more intensely and thoroughly. We are also inclined to trust our own group leaders more intensely and thoroughly. Indeed, we are likely to see them as a refuge. We demand of them precisely the violence that we feel is necessary to eradicate the danger. This is why intensified fear is highly functional for facilitating war or other national violence and strengthening the internal hierarchy of a nation (e.g., in enhancing executive powers). It is something

social change). “Schools in America,” she writes, “have become barricaded places of fear. People who don’t have their own youngsters in school today may not realize what’s happened to the environment where our young people spend seven hours of their day. You can’t get into a school and you can’t get out. Surveillance is pervasive. There are lock downs, body searches, and dogs. There are armed guards. And all of this is in schools that have never seen a violent incident. The fear of violence and the notion that it is likely to come from anywhere, including from our young people, has been the precursor and the trial run for what’s now happened in all of our public spaces and airports” (132).
of a political commonplace that a fearful populace is a politically passive populace, willing to accept any dictates from their leaders. The claim is not precisely accurate. Emotions certainly limit our action tendencies. Indeed, that is one of their definitive features. However, fear does not typically make us passive. (That is more likely to be the result of certain sorts of depression.) Rather, fear makes us active supporters of (putatively) defensive violence and intensified (putatively) protective hierarchization. Put differently, if you are a leader who wants to move a society toward peace and democracy, cultivating fear will not serve your purpose.

Of course, cultivating fear serves the purposes of war only in very limited ways. Specifically, it enhances support for war. However, it typically enhances support for other people fighting the war. If I am deathly afraid of the enemy, I am unlikely to join the army in order to fight that enemy. This is where anger becomes important. Needless to say, many emotions affect the recruitment of soldiers. Fear of hunger, or more generally a sense of anxiety over one's finances, is an obvious instance, what Marxists often call “economic conscription.” Pride in one's nation, or indeed in oneself (e.g., as valiant and manly), may play a motivating role as well. But in the case of a particular crisis, the cultivation of anger toward the enemy is often crucial. Indeed, just as broad support for war and internal hierarchization are facilitated by the intensification of fear into panic, the actual prosecution of war may be facilitated by the prolongation of anger into something like ruminative vengefulness (e.g., through the repeated activation of the relevant emotional memories such that the anger is so widely primed, and so readily triggered, that it is almost a habitual state).

Anger may be triggered in a number of ways. The most obvious, perhaps, is physical injury or other aggression. However, the most fundamental seems to be a sort of inhibition—“thwarting and frustrations,” in Panksepp's phrase (Affective Neuroscience 52). Even physical injury commonly provokes sustained or recurrent anger, as opposed to immediate anger, through inhibition (as when an injury prevents one from engaging in a certain activity for months afterward). Inhibition is a cognitively interesting trigger because it crucially involves imagination. If someone grabs my arm, this counts as inhibition only if I am in the course of intentionally moving away. I recognize it as inhibition due to the contrast of my current state (still standing in the room) with a state that I tacitly imagine as

19. Panksepp has roughly the same emotion in mind when he refers to hatred as “little more than the emotion of anger, conditioned to specific cues, that has been cognitively extended in time.” It is differentiated from ordinary anger in being “more calculated, behaviorally constrained, and affectively ‘colder”’ (191).
the outcome of my previous action (exiting through the door). Most anger is immediate. It involves a sort of mirroring aggression (e.g., hitting the person who just hit you) or freeing oneself from inhibition (e.g., pushing away the person who has detained you). We may refer to this as expressive or spontaneous anger. Ruminative or retrospective anger (Panksepp’s “hatred”; Affective Neuroscience 191) occurs when the injury or inhibition remains with us beyond the exciting cause.

Ruminative anger is perhaps best thought of as a series of emotional spikes of spontaneous anger, spikes that occur when we reexperience the pain or inhibition of the initial event directly (e.g., due to a resulting physical condition, such as a broken limb) or through the triggering of emotional memories. In this way, ruminative anger is bound up with spontaneous anger. However, there is an external inhibition on our “actional response” in ruminative or retrospective anger, for the exciting cause is no longer present. We tacitly imagine a response (e.g., mirroring aggression, such as punching our antagonist). However, we are unable to engage in this response.

This leads us to a peculiar feature of anger. Emotions tend to dissipate spontaneously. Think of joy. You are very happy about something. Then, after a while, you are not so happy. No unhappy event has intervened. The joy has simply dissipated on its own. There are, of course, cases when a particularly traumatic experience continues to trouble us long after the event. These are important, and we find them particularly in cases of great fear and the specific sort of sorrow that bears on attachment (i.e., grief). However, anger is unusual, for it may actually be intensified in retrospect. The reasons have to do with actional and expressive outcomes. When I recall the death of a loved one, I can engage in the usual actions that are part of grief. I can weep or seek comfort from family and friends in almost the same way I could at the time of the death itself. I cannot do anything to rectify the situation (e.g., to bring the dead person back to life). Indeed, that is centrally what makes grief a difficult emotion. However, it is crucial that frustration—in this case, my inability to do anything about the situation—is not itself a trigger of grief. In other words, the reexperiencing of grief does not generate further triggers for grief. That is a crucial difference from anger.

Specifically, the retrospective reexperiencing of anger invariably leads to the imagination of some response to the provoking event (e.g., punching the initial offender). However, the fact that we cannot act on that imagination is itself a cause of frustration and thus a trigger for anger. In this way, whenever we dwell on anger-provoking incidents, we almost necessarily
multiply triggers for anger through the discrepancy between our imagined response and our real action. It is this multiplication of frustrations that sustains and even intensifies anger. The point is supported by the work of Bandura. As Clore and Ortony explain, referring to Bandura’s conclusions, “whether angry behavior eliminates anger depends not on whether one uses up or drains off a pool of aggressive energy”—as in the folk psychological view—“but on whether it decreases the activation of cognitive material conducive to anger” (Clore and Ortony 50). In short, the crucial factor in sustaining and intensifying anger is the repeated recollection of the anger-provoking incident. This gives rise to action tendencies, which are, in turn, frustrated—generating still further anger.

Moreover, once the process of recollection and intensified frustration has begun, it tends to be self-perpetuating. Every time they are recalled, the relevant memories become more prominent in our emotional life, and thus more likely to be recalled again in the future. This results from two factors. First, the anger memories come to have a wider range of associations. This means that they are more likely to be activated in the future as they are part of a larger and more diverse set of circuits. To take a simple example, suppose I go to a movie and find myself distracted by these anger memories. When I return to the theater later, that may activate memories of my earlier visit—thus the anger memories (along with the additional frustration). The second factor derives from the simple principle that, if a circuit is repeatedly activated, it acquires a higher level of resting activation. Technically, it becomes more highly primed. To take a simple, nonemotional example, if I am at a conference on neurology, some lexical items will be activated regularly. That repeated activation will serve to prime those items. Thus, if someone says “emotion,” I may immediately think of “amygdala.” In contrast, if I have been attending a music conference and someone says “emotion,” I might immediately think of “Romanticism.” This process affects memories, including emotional memories, no less than lexical items. In the case of anger, as priming effects accumulate and the anger circuit pervades our thought more fully, it comes to affect the way we interpret current conditions and imagine future possibilities, even outside the original context of the incident. For example, it may lead us to interpret ambiguous statements or actions as aggressive, thus as a cause for further anger. As it becomes more of a “normal” or continuous attitude, anger may come to affect our longer-term goals as well. This is, of course, what occurs in the imagination of revenge.

National identification benefits from such ruminative anger in particular circumstances and for particular national out-groups. Specifically,
ruminative anger serves to support war and related forms of violence. It is particularly important for the citizens who are engaging directly in the violent actions—for example, soldiers. Again, fear serves national militancy when it is spread throughout the noncombatant population. But it can hardly serve nationalist purposes in the military itself. Some testimonies of Vietnam War veterans, given in the Winter Soldier Investigation, suggest how this ruminative anger—with its sustaining spikes of spontaneous anger—may be cultivated in military training. As one corporal put it, “Marine training starts from the first day you get into boot camp. . . . When you’re told something to do, whether to go to the bathroom or have a cigarette, or whether you go to bed or you get some free time to write a letter, you preface it or you end it with VC, or gook or slope, kill-kill-kill. . . . [T]hey make you want to kill. . . . When you’re wound up and when your button is pushed, you’ve gotta react” (Vietnam Veterans 5–6). In the words of one sergeant, “By the time I had left Ft. Polk, Louisiana, I wanted to kill my mother, you know. Or anyone, that, that wasn’t, you know, completely in agreement with me. I wanted to kill everything. . . . I went over to Vietnam with the same attitude because I, I had been trained and I knew I was an effective fighting machine. . . . I was going to kill everything in my path” (157–58).

It is worth noting that, in general, spontaneous anger does not serve nationalist identification as well as a ruminative devotion to revenge. The former demands immediate action, which is likely to be reckless (as in the calls for “nuking the Arabs” after September 11). Revenge, in contrast, allows for longer-term planning. Moreover, it is more likely to allow for hierarchies of authority. Spontaneous anger is impulsive and rash. The contemplation of revenge, in contrast, is more readily shaped by national authorities, as long as the prescriptions of the authorities lead to violent action that is likely to produce the required pain on the part of the enemy. On the other hand, ruminative vengefulness loses its motivating force if it is not sustained by bursts of anger. This creates a paradoxical situation in which military training must make soldiers experience spikes of immediate or spontaneous anger (as is quite clear in the case of the sergeant just quoted), but act only under the effects of ruminative anger.

Shame often provides a particularly intense provocation for ruminative anger. Again, shame (as I am using the term) is produced by a sharp decline from a particular imagined status to comparative inferiority. It is part of the nature of a shameful event that we cannot change it through the expression of spontaneous anger. The event is over when we feel shame. Indeed, the completion of the event is what gives rise to shame. Put differently, shame
implies that one has already responded to some provocation and has been 
defeated (e.g., in an argument). As a result, shame almost invariably pro-
duces retrospective anger. Moreover, this retrospective anger is facilitated 
by the fact that shame is bound up with our comparative imagination of our 
character, abilities, and social standing. This imagination is a recurring fea-
ture of our ordinary lives as we estimate our ability to perform certain acts 
or envision different people’s expectations of or reactions to us. As a result, 
ordinary experiences (e.g., situations where we might engage in an argu-
ment) repeatedly trigger relevant memories, including emotional memo-
ries, which revive the feeling of shame. This, in turn, is likely to produce 
and enhance anger in the usual way, through the repetition of frustration. 

It is not surprising, then, that “violence is linked to the experience 
of shame and humiliation” (Wilkinson 25), as Wilkinson explains in his 
treatment of the conflicts between evolved human propensities and social 
stratification. Moreover, anger that develops out of shame is often bound 
up with individual self-destruction as well as destruction of the enemy. As 
Tangney explains, there is some clinical research suggesting that “shame 
can motivate . . . a kind of hostile, humiliated fury.” This suggests why, for 
example, suicide bombing is often related to a sense of humiliation, as 
Jessica Stern’s study suggests (see her chapter on “Humiliation”; 32–62). 
Stern is not alone in this view. For example, she cites the work of Mark 
Juergensmeyer, who “sees suicide bombing as a means to ‘dehumiliate’ the 
deeply humiliated and traumatized” (54). (Suicide bombing is also com-
monly bound up with a particular sort of narrative structure—the sacrificial 
prototype—which we will discuss in chapter 5. As I have already noted, 
that prototype is itself bound up with shame—as is clear from the paradigm-
matic sacrificial narrative of the Judeo-Christian tradition, the story of the 
Fall.) It is worth noting that humiliation is also inseparable from a sense, 
not only of frustration, but of impotence. As Frijda points out, “Being, or 
just feeling, reduced to impotence probably is the most important cause of 
violent anger” (296). 

Up to this point, we have been considering out-groups that are, largely, 
outside the nation. We may respond to other nations with fear or anger. Of 
course, we may respond to internal out-groups, internal enemies, in this 
way as well.20 Such internal enemies may be supporters of other nations or 
they may be antinational activists (e.g., advocates of international solidar-
ity among workers). They may also be citizens whose religious, ethnic,

20. A number of analysts, drawing on different theoretical frameworks, have noted the 
importance of differentiating internal from external enemies (see, for example, Wimmer 
218).
linguistic, racial, or other identifications come into conflict with national identification, or simply with the vision of certain nationalists who wish for a religiously, ethnically, linguistically, and racially uniform nation. This returns us to the difference between nationalisms of hierarchization or subordination and nationalisms of alignment.

Anger figures significantly in nationalisms of subordination. Specifically, it is important in the mobilization of national opinion against citizens who do not hierarchize properly, which is to say, citizens who do not place national identity above other identity categories or, worse still, citizens who oppose identity categories generally. Anger may operate in alignment nationalism as well, particularly in those forms of alignment nationalism that focus on elective categories. In these cases, anger is likely to be directed against citizens who do not change group membership appropriately, persisting, for example, in their minority religious affiliation. However, another emotion becomes crucial for alignment nationalisms that stress nonelective categories, such as race. When people are to be expelled or killed—particularly people who have apparently been part of our in-group, perhaps even part of our face-to-face community—we do not want to think of them as agents at all. Anger implies the agency of other persons. While expulsion and extermination may draw on anger, they draw much more readily and much more effectively on the emotion that requires expulsion or extermination—disgust. Martha Nussbaum argues that disgust (along with shame) is crucial to sexism, racism, homophobia, and other forms of discrimination (see Upheavals 205–6, 220–22, 346–50, 448–54). I believe she overgeneralizes the point. Nonetheless, she is absolutely correct to point to disgust as centrally important in facilitating certain forms of social brutality. Disgust is particularly functional in ethnic cleansing, as the term itself (“cleansing”) suggests. Here, the in-group responds to the out-group as something decayed and disease-bearing, to be expelled like sewage, to be exterminated like vermin.

As the preceding point suggests, the obvious technique for producing disgust is to link the out-group with well-established disgust triggers such as excrement, insects, and rodents. This may be done through metaphor, or through literal links, usually in narrative form. For example, I have argued that films such as Nosferatu served, subtly and indirectly, to associate Jews with rats and plague (see “Narrative Universals, Nationalism”). Similarly, Sander Gilman has pointed out that anti-Semitic propaganda linked Jews with syphilis, as well as other forms of physical and mental disease (96). There are more practical techniques as well. Nussbaum explains that “Nazis made Jews do things that would . . . associate them with the disgusting.
They were made to scrub latrines... They were deprived of access to toilet facilities so that they had to squat in the open” (348). This functioned to link Jews more thoroughly with disgust reactions on the part of guards and thus facilitated the execution of Jews.

Of course, the use of disgust is not confined to internal enemies in alignment nationalism. In fact, in-groups commonly claim that out-groups are smelly and unclean. However, this aspect of the relation to out-groups is given intensive development only in cases where the systematic killing of the out-group is a nationalist goal, and where members of that out-group are readily experienced empathically (e.g., through face-to-face interaction). That occurs most commonly in the case of an internal enemy.

Finally, as I have already suggested, prototypes and exempla operate here in much the same way that they do in the case of trust. Our prototypes of out-group members, readily formed through news, film, fiction, and so forth, very easily come to incorporate fear, anger, and disgust triggers. The point is even more obvious for exempla, where real or fictional instances may be socially emphasized in such a way as to produce widespread effects on in-group responses to the out-group. One need only think of the emotional function of Saddam Hussein or Osama bin Laden in the United States. Generalization of such instances to the out-group as a whole is facilitated by the fact that we view out-groups as “less complex, less variable, and less individuated” (Duckitt 81). Thus, we tend to view individual out-group members as representative of the out-group generally. Even when we self-consciously deny this generalization, our intellectual judgments and emotional responses commonly manifest it.

**In-Group Hierarchy**

Like any other aspect of national identity (or anything else), an in-group hierarchy is operative only insofar as it inspires relevant emotions. The relevant emotions are straightforward. The most obvious is a form of fear.21 In a nation, the in-group hierarchy is inseparable from coercive force. Indeed, the state—the centerpiece of this hierarchy—commonly asserts a monopoly over certain sorts of violence, particularly the ability to take away human life. For citizens to respect this authority, they must feel a type

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21. A number of analysts, working in different descriptive and explanatory contexts, have noted that fear is important not only for fostering antagonism toward out-groups, but also for maintaining and extending internal hierarchies (see, for example, Robin 18–20). For a fuller discussion of fear and recent U.S. policy aims since September 11, 2001, see Kateb 60–92.
of fear. However, this is not, typically, the same sort of fear that citizens feel for the out-group. Specifically, fear of the out-group is a fear of generalized hostility. It is based on a lack of trust. Insofar as fear of a national state serves national identification, it must be based on trust. In other words, it must involve a sense that the hierarchy exercises violence in both predictable and reasonable ways. If I violate the national order (e.g., in breaching property guarantees or in harming fellow citizens), then I can expect punishment, because I am guilty and deserve it. However, if I do not violate the national order, I can trust that I will not suffer deprivation or harm from the state. In contrast, the point of out-group violence is that its victims (i.e., its victims in the in-group) are innocent. The techniques for cultivating this positive or trusting fear with respect to the national hierarchy are obvious. They include, for example, the entire judicial system. They also include a wide range of narratives (e.g., on television programs), many of which treat that system.

What I just referred to as our “trusting fear” of the national hierarchy is, in fact, a feeling of trust that is inflected by fear in particular conditions. Trust is the crucial, fundamental emotional attitude required for commitment to a national hierarchy. Specifically, we are motivated to accept national hierarchies as the legitimate hierarchies of our in-groups insofar as we feel that they protect us (i.e., that they protect the national in-group). This is why the power of the national hierarchy tends to increase as we feel a greater threat from national out-groups. Insofar as our need for protection is greater, our attachment to protectors will be greater as well. Exempla are

22. Obviously, different forms of fear may be highly functional in a given society, strongly supporting internal hierarchization. My concern here is only with the forms of fear that contribute to national identification. For a broader treatment of the operation of fear in society, specifically the United States, see the second part of Robin’s book. Robin also considers such issues as the effects produced by theorizations of fear and the ways in which fear may be used as a pretext—important issues that are beyond the scope of this discussion.

23. It is important to distinguish “reasonable” from “rational” here. There are certainly cases when violence is predictable, and even rational (given the aims of the perpetrators), but not what we would consider “reasonable” in the sense of a generally acceptable way of running a nation (for a discussion of this point, see Robin 208–10). I take it that only predictable and reasonable forms of state violence cultivate trust, thus fostering national loyalty, rather than some sort of panicked conformity.

24. Crime investigations and courtroom dramas range from protoforms in Oedipus the King and The Eumenides through CSI and Law and Order and include such non-Euro-American works as The Injustice Done to Tou Ngo (an important Chinese drama from the Yüan dynasty). Dramas of this sort may show that there are some problems with the justice system. But, on the whole, they suggest that the system and the people in it are fair, thus trustworthy, and that investigators are smart and thorough, thus posing a serious threat to potential criminals.
particularly consequential here. Our trust and attachment focus naturally on individuals. Moreover, these feelings are particularly inspired by singular incidents of protection. Stories of national heroes serve this function in obvious ways. By the same token, stories of betrayal inspire distrust. In the 2004 election, supporters of John Kerry sought to portray his war record in such a way as to inspire just the sort of trust and attachment that benefit hierarchical order. In contrast, his antagonists portrayed his war record and postwar activities as one of betrayal. It is unsurprising that the antagonists were more successful.\textsuperscript{25} Again, our spontaneous tendency for all other people appears to be one of distrust. More important, the stakes are fairly high when it comes to trust. It makes sense in evolutionary terms that we would not be inclined to trust someone with our safety after that person has shown any signs of betrayal. We speak of “breaking” trust precisely because the emotion of trust is fragile. The overall result is that most Americans’ emotional response to Kerry was likely to be more influenced by the accusations than by the praise. The case for trust must, in general, be overwhelmingly stronger than the case for distrust if it is going to foster a feeling of trust in us.

As the last points indicate, if the state fails in our protection—or even shows signs that it might fail—there is a good chance that we will reject the state hierarchy. Indeed, the occurrence of revolutions during or just after war (as in Russia and Germany) suggests just this sort of rejection. On the other hand, the precise opposite can occur as well. If there is a sharp gradient from fear of the enemy to domination over the enemy, and if the domination over the enemy is thorough, attachment to national hierarchy may be enhanced to the point of becoming almost religious. Specifically, the spectacular defeat of an enemy produces awe—roughly, joyous relief combined with intense admiration of the power of the state, trusting fear, and even a sense of aesthetic wonder. I take awe to be the ideal feeling for fostering devotion to in-group hierarchy, and for sustaining or extending the authority of that hierarchy.

Awe is commonly fostered by narrative—in news, history, fiction. However, it may also be fostered by other means. Parades of military equipment

\textsuperscript{25} See, for example, Langer on changes in voters’ views of Kerry during the relevant period. Questions about Kerry’s war record did not elicit a predominantly negative response. However, there was a significant decline in many people’s judgments of character attributes bearing on trust (e.g., honesty) during this time. This suggests that the attacks (among other factors) were having effects, even if people were not fully, self-consciously convinced of their accuracy. This is just what one would expect. To lose trust, one need not have an actual conviction in the other person’s bad character; one only has to have doubts about his or her good character.
and soldiers, the testing of nuclear weapons, and displays of might outside of war provide examples. But, of course, the primary instances of direct cultivation of awe come in war. The most obvious example is Nazi Germany, particularly during the period of early military success. But there are countless other cases as well. For instance, in the “Shock and Awe” campaign of bombing Baghdad, the U.S. government sought not only to demoralize the Iraqis, convincing them that resistance is futile. The government also sought, through images and descriptions of the bombing, to make Americans feel awe. That sense of awe was important not only for the war in Iraq. It was one part of the U.S. government’s response to the Vietnam Syndrome. It served to help overcome the partial American aversion to making war. Awe inspires a sense of national omnipotence that tends to weaken our inhibitions resulting from a rational fear of violent conflict. When we feel awe for the state, we not only feel that it can protect us within our borders. We feel that it can protect us anywhere at any time. Awe, then, is a particularly powerful emotion for fostering and sustaining aggressive, militant nationalism.

God and the Nation

The preceding reference to awe almost necessarily leads us to the issue of just how nationalism relates to religion. To a great extent, nationalism tries to take over religion, in effect substituting for religion. Indeed, one of the most powerful techniques for enhancing nationalist affectivity involves the incorporation of religious ideas, beliefs, and attitudes into nationalism. Perhaps the most surprising incorporation of this sort concerns the land, which is commonly sanctified and linked directly with God. For example, the Gikuyu of Kenya hold the “belief that the land has been given them, through Gikuyu and Mumbi [the founding ancestors], by God” (Sicherman 41). The Indian nationalist leader Subhash Bose wrote that India was “the holy land” with “sacred rivers” and “sacred cities” (quoted in Daniel 55). The idea recurs in Indian subnationalism also, as in the claims of Tripuran separatists that Tripura is a “Holy Land” (see Debbarma 183). Mark Williams refers to “the Edenic myth of God’s Own Country” in New Zealand (261). Hobsbawm mentions beliefs in “Holy Russia,” “Holy Tyrol,” and “Holy Ireland” (Nations 49–51).

The connection derives in part from a metaphorical alignment of religion and nation. Just as religions commonly have holy sites, the nation itself becomes a holy site in its entirety. Indeed, as a number of writers
have pointed out, national tours have one precursor in religious pilgrimages. However, there is another source for this connection as well. It is in the intensification, indeed absolutization, of the evaluative—and oppositional—quality of in-group/out-group division. In the case of nationalism, this intensification divinizes the land. But it does not stop with the land. It extends to the national hierarchy and, beyond even that, the in-group generally. Thus, the national hierarchy is sanctioned by God. Indeed, it culminates in God. Moreover, the national in-group is itself divinely chosen, in opposition to national out-groups (which, in consequence, may be demonized). In this way, nationalism does not have to be aligned with religion, even metaphorically. It becomes a sort of religion.

The relation of divinization to internal authority is perhaps the most obvious case, at least in feudal nations. The idea of the Divine Right of Kings is familiar to anyone who took some English history in high school (for an overview of the idea, see chapter 10 of Nicolson). Cannadine explains that the Archbishop of Canterbury felt that “Britain was close to the Kingdom of Heaven on Coronation Day” (154). Cohn discusses the idea of “heaven-blessed British rulers” in colonial India (194). Ranger treats colonial Africa and the representation of the British king as “almost divine” (230). Similar complexes of ideas recur across the globe. Greenfeld notes the belief in “the Divine election of the French king” (94). Peter I of Russia understood his kingdom as “lands subjected by God Almighty to our Government” (Greenfeld 194). The Shah of Iran ruled by grace of God, as shown by the “divine farr” or radiance bestowed by God (see, for example, Ferdowsi 7, 9, 15, and 17). The emperors of China held their authority through the Mandate of Heaven. The Turkish Book of Dede Korkut tells us that “Emperors are the shadow of God. None who rebels against his emperor prospers” (153). Nicolson cites examples extending back five-thousand years. “As early as 3000 BC,” he writes, “the Sumerian city kings asserted their claim to have been begotten by gods and born of goddesses” (28). He goes on to cite Babylonian (31), Incan (31), Egyptian (31), Roman (32–34), Japanese (34–40), and Chinese (41–46) examples. Other clear cases include the Holy Roman Empire and the Caliphate (a Khalīfah being a successor to the Prophet Muhammad, whose own political authority was clearly inseparable from his claim of receiving divine revelation and being set on a divine mission of witnessing for that revelation).

The point extends, usually in more subtle ways, to nationalist leaders in the modern period. For example, Wachtel cites a statement by the nineteenth-century nationalist epicist, Petar Njegoš, speaking to the Croatian leader Ban Jela: “Everyone who loves our nation . . . stretches out their
hands to you as to a heaven-sent Messiah” (103). Of course, Njegoš probably intended his statement metaphorically. In this respect, he was incorporating religion rhetorically, not substantively. But that does not mean all modern cases are similarly metaphorical. For example, George W. Bush repeatedly cites the Lord when discussing U.S. policies, indicating, for example, that “God is not neutral” in the War on Terrorism (“Address”; we will consider further indications of divine preference, drawn from “President’s Remarks,” in chapter 5). This indirectly suggests the political hierarchy instituting that war has divine authority. Certain Christian nationalist groups believe that “Christians have a God-given right to rule” (Goldberg 13).

Again, the cultivation of popular adherence to national hierarchy is commonly bound up with the cultivation of awe. That cultivation of awe is obviously facilitated by linking our response to the hierarchy with religious devotion. The relation between divinizing national hierarchy and cultivating trust and fear is self-evident. God is, in many ways, little more than the imagination of an ideal in this area, a paradigmatic object of awe. God protects us against our greatest enemies. In doing so, God is perfectly benevolent and omnipotent. At the same time, God punishes our transgressions—in a perfectly reasonable and predictable manner. Associating the state with God fosters the same feeling of awe toward the state.

The divinization of the nation as a whole is no less widespread than the divinization of national hierarchy. Instances are ubiquitous. For example, some Welsh nationalists believed in “a special relationship between Welsh and the Deity” (Glanmor Williams 126), even suggesting that Welsh was the “The Language of Heaven,” an idea “still heard to this day” (Morgan 74). Arendt explains that pan-Slavic activists claimed they represented “the true divine people of modern times” (233). Wachtel writes that Serbian nationalists viewed the Serbs “as a people of God” (35), “a special people, chosen by God” (203). Arendt also notes that “Austrian Pan-Germans laid . . . claims to divine chosenness.” Hitler said, “God the Almighty has made our nation. We are defending His work by defending its very existence” (Arendt 233). Kevin Foster explains that the military chaplain for the Argentinian troops in the Malvinas/Falkland Islands war “celebrated the recovery of the islands as a triumph of Catholic nationalism, proof that the nation’s cause was just and that those who served it were assured of special protection” (124). A bizarre extension of this idea is reported by Greenfeld. “In 1559,” she writes, “the future Bishop of London John Aylmer took up Latimer’s astonishing claim that God had nationality,” declaring that “God is English” (60).
Kohn has maintained that modern nationalism took “the idea of a chosen people” from the Old Testament (Brennan 59). It is no doubt true that modern European (and, of course, Israeli) nationalists were influenced by the biblical precedent. The foregoing cases suggest this already. Other instances are even more straightforward. For example, Trumpener discusses the self-conscious development of a Welsh/Jewish parallel along these lines (2–4). Greenfeld presents numerous examples. She cites the claim in John Foxe’s *Book of Martyrs* that “the English people was chosen, separated from others and distinguished by God.” She states that this was not some marginal and idiosyncratic work. Rather, “The status of Foxe’s book, the influence it was allowed to exert on the minds of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Englishmen, was far above that of any other work of the age, and comparable only to that of the Bible” (61). Unsurprisingly, the enemies of the English, the French, had the same view of themselves. “In the literature of the crusades,” she tells us, “the Franks . . . are represented as . . . ‘chosen by God’” (93). Even “The Papacy recognized that ‘God chose the kingdom of France among all other peoples’” (94).26

On the other hand, the notion of Jews as the chosen people is itself merely one specification of a cross-cultural belief that one’s in-group is favored by God. For example, a few years ago, the Japanese Prime Minister said that “Japan is a divine nation with the emperor at its core, and we want the people to recognize this” (French A3). Showing the same idea, but, so to speak, from the other side, one of the Dinka poems collected by Deng ties the group’s military defeat to the loss of divine favor (205).

As the Dinka example suggests, the divinization of the in-group is developed most consistently and most powerfully in heroic plots. Heroic plots treat war, and the most consequential and salient way that God shows His preference for our nation is in battle. In keeping with this, the place of divine election in war is straightforward in much nationalist writing. A well-known literary example may be found in King Henry V’s characterization of the English victory over the French in Shakespeare’s play. Henry gratefully addresses the Supreme Being with the acknowledgment, “God, thy arm was here” (IV.viii.100). He then addresses those around, asserting that “God fought for us” (IV.viii.114). Indeed, he goes so far as to proclaim that, if anyone refuses to accept that God is responsible for the victory, that person will be put to death (IV.viii.108–10).27 The idea was by no

26. For a recent, extensive discussion of national “chosenness,” see Roshwald 167–252.
27. It is worth noting that such an attitude is widely considered humble, because the speaker does not assert the group’s strategic or martial superiority. However, it is anything but humble, for it affirms a far more important and consequential superiority, a spiritual
means confined to fiction. Greenfeld points out that the English, French, and Germans all thought that God aided them in war. For example, Aylmer claimed of England that “God and his angels fought on her side against her foreign foes” (Greenfeld 60). German nationalists contended that “the triumph of Germany was willed by God” (363). John Milton stressed that the victories of Cromwell proved divine election had fallen with the English (see the “Apology for Smectymnuus,” *Works* 3: 340). The general pattern recurs outside Europe (and Dinka poetry) as well. In *The Book of Dede Korkut*, one of the heroes is explicitly aided by an angel of God (160). The great Ainu heroes regularly have divine ancestry. In the Indian *Rāmāyana*, the central text of modern Hindu nationalism, the paradigmatic hero Rāma was himself an incarnation of God.

Unsurprisingly, this divinization of the in-group is commonly paralleled by a demonization of the out-group. Arendt quotes a pan-Slavicist who maintained that, “The German monsters are not only our foes, but God’s foes” (233). Greenfeld explains that, at a certain time, French nationalism was inseparable from a “violent and irrational Anglophobia,” according to which, the English were “the eternal enemies of our nation” and England was the “artisan of the ills of the world.” As a result, “The mission of France was to rid the world of this monster” (183). German nationalists sometimes viewed France similarly. For example, one German nationalist asserted, “I hate all Frenchmen without distinction in the name of God and of my people, I teach this hatred to my son, I teach it to the sons of my people . . . I shall work all my life that the contempt and hatred for this people strike the deepest roots in German hearts and that the German men understand who they are and whom they confront” (376). Milton asserted that the Irish are a “godless” group “cursed and set apart for destruction” (*Works* 5: 190). Moving outside Europe, we find that the enemy of Rāma in the *Rāmāyana*—an enemy that commonly serves as a model for Indian national enemies even today (see, for example, Narayan xii)—is literally a demon. The enemies of Iran in the *Shāh-nāma* are often associated with devils. For example, the first threat to the Shahs is the Black Demon (Ferdowsi 6). More significantly, the first Arab ruler of Iran is a collaborator of Iblis (Satan) and is referred to as Ahriman, “the Maker of Evil” in Zoroastrianism (Ferdowsi 20). The Ainu national hero, Aeoina-kamui, battles for many years against Big Demon.  

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28. Aeoina-kamui is relevant to our concerns in several ways. His authority is underwritten by the fact that his father is a god. Moreover, his mother is the Ainu land itself (see Philippi 204).
their traditional enemies are directly characterized as “demons” (Philippi 369; see 369n.7) and one of this group’s great warriors is referred to as an “evil monster” or an “evil human demon” (Philippi 378, 378n.21; see also 378n.20). The heroes of *The Book of Dede Korkut* must struggle against infidels. The enemy must not only be defeated. Their churches must be destroyed, their priests killed (see 87, 139, 181), and they themselves must be slaughtered in impressive numbers (see 57 and 105). These acts suggest that the enemies are not merely the partially correct Christians, who are tolerated in orthodox Islam. Rather, they are “enemies of religion” (43), as one story puts it.

I take it that the practical consequences of all this are too obvious to require spelling out.

In this chapter, I hope to have shown that techniques of nationalization—techniques that serve to make national categories supersede other identity categories—pervade our ordinary lives and our experience of extraordinary events. In doing so, they constantly affect the key parameters of categorial identification. They systematically enhance the salience, (perceived) functionality, opposability, and (perceived) durability of the nation. Simultaneously, they develop and intensify national pride, attachment to the nation as a physical place, awe before the national hierarchy, fear or anger toward national enemies, and other forms of national affectivity. Moreover, all these effects are commonly enhanced by associations with religion or even the implicit development of a sort of religion of nationalism. Given this, it should be much less surprising that people are so inclined to accept and act on national identity categories, even when those categories come into conflict with non-national (e.g., racial or religious) identities.