Moral Order in the World of Work: Social Control and the Guilds in Europe

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In urban communities guilds exercised a wide ranging, if incomplete, social control during the early modern period. This social control encompassed both members and nonmembers and mainly touched on their economic lives but was also extended to such social issues as marriage and burial and the gendered division of labor, and to cultural aspects like common meals, celebrations, and rituals, or a shared religion among the membership, as well as exclusion of other religions, notably the Jewish.

In developing this argument, the chapter will, at one and the same time, claim that social control was very important in the early modern guild system but that it was also circumscribed in various ways. One of these is that the guild system was basically an urban phenomenon—and townspeople were a small minority compared to the huge numbers of villagers. If we consider 10,000 inhabitants the standard to call a community urban, a mere 10 percent of Europeans lived in towns by 1800 and only half that percentage in 1500.¹ Even if we consider this standard excessive, there is no way in which the figures can be fundamentally redressed in favor of the towns.

In the towns, moreover, the guilds’ control in areas it claimed to supervise, such as training, or the production of many privileged goods, was not necessarily complete. In fact, the assessment of this particular aspect of the guild system has shifted significantly in recent years. For a very long time guilds were seen as bulwarks of conservatism, holding the urban economies of early modern Europe to ransom with their outdated monopolies. Guilds were portrayed as Gothic relics, carried over from the Middle Ages into a time that would have been better off without them.² Significantly, their demise happened to coincide with the industrial revolution, strongly suggesting that progress had been hampered by their grip on the economy. The point was hammered home by Adam Smith, who observed in his Wealth of Nations:
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some conversation to raise prices. It is impossible to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies, much less to render them necessary.  

Smith died just before his proposals were enacted by the French revolutionaries in 1791, when the guilds were abolished.

The essence of Smith's remarks is that incorporated artisans not merely conspired against the public but were actually capable of enforcing their control of labor and product markets. This is strongly doubted in the more recent literature. Much of that recent literature explores how the rules of the guilds translated into practice, and the general opinion seems to be that there were serious gaps between what the statute books said ought to happen and what was in fact happening on the work shop floor. “Flexibility” has become the new buzzword when it comes to characterizing the activities of the guilds and explaining how they were able to survive across seven centuries and against the odds of major changes in the structure of the economy and the general society. The new orthodoxy, however, creates a dilemma that is conveniently passed over by most authors. If the guilds were so easily adaptable to any new circumstance confronting them and gave in to any serious challenge to their monopolies, what was the point of continuing them in the first place? That question is in order, because guilds were ubiquitous in early modern Europe and were charging people to join them. Some authors claim that people continued to pay admittance fees simply to avoid the hassle of confrontation. However, to see millions of people over several hundreds of years paying often substantial amounts of money, all for the relatively minor pleasure of being left alone, seems to beg the question of how these guilds were able to instill such fear. Certainly not by being merely “flexible”!

The debate about the guilds' regulations and their enforcement thus strikes at the very heart of social control. On one side we find sets of fairly strict regulations, on the other side presumably flexible practices. In the light of modern research, it will not do merely to insist that the regulations mattered. The guilds had to come to terms with the fact that many of their privileges were very difficult to monitor and to enforce. At the same time, there can be no question that substantial efforts were nonetheless made to enforce them. This chapter deals with the strategies used by craft guilds to make their regulations stick. Guilds in all western European countries tended to underline a dichotomy between insiders and outsiders, that is, between those who were members of the guild, or otherwise belonged to the guild community, and those who did not. We will be
looking at the guilds’ attitudes toward their own recruitment and membership and at their attempts to regulate the workforce, as well as at the ways guilds were dealing with nonincorporated competitors, especially females.

Apprentices: Learning the Rules of the Game

It was possible to enter the guild system through alternative routes, mainly that of matrimony (marrying a master’s widow or daughter), but by far the most common point of entry was apprenticeship. So whatever control guilds could exercise, it had to start here. And indeed, most guilds cared deeply about apprenticeship and tried to regulate it in great detail. Extensive lists of registered apprentices also suggest that guilds tried their best to keep track of the people in the system.

Initially, apprenticeship may have fallen outside the scope of guild regulations. After 1300, however, it is mentioned routinely in guild statutes. The primary goal of apprenticeship was, of course, learning the skills of a trade. Indeed, S. R. Epstein has recently claimed that transmitting skills was, in the absence of state-sponsored schools, the main economic function of guilds. It allowed guilds to continue playing a key role in the transmission and distribution of technological innovation, and tacit knowledge more generally. It was, Epstein claims, also the main reason for their survival over an impressive period of time.

Apprenticeship usually took place during a child’s teens and took several years. Two or three years seem to have been a minimum, but apprenticeships of seven, eight, or even ten years are recorded, and they may not even be exceptional. In eighteenth-century Paris an apprentice stayed with his master for an average of four years and ten months. In England, the Statute of Artificers of 1563, which regulated apprenticeship across trades and across the country, stipulated a general term of seven years for all apprenticeships. Dutch tailors’ guilds usually required two years of training, but in actual practice an apprentice served three to four years in the service of a master.

Remarkably, the statutes have very little to say about what the training actually entailed. But obviously, it must have been more than just skills. The varying lengths of apprenticeships already suggest this: if Dutch tailors were supposed to learn their trade in two years, why should the English need seven? One possible explanation is that masters had to recoup their initial investment in a child’s training, by employing him (or her) at substandard wages for an additional period of time. This might explain why Dutch orphanages had to agree to three- or four-year contracts to apprentice their orphans. Part of the answer, however, seems to be that the apprentice was supposed to learn other things as well, besides the “mystery” of the trade. In actual fact, the statutes are more concerned with these aspects than they are with the technical education of the apprentice.
In Paris, the guilds insisted that the apprentice be of legitimate birth and come from a Catholic family. He should under all circumstances behave respectfully toward the master and the master’s family. Likewise, the master and his wife should look upon their young ward benevolently. Daniel Defoe has a fictional master exclaim that he is “a parent to the boy tho not a father, and that the duty of taking care of him, both soul and body, was mine.” Although this is not written down, it seems evident that the guilds themselves conveyed a strong moral framework of Christian charity, as well as middle-class honesty. It thus provided an introduction into “a more general bourgeois culture.”

In seventeenth-century England, cheap manuals instructed apprentices on how to conduct themselves. These manuals emphasized such values as “honesty, sobriety, sexual abstinence and, above all, diligent attention to the master’s interests.”

In London, City regulations stipulated that apprentices could wear only the clothes provided by their masters. The tin-plate workers’ guild also required the apprentices to wear a special badge, and the vintners’ apprentices had a cap badge. The dress code for apprentices required modesty and precluded wearing colorful outfits or precious tissues like silk. English apprenticeship regulations could even extend to the youngster’s hairstyle: it should be cropped. In 1626 the London butchers hired a barber to give the apprentices a haircut. And in July 1640 the London Court of Aldermen insisted that an apprentice who wanted to receive the freedom of the city “shall first present himself at that time with the hair of his head cut in a decent and comely manner.” Beards were out of the question, of course. Apprentices should not dress above their status. The masters, who were supposed to provide a chest in which the apprentice’s clothes were kept, had the right to inspect the contents of that chest.

Apprentices’ behavior was also regulated outside the workplace. In numerous Parisian apprenticeship contracts, it was expressly stated that the apprentices should not go into bars or hang out with the wrong sort of people. In London apprentices could not participate in dances or masquerades, nor could they go to tennis courts or bowling alleys, not to mention brothels or cock fights. Apprentices could not get married. It is important to keep in mind that the apprentices were mostly teenage males and for this reason alone guilds, parents, and public authorities were keen to oversee their comings and goings. When, in eighteenth-century France, apprenticeship came under fire as part of the guild monopolies, those in favor of the institution defended apprenticeship as a pillar of the biological and moral order, concerned as it was with the socialization of males during puberty, as much as with the economic (learning a trade) and sociopolitical (introduction into the corporate world) orders of society.

Apprenticeship was regulated in three distinct ways in early modern Europe. England was the only country where national law provided the framework for apprenticeship, from its introduction in the Statute of Artificers in 1563 until the repeal of the apprenticeship clauses in 1814. However, its enforcement was
not provided for, and it was mainly the guilds who undertook this. As a result, the statute’s clauses were monitored much more closely in incorporated towns than they were in the countryside. In France apprenticeship was regulated by private contract, usually notarized. Guilds, however, were very often cosignatories to the contract. In the Low Countries and the German-speaking territories, apprenticeship was directly overseen by the guild, which laid down the rules and took care of registration and enforcement wherever deviation from the rules was suspected. It is as yet too early to explain these variations, but we have good reasons to assume that in all three types the guilds played a crucial role. Were they also successful in making the rules stick?

In general, that is difficult to say. We have no systematic information on enforcement of apprenticeship rules. The best information relates to time aspects of the apprenticeship contract. As was discussed above, it is quite likely that most trades could be learned in a relatively short span of time. Long terms of apprenticeship, like the seven years required in England, therefore were not necessarily in the interest of the apprentice, who might be tempted to run away before the expiration of his term. To persuade the apprentice to stay on, he might be offered a small wage during the later stages of the apprenticeship. But that diminished the master’s return on the time and effort invested in the apprenticeship. The great majority (almost 90 percent in Bristol during the seventeenth century) finished the full apprenticeship anyway, and some stayed on even longer. In sixteenth-century London the drop-out rate was substantially higher than in Bristol, or in the small towns of England. No more than forty percent of apprentices actually stayed the full seven years. However, among a sample of 250 apprentices entering seven different London companies, only seven had not completed a seven-year apprenticeship, and as much as sixty percent in this group had done more than the required seven years of training.

So, even if not all apprentices served the full term—and it seems a great many did take the whole course—guilds were successful at enforcing the requirement for their own members. One possible explanation is the check, afterward, of their record as an apprentice. Many guilds, not just in England, requested a candidate member to produce not only a masterpiece but also proof of his apprenticeship record. In sixteenth- and seventeenth-century London, however, about half of the apprentices failed to become masters. In Bristol as many as two-thirds did not become masters after finishing an apprenticeship. Part of this is explained by early deaths; teenagers were still a vulnerable age group. Some were discharged early by their masters because they were good-for-nothings, or for some other reason. But the great majority simply drifted away. Detailed research in seventeenth-century Bristol strongly suggests that the town–countryside relationship was crucial here. Although apprenticeships in the countryside were quite possible, the urban guilds probably provided better training facilities for many crafts. It may have contributed also to one’s reputation as a
craftsman to have been trained in a town. Bristol apprentices may have found the financial obstacles of setting up a shop in town simply too expensive, or the prospects too unattractive. When the local economy improved later in the seventeenth century, the number of apprentices recruited into the local guilds increased significantly, as opportunities opened up again. The Bristol data thus strongly suggest that even where there were no formal exams, as in the countryside, apprentices would tend to take the full course.

If necessary, masters would force runaway apprentices to finish their terms. Cases brought to trial under the 1563 Statute of Artificers usually concerned runaways. Most were apprehended with the help of informers, hoping for a reward. Already in the Middle Ages guilds had employed such informers. But the authorities were not very active in this area, and the number of court-cases—ten to fifteen per annum—was completely insignificant if we consider that in London alone the companies admitted four to five thousand apprentices annually in the early-seventeenth century. So, even if we do not underestimate the impact of the negative incentives, it seems that at least for the term of apprenticeship (and by European standards it was unusually long in England) the positive incentives persuaded most apprentices to abide by the rules.

**Journeymen: An Unruly Workforce**

Perhaps no single publication has done more to shatter the image of the corporate world as one of peace and harmony than Robert Darnton’s account of the “great cat massacre,” that occurred in Paris in the 1730s. Although the circumstances are only vaguely known, because the story was committed to paper long after the event, the essential details are telling. In his autobiography the printer Nicolas Contat recounts how, as an apprentice, he and the other journeymen decided to take revenge for all the unpaid hours and abuse they had suffered while working for the presumably draconian master printer Jacques Vincent. Vincent’s wife, who must have been an equally unpleasant character, was very fond of cats, particularly *le gris*, the grey one. By mimicking a bunch of love-sick cats underneath the Vincents’ bedroom window for several nights in a row, the workers managed to provoke their employer into ordering a clearing of the cats from the neighborhood—but not *le gris*, of course. The journeymen went after the cats straightaway. The first to be battered to death was *le gris*. By the time Vincent and his wife realized what had happened, a great many cats had been butchered. The implied message of their dreadful fate could not be lost on anyone involved.

If the mutual feelings between Vincent and his workforce were less than cordial, the way his journeymen taunted him also tells us something about the potential power of the workforce. The apprentice was bound by contract to his master
and needed a certificate or letter of recommendation to establish himself in the trade. But the journeymen were proud of their skills, and if Vincent did not like them any longer, they were confident of finding another employer. One of the most remarkable results of recent scholarship on the world of work in early modern Europe is the exposure of the fluidity of labor relations and hence the dynamic of the labor market. Wherever one looks, the figures are staggering. Among the wigmakers in Rouen, between March 1783 and August 1791, no less than 5,320 job placements are recorded, relating to 3,274 individual journeymen. On average, a journeyman wigmaker worked a mere 118 days for the same patron. Among the journeymen tailors in the same city, the turnover rate was equally impressive: between mid-July 1778 and mid-November 1781 there were 4,903 registrations by 1,859 individuals. The tailors’ guild of Rouen was not small by any means, but its membership of 274 in 1775 is dwarfed by the number of journeymen passing through their workshops. Among cabinetmakers in Vienna the numbers were less impressive, but they suggest the same substantial turnover. While the guild’s 142 masters employed about 200 journeymen at any given time, as many as 600 journeyman cabinetmakers were registered every year. This figure again suggests an average term of employment of about four months.

The journeymen were recruited from a very wide area. Among four Viennese guilds—bookbinders, cabinetmakers, bag makers, and silk weavers—the number of journeymen who were recruited locally was between 6 and 16 percent in the eighteenth century. Of the journeyman tailors registered in Rouen, only 5 percent were natives, while another 35 percent came from the direct hinterland or adjoining areas. That leaves over half of them originating from farther afield. And this was not at all a recent phenomenon. Of the journeyman lock makers registered in Frankfurt, Germany, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, more than half came from towns situated over 500 kilometers away from Frankfurt. This combination of high turnover and long-distance travels is possibly related to the custom, in both France and the German-speaking parts of Europe, of journeyman touring, known as wandern in Germany, the tour de France in France, or tramping in England.

To facilitate the combination of supply and demand in this very dynamic labor market, tramping journeymen would usually meet at specific addresses in towns. In Rouen, around 1780, almost 60 percent of journeyman tailors gave an inn as their address. It was at Au Chat Qui Dort, Aux Trois Images, and two or three other such places that master tailors could expect to find their workers. In Dijon in the 1670s, the journeyman joiners stayed with Bénigne Simonnet, who was designated as their père. Besides lodgings, Simonnet provided a meeting room for the journeymen’s organization. Each new arrival was greeted with an elaborate ritual, which included a washing of the hands of those present by the newly arrived compagnon and his paying for a pint of wine, a loaf of bread, and a piece of meat, which would then be consumed. Only after he had gone
through this ritual, could the initiated expect to find work in the city. In German
towns, journeymen likewise had fixed premises, where they would meet and drink.
Early references go back to the fourteenth century. Obviously, these would be
the first places of call for itinerant journeymen.

Although there may not be a direct connection between tramping and for-
malized organization by journeymen, the existence of meeting places and their
role in local labor markets must have contributed to the success of the institu-
tionalized journeymen’s organizations. In most countries journeymen were not
in any formal sense part of the corporate order. Only in English craft guilds
were journeymen accepted as members and, if the situation in London can be
taken as indicative, they were even there allowed a certain amount of auton-
omy. The London yeomanry, the humblest subsection of the companies, did
include independent craftsmen (so-called householders) but the majority seem
to have been journeymen. In Germany, journeymen were organized in what
was variously known as “guilds,” or “brotherhoods,” or “confraternities.” In France
they were known as compagnonnages. Their origins are closely related to the
existence of craft guilds, as is demonstrated, for instance, by the claim of jour-
neyman wool weavers in 1331 in Zürich that they wanted to establish a box
to pay for the burial of their members and felt they were entitled to have such
a benefit, because it already existed “in all towns along the river Rhine where
there are guilds.”

Such welfare boxes could easily develop into union-type organizations.
There is a strong correlation between the incidence of strikes and other labor
unrest and the presence of journeymen’s organizations. In some trades, for instance
hat making in the southern Netherlands, journeymen succeeded in integrating
their organizations into regional networks, so as to be even more effective in pro-
tecting their members’ interests. Everywhere, they were concerned with regu-
lation, under their own supervision, of the labor market. They tried to control
supply, by supervising the hiring mechanism. They sought the exclusion of cheap
competitors, especially women. They organized strikes against specific workshops
and, if necessary, walk-outs, which deprived a complete trade of its workforce
by moving to an adjacent town. Interestingly, from the point of view of social
control, they also tried to uphold guild legislation, once the rules had been changed
to their satisfaction. And journeymen organizations tried to improve the qual-
ity of labor, by trying to suppress drinking on the job and other abuses.

Obviously, both guilds and civic authorities had mixed feelings about these
journeymen’s associations. They may have contributed to the disciplining of the
workforce, but at the same time they were a source of strife, if not worse. In gen-
eral, however, attempts at suppression met with little success. The organizations
might go underground, but would reemerge at some later stage. The fluidity of
the labor-force, in combination with the fact that they had their own auton-
omous organizations, enabled journeymen to escape, at least to some extent, from
the supervision of their masters. Instead, they nurtured a culture of independence, complete with nicknames such as Liberty, or Without Respect, and ridiculing their masters, if necessary with the loss of some cats’ lives.

Masters: The Price of Community

Although it has become fashionable these days to emphasize the social and cultural sides of the corporate system, the core business of early modern guilds was economic. Almost invariably, guilds were organized on the basis of one or more professions shared by their members. The guilds’ privileges gave those members exclusive access to the production and retail sale of specified goods, which might range from the humble, routinely produced, but also vital daily bread, through more complex clothing, to expensive, unique, and luxurious works of art in paint or precious metals. To enforce their monopoly, the guilds had to ensure that attempts at infringement by outsiders would be rebuked, their members would refrain from trying to reap the potential benefits of bending the rules, and the craftsmen would deliver the professed advantages of the corporate system for customers, mainly the stamp of quality.

Most guilds saw the monopoly as the single most important justification of their existence, at least insofar as the members themselves were concerned. They spent huge amounts of effort, and if necessary money, on enforcing this monopoly. Take the example of Willem Swinderswijck, a minor painter in the town of Haarlem, in Holland. Haarlem boasted the oldest guild of St. Luke, the patron of painters, in the Dutch Republic. Its records went back to the early-sixteenth century. Moreover, the guild was the proud owner of a relic, a small piece of bone, of its patron saint, a Catholic memento that was still revered after the introduction of the Reformation in Haarlem during the 1580s. Willem Swinderswijck was selling paintings in Haarlem, even though he was not a member of the guild, which therefore summoned him to come and explain himself in its meeting of March 1642. But Swinderswijck did not show up. In April he was summoned again, to no avail. In May the guild explicitly excluded Swinderswijck from further exercising his trade, but in June it was reported that the culprit had only laughed at the guild official who had come to serve him the writ. In August it was reported on two separate occasions that, despite the injunction, Swinderswijck had sold works of art. In early September there was another such report. On each occasion a three-guilder fine was imposed, which if collected would more than wipe out any profits Swinderswijck had made on his no-doubt modest work. It seems that the fines, in combination with the perseverance of the guild, finally did the trick, because on September 15, Swinderswijck gave in: he told the guild he would pay the usual fee and join the guild. The guild itself, having achieved its goal, was prepared to drop charges and abstain from collecting
the fines. Swinderswijck had been transformed from an outsider who had to be coerced into complying with the guild rules, into an insider to whom the violence douce of community was applied.

Enforcing the monopoly was the single most important issue in the seventeenth-century records of Haarlem’s guild of St. Luke. From those records we learn that the guild must have had numerous “eyes and ears” in the city, although it is not entirely clear who exactly was spying on illegal production and sales. In London, a city perhaps ten times as big as Haarlem, guilds at times employed paid informers, to help them smoke out the “ground rabbits” (interlopers). But even in London, we can safely assume that interested parties, not least the members themselves and their relatives, were looking for offenders and informing the guild wardens about them. The wardens themselves, moreover, were vigilant too. The London companies held regular “searches” that took them to specific districts, where they invaded workshops and stalls to look for illicit products or journeymen and apprentices who had not been properly registered. In Paris, the jurés of the guilds “launched investigations that included spying on suspects; they conducted ‘visits,’ usually in the company of police officials, that involved searches and seizures, they participated in the issuing of summonses, in arrests and in trials.” Members whose products were found to be shoddy were fined and, if necessary, the product was publicly destroyed. The gold- and silversmiths’ guild in Amsterdam, which was also responsible for maintaining the standards of precious metals, routinely destroyed work by its members that was found to contain less than the minimum amount of gold or silver. Such measures involved members as much as outsiders.

To what extent was all of this effective? That really seems very difficult to say. James Farr, for instance, who is one of the most important modern historians of the artisans’ world, thinks that the searches by the London companies were a ritual more than anything else. Their route was known beforehand and the cortege so loud and large, it was no problem at all to hide illicit journeymen and their work, or so he claims. Nonetheless, offenders were captured and fines were imposed. And as the Swinderswijck case suggests, the harassment at times could be effective enough to persuade an outsider to join the guild. Generally, of course, the problem was of the guilds’ own making. The monopoly was designed to create rent streams and it was only natural that free riders would try to tap into them. Even the guild members themselves might consider playing it both ways, going by the corporate rules and also trying to get around them.

However, some unique data on the sales of Dutch paintings suggest that, after all, the guilds were not completely powerless in the face of outside competition. Because paintings were signed and sometimes listed in probate inventories, their origins and whereabouts can be traced. Painstaking research by Michael Montias in the notarial records of seventeenth-century Amsterdam has revealed that about half the paintings sold in that town were of local origin, with local origin defined
as masters registered with the guild of St. Luke. Similar research in Delft and Haarlem produced percentages that were even higher, 66 and 79 respectively.69 The inhabitants of Delft and Haarlem accounted for 6 and 11 percent respectively of the total urban population in the province of Holland, where most Dutch art of the period was produced.70 So it is safe to say that, especially in these towns, the guild dominated the local market, and even in Amsterdam, with its very busy port and manifest flows of imports and exports, as well as migration, the guild members were substantially overrepresented in the market. But obviously, that domination was incomplete, as it must have been in many other trades. In her book on Dutch tailors’ guilds, which found it equally impossible to maintain their monopoly in full, Bibi Panhuysen suggests, and rightly so to my mind, that it is of little help to think in terms of either a monopoly or a free market. Instead, guilds devised a variety of strategies to deal with these problems, ranging from attempts to suppress competition, to incorporation of the competitors into the guild itself. However, these strategies, as Panhuysen states, were always designed to give the master tailors control over the most profitable parts of the trade, while they were willing to compromise in what was seen as the peripheral activities.71

One reason why guilds seem to have been at least moderately successful in maintaining their economic privileges was that they could often count on the active support of the civic authorities. The bakers’ guild in Paris and the local police were working closely together in regulating the bread market in the French capital. The rules were laid down in the statutes of the guild, as well as in the municipal ordinances, and violating them was thus an offense against both the corporate and the civic law.72 In Antwerp, the municipal authorities encouraged individuals to accept the mediation of the guild and applied extra penalties if they failed to do so.73 In London, the companies’ courts of assistants played an equally vital role in resolving disputes and dealing with crimes against the community. These courts, meeting as often as twice a week, were usually composed of the past and present wardens of the company and could apply fines, close down shops, and expulse members from the trade if the offense was very serious. They dealt with any issue, trade related or not, as long as the defendant was a member of the company.74

Guilds also had privileged access to municipal authorities. When the Haarlem guild of St. Luke considered filing a petition in 1642 that should put an end to the lotteries that were supposed to be spoiling the market for paintings, they prepared the ground during an informal visit to one of the town’s mayors.75 In Antwerp, guilds filed on average twice as many petitions as individual citizens during the seventeenth century.76 In France, guilds took their complaints to the courts. By combining the limited resources of modest individuals, guilds could mobilize expensive legal aid. When, for example, the linen drapers’ guild of Paris, an all-female corporation, came into conflict with the powerful merciers, they ensured that their case was presented by Maître Belin, a lawyer
with a twenty-year track record.\textsuperscript{77} An appeal to the courts was, in France, such an obvious route to take for the guilds that, as Michael Sonenscher reminds us, they tended to phrase any conflict in their ranks in “words and phrases . . . not drawn from the experience of particular trades, [but] derived, instead, from eighteenth century civil jurisprudence and the vocabulary of natural law.”\textsuperscript{78} In some regions of Europe guilds were themselves directly represented in local government. It is a subject that awaits more systematic investigation, but generally we find this to be the case in many German and some Swiss towns, in the southern Netherlands, and in the eastern parts of the Dutch Republic.\textsuperscript{79} There, of course, they could expect an especially sympathetic court hearing.

While the supervision of the production and marketing of urban industry was uppermost in the minds of many corporate officials, it was by no means their exclusive concern. In many places they saw it as their duty to supervise the morals of their members or prospective members. Two areas seem to have given particular concern: the family and religion. During the Middle Ages, there had been an intimate relation between the guilds and the Church.\textsuperscript{80} Guilds maintained altars and religious services, either directly or through religious confraternities that were really satellite organizations. In Protestant areas the guilds’ religious impact was redirected in the course of the sixteenth century but not necessarily lost. In regions that were officially declared to be religiously homogeneous, it was more or less taken for granted that guild members belonged to the official church. This seems to have been the case in London, for instance. Where the community was religiously mixed, two patterns might emerge, as the Dutch Republic demonstrated. In the west, where a patriciate of merchants and rentiers ruled the towns and cities, religion was not an issue, except for Jews. Even in tolerant Amsterdam, Jews were excluded from the guild trades.\textsuperscript{81} For other religions, including Catholics and Anabaptists, there were no obstacles, although the only publicly tolerated religion in the Netherlands at the time was Calvinism. In the eastern towns of the Dutch Republic, however, another pattern prevailed. Although there were no formal religious bars preventing candidates to join a guild, citizenship was open only to Calvinists. And citizenship was a prerequisite for guild membership. In these towns guildsmen, directly or indirectly, had a significant influence in local government, and it was they who insisted on the religious purity of the citizen community. In some towns artisans were kicked out of their guild, and out of their jobs, when it was discovered that they were participating in Catholic rites.\textsuperscript{82}

In Germany, we find a similar situation. According to a survey undertaken by Étienne François, this resulted in three patterns.\textsuperscript{83} In a very limited number of cases, all in southern Germany and with Augsburg as the most notable example, a system of power sharing was developed. In Augsburg the guilds’ political power was taken away by Charles V in 1548, and this effectively ended attempts to impose religious views, one way or another, on the citizenry.\textsuperscript{84} In
small towns, dominated by middle-class guildsmen, there was no room for compromise. Here, religion was seen as one of the foundations of the community and the community’s preservation as depending on religious unity. In newly established towns and capital cities, however, religious minorities were protected by absolutist princes and enjoyed a reasonable degree of toleration. Thus, in towns where guilds were politically influential, they were able to impose religious uniformity on their membership.

Already in their very early stages, guilds tended to define their community in terms of “artificial families.” They referred to the membership as “brothers” and “sisters.” In some Dutch towns guilds had common graves, where deceased members would be buried together. In the town of Dordrecht, in Holland, the guilds of the carpenters, the cabinetmakers, the bakers, and the shoemakers between them buried on average ten masters, masters’ wives or widows, and masters’ children annually during the eighteenth century in the guilds’ own crypts. In many parts of Europe it was common practice to provide a guild burial for deceased members, with a required presence of the complete membership.

The importance attached to the guild’s involvement at the end of a member’s life was matched by its supervision over the earlier stages. Especially in the German territories, guilds were obsessed with the propriety of their members’ marriages and the legitimacy of their offspring. In many, perhaps most, of the small towns of the Holy Roman Empire, guilds would admit only candidates who could prove four legitimate grandparents. In his famous description of these “home towns,” Mack Walker demonstrates how one German artisan, the tinsmith Flegel from Hildesheim, was ostracized by his guild after marrying a woman whose father had been born out of wedlock but was later legitimated by the national court, a verdict that was, however, not accepted by the Hildesheim guild. Such intrinsigence was not the privilege of small-town guilds, as Walker suggested. In Augsburg, a city of 45,000 in the middle of the sixteenth century, the guilds also required their members to be of legitimate birth. Engagements and weddings were celebrated in the guild house. During a brief interlude, in the 1560s, anyone wanting to contract a marriage in Augsburg had to be both a citizen and a member of a guild. In Dijon, France, the authorities expressed similar concerns over the descent and marital state of prospective guild masters. It seems that they preferred candidates to be married, and depositions mention the parents’ marital state at the time the candidate was born, so as to testify of his legitimacy. And although there is no evidence about its enforcement, the Parisian guilds also insisted that their members be of legitimate birth. Even if there were no official rules relating to these issues, as in eighteenth-century Amsterdam, guild rhetoric routinely assumed that their members were family men, with responsibilities for wives and children, inhabiting family homes, in contrast with journeymen, for instance, who were pictured as celibate and inhabiting single rooms. This insistence on connecting guild membership with traditional family arrangements would
have highly significant implications for the ways in which guilds looked upon the issue of gender.

Women: Social Control within and outside the Corporate System

One area in which the guilds exercised significant social control during the early modern era was the division of gender roles. The guilds’ attitudes toward females changed dramatically, especially in the sixteenth century. Whereas females had been pictured as at least potentially equal to male masters in the Middle Ages, guild statutes started to exclude women from the guilds’ ranks after the Reformation. Changing religious attitudes may have been one of the reasons why this happened, but the changes are better documented than explained and alternative interpretations cannot be ruled out at this point.

Many Medieval guild statutes routinely assumed that a candidate for membership could be of either sex. The statutes of the tailors’ guild in The Hague, Holland, for example, stated in 1505 that the aspiring master had to demonstrate his skill “as a man or woman” before the guild’s examiners; the masterpiece could be either a man’s or a woman’s garment. Two centuries earlier, in 1304, a general ordinance concerning the trades in the city of Utrecht stated that “those who want to exercise an incorporated trade, be they man or woman, have to become members.” It is difficult to assess the role of women in the Medieval urban economy on the basis of this evidence alone. Many guild statutes remain completely silent on the subject. That women were acceptable as members does not mean that they were numerous, or influential within the guild. Some evidence suggests that females were already relegated to the margins. It was highly unusual, for instance, for women to take up guild offices.

Nonetheless, there is every reason to assume that things were taking a turn for the worse during the sixteenth century. Thus, in 1524, the tailors’ guild of Haarlem introduced a prohibition against women cutting new cloth, thus effectively barring them from the trade. The female members of the guild were allowed to continue, but “they will die out, and no new female members shall be accepted into the guild.” The same thing happened in London, where the weavers’ company stipulated in 1578 that “no manner of person or persons exercising [their trade] shall keep, teach, instruct, or bring up in the use, exercise, or knowledge of [weaving] any maid, damsel, or other woman whatsoever.” Around the same time, the Nuremberg ring makers decided that “from now on, no maid is to be used for any kind of work in this craft.” It was a trend that could be observed all over Europe.

This dramatic deterioration in women’s positions in the corporate world has been explained in different ways. Martha Howell, one of the most influential
among modern scholars addressing the issue, sees the marginalization of women as the result of shifts in the economy and the political role of guilds. Women's economic positions, Howell argues, had always been defined in the family sphere. Women's work was additional to their husbands' and never seen as the mainstay of the household. As artisanal production moved away from household production into a more commercial mode (defined by Howell as “small commodity”), women lost their traditional foothold. Because they had never won political influence within the guilds, they were now unable to counter this development by an appeal to the urban authorities. When the linen weavers' guild in Leyden, Holland, was established in 1563, it welcomed women who, of course, were long active in the trade. But only a few years later, it seems, females were barred from the guild and thus banned from the independent exercise of the trade, or at best relegated to its margins.102

Merry Wiesner also sees the guilds as a key factor in engineering these changes and the state of the economy as an important structural condition but blames the journeymen. During the sixteenth century they found it more difficult to set up shop as an independent master. Instead, journeymen were forced to live in hostels much longer, sometimes all their lives. The hostels were all-male communities, where the symbolism of male honor became much more important than it had been before. These values were transferred to the guilds, as journeymen's associations clamored for the exclusion of women from the trade, or when the journeymen finally managed to win membership and brought their gendered identities into the guilds.103 Others also see the guilds' negative attitude toward women as primarily defensive: under threat from shrinking markets, male masters sought to break the weaker links in the chain of the trade. Thus, in the course of the eighteenth century, when rural protoindustry was making headway in Prussia, urban guilds there tried to redefine “real” work as a male preserve, while the sloppy products of rural industry, and women's work, were labeled together as inferior.104

In the process, women's roles in relation to work were recast in much more narrow ways. One telling example is the Berlin tailors' guild's exclamation, in 1803, that married women must be maintained by their husbands, know housekeeping, and care for and educate their children. The unmarried may work as domestics or engage in other feminine occupations outside regular manufacture.105 This opinion reflects a long tradition of discourse, which was not necessarily new even in the sixteenth century but much reinforced during that age. As we saw earlier, the guilds of Augsburg, with the help of the Reformed town council, were able to set up a regime of moral righteousness centered around family values. In this scheme of things, Lyndal Roper tells us, the “master's wife was . . . guarantor of her husband's achieved adult masculinity: she proved his masterhood, while at the same time being responsible for the food, light, bedding, heat, water and other domestic needs of the shop's small labor force.”106

The exclusion of women was not just a matter of guild discourse and ideol-
ogy; it also translated into practice. Females were still apprenticed in large numbers in eighteenth-century England. But the great majority were trained either in husbandry or in housewifery.\textsuperscript{107} Already in the first half of the sixteenth century, two-thirds of female apprentices in Bristol were destined for specifically female occupations, such as seamstress and, again, housewife. And even though their social backgrounds were similar to those of male apprentices, they found it increasingly difficult to establish themselves as independent producers. By 1600 it was all but impossible for women to enter Bristol’s incorporated trades.\textsuperscript{108} In Germany there was a general rollback of women from all but a small number of crafts.\textsuperscript{109}

In the eyes of the guilds, the exclusion of women from the incorporated trades may have rid them of some serious competition, but at the same time it created new problems. One was that cheap female labor could be profitable for the guild masters too, under specific circumstances. According to regulations going back to the mid-sixteenth century, female silk weavers in Lyon, France, could work in the industry alongside their husbands. During the 1730s, when more and more master silk weavers were in danger of losing their independence at the hands of the merchants, they clamored for the right to allow their wives to go to work in another master’s workshop. By extending the idea of patrimony, they hoped to preserve the household’s economic integrity. The merchants, in retaliation, managed to get the labor market for silk weavers declared open to all women, whatever their relations with the master weavers. The market was thus flooded with cheap labor, to the horror of the guild. Interestingly, the guild itself had considered promoting this step sometime earlier, during a period of acute labor shortage. Its plans, however, had included only a limited access for women, instead of the open-door policy adopted by the town council, a policy that threatened male job opportunities and their remuneration. Both masters and journeymen therefore protested vociferously, but to no avail. As a result, journeymen’s wages came under pressure and masters were forced to cut costs, for example by employing the same female labor they had so recently opposed.\textsuperscript{110}

Another problem resulted from the creation of competition from outside the guilds’ own jurisdiction. This was recognized by the London weavers’ company, which had so emphatically excluded all females and foreigners from its ranks in 1578. In 1630 the guild’s bailiffs, wardens, and assistants pleaded with the city’s aldermen to allow them to admit foreigners again into the guild, because only then would they be able to keep control of the trade in the sprawling metropolis that was seventeenth-century London.\textsuperscript{111} For the very same reason, if no other, the guilds found it impossible to completely suppress female labor. In their attempts to control female labor, various strategies were employed. Dutch tailors’ guilds tried to come to terms with female labor in at least four different ways. First, in Amsterdam, by far the largest among Dutch towns, the seamstresses were organized into a separate guild in 1579, in the context of a general reorganization of
the town's guild system immediately after Amsterdam had joined the Dutch Revolt and had become a Protestant town. Like everywhere else, the Amsterdam seamstresses had to limit themselves to the production of clothing for females and children. In nearby Haarlem, the seamstresses were in a state of permanent conflict with the tailors throughout the seventeenth century, until 1707 when they were organized into a subdivision of the tailors' guild. This happened after the tailors complained that their trade was being ruined by the large numbers of seamstresses and that as a result they found it impossible to provide assistance to their members in need. The seamstresses were brought under guild control as much to boost the guild's finances, as to allow the latter to keep a closer eye on female competition. Like the men, women were entitled to benefits, but they could not hold office in the Haarlem guild. In the city of Den Bosch (or Bois-le-Duc), the seamstresses were also forced to pay an annual contribution, and a substantial one at that, but basically they received nothing in return, except the right to exercise their trade. In the small town of Zutphen, a former Hansa town in the eastern part of the Netherlands, women could enter the tailors' guild, but only with special permission of the town council. In 1755 the council decided to introduce a very tight limit on the number of seamstresses in Zutphen. Henceforth, no more than five could work at any one time in this town of seven thousand inhabitants. Obviously, the market for women's and children's clothing was still very much a male preserve in Zutphen.112

Flexibility, if that is what we want to call these variegated responses to the challenges of the gender division of labor,113 was required especially in areas where the guilds had little political clout. In Den Bosch the guilds for a long time had appointed the members to one of the three tiers of the local government. Even though they lost that right in 1629, they were still a powerful force in the community. In Zutphen, the citizenry, and hence guild members, could directly influence the composition of the town council. Significantly, in the southern Netherlands, where guilds held seats in urban representative institutions and had to approve of, for instance, new taxation, they found it relatively easy to push women to the margins of the clothing industry. The available data suggest that in the Flemish towns seamstresses were much less numerous than in the Holland towns.114 Thus, where local elites had greater autonomy, as in Amsterdam and Haarlem for example, they were more likely to grant a hearing to women's complaints and balance their interests with those of the male-dominated guilds, than in towns where the guilds themselves could call the shots.115

All-female guilds were not completely unknown before the seventeenth century,116 but they acquired a new meaning after the guilds' two centuries of attempts to force female labor into the framework of the artisanal family model. Significantly, the new seamstresses' guilds, established almost simultaneously in Paris and in Rouen in 1675, swiftly developed a new language and social ideal, which was diametrically opposed to the patriarchy of the traditional corpora-
tions. These newly created guilds were designed to cater specifically to female customers. In Paris women were, in so many words, excluded from the tailoring business, except when they were the wife or daughter of an established master. The seamstresses as a result had few connections with the tailors, and they were able to establish themselves as an independent corporation thanks only to a financial crisis of the French crown. In contrast with the tailors’ guild, where entry was mainly through family connection (60 percent entered that way), the seamstresses were free from family intervention, with only 8 percent of the members entering through that channel. Whereas the tailors propounded a world view that emphasized family values and women subject to male authority, the seamstresses underlined the individuality of the members. While the tailors, during the 1776 crisis when Turgot had abolished the guilds in France, depicted the future as one of total anarchy, now that both guilds and families were threatened, the seamstresses pictured themselves as vulnerable individuals, who needed the guild to protect them against undesired contacts with men.\textsuperscript{117}

So family values came home to roost. In Den Bosch the seamstresses took their critique one step further still and fundamentally questioned the whole of the corporate system that sustained patriarchy. Triumphantly they announced the “Liberty, Equality, or the Needle Struggle” in 1795, shortly after the town had been “liberated” by the French revolutionary armies. They demanded complete freedom of production, even—and this was previously unheard of—the right to make men’s clothes if the opportunity presented itself. This they did not get, but the six guilders annual payment to the tailors’ guild was scrapped by the Municipalité. The tailors retaliated in the usual way: they entered the seamstresses’ shops and confiscated all illegal produce. But the seamstresses of Den Bosch, who condemned the guild’s appeal to ancient custom and privilege as completely outdated, won the day: they were relieved from the annual payments because “it was unfair to have to contribute to a fund from which one could not profit.”\textsuperscript{118} Their attacks, ostensibly on a financial arrangement imposed on the seamstresses, but in actual fact casting doubt on the guild order as such, tell us something about the depth of the crisis of the ancien régime. But at the same time it should serve as a reminder of the potency of that very same guild order, and the social and economic constraints it had so cunningly imposed on female labor, and women’s lives more generally, through a wide array of containment strategies.

Conclusion

The trouble with social control is that we know it is happening all the time but will find it incredibly difficult to put a finger on the precise mechanisms that translated prescriptive discourse into social practice. As far as the guilds are concerned, this problem has become all the more acute since recent scholarship has
shattered the naive assumption that the rules, laid down in guild statutes, were straightforwardly applied in practice. As many scholars have emphasized during the last fifteen years or so, guilds had to employ a variety of strategies to achieve any success in making their rules stick.

In this chapter we have looked at a broad set of rules that the guilds hoped to impose on various groups of people within the orbit of the corporative system. These groups included adolescent apprentices, journeyman wage laborers, male masters, and female, usually nonincorporated, artisans. In each section of the chapter, I have attempted to establish at least one standard that might indicate the success, or lack of it, and the extent of corporate social control. It proved impossible to find even one such indicator for the journeymen, and this seems to confirm a more general impression that guild authority was weakest when it came to controlling the labor force. Journeymen, moreover, were the only group in the corporate system that managed to establish its own organizations, more or less independently from the guilds.

With other groups the guilds seem to have been more successful. They managed to force apprentices to stay the full length of their term, or at least require this from candidates who wanted to join the corporate system. To judge by the distribution of Dutch paintings in the seventeenth century, guilds were quite, if not completely, successful in protecting local markets against outside competition. In towns with a mixed-religion population, guilds managed to impose religious constraints on their members whenever they were politically represented, either directly or indirectly, in the town’s governing institutions. In such towns they were also relatively successful in suppressing female competition, as is demonstrated by the lower number of seamstresses in areas where guilds held political power.

All of this does not amount to conclusive proof, if that were ever possible with a topic like social control. Further research, moreover, should make this picture more detailed. We need more systematic information on local and regional variation and have only a limited understanding of the ways in which the system changed in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It would be interesting to analyze what happened in the wake of the abolition of the guilds during the French Revolution. But for the time being, and in the light of the repeated insistence that guilds were merely “flexible,” it is important to note that they could be effective, if only partially, in imposing their rules in important areas of their jurisdiction and that the strategies employed in dealing with the inevitable fact that the rules could not be enforced completely helped protect significant benefits for, but also imposed significant constraints on, substantial sections of the urban populations in early modern Europe.
Notes


2. This critique goes back to the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. For a discussion of the French *discours* against the corporations, see Kaplan, *La fin des corporations*, 7–49; a Dutch seventeenth-century critique of the guilds is discussed in Lucassen, “Het welvaren van Leiden (1659–1662),” 13–22. See also Davids, “From de la Court to Vreede.” For the nineteenth-century evaluation of guilds, especially among German scholars, see Ehmer, “Traditionelles Denken und neue Fragestellungen,” 19–29.


4. The tone for this argument was set by the brilliant and highly influential work of Sonenscher, *Work and Wages*. See also the slightly earlier, very outspoken Swanson, “The Illusion of Economic Structure,” 29–48.


9. This section has profited from the discussions at a conference on Apprenticeship (Middle Ages–2000), organized in Alden Biesen, Belgium, by the FWO Research Network on Labor, December 8–9, 2000, where the program included papers by Peter Stabel (Ghent), Karel Davids (Amsterdam), Bert De Munck (Brussels), Reinhold Reith (Augsburg), Clare Crowston (Urbana, Illinois), Gilles Postel-Vinay (Paris), and Jeroen Onstenk (’s-Hertogenbosch) that proved helpful for this chapter.


15. This is borne out by the fact that in early modern London a former apprentice could enter any trade, no matter if it coincided with his training or not (Schwarz, *London in the Age of Industrialisation*, 216–18). This, however, was unusual, probably even in England. In most towns an applicant had to be apprenticed in the trade he hoped to enter.

16. By common consent, however, three to four years was enough to acquire the skills, also in England: Krausman Ben-Amos, *Adolescence and Youth*, 123.
30. Snell, *Annals*, 228. The statute’s regulations were inspired in many ways by those already in force among the London guilds.
33. Unfortunately, the only systematic study of apprenticeship in the early modern Low Countries is not yet in print: Bert De Munck, *Lerpraktijken*. For the tailors, see Panhuysen, *Maatwerk*, 137–42; Deceulaer, *Pluriforme patronen*, 261–90.
34. Reith, “Apprentices in the German Crafts in Early Modern Times.”
35. Krausman Ben-Amos, “Failure to Become Freemen,” 166. See also Snell, *Annals*, 235–40 for evidence that most apprentices in England, in rural as well as urban areas, served the full term, at least until the middle of the eighteenth century.
37. In France this document was generally introduced in 1781 and called the *livret*: Kaplan, “Réflexions sur la police,” 56–57; idem, *Bakers of Paris*, 215–16.
40. The importance of the master’s reputation for the apprentice is briefly discussed by Brooks, “Apprenticeship, Social Mobility,” 60.
42. Davies, *The Enforcement of English Apprenticeship*, 17–19, 25, 83; the number of London apprentices is provided by Brooks, “Apprenticeship, Social Mobility,” 55.
Migrations,” 74–96.
46. Ibid.
49. On German wandern: Reininghaus, “Migrationen von Handwerkern,” 194–212; Elkar, Walz; on tramping: Leeson, Travelling Brothers. Regional variations in tramping are discussed in Epstein, “Journeymen Mobility.”
51. Truant, Rites of Labor, 96–97.
52. Wesoły, Lehrlinge und Handwerksgesellen, 336.
54. About the London yeomanry: Rappaport, Worlds within Worlds; and Schulte Beerbühl, Vom Gesellenverein; on the German organizations: Reininghaus, Die Entstehung der Gesellengilden; and Schulz, Handwerksgesellen; and on French compagnonnages: Truant, Rites of Labor.
55. Quoted in Wesoły, Lehrlinge und Handwerksgesellen, 306–7. The only book length study of these boxes, to my knowledge, is Bos, “Uyt liefde tot malcander.”
56. This paragraph closely follows the argument in the masterful survey by Lis and Soly, An ’Irresistible Phalanx,’” 11–52.
57. Lis and Soly, “De macht van ’vrije arbeiders,”” 30–32.
58. This is ironic in the light of some claims that guilds had originally been created with the specific goal in mind of controlling the workforce and the labor market: Epstein, Wage Labor and Guilds, 259.
60. For the bakers, see Kaplan, Bakers of Paris. The tailors are discussed by Deceulaer, Pluriforme patronen; Panhuysen, Maatwerk; and Crowston, Fabricating Women. The painters and their guild are discussed in Montias, Artists and Artisans in Delft. For the gold and silversmiths, see Bimbenet-Privat, Les orfèvres Parisiens; and Mitchell, ed., Goldsmiths, Silversmiths and Bankers.
61. In some branches, like hat making, the major workshops were so powerful, they did not need the guild to help bolster their market position. As a result, these guilds were notably more relaxed about the enforcement of the monopoly: Sonenscher, The Hatters, 49.
63. Archer, The Pursuit of Stability, 138–39. The word ‘ground rabbit’ was used in Germany, and also in the Low Countries, for illegal, i.e. nonmember, workers: Walker, German Home Towns, 86.
64. Berlin, “‘Broken All in Pieces,’” 79–80.
70. Percentages calculated for 1622 on the basis of de Vries and van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy*, 64 (table 3.10). Amsterdam’s share in the urban population of Holland in 1622 was 29 percent.
73. Deceulaer, “Guilds and Litigation,” 182.
74. Rappaport, *Worlds within Worlds*, 201–5, 212.
76. Deceulaer, “Guilds and Litigation,” 190. On the contents of such petitions, also Prak, “Individual, Corporation.”
77. Truant, “Parisian Guildswomen,” 53.
80. For a survey, see MacKenney, *Tradesmen and Traders*, chap. 2.
82. This argument is further developed and illustrated in Prak, “The Politics of Intolerance.”
83. François, “De l’uniformité à la tolérance,” 783–800.
84. More details on this arrangement in François, *Protestants et catholiques en Allemagne*.
85. Interestingly, in Dublin, a city with a mixed Catholic and Anglican population, the guilds also managed to use their political influence to impose religious uniformity. The result here, however, was that guilds lost control over parts of the local economy: Hill, *From Patriots to Unionists*, 32–41.
86. Black, *Guilds and Civil Society*, 4. Significantly, this situation among the guild masters was mirrored by that of the journeymen. The French *compagnonnage* system also created ‘fictive families,’ with the innkeeper and his wife called “father” and “mother”:
91. Significantly, sons born before their fathers had become a member of the guild were treated as outsiders and deprived of the privileges available to “genuine” sons of the masters: Kaplan, Bakers of Paris, 273–74.
93. But certainly not the only one, as this process was already underway before Luther: Herlihy, Opera Muliebria, chap. 7.
94. Panhuysen, Maatwerk, 206.
97. Panhuysen, Maatwerk, 206.
98. Ward, Metropolitan Communities, 128.
99. Wiesner, Working Women, 166.
101. For a general discussion, see Honeyman and Goodman, “Women’s Work.”
102. Howell, Women, Production, and Patriarchy, 89–90, 133, 137 and passim; idem, “Women, the Family Economy and the Structures of Market Production.”
105. Ibid., 1133.
111. Ward, Metropolitan Communities, 131, 142.
112. This paragraph relies entirely on Panhuysen, Maatwerk, 209–33.
115. This complements the observations by Howell, about guilds and political power, in her Women, Production, and Patriarchy, 137.
117. This paragraph closely follows the argument in Crowston, “Engendering the Guilds,” 339–71; but see also Coffin, “Gender and the Guild Order”; and Truant, “Parisian Guildswomen,” 46–61.
118. Panhuysen, Maatwerk, 222–24.