A key objective of Johannesburg’s strategic spatial planning has been to promote more compact development, limiting growth on the urban periphery. However, there has been considerable pressure for growth close to and beyond Johannesburg’s defined urban development boundary (UDB), and in adjacent municipalities. Some 56 per cent of major land-use conversions from open space to other uses in Johannesburg and the area 5 km around it over the 2004–2007 period occurred within neighbouring municipalities, and significant development took place in areas close to, but still inside of, Johannesburg’s UDB, especially in the north and north-west (see Figure 20.1). These trends suggest that Johannesburg increasingly needs to be seen in a broader city-region context. However, growth on Johannesburg’s periphery and beyond is not merely a question of continuous incremental expansion in search of cheaper land. Rather, dynamics are complex and variable across areas, and processes of growth have been highly contested (Chipkin 2012).

However, unlike other work that has focused on the periphery, particularly the north-western edge of the city and the newly constituted ‘political relationship’ between the state and communal forms of ownership offered by sectional title units and cluster houses (Chipkin 2012), in this chapter we focus on patterns of growth in specific parts of the north-west since the 1990s, explaining the various drivers and dynamics of change. We consider the differing objectives and intentions of the City of Johannesburg and its neighbouring municipality of Mogale City, as well as of provincial authorities; the role of formal regulatory and legal processes, and of more informal political processes; the pressures by different groups of developers to allow growth beyond the UDB; the...
FIGURE 20.1: Major land-use conversions from open space to other uses in Johannesburg and surrounds (5 km), 2004–2007
influence of environmental groups and existing residents in constraining development; responses to the growth of informal settlements; and the diverse visions for development in the area.

We begin by providing an overview of development trends in the area, and then move in an arc from west to east, discussing the cases of Ruimsig, where the UDB itself has been a focus of contestation; the broader Muldersdrift area, including the Cradle of Humankind and informal and housing areas within Johannesburg, where conflicts have centred around tourism-development-conservation-nimbyism axes; and the planning for large-scale development in Lanseria. These cases are used to illustrate the complex entanglement of politics, interests and contestations shaping development on the urban edge.

The research is based on interviews with a selection of officials in the City of Johannesburg, Mogale City, relevant provincial authorities, professionals and developers, and an examination of legal documents, media reports and official documents, as well as an analysis of available data on development trends in the area.

Development trends in the Johannesburg north-west

For the purposes of this chapter, the Johannesburg north-west (the study area) is defined as the area lying between Ruimsig/R28 in the south-west and Lanseria Airport/R511 in the north-east, extending in parts for about 3 km on either side of the current Johannesburg boundary, but also including areas close to the Cradle of Humankind. The area could also be defined as the outer ring area of the larger Johannesburg north-west quadrant (see Figures 20.1, 20.2 and Plate 48 in the colour section).

Originally a ‘white’ farming community during the apartheid era, the expansion of the boundary of Johannesburg over the years has resulted in the transformation of the area from a purely rural area to a peri-urban area (Berrisford 2008). This broadly involved the subdivision of farms into smallholdings. In the mid-1990s this area comprised mainly smallholdings, farms and small-scale mining operations, but some informal settlements such as Zandspruit, Itsoseng and Lion Park had emerged.

By 2011, various development trends were evident in the area. Overall, population growth within the City of Johannesburg component of the area was very rapid, tripling from 100,226 in 1996 to 315,315 in 2011, a growth rate of 8 per cent per annum. This rapid growth reflects the broader trends of peripheral growth noted in Chapter 2 of this volume. However, growth was uneven and in some parts of the area it was much faster (Figure 20.3).

In the western part, namely in Ruimsig, the smallholdings began to be converted into residential cluster developments, along with some ancillary retail and education facilities. This growth is clearly seen in Figure 20.3, which shows Ruimsig as an area of particularly concentrated population growth, and in the comparison between the 2001 and 2009 spatial trends in Plate 49. The area between the M47 (Hendrik Potgieter Drive) and the M5 (Beyers Naude Drive) is under particular development pressure for mostly residential development, whereas the area between the R512 and the Beyers Naude Drive (i.e. the
areas adjacent to the farms Tres Jolie AH and the Sonnedal AH) has experienced growth in mainly light industry and commerce (Akanya Development Solutions 2009).

In 1999 the Cradle of Humankind, to the north-west of Muldersdrift, was declared a World Heritage Site. In part as a consequence, since the late 1990s there has been a further intensification of development between the World Heritage Site and the N1, with smallholdings being converted into bed and breakfast establishments, wedding venues and conference centres, arts and crafts markets and the like (Klug 2009). According to a report to Parliament, tourism offerings have more than doubled in a five-year period, with over 300 different providers of tourist experiences and services in and around the Site. With the urbanisation of the area, existing farms have also intensified their activities to compensate for their inability to expand spatially.

As might be expected, informal settlements within the area densified and expanded between 2001 and 2009, as is evident in Figure 20.3 and Plate 49. Further, the development of Cosmo City in the early 2000s began a significant trend in this part of the north-west towards the establishment of formal mixed-income residential development at suburban densities (see Plate 49). Cosmo City also emerges as an area of concentrated population growth between 1996 and 2011. A more recent apparent trend is the growth of ‘affordable, lower end of the market’ golf estates in the area, such as Jackal Creek Golf Estate lying just to the south-east of Cosmo City.

Further to the east, significant industrial development has emerged along the R512 towards Lanseria Airport, which has continued to expand its operations since its privatisation in 1991.

By 1999, the continued growth in the number of operators, passengers and freight volume utilising Lanseria, brought heavy pressures to bear on the existing infrastructure. The 27-year-old terminal building was no longer able to meet this demand and, in 2002, a larger main terminal building was completed along with an upgrade of all runways and taxiways.

Infrastructure has been upgraded incrementally to support these developments: road improvements have occurred on the main north-east/south-west routes such as the R511, the R512, Beyers Naude Drive and Hendrik Potgieter Road, and water and electricity networks have been improved. However, evidence suggests that these upgrades have not kept pace with demand.

In the following sections of this chapter we focus in greater detail on the particular areas outlined above, examining both the dynamics underlying these trends and the way they have been contested.

Ruimsig

Ruimsig has seen significant growth and development since the mid 1990s. Moving from a relatively low-density residential area comprising mainly small agricultural plots, it has seen increasing growth pressures from the south and the west (Chipkin 2012; CoJ 2005).
Prior to the consolidation of local government into a two-tier structure with a weak metropolitan government and four substructures in 1996, the area was run by the Roodepoort City Council, which saw the Greater Ruimsig area as a major opportunity for urban expansion.
Ruimsig’s good location and transport links made it a desirable place for households looking for relatively inexpensive land that was accessible to Johannesburg and Tshwane. According to Solange Berichon-Williams, who was working at the Roodepoort Council at the time, Ruimsig/Poortview was ‘where most of the development interest was; where the money was going to go. So they [the council] acknowledged the need’ and responded to the increasing demand for housing development within the area. As such, the original Wilgespruit Structure...
Plan was developed in 1994 ‘to address the issues pertaining to urban development in the Wilgespruit area’ with some sensitivity towards the environmental issues within Ruimsig.\(^8\)

The Plan, quoted in the Ruimsig/Poortview Detailed Development Framework Final Report of 2005, identified Ruimsig for extensive development and earmarked Poortview AH for densification of up to three to four units per hectare. To the south of Metro Boulevard (PWV10) the Plan proposed even higher development of densities of 20 units per hectare and 40 units per hectare around the major road network. This was accompanied by the idea of including six primary business nodes and eight subsidiary nodes throughout the area. The Plan was used extensively to guide development and a number of private owners and developers bought land on the assumption that the Wilgespruit Structure Plan supported growth within the area.\(^9\) In the period of transitional local government between 1996 and 2000, these patterns of development largely continued (see Chapter 4). The amalgamation of local government in 2000 to a unitary government, however, transformed Ruimsig from a central node for the Roodepoort City Council and the later Western Metropolitan Sub-structure, to a peripheral area for the newly established City of Johannesburg.\(^10\) Such changes led to a series of conflicts and confrontations between a range of stakeholders, including the city, the Gauteng province and residents and developers within Ruimsig.

Within the new conceptualisation of Johannesburg’s spatial planning, Ruimsig fell outside of the city’s defined development and mobility corridor planned for the north of the city. Furthermore, due to the location of the area, previous investment and the market that the housing was catering for, the newly structured City of Johannesburg did not see it as a priority for public investment. The private sector still saw potential returns due to the high demand arising from its location, the development trends of the city and its relatively low property prices. However, many of these plans drew to a halt when in May 2001 the Gauteng provincial government, after much discussion and debate, approved the delineation of the ‘urban edge’ (Horn 2009). The urban edge was intended to be one tool in a much larger set of instruments that could be used to control and monitor growth within Gauteng.\(^11\) In the same year the municipalities were advised to incorporate the urban edge in their Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) and Spatial Development Frameworks (SDFs) (Horn 2009). However, the City of Johannesburg, along with the other municipalities in Gauteng, had a great deal of difficulty including the urban edge into their planning, as it was considered to be too crude and largely not supported by the ‘… necessary enabling tools, such as, infill, densification, public transport and mixed use strategies’ (Horn 2009: 84). In response, the city promulgated its own UDB in its 2002/2003 IDP and SDF, which differed from the province’s urban edge (see Plates 48 and 49). The disparities caused confusion and conflict between developers and the City of Johannesburg as well as tensions between the city and the Gauteng province, and nowhere more so than in Ruimsig.\(^12\)

By the early 2000s the growth that had been anticipated in Ruimsig was being realised and there was an expectation that further growth would be supported by the city. This expectation was shared by Mogale City in the adjoining municipality, which was encouraging growth and eager to approve applications for higher-density housing.
They faced cross-border pressure from Johannesburg for middle-income housing and thought that they could capitalise on the demand and increase their rates base through densification. However, Mogale apparently undertook these approvals with insufficient capacity to provide bulk infrastructure but with the optimistic expectation that the city would assist. Unfortunately, developers on both sides of the municipal boundary were sorely disappointed. The Johannesburg UDB, delineated in 2002/2003, excluded Ruimsig, which meant that the city refused certain development applications on the basis that it would not and could not supply bulk infrastructure. At the same time, Johannesburg rejected Mogale’s request. This left a number of speculators and developers ‘high and dry’.

Developers, mostly through their consultants, who were concerned about their investments now lying outside of the UDB made representation to the city and asked to move the boundary. Initially the city refused, based on the constraints of the UDB, the SDF and the IDP and the cost of putting bulk services into the area. The developers and residents then approached the provincial tribunals, in accordance with the provisions of the 1995 Development Facilitation Act, and appealed against the city’s decisions (Van Wyk 2010). The appeal was based on the understanding that the provincial boundary was more extensive, that the provincial tribunals had greater latitude and flexibility and that the Act was a quicker, more efficient process. According to a city official who was involved in the area at the time, some of these applications did succeed – the tribunal approved the applications and the developments went ahead. The trouble was that the ‘pace of development was far outstripping the capacity of [local] government to deal with it’ and it was left up to the city to put the infrastructure in place. This situation caused tensions between the city and the province that were exacerbated by the province’s seeming refusal to incorporate the changes that the city requested into its urban edge, as well as a refusal to engage with the city around the Act (Horn 2009). One city official remembers that it was the refusal to discuss these issues that led to the Constitutional Court case (discussed later): ‘That’s where most of that came from with the actual court cases because we kept trying to engage but they’re like – well this is just the way it is.’

In the meantime a great deal of pressure was brought to bear on the city through a Ruimsig developers’ forum and a string of meetings were held between the two. The city was also under pressure from the small but active environmental voice of the Greenbelt Action Group. They were deeply concerned about some of the more sensitive species living in the area, the ridges and the wetlands. They also argued that Mogale City’s development had been rampant, that the City of Johannesburg should refuse any new developments until sufficient infrastructure had been put in place and ‘that the identification of land of primary and secondary environmental value in a Metropolitan Open Space System should come before township development is permitted’ (CoJ 2005: 7).

Eventually a compromise position was reached between all parties, whereby the UDB was changed to incorporate areas that had the potential to supply some infrastructure but the city had a few conditions. The developers had to construct 20 per cent of their units for low-income earners. However, most of the plots were too small and the 20 per cent was not
really viable so a further series of negotiations between the city and the developers resulted in an agreement that for every unit that the developers built, a levy would be paid into an inclusionary housing fund. The idea was that the fund would then be used by the city to provide housing for low-income groups within the vicinity. The city owned some land in Arena, which was seen as a potential site for this affordable housing development. The underlying logic of this agreement was that if the city was going to spend a great deal of its own money on bulk infrastructure in a non-priority area then it wanted something to justify the investment and gain/leverage something from it. When searching around for options, the City of Johannesburg came across the Western Cape Inclusionary Housing policy and thought that leveraging low-income inclusionary housing would meet a number of the city’s goals: integration; low-income housing demand and densification (Horn 2009).

The levy was not the only consequence of the negotiation and in 2005 a spatial framework was developed to ensure that the growth of the area followed the UDB and that there was an overall strategy guiding Ruimsig’s development. It also took into consideration many of the environmental concerns that had been raised with the city by the very active environmental movements in the area, including the Greenbelt Action Group.

The negotiations split the developers into two groups: those whose developments were within the redrawn UDB and would have their developments approved and those who fell outside. In this case the city used the UDB as leverage and said that unless the developers agreed to the levy, the boundary would not be moved at all. At this point, 2006, the city had a great deal of support from its senior politicians, who saw development in the north-west as unjustifiable considering the needs of priority areas such as Alexandra and Soweto. This meant that the officials could ‘play hardball’ with the developers and push for their inclusionary housing provisions. The group of developers had little negotiating power, being neither very politically connected nor really having anything that the city wanted. Finally, the levy was placed into the local government coffers but there were no local government provisions by which to ring-fence the money and use it for inclusionary housing, specifically in the Ruimsig area. The end result of the negotiations: the detailed development framework was an amended UDB to include portions of Ruimsig and a spatial framework that was very much a compromise of the various interests within the area and the City of Johannesburg.

At the same time as these negotiations were taking place, ‘In August 2005 the city unilaterally, and without any warning, announced that it would no longer recognize approvals in terms of the DFA [Development Facilitation Act]’ (Van Wyk 2010: 217). The city almost simultaneously brought a case against the Gauteng province to the High Court and sought to have the powers of the province to establish provincial tribunals, authorise applications for rezoning and establish townships in terms of the Act struck down. Two of the applications which catalysed this case were in the Greater Ruimsig area and demonstrated instances of the provincial tribunal approving applications that the city had turned down. The case worked its way up the legal chain to the Constitutional Court. The Court quickly recognised the dangers of the existing parallel systems of approvals and
confirmed the Supreme Court’s decision and struck down the sections of the Act which provided the province with these powers (Van Wyk 2010).

The Ruimsig case surfaces a range of contests and demonstrates the ability of various groups to gain leverage within conflicts. The developers were initially able to play off the existing contradictions within the planning environment; however, when the city closed the loophole it closed down the developers’ ability to subvert the city’s larger plans. This, coupled with the developers’ lack of political pull and the peripheral location of the area in question, meant that the city was in a very powerful position to be able to bargain with the developers. The city also had a number of levers by which it could push development and its trajectory into the shape that it sought, as well as the political support that allowed the officials to actually use this leverage. The case study also raises a larger set of governance issues. The lack of alignment of the UDB with the urban edge as well as the province’s willingness to override some of the city’s decisions provide further indications of the common complaint that the state works in silos and lacks sufficient regard for the goals and aims of each sphere of government.

The broader Muldersdrift area

The area discussed in this section includes land lying roughly between Beyers Naude Drive and the R512 within Johannesburg, containing the Tres Jolie and Sonnedal agricultural holdings, as well as the adjacent Muldersdrift area within Mogale City (Plate 48). According to Mogale City’s precinct plan for Muldersdrift, the area is a ‘rural/urban transition zone’ lying between the Cradle of Humankind World Heritage Site and the city, as well as between Ruimsig and Lanseria Airport.

While not experiencing the same type of private-sector residential development pressures as in Ruimsig, this area is also subject to contesting development forces of a different nature. Three types of development pressure can be identified in this area. A first set of pressures has arisen from the demand for more intensive tourism- and recreation-related land uses, as the private sector has attempted to capitalise on the World Heritage status of the Cradle of Humankind. A second set of pressures has emerged from the rapid expansion of informal settlements (see Plates 48 and 49), and the development of the Cosmo City housing development by the City of Johannesburg in response. Finally, continuing illegal and uncontrolled mining and stock farming constitute a third set of development pressures, common to most other peri-urban areas around Johannesburg.

Development pressures for recreational/tourism and agricultural development have largely been driven by the private sector, while residential development pressures are mainly the consequence of state response to informal settlements. However, it might be argued that most forms of contestation in this area are ultimately the consequence of government interventions or initiatives, stemming from the designation of the World Heritage Site in 1999 and the development of Cosmo City in 2001.

There have been growing concerns on the part of both land owners around the Cradle of Humankind and officials within the World Heritage Site management authority that
the rising number of developments around the area will have negative impacts on the Cradle, resulting in the ultimate loss of its World Heritage status. This reaction has at times included a level of nimbyism, for instance in the attempts by land owners to prevent the development of the Ethembalethu eco-village, an initiative by farm workers in the area to establish a mixed-use farming and housing settlement there (Berrisford 2008). The World Heritage Site management authority originally attempted to address concerns through a proposed buffer area around the Cradle in 2008. However, there were so many protests by owners within this buffer area that it was not applied, leading to a group of dissatisfied land owners within the World Heritage Site taking the management authority to court on the grounds that they were not adequately protecting the area.

Mogale City also reacted against the buffer, arguing that ‘the proposed new buffer zone around the Cradle of Humankind covers a large part of Mogale City and therefore begins to pose a developmental challenge on the development potential of the area’ (MCLM 2009: 2). This proposed buffer ran along the N14 between Hendrik Potgieter Road and the R512 and then north along the R512 to the northern boundary of Lanseria Airport. As a consequence, the World Heritage Site management authority prepared an Environmental Management Plan between 2009 and 2011 to ascertain the future limits on development within and immediately surrounding the Cradle. One of the recommendations of this Plan was for a much reduced buffer area, as shown in Figure 20.4. The boundary of the buffer area has been retracted to the boundary of the Site, with only two buffer areas beyond it in the south-west and the north-east (into Tshwane). The reason for this change was that it was felt after an extensive consultation process that the World Heritage Site authority should focus its limited resources ‘on protecting and managing the WHS [World Heritage Site] rather than attempting to influence land use development in the proposed buffer zone’ (SRK Consulting 2011: 14).

Thus considerable conflict has occurred around the definition of the buffer area. The fact that the area ‘falls under a number of provincial and municipal jurisdictions and there is a lack of land use management coordination across the area’ (Klug 2009: iv) seems to have exacerbated tensions.

Within the broader Muldersdrift area, the different visions of Mogale City and the City of Johannesburg are clearly evident, as they are in Ruimsig. While the city has attempted to limit development beyond the UDB in response to concerns about the capacity of bulk infrastructure networks and environmental degradation, Mogale City has wanted to encourage development there. In its 2009 SDF it proposed urban areas adjacent to the Tres Jolie AH area and a densification priority zone adjacent to the Sonnedal agricultural holdings (Klug 2009).

According to the Draft Precinct Plan for the Muldersdrift Development Zone, the Muldersdrift area comprises two nodes, namely:

- The Pine Haven Node at the intersection of R28, N14 and Hendrik Potgieter Road; and
- The Drift Node along the R28 in the central part of the Muldersdrift area.

These two nodes are important in the structure of the Mogale City Local Municipality, as they form an urban growth zone to the north of the municipality.
The planning proposals by the Mogale Municipality are contested by the city, which is refusing development applications beyond their UDB. Nor does the city see the area adjacent to the UDB as a priority for development. Rather, it is defined as a consolidation area, where development is only allowed if infrastructure is available or if it is paid for by developers. This limitation applies to incremental and large-scale developments and will affect individual property owners and the development community alike (CoJ 2011a). On the other hand, Mogale City and the West Rand District Municipality appear to be approving development applications on their side of the boundary in response to their development pressure concerns (Klug 2009).

However, the City of Johannesburg has itself enabled the growth of housing in the area, in response to the rapid expansion of informal settlements between 2001 and 2009 (see Plate 49). In 2001 it established Cosmo City, a 1 500-hectare development including 12 500 mixed-income housing units as well as ancillary facilities (in line with the 2004 Breaking New Ground policy of the national housing department).

The Cosmo City development initially attracted intense objections from surrounding property owners fearing a negative impact on their property values. Following on the state’s initiative there have been three additional mixed-income housing proposals within the area, namely the Zandspruit Development, the Malibongwe Ridge Development and the Lion Park Development. All three of these proposals entail a few thousand housing units. Based on the extensive objections and issues raised around the Lion Park proposal and the similarities between the proposals, it could be surmised that all have faced similar
objections from local land owners. Most of these objections pertain to concerns around the proposed densities and their potential impacts on the environment and rural nature of the area (Berrisford 2008; The MSA Group 2010). Another set of issues raised by ‘concerned stakeholders’ in response to the proposed Malibongwe Ridge Development is around the potential impact on local infrastructure networks, and whether they are adequate to accommodate further development proposals of that nature.

These development pressures are reflected in the constantly shifting provincial urban edge, as is evident in the boundary changes in 2002 and 2009 (Figure 20.2 and Plate 48). The Gauteng urban edge originally excluded the Malibongwe Ridge area and an area south of Zandspruit. However, in 2007 these areas were included.

The Muldersdrift case study demonstrates again the various conflicts between the private-sector developers and the state, with the existing land owners attempting to maximise their returns from their proximity to the World Heritage Site, while objecting to any new developments of a low-income housing or commercial nature to protect their investments. However, the case study also exposes conflicts among existing land owners, between those wishing to expand their return on investments and those wishing to protect the integrity of the Cradle. In addition, the case study demonstrates the lack of alignment of land development policies between the various spheres of government, and the conflicts that arise in consequence.

Lanseria

To the north, adjoining the broader Muldersdrift area, lies Lanseria Airport. From the City of Johannesburg’s perspective the challenge has been how to integrate islands of development, i.e. the airport, into Johannesburg. Lanseria Airport started out as a grass-strip airfield in 1972, and is now the only privately owned international airport in South Africa. Today it is the busiest airport in the Gauteng region after the OR Tambo International Airport in Johannesburg, with approximately 160 000 passengers per year. This is owing to the fact that it is the preferred entry point for most overseas corporate, diplomatic and private aircraft visiting South Africa. Having achieved a certain threshold, the airport attracted a large proposed development in 2008, which was described as follows:

Lanseria International Airport will be the address of a massive mixed-use precinct said to be three times the size of the Sandton central business district. Known only as the Cradle City, this project will comprise about 10 million m² of development bulk which will be worth an estimated R35bn when completed – the biggest single property development for Gauteng. Developers Amari Land says that the idea is to create a complete city centre around Lanseria, which will embrace new urban design principles by integrating living, working, playing, trade and travel.

It is proposed that this mega project be undertaken in six phases, consisting of:

- open space – 41.46 ha (6.9 per cent);
- residential – low density of 111.3 ha (18.52 per cent);
The proposed development was originally conceptualised as an aerotropolis by the developers, and this was also supported by the City of Johannesburg’s economic development department. However, due to the lack of clarity by the Lanseria Airport Company on plans for upgrading Lanseria Airport (i.e. the incorporation/expansion of cargo facilities as a basic requirement of an aerotropolis), the developers decided to base their development concept on a mixed-use development instead, which was accepted by the city. This has left open the possibility for the development of a future aerotropolis around Lanseria Airport.

The 2007 Gauteng urban edge shows Lanseria as an island, but it was fully incorporated into Johannesburg in the revised 2009 urban edge. The city, on the other hand, has designated the airport itself as a development consolidation area and the surrounding areas as expansion areas. According to the city’s Growth Management Strategy:

> Infrastructure in [expansion] areas is limited and the future market-led developments will be determined by the ability of the prospective developments at-scale to be self-sufficient in the upgrading of bulk infrastructure (and utilising resource efficient techniques as an integral component of the development). Minimum Inclusionary Housing requirements will apply in those localities ... with a minimum prescription of 20% of units required for a mix of affordable housing categories. (CoJ 2011b: Section 2.1.2 iv, p.6)

However, where a proposal within an expansion area pertains to the upgrading of informal settlements, they will be treated as high-priority areas.

Prior to this development proposal, Lanseria was seen as a peripheral area with an isolated airport, and was not given any priority in terms of the city’s SDF. The city’s changing perspective seems to have been influenced at least in part by the strong political lobbying undertaken by the developers, but also reflects a rethinking of concepts of peripherality in the context of an increasingly connected city-region.

The development was initially promoted by provincial officials who came to the city to give it support and to co-ordinate the application and amend the Regional Spatial Development Framework (RSDF). However, this decision appears to have emerged from high levels within the province, as officials were called to a meeting with the deputy director-general and a delegation from the developers, Amari Land, and instructed to facilitate the development application with other sector departments.

The political support accorded to the development may, however, have also reflected the
breadth of the proposal and its consistency with the concerns of provincial and municipal politicians. Initially, there were two proposed separate development initiatives, one of a logistical nature to the south of the airport, and the other an industrial proposal to the north. When the consultants for each of these developments engaged with each other, a much broader and bolder plan emerged that was proposed to their respective clients. The thinking behind this proposal was to go beyond just the logistics and industrial demand, and also to address the environment and the need for mixed-income residential development as a way of responding to the growth of informal settlements within the area. Thereafter, this initiative obtained the strong support of both provincial and city politicians.32

However, infrastructure is expected to be funded by the developers, as it is in an expansion area and is not an immediate priority. The city will support them by amending spatial policy documents (SDF and RSDF) and rights, but will not provide financial support for infrastructure.33 The effective privatisation of infrastructure development in this way is not unusual internationally and might be seen as a form of ‘splintering urbanism’ (Graham and Marvin 2001), but it remains to be seen whether the public sector is drawn into funding the development in later years.

There are grounds for concern over whether the development will accord with the stated principles and requirements, or whether it will be simply another way of revalorising land through property development. To date development of only phase 1, the Cradle Business Park, has begun, with the upgrade of the access road to the airport, which will also serve as the main entrance to the Business Park. According to an urban-design assessment of this phase, the Business Park appears to resemble a traditional gated office park rather than the claimed ‘new urban design principles’ outlined above (Chapman 2010). Further, although the R512 on which Lanseria is located is one of the focus areas for the city’s inclusionary housing policy thrust,34 there is no mention of inclusionary housing in the environmental impact assessment application, although some 30 per cent of the proposed Cradle City development has been reserved for low- and medium-density housing.

The Lanseria case study has demonstrated the power of the private sector in lobbying the public sector as well as the way individual agency can influence developments. It also points to the ability of mega projects to drive development contrary to planning logics (see also UN-Habitat 2009). While planning has hoped to shape the form development takes there, there are questions about its ability to do so.

Conclusion

Despite Johannesburg’s policy to contain growth, there has been considerable urban expansion close to and beyond the UDB in the north-west, as well as in adjacent municipalities. Of course, Johannesburg’s plans do accept a level of growth in these areas, and both Johannesburg and the provincial government have shifted their growth boundaries in response to this. Johannesburg’s 2011 SDF recognises explicitly that Johannesburg is located within a city-region, and refers to a series of engagements with adjacent municipalities and plans to address
growth and change in the area, including acceptance of a R8/N14 corridor between Mogale City and Tshwane going through the area, although this does not imply urban development all along it (CoJ 2011b). However, the accommodation of growth in this region has largely been as a set of post hoc responses to pressures from below, in a context where Johannesburg’s plans prioritise growth and infrastructural investment in other parts of the city. Johannesburg’s approach contrasts directly with Mogale City’s perspective and vision of development, which sees this area as a region of growth, as well as with the expectations of property owners and developers in these parts of the area. These differences in vision have been one important source of contestation around development in the north-west.

However, Johannesburg has responded rather differently to development pressures in various parts of the area. While the politically connected large developers in the Lanseria area were seemingly able to effect changes to plans within a short time, this was not the case for the many small developers and land owners in the Ruimsig area, who used other channels to challenge or sidestep Johannesburg’s policies. Their lack of a political linkage made it possible for officials to adopt a hard line with some developers and to work out deals with others in Ruimsig. Still, it could be argued that the difference between the two cases was more to do with the merits of the two situations and what they promised in terms of the type of development to be generated. In both cases, some developments have been allowed on the basis that they offer the opportunity for inclusionary housing, and for new forms of urban development consistent with SDF principles. Although it is still early days, and the impact of the recession has slowed development, there is little evidence that development is occurring along the lines desired, and the implementation of inclusionary housing remains elusive.

The inclusion of lower-income housing in an area which under apartheid was seen as a ‘white’ agricultural area has largely been a response to the growth of informal settlements, but Cosmo City does offer housing for a range of income types, moving away to some extent from traditional models of low-income housing. This project has spawned a range of other developments. Growth of this sort, however, has been contested on environmental and infrastructural grounds, sometimes reflecting nimbyism but also an attempt to maintain a rural imaginary.

More fundamentally, the growing urbanisation of an area which was previously largely agricultural, and where some places have considerable perceived value from an environmental and tourism perspective, has generated significant tension. The use of buffer zones and urban development boundaries is, at one level, quite a blunt instrument to address these issues, but at another becomes the focus for conflict in its own right. As Berrisford (2008) argues, there has been insufficient engagement with the nature of peri-urban space, the various needs and activities and thus land uses that seek space in these areas, and too much of a polarisation of policy into urban and non-urban spaces. However, Johannesburg’s 2011 SDF and related plans are beginning to engage with the inevitability of urban growth in this area, and the most appropriate way it might be managed.
Conflicts, contestation and tension are to be expected in areas such as this where there are diverse and differing interests and perspectives, but more so where it is most likely that growth will occur, both as a consequence of its location and position within the broader city-region, but also cascading from some of the major developments. If the Cradle of Humankind World Heritage Site and Cosmo City have both spawned development – and conflicts around it – this is even more likely to occur over the longer term in response to the growth of Lanseria. The lack of infrastructure in the area and priorities elsewhere have contributed to policies to limit development there, and to allow it only on the basis that it is paid for by developers. It remains to be seen whether this policy can be sustained politically, or whether, as in many other parts of the world, a mega project will drive spatial change in rather different ways from policy intentions.

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Notes
2 Some areas even experienced population decline, reflecting the removal of informal settlements or a more general decline in population in commercial farming areas.
4 Interview with M Albonica, architect and urban designer, 19 July 2011, Johannesburg.
6 Interview with T Pretorius, principal, Plan Associates, 13 May 2011, Johannesburg.
7 Interview with S Berichon-Williams, Manager: Land Use Management Development Planning & Urban Management, City of Johannesburg, 14 June 2011, Johannesburg.
9 Interview with T Pretorius, 13 May 2011; interview with P Ahmad, Department of Development Planning and Urban Management, City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality, 17 May 2011, both Johannesburg.
10 Interview with P Harrison, Chair, Development Planning and Modelling, Former Executive Director, Development Planning and Urban Management, City of Johannesburg, 5 April 2011, Johannesburg.
11 Interview with A Ponnusamy, development planner, Gauteng Department of Economic Development, 26 May 2011; interview with N du Toit, development planner, Gauteng
Department of Economic Development, 26 May 2011, Johannesburg.
12 Interview with S Berichon-Williams, 14 June 2011, Johannesburg.
13 Interview with P Harrison, 5 April 2011, Johannesburg.
14 Interview with P Ahmad, 17 May 2011, Johannesburg.
15 Interview with T Pretorius, 13 May 2011, Johannesburg.
16 Interview with S Berichon-Williams, 14 June 2011, Johannesburg.
17 Interview with P Ahmad, 17 May 2011, Johannesburg.
18 Interview with T Pretorius, 13 May 2011, Johannesburg.
20 Interview with P Ahmad, 17 May 2011, Johannesburg.
21 See www.SouthAfrica.info.
23 Golder Associates, Proposed Development Portions 2 and 21 of the farm Nietgedacht 535.
26 An aerotropolis is seen as ‘a driver of business siting and urban development in the twenty-first century’, and consists of an ‘airport city core and an outlying area of businesses stretching fifteen miles along transportation corridors’ (Kasarda 2006: 1). Aerotropoli become the focal point of commercial, industrial, telecommunication and transportation activities and take advantage of their location to attract further related activities such as conference facilities and logistics and distribution companies (Kasarda 2006).
27 Telephonic interview with M Albonica, architect and urban designer, 17 February 2012, Johannesburg.
28 ‘The Spatial Economic Development Directorate Overview’, a presentation made to the Johannesburg Business Forum on 12 June 2009 by the City of Johannesburg, Department of Economic Development.
29 Telephonic interview with M Albonica, 17 February 2012, Johannesburg.
30 Interview with P Harrison, 5 April 2011, Johannesburg.
31 Interview with A Ponnusamy, 26 May 2011, Johannesburg.
32 Interview with M Albonica, 19 July 2011, Johannesburg.
33 Interview with P Ahmad, 17 May 2011; interview with P Harrison, 5 April 2011, both Johannesburg.
34 Interview with P Ahmad, 17 May 2011, Johannesburg.

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