Manhood, Citizenship, and the National Guard

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Notes

Notes to Introduction


2. Some works that provide an overview of these issues are Mary P. Ryan, Women in Public: Between Banners and Ballots, 1825–1880 (Baltimore: The


9. Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard*, 47–49. Between 1870 and 1899 the Pennsylvania militia served in nine strike situations, and between 1877 and 1899 the Ohio NG eight, and the New York NG, just six—in comparison to the ING’s fifteen incidents of strike service.


12. Militia Act of 1792, Second Congress, Session I. Chapter XXVIII, Passed May 2, 1792, providing for the authority of the President to call out the Militia.

13. Organization tables are the paper structure of company, regiment, division. That is the number of men and officers in each and their relation to each other.


15. Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard*.

16. See Revised Statutes—Illinois 1874 (Springfield: Hurd, 1874), 1007–8; Revised Statutes—Illinois 1882 (Springfield: Hurd, 1882), 1043–51; Revised

18. Mahon, 18. See also Weigley, ch. 1; Cunliffe; Riker.

19. Mahon, 110.


21. Mahon uses “militia” until the 1870s and then uses the phrase “militia/national guard.” Jim Dan Hill equates George Washington and other Revolutionary War generals with modern National Guard officers being inducted into national service. Hill also identifies the earliest volunteer companies, for example, New England’s Minutemen with today’s National Guard. See Jim Dan Hill, *The Minute Man in Peace and War: A History of the National Guard* (Harrisburg, PA: The Stackpole Company, 1964), 5, 11. Cooper uses “militia” until the post–Civil War period when he adopts “National Guard.”


27. The two notable exceptions were New York and Connecticut, both of which had begun to rationalize their large state militia systems before the Civil War and continued development, albeit slowly, even during this period of slacking interest and enthusiasm. See Mahon, ch. 8; Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard*, 103–4.

28. Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard*, ch. 8; Doubler, ch. 4.

Governor and Commander in Chief, 1879 and 1880 (Springfield, IL: Philips Bros, State Printers, 1880).

30. See Cunliffe and Davis.


38. Biennial Report . . . 1875 and 1876, 23–43.

39. Descriptive List, Illinois National Guard, First Infantry, 1880–1904, Miscellaneous, RS 301.96, Illinois State Archives. (See appendix A.)

40. The majority of the membership were laborers, factory workers, or skilled tradesmen. A breakdown of all 463 members of Company A over the years between 1898 and 1916 demonstrates that at least in Dekalb, the soldier-citizen model continued to exert a strong hold on men across a range of working-class backgrounds. (See appendix B).

41. See twelve-issue run of The Illinois Cavalryman.

42. Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of Illinois Transmitted to the Governor and Commander-in-Chief. For 1877 and 1878 (Springfield: Weber, Magie & Co., State Printers, 1878), 51–52. The Sixteenth Battalion included Companies A and B in Chicago, as well as the Clark County Guards of Marshall, and in October gained the Cumberland County Guards of Greenup. Evidence suggests these last two companies were not African American, as they are listed as “Independent,” though under the Sixteenth Battalion’s officers and staff, and in 1880 they are assigned with letter designations to the Seventeenth Battalion. There is no evidence to corroborate this one way or another, but based on the organization charts it appears that for technical purposes these two white, independent companies were subject to the orders of the black major of the Sixteenth Battalion, though it is extremely unlikely that attempt was made to place them under his command. See also Goode, ch. 1.

43. In 1892 most officers in all grades had served for three years or less in the current position. These patterns appear consistent over time; in 1882 the number of Captains with three, six, or nine years of service in the ING almost exactly matches the 1892 figures.

44. Thomas W. Scott, Adjutant General of Illinois, to Lieutenant Colonel E. M. Weaver, Chief, Division of Militia Affairs, Washington, DC, April 1, 1908, Document #111 April 3 1908, filed with Document #91, Box 45, Record Group 168.7, National Archives. Illinois actually had a low annual percentage of enlisted discharges (20 percent) and officer discharges (15 percent) relative to the rest of the State National Guard organizations: 23 out of
50 states reporting lost over 33 percent of their enlisted personnel each year. See the chart “Data Relative to Length of Service and Instruction of the Militia,” Nov. 30, 1908, Document #91, Box 45, Division of Militia Affairs, Record Group 168.7, National Archives.


of the Militia,” Nov. 30, 1908, Document #91, Box 45, Bureau of Militia Affairs, RG 168.7, National Archives; “Tabulation Showing the Authorized Strength of the Organized Militia of the several States and Territories on January 21, 1903, and also the actual strength of the Same as Determined by the recent Special Inspections, the dates of completion of which range from the first of May to the last of June 1903,” Oct. 17, 1903, Card # 506151, Box 27, Bureau of Militia Affairs, RG 168.4, National Archives; “untitled,” July 24, 1909, Document #8801, Box 83, Bureau of Militia Affairs, RG 168.7, National Archives; “Balances, June 1, 1911, prior to allotment of unexpended balance,” June 6, 1911, Document #25382, Box 140, Bureau of Militia Affairs, RG 168.7, National Archives; “List of Appropriations made by Various States and Territories for the Support of the Organized Militia,” 1899?[], Near the back, with 1899 material, Box 23, Bureau of Militia Affairs, RG 168.2, National Archives; “Expenditures from the appropriation under section 1661, revised statutes, and from the appropriation: camp and maneuvers, Organized Militia, in connection with the joint maneuvers of Mobile troops during the calendar year 1908,” 1908, Bureau of Militia Affairs, RG 168.7, National Archives.


49. See the following for examples of articles on strike interventions in which the neutrality of the guard is the central thesis: Andrew Birtle, “Governor George Hoadly's use of the Ohio National Guard in the Hocking Valley Coal Strike of 1884,” Ohio History 91 (1982): 37–57; and Brian M. Linn, “Pretty Scaly Times: The Ohio National Guard and the Railroad Strike of 1877,” Ohio History 94 (1984): 171–81. See also Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, ch. 3.
Notes to Chapter 1

1. State Register, 13 March 1875; Daily State Journal, 13 March 1875


5. Biennial Report . . . 1873 and 1874, 29–30. The number of new members is actually greater than 1200, as between 1870 and 1874 at least four companies, representing about 200 men in total, disbanded, and so the 1874 figure includes the men who replaced those who left.


7. Chicago Times, 15 October 1874. A vote taken during the general convention of the Army of the Tennessee defeated a resolution to allow soldiers as well as officers into the society. Daily State Journal, 16 October 1874, Illinois State Register, 15 October 1874. The private military-styled companies of the fraternal organizations are examples of the types of private organization that did not seek affiliation with the state.


10. For antebellum militias, see Cunliffe, ch. 11; Davis, 66–72; and Ryan, *Women in Public*.  
11. Jerry Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard*, ch. 2; Doubler, chs. 2, 3.  
17. This expansion of the types of groups that were able to use the parade to seize or claim public and therefore political space is one of the main contentions of Ryan, *Women in Public*, 53–54.  
23. This is not meant to discount the very real possibilities that the “Governor’s Guard” might have been mostly made up of sons of “good” families. However, the speeches of both Emma Hickox and Governor Beveridge assume a common significance for militia membership that does not seem specific to this single company; rather, this company is a sterling example of a general principle.  
24. Cunliffe, 230–35; Davis, 47; and Ryan, 31–35.  
29. Adjutant General of the United States Army, *Militia Force of the United States*, 43rd Congress, 1st sess., 1874, S. Exdoc. 41, Serial 1580, 2. *Biennial Report . . . 1873 and 1874*, 28. Why Illinois officials failed to report these companies to Washington remains a mystery whose only solution seems to be that the Governor and his staff simply didn’t think they were significant. Also, some companies never chose to seek affiliation with the state, preferring to remain purely private social organizations, albeit with military-styled uniforms, drills, and parades. See Henry Barrett Chamberlin, “A Sketch of the Oakland Rifles,” in *Historical Sketch of the Oakland Rifles and Company “C,” 4th Infantry I.N.G* (1889).  
32. Cunliffe, 241–47. Also, recall the Zouaves from Atlanta in *Gone with
the Wind by Margaret Mitchell. The year 1860 was also the year that Ellsworth came to the attention of Abraham Lincoln, accompanying him to Washington as a bodyguard and receiving a 2nd Lieutenant's commission in the professional army. Ellsworth was shot and killed just after the firing on Fort Sumter while attempting to remove a Confederate flag from a Washington, DC, hotel and was briefly immortalized as the Union’s “First Martyr.”

33. That the Zouave Cadets were remembered is in no doubt: “Chicago once sent out an independent company which beat the world. . . .” (The Chicago Times, Thursday, 29 July 1875), 5.


35. R. S. Bunzey, History of Companies I and E, Sixth Regt., Illinois Volunteer Infantry from Whiteside County (Morrison, IL: 1901), 22–23.


37. Collins, 28; Biennial Report . . . 1875 and 1876.

38. Membership in the Illinois militia had fallen by the end of 1874 to around 850 men, but then this number more than doubled to over 2,000 during 1875 alone.


40. Critics insisted that the First Regiment was formed to oppose socialist demonstrations in Chicago and that the Bohemian Rifles were formed to oppose the First Regiment. This is both a Chicago-centric view and one that insists that militias served only overt class and political interests; it does not place these Chicago organizations within a broader statewide or national context. Richard Schneirov, Labor and Urban Politics, Class Conflict and the Origins of Modern Liberalism in Chicago, 1864–97 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1998), 59.

41. The Chicago Times, Thursday, 29 July 1875, 5.

42. Biennial Report . . . 1875 and 1876, General Order #3, 1875.

43. The Chicago Times, 5 July 1876.

44. Biennial Report . . . 1875 and 1876, 8–12, 28–35. Maxwell did feel that interest in the regiment would revive after the elections.

45. Schneirov, 59.

46. Schudson, 155–68.

47. Biennial Report . . . 1873 and 1874, 32.

48. This desire on the part of many men to tie themselves visibly to their communities can be viewed negatively as well as positively. Certainly in 1874 and 1875 members of the People’s Party and other socialist groups in Chicago viewed the new First Regiment as little more than a creature of the Chicago Citizen’s Association, calling it “the Businessmen’s Militia.” Schneirov, 59.


50. Hubbard’s father, Guerdon S. Hubbard, Sr., was one of the first traders to make a fortune during the early years of Chicago’s history. See Guerdon Stonstall Hubbard, The Autobiography of Guerdon Stonstall Hubbard. Pa-Pa-Ma-Ta-Be “The Swift Walker.” With an Introduction by Caroline M. McIlvanie (Chicago: The Lakeside Press, 1911).

52. Biennial Report . . . 1875 and 1876, 12.
53. It is not clear where or when Sherman picked up his nominal rank of “General.” He may be Francis T. Sherman, Major in the 12th IL USV Cavalry, and later Colonel of the 88th IL USV Infantry during the Civil War. There was also a Frank Sherman who was asked to lead a volunteer company gathered in the aftermath of the Chicago Fire in 1871. http://www.sos.state.il.us/departments/archives/databases.html. Accessed 3/21/05.
54. The Chicago Times, Thursday, 29 July 1875, 5.
59. The Citizen’s Association was specifically intended to oppose “the baser sort” and put “the best men” in power. See Schneirov, Labor and Urban Politics, 58; and Carl Smith, Urban Disorder and the Shape of Belief. The Great Chicago Fire, the Haymarket Bomb, and the Model Town of Pullman (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 109.
65. Collins, 18. These figures were presented to the regiment 29 May 1875.
66. Biennial Report . . . 1873 and 1874, 28. The Ellsworth Zouaves charged $12.00 in annual dues in 1874, more than double any other company, which implies reasonably high resources on the part of the members.
69. The Chicago Times, Thursday, 29 July 1875, 5.
70. The Chicago Times, Thursday, 29 July 1875, 5.
71. Kimmel, ch. 4.
72. Cunliffe, chs. 7, 8; Kimmel, 81–89; Rotundo, 251–55; and Gorn, 138–49.
73. According to Schneirov, Labor and Urban Politics, 59, the Bohemian Rifles were formed in response to the First Regiment because the German socialists believed that the First Regiment had been formed for the sole purpose of intimidating their constituency. Whether or not this was their intent, the Bohemian Rifles were accepted into the state militia and, formally at least, were given the same support and encouragement as all the other new companies that entered the state militia in 1875 and 1876.


78. In 1870 the state reported to the federal government that there was no active militia. By 1880 there were over 8,000 active members of the state militia—and thousands more had passed through in the intervening decade—the average member spending slightly less than three years in a militia company. *Fourth Annual Report; Biennial Report . . . 1872, 1–2.*


80. Goode, 5.


82. *Fourth Annual Report . . . 1872, 1–2.*

83. *Illinois State Register*, 15 Ocotber 1874.

84. Collins, 17. The Relief and Aid Society had a longstanding commitment toward the prevention of a creation of a welfare class, which resulted in a number of policies designed to judge those most fit to receive aid and deny it to any who did not meet their standards for being only temporarily distressed. For further information on the Relief and Aid Society see Karen Sawislak, “Smoldering City,” *Chicago History* 17, nos. 3 and 4 (1988–89): 70.

85. *The Chicago Times*, Thursday, 25 February 1875, 3–4. The last company, the Hannibal Zouaves, was very likely the same as the Hannibal Guards, one of the first African American companies in Chicago. The only reason for saying this is the use of the name Hannibal, but this name was a very popular one for African American companies because of the famous North African
General Hannibal who challenged the Roman Empire. Also, because it was used in Chicago for an African American company, it is difficult to believe that any white company would have attempted to co-opt the name. The confusion would have been greater than any community would have sought to bear. This remains, of course, only speculation, and there is no conclusive evidence one way or another.

86. Goode, 5–6.
89. Biennial Report . . . 1875 and 1876, 10; Biennial Report . . . 1877 and 1878, 8; Biennial Report . . . 1879 and 1880, 4–6; Biennial Report . . . 1881 and 1882, 7; Biennial Report . . . 1887 and 1888, 5.
90. U.S. Serial Set, H.misdoc. 191 (42–2) 1526, Statement from the Ordnance Department, dated 4/15/1872.
92. U.S. Serial Set, S.exdoc. 22 pr 2 (45–2) 1780, 11. It is unclear what happened to the annual distributions which by 1878 were around $10,000 for Illinois; presumably the debt should have been closer to $45,000. There is a hint later on that instead of retiring the debt, from 1875 forward the Governor chose to request rifles for the rapidly growing state forces and leave off “paying” on the charges; see The Chicago Times, Thursday 29 July 1875, 5: “he [the Governor] secured for the regiment the newest and best arms known to modern warfare.” The only place Governor Beveridge could have gotten the rifles was from the U.S. government, as he had no budget for a purchase of such magnitude for the militia.
93. Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, chs. 2, 3, 4.
94. See Cooper, Rise of the National Guard; and Jerry Cooper with Glen Smith, Citizens as Soldiers: A History of the North Dakota National Guard (Fargo: The North Dakota Institute for Regional Studies, North Dakota State University, 1986), in which he demonstrates that this was true across the nation.
97. Biennial Report . . . 1875 and 1876, 23–43.
102. Cooper, 28–29.

Notes to Chapter 2

2. Turner, 5.
3. See Descriptive List, Illinois National Guard, First Infantry, 1880–1904, Miscellaneous, RS 301.96, Illinois State Archives. See appendix A.
5. Turner, 5.
7. Quoted in Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, 76.
13. Minute Book, Company “I,” 36–41. The “masked ball” did not earn any money for the company, probably as a result of the rental fee for the masks—“from the lady in Peoria.”
17. Bunzey, 29.
19. Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, 39.
30. See Minute Book, Company “I.” The minute book is not clear on this point, but it is an obvious explanation for the rise and fall of this company.
31. Biennial Report . . . 1881 and 1882, 28. The ING was radically downsized in 1882, but Company I, seemingly going well until the cancellation of “True Blue,” left the ING in 1881. Again the loss of the first Captain is probably the best explanation.
32. For example, see “Militia Notes” column in The Chicago Tribune, 5 July 1880, 8; Newspaper photo, header “When Cavalry officers gave tea for Mrs. Tanner and Friends at Camp Lincoln” in “the Family Album,” clipping in the Camp Lincoln Vertical File, Sangamon Valley Collection, Lincoln Library, 325 South 7th Street, Springfield, IL; Newspaper photo, header “Sunday Visitors at Old Camp Lincoln, about 1901,” clipping in the Camp Lincoln Vertical File, Sangamon Valley Collection; Newspaper clipping dated “1896” (and headlining Governor Altgeld) from a scrapbook in the Camp Lincoln Vertical File, Sangamon Valley Collection; newspaper clipping dated “around 1901” (and headlining Sunday Visitors) from a scrapbook in the Camp Lincoln Vertical File, Sangamon Valley Collection.
33. Headenburg, 27.
34. Headenburg, 27.
35. Turner, 73.
36. Turner, 60.
38. *Inter Ocean*, 7 July 1875.
40. *Inter Ocean*, 20 May 1879.
41. *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 15 February 1884; 21 October 1892.
42. Chamberlin, 19.
44. Minute Book, Company “D,” minutes of 31 July 1877.
48. Chamberlin, 23.
49. Chamberlin, 23.
50. Chamberlin, 23.
51. Turner, 155.
52. Turner, 157
53. Chamberlin, 19.
54. Turner, 66.
55. Chamberlin, 23.
56. Turner, 66. It turned out that the company took in $165.00 at the ball but spent $875.00.
61. Chamberlin, 29; Headenburg, 35.
62. Headenburg, 35.
63. Headenburg, 35.
64. *Chicago Defender*, 17 October 1914
65. *Chicago Defender*, 26 December 1914
68. Skinner, 384.
69. Davis, 66–72. Davis argued that volunteer military companies filled with men of “good families” marching in antebellum Philadelphia parades of the 1820s and 1830s defined an elite form of patriotism and patriotic display and simultaneously constituted themselves as patriotism’s chief interpreters. Davis also argues that militia company performances at ceremonial tasks were
their most significant activity. While this may have been true for antebellum Philadelphia volunteer companies, it is not the contention of this chapter.

70. Davis, 66–72.

71. Davis offers a scale to evaluate parades from “respectable” to “rowdy”—generally meaning “organized” to “spontaneous,” though of course in practice there was much bleeding from one end to the other and most parades ended up somewhere in between. Also, both Davis and Ryan, Women in Public, note the connection between the creation of new public ceremonial moments, both unique and those destined to become traditional, and the commemoration or identification of historic moments in the history of the young republic. Davis, 19; Ryan, ch. 1. See also Schudson, 155–68.


75. See Ryan, ch. 5; Cunliffe, ch. 7.

76. The Chicago Tribune, Monday, 5 July 1880, 8.

77. Chicago Daily Tribune, Wednesday, 5 July 1882, 1–2.

78. The Chicago Tribune, Thursday, 5 July 1883, 2.

79. Bunzey, 42, 44.

80. Grand Rapids Daily Democrat, 5 July 1885, quoted in Headenburg, 27.


82. See John Whiteclay Chambers II and G. Kurt Piehler, Major Problems in American Military History (Houghton Mifflin, 1999), ch. 5. For example, a “General Frank T. Sherman” was involved with the First Infantry in Illinois, but the only Frank T. Sherman from Illinois who served in the Civil War finished out his service in the rank of Colonel. http://www.sos.state.il.us/departments/archives/databases.html. Accessed 3/21/05.

83. Turner, 8.

84. Charles Diehl to Fred W. Bleike, Nov. 3, 1927, Folder 1, Charles Diehl Collection, Chicago Historical Society.

85. Turner, 8; Collins, 18–19.


88. Headenburg, 15, 19.

89. Headenburg, 19, 23, 27.

90. Headenburg, 23; Biennial Report . . . 1877 and 1878, 111. According to the report of E. N. Bates, Brig. Gen. Commanding Second Brigade, ING, the Springfield companies were in service only five days, July 27–July 31, in East St. Louis.

91. McCard, 82.
93. Biennial Report . . . 1891 and 1892, 24, 35. It is difficult to completely track developments. Major Scott of the Sixteenth resigned September 23, 1881, but no company of the Sixteenth is on the disbanded list, and the officers are not otherwise listed as resigning. However, the commissioning of Alexander Brown of the Chicago Light Infantry (Colored) which took place on July 12, 1882, is not mentioned in the 1881–82 report either. Biennial Report . . . 1885 and 1886, 95.

96. Biennial Report of the Adjutant General of Illinois to the Governor and Commander-in-Chief. For 1883 and 1884 (Springfield: H.W. Rokker, State Printer and Binder, 1884), 55. It is unclear why it did not make the 1882 or July 1883 rosters, because the company officers’ commissions date from July 1882.

97. Goode, 6. It is not known when or why the McLean County organization folded or the Springfield Company lost steam. However, the records of all companies in the state forces suggest that African American companies must have suffered from the same difficulties of financing, enthusiasm, and membership problems that plagued most companies across the state.

98. The state always had long lists of companies seeking a place in the ING, and they were granted places whenever an older company was mustered out of an existing regiment—something that happened quite frequently. Obviously the state military authorities had no intention of similarly substituting a black company into the ranks, though such a case did exist in Massachusetts. Johnson, 31. Company L of the Sixth Massachusetts Infantry was African American, though the rest of the regiment was white. The regiment was mobilized with Company L in 1898. Company L joined the 6th in 1878.

100. The Guardsman seems to have been a locally published journal for National Guard members in Illinois. No extant issues have been located. Chamberlin appears to have been white, as was George W. Bristol, later a Captain with the 1st Infantry ING, who succeeded him as an instructor and teacher with the 9th Battalion. Goode, 13–17. The 1st Regiment was the wealthiest and most socially prestigious regiment in Chicago and, perhaps, in the ING. Their support for the African American guard organization, while probably not crucial, set the tone for how other whites, within and without the ING, would view the efforts of the 9th Battalion to enter the ING.


106. Under Illinois state law, no groups beyond the state militia could march publicly in uniform with weapons unless they had specific permission to do so granted by the Governor.


108. Chicago Daily Tribune, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 18, 19 July 1896; 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, July 1897.


110. “Photograph, Random set of men from the First Division of Illinois National Guard; Chicago (Ill.), ” ca. 1895, Photographer—D. H. Spencer, ICHi-26577, Chicago Historical Society, Prints & Photographs Department, 1601 N. Clark Street, Chicago, IL.

111. Goode, 13.

112. For example, the Chicago papers referred to African Americans, in association with their ING organizations, as “ladies and gentlemen.” Inter Ocean, 20 May 1879.


114. See Berlin, 230–33; Saville, 172.


119. The Chicago Tribune, Monday, 26 September 1881, 1.


122. The Chicago Tribune, Tuesday, 27 September 1881, 9.

123. The Chicago Tribune, Tuesday, 27 September 1881, 9.

124. The Chicago Tribune, Tuesday, 27 September 1881, 9. If the reporter's guess was correct, between 600 and 800 veterans marched beside the militia. As President Garfield had been a Mason, in Chicago the Masons were given the honor of escorting the catafalque, or funeral car. The other four divisions of the Chicago procession consisted of the Odd-Fellows (the 3rd); the Knights of Pythias (the 4th); city officials, including companies of police, firemen, and post office employees (the 5th); and various civil and ethnic societies, totaling some 9,100 (the 6th).

126. *The Chicago Tribune*, Tuesday, 27 September 1881, 4. The boosterism, while pardonable, hardly gives credit to the nine divisions that marched in the funeral cortège in Cleveland. See *The Chicago Tribune*, Monday, 26 September 1881, 1.


128. For other organizations with a wide range of members, see Carnes; Clawson; Taillon.

129. Memorial Day was initially the product of southern women who took a day in the spring when the local flower season was at its peak to decorate the graves of the men who died in the Civil War. In the north the idea was taken up by the various veteran associations as they honored fallen comrades. Matthew Dennis, *Red, White, and Blue Letter Days: An American Calendar* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), ch. 5.


133. Chamberlin, 11–25. The Oakland Rifles were an unaffiliated, private military company that worked as a feeder group to Company C, Fourth Infantry, providing them a pool of potential members and a large supply of active supporters.

134. Headenburg, 23


136. See chapter 7 of this book for a detailed history of the struggles for public funding by the ING.


139. Bunzey, 39–41.
Notes to Chapter 3

1. Bunzey, 357.
4. Cooper, 49.
5. Riker; Schneirov, *Labor and Urban Politics*, 59, reaches a similar conclusion but via a different route, noting the rise of a “business man’s militia” in Chicago just before the push to write a new militia bill and assuming causation from the coincidence of timing.

6. One example can be found in William Leach, *Land of Desire: Merchants, Power, and the Rise of a New American Culture* (New York: Pantheon, 1993), 58. “It was here that the greatest midwestern department stores bestrided the city’s center and that Marshall Field periodically called out the National Guard to crush the unions.” Marshall Field was indeed a powerful figure in Chicago, and one who supported the wealthy and fashionable First Regiment—though apparently neither of the other two regiments in town nor the African American companies. But he never “called out” the ING because he had no authority to do so. Only the governor at the request of the Mayor of Chicago or the Sheriff of Cook County could call out the ING for any purpose in Illinois, and the bulk of ING strike service actually took place far outside of Cook County anyway, in places where Marshall Field had little or no authority. Also, the ING was never once ordered to “crush the unions”; nor were any unions crushed. While Leach’s hyperbole about the powers of Marshall Field is a little over the top, similar sentiments about the nature of the National Guards as an organization totally responsive to elite control are fairly widely held. See also Smith, Philip S. Foner, *The Great Labor Uprising of 1877* (New York: Monad Press, 1977), conclusion; Riker, ch. 4; Trachtenberg, ch. 3; Eugene E. Leach, “The Literature of Riot Duty: Managing Class Conflict In the Streets,” *Radical History Review* 56 (1993): 23–50.

7. For histories of the militias see Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard*; Doubler; Martha Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965); Mahon; Hill. Many labor historians have alluded to the rise of militias and National Guards in the late nineteenth century, but few have focused on it, taking the connection between strikes and the formation of National Guard units as a given rather than a debatable proposition. See, for example, Schneirov, *Labor and Urban Politics*, and Schneirov et al. Older books that assume a direct relationship between industry and the National Guards include Bruce; Jeremy Brecher, *Strike!* (San Francisco: Straight Arrow Books, 1972); Philip Foner; and Samuel Yellen, *American Labor Struggles* (New York: S. A. Russell, 1956).

8. *Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894*, Section VI.

9. Disagreements could, of course, reach further than state v. county or city. In 1894 President Cleveland intervened and sent federal troops into Chicago, a move that infuriated both the mayor of the city and Governor John P. Altgeld, neither of whom felt that the situation warranted the presence of state troops, let alone the U.S. Army. See *Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894*, xl–xlv.

11. The classic example of pro-corporate behavior by the National Guards is during the Colorado mine strike in 1914. Colorado National Guard troops fired into a tent city constructed by striking miners and killed at least two women and eleven children. The Colorado National Guard troops had a history of close support for mine owners and operators, and they were condemned by National Guardsmen in other states for their actions. There is also strong evidence to suggest that these particular Colorado National Guardsmen were one and the same men hired by the mine operators as private guards, reformed into a CNG regiment in order to shift the cost onto the shoulders of Colorado taxpayers. See articles in the *National Guard Magazine* for May, June, and July 1914. See also Cooper, 149–50. In Montgomery, *Fall of the House of Labor*, 343–47, this is the only episode in his entire book in which he mentions the National Guards at all; otherwise they are entirely absent from his story—leaving the impression that this was a representative rather than an aberrant National Guard.


13. The Relief and Aid Society had a longstanding commitment to the prevention of a creation of a welfare class, which resulted in a number of policies designed to judge those most fit to receive aid and deny it to any who did not meet their standards for being only temporarily distressed. See Schneirov, *Labor and Urban Politics*; and Smith, 104. For further information on the Relief and Aid Society see Karen Sawislak, *Smoldering City: Chicagoans and the Great Fire, 1871–1874* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).


20. Collins, 17; *The Chicago Times*, Thursday, 29 July 1875, 5. Notice that Collins fails to suggest that any credit should belong equally to all the companies that mobilized for action.


22. Railroad strikers were generally very careful to keep passenger trains running as long as they could, as they did not want to jeopardize their generally favorable public support on the issue of the family wage. See Bruce; Montgomery; Philip Foner.
23. Bruce, chs. 7, 8.
25. Schneirov, *Labor and Urban Politics*, 69–76; Smith, 106–11. See also Bruce, ch. 12. Bruce indicated his opinion about the changing tenor of the labor movements as the strikes spread across the country and from railroad line to railroad line by titling his chapter on the events in Chicago and St. Louis “Marxists and the Mob.”
26. Collins, 64.
27. Schneirov, *Labor and Urban Politics*, 69–76; Smith, 106–11. See also Bruce, ch. 12.
28. Collins, 64.
31. Biennial Report ... 1877 and 1878, 103.
32. Biennial Report ... 1877 and 1878, 104.
33. Biennial Report ... 1877 and 1878, 103. The companies were later disbanded and mustered out of state service.
34. Bruce, 242; Schneirov, *Labor and Urban Politics*, 69–76; Smith, 106–11.
36. Biennial Report ... 1877 and 1878, 106.
38. Bruce, 251; Collins, 69; Schneirov, *Labor and Urban Politics*, 69–76; Smith, 106–11. General Ducat's report does not mention the volleys fired by the Second Regiment. The historian of the Second Regiment, Horace Bolton, recorded only that it “was called out to aid in repressing ‘The Railroad Riots,’ when their dash and coolness in dispersing the armed and desperate crowds which terrorized the city, fully established its reputation as an efficient and valuable organization.” Bolton, 14.
41. Biennial Report ... 1877 and 1878, 111–12.
42. Biennial Report ... 1877 and 1878, 108.
47. *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 8 February 1879.
49. It is not entirely clear why these sorts of confrontations didn’t take place during coal-mine strike-policing expeditions in Illinois. The best hypothesis is that the locations of the strikes, one center city and the other outside the city limits, affected the nature and composition of the crowds, with a primary difference being that the crowds that formed during coal strikes seemed not to have contained workers from other industries or shops, a pattern more typical of large rail strikes.

50. See active duty reports in Biennial Report . . . 1877 and 1878; Biennial Report . . . 1889 and 1890; Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894; and Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898.

51. See reports on active duty in Biennial Report . . . 1877 and 1878; Biennial Report . . . 1889 and 1890; Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894; Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898; Biennial Report . . . 1899 and 1900; and Biennial Report . . . 1903 and 1904. See also “J. H. Barkley, Colonel Commanding the Fifth Regiment, ING, to Brigadier General J.N. Reece, Commanding the Second Brigade, ING. Springfield, IL, 6 June 1883,” 1883, 1883 Strike File, Governor Hamilton’s Correspondence, J. H. Barkley, RG 100.19, Illinois State Archives.

52. Birtle, 37–57, argues that the National Guard could take a “non-partisan” stance in regard to the disputing parties while policing strike-related situations and nevertheless end up with the public impression that their presence had ultimately served the ends of management when the strikes collapsed without securing their aims.


54. For example, there was no state-supported summer camp training in 1890 due to budget shortfalls. Biennial Report . . . 1889 and 1890, 5. See also Illinois’ Writers Project, “Camp Lincoln,” Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 34, no. 3 (1941): 281–302.

55. The Chicago Tribune, 25 May 1883, 26 May 1883, 27 May 1883, 29 May 1883, 30 May 1883, 1 June 1883. The Chicago Tribune has a long reputation as an “anti-labor” newspaper, but the chronology of the strike they reported matches the chronology Colonel Barkley reported to Adjutant General Reece. Barkley to Reece, 6 June 1883.

56. Barkley to Reece, 6 June 1883.

57. In the traditional mines, after the shaft was dug and the lifts installed, it was up to each miner to work his own section of coal as assigned by the mine foreman, either a “room,” or along a “long wall.” In Illinois most mines were some variation of the “room” arrangement. Once the miner had a “room,” it was up to him to make the cuts at the base of the coal seam (this was the part of the job known as mining), bore holes, lay in blasting powder, set off the explosion, gather up the fallen coal, load it into the car, and haul it to the opening to his “room” for the car drivers to pick up to take to the surface. The individual miner was also responsible for his own safety, including not only the results of his actual “work” but for the general area surrounding him as well. Miners ensured the structural stability of their “room” through timbering and
laid the track into the “room” that the coal cars ran along. Most of the work was done with the miner’s personal tools and supplies, including powder and blasting caps. For this work, miners were paid by the weight of the raised coal, excluding any shale or slate and pieces too small to make the grade. In “machine mines” a cutting machine developed in the early 1870s was used to make cuts under the coal seam, after which the miner continued to work in the usual way. The introduction of the cutting machine changed work relationships throughout the mines in which they were introduced through a slow and heavily contested process of de-skilling. Piece rates continued after the introduction of machine cutters, however, and productivity remained roughly equal overall for machine and traditional pick mines. The price and productivity of an individual mine were, however, dependent on the quality and type of coal in the region, and so there were regional variations in price and productivity between machine and traditional mines. See general studies of coal mining practices, for example, Keith Dix, *Work Relations in the Coal Industry: The Hand-Loading Era, 1880–1930* (West Virginia: Institute for Labor Studies, 1977); Price V. Fishback, *Soft Coal, Hard Choices: The Economic Welfare of Bituminous Coal Miners, 1890–1930* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). For work more specific to Illinois, see John H. M. Laslett, *Nature’s Noblemen: The Fortunes of the Independent Collier in Scotland and the American Midwest, 1855–1899* (Los Angeles: Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, 1983).

58. Report by the Governor of Illinois to the 33rd General Assembly, Concerning the Use of the State Militia in Support of the Civil Authorities, in Madison and St. Clair Counties, in May, 1883. “J. D. Miner, Caseyville to Governor Hamilton of Illinois, 31 May, 1883,” 1883, May 23–31, 1883, Governor Hamilton’s Correspondence, J. D. Miner, RG 100.19, Illinois State Archives.

59. Nationally the unit of measurement was generally one ton, but in Illinois the standard piece unit was one bushel. Shale and slate are two of the most common types of coal with too many impurities to be used effectively as a fuel source.

60. J. D. Miner to Governor Hamilton, 31 May 1883. Disagreements over the weighing process were endemic to coal mining because the miners were perennially suspicious that they were being shortchanged by the mine operators. See Fishback, ch. 5. There were also some complaints about the stiff penalties for loading “dirty” coal (coal with too many impurities), but these again were perennial labor-management conflicts in the coal mining industry.

61. “Telegram from B. Lowman, Sec’y, Belleville, Illinois to Governor Hamilton, 3 May 1883,” 1883, 1883 Strike File, Governor Hamilton’s Correspondence, B. Lowman, RG 100.19, Illinois State Archives. “We the miners have held a meeting & are fully determined to stand by our resolutions that were passed by us, by advice of our attorneys R.A. Halbert and Ed B——s.”

62. Barkley to Reece, 6 June 1883, 7.

63. “Governor Hamilton, Springfield to E. J. Crandall, Collinsville, Illinois 26 May 1883,” 1883, Strike File 1883, Governor Hamilton’s Correspondence, Governor Hamilton, RG 100.19, Illinois State Archives. The Governor sent this message via telegraph, collect.
64. Barkley to Reece, 6 June 1883, 7.
65. Barkley to Reece, 6 June 1883, 7–9.
66. Barkley to Reece, 6 June 1883, 10.
67. Barkley to Reece, 6 June 1883, 10.
69. Barkley to Reece, 6 June 1883, 10.
70. Barkley to Reece, 6 June 1883, 11–14. Certainly the militia officers, including Colonel Barkley, felt satisfied that they had made themselves perfectly clear to the engineer and that he had quite deliberately ignored their requests and then instructions and even the repeated remonstrations of the ING officer riding in the engine with him as they approached the mine. The Chicago Tribune, 29 May 1883, 30 May 1883.
72. The Chicago Tribune, 29 May 1883, 30 May 1883, 1 June 1883.
73. “Geo. W. Parker, President and General Manager of the St. Louis, Alton & Terre Haute Rail Road, to E. F. Leonard, Secretary, Springfield, IL, 24 May 1883,” 1883, Strike File 1883, Governor Hamilton’s Correspondence, Geo. W. Parker, RG 100.19, Illinois State Archives. Parker recounts a tale of an attempted sabotage of a railroad trestle, which he blames on the strikers.
74. Barkley to Reece, 6 June 1883, 1–2.
75. On his arrival, Barkley had presented himself with a letter of introduction to a Dr. Wadsworth, who in turn introduced Barkley to J. M. Pearson, a Justice of the Peace. Both Wadsworth and Pearson signed the telegraph to Governor Hamilton requesting state intervention in Madison County. Barkley to Reece, 6 June 1883.
76. Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894, VI.
77. Barkley to Reece, 6 June 1883. Telegram quoted on 2–3.
79. Barkley to Reece, 6 June 1883, 4.
80. In 1922, the company town was much less common in Illinois than in some other coal mining regions (more than 90 percent of Illinois coal miners lived in independent towns), and it seems that this was the case from the beginning of the exploitation of the coalfields. This may account for the relative freedom of county officials to implicitly oppose the mine operators. See Fishback, 164.
81. Barkley to Reece, 6 June 1883, 4.
82. Barkley to Reece, 6 June 1883, 4.
83. Barkley to Reece, 6 June 1883, 4.
84. See active duty reports in Biennial Report . . . 1889 and 1890; Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894; Biennial Report . . . 1899 and 1900.
85. See active duty reports in Biennial Report . . . 1889 and 1890; Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894; Biennial Report . . . 1899 and 1900.
86. Biennial Report . . . 1885 and 1886, 20–33.
87. Lause, 81–112.
90. “J. D. Miner, Caseyville to Governor Hamilton of Illinois, 31 May 1883,” 1883, May 23–31, 1883, Governor Hamilton’s Correspondence, J. D. Miner, RG 100.19, Illinois State Archives.
91. Miner to Hamilton, 31 May 1883.
92. Jas. K Magie, Plain Talk, 73.
94. Barkley to Reece, 6 June 1883.
95. Miner to Hamilton, 31 May 1883.
96. “News Clipping included in the letter, Joseph J. Reifgraby Chairman of the Mass=and Indignation=Meeting of St. Louis Citizens to Governor Hamilton of Illinois, 9 June 1883,” 1883, File June 10–15, 1883, Governor Hamilton’s Correspondence, Joseph J. Reifgraby, RG 100.19, Illinois State Archives.
97. All but one recent study of the history of the militia/national guards nationwide generally assume a direct link between the rise in national and statewide strikes and the growth of the state national guards in these decades. See Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, for the one that does not. See Doubler; Derthick; Mahon; Riker. Hill also rejects a connection between strike duty and militia resurgence.

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2. Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, ch. 4.
3. Cooper, The Rise of the National Guard, 44–45. Nineteen of forty-four state militias had no record of strike duty at all in this period.
6. See a collection of drill cards printed in 1882 by the New Hampshire National Guard, National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 168.2, “Pre-Federal Correspondence,” Box 21.
8. Bunzey, 13; Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, ch. 4.


11. See Kutlowski and Kutlowski, 5–38, for a discussion of militia service records and elective offices. The Kutlowskis suggest that among other factors, the impression of military service conferred on retired militia officers who carried their rank with them out of the National Guard was a significant advantage to men attempting to climb the ladder of political influence.

12. Only a small number of National Guard officers ever advocated a role for the militias specifically giving priority to strike interventions or even considered introducing tactics or training for the militias as a riot control force. Even when any consideration was given to the issue, theorists of riot control generally envisioned a military response. The theorists described the crowds which militia companies would face as “the enemy,” and they gave thought to the most efficient ways of killing large numbers of the “mob” at once and imposing martial law on the affected cities. See Eugene Leach, 23–50, for a discussion of the work of a small group of National Guard officers who saw in riot control a serious mission for the state militias and advocated training and preparation for such duties. Even here, however, curious distinctions arose. Most of the riot control literature that Leach writes about is focused on the strike in the large urban environment. At least in the Midwest, most strike intervention took place in largely rural settings with much smaller crowds of people and smaller bodies of militia than anticipated in the literature Leach surveys. The doctrine that the regulars articulated for dealing with labor-related civil disorder also assumed a military-style response as opposed to a police-style approach to maintaining order. The militias followed the regulars, up to and including adopting what consideration the professional army gave to the business of riot control. As a result of this dichotomy, Leach’s thesis that this literature speaks as much to certain middle-class fears as any actual strike intervention practices is all the more persuasive.

13. Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard*, chs. 6, 7.
14. See “Comment by General Fry” in General William T. Sherman, “The Militia,” *Journal of the Military Service Institution of the United States* 6, no. 21 (1885): 1–26. General Fry runs down a list of the various attempts to change the 1792 federal militia law in only the first twenty-five years of its existence, and their failure, beginning in 1803 and then in 1806, 1809, 1810, 1816, 1817, 1819, 1822, 1826, and 1829. Fry offers his list as proof that the defects of the 1792 law were obvious from the beginning and that the defects had never induced Congress to take any action to improve matters for the organization and disciplining of the militias.

15. The few state militia organizations that survived the aftermath of the Civil War, in New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts primarily, were explicitly modeled on the Union Army in organization and drill. Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard*, 25–26.

16. Turner, 12; *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 20 December 1874.


18. *Biennial . . . 1875 and 1876*, 2–6. State militias, including the Illinois militia, tended to award staff and senior line positions higher rank than the regulars, thus establishing the happy position of being able to create far more majors, colonels, and generals than they otherwise could have supported on their relatively small enlisted bases. As a result, when states came to consider active duty pay, they found that if they created “equivalency” charts—state militia ranks equal the rank in the regulars corresponding to similar job responsibilities—they could then use regular army pay standards much more economically.


22. Minute Book: Company “I” 7th Inf. Several entries discuss target shooting and target shooting matches; the strong implication is that they are practicing somewhere locally.

23. See Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard*; Cosmas, *An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish American War* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1971), ch. 1; Doubler, 112. See also Riker, ch. 4; and Derthick, ch. 2, for more information on the general development of the militias during these decades.


National Archives; “Capt. Gains Lawson, 25th Infantry, Fort Snelling, Minn, to the Adjutant General US Army, Washington, DC; August 12, 1886,” 1886, filed as “Mississippi 1886,” Box 23, Capt. Gains Lawson, RG 168.2, National Archives. See also Derthick and Mahon for information about developments in training in the 1890s and early part of the twentieth century.

31. Theo. Schwan to The Adjutant General, U.S. Army, September 10, 1885, Box 23, RG 168.2 5844 ACP 1885, 7840 AGO 1885, National Archives and Records Administration; Gaius Lawson to The Adjutant General, U.S. Army, August 12, 1886, Box 23, RG 168.2 “Misc 1886.”
32. See the 1908 Act, but in brief the new Militia Bureau in the War Department was responsible for overseeing the disbursement of federal funds to the various state organizations.
35. See Cooper, *The Rise of the National Guard*; Doubler. See also Millett and Maslowski, chs. 8, 10.
37. *The Chicago Tribune*, Friday, 21 October 1892.
42. *Biennial Report . . . 1891 and 1892*, 133.
43. Bunzey, 42; *The Chicago Tribune*, 19, 21, 22 October 1892.
47. Cary Ray Papers, “The First Infantry Illinois National Guard “The Dandy First” As military escort to the Chicago and Southern States Association, to the Southern Cotton States and International Exposition, Atlanta, Georgia, November 1895”; Blight, 272.
48. See Record Group 168, National Guard Bureau, National Archives and Records Administration, covering federal returns and correspondence from 1885 until 1916.
49. Cooper, 38–39.
50. Beginning in the 1880s, some ING regiments began experimenting with signal corps, bicycle corps, and hospital corps. Bolton, 21.
52. “Camp Lincoln,” 281–302. Summer camp could be postponed during
years of heavy active duty, for policing strike-affected regions, or for national service, or for lack of funds. For example, there was no summer camp in 1898 or 1915, two summers when the entirety of the ING was called into federal service, and in 1890 when there was no money. Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898, Biennial Report . . . 1889 and 1890. Capt. Gains Lawson, 25th Infantry, Fort Snelling, Minn, to the Adjutant General U.S. Army, Washington, DC; August 12, 1886, 1886, filed as “Mississippi” 1886,” Box 23, Capt. Gains Lawson, RG 168.2, National Archives, 1.


57. See Capt. Lewis Green to Chief, Division of Militia Affairs, 10 September 1909, Document 8237-B, Box 78, RG 168.7, NARA; A.L. Miles to Chief, Division of Militia Affairs, 8 May 1913, Document 39615, Box 181, RG 168.7, NARA.

58. M. C. Kerth to Illinois Adjutant General, 21 April 1909, Document 5950–2,3, Box 67, RG 168.7, NARA.


60. Bolton, 22.

61. Newspaper photo, header “When Cavalry officers gave tea for Mrs. Tanner and Friends at Camp Lincoln” in “the Family Album,” clipping in the Camp Lincoln Vertical File, Sangamon Valley Collection, Lincoln Library, 325 South 7th Street, Springfield, IL.


63. Newspaper clipping dated “1896” (and headlining Governor Altgeld) from a scrapbook in the Camp Lincoln Vertical File, Sangamon Valley Collection.

64. “Camp Lincoln,” 281; newspaper clipping dated “around 1901” (and headlining Sunday Visitors) from a scrapbook in the Camp Lincoln Vertical File, Sangamon Valley Collection.

65. See Bunzey, 39–41; Headenburg, 35.


68. Guy Mathis Collection, Militia pictures, ALPML.

70. Bunzey, 21.
71. Cary T. Ray Papers, “Resume of Service.”
72. ING Photographs, Chicago Historical Society; Guy Mathis Collection, Militia pictures, ALPML; photographs in the Camp Lincoln Vertical File, Sangamon Valley Collection.
73. Bunzey, 21.
74. Guy Mathis Collection, ALPML.
75. For example, in 1890 Senator W. D. Washburn of Minnesota donated a trophy to be awarded to the winner of a marksmanship competition between teams representing Wisconsin, Michigan, Iowa, Minnesota, and Illinois. If one team won the trophy three times in a row, the trophy became theirs permanently. Illinois won the competitions in 1891 and 1892. The third competition was held in 1903; the Illinois State Rifle team won that meet as well, and the trophy became theirs permanently. See Biennial Report . . . 1891 and 1892, 5; Biennial Report . . . 1903 and 1904, 7.
76. Goldstein and Gorn, 140.
79. Minute Book: Company “I” 7th Inf., ING, Record Group 301.106, Illinois State Archives, 39–48, April and May 1877 entries. Turner; see individual company histories.
80. The Chicago Tribune, Friday, May 14, 1875.
81. The Chicago Tribune, Friday, May 14, 1875.
82. Bunzey, 22.
83. See Bunzey; Bolton; Headenburg; and Turner.
84. The Chicago Tribune, Friday, May 14, 1875.
85. Headenburg, 27; Bunzey, 22.
86. See the individual company histories in Turner, Souvenir Album and Sketch Book.
88. The Chicago Tribune, 5 July 1883, 2.
90. Turner, 60.
91. Bunzey, 22. See the individual company histories in Turner, Souvenir Album and Sketch Book.
92. Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, 80.
94. See the Adjutant General reports in *Fourth Annual Report; Biennial Report . . . 1873 and 1874; Biennial Report . . . 1875 and 1876; Biennial Report . . . 1877 and 1878; Biennial Report . . . 1879 and 1880; Biennial Report . . . 1881 and 1882; Biennial Report . . . 1883 and 1884; Biennial Report . . . 1885 and 1886; Biennial Report . . . 1887 and 1888; Biennial Report . . . 1889 and 1890; Biennial Report . . . 1891 and 1892; Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894; Biennial Report . . . 1895 and 1896; Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898; Biennial Report . . . 1899 and 1900; Biennial Report . . . 1901 and 1902; Biennial Report . . . 1903 and 1904; Biennial Report . . . 1905 and 1906; Biennial Report . . . 1907 and 1908; Biennial Report . . . 1909 and 1910; Biennial Report . . . 1911 and 1912*; for the general history of the slow growth of state rifle ranges, replacement of old weapons with new, accounting practices for ammunition expended and saved, etc., and, most important, the ever-expanding office of the Inspector General of Rifle Practice.


100. Bolton; Bunzey; Chamberlin; Collins; Headenburg; Turner.


102. The *Chicago Tribune*, 3 July 1880.


108. A. L. Mills, Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, to Adjutant General of Illinois, 2 February 1914, Document 43398, Box 189, RG 168.7, NARA.

Notes to Chapter 5


2. Graham A. Cosmas, *An Army for Empire: The United States Army in the Spanish American War* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1971), 133–36, argues that National Guard officers and their supporters in Congress were directly responsible for the large calls for volunteer troops—200,000 strong and to be recruited by the states—and that the army did not need and could not adequately provide for under their existing logistical practices. Millett and Maslowski, 289, repeat the same assertion.


4. Under the provisions of the Volunteer Law of April 22, 1898, Congress authorized 3,000 volunteers to be recruited, organized, and officered directly by the federal government (separately from the 120,000 men to be drawn from the states, via the state National Guards, into the United States Volunteers). The famous First United States Volunteer Cavalry, or the “Rough Riders,” were raised under provisions of this law. On May 10, when the war objectives changed again, Congress authorized another 10,000 federal volunteers as the United States Volunteer Infantry, under the direct control of the regular army—i.e., no recourse to state Governors or Congressmen. The federal volunteers were supposed to be raised from men theoretically “immune” to tropical disease, thus the nickname “Immunes.” The regiments were given recruiting areas largely in the South with this end in view. Four of the federal infantry regiments raised as part of the 10,000 federal volunteers were filled by African American men, officered largely by white regular army officers. The Ninth Infantry USV, or “Immunes,” were part of this group. See Cosmas, 133–36; Millett and Maslowski, ch. 9.


8. Millet and Maslowski, 290. In all, over 200,000 men volunteered to serve in the Spanish American War.


10. Millet and Maslowski, 280. Observers accepted, often grudgingly, the idea of state militias as they developed in the 1870s and 1880s in the position
of reserve army because they believed that it would be virtually impossible to significantly alter the status quo. Alterations in the reserve system were believed impossible because (1) the people of the United States would never accept a large standing army, (2) there were no serious military threats to the security of the national boundaries to worry the population and so Congress, (3) the public was totally uninterested in military matters, (4) any changes were perceived to be a threat to the power and authority of state governors and to certain prerogatives of the state governments, and finally (5) the growing political power of the activist officers in the emerging National Guards. For secondary commentary see Abrahamson; Coffman; Cosmas; O’Toole; Trask; Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Army: Military Thought from Washington to Marshall (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962). See the following late nineteenth-century journal articles for views of the Guards: King, “The Military Necessities of the United States”; Michaelis, “The Military Necessities of the United States”; Price, “The Necessity for Closer Relations Between the Army and the People”; Sherman, “The Militia”; Wagner, “The Military Necessities of the United States, and the Best Provisions for Meeting Them”; Webb, “The Military Service Institution: What it is doing; What it may do.” In particular, see also Upton, The Military Policy of the United States, for a contemporary, and hostile, view of the guards from the professional officer ranks.

15. See Brown.
16. The Daily Inter-Ocean, 18, 20 February 1898.
17. See Cosmas; O’Toole. The American report merely concluded that the Maine sank as a result of an external explosion. The Spanish report concluded that the Maine sank as the result of an internal explosion, a conclusion shared by U.S. naval damage-control experts under Admiral Rickover who reexamined all the available data in 1976 and concluded that the Maine sank as the result of a spontaneous combustion of some coal with particular impurities that was stored in lockers next to the boiler room, and once the fire burned down the wall between the storage chamber and the boiler, the steam engine exploded, sinking the ship.
18. Millett and Maslowski, 289.
19. Cosmas, particularly chs. 1, 3, 4. Cosmas offers some evidence of influential individual National Guardsmen on Capitol Hill in 1898, but he overstates the case for the “powerful National Guard lobby.” He is, after all, referring to the same group who had been completely unable to secure any significant new legislation on their own behalf beyond a small increase in their federal budget in almost twenty years of agitation on the issue, and they got the increase in 1887—eleven years before the war. See Doubler, 113–15, and Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, 91–93.
22. Cosmas, 12–3, chs. 4, 5, 6; Trask, ch. 7.
23. O’Toole, 195. Seventy-seven percent of the volunteers were rejected on physical grounds, and 90 percent of those seeking commissions in the volunteer forces were rejected as well.
28. *Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898*, 28. See also Cosmas and Trask for their discussions of the difficulties of supplying the troops in the first weeks of the war. The limited supplies on the market only exacerbated the problems because the Army itself was not in the habit of stockpiling even such less perishable items as tents, clothing, and munitions.
29. Troops were also being mustered for an expedition for the Philippines, but those troops were drawn from the western states and gathered in San Francisco.
34. Bunzey; Cosmas, 230–36.
37. Cosmas, 251–52; Doubler, 131.
40. Cosmas, 251–52.
42. Kendrick to Scriven, Kendrick Collection, manuscripts division, CHS.
44. *Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898*, 39; McCard, 87.
46. See Johnson for a state-by-state breakdown of African American troops in state militias and National Guards from 1870 through WWII.
47. “Negroes Wish to Go,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 22 May 1898, 2.
53. McCard, 85.
57. “1st Illinois Volunteer Infantry, Morning Reports.”
58. Goode, 44–45. The editors of the Illinois Record protested this belief earlier, after the 10th Cavalry was ordered to Cuba, 9 April 1898.
61. The New York Times carried a brief notice of adjustment problems for the Eighth in San Luis on August 20, but there were no later national reports of trouble for the Eighth.
62. McCard, 90–96; Goode, chs. 7, 8, 9.
64. Goode, 212–14.
66. “Excerpt from a letter by Dr. Curtis, 1st Lt, 8th Ill. USV,” reprinted in Goode, 233–34.
69. McCard, 92.
70. Goode, 171. Goode includes a quote that the soldiers of the 8th believed to have been uttered by General Leonard Wood: “The soldiers of the Eighth were made up of the scums and slums of Chicago, or the state of Illinois.” Unfortunately for the 8th in this case, Wood was successfully maneuvering to be made the governor-general of all of occupied Cuba. Goode responded to the insult with “They were the scums of Chicago because they had Negro officers, we infer. Many thanks to General Wood.”
71. Goode, 238.
72. Goode, 238.
73. Goode, 238.
74. Goode, 237.
75. Goode, 278; McCard, 95.
76. McCard, 92, 95.
77. Bolton, 23.
78. Skinner, 286.
79. See the photographs reproduced in Meldrum, The Cuban Campaign.
80. John F. Kendrick to Margaret Scriven, 28 September 1958, John Kendrick Collection, Chicago Historical Society. Other memoirs of members of the First Regiment and their service in Cuba held at the Chicago Historical Society include those of Cary T. Ray, Horace Mellum, and Nicholas Budinger.
82. Skinner, 386
83. Bunzey, 37.
84. Bolton, 433.
85. Bunzey, 352.
86. Goode, 5.
87. McCard, 5.
88. McCard, 81.
89. Souvenir of the Banquet, 27.
90. In lieu of their first goal of obtaining a completely federalized reserve army, members of the regular army often proposed a system for reorganizing the National Guards to make them more efficient and useful by their standards. In the 1880s a favorite organizing strategy was to have one regiment per congressional district and to legislate a three-party payer system—federal, state, and local—to carry the significant cost increases that reformers felt would be necessary to properly outfit, supply, and train the new “reserves.” For example, see “Comment by General Fry” in Sherman. Fry refused to accept the viability of the militias and reiterated a commitment to the establishment of an entirely federalized reserve under the authority of Congress to raise an army, and he rejected the notion that the militia could ever be a useful or efficient body of reserve troop training. See also Price and Wagner. National Guard leadership also advocated different missions for the militias. Guardsmen along the Eastern Seaboard tended to be content with the idea of the militias as coastal defense alone, whereas Guardsmen from the interior states, like Illinois, tended to advocate a much more aggressive role for the Guard at home and also abroad as a reserve army. See Derthick, chs. 1, 2. However, very few Guardsmen advocated a primary role for the Guards as state strike police.
92. The federal appropriation for the militias doubled in 1887 from $200,000 to $400,000 as a response to National Guard Association (est. 1879) lobbying. Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, ch. 3.
93. Upton. See also Magie, 73.
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3. See Montgomery; Schnierov et al., Introduction.
4. Cooper, *Rise of the National Guard*, 49. The ING intervened in fifteen strikes (nine in the coalfields) between 1878 and 1899, the Ohio National Guard in eight, and the New York National Guard in six; the Pennsylvania National Guard troops intervened in only four strikes after 1877.
5. See “J. H. Barkley, Colonel Commanding the Fifth Regiment, ING, to Brigadier General J.N. Reece, Commanding the Second Brigade, ING. Springfield, IL, 6 June 1883,” 1883, 1883 Strike File, Governor Hamilton’s Correspondence, J. H. Barkley, RG 100.19, Illinois State Archives.
7. Brackett, 16.
15. Ray Papers, “Resume of Service.”
21. Merithew and Barrett, 138–39; “Occasions on which the Organized Militia has been called out in aid of Civil Authorities,” Report Prepared by the Bureau of National Guards for the War 1908, Document #3135, Box 57, Bureau of Militia Affairs, RG 168.7, NARA.
23. Merithew and Barrett, 142.
25. “Occasions on which the Organized Militia has been called out in aid of Civil Authorities,” 1908.
27. For a basic overview of the issues and the events of the strike intervention in Chicago, see the following in *Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894*: Report of the Adjutant General, XIV–XXVIII; Altgeld’s Protests and the

28. Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894, XL–XLIV. See also Cooper, Rise of the National Guard; Cooper, The Army and Civil Disorder; Coakley; and Schneirov et al.

29. Ray Papers, “Resume of Service.”
30. Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894, XV–XVI.
31. Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894, XVI.
32. Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894, XVII. “Moving the Trains” generally consisted of guarding, with however many men were necessary, each train as it left the train yards and proceeded out of town far enough to pick up speed sufficient to prevent any sensible person or persons from personally blocking the tracks. “Guarding” was when the engine and cars were surrounded by ING troops facing outward toward the crowds. The guards moved with the train, keeping it surrounded and forcing individuals who might be blocking the tracks to clear them until open track was reached. In his article “Honest Men and Law-Abiding Citizens: The 1894 Railroad Strike in Decatur,” Sampson claims that Altgeld “over-reacted” to the strike and that militia intervention in Decatur was not necessary.

35. Montgomery; Schneirov et al.
36. See “Governor Altgeld’s Protests Against the use of Federal Troops in Illinos During the Late Strikes and the President’s Replies,” in Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894, XL–XLIV.
38. Merithew and Barrett, 142.
39. Merithew and Barrett, 142; Smith; Ray Papers, “Resume of Service.”
42. Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, ch. 3.
43. This observation comes from reading the coverage of several strikes in The Chicago Tribune and the Illinois State Journal, including editorials, front page articles, wire service notes, and back page follow-up pieces. See, for example, The Chicago Tribune, frequent coverage daily between 28 May–6 June, 1883, on Collinsville and Belleville; and 30 September–20 October, 1898, on Virden and Pana.
44. Barkley to Reece, 6 June 1883, 8.

45. “Governor Hamilton, Springfield to Fred Ropiequet, Sheriff, Belleville, Illinois, 27 May 1883,” 1883, Strike File 1883, Governor Hamilton's Correspondence, Governor Hamilton, RG 100.19, Illinois State Archives.

46. “Governor Hamilton, Springfield to E. J. Crandall, Collinsville, Illinois 26 May 1883,” 1883, Strike File 1883, Governor Hamilton's Correspondence, Governor Hamilton, RG 100.19, Illinois State Archives. The Governor sent this message via telegraph, collect.

47. “Report of Adjutant General Alfred Orendorff to Governor Altgeld, October 1, 1894,” in Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894, VII–VIII.


49. Notwithstanding General Order No. 8, the commander of the strike intervention in La Salle encamped his men on mine-owned property, though apparently well away from the actual mine and mine buildings. See “Report of Col. Fred Bennitt, 3rd Inf, ING to Adjutant General Orendorff, 1 June 1894,” Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894, 42; Biennial Report . . . 1889 and 1890, 154–75.


56. Strikers and bystanders were killed and wounded by ING rifle fire in 1883 (one killed and one wounded) and 1894 (at least six killed and many


58. Chicago Tribune, 30 May 1883.


64. Illinois State Journal, 13, 14, 15, August 1898.


67. Illinois State Journal, 29, 30 September, 1 October 1898.


69. Illinois State Journal, 8 October 1898; Pana/Virden strike photographs, ALPML; Biennial Report . . . 1899 and 1900.

70. Illinois State Journal, 23 September 1898.


73. Illinois State Journal, 10 October 1898.


76. The Chicago Tribune, 13 October 1898.

77. The Chicago Tribune, 15 October 1898; see also The Chicago Tribune, 26 October 1898.

78. The Chicago Tribune, 13 October 1898.

79. Lewis, “Job Control and Race Relations.”

80. The Chicago Tribune, 15 October 1898; see also The Chicago Tribune, 26 October 1898.


82. Illinois State Journal, 3 December 1904.


86. Schneierv et al., 1–14.
87. *The Chicago Tribune*, 15 October 1898; see also *The Chicago Tribune*, 26 October 1898.

88. The mine operators did so anyway and were promptly rewarded with the riots that all had predicted. When the militia was sent to intervene, they pointedly refused to guard African American strikebreakers or arrest strikers. *Biennial Report . . . 1889 and 1890*, 154–75. *Illinois State Journal*, 10 October, 1898.

89. *Illinois State Journal*, 2 October 1898.


92. This practice changed over time, and in 1898 and 1899 Illinois militia spent months occupying strike-torn regions. See appendix H.

93. See Lause, “Cruel Striker War.”


101. Cosmas, Millett, and Maslowski.

102. See sections of the AGs’ introductory reports titled “In Aid of the Civil Authorities,” in *Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894*; and *Biennial Report . . . 1889 and 1890*. According to Merithew and Barrett, coal strikes did get more violent beginning in 1894.

103. See the several reports of strike duty beginning on page 154 in *Biennial Report . . . 1889 and 1890*.

104. “Report of Adjutant General J. N. Reece to the Governor, Oct. 1, 1900,” in *Biennial Report . . . 1899 and 1900*, 7. AG Reece went on to note that the militia accounts were overdrawn by $128,000 because of strike service in 1898 and 1899.

105. Alfred Orrendorf to T.B. Needles, Chairman House Committee Appropriations, 14 February 1895, copy in Governor’s Correspondence, Illinois State Archives.

106. See Barkley to Reece, 6 June 1883, *Chicago Daily Tribune*, 29 May 1883. See also Eugene E. Leach, “Literature of Riot Duty.”

Notes to Chapter Seven


2. This process is very similar to the processes of state building described in Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social*

6. Collins, 46–57; Schneirov, Labor and Urban Politics, 59, suggests that this bill represented a “stunning triumph of Chicago’s top citizens in creating new state administrative apparatus and centralizing political power.” This view is quite Chicago-centric and overlooks how relatively little Ducat received in light of what he requested.
17. Biennial Report . . . 1881 and 1882, 5–7. Then—Adjutant General I. H. Elliot used his opening statement in the Biennial Report to explain that this appropriation (The Military Code of Illinois, Article 10, provided for a 0.01 mil property tax to supply militia funds—see Revised Statutes. Illinois, 1882) was at least $20,000 short of meeting the obligations imposed by the 1879 Military Code. Biennial Report . . . 1887 and 1888, 13.
19. Biennial Report . . . 1911 and 1912, 144. And this was long after the federal outlay for the National Guards had moved in the millions annually.
20. See Adjutant General’s reports at the front of each of the biennial reports issued between 1874 and 1912.
21. For more on late-nineteenth-century attitudes against state government spending, see Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, 42–43; Schneirov, Labor and Urban Politics, 329–35.
22. Chicago Daily Tribune, 6 June 1883, 13 March 1887.
23. Chicago Daily Tribune, 3 July 1889.
26. Schneirov, Labor and Urban Politics, 59. Schneirov argues that the “Businessmen’s Militia”—his name for the First Illinois—was formed solely in response to these events. Schneirov ignores militia companies elsewhere in the city and around the state and so does not read the First Illinois as part of a larger militia phenomenon. In 1874 Chicago was home to another regiment’s worth of companies—most were gathered together the following year into the Second Regiment—and to scattered and small African American companies as well. There were also a steadily growing number of companies scattered throughout the state. See appendix J.
29. Biennial Report . . . 1875 and 1876, 8–9. There was great controversy at the time over the role that Hilliard would play in pushing for the 1879 legislation, with some observers feeling that he did all but scuttle the bill over a disagreement about the size and type of responsibilities that would be given the Adjutant General. See Collins.
30. Biennial Report . . . 1877 and 1878, 1–12. Hilliard did not get anywhere near so princely a sum as $200,000 annually, but he did get an annual appropriation in the next militia act.
32. Biennial Report . . . 1881 and 1882, 5. Elliot’s opening line of his argument is almost as interesting: “It is not my province to discuss in this report the necessity of what is known as a National Guard in the United States, but . . .”; he then goes on to do a bit of that anyway, which is why his other sentence is more interesting.
39. In 1908 the Adjutant General of Illinois estimated that over the preceding five years the ING lost on average 20 percent of its almost 6,000 strong membership annually. That meant that every year ING officers needed to recruit on average 1,200 new members. Thomas W. Scott, Adjutant General of Illinois to Lieutenant Colonel E. M. Weaver, Chief, Division of Militia Affairs, Washington DC, April 1, 1908, Record Group 168.7, Box 45, #111 April 3, 1908, Filled with #91, National Archives and Records Administration.
40. See Kutlowski and Kutlowski, 5–38, for a discussion of militia service records and elective offices. The Kutlowskis suggest that among other factors the impression of military service conferred on retired militia officers who carried their rank with them out of the National Guard was a significant contribution to men attempting to climb the ladder of political influence. See also Cunliffe; Douglass; Ryan; Schneirov, Labor and Urban Politics; Hannah, “A Place in the Parade,” 82–108.
41. Schneirov, Labor and Urban Politics; Schneirov et al.
43. For information on Torrence, see Chicago Daily Tribune, 29 January 1882; 31 January 1882.
44. Chicago Inter Ocean, 28 March 1893.
45. The Chicago Tribune, 15 September 1895.


52. Illinois Record, 19 March 1898.


54. Chicago Daily Tribune, 27 May 1898.

55. All of the relevant correspondence is reprinted in Willard B. Gatewood, Jr., “Smoked Yankees” and the Struggle for Empire” (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1971) 179–235. It is worth noting that skin color played at least a part in some of the controversy as John Marshall was very light-skinned and had blue eyes, fair enough some said to pass for white if he wanted to. The complaints of the men in Cuba focused on food, being kept in camp, the heat, tropical illnesses, and Marshall’s extremely exacting standards for behavior, which resulted in some 200 courts-martial for disciplinary infrac-

tions while the unit was stationed in San Luis.

56. Illinois Record 26 November 1898, 4 February 1899.

57. Gatewood, “An Experiment in Color,” 312. In 1913 Marshall was charged with filing a time card for his game warden duties the same week he also filed to receive pay for attending ING summer camp, and he had to resign from the Eighth in some disgrace.

58. See, for example, Captain Lewis D. Greene to The Chief, Division of Militia Affairs, War Department, Washington, DC, 10 September 1909, NARA RG 168.7 Box 78 #8237-B filed with #8071, BR 1906, Inspection reports, BR 1908 inspection reports, Report of 12 Sept 1910, NARA RG 168.7 box 103 #14286-D.


60. Biennial Report . . . 1907 and 1908, 270.

61. “Confidential sheet to accompany Field Inspection Report of 8th Illinois Infantry, in camp at Camp Lincoln, Springfield, Illinois, Aug. 31st to Sept. 6th, 1913.” RG 168.7 Box 189, #43389, filed with #41592, National Records Administration, Washington, DC.


63. Chicago Daily Tribune, 8 February 1879; Gatewood, “An Experiment in Color.”

64. See Chicago Daily Tribune, 1 August 1881, for a call for ING officers to create just such a body to see to their concerns.

65. Chicago Daily Tribune, 7 December 1887.

66. Chicago Daily Tribune, 8 December 1887. The amendments that year
were bent toward increasing the abilities of officers to enforce discipline among
the enlisted personnel.
68. The laws also included a clause that prohibited any but recognized
militia companies from parading with weapons unless they had a special
license from the Governor. Militia Law of 1879 in Revised Statutes. Illinois 1882.
69. Illinois Statutes. The Militia Law was rewritten or substantially amend-
ed in 1874, 1876, 1879, 1885, 1897, 1899, and 1903. See the General Orders
published in the complete run of the biennial reports.
70. Biennial Report . . . 1885 and 1886; Illinois' Writers Project, “Camp
Lincoln.”
71. See General Orders and Circulars in Biennial Report . . . 1883 and
1884; Biennial Report . . . 1885 and 1886.
73. See Collins; Turner; Headenburg; Fourth Annual Report; Biennial Report
. . . 1873 and 1874; Biennial Report . . . 1875 and 1876; Biennial Report . . .
1877 and 1878; Biennial Report . . . 1879 and 1880; Biennial Report . . . 1881
and 1882; Biennial Report . . . 1883 and 1884; Biennial Report . . . 1885 and
1886; Biennial Report . . . 1887 and 1888; Biennial Report . . . 1889 and 1890;
Biennial Report . . . 1891 and 1892; Biennial Report . . . 1893 and 1894; Biennial
Report . . . 1895 and 1896; Biennial Report . . . 1897 and 1898; Biennial Report
. . . 1899 and 1900; Biennial Report . . . 1901 and 1902; Biennial Report . . .
1903 and 1904; Biennial Report . . . 1905 and 1906; Biennial Report . . . 1907
and 1908; Biennial Report . . . 1909 and 1910; Biennial Report . . . 1911 and
1912. See also Roy Turnbaugh, “Ethnicity, Civic Pride, and Commitment: The
Evolution of the Chicago Militia,” Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society
72, no. 2 (1979): 111–27.
74. Turner, Collins, Headenburg, Chamberlin, Goode, Minute Book
Company “I.” Turner, Headenburg, Goode, and Chamberlin are all examples
of fund-raising materials. See also Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, 60.
75. Robert M. Fogelson, America's Armories: Architecture, Society, and
76. Biennial Report . . . 1895 and 1896, 8. Some regiments owned or leased
their own specialized armories, but these were privately constructed.
80. Biennial Report . . . 1905 and 1906, 5–6. Scott was unfortunately pre-
scient. The state arsenal building burned down completely in the early 1930s.
83. Collection G1986:097, Prints and Photographs Division, Chicago
Historical Society. The report emphasizes the terrible conditions the cavalry
put up with. The armory was really just the offices in front of and over an old
stable complex, with ladder stairs between levels, low Jerry-rigged hallways
hung above the riding arena to provide access to company quarters in an old
hay loft and storage areas, and poor stable conditions for the horses them-
selves—in short a giant fire-trap.
There was some disgruntlement in the black community over the eight-month lag between promised completion and actual opening of the new armory.

There is an extensive biographical essay on a major donor, Mr. Marshall Field, in the souvenir, who purchased the land and then gave the First Regiment a very generous 99-year lease on the property and the building they erected on it.

The proposed militia bill indicates a close relationship with the regular army via regulation and boards of inspection and training made up of representatives of both the National Guards and the regular army. This proposed bill also mandated an organizational plan that assigned to each congressional representative a minimum of 700 uniformed militia as the basis for receiving federal aid. Seven hundred men would be either a minimum strength regiment or a maximum strength battalion organization.
Initially there was much debate over how much to ask for—$1 million, $2 million, $5 million—but the convention members settled on $1 million as the most feasible project.

Derthick comments on the “vague” notions that INGA and the NGAUS held about their goals and their future, but I think these statements, twenty years apart, are far more notable for their singleness of purpose and the clarity, if not the feasibility, of the vision.

For discussions of the Federalization, or Nationalization, of the Guard over the first quarter of the twentieth century see Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, chs. 5, 6; Derthick; Doubler; Hill; Mahon; Riker.}


See Proceedings INGA for 1897, 1898, 1900.

Cooper, Rise of the National Guard, 111–27.

“A. L. Mills, Chief of the Division of Militia Affairs, to Adjutant General of Illinois, 2 February 1914, Document 43398, Box 189, RG 168.7, NARA.

124. See front page editorial cartoon in the *Illinois Cavalryman*, 5 August 1916. The cartoon features a wounded soldier from the fighting in Europe, front and center, and on the distant edge of the picture is a small line of tents marked “Mexican Border.”


126. See complete run (twelve issues) of the *Illinois Cavalryman*. 