Introduction

1. I borrow the distinction between “The Two Modernities” from Matei Calinescu’s classic study, *Five Faces of Modernity*, pp. 41–46.

Chapter 1

1. In his 1934 essay “What Is Baroque?,” Erwin Panofsky makes a strong case for the Carracci being at the center of a late-sixteenth-century movement toward synthesis, though by this time the negative term “eclectic” is simply omitted. Annibale Carracci, he writes, “began with a deliberate effort to synthesize the plastic values of classical antiquity and classical High Renaissance art with such purely pictorial tendencies as had survived the manneristic intermezzo, namely the Venetian colorism and the Correggesque ‘sfumato’” (38). Furthermore, Panofsky affirms the role of the Bolognese school as artistic reformers who wished to restore the “good old traditions” (36).

2. In the 1959 foreword to his 1924 book *Idea: A Concept in Art Theory*, Erwin Panofsky qualifies the original priority he gave to Bellori’s 1672 “classicistic interpretation” of art and traces the concepts of the *Idea del pittore, dello schultore, e dell’ architetto* back to Giovanni Battista Agucchi, whose manuscript papers clearly show that ideas about the Carracci’s resolution of the conflict between “unnatural” Mannerism and “raw” Naturalism were already in circulation between 1607 and 1615 (vii). Despite this revision of Panofsky’s original genealogy, his contribution to the history of *Idea* is still valuable. It is particularly interesting how he distinguishes the Mannerists’ Neopla-
tonic understanding of Idea from that of the Carracci (and Agucchi/Bellori). Neither the Mannerists nor the Naturalists were on the right path. If Idea has a metaphysical origin, then the artist can ignore sensory reality. Bellori argued that Idea originates from sensory perception, and comes into being through the selection of natural beauties, especially from art: “The infallible measure of this juste milieu was obviously the art of antiquity, which was honored not as a ‘naturalistic’ art but—precisely because of its limitation to a ‘purified’ or ‘ennobled’ reality—as a truly ‘natural’ art” (Panofsky, Idea, 105). Thus classical art theory is born from an eclectic process, of which the Carracci may be considered the originators.

3. According to Mahon, “eclectic” designates neither a period in the history of art nor a recognizable visual style, and cannot be recovered as a value-free critical term, since it “is unable to divest itself of its inherent qualitative connotation (which entails the confusing injection of aesthetic judgment into the argument): because of its obvious etymological origin and subsequent history it does not lend itself, as Gothic and Baroque have done, to gradual metamorphosis into qualitative neutrality” (228).

4. Commentators on the Carracci experienced some semantic difficulty after Mahon banned the use of “eclectic.” Donald Posner, in his two-volume monograph, concedes Mahon’s point: since “Annibale’s analytical and selective stylistic experiments were mainly confined to the period before 1600, [ . . . ] the attempt of later critics to see the whole of Annibale’s Roman art as broadly and programmatically ‘eclectic’ was an unjustified exaggeration” (116). Posner concedes this point only to disagree with Mahon at the back door: “to suggest that Annibale’s art was in any way naïvely formed in a simple response to new influences would be equally unjustified. Annibale’s analytical deliberation in creating his style—his selection of Raphael as his main source, his investigation of Correggio within the context of his new style, his introduction of elements from Michelangelo and the Antique, the preservation of pictorial qualities from his Bolognese style—made him the first critically retrospective artist in the history of art and an example for artists and theorists for the next three centuries” (118). In 1977 Charles Dempsey acknowledges that Denis Mahon played a vital role in making a critical re-evaluation of the Carracci possible, that he had effected “a revolution in taste” (1). But he goes on to write of Annibale’s confrontation with the “central intellectual issue which faced all artists of his time—the bringing together of Theory and Practice, both in the painting of his own pictures and in the training of young artists” (3). Like Posner, Dempsey credits the Carracci with “uniting Tuscan disegno and Lombard colore through mastering the theoretical basis of both in natural observation and analysis”; he adds, “in doing so [they] rose above the mere eclecticism of combining the natural perfections already expressed in the various manners of others” (43). In 1988 another Carracci historian, Carl Goldstein, feels obliged to come to terms with Mahon’s and Dempsey’s diametrically opposed readings of the Carracci, and produces a book chiefly concerned with reexamining the relationship between theory and practice, with a special emphasis on contemporary understandings of the theory and history of painting. He describes the Carracci (without using the word eclectic) “as thoughtful artists who consciously chose from among the artistic options available to them, developing a particular aesthetic stance and pictorial styles as a result of their assessment of past and recent art,” but whose achievements were misrepresented by well-meaning literati (Visual Fact 6). Margaretha Rossholm Lagerlöf, in her study of classical landscape painting, agrees with Mahon “that the wording employed by the theorists has simplified or concealed important aspects of these paintings”; but she goes on to admit, “It cannot be
denied, however, that the Carracci school won the high regard of the classicists, of the advocates of selection according to the principles of beauty together with subjects and a style derived from the repertoire of antiquity, and a mode of expression resembling that of Raphael” (42). This prompts Lagerlöf to ask, “What was it in the Carracci paintings that could satisfy this type of taste and yet be regarded as innovative, a conquest of new artistic territory?,” to which I would answer: a successful eclectic synthesis of their study of past art and of nature.

5. Despite Dempsey’s appreciation for Mahon’s contribution to the study of Baroque painting, he strongly disagrees with Mahon’s attempt to throw out the theoretical interpretation with “the bathwater of eclecticism” (54). In defending the Carracci against critics who underrated the Carracci by subscribing to a critical notion of eclecticism, Mahon ignored the very reliable historical sources such as Agucchi who testified to the Carracci’s effort to reform painting through imitation of various masters (56).

6. The original Italian text is given by Denis Mahon in his discussion of its correct attribution:

Sonetto in lode di Nicolò Bolognese.
Chi farsi vn bon pittor cerca, e desia
   Il disegno di Roma habbia alla mano,
   La moss, coll’ombrar Veneziano,
   E il degno colorir di Lombardia.
Di Michel’Angiol la teribil via,
   Il vero natural di Tiziano,
Del Coreggio lo stil puro, e sourano,
   E di vn Rafel la giusta simetria.
Del Tibaldi il decoro, e il fondamento,
   Del dotto Primaticcio l’inuentare,
   E vn pò di gratia del Parmigianino.
Ma senza tanti studi, e tanto stento,
   Si ponga solo l’opre ad imitare,
   Che qui lascioci il nostro Nicolino. (208)

7. Mahon believes that Malvasia is responsible for these verses, whether they were actually written by a mourner at Abate’s funeral or invented later for his Felsina Pittrice (1678).

8. Fuseli’s early argument against eclecticism resonates well into the nineteenth century. In “The Nature of Gothic” John Ruskin will value “imperfection” in art over mechanistic perfection and launch the entire reformation of nineteenth-century arts and crafts.

9. It would be intriguing to interpret Blanc’s assessment of the Carracci in light of a recent study of Blanc’s own eclecticism by Misook Song. She claims that “Blanc’s eclecticism, although it appears strongly hybrid in nature, can be reduced to his purist belief in the all-embracing universal notion of ‘eternal geometry’ whose pedigree ultimately goes back to Plato” (105). The line Song traces from Blanc back to Plato would certainly have to include the Neoplatonists of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries who propagated many of the theories the Carracci found so congenial.

10. In his comprehensive study Teaching Art, Carl Goldstein affirms that “The visual evidence [. . .] shows that the Carracci did indeed mine the works of the masters of the Renaissance, regarding such works as sources of images at least equal to nature, which
Notes to Chapter 1

is to say that their practice was demonstrably ‘eclectic,’ and eclecticism is a doctrine residing in the innermost sanctum of the academic tradition” (36). However, Goldstein believes that Carracci eclecticism was based on the Renaissance notion of “imitation” and that their practice involved a higher degree of improvisation than such an institutionalized system might allow. Assuredly, Goldstein says, they were not systematically eclectic in their teaching. But he admits “That later academies may have been influenced by reports of Carracci ‘eclecticism’” (36).

11. Academic prestige might have fallen off in the first half of the nineteenth century, but the academies remained for artists the primary route to public success. Thus, I do not wish to overemphasize the importance of Romanticism, since Carl Goldstein, in his comprehensive study Teaching Art, has shown that the two revolutions of the late eighteenth century, the political and the cultural, did not substantially affect teaching methods in the academies (58–61). More substantial reforms, described by Albert Boime in “The Teaching Reforms of 1863 and the Origins of Modernism in France,” would come later, but even these, Goldstein argues, were primarily “external” (having to do with admissions and the awarding of prizes and with overcoming the prejudice against craft) (61); that is, the academic teaching methods based on eclecticism remained.

12. While the academic tradition might have originated in Italy and reached its pinnacle of prestige and organization in France, Goldstein points out that nowhere “did doctrine take so strong a hold or play so central a role as it did in the Royal Academy officially established in London in 1768” (Teaching Art 54). Founded to establish an academy of design and to hold annual exhibitions, it incorporated the best of the Italian and French academies. He also notes that Reynolds’s series of Discourses would largely be supported by his successors, which “testifies to a consensus in the Royal Academy, as though the members had entered into a pact as to the means and ends of visual art” (58).

13. Albert Boime’s Thomas Couture and the Eclectic Vision is by far the most comprehensive account of eclecticism in painting. He provides not only a history of its sources in the philosophy of Cousin and his contemporaries, but also a detailed study of the art and teaching of Thomas Couture—the genesis of his eclectic style, his search for “the juste milieu expression,” and “the iconography of the juste milieu.” Couture and other eclectic artists wanted to mediate between the “extremes of romanticism and classicism in the fine arts” (29). Boime points out that even those artists whom we consider most “Romantic” were deeply affected by Cousin’s teachings. Eugène Delacroix believed that eclecticism had its source in national identity: “One might say that eclecticism is, par excellence, the French banner for the arts of drawing and music. In their art, the Germans and the Italians have marked qualities some of which are often antipathetic to others: the French seem to have striven since time immemorial to reconcile these extremes by attenuating whatever seemed to be disharmonious therein” (qtd. in Boime 29). As Boime points out, it is not contradictory to associate romanticism with eclecticism. Both represented the aspirations of the middle classes; both wished to expand political and cultural frontiers; and both “emphasized the individual’s consciousness as the ultimate test of experience” (30). Boime’s work on eclecticism effectively reminds us of how dominant it was as a way of thinking in all artistic and cultural movements of the nineteenth century.

Patricia Mainardi is another critic whose work attends to the intersections between high art and popular culture. In her 1987 book Art and Politics of the Second Empire: The Universal Expositions of 1855 and 1867, Mainardi explores the impact of
eclectic theory on academic painting and international exhibitions. The 1855 Exposition Universelle des Beaux-Arts allowed ordinary French people to see art from around the world for the first time, to compare the art of different countries, and to “form their own opinions” (66). Actually, Mainardi argues, the critic became more important than ever in helping the visitor to understand the dizzying range of works of art. In accordance with the “government dictum of eclecticism,” artists representing twenty-eight countries were honored at the exhibit. Eclecticism thus attempted “to find a structure, a theory, which could encompass in coherent fashion the varied art” on display (69). The second mandate of eclecticism, that of “combining the qualities of different schools into a harmonious ensemble,” was admirably fulfilled by the French artists themselves for whom eclecticism became a national aesthetic. Even an art critic such as Théophile Gautier was satisfied with this formulation, proposing that English art represented the idea of individuality, Belgian art the idea of facility, German art the idea of intellect, and French art the idea of eclecticism (70).

14. For Reynolds the prestige of poetry derived from its independence of the accidents of nature. In “Ut Poesis Pictura: Reynolds on Imitation and Imagination,” Harvey D. Goldstein asserts that Reynolds consistently opposes the two arts, because poetry “applies itself directly to the imagination ‘without the intervention of any kind of imitation.’ The ‘poetry of painting’ locates, for him, the imaginative effect of the art divorced from the subject which is that art’s language” (227). Nevertheless, Goldstein concedes, the painter must follow the ways belonging to art—the “study of authentic models of excellence”—to learn how an object strikes the imagination (227).

15. Despite Ruskin’s powerful critique of the academic method Reynolds advocated, there is strong evidence to suggest that Reynolds ultimately won the war. Prominent academicians of the later nineteenth century, such as John Everett Millais, Lord Leighton, G. F. Watts, and Sir Lawrence Alma-Tadema, not only were trained using traditional academic methods but also led the revival of typical academic subjects (history and mythology) and lent them a new post-Romantic prestige. Ample proof of the eclecticism of later-nineteenth-century art can be found in Andrew Bolton Marvick’s 1994 dissertation, “The Art of John William Waterhouse: Eclecticism in Late Nineteenth-Century British Painting.” In his conclusion, Marvick affirms the notion on which this study is based, namely that Waterhouse’s “eclectic program [. . .] suggests the possible existence of parallel examples of eclecticism in the art of Waterhouse’s era and social milieu” (abstract). Marvick arrives at this conclusion after a careful examination of “[t]hree predominant historical situations [. . .]: first, that an environment suitable for the emergence of a consistent eclectic—as it were, a consistently inconsistent—figurative art within the Royal Academy existed at the time of Waterhouse’s studentship; second, that Waterhouse responded, with an extraordinary degree of variety, to that stimulus to create any number of eclectic inventions while maintaining his links with the Academy; third, that his work was, in more or less degree, recognized by his contemporaries as primarily an eclectic art, an art of style” (270). Marvick’s study of Waterhouse thus lends support to my claim that academic eclecticism dominated nineteenth-century art.

16. In what follows, I affirm the importance of Scott’s literary example to the touristic pursuit of history and argue that Scott contributed to the growth of an eclectic-historical outlook in architecture. Scott’s place in the genealogy of eclecticism is more complex and far-reaching. Most notably, Scott’s reception in France by Stendhal, Balzac, and Hippolyte Taine is significant in light of the fact that they were all influenced by the arch-eclectic philosopher Victor Cousin (the subject of chapter 2). Balzac in
particular seems to have recognized Scott’s eclecticism as his genius: “certain rounded and completed beings, certain bifron intellects, embracing all, want lyric and action, drama and ode, believing that perfection requires a sense of the total. This school, which must be named that of literary eclecticism, demands a representation of the world as it is: images and ideas; the idea in the image, or the image in the idea, movement, and reverie. Walter Scott satisfied completely these eclectic natures” (Balzac 127). In this passage, Balzac seems to describe the exemplary form of the novel, a genre which was born, through Cervantes, a hybrid creature. Not surprisingly, he includes himself in the eclectic school, determining that only such an all-embracing vision would be adequate to represent such a complex age.

17. Ruskin was wrong about Scott’s Presbyterianism, at least according to recent biographer John Sutherland. Scott attended Episcopalian services with his mother, and then with his wife, though he read the Scottish prayer book at home. As Sutherland puts it, “Scott seems not to have put much importance on the mere forms of religious devotion” (72). But Ruskin’s broader sense about Scott’s religion is correct—it is not a serious matter with him, and is probably therefore an accurate measure of the writer’s modernity, and his eclecticism.

18. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that Scott was a volitional eclectic. Ian Duncan puts it this way: “Scott composed Ivanhoe out of the quarry of his extensive reading in English literature from the Middle-English romances and old ballads to Shakespeare and the King James Bible” (“Editor’s Notes” 525). The image of a compositional quarry is an apt one for Scott, and could illustrate his writing process from The Lady of the Lake (1810) through to the end of his career. In the “Dedicatory Epistle” that accompanied the first edition of Ivanhoe (1819), Scott makes it clear that he is mixing history and romance, and “intermingling fiction with truth” (17), and, though the completion of Abbotsford is a few years off, he makes a prophetic (and typically self-deprecatory) comparison with trends in architecture: “it is extremely probable that I may have introduced, during the reign of Richard the First, circumstances appropriate to a period either considerably earlier, or a good deal later than that era. It is my comfort, that errors of this kind will escape the general class of readers, and that I may share in the ill-deserved applause of those architects who, in their modern Gothic, do not hesitate to introduce, without rule or method, ornaments proper to different styles and to different periods of the art” (21). The letter is signed by the fictitious Laurence Templeton and is addressed to his friend, the equally fictitious Dr. Dryasdust, suggesting that Scott regarded as silly the preoccupation with antiquarian details of modern Gothic. Scott was an obviously self-conscious practitioner of literary eclecticism, and given the allusion here to contemporary architecture, it is safe to assume that he was equally aware of the mixture of styles employed at Abbotsford.

19. In his study Architecture and Utopia: Design and Capitalist Development, architectural historian Manfredo Tafuri points to awareness of urban eclecticism early in the nineteenth century when he cites this passage from F. Milizia’s Princípi di architettura civile (3rd ed., 1813): “The plan of the city should be distributed in such a way that the magnificence of the whole is subdivided in an infinity of individual beauties, all so different one from the other that the same object is never encountered twice, and moving from one end to the other one finds in each quarter something new, unique, and surprising. Order must reign, but in a kind of confusion . . . and from a multitude of regular parts the whole must give a certain idea of irregularity and chaos, which is so fitting to great cities” (qtd. 21).
20. I have written elsewhere of picturesqueness as the dominant aesthetic of eclecticism, specifically in the design of Bedford Park (see Bolus-Reichert, “Everyday Eclecticism,” 162–96). Established in London in 1875, the early garden suburb of Bedford Park represented the best effort of architects and designers to live up to the ideals of the Aesthetic Movement. In most contemporary accounts, visitors remark on the picturesqueness, variety, and novelty of the Queen Anne architecture, in stark contrast to the drab monotony they would find in the ordinary middle-class housing estate. William Morris visited the suburb in 1879 and soon after began writing of the historical dilemma provoked by the Queen Anne style, which captured the qualities of the picturesque only by eclectic imitation. Morris’s revision of the idea of the picturesque and the writing of his utopia News from Nowhere emerge in dialogue with the aesthetic and communitarian principles of Bedford Park. The picturesque eclecticism of Bedford Park remains as a persuasive image of the road not taken in twentieth-century domestic architecture, a failure of vision more easily explained by Morris’s socialist critique of the picturesque aesthetic.

Chapter 2

1. George Boas’s 1925 history, French Philosophies of the Romantic Period (1964) is still the best account in English. Valuable contemporary histories include Charles Adam’s La Philosophie en France (première moitié du XIXe siècle) (1894) and Félix Ravaission’s La Philosophie en France au XIXe siècle (1868). Paul Bénichou’s Le Temps des prophétes: Doctrines de l’âge romantique (1977) is probably the most influential recent study of the period. During the 1990s there was a spate of studies on Cousin’s legacy in France. Notable among them are Éric Fauquet’s edited collection Victor Cousin: Homo Theologico-Politicus: Philologie, philosophie, histoire littéraire (1996), Jean-Pierre Cotten’s Autour de Victor Cousin: Une politique de la philosophie (1992), and Patrice Vermeren’s Victor Cousin: Le jeu de la philosophie et de l’état (1995). Donald R. Kelley gives the best recent account in English of the varieties of philosophical eclecticism before Cousin in “Eclecticism and the History of Ideas,” pointing out that although eclecticism was neither a school nor a real tradition, it was given new life (and a history) in early modern times (580). The appearance of several books and articles in the Journal of the History of Ideas in recent years seems to indicate that the history of eclecticism is being written once more, lending credence to Martin Mulsow’s claim that “in a ‘multi-option society’ eclecticism is a virtue which is necessary for life” because, like our Enlightenment precursors, “we are faced [. . .] with a breadth of choice before which the making of a considered judgment becomes a farce, for it can lead only to paralysis” (476). Eclectic thinking has once again become a necessity. In his review of German scholar Michael Albrecht’s monumental history of eclecticism, Eklektik. Eine Begriffsgeschichte mit Hinweisen auf die Philosophie- und Wissenschaftsgeschichte (1994), Ulrich Schneider agrees, “eclecticism has lost its traditional bad reputation and seems increasingly attractive to late twentieth-century thought in search of non-dogmatic and nonsystematic forms of philosophizing” (173).

2. Cousin had originally published his early lectures in five volumes as the Cours de l’histoire de la philosophie moderne in 1841. He selected what he considered the key elements of his philosophy and republished the extracts in one volume as Du Vrai, du Beau et du Bien in 1853. They were translated into English the same year as Lectures...
on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good. All citations refer to the 1872 American edition.

3. Cousin does not speculate whether that synthesis had been achieved in Christianity, although some later writers do. For example, Charles Kingsley’s novel Hypatia (1852–53), set in fifth-century Alexandria, deals with exactly the period of transition that Cousin describes, but he sees Christianity as fulfilling and indeed exceeding the promise of Hellenistic eclecticism.

4. Though Cousin does not here give his philosophy the name “spiritualism,” by 1853, when he is writing the preface to Lectures on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, he says “Our true doctrine, our true flag is spiritualism” (9). After decades of attacks on eclecticism, he seems to find safe harbor in spiritualism and gives it a respectable lineage, including Socrates, Plato, the Gospel, Descartes, Royer-Collard, Chateaubriand, and Madame de Staël. He still calls eclecticism “dear to us, for it is in our eyes the light of the history of philosophy,” but now it is an “application of the philosophy which we teach, but it is not its principle” (9).

5. In the best recent account of the “eclectic” interregnum, John Dillon and Anthony Long try to shed the negative judgment that these unaffiliated philosophers were mere “indiscriminate assemblers of other thinkers’ doctrines” (vii).

6. Both Donini and Dillon and Long want to overthrow the long-standing influence of Zeller’s account of eclecticism in Greek philosophy, arguing that his account was reductive and frequently uninformed about the actual contributions of philosophers to whom he attached the negative epithet. Donini canvases the variety of meanings that can be attached to eclecticism in this period, arguing finally for great caution in applying the term at all, which seems to have only limited usefulness. See “The History of the Concept of Eclecticism,” especially pp. 31–33.

7. Donini points out that most of Diderot’s definition is “derived from, or almost translated from, [Jakob] Brucker” (19). Neither Brucker nor Diderot originated the ideas presented in the Encyclopédie, however, as a positive orientation toward eclecticism in philosophy had been building since the late Renaissance (20).

8. Along with Casini and Donini, several other historians of philosophy have detected in Diderot, and the Enlightenment more generally, a powerful strand of eclectic thought. Petr Lom looks at the element of skepticism in Diderot’s thought, which he traces back to ancient skepticism and the Pyrrhonists, arguing that Diderot intentionally rejects the destructiveness of their doubt in favor of the constructiveness of eclecticism: “The eclectic free thinker [. . . ] is to walk side by side with the sceptic, in order to pick up everything that his companion ‘has not reduced to dust by the severity of his inquiries’” (9). Although skepticism was an element of his thought, Diderot believed that “no philosopher [was] mad enough not to discern some element of the truth” (qtd. in Lom 10)—there had to be a point where the doubting stopped. Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann regards eclecticism, with rationalism, as one of the two mainstreams of the German Aufklärung: “They were both optimistic theories, they were both interested in the freedom of mankind; eclecticism in a practical way, rationalism in a theoretical way, a way which had to discover the possibility of freedom” (550).

9. A professor of philosophy and Vico specialist, Joseph Ferrari, launched one of the most serious attacks on Cousin’s teachings in 1849 with Les philosophes salariés. Although he believes eclecticism to be a false philosophy riddled with errors, he does not specifically take issue with Cousin’s appropriation of Vico; rather Ferrari is more concerned to explore the links between the state and its quasi-official philosophy.
10. Sainte-Beuve’s relationship to Cousin was complicated throughout his life by his reliance on the prominent philosopher’s patronage. Literally saving Sainte-Beuve from a poverty that “kept his youth in chains,” Cousin, as Minister of Education, appointed him director of the Mazarine Library in 1840, but the 4,000 francs per annum constituted perhaps a new form of bondage. Sainte-Beuve’s respect for Cousin must have been sorely tested in the 1840s when the philosopher made use of some unpublished material on Pascal and Madame de Longueville that Sainte-Beuve had brought to light. Enraged, he wrote a vicious letter to Cousin berating him for taking the food from his plate, but did not send it, remembering that he still needed a sponsor at the French Academy. Once elected in 1844 Sainte-Beuve no longer had to restrain criticism of his patron. When Villemain and Cousin resigned their government appointments in protest against restrictions that would be imposed by Louis Napoleon, Sainte-Beuve attacked them both publicly. His abuse of the liberals and their cause had the effect of alienating many of his former associates. Proust later contended that Sainte-Beuve’s criticism of Cousin never really hit its mark; to say that the philosopher’s egoism had got in the way revealed nothing of importance. See Harold Nicolson, *Sainte-Beuve* (1957).

11. John Brooks offers an excellent account of the influence of Cousin’s eclectic spiritualism on the development of psychology and sociology in nineteenth-century France. Whereas Brooks convincingly recovers the suppressed history of eclecticism in the “human sciences,” I want to trace the influence of Cousin and a broader eclecticism on the literary history of the period.

12. Taine blames the influence of German philosophy, imported by de Staël and Cousin, for much of the vagueness of eclecticism and for the collapse of philosophical inquiry in nineteenth-century France: “Les horribles substantifs allemands, les mots longs d’une toise, noyèrent la prose nette de d’Alembert et de Voltaire, et il semblait que Berlin émigré fût tombé de tout son poids sur Paris” (298) [“The horrible German substantives, the long words of a measuring apparatus, were embedded in the clear prose of d’Alembert and Voltaire, and it seemed that Berlin had fallen with all its weight on Paris” (my translation).]

13. The art historian Albert Boime has written the most lucid account to date of the tremendous importance Cousin’s eclecticism had for the development of French Romanticism in all its aspects. In his view, all the major writers and artists of the first half of the nineteenth century were affected by Cousin including (in addition to those I discuss) Hugo, Vigny, Sand, Flaubert, and Merimée. See *Thomas Couture and the Eclectic Vision*, pp. 3–22.

14. In *Racine et Shakespeare*, Stendhal credits Cousin with converting the youth of France to Romanticism: “Mais, monsieur, l’immense majorité des jeunes gens de la société a été convertie au romantisme par l’éloquence de M. Cousin . . .” (151). He goes on to say that if Cousin were still permitted to teach (in 1824 he was in exile), he would convert any who remained unconvinced.

15. At the time of his attack on Cousin, Hamilton occupied “an underpaid and undemanding Chair in Civil History” at Edinburgh, having been refused the post of the Chair of Moral Philosophy, which he had desired (Ryan xv). The article on Cousin was Hamilton’s first for the *Edinburgh Review* and made his name in intellectual circles, where he was previously unknown. As Ryan relates, it was “an editor’s nightmare, being late in arrival, much too long, and completely beyond the grasp of most readers of the *Review*. But it was a great success with Cousin himself, and it served notice on the outside world that someone in the British Isles was abreast of European philosophy”
It is the earliest review of Cousin that I have discovered in any British periodical, which accounts for the attention it receives here.

While the reception of Cousin’s writings by the British public was largely negative, and I do tend to focus on those writers who best articulate the opposition to eclecticism, it was not entirely so. J. D. Morell provides a critical defense of Cousin’s career in his review of a five-volume collection of the philosopher’s works in 1851. For example, he answers the charge of pantheism leveled against Cousin: “Indeed pantheism has always been the child of over-wrought speculation, the refuge of the recluse, when worn out with pondering over the mysteries of existence and the insoluble problems of human destiny; while the whole tendency of our author’s eclecticism is to depreciate mere individual speculation, to appeal to the sentiments of mankind at large, and to consider that no philosophical dogma has any authority whatever, until it is shown to be based upon and sustained by the massive foundations of common sense” (227). In conclusion, Morell declares that Cousin had presided over “a remarkable era in the literary history of France” (228). Reviewing the works of Cousin’s biographers in 1890, John Owen agrees with them that Cousin was “the master critic of modern France” (459), talks of “his sturdy mental independence” (487), and believes, in spite of the failure of eclecticism, that “the spirit—the *vis viva*—of Cousin’s work still survives [. . .]. He still remains the greatest philosopher, the most eminent systematizer of philosophical and cultured thought, in the France of the nineteenth century” (487).

Ryan reminds us that in the first half of the nineteenth century, philosophy and psychology had not yet attained their current meanings. “But whereas we now tend to draw a sharp distinction between the empirical inquiry into the mind and its powers which we call psychology, and the non-empirical inquiry into the possibility of knowledge or into the intelligibility of knowledge-claims which we now call philosophy, no such distinction appears in [Mill’s] *Examination*” (ix), and nor did it in Cousin’s *Cours de philosophie* or Hamilton’s review of it.

The phrase is Henry Calderwood’s. In *The Philosophy of the Infinite* (1854), he objected to Hamilton’s proposition that we can have no notion of an Infinite Being and actually sided with Cousin on this issue. Belief, he said, “rises above things of matter” and the mind looks upon a finite world and realizes that its powers are limited. Nonetheless, the mind is conscious of the belief that the Infinite Being exists without limits. He agrees with Kant that our practical reason gives us the knowledge of “God as a necessary postulate for proper moral action.” Calderwood acknowledges that the “balance of truth” is Cousin’s, but he makes it clear “that in upholding the French philosopher, we do so only to a limited extent, and that merely in reference to this individual doctrine, and not in reference to the relation which this doctrine holds in his system. [. . .] We admire the great central truth in the philosophy of M. Cousin, but we regard the various points of Eclecticism, which he has made to cluster around it, as so many outposts, worse than useless, which ought to fall to atoms, and which have so fallen under the effective assaults of the Scottish metaphysician” (14–15). Calderwood differentiates between being conscious of the Infinite (here used as synonymous with Absolute, as in Cousin) and being able to mimic its powers—assuming the position of God. Interestingly, J. S. Mill, in his complete demolition of Hamilton’s philosophy, agreed with Hamilton that we have no direct knowledge of God. Whatever we know of God is by inference only (*Examination* 36). However, he uses Hamilton’s essay on Cousin to assert that “the most unquestionable of all logical maxims, [is] that the meaning of the abstract must be sought for in the concrete, and not conversely” (34).
19. One of the sciences that Lewes saw as having potential for practical application and verifiability was phrenology, also a favorite of Comte’s (see Lewes, *Biographical History of Philosophy* 749–68, and Simon, “Two Cultures” 48).

20. Lewes also tells a hair-raising story about Cousin’s exploitation of Hegel (372–74). It is hard to overlook in Lewes’s vicious critique at least some degree of personal animosity he must have felt over Cousin’s treatment of Comte. The quarrel between the two philosophers was well known at the time. Born only six years apart in the final decade of the eighteenth century, Cousin and Comte yet seemed a generation apart in their professional success and cultural values. When Cousin was already teaching at the Sorbonne and the École Normale, Comte was still a student at the École Polytechnique; fifteen years later Cousin, the “idol of Parisian academic youth,” was appointed to an educational post in the new government, while Comte still held only a minor teaching post and began writing his *Cours de philosophie positive* in total obscurity. Cousin became director of the École Normale, wrote a syllabus for philosophical instruction that was adopted for use throughout the secondary system of the Université, and was the founder of the official philosophy, eclecticism, while Comte still pestered the government to create a Chair for him in the History of Science. When he was refused by Cousin’s friend, Guizot, then Minister of Education, Comte turned against the government and the entire educational establishment (Simon, “Two Cultures” 46).

Chapter 3

1. Coleridge’s career parallels Cousin’s rather remarkably: both men were attracted to eclectic styles of thought; both men wanted to rescue forgotten thinkers; both traveled to Germany and studied philosophy; both espoused a vague spiritualism and both were condemned for pantheism; both were great talkers who seemed unable to fulfill their promise by publishing a magnum opus; both were addicted to reading and quotation and both were accused of plagiarism; both valued poetry as the highest form of expression; both gained numerous, enthusiastic followers; and both were liberals with pragmatic conservative leanings accused of apostasy later in life.

2. Coleridge is drawing upon Leibniz’s *Trois Lettres à M. Remond de Montmort* (1714) and *Éclaircissement de difficultés que M. Bayle a trouvées [. . . ]* as they are quoted and translated in the German of F. H. Jacobi, *Über die Lehre des Spinoza* (1789). Leask points out the appropriateness of this heavily mediated paragraph (French text quoted and translated in German text translated into English and, at the end, back into French), the subject of which is philosophical syncretism (Leask 402). Engell and Bate in their note on the same passage say that it should not be taken as Coleridge’s approval of eclecticism (*Works* 7.1: 245–46).

3. Leask translates Leibniz: “I have found that most [philosophical] sects are right in a good part of what they assert, but not in what they deny” (403).

4. A great number of publications billing themselves “eclectic” appeared in the first half of the nineteenth century as a means of collecting disparate areas of knowledge for easier consumption. The *Eclectic Review* was published in London from 1805 to 1868, but the vast majority of eclectic journals issued from American publishers: the *American Eclectic, or Selections from the Periodical Literature of All Foreign Countries*, and the *Museum of Foreign Literature, Science and Art*, which joined to become the *Eclectic Museum* and the *Eclectic Magazine*, was published in Boston. This journal continued under
various titles through the turn of the century. Also in the United States, a number of eclectic medical publications appeared, including the *Eclectic Medical Journal* out of Cincinnati and the *Eclectic Journal of Medicine* from Philadelphia. Perhaps the best-remembered eclectic publication today is the McGuffey’s series of “Eclectic Readers.”

5. Mill praises the efforts of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge as marking an important first attempt in combination. He imagines that ultimately, “authors, as a collective guild, must be their own patrons and their own booksellers” (106).

6. Perhaps the greatest proof of the link between eclecticism and democracy can be seen in the wider acceptance of Cousin’s teachings in America. Not only did most of the translations into English of Cousin’s works come from American publishers, but Transcendentalism, the most important philosophical system in the United States during the first half of the nineteenth century, was “eclectic in nature” and also “represented a phase of idealistic reaction” as French eclecticism had done. Following a survey of the sixty-six references to French philosophy in American periodicals between 1828 and 1848, Georges Joyaux concludes that “Cousin’s doctrine was widely known in America and generally well received” and that “Much of the interest devoted to Cousin originated in the transcendentalist milieu, [and] most of it paralleled closely the rise and development of transcendentalism” (336–37).

7. Vico’s 1744 *New Science* probably reached England by around 1827 via the French translation of Michelet. Cousin actually encouraged Michelet—who then counted himself among Cousin’s followers—to undertake the translation, no doubt as part of Cousin’s effort to bring to light the greatest works in all fields of knowledge. Vico’s work influenced Michelet’s own historiography, and thus the entire historiographical effort of the later nineteenth century.


9. Similarly, Peacock places Milton between the modern ages of gold and silver, “combining the excellencies of both” (13), and Dryden in the modern Silver Age, with its poetry of civilized life, authority, and the “exquisite and fastidious selection of words” (9).

10. Moving beyond the battle of the Ancients and the Moderns, Dryden praised Milton in much the same terms as the Carracci painters had been praised in the early seventeenth century for their eclectic combinations of the best attributes of their precursors:

Three poets, in three distant ages born,
Greece, Italy, and England did adorn.
The first in loftiness of thought surpassed,
The next in majesty, in both the last:
The force of Nature could no farther go;
To make a third, she joined the former two. (“Epigram on Milton” 1688)

Chapter 4

1. Edgar Finley Shannon, Jr., tracks the early critical reception of *The Princess* in his *Tennyson and the Reviewers: A Study of His Literary Reputation and of the Influence of the Notes to Chapter 4*
Critics upon His Poetry, 1827–1851 (1952). In his chapter on The Princess, Shannon is at pains to debunk the notion that early reviewers misunderstood the genius of the poem and that only later critics read it rightly. On the contrary, he shows that the early reviews were generally positive and that by 1851, when The Princess reached its fourth edition, critical opinion had reached another high point. During these four years, however, negative reviews appeared with regularity, prompting Tennyson to make many changes to his work, primarily in the interest of improving the unity of the whole (Shannon 97–140).

2. Christopher Ricks downplays the significance of the Cambridge Apostles in shaping Tennyson’s worldview, noting that “Tennyson’s participation in the group was to be generally torpid—so torpid as to lead to his formal resignation when he failed to deliver his paper on ‘Ghosts’” (29). But as Ricks acknowledges, most of Tennyson’s close friends, including Arthur Henry Hallam, were also Apostles.

3. In a brief survey of four “Cambridge poems”—the prize-winning “Timbuctoo,” “A Character,” “Lines on Cambridge of 1830,” and “The Palace of Art”—John Coyle and Richard Cronin characterize Tennyson’s engagement with the Apostles as part of a sustained effort to chart a poetic territory in which he can write about his age, but remain detached from it. They have suggested that “it was the point of transition that held Tennyson’s poetic interest,” that he was “fascinated by the process of waking” (114).

4. In the Memoir Tennyson’s notes on The Princess record that “the ‘Tale from mouth to mouth’ was a game which I have more than once played when I was at Trinity College, Cambridge, with my brother undergraduates” (Memoir I:253). Nonetheless, this “game” of storytelling has much in common with debating, as each orator must be careful to take up points made by the previous speaker in order to advance his own interpretation of the material.

5. In her recent Victorian Poetry article, Alisa Clapp-Itnyre argues that the interpolated songs are genuinely providing counterpoint, or antithesis, to the main verse-narrative: “they tell the story that Ida might have told if the women had controlled her story: a more realistic portrait of Victorian women’s social roles and creative energies to counter the narrators’ parody of women’s social and creative aspirations” (230). While I do not make a strong distinction between the male and female voices that are telling the story of Princess Ida, except as they are involved in the broader dialectical effort of the poem, I do take Clapp-Itnyre’s point that these lyrics are integral to her story, particularly as they suggest the importance of finding the lost child in order to develop her complete womanhood and her creative power.

6. For Johnston this usage of “mellay” or medley to describe the conflict between Arac and the Prince underscores the contest between Ida and the Prince, specifically war as “the unproductive convention of a superannuated social code” against which the Princess protests when she refuses to marry the Prince or anyone else (Johnston 563).

7. Some of Tennyson’s remarks on the Princess, including this one, had originally appeared in a letter to and had been published by Canadian critic S. E. Dawson: “The child is the link thro’ the parts as shown in the songs which are the best interpreters of the poem” (Memoir I:254). When “the public did not see the drift” after publication of the first edition, Tennyson decided to include interpolated songs explaining it.

8. Considering the readership and orientation of the periodicals in which these two reviews appeared, the divergence of opinion is not surprising. The Christian Remembrancer was, according to Alvar Ellegard, a quarterly “exponent of conservatively orthodox High Church views, [and] appealed chiefly to the High Church clergy” (30).
In 1860 its circulation was about 2,000. As a reviewer, however, Charles Peter Chretien was prominent enough to attract Tennyson’s attention: he denounces Chretien’s review in a letter to De Vere of October 1849, because of the claim that Tennyson always represents the sea “dead asleep,” “which is a lie” (Letters I:305). Nevertheless, Chretien’s review offers a valuable counterpoint to De Vere’s inasmuch as religious beliefs often shaped responses to eclecticism—an element that is missing from De Vere’s analysis.

The Edinburgh Review, also a quarterly and available at Mudie’s, was of course the chief organ of the Whig-Liberals. At its peak in 1818, it boasted a circulation of 13,500 though by 1860 it had slipped to around 7,000 (Ellegard 27). In the contemporary press, it was generally considered second only to the Quarterly Review in importance. Naturally, this would have given Aubrey De Vere a much bigger readership than Chretien could have hoped for, even with library circulation figured in. It is also important to recognize that Aubrey De Vere was a friend and admirer of Tennyson. In his diary De Vere records that he heard portions of the Princess in manuscript as early as April 1845. In May of the same year, Tennyson and De Vere again talked about his “University of Women,” and “discussed poetry, denouncing exotics, and saying that a poem should reflect the time and place” (Letters I:237–38). De Vere not only is responding to early negative reviews of the Princess, but is trying to work out a new direction for poetry of which Tennyson’s work is the harbinger.

9. As Isobel Armstrong notes, Chretien borrows this extended metaphor from Wordsworth. In the preface to The Excursion, Wordsworth wrote that “all his work was essentially a whole,” that The Excursion was related to the unpublished Prelude, as the antechapel to the body of a gothic church, and “his minor Pieces will be found by the attentive Reader to have such connections with the main Work as do the little cells, oratories, and sepulchral recesses, ordinarily included in these edifices” (qtd. in Armstrong 200).

Chapter 5

1. Morris and certainly Kingsley were also likely to have been influenced by Shakespeare’s representations of Rome and Alexandria in Antony and Cleopatra (1606, 1607). Other possible influences on the Victorian idea of Alexandria covering the same material as Shakespeare include John Dryden’s All for Love (1678) and G. F. Handel’s Giulio Cesare (1724).

2. The OED quotes James Fitzjames Stephen’s 1858 review of Thomas Hughes’s Tom Brown’s Schooldays (1857) in defining “muscular Christianity”: “The principal character of the writer whose works earned this burlesque through expressive description, are his deep sense of the sacredness of all ordinary relations and the common duties of life, and the vigour with which he contends . . . for the great importance and value of animal spirits, physical strength, and hearty enjoyment of all the pursuits and accomplishments connected with them” (qtd. in Adams 108). As James Eli Adams notes, this “regimen marks a revival of aristocratic norms of manhood, and as such seems to have appealed to middle-class men (and boys) anxious to align themselves with more traditional sources of masculine identity” (108). This alliance between aristocratic ideals and middle-class manhood complicates Kingsley’s rejection of the aristocratic exclusiveness of Hypatia’s philosophy.
3. John C. Hawley’s account of Kingsley’s Anglican via media has strongly influenced my interpretation of Hypatia, particularly his characterization of the struggle in Alexandria as a contest between atheism and dogmatism.

4. Hypatia was first published serially in Fraser’s Magazine from 1852 to 1853 and as a book in the summer of 1853 (Baldwin 126). Kingsley’s biographer Susan Chitty locates the practical inspiration for Hypatia in a trip Kingsley made to Roman ruins in Germany in 1851, where “he imagined all the hellish scenes of agony and cruelty that the place had witnessed” (151); yet, for at least two years, Kingsley had been reading the early Church fathers and “contemplating a book about Alexandria after the sack of Rome, depicting the clashes between Christians, Jews, Greeks and barbarians in that dissension-rent city” (152). Kingsley probably first encountered the tragic story of Hypatia in chapter 47 of The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, though he disagreed with Gibbon’s representation of fifth-century Alexandria: “And thus an age, which, to the shallow insight of a sneerer like Gibbon, seems only a rotting and aimless chaos of sensuality and anarchy, fanaticism and hypocrisy, produced a Clemens and an Athanas, a Chrysostom and an Augustine” (Hypatia xi).

5. Chitty also views this work as a crucial precursor of Hypatia. It was Kingsley’s first “practical sortie into the past,” and the two works share a common plan, wherein each of the major characters was to represent a school of thought (152); however, in Phaethon the intention was to demolish Neoplatonic Anythingarianism, and in Hypatia the goal is to forge from the combination of elements a Christian via media.

6. In an exhaustive study of American periodicals published before 1850, Georges J. Joyaux has investigated the vexed question of the influence of French Eclecticism on American Transcendentalism. Many scholars would prefer that Emerson were indebted only to the German idealists and not at all to the “rational, urbane, compromise philosophy” of eclecticism. As Joyaux admits, however, “the two systems are both philosophically eclectic in nature, and that, furthermore, both represented a phase of idealistic reaction” (327). Joyaux concludes that Cousin, whose works were “widely known and generally well received” (336) in the United States, especially as the explicator of German philosophy, must at least have provided a catalyst to the study of metaphysics.

7. Kingsley had taken this position some years earlier in The Saint’s Tragedy; or, The True Story of Elizabeth of Hungary (1848). The focus of the play is on the “agonising contradiction” in the mind of Elizabeth, a pure and married woman who has been taught “the Manichean contempt with which a celibate clergy would have all men regard the names of husband, wife, and parent” (Project Gutenberg text, p. 6).

8. Susann Dorman recounts the story of how Edward Pusey used Hypatia as grounds for derailing the Prince of Wales’s nomination of Kingsley for an honorary Oxford doctorate (192).

9. Dorman points out that Kingsley borrows some of Newman’s own phrases in this passage (192).


11. See chapter 3, “Imagining the Science of Renunciation: Manhood and Abasement in Kingsley and Tennyson,” pp. 105–47. Although Adams does not deal with Hypatia, his judgment that Kingsley’s novels betray “a powerfully masochistic impulse [. . . ] where his heroes typically experience an unusually violent oscillation of desire and restraint” (110) could well apply to Kingsley’s representation of fifth-century Alexandria as a contest between two undesirable extremes, abstinence and sensuality.
12. As Frederick Grant has argued, the “main characteristic feature of Hellenistic religion was syncretism: the tendency to identify the deities of various peoples and to combine their cults” (xiii).

13. In tracing the fortunes of the concept of eclecticism throughout history, Pierluigi Donini distinguishes, as seventeenth-century eclectics also did, between syncretism and eclecticism. It is important to note that Kingsley wavered between a stance that might be described as syncretistic and one that might legitimately be designated eclectic. Eclecticism is a method for choosing doctrines and seeking the truth; it is most frequently opposed to dogmatism and sectarianism. Thus, “anyone who becomes a faithful disciple of an eclectic philosophy loses by this very fact the right of being considered eclectic” (Donini 20). A syncretist “aimed to reconcile widely different opinions and [ . . . ] succeeded only in producing a ‘heap’ [or] ‘large shapeless mass’” (Donini 21). The religious historian Brian Hatcher agrees that syncretism is distinguished from eclecticism by “the additional feature of reconciliation. That is, it is not sufficient, when speaking of syncretism, to refer only to the process of encounter and appropriation; one must also speak of merging, accommodation, or amalgamation” (8). Donini does not see, however, that the distinction has any currency in philosophy, although syncretism is still used as “a technical term” in the history of religion. Indeed, in philosophy, the two terms are now used interchangeably.

14. Both Victorian writers acknowledge Philo of Alexandria’s probable influence on Clemens and the first school of Christian theology. Another eclectic thinker, Philo, as a Jew, might well be another model for Raphael. Kingsley devotes a long chapter to Philo in Alexandria and Her Schools.

15. Some years after Robert Milman published his article on Indian Brahmoism, John Murdoch published in the series “Papers on Indian Reform” a pamphlet titled “The Brahma Samaj and Other Modern Indian Eclectic Systems of Religion in India: Religious Reform, Part IV.” In introducing his readers to the Indian eclectic school, Murdoch paints them as reformers in religious matters: “The adherents of the new eclectic systems in India are far more enlightened than the greatest Hindu philosophers in former times. They have much clearer ideas of God than the authors of the Vedic hymns” (1). Furthermore, Murdoch writes, “The members of the Brahma Samaj are monotheists, and hold a pure system of morality. As protesters against idolatry and advocates of social reform, they are doing excellent service” (2). Murdoch attributes this reformist tendency to the influence of Christianity.

16. In his guide to the city, E. M. Forster does not attempt to draw any parallel between Alexandria (ancient or modern) and Britain, which perhaps signals the diminished importance of the comparison by 1922. However, as Forster puts it, Alexandria had still “nourished imperial dreams” during the nineteenth century (91) and “Life flowed back into her” when “The eyes of Europe were again directed to the deserted shore” (93). James Stevens Curl’s fascinating study of the Egyptomania of the nineteenth century confirms that, for Europeans, interest in Egypt revived with the “imperial dreams” of Napoleon, Nelson’s victory at Aboukir Bay, and the building of the Suez Canal from 1859 to 1869. The mania for Egyptian design motifs and artifacts endured throughout the century. Curl observes that “eclecticism involving Egyptianising themes was one of the richest of tendencies in a century already rich in invention” (206). See chapter 9, “Aspects of the Egyptian Revival in the Later Part of the Nineteenth Century,” pp. 187–206.

17. A product of European Romanticism and German historicism, the “science of nations” offered a pseudoscientific justification for Europe’s domination over the native
peoples of Asia, Africa, and the Americas. The writer’s expression of this view is typical of Romantic nationalism: “The life and habits of a people are, to a large extent, moulded by their climate and the peculiarities of their land. Orientalisms and Occidentalisms are not altogether capricious and arbitrary. Many of them are the offspring of the sky and soil. Certain features must always be peculiar to certain nations, not merely because of their ancestry, but because of their physical distinctions; and though, to some extent, there may be a fusion of these, an interchange of peculiarities, yet there are certain great ridges or outlines which must remain unobliterated and almost unsoftened” (“Egypt and Syria” 150). Kingsley, too, relied on such essentialist views of cultures and peoples. In the preface to *Hypatia*, he had judged the “races of Egypt and Syria” in ancient times to be “effeminate, over-civilized, exhausted by centuries during which no infusion of fresh blood had come to renew the stock. Morbid, self-conscious, physically indolent, incapable then, as now, of personal or political freedom, they afforded material out of which fanatics might easily be made, but not citizens of the kingdom of God” (xiv).

18. In his review of *Alexandria and Her Schools* (1854), James Martineau accepts the “parallelism [ . . . ] in the broad features of the two ages”: “The decline of ancient faith without mature successor to take the vacant throne; the attempt of metaphysics to fit the soul with a religion; the pretensions of intuition and ecstasy; the sudden birth, from the very eggs of a high-flown spiritualism, of mystagogues and mesmerists, as larvae are born of butterflies; the growth of world-cities and world-science, with their public libraries and institutes, their botanic and zoologic gardens, their cheap baths and open parks; the joint diffusion of taste and demoralization, of asceticism and intemperance; the increase of a proletary class amid the growing humanity of society and the laws; the frequency of frightful epidemics; the combination of gigantic enterprises and immense commerce with decay at the heart of private life” (295). Martineau refuses to accept, however, the analogy between “declining empire” and the “intellectual tendencies of the present age,” because “the cosmopolitanism of modern times is altogether different” (298). Roman cosmopolitanism had led to the almost universal adoption of one or two languages; whatever was specialized became provincial and eventually servile: “All that was indigenous and characteristic was smoothed away; and over the wooded uplands and sequestered meadows of history, the paved roads of universal empire pushed their level way” (297). By contrast, modern cosmopolitanism arises from a “universal faith” that acknowledges “the common law and common kindred of the human race, in all the highest relations” (298). Like most of Kingsley’s contemporaries, Martineau believes that the spirit of world history is fulfilled in Christianity. While he praises the coexistence of different languages, he is unconcerned at the loss of diversity in religion.

Chapter 6

1. In 1959 *Victorian Studies* published these early reading lists with commentary by Kenneth Allott. In establishing the importance of Cousin’s thought for Arnold’s intellectual development, I rely on Allott’s discussion of his reading during this period. Although monographs by Iris Sells and F. J. W. Harding treat Arnold’s relationship to French literature and culture in great detail, neither mentions Arnold’s reading of Cousin. Sells’s book appeared in 1935, before the early reading lists were published, but Harding’s 1964 *Matthew Arnold the Critic and France* should have taken Allott’s work into account.
2. Allott argues, therefore, that “Cousin seems to deserve a little of the credit for ‘The Scholar Gypsy’” (260), since Glanvill is the source of the scholar-gypsy legend.


4. Clinton Machann notes that Arnold was “eclectic in his reading of George Sand (whose liberal idealism appealed to him and whose version of feminine sentimentality may have reminded him of his mother), Goethe (who had largely displaced his earlier interest in Byron), the French poet Beranger (who reinforced his affectation of French culture), and the Hindu classic *Bhagavad Gita* (where he found a discipline of resignation congenial with his developing stoicism): he typically balanced his studies of Kant, Lucretius, Descartes, and the Epicureans and Stoics with critical refutations of their positions, following the dialogic impulse that would lead him to his later work as critic” (18). Allott remarks that “Arnold’s assent to the eclectic variety of Stoic ethics preached to Pausanias as practical wisdom in the second scene of ‘Empedocles on Etna’ was always more intellectual than emotional while he was still capable of writing poetry” (86). While both these critics perceive Arnold as eclectic, generally speaking, neither investigates the deeper significance of his eclecticism.

5. While traveling in France as school inspector, Arnold met many of the leading intellectuals of the day including Barthélemy St. Hilaire, Mignet, Villemain, Guizot, Thiers, Sainte-Beuve, and Renan (*SL* 118–31). He first met Cousin in March 1859, at dinner and then at the Sorbonne (“Cousin well worth seeing.”) and he wanted to meet him again, though it is not clear that he ever did so: “My great inducement in going back [to Paris] would be to see and talk to Cousin who has himself had a Report to make much like that on which I am engaged” (*Letters* 426; *SL* 130). The report to which Arnold refers was completed in 1860 and published as *The Popular Education of France with Notices of that of Holland and Switzerland* (1861). During the 1830s Cousin had published reports on the state of elementary education in Holland, Prussia, and Germany; during the 1840s he focused his attention on France, coming out with the definitive report *Instruction publique* in 1850.

6. Clough was not the only one to see the limits of Arnold’s imitations, architec tonic though they might be, of past styles and subjects of poetry. G. H. Lewes (among others) wrote reviews decrying Arnold’s new poetics. In directing young poets to study the classics and to “beware of the syren- charms which enervate the Moderns,” Arnold is recommending imitation (Lewes, “Schools of Poetry,” 82). As a positivist, Lewes condemns imitation: “the retention in our organism of the elements which have lived is in itself fatal as a source of destruction, poisoning the very life these elements once served, so in the onward progression of Humanity the old elements must pass away, transmitting to successors the work they had to perform” (78). To imitate, apparently, is to eat the dead, and be poisoned unto death.

7. For the eclectic sources of Arnold’s poetry, I am relying on Kenneth Allott and Miriam Allott’s edition of *The Poems of Matthew Arnold*.

8. In his reading of “The World and the Quietist,” George Forbes relates how in the *Bhagavad Gita*, Krishna tells the warrior Arjuna that he is “all-grasping death” and “Time, the destroyer of mankind” (157). Forbes sees Arnold’s “adverse voices” as reminders of Krishna and of death to human beings who have “their hearts set on the goals of their frantic and futile activity” (157). Krishna is Time and death, but he is also “generation and dissolution; the place where all things are reposed, and the
inexhaustible seed of nature” (159). Arnold would undoubtedly have found these images of incorporation in the body of time most appealing as a solution to the problem of the divided self, and to the dilemma of style.

9. Sidney Coulling, in the best account of the development of the 1853 preface, identifies the writer of these words, the editor of The Spectator, Robert Stephen Rintoul, in a review of the poetry of Edwin Arnold, as Matthew Arnold’s immediate target. Arnold disagreed with the whole premise of The Spectator’s literary criticism, that “poetry must be both modern and moralistic.” The quoted comment is thus “typical of the criticism of the age—a specious criticism designed to confuse the reader and mislead the poet” (Coulling 235).

10. In his 1956 monograph on Glanvill, Jackson Cope examines the sources of the eclecticism of the Cambridge Platonists. In tracing the sources of their eclecticism, Cope discovers traces of Skepticism, Stoicism, and Aristotelianism, mixed up with Platonism (139). It would be useful to trace Arnold’s eclecticism back from Cousin to Leibniz and the German Eclectics and to Glanvill and the Cambridge Platonists.

11. In “Arnold and the Cambridge Platonists,” Ruth apRoberts traces the “Viconian” influence back from Michelet and Herder (both influenced by the Italian philosopher of history), thus allowing for a French point of departure in his thinking, which I deem appropriate. She argues that Arnold imbibed Vico’s New Science from his father and from Rugby, where Vico’s “The Social Progress of States” was a textbook (139). She points to the odd periodization in texts such as the preface to Poems of 1853 (where Arnold speaks of the age of the Greeks, and then of the moderns, Shakespeare and Goethe) as evidence of his “belaboring the three Viconian ages.” ApRoberts claims that Arnold sees “the dialogue of the mind with itself” as “an obverse side of Renaissance culture.” Again, in “On the Modern Element in Literature,” he posits recurrent modern ages, in keeping with Vico’s theory of historical cycles. In his excellent The Victorian Critic and the Idea of History, Peter Allan Dale also explores the connection between Arnold’s thought and Vico’s, emphasizing that Arnold shares with Vico “his high opinion of the healthy, fully developed modern age as a stage in the cycle” (94). Dale also explores Arnold’s assimilation of Carlyle and the German philosophers, particularly the concept of Zeitgeist; but in Arnold it is a radically different concept than it is in Hegel (128). In The Victorian Mirror of History, Dwight Culler entirely dismisses the role of Vico and traces Arnold’s thinking about the Zeitgeist and the Time-Stream to “the Philosophy of Clothes in Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus” (139). Arnold agrees with Carlyle that changes are initially spiritual, and that the forms of society—the Clothes—are continually lagging behind (138); nevertheless, as David DeLaura has written in “Arnold and Carlyle,” Arnold would ultimately reject the example of the older writer as insufficiently disinterested.

12. Lewis Mott, F. J. W. Harding, Flavia M. Alaya, and Stephen Prickett have all offered persuasive arguments for the French historian Ernest Renan’s key role in the development of Arnold’s critical principles. The parallels between Arnold’s career and that of Renan are indeed remarkable. Alaya and Prickett observe the similarities in their writings on the Celts and on religion, in particular their emphasis on the need for both the Hellenic and Hebraic principles. Not all critics who have examined the Arnold-Renan relationship agree on its importance in Arnold’s work. Sidney Coulling contends that the claims of influence have been exaggerated, providing evidence that Arnold had written about such key ideas as “disinterestedness” before he had read Renan. Coulling would rather talk of resemblances. Rose Bachem, in her comparison of
the two writers’ views on perfection, also downplays the question of influence, agreeing with Saintsbury’s 1902 assessment: “Mr. Arnold needed no teaching from Mr. Renan” (229).

13. In fact, so many of Victor Cousin’s English critics reacted violently against his eclecticism because they felt there would be no check on the individual eclectic’s determination of what was true and what was false. But of course, Cousin worked within the context of the French Academy and followed developments in philosophy and the history of philosophy around the world.

Chapter 7

1. Hardy met Pater in London in 1886 (Donoghue 13), after the publication of the works I am considering here; but as Natarajan points out, he was well acquainted with Pater’s work by 1878 (849).

2. Diane Elam takes up the question of the politics of romance from Fredric Jameson and Northrop Frye. All three critics see a revolutionary potential in romance that depends largely on its willingness to remake the world on a new pattern: “romance contains a transformative potential which allows the articulation of marginalized desire” (20). See Elam, pp. 19–25; Frye, pp. 161–88; Jameson, pp. 157–62.

3. Billie Inman points out that this idea—“the first step towards seeing one’s object as it really is, is to know one’s own impression as it really is”—derives from Hegel’s Aesthetik (Inman xiv, 56–57).

4. The other influences cited by Inman are 1) Hegel’s and Schiller’s ideas on aesthetics, and 2) Quinet’s and Michelet’s orientation in history. She points out that Pater had “command of a general range of reference—classical, German, French, and English, quite astounding to one who realizes that it was primarily the fruit of only six years” (xi-xii). He had not, however, mastered whole subjects. As Inman puts it, “He was a highly literate dilettante” (xii). Furthermore, by 1869 “Pater’s mind was formed,” which makes it “inadvisable to speak of major influences from his readings after that time” (xii).

5. In his notes to The Renaissance, Donald L. Hill identifies the echo of Sainte-Beuve’s essay in “Two Early French Stories” (319).

6. “Au reste, il ne s’agit véritablement de rien sacrifier, de rien déprécier. Le Temple du goût, je le crois, est à refaire; mais, en le rebâtissant, il s’agit simplement de l’agrandir, et qu’il devienne le Panthéon de tous les nobles humains, de tous ceux qui ont accru pour une part notable et durable la somme des jouissances et des titres de l’esprit” (Causeries du lundi 50).

7. “Voilà nos classiques; l’imagination de chacun peut achever le dessin et même choisir son groupe préféré. Car il faut choisir, et la première condition du goût, après avoir tout compris, est de ne pas voyager sans cesse, mais de s’asseoir une fois et de se fixer” (Causeries du lundi 53).

8. Instead of seeing here a choice between the historic method and the eclectic method, Carolyn Williams perceives a “graphic contrast between the historical method and the allegorical method” (Transfigured World 105). In Williams’s view, Pater is drawing a distinction between “temporal and spatial modes of ‘reconciliation’” (105). “Allegorical juxtaposition imitates ‘agreement’” in space, while the historical method would give priority to temporal differences. While I believe that Williams’s distinction is an
important one, I do not wish to take up the relationship between the allegorical and the eclectic in this study. For the moment, it is sufficient to acknowledge Pater’s own characterization of Pico’s allegorical approach.

9. Donald Hill’s notes on the Pico essay (322–23) led me to the relevant passages in *Plato and Platonism*. John Conlon also deals with the *Plato and Platonism* passages and comes up against the inconsistency in Pater’s thought regarding critical practices “somewhat allied to ‘impressionism,’ the ‘dogmatic,’ the ‘eclectic,’ and ‘the historic method’” (*Walter Pater and the French Tradition* 148). Conlon notes that Pater is “by no means free” from eclecticism, “especially in his pursuit of the Romantic spirit from ancient Greek culture to the nineteenth century” (149), an assessment with which I heartily agree.

10. In this account of Plato’s creation of an original philosophy, Pater makes it clear that all creation incorporates the ideas, images, and aspirations of others. This could account for that homesickness that so many of Pater’s critics have observed in him. Bullen claims that these “translations” of other cultures bring us back into contact with a world we’ve lost, “counteracting the homesickness of the modern condition” (279).

11. Gerald Monsman’s 1980 study *Walter Pater’s Art of Autobiography* is probably the most thoroughgoing account of the creation of selfhood in all of Pater’s writings. He sees the shaping of self in these works as an ongoing dialectic “between the autobiographer shaping his life and the emergent work which reflects and enhances that identity” (36). The unity that emerges is a provisional one, since the “center is always in movement away from the present toward layers deeper within or frames further outside” (36). Monsman’s characterization of Pater’s writing of self rings true, particularly since Pater so often wrote of the creations of others as involving a dialectic, or mixed, situation.