One Hundred Years of the ANC

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Chapter Six

POPULAR MOVEMENTS, CONTENTIOUS SPACES AND THE ANC, 1943–1956

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INTRODUCTION

During the 1940s and 1950s, two principal components of black resistance in South Africa, namely, local popular movements and political organisations, underwent profound transformation and radicalisation. Both were rejuvenated, became demonstrably defiant and assumed mass characters, albeit with considerable geographical and temporal variations. New layers of the black urban working class participated in various forms of protest, from individual to collective and organised acts of defiance. Urban areas and especially the places in which the rapidly growing urban working class lived – locations, freehold townships and squatter camps – became the primary centres of resistance. The chapter proceeds from the premise that popular movements and political organisations both contributed significantly to shaping resistance politics. While this may be self-evident, the historiography of liberation movements in South Africa, especially in the past two decades, has tended to elevate the role of political organisations at the expense of popular movements. In its current form, and despite routine disclaimers, the hegemonic narrative of liberation history has become virtually synonymous with the history of the African National Congress (ANC). Institutional histories and the proliferation of struggle biographies have arguably reinforced this approach.

A linear history of the ANC (and, by extension, of the liberation struggle) has been produced. It is one of constant progression from the launch of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) in 1944 and the adoption of the Programme of Action in 1949 to the organisation’s apparently ineluctable march from one campaign to the next, continually scaling new heights in its transformation into a mass movement and very rapidly reaching the summit of 100 000 members at the end of the Defiance Campaign in 1952. The decade from the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s is thus perceived as a critical turning point in liberation history but has generally been interpreted uncritically.
Unevenness in the development of struggle, setbacks and the absence of overt resistance are elided or presented as minor detours on the path to power. Such a teleological narrative arguably suppresses alternative histories of the rich and dynamic processes that configured resistance politics during the period under discussion. In this dominant rendition of liberation history, popular protest movements are either subsumed under the ANC’s history or, in the case of the struggles of the 1940s, portrayed as overtures to the subsequent decade of mass defiance led by the ANC. Consequently, a wide range of other histories of struggle have been marginalised, resulting in a failure, as Hilary Sapire has argued, properly to comprehend the ‘idioms of protest, ideologies and forms of consciousness which fed into the overall mass political culture of the decade.’ Constituencies at the heart of these struggles are thus ‘obscured or ignored.’ So, at this moment of heightened celebration of the ANC’s achievements and when there is renewed interest in liberation historiography it seems apposite to reinterrogate the history of resistance in the period when both local popular movements and political organisations emerged from the quiescence of the 1930s to mount multiple challenges to the status quo.

Rather than concentrate on the role either of popular movements or of the ANC, this chapter discusses the development of resistance by focusing on the production of contentious spaces and emphasising the mutually constitutive relationship between place and resistance. It proceeds from the premise that the spatial manifestations of the oppression of black people in urban areas were not monolithic, which implies that their responses varied among different types of localities and over time. Thus, there were marked differences in the politics produced in the 1940s in freehold locations and squatter camps, as well as in the ‘model townships’ of the 1940s and 1950s. Such an approach allows for different explanations of the rhythms of resistance by being attentive to both the presence and the absence of struggle.

The chapter proposes that struggles for ‘the right to the city’ should feature centrally in analyses of the radicalisation of resistance and, as the state responded to demands, to the spatial fragmentation of struggles and their decline in some places. Finally, the relationship between popular movements and political organisations is examined, especially in the various black residential areas of the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal (PWV, now Gauteng) region.
GEOGRAPHIES OF RESISTANCE

Place shapes struggle in important ways and should therefore play a more central role in analyses of resistance. Put differently, resistance should be understood in terms of where it happens. Scholars such as Michael Keith and Steven Pile have utilised the analytical framework of ‘geographies of resistance’ to explain the mutually constitutive relationship between place and resistance, or, as Pile states, to examine ‘the ways in which resistance uses extant geographies and makes new geographies and [how] geographies [make] resistance.’ Following Henri Lefebvre’s notion of the ‘social production of space,’ this body of work challenges the idea that place is passive or an empty canvas on which history happens. Rather, space should be understood as an important constitutive element in the shaping of socio-political processes and of resistance. It is an approach that calls for greater attention to be paid to how different places generate varied forms of resistance over time and how such resistance can transform localities.

Foregrounding place is especially important in the South African context, where it was deeply implicated in the state and capital’s efforts to assert dominance over the black population. Control and surveillance of the places inhabited by black people, especially urban Africans, were strategic in the assertion and maintenance of white privilege and power. Inevitably, resistance against this domination was highly spatialised. In the 1940s, the state’s ability effectively to impose technologies of control and surveillance was often weak and fragmented, which makes it necessary to consider what forms of contentious politics were produced in places where authority was diminished. For instance, in freehold locations where the reach of white local authorities was tenuous the demand for local autonomy was a recurrent theme in protests. In some squatter camps where state authority was almost entirely absent, alternative autonomous mechanisms of local control were established. The approach adopted here is to discuss the manifestation of varied processes of resistance in different places and how these places, in turn, were transformed to make possible other forms of contentious politics. Mapping resistance allows one to understand why and how certain forms of resistance occur in particular places. It is also important, as Emma Wainright argues in her study of the struggle of women in Dundee’s jute industry around the turn of the twentieth century, to understand ‘the role of space in enabling resistance.’

It has certainly been crucial in the rewriting of South Africa’s history to concentrate on the presence of resistance, its multiple forms and actors. Nonetheless, the focus of
this work has left a major lacuna, namely, explanations for the absence of resistance. Moments of mass uprising (such as at the height of the anti-apartheid struggle in the 1980s, when possibly millions of people joined certain actions or campaigns) are uncritically read back into history to produce generalisations about levels of involvement or support for resistance movements. For the period under discussion, it is evident that there were times when large sections of the urban black population were not involved in overt resistance politics, or, for that matter, in the campaigns of the Congress Alliance. There are several obvious reasons for this, including increasing state repression. However, the concerted effort by the apartheid government from the early 1950s to reconfigure urban spaces by eliminating existing contentious spaces and replacing them with ‘properly planned’ ‘model townships’ was a significant and largely underestimated factor in shaping geographies of resistance.

A combination of instituting tightly controlled spaces and basic reforms, especially housing, had the effect of diminishing resistance among those sectors of urban black society that had previously been at the centre of popular resistance. Importantly, a significant proportion of the participants in these struggles was drawn from the ranks of the hundreds of thousands of new immigrants in urban areas: lodgers, tenants, squatters and, critically, women. Claiming rights to the city became a leitmotif of the resistance of these marginalised and excluded groups.

STRUGGLING FOR THE RIGHT TO THE CITY

From the mid-1930s, the South African economy experienced an industrial revolution, so that at the end of the war, secondary industry had eclipsed mining as the main contributor to the national economy. As the demand for labour surged so, too, did the influx of Africans into the urban areas. Between 1936 and 1946, the African, urban population increased by a huge 50 per cent, from 1 141 642 to 1 794 212, with women featuring prominently, as their numbers in the urban areas nearly doubled from about 350 000 to 650 000. However, the process of African urbanisation was considerably more ambivalent than these figures suggest. Drawing on data from a survey on pass records, Philip Bonner has explained that in the 1930s and 1940s the majority of the non-mining African urban population was either migrant or first-generation immigrant. In other words, they were still in the process of becoming urban. The process of becoming fully urbanised was undoubtedly complex but from the 1940s there was, nevertheless, a discernible trend towards permanent settlement by more Africans in the urban areas.
While the existing literature correctly underscores the immigrant character of large sections of the urban African population in this period, it is important to recognise the shift towards urban rootedness among increasing numbers for whom the prospect of returning to a rural lifestyle was becoming remote and, for some, probably not even desirable. The explosion in the population of urban black settlements, which, from the late 1930s, involved large numbers of women and children, reflected this trend. It marked the beginnings of a qualitative shift in the worldview and politics of the nascent urban-based black working class, which was reflected in the types of struggles executed at the time. Demands and actions of Africans became more explicitly about claiming rights associated with permanence in urban areas. These were framed primarily as struggles for ‘presence’ but increasingly, albeit unevenly, were also articulated in terms of what Lefebvre called ‘appropriation’ – demands by marginalised poor for the right to use urban spaces to meet their needs. This is not to argue that rural ties had been severed or that rural cultures and social practices had vanished among African urbanites. On the contrary, the repertoires of struggle and types of leaders who were at the helm, especially of the squatter movements, were imbued with the ideas and practices of recent immigrants. But not being fully urbanised did not preclude new members of the urban working class from claiming the right to be in the city and from making demands around issues of collective consumption, such as housing and public transport.

A salient feature of these struggles was their challenge to the dominant discourse about cities that sought to prescribe them as spaces for white privilege and power. By openly challenging hegemonic powers and practices, the urban poor reconfigured their living areas into contentious spaces. The state’s response, at least in the early years of apartheid, was to concede limited urban rights to some Africans and to destroy most of the old locations and replace them with massive housing projects in new dormitory townships, which contributed to the decline of resistance politics in several of these areas.

‘JUST ENOUGH SPACE TO HANG UP THE WASHING’

Designed in the 1920s to accommodate a maximum of 8 000 people, Payneville location in Springs appeared remarkably underpopulated in the early 1930s, with the official number of residents standing at a mere 5 441. But the surge in urbanisation caused that number to nearly double to about 10 000 on the eve of World War II and, by 1952, the location’s African population had grown to
33 000, a staggering increase of 600 per cent in just under two decades. In addition, 800 coloureds lived in a racially demarcated section of the location, called Cape Stands, and about 1 000 Indians lived in the adjacent Asiatic Bazaar. Faced with this unprecedented population explosion, which the local authority encouraged with its pursuit of a programme of rapid industrialisation, and the ensuing demand for housing, the Springs council did absolutely nothing to address the shortage of housing for Africans. Consequently, overcrowding became ubiquitous and lodging proliferated. Banzi Bangani remembers that on his father’s stand, ‘we had nine people [in the house] and at the back there was a man with his wife and also a single man in one room. There were about 16 to 18 people on our stand. There was not very much space left on the stand. Maybe just enough to hang up the washing.’

These conditions were replicated throughout the PWV region as new work-seekers streamed into the country’s economic heartland and were forced to seek accommodation in or next to the locations set aside for Africans. At the height of the influx of African workers to the cities in 1944, the state hardly built any houses for Africans, causing a severe national housing crisis that was most concentrated on the Reef. The number of African families living without accommodation outside locations more than doubled between 1936 and 1951, from 86 000 to 176 000. In 1947 it was estimated that more than 150 000 family houses and 106 877 units for single male workers were required in the urban areas. A cursory survey of locations on the Reef reveals the desperate overcrowding and a general, often precipitous, decline in living conditions. In Brakpan location more than 10 000 were crammed into a space built for 6 000. Dukathole, the African location attached to Germiston, was already bursting at the seams in the early 1940s, with 18 000 people squeezed into an area similar in size to Brakpan location. Orlando, which was established in 1931 amid considerable fanfare and international recognition as a ‘model location,’ experienced similar problems, despite being 13 km to the south of Johannesburg. Here the housing crisis was graphically highlighted in the exponential growth of the official housing waiting list. In 1939 the housing list consisted of a modest 143 names, by 1941 it had increased to 4 500 and by the end of the war to a staggering 16 000.

In the opposite direction, 12 km north of the city centre, conditions in Alexandra were even worse. This freehold location, formally established in 1912, became a magnet for new immigrants. At the start of the war, its population was already estimated at around 35 000. Less than two years later, officials conceded that there were between 40 000 and 45 000 people living in 4 376 buildings, of which only 702 were ‘in good
order.’ What this meant was that an average of nearly 100 people lived on one stand, making it easily one of the most populous and congested locations in the country. By contrast, the better-known Sophiatown only had a population of 16,668 in 1937, but also registered significant growth, reaching 39,186 in 1950. Perhaps only the scale of overcrowding in Benoni old location could be compared to the situation in Alexandra. Both the ‘Native’ section and the Asiatic Bazaar in Benoni experienced unbearable overcrowding from the early 1940s. An estimated 1,900 lodger families lived in the backyards of the 1,179 houses in the ‘Native’ location. It was common for three to four families to occupy one yard and often a single 50 x 50-foot plot housed between eight and twelve families. Overcrowding spilled over into the Asiatic Bazaar, which very quickly experienced even worse conditions. In 1945 more than 2,500 African and 1,000 Indian residents were crammed onto the 120 50 x 50-foot stands in the area. Five years later, the African population in the bazaar had doubled, to 5,003, causing unimaginable overcrowding, including, in one case, a stand occupied by 111 people. Similar conditions prevailed in Durban and the Cape Peninsula. According to Paul Maylam, in 1946 there were approximately 5,000 shacks occupied by Africans in Durban. In 1949, a third of the 90,000 registered African male workers did not have formal accommodation. In Cape Town in 1950, an estimated 25,000 African men and a further 5,000 African families were living in about 30 squatter camps dotted around the peninsula.

Living conditions in these overcrowded locations were appallingly insalubrious, characterised by the lack of proper sewerage systems, the operation of the notorious and unhygienic bucket system, scores of residents having to share a single tap and unreliable refuse collection. Poverty was pervasive and levels of malnutrition high, making conditions conducive to the spread of disease. Outbreaks of diphtheria, tuberculosis, pneumonia and enteric fever were common. In Payneville in 1950, there was an outbreak of diphtheria and more than 800 tuberculosis cases were reported. Infant mortality among Africans in the location was alarmingly high – 383.77 per thousand live births compared to only 41.01 for whites. Location medical officers issued similar reports of conditions in locations across the region. The socio-economic deprivation in the locations, coupled with the restrictive laws that sought to control many aspects of the lives of African urban dwellers, generated widespread dissatisfaction and eventually produced a culture of opposition as residents sought ways to survive and to overcome the deprivation to which they were being subjected.
Contentious Locations

The authorities described these locations as ‘black spots,’ a pejorative label that succinctly captured their deep anxieties about the rapidly increasing population there, their mixed ‘racial’ character and the growing propensity for multifarious acts of defiance. Urban ‘black spots’ were perceived as blemishes on the white urban landscape and by the 1940s had become the antithesis of the state’s intentions when they were established in the early part of the twentieth century, to replace what were then perceived as troublesome inner city slums. Previously the combination of influx control, segregation and a battery of coercive laws had proved reasonably successful in maintaining stability and order in the locations, but the rapidly expanding and refractory urban black working class persistently punched holes in this structure. State hegemony, so carefully constructed through pieces of legislation such as the pass laws and the Native (Urban) Areas Act of 1923 and a network of location administration, was daily being challenged. Defiance of state control occurred at multiple levels: urban segregation was increasingly transgressed and a host of location regulations aimed at controlling inhabitants were brazenly and regularly violated.

Instead of places where the authorities could exert tight control and surveillance over the African population, they were transformed into spaces of defiance, subversion and resistance. Resistance assumed various forms, from individual acts of defiance to organised mass mobilisation. The socially dense spaces of the backyards produced a multitude of what James Scott has called ‘hidden transcripts of resistance.’30 They were also critical spaces where other forms of more explicit, albeit unorganised, defiance occurred, including various ‘illegal’ and ‘anti-social’ activities.

Social historians have drawn attention to the myriad experiences of the newly urbanised (or urbanising) black population and have provided vivid accounts of the range of daily ‘illegal’ and ‘anti-social’ activities that routinely challenged the state’s presumed prerogative to control black lives.31 They have explained how pass laws were routinely flouted by those whose movement they aimed to control. African males in search of work regularly circumvented the system by entering towns ‘illegally’ and finding refuge in locations, where the prospect of detection was low. Many of those who were caught and jailed or deported (to the rural area of their origin) simply returned.
‘Illegal’ beer brewing by African women was perhaps the quintessential and most common example of such unplanned ‘subversive’ and ‘anti-social’ activities. In every location, scores of women daily defied the law and in so doing, presented the authorities with one of their most serious and persistent problems of control. Regular confrontations between beer brewers and local police contributed to the growth of a culture of resistance in the locations.\textsuperscript{32} The proliferation of youthful gangs during this period was further evidence not only of a growing trend among young people to anti-authoritarian and anti-social behaviour but also of the inability of the state at this juncture to control black youth, which was reflected in the failure to draft them into menial, low-paying industrial labour. Although these gangs were mainly apolitical, they represented a significant informal and largely uncontrollable force of defiance.\textsuperscript{33} Through this multitude of subversive acts, the state’s ability to exercise effective control over the urban black working class diminished considerably.

From the mid-1940s, the various strands of defiance multiplied and began to coalesce and to find expression in more organised and mass resistance. There had been previous instances of local mass popular struggles, such as in the Vereeniging and Potchefstroom locations, but these proved exceptional in the pre-war era.\textsuperscript{34} The turning point in the emergence of local popular movements was probably the Alexandra bus boycotts of the early 1940s, when residents mobilised against proposed fare increases. The first of these occurred in August 1940 and its success resulted in the formation of the United Front Committee at a meeting in the location attended by 8 000 residents (about 20 per cent of the total population). In 1943 a mass boycott was organised against the proposed fare hike from 4d to 5d, which produced incredible scenes of thousands of Alexandrans marching 12 miles to Johannesburg and back. The event was described by \textit{Inkululeko} as the ‘biggest demonstration in many years’ and by Eddie Roux, a leading figure in the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA), as the most significant moment of African resistance during the war.\textsuperscript{35}

Often popular resistance crystallised around opposition to authoritarian township management. A case in point was that of Brakpan, where a particularly ‘inflexible’ regime imposed strict control over the location, including erecting a fence around it. As Sapire has explained, in 1944 the hardline approach by the location superintendent, Dr F J Language, ignited an already tense situation in the location when community and CPSA leader David Bopape was dismissed from his teaching post. A successful stayaway of the entire location was organised on 10 August 1944 to demand Bopape’s
reinstatement. In similar vein, after the war there was unprecedented mobilisation in the usually quiescent old Alberton Location against efforts by the township superintendent, Van Coller, to enforce stricter permit controls. Women were in the forefront of the struggle that resulted in Van Coller’s removal. Not surprisingly, members of the Reef Managers and Superintendents of Urban Native Administration and Native Commissioners’ Council expressed growing concern over ‘the general attitude of natives along the Reef and elsewhere in massing together and defying constituted authority ...’

As noted above, the state’s determination to stamp out beer brewing was a perennial source of friction, causing almost daily confrontations between the authorities and individual brewers or groups of their supporters. On occasion, however, whole communities were mobilised, as happened in Payneville in the mid-1940s. Prior to the war, the Springs municipality had established a beerhall in a deliberate attempt to monopolise the lucrative beer-drinking market and to strike a blow against local brewers. Led by the indefatigable Dinah Maile, a local communist activist, head of the African Protection League and a member of the Advisory Board, women mobilised for the closure of the beerhall. In mid-1945, Maile called for a boycott, which was enforced by women. Throughout July the location’s women regularly confronted the police and men who broke the boycott, culminating in a demonstration by 2 000 women in front of the beerhall to prevent men from entering. The police’s violent dispersal of the demonstrators sparked a riot that quickly engulfed the whole location. In 1949 the Residents’ Protest Committee was formed to campaign against the ‘indirect method of taxation’ represented by the beerhall.

The lack of affordable housing was, arguably, the greatest source of discontent, triggering popular movements involving established residents and new immigrants in nearly all locations. Lodgers and sub-tenants, especially women, were typically very active in these struggles. In March 1950, after a housing protest meeting in Payneville, residents decided to march to the centre of Springs to demand that the authorities build houses. Fifty people left the meeting venue to embark on the march. By the time they reached the police station on the outskirts of the town, their ranks had swelled to more than a thousand, illustrating the widespread support for the demonstrators’ demand. In 1945, trade unionist Raphael Palime organised a Lodgers’ Association in Dukathole, Germiston’s old location, to lobby the government to peg or reduce rents. Throughout 1946 and 1947, the association also campaigned for the creation
of a site on which lodgers could build houses. Similar demands for housing were made in Alexandra, Evaton, Brakpan and Western Areas.

However, it was the eruption of squatter movements, led by ‘grassroots community leaders’ that had the most profound impact on urban politics in the post-war years. The best known of these was Mpanza’s movement in Orlando. James ‘Sofasonke’ Mpanza initially rallied hundreds of sub-tenants behind the slogan of ‘Housing and Shelter for All.’ In March 1944, he led a group of sub-tenants to occupy an empty space on the periphery of Orlando East. There they erected 250 shacks, which act of defiance immediately attracted huge support: the number of families joining this squatter movement increased by 300 a day and within weeks there were 4 000 shacks in the area. Squatter movements from Pimville (led by Abel Ntoi), Orlando East (led by Oriel Monongoaha) and Alexandra (led by Schreiner Baduza) occupied various empty spaces around Orlando, so that by the end of 1946, the number of squatters in the area numbered nearly 30 000. Officials estimated that approximately 92 000 people joined squatter settlements around Johannesburg at this time. Similar squatter movements sprang up across the PWV region, including in Evaton, Vereeniging and Benoni.

Harry Mabuya led a movement similar to that of Mpanza in Benoni, where, in July 1946, he established a ‘Tent Town,’ comprising 80 tents and 7 shacks, which grew to 820 tents and shacks housing 4 000 people by 1949. A similar number occupied an open space in Evaton in 1946 and continued until they were finally removed in 1951. Importantly, as Bonner has explained, the squatter phenomenon was not restricted to the abovementioned movements. Tens of thousands of new immigrants were unable to find accommodation (or chose not to live) in existing locations and established informal and often illegal settlements, ranging from individual shacks to relatively large groups, across the peri-urban areas of the PWV. By the end of the war, nearly 100 000 people lived in these areas. Collectively the illegal occupation of various urban spaces by squatters reflected the failure of the state to contain urban Africans in designated spaces. And they disrupted the state’s plans to maintain a carefully controlled urban landscape.

NEW POPULAR MOVEMENTS

The form and character of popular local movements were shaped by a constellation of local factors, including opposition to repressive local regimes, the pre-existence of political organisations and previous experiences of popular mobilisation, the
urban or immigrant nature of the population, the presence of an educated elite and, of course, levels of material deprivation and socio-economic hardship. These manifested themselves differently depending on the nature of the localities, that is, whether they were freehold settlements, municipal locations or peri-urban squatter camps.

The historic constitution of places, and their social dynamics, had a significant influence on the character, demands and leadership of movements. Political resistance in freehold areas such as Alexandra and Evaton, where large numbers of long-standing residents owned land and properties, differed quite markedly from the politics of new, spontaneously created squatter camps that consisted mainly of new immigrants. However, locations were also internally fragmented, with cleavages among property owners, lodgers and tenants reflecting themselves in political movements. Thus, in places like Alexandra, Dukathole, Evaton and Orlando, lodgers and sub-tenants led housing struggles and squatter movements, with little involvement by the propertied classes. But there were also issues that united different sections of these locations. For example, in Alexandra and Evaton the bus boycotts of the 1940s, as well as those of the 1950s, drew massive support from all sectors of the population.

Although local specificities generated differences in struggles, there were nonetheless common issues affecting communities across locations. At a most basic level, many of these movements may be characterised as subsistence struggles. But, as discussed above, they were about much more: what was increasingly evident was the growing importance of demands for access to resources commensurate with the needs of a settled urban population, such as affordable public services and amenities, right to a livelihood and freedom from unfair municipal control. Demands articulated in the struggles in the established locations of Brakpan and Alexandra were very revealing in this respect. In addition to calling for the reinstatement of David Bopape, Brakpan location residents demanded ‘a reduction of the high municipal rents, an increase in wages for municipal workers and the recognition of their trade union, the construction of long-awaited and desperately needed 300 additional houses, home and street repairs, the reduction of bus fares, the improvement of the bus service, the installation of water-borne sewerage, the right to home-brewing, the construction of a secondary school and the relaxation of the harsh system of administration.’ 49 By engaging in mass resistance against bus fare hikes, the people of Alexandra also sent an unambiguous message of their permanence in the city and consequently their right to affordable public transport. 50 Campaigns for affordable housing were,
on the one hand, a reaction to the desperately inadequate housing stock in all black
locations and, on the other, a powerful statement of intent by growing numbers of
African families to put down roots in the cities. This was especially noticeable among
lodgers and tenants, who previously comprised a high proportion of single men but,
from the early 1940s, included many more women and families, who were the main
constituency in the squatter movements. Demands for housing, both by existing
location residents and new arrivals, became integral to many of the struggles waged
at this time and indicated an important change in black people’s relationship to and
view of the city. According to Rusty Bernstein, a leading member of the CPSA at the
time, the mushrooming of squatter settlements across the Witwatersrand reflected
the black urban poor’s ‘claim [to] living space for themselves.’

A salient feature of these popular movements, especially of the 1940s, is that
they remained spatially confined, despite the commonalities of grievances across
localities. This applied in varying degrees to movements in established locations and
to squatter movements. Referring to recent arrivals in the urban areas, Bonner has
argued that the politics of these newly created and restive communities remained
‘sectional’ and ‘introverted.’ In general these movements exhibited rather limited
political horizons and their claims to rights rarely transcended the borders of
their own location. This was due to various factors, including the impact of urban
segregation that kept people separate not only from other locations but also from the
white city, which limited their perceptions about the city, the immigrant character of
this population as well as the weakness of existing political organisations and their
inability to connect these struggles. Locality-based movements did, in fact, pose
important challenges to authorities, but these were almost exclusively directed at the
local state. Protests were generally aimed at the local representatives of state, such as
the location superintendent and police and the Non-European Affairs Department.
The nascent and inexperienced black working class, and the localised nature of the
struggles it waged, limited the possibility of collective struggle to transform both the
process of urbanisation and the character of cities themselves, which are critical to
a radical notion of rights to the city.

Such political parochialism notwithstanding, these local struggles gave birth to a
new generation of popular movements, whose character was largely determined by
local circumstances but which also shared common traits. Many of these movements
emerged spontaneously in the course of struggles, while others were influenced by
local political leaders, especially from the CPSA. The leaders of these movements
varied from place to place: in established locations such as Alexandra, Brakpan location, Evaton and Sophiatown the educated urban elite were invariably at the fore, while squatter movements were mostly led by new arrivals or first-generation immigrants. Although women were often the most active participants in the struggles, the formal movements were mostly led by men. In this regard, a spatial division of gender activism crystallised, with women playing a more leading role in the inner space of localities, such as the yards, and men dominating the public spaces, such as the squares, which tended to be the main places of congregation for communities. What also stood out was the multiplicity of political voices, from socialists and communists, to Africanists, nationalists and conservatives.

Alexandra’s reputation as home to left-wing politics and multiple popular movements was firmly established during this period. During the 1943 boycott, the Alexandra Workers’ Union (comprising traders, craftsmen and property owners), the Alexandra Women’s Brigade and an array of socialists and communists created the Emergency Transport Committee and then the Workers’ Transport Action Committee. Lilian Tshabalala, Lilian and Vincent Swart, Paul Mosaka, Gaur Radebe, Self Mampuru and AEP Fish were prominent local leaders in this movement and went on to launch the African Democratic Party (ADP) in September 1943. In Brakpan, the Advisory Board, the Vigilance Association and the Communist Party created the Brakpan Location Joint Organisations Committee, which co-ordinated all struggles in the location. A joint committee was also established in Evaton to mobilise a campaign for local autonomy. In a number of other locations, vigilance associations and tenants’ leagues emerged as prominent organisations in local campaigns. Squatter movements produced their own brand of movement, most notably Mpanza’s Sofasonke Movement and the less well known ‘Eye of the City’ organisation in Evaton.

MOVEMENTS AND PARTIES IN THE 1940s

What was the role of the ANC and the CPSA in this upsurge of local popular struggles? There was some evidence in the early 1940s of sections of the ANC awakening from the political slumber of the 1930s. According to Saul Dubow, for example, the tone of the ‘Africans’ Claims’ of 1943 ‘contrasted markedly’ with the polite approach of previous requests to the state. Now the ANC demanded a ‘democratic bill of rights’ for everyone. Importantly, the ANC, under the leadership of AB Xuma, appeared responsive to events unfolding around it. Xuma captured the prevailing mood
in the locations, especially among aspirant homeowners, when he endorsed the right to freehold tenure in urban areas. ‘The simple assertion was that Africans,’ he wrote, ‘were in the cities for their own betterment. They were not there to serve European interests, but to establish a stable family life in the new environment and to participate fully in the opportunities of the modern exchange economy.’ Nelson Mandela, who witnessed the Alexandra bus boycott, remembers it as one of the key moments in his political transformation from ‘observer’ to ‘participant’.

These were undoubtedly early signs of changes underway in the ANC. However, the national organisation remained largely uninvolved in the popular resistance. Little, if any effort was made to intervene, support or direct these struggles. Importantly, and unlike in the 1950s, the ANC of the 1940s seemed unwilling and unable to offer itself as a political banner behind which struggle could be co-ordinated or provided with a degree of political coherence. At the time, the ANC leadership was still largely drawn from the ranks of the educated urban elite, which reflected the character of its primary constituency in the locations. Its politics and modus operandi lagged behind events. This was especially noticeable in its absence from struggles by the poorest sections of the population – new immigrants, squatters and women. Bonner and Sapire have attributed this to the failure by the ANC (and to a lesser extent the CPSA) leadership to connect to and comprehend the nature of this massive new population of first-generation immigrants. For their part, squatter leaders eschewed formal political parties and, argues Dubow, ‘were suspicious of external control.’ For example, Mpanza was vocal about his antipathy to formal or national politics, rejecting any interest ‘in Communism, Democracy or any other party.’ In Durban, Iain Edwards has explained, the ANC tried to establish a foothold in the city’s shacklands throughout the 1950s, but with very little success.

Notwithstanding his role in rebuilding the ANC in the 1940s, Xuma remained resolutely moderate. He opposed strike action during the war, echoing Jan Smuts’s stance that it would undermine the war effort. In Alexandra he and RG Baloyi (treasurer of the ANC) attempted to use the bus boycotts to become bus owners themselves. Growing dissatisfaction among local leaders about the ANC’s ineffectiveness led, in the case of Alexandra, to the launch of the ADP, which Peter Walshe interprets as a signal of ‘growing radicalism among certain section of the political active classes,’ especially its declared intention to engage in mass mobilisation. It was a sign of the mounting frustration about the ANC leadership’s continued imperviousness to the profound events unfolding around it. Amidst the explosion of local struggles, the
ANC decided to launch a national anti-pass campaign after the government refused to repeal the pass laws. While undoubtedly a critical issue, the campaign to collect a million signatures to be submitted to the government neither connected with the immediate issues animating popular movements nor reflected the drastic shift in modes of struggle that had been taking place. Xuma’s aim of collecting a million signatures for a petition started reasonably well, with a launch attended by about 600 delegates, but quickly petered out. Mass popular struggles seemed beyond the horizons of the political elite.

Young ANC members responded to the ineffectiveness and moderate politics of the ANC leadership and the perceived threat posed by new initiatives such as the ADP by launching the ANCYL. The new body was scathing about the incumbent leadership, accusing it of yielding to oppression and of being an ‘organisation of a privileged few – professionals, traders, a sprinkling of intellectuals and conservatives.’ It was audacious and ambitious, setting itself ‘the historic task of imparting dynamic substance and matter to the organisational form of the ANC.’ This took the form of ‘a forthright exposition of the National Liberatory outlook – African Nationalism – which the Youth League seeks to impose on the Mother Body.’ Despite this radical rhetoric, the ANCYL in the 1940s remained as disconnected from the local struggles as the leadership of the ANC. It was, of course, still in its infancy and in the process of crafting a political identity. Moreover, it saw as its primary task the ideological and organisational transformation of the ANC, not engagement in popular struggles.

By contrast, the CPSA enjoyed considerably more influence in several location struggles. In fact, where the ANC enjoyed some influence it was often due to the role of local activists such as Bopape, Radebe, Edwin Mofutsanyana, JB Marks, Paul Mosaka, Walter Sisulu and Naboth Mokgatle, most of whom were either members of the party or were influenced by socialist ideas. The CPSA had a head start over the ANC in its involvement and influence in the popular struggles at the time because of its earlier role in the unionisation of black workers, and had been actively recruiting African workers into its ranks for some years. Its influence was already evident in Vereeniging location, where, during the riots, local party leader TW Thibedi organised meetings of 1 000 to 2 000 residents, and in the struggle in Potchefstroom location, where, reportedly, ‘practically every man and woman in Potchefstroom location joined the Communist Party.’

In Alexandra, party leaders played an increasingly prominent role in the bus boycotts and other struggles. Tom Lodge believes party and unionists ‘of the calibre
of Marks, Bopape, and [Dan] Thloome had at that stage probably greater local standing than the young intellectuals of the Congress Youth League." Sapire’s study of the uprising in Brakpan location confirms this view. The party’s attention to ‘bread-and-butter issues, local disputes and the everyday struggles’ led to great success, which was reflected in the huge support it enjoyed in the location. Dinah Maile, a prominent CPSA member, was the outstanding radical leader in Payneville throughout this period. In Benoni old location, the party held regular public meetings in the mid-1940s and at least once was reported to have attracted 1 000 residents, when it campaigned for the introduction of a sub-economic housing scheme.

If the CPSA enjoyed success in those locations with high proportions of urbanised workers, it proved almost as ineffective as the ANC in penetrating those areas dominated by new immigrants. This was nowhere more graphically illustrated than in the party’s lethargic reaction to the squatter movements. Bernstein explained in his autobiography the failure of the CPSA to respond to the squatter movement in Johannesburg. According to him, the party’s attitude to Mpanza’s movement was mainly influenced by Edwin Mofutsanyana, a prominent figure on the party’s district committee and a member of the Orlando Advisory Board, who had concluded that Mpanza’s call for an occupation of a piece of land in Orlando during winter would not muster support.

Bernstein’s analysis of the party’s error was frank and revealing:

*Things might have been different had our views been shaped by people who were themselves under the accommodation hammer ... Very few of our members were themselves amongst the townships’ desperate and homeless. Most of them were settled urbanites, with reasonably steady jobs and reasonably acceptable if meagre housing which they had acquired before the great war-time influx. Few of them lived with the full trauma of homelessness or overcrowding. Though they lived amongst the homeless and the desperate, they were not of them. We were slow to recognise this fact, and to discover that we did not have our fingers firmly on the pulse of the explosion which was coming.*

The party’s lacklustre response was repeated in relation to other squatter movements, in Benoni and Vereeniging, which could not be ascribed to the erroneous assessment of one person. Only in Alexandra did a movement come under its influence. There, local party activist Schreiner Baduza led the movement to establish a squatter camp in the middle of the location. But, recalled Bernstein, Baduza was ‘acting on his own initiative independently of the local Party branch.’ Only after
Baduza moved his camp to Moroka did the party intervene by attempting to launch a campaign for houses. By then the movement had come under attack from the state and it quickly declined. From the late 1930s, the CPSA had consciously embarked on a strategy to root itself more firmly among the black working class, which, as has been shown, made it far more alert to local struggles. Nonetheless, its influence was fragmented and limited, especially among new members of the working class. From 1950, the political landscape changed completely. Confronted by state suppression, the CPSA disbanded itself and threw the party’s weight behind the Congress Movement, at the moment when the ANC was rapidly transforming itself.

MODEL TOWNSHIPS AND DEFIANCE IN THE 1950S

Compared to the preceding four decades of moderate petitioning, the ANC of the 1950s was a robust, defiant and energetic movement. It was in these years that its reputation as a formidable liberation movement able to lead a nationally co-ordinated struggle against apartheid was firmly established. Despite the obvious successes achieved by the ANC in the years immediately after the historic 1949 conference, it in fact enjoyed inconsistent success in mobilising support for its campaigns in black locations. As mentioned above, where geographical unevenness features in the extant literature, the main purpose has been to demonstrate where upsurges occurred. Missing from this literature are explanations for the decline and even absence of struggles in numerous locations and townships, including those whose populations had previously been at the centre of popular movements. I argue that one of the factors that should be taken more seriously is the impact of the establishment of ‘model townships’ on the decline of contentious spaces and politics, which affected the ability of the ANC and its allies to mobilise support for its national campaigns.

The National Party (NP)’s ‘swart gevaar’ campaign, which aimed to mobilise white fears about mass immigration by Africans into cities and about the high levels of resistance in locations, was arguably the major contributor to its electoral victory in 1948. Dealing with contentious urban ‘black spots’ thus became a major and urgent preoccupation of the apartheid government. HF Verwoerd recognised the salience of these areas in popular struggles when he noted that ‘[t]he really successful boycotts occurred in uncontrolled townships.’ Whereas in the 1940s the response of the state to these dilemmas was habitually tentative and lacking in a clearly defined vision, after
1948 it moved swiftly to formulate plans and to promulgate laws to bring the urban black population under control. Inspired by the modernist discourses shaping post-war reconstruction schemes in Europe and the US, the South African state in the 1940s launched a policy process to weave these ideas into its commitment to segregation and racial oppression, the programmatic outcome of which – ‘modernist apartheid’ – was only realised under the rule of the NP.76 At the heart of the plan, pursued with singular determination and ideological fervour by the new ruling party, were three intimately connected objectives: to eliminate all urban ‘black spots,’ including squatter settlements and other ‘illegal’ spaces occupied by black people; to enforce strict racial segregation of urban areas and to corral all black people into ‘properly planned’ regional townships and group areas. It was a plan profoundly aware of the importance of creating spatial order if the state’s ambition of achieving control over an increasingly refractory, but indispensable, African working class was to be realised.

Verwoerd explicitly identified ‘[s]quatter chaos, overcrowding of existing Native plots, illegal lodging in white yards, the removal of those who refuse to work and thus don’t belong in the city’ as among the most serious challenges facing the state and proposed that these challenges could ‘only be combated once large enough legal townships for Natives are established close to the towns.’77 As minister of native affairs in the early 1950s, Verwoerd was the driving force behind the formulation of a new plan to reconfigure the urban areas, especially in the PWV region, which he identified as ‘the most complicated problem of this character in the Union.’ Elaborating in a speech to the Senate in May 1952 on the idea of creating large ‘legal townships,’ the future ‘architect of apartheid’ enunciated the basic principles underpinning his vision of the siting and planning of African townships. They had to ‘be an adequate distance from the European town,’ ‘be separated from the European area by an industrial buffer’ and ‘should be at a considerable distance from main and more particularly national roads.’78 Pivotal in this grand scheme was the establishment of ‘properly planned areas’ or, to use the official terminology, ‘model townships.’ Before 1948 the notion of a model township was employed in the planning of Orlando, Sharpeville and Natalspruit, but with Verwoerd’s urging it became the mantra of town planners, ‘Native Administrators,’ local councillors and state officials in the 1950s.

Model townships were, essentially, tightly controlled and racially segregated spaces for the cheap reproduction of urban African labour. They were designed to optimise surveillance of inhabitants with the grid-like layout, monotonous but clearly numbered houses, mast lights and single entry/exit points, where the township’s administration
offices and police stations were usually also located. Natasha Vally, invoking a Foucauldian frame of analysis, has argued in her study of the establishment of Sharpeville that it was an attempt by the state 'to introduce disciplinary techniques and regulatory techniques – “better” schooling, accommodation and infrastructure – in an attempt to create a self-disciplining urban African subject that would be impelled to work, be sexually “conservative” preferably in “family circumstances” and would not resist control over their lives by the state.'

The provision of housing in these model townships was absolutely critical because it simultaneously addressed one of the main demands of the popular resistance of the 1940s and established neatly ordered physical spaces where Africans could be demarcated and organised into nuclear families. It was a measure that, at least in the early phases of apartheid, facilitated administrative control over Africans, especially women.

The political significance of the state’s housing delivery programme of this time should not be underestimated. Its scale of investment in African housing was unprecedented: between 1949 and 1957 nearly R40 million was spent on housing from state funds alone. The effects of this huge injection of funds into township development were evident in Daveyton, where, between 1952 and 1962, 8 184 houses were constructed. There were similar developments in KwaThema, Katlehong and, of course, Soweto. Tsakane, Duduza, Vosloorus, Thokoza, Sebokeng and Tembisa experienced similar development between the late 1950s and late 1960s. Houses built for Africans were of a low quality, were very small and left little room for improvements. Conditions in the site-and-service schemes were considerably worse: electricity, water connections and toilets in homes were luxuries. There was a great deal of dissatisfaction about these houses as well as about the distance between the new townships and places of employment. People also objected strongly to the destruction of old communities and to forced removals. Nonetheless, the provision of housing was perceived by the large squatter and lodger populations as an important reform. For them the new model townships, with all their formal restrictions, represented an escape from the unbearable overcrowding, lack of basic facilities and exploitation by rack-renting landlords in the old locations and squatter camps. Furthermore, the application of the 30-year leasehold scheme also offered residents greater security of tenure and, critically, seemed at the time to be an acknowledgement by the state of their long-term, possibly permanent, presence in the urban areas.

A former Payneville resident’s opinion that people ‘would rather be a landlord somewhere in the bundu than be subservient to a landlord in the location’ reflected
the prevailing attitude of many of the beneficiaries of housing in the new townships. This explains the relative absence of struggles against removals in the early and mid-1950s, with the notable exception of the Western Areas. During the first phase of removals, the vast majority of people resettled in the new townships were squatters and lodgers. Only from the late 1950s, when property owners began to be affected on a significant scale by removals, did the campaigns against forced removals gain some traction, by which time state repression had also escalated. The effect of the removals was to unravel the closely-knit communities that had been established in the old locations. Even taking account of the often overly romanticised memories of locations prior to removals, they were generally known for their strong sense of community and networks of reciprocity. These were destroyed by the removals. Yards, such critical spaces in this world, were eviscerated of their social density. None of the social organisation that characterised the old locations was easily transplanted to the rigidly ordered model townships and it took some time for community cohesion to be recreated. At their origins, new townships comprised fragmented communities where neighbours from the old location were allocated plots without consultation and according to rules devised by the state.

From the mid-1950s, an even more insidious spatial division was imposed on the new townships with the implementation of ethnic zoning. It caused not only further fragmentation of existing social and political relations but sought to recreate communities in the segregationist image of the state. Daveyton was the first to be divided along ethnic lines and in 1954 the Brakpan council decided it would divide Tsakane into eight ethnic sections.\(^84\) New sections in KwaThema and Katlehong were similarly divided, despite objections from residents.\(^85\) Model townships were created to engender order, an objective that was realised with some success in the first phase of their establishment. The political consequences of urban spatial reconfiguration may be illustrated by looking more closely at Sharpeville and Brakpan.

Sharpeville occupies an iconic status in liberation narratives because the massacre of anti-pass protesters there marked a decisive turning point in the country’s politics. It is etched in popular consciousness as a key site of the resistance movement. Yet, as a number of scholars have explained, the momentous events of March 1960 appeared incongruous with the township’s previous history of political quiescence.\(^86\) The decision to establish Sharpeville about 10 km from the centre of Vereeniging was prompted by the riots of 1937 and the overcrowding in the old location. In the 1940s and 1950s, the new township was praised as the ‘pride of the municipal authorities,’\(^87\)
in part because of the numerous facilities on offer there: six schools, nine churches, 
two communal halls, a library and crèche, branches of Standard Bank and the United 
Building Society, five football fields, four tennis courts, a boxing gymnasium and a 
10 000-seater stadium.\textsuperscript{88} The incredulity expressed by Vereeniging’s officials at the 
Sharpeville inquiry was therefore not surprising. In their words, the people of their 
model township were ‘peace-loving and law-abiding’ and generally unaffected by 
the ‘riots and boycotts instigated by the Bantu’ elsewhere on the Reef.\textsuperscript{89} 

Their intentions were, of course, to absolve themselves of any responsibility and 
to blame the usual ‘outside agitators’ for the anti-pass campaign. Nonetheless, their 
description of the state of politics in Sharpeville in the 1950s was not entirely off the 
mark. According to Lodge, the Defiance Campaign and Bantu Education boycott, two 
of the main national campaigns launched by the ANC, barely affected the township. 
Some evidence exists of activities in late 1952 by the Society of Young Africa (Soya), 
but they appear to have been confined to discussion forums rather than mobilisation 
of protests.\textsuperscript{90} Even the women’s anti-pass struggle of 1956, which was an important 
precursor to the anti-pass struggle in 1960, had little impact on the area. Vally 
concluded that there was little, if any, overt political activity in Sharpeville between 
1953 and 1959.\textsuperscript{91} Daveyton and KwaThema had almost no involvement in either the 
Defiance Campaign or the Bantu Education boycott. The same applies to a number 
of the new suburbs created in Soweto.

The Brakpan of the 1950s provides a fascinating insight into how four different 
spaces occupied by Africans produced different forms of politics, and an example of 
the presence and absence of popular resistance. In 1948 the town’s African popula-
ton numbered 58 000, with 36 000 on the mines, 10 000 in the location and 12 
000 in peri-urban squatter settlements.\textsuperscript{92} Male migrants living in closed compounds, 
who constituted the majority of the town’s African population, were, for the most 
part, completely uninvolved in the politics of urban locations. The state’s violent 
suppression of the 1946 miners’ strike effectively shattered mobilisation among that 
sector of the population for at least a generation, although they were rarely involved 
in urban politics before then.

For Sapire, the fact that the old location was not finally removed until the 1970s 
meant that its ‘sense of community and political cohesiveness remained intact in the 
1950s’ and explains why it was a strong base for ANC-led campaigns.\textsuperscript{93} Important, 
too, was the role played by leaders of the 1940s movements, who became more 
active in the ANC after the banning of the CPSA. Consequently, wrote Sapire, ‘the
ANC branch was to assume the character and many of the functions of the CPSA of the 1940s.’ In the process the local ANC was transformed from an elitist and aloof organisation ‘to one with a more distinctly plebeian character.’ ANC activists established some of the more successful independent schools or ‘cultural clubs’ that allowed the Bantu Education boycott in the location to be among the most successful of the entire campaign. Nearly 800 children attended classes, which were run by dismissed teachers. Brakpan’s independent schools were only closed when the ANC decided to end the boycott in 1956. Nearly 2 000 women from the location participated in the 1956 women’s march.94

Tsakane, Brakpan’s new township, evinced similar characteristics to those of other model townships. As elsewhere, the vast majority of new residents in the area were new immigrants, squatters, lodgers and also ex-miners. Unlike their neighbours in the old location, the inhabitants of Tsakane remained aloof from formal political organisations and their campaigns. The reasons for their ‘passivity and complacency,’ Sapire argued, were that they had won ‘formal recognition of their “right” to remain in the urban area and the provision of rudimentary shelter.’95 Finally, Brakpan experienced its version of a squatter movement in the mid-1950s. Due to the delay by the Brakpan authorities in the provision of new housing, the number of permanent immigrants living in squatter settlements increased to about 22 000 in the mid-1950s. Faced by continual extortion, harassment and the threat of eviction by white landlords, the squatters embarked on collective protest by invading vacant municipal land,96 an action reminiscent of the major squatter movements of the previous decade. As was the case then, the ANC, which had become far more attuned to issues affecting settled residents of the old established location, remained largely disconnected from the struggle of the squatters in the peri-urban areas.

As intimated above, there were numerous places where ANC-led campaigns enjoyed significant support and success. On the East Rand (Ekurhuleni), Brakpan location, Germiston and Benoni old location were the main sites of struggle during the Bantu Education boycott.97 In Benoni’s Wattville, women stood united and resolute in opposition to women’s passes and descended in hundreds to protest at the native commissioner’s offices.98 In Katlehong similar marches were mounted and spluttered on into 1956, precipitating, in the process, a split in the ANC’s male leadership in the location.99 In areas such as Orlando and Alexandra, the campaigns were solidly supported, mainly as a result of the efforts of local leaders.
It is interesting that the two locations that spearheaded local popular movements in the mid-1950s, Alexandra and Evaton, were among the most established places of African residence in the PWV. The bus boycotts in those locations were driven by an array of political forces, including socialists and different factions of the ANC. Significantly, from the mid-1950s, the government’s decision to impose economic rentals, thereby removing subsidies on the rentals of urban Africans and causing sharp increases of up to 200 per cent, generated new struggles in locations, including the model townships. Opposition to economic rentals was widespread and in two of the areas where significant resistance was organised, that is, Katlehong and Orlando, local ANC leaders spearheaded the struggles.

CONCLUSION

The ANC’s relationship to popular movements in the 1940s was varied and complex. For Dubow, this is due to the fact that the movement was in ‘the throes of transition’ and ‘was neither organisationally nor ideologically unified.’ This chapter concurs with this assessment and has argued that it is also necessary to add the impact of the production of particular forms of contentious spaces and their subsequent decline, as well as the varied forms and character of popular movements that were spawned in this period to analyses of the changing relations between popular movements and political organisations.

By paying more attention to ‘geographies of resistance,’ it is possible also to have a more nuanced understanding of the character and evolution of popular resistance, especially about its manifestations in particular localities and decline in the wake of the state’s concerted reorganisation of the PWV’s urban spaces. It is certainly not the argument here that the relative absence of resistance can be ascribed only to the creation of model townships, but its impact on resistance movements does require serious consideration.

The popular local struggles of the 1940s and early 1950s enjoyed some important successes. By the mid-1950s, many Africans had won the right to be present in urban areas, as well as access to housing. However, these rights were severely circumscribed: only African families deemed useful to the burgeoning modern economy were given limited rights to be in urban areas and the new housing complexes were segregated zones of control. The state had largely succeeded in creating cities to suit the needs of capital and white privilege. It would take more than two decades for the black urban proletariat to mount another serious struggle for the right to the city.
Endnotes


5. Ibid.


15. Ibid.

16. Interview with Banzi Bangani, KwaThema, 1 July 1995.

17. K Beavon, Johannesburg: The Making and Shaping of the City (Pretoria: Unisa Press, 2004), 123. According to Beavon, no houses were built at this time, although the Vereeniging municipality was busy erecting houses in the new township of Sharpeville.


23. NASA, CAD, MB 1/4/9, Minutes of the Native Affairs Committee, 9 February 1945, Minutes of Special Native Affairs Committee Meeting, 29 May 1945.


29. NASA, CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/31, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Committee, preliminary report of the medical officer of health for the year ended 30 June 1953.


33. See, especially, Bonner, 'Family, Crime and Political Consciousness,’ and also Bonner and Nieftagodien, Kathorus.

34. B Hirson, Yours For The Union: Class and Community Struggles in South Africa (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 1990), 64; Lodge, Black Politics.


38. The healthy surpluses generated from ‘kaffir beer’ sales in the late Forties and early Fifties (£42 026, £38 143 and £55 387 in 1948/49, 1949/50 and 1950/51 respectively) confirm this as an important source of income for the municipality, but, conversely, as a substantial loss of income for domestic brewers.


42. NASA, CAD, MSP 1/3/5/1/28, Minutes of the Public Health and Non-European Affairs Committee, ‘Protest against the proposal to use profits from the sale of Kaffir beer for housing funds,’ 1949.
43. Springs and Brakpan Advertiser, 31 March 1950.
44. Bonner and Nieftagodien, Kathorus, 28–29.
46. Bonner and Segal, Soweto, 25–27.
47. Stadler, ‘Birds in the Cornfield,’ 93.
51. Bernstein, Memory against Forgetting, 105.
58. Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom, 100
66. Ibid, 111.
69. Lodge, Black Politics, 34–5.
71. NASA, CAD, MB 1/4/10, Minutes of the Native Affairs Committee, 9 April 1946.
72. Bernstein, Memory Against Forgetting, 103.
73. Ibid, 102.
74. Ibid, 105.
75. Quoted in Bonner and Nieftagodien, Alexandra, 8.
77. NASA, CAD, GGR 40, 14/1/4, Persverklaring oor Lokasie-beplanning in die Pretoria tot Vaal-rivier streek insluitende die Witwatersrand (Press release by HF Verwoerd announcing the formation of the Mentz Committee), 1952.
78. HF Verwoerd, Speech to the Senate, 1952.
82. Bonner and Nieftagodien, Kathorus, 18.
84. NASA, CAD, Municipality of Brakpan, 2/2/859, 14/6/25, Minutes of the Non-European Affairs Department, 27 August 1954.
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88. *Chaskalson, The Road to Sharpeville*, 35.
90. Ibid.
91. Vally, 'The “Model Township” of Sharpeville,' 69–70.
94. Sapire, 'African Political Organisation in Brakpan Location,' 261–263.
95. Ibid, 270.