Notes

Introduction


2 See the report by the Dutch Committee of Inquiry on Decision-making concerning the War in Iraq (12 January 2010), henceforth (after its chairman): Davids Report.

3 Greg Muttitt, Fuel on the fire. Oil and politics in occupied Iraq (London 2012) 3-5.


7 sfir End Evaluation.

Chapter 1
Towards Iraq


2 de Volkskrant 6 October 2005.

3 NRC Handelsblad 6 October 2005.


6 See Atkinson, Crusade.

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8 See *Frontline* television documentary ‘Spying on Saddam. Investigating the UN’s dramatic, thwarted effort to uncover Iraq’s chemical, biological and nuclear weapons’, Public Broadcasting Service (pbs) 27 April 1999; See also www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm.


17 Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra ii*, 49.


22 *de Volkskrant* 14 February 2002.


29 Evidence for this came to light in the spring of 2005 when the British press reported on what became known as the ‘Downing Street Memos’, leaked government documents in which senior British officials had stated back in the summer of 2002 that “the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy” and that the US intended to justify a war by claiming links between Iraq, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. See the original documents on: www.downingstreetmemo.com.


31 Ibid., 71.

32 *NRC Handelsblad* 9 November 2002. The resolution can be found on the UN website.

33 Daalder and Lindsay, *America unbound*, 139.

34 Gordon and Trainor, *Cobra ii*, 105. Original documents backing the research have been published by The National Security Archive (www.nsarchive.org).

35 Daalder and Lindsay, *America unbound*, 140; see also ‘Blix: Irak is te weinig coöperatief’, *de Volkskrant* 28 January 2003.
36 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra ii, 145.
38 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra ii, 160.
41 Klop and Van Gils, Van Korea tot Kabul, 466-467.
42 Idem.
43 Gordon and Trainor, Cobra ii, 457-459.
45 Idem, 5665-5666. See also: Davids Report, 85.
46 House of Representatives 2002-2003, 23 432, no. 66, specifically 5.
49 Davids Report, 92-96 and 355-360, and annex l for the original text.
50 Davids Report, annex l.
54 Idem, 132-133.
56 Davids Report, 194. For the selective use of intelligence analyses, see chapter 7.4 and 9.
58 Davids Report, 373.
59 House of Representatives 2002-2003, 23 432, no. 92, letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs dated 11 March 2003. Here, too, the Davids Committee concluded that the Dutch government had interpreted the UN inspectors’ reports selectively – as they had with intelligence material – and had stripped them of nuances. See conclusion 25 (page 427) and chapter 7.
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63 Documents containing proof of this were obtained by *NRC Handelsblad*. See: Joost Oranje, 'Hollandsche oorlogslogica', *NRC Handelsblad* 12 June 2004 and ‘Memorandum DJZ/I/R/2003/158’, *NRC Handelsblad* 17 January 2009.

64 *NRC Handelsblad* 12 June 2004, as well as Davids Report, 254-255.

65 Davids Report, chapter 8.


68 House of Representatives of the States-General 2002-2003, 23 432, no. 94.


70 Ibid.

71 Planning order 080 (Stabilisation Force Iraq) from CDS dated 11 April 2003, in: SSA Defensie, Records of the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), S200302188.

72 *de Volkskrant* 11 April 2003.

73 Ibid.


75 D.A. Swijgman, ‘Verslag verkenning Irak’, 15 May 2003, in: SSA Defensie, Contingent Command Stabilisation Force Iraq 1 Records, CD-ROM 1: OC\OC\nldeirak\Vastlegger\sf irak\5 planning\ontplooiing\Verslag verkenning Irak1.doc.

76 Swijgman, ‘Verslag verkenning Irak’.

77 Ibid.


79 Minutes of 7th Planning Team meeting 1 (NL) Det Iraq dated 15 May 2003, in: SSA BUZA, DVb Records, file 815603 (May 2003); Interview with Colonel (Rtd.) T.G.J. Damen (11 March 2010).

80 *Herinneringsboek SFIR* 1, 17.


85 Ibid, 2.

86 *Herinneringsboek SFIR* 1, 27.

87 Ibid, 8.

88 Ibid, 10.

89 House of Representatives 2002-2003, 23 432, no. 121, 3-8.

90 Ibid, 8-12.
Chapter 2
‘A sandpit under Dutch control’

1 Sitrep by political adviser, 30 July 2003; Sitrep by political adviser, 14 October 2003; Sitrep by Contco 005/2003, 31 July 2003, in: SSA Defensie, SFIR Records, back-up files SFIR 5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFIR 051012\Rapportages\Situerapporten Conndo. The Contco Sitreps, which contain all daily Sitreps by the battle group as annexes, can be found at this location unless otherwise specified. Some of the reports by the Dutch political adviser for the SFIR 1 period can be found in: SSA Defensie, SFIR Records, back-up files SFIR 1 t/m SFIR 5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFIR 051012\Rapportages\NLBG\Polad. The remaining political adviser reports for the SFIR 1 and SFIR 2 periods can be found in: NHMI, SFIR Collection, box 1.

2 Sitrep by political adviser, 1 August 2003; Interview with Colonel (MC) D.A. Swijgman (16 May and 24 June 2008).

3 Sitrep by political adviser, 1 August 2003.

4 Monte Reel, ‘The Bridge at Samawah: It was a small thing, the taking of this obscure Iraqi city. Unless you were there’, The Washington Post 4 April 2003; Rick Atkinson, In the company of soldiers: a chronicle of combat in Iraq (New York 2004) 199 and 215.

5 Verkenningsmissie naar Zuid-Irak i.v.m. mogelijke uitzending Nederlands bataljon mariniers (24-28 mei 2003), in: SSA BUZA, DVB Records, inv. no. 02857 (May 2003).

6 Swijgman, ‘Verslag verkenning Irak’.


9 Herinneringsboek SFIR 1, 189-191.


11 Report by 12 Infantry Company, ‘Camp Smitty As Samawah’ (1 August 2003) on the website of 1 NLDETRAK, to be found on the CD-ROM in Herinneringsboek SFIR 1 (henceforth: Website 1 NLDETRAK).

12 Interview with Swijgman.


15 C. Schellens, ‘Van de compagniescommandant 11 Coy Gp, As Samawah, Irak’, Website 1 NLDETRAK.


17 OpO 001/03 1 NL DET IRAQ (Establishment Al Muthanna), 18 June 2003, in: SSA Defensie, Contco Stabilisation Force Iraq 1 Records, CD-ROM no. 2, S-3\Irak\OPORD\OPORD 001. See also: Herinneringsboek SFIR 1, 20.


20 Sitrep by 1 NL DET IRAQ 024/2003, 5 August 2003, in: SSA Defensie, Contco Stabilisation Force Iraq 1 Records, box 17; Interview with Swijgman.

21 Herinneringsboek SFIR 1, 77.

22 Idem, 71.

23 Herinneringsboek SFIR 1, 20.

24 Sitrep by Contco 009/2003, 4 August 2003; Sitrep by Contco 010/2003, 5 August 2003; Maj. J. Schooneman 14 August 2003, article for Website 1 NLDETRAK.
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25 Interview with Swijgman; 1 NLDETRAK Briefing to Permanent Parliamentary Committees for Foreign Affairs and Defence, 29 October 2003, in: SSA Defensie, Contco Stabilisation Force Iraq 2 Records, box no. 45, hard drive, f:\batst as-samawah\algemeen\jurist prinsen, mr f.k\sfir3\Geeratz

26 Herinneringsboek SFIR 1, 126.


31 Major Kees Schellens, 11 Infantry Company for Website 1 NLDETRAK.

32 Major Jos Schooneman, article for Website 1 NLDETRAK; Herinneringsboek SFIR 1, 103-105, 118 and 123-124.


34 Herinneringsboek SFIR 1, 164; Article no. 4 by 13 Infantry Company for local newspaper, in: SSA Defensie, Contco Stabilisation Force Iraq 1 Records, CD-ROM 5\cc13\Info ops.

35 Memo Advies personeelssterkte MP peloton, 11 November 2003, in: SSA Defensie, Contco Stabilisation Force Iraq 1 Records, CD-ROM KMAT SFIR 1, vastlegging gegevens\dennis\Personeel.


37 ‘Verkenningsmissie naar Zuid-Irak i.v.m. mogelijke uitzending Nederlands bataljon mariniers (24-28 mei 2003)’, in: SSA BUZA, DVB Records, inv. no. 02857 (May 2003).

38 CPA order no. 7 dated 23 June 2003; 1 NLDETRAK Frago 005/2003, 6 August 2003, in: SSA Defensie, SFIR Records, back-up files SFIR 1 t/m SFIR 5, hard drive no. 156, f:\sfir 051012\Operaties\Algemeen\Wapens\030806\nlbg.frago 005 inbeslagname vuurwapens.doc.


41 Legal adviser 1 (NL) Det Iraq to 1 (NL) Det Iraq / 83, 14 August 2003, in: SSA Defensie, Contco Stabilisation Force Iraq 2 Records, box no. 45, hard drive, BATST AS-SAMAWAH\ALGEMEEN\JURIST PRINSSEN, MR F.K\SFIR3\Geeratz\Brieven\schapensmokkel.doc.

42 Synnott, ‘State-building in Southern Iraq’, Survival, 47-2 (summer 2005) 37-38, 54. See also: Thomas Ricks, Fiasco: the american military adventure in Iraq (London etc. 2006) and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Imperial life in the emerald city: inside Iraq’s Green Zone (New York 2006). For the lack of attention devoted to provincial CPA administration, in addition to the reports by the Dutch political adviser, see also the book by Rory Stewart, The Prince of the Marshes.

43 Ricks, Fiasco, chapter 10.

44 For a brief analysis of allied military command between 1942 and 1949 see: Brocades Zaalberg, Soldiers and civil power, chapter 1. For the poor US-UK planning for post-war Iraq see: Ricks, Fiasco; George Packer, Assassins’ gate: America in Iraq (New York 2005); David L. Phillips, Losing Iraq: inside the postwar reconstruction fiasco (s.l. 2005); Chandrasekaran, Imperial life in the emerald city; Hilary Synnott, Bad days in Basra: my turbulent time as Britain’s man in Southern Iraq (London and New York 2008).

45 Sitreps by political adviser, 28 July and 30 July 2003.

46 Interview with Swijgman; Interview with M. Rentenaar (7 June 2008); Correspondence between authors and Rentenaar, 21 February 2008; Sitrep by political adviser, 4 August 2003.

47 ‘First impression report / Rapport resultaten verkenningssteam Irak’, version 10 June 2003, in: SSA BUZA, DVB Records, inv. no. 03060 (June 2003); DVB E-mail to Dutch Embassy in London, 29
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May 2003, in: SSA Buza, DVB Records, inv. no. 02857 (May 2003); Rentenaar, ‘Verkenningsmissie naar Zuid-Irak i.v.m. mogelijke uitzending Nederlandse bataljon mariniers (24-18 May 2003)’, in: SSA Buza, DVB Records inv. no. 02857 (May 2003).

48 For this concern see: DVB E-mail to Dutch Embassy in London, 29 May 2003, in: SSA Buza, DVB Records, inv. no. 02857 (May 2003).


50 Brocades Zaalberg, Soldiers and civil power, chapters 10 and 11.


54 The New Zealand government, which sent 55 military engineers to Iraq, was the only other country to stress its status of non-occupying power in a way similar to that of the Netherlands. Zwanenburg, ‘Existentialism in Iraq’, 756 and 765.

55 See, among others: the use of the abbreviation SFIR in SFIR End Evaluation.

56 Initially it was in fact the Danish ambassador Ole Wohlers Olsen who headed the CPA in the southern region. According to his successor, Sir Hilary Synnott, the appointment of the Danish diplomat was “a political symbol of wider support for reconstruction and stabilisation and as a dilution of the apparent US domination of the enterprise”. See Synnott, ‘State-building in Southern Iraq’, Survival 47-2 (Summer 2005) 37.


60 Hilary Synnott, Bad days in Basra, 129.

61 For references to mou between Dutch and UK governments see: Van den Berg Committee, 29-30; SFIR End Evaluation, 9.


65 SFIR Periodic Evaluation, 22.


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69 Operational journal of C-Contco (29 September 2003), in: SSA Defensie, Contco Stabilisation Force Iraq 2 Records, box no. 45, hard drive, Contco Shabah\OFF VASTLEGGER KASTELIC BC, 1.M\Vastlegger 15 mrt\C-Contco (Henceforth: Operational journal C-Contco).

70 Operational journal of C-Contco, 3 October 2003.


74 Major Mark van den Berg on Website nl.detirak.


78 Op Pocket Search, s2 Briefing, 9 September 2003.

79 Sitrep by Contco 046/2003, 10 September 2003; Interview with Rentenaar.

80 Interview with Swijgman.

81 See abovementioned mou.


83 Preventive operations against Former Regime Loyalists never resulted in the use of firearms. Evaluatie SFIR 1 conform aanwijzing CBS nr. A-5, 7.

84 From November 2006, two official committees investigated the alleged poor treatment of detainees by Dutch military personnel in Iraq. They published their findings simultaneously in June 2007. See: Onderzoek ondervragingen in Irak: rapport van de commissie van onderzoek naar de betrokkenheid van Nederlandse militairen bij mogelijke misstanden bij gesprekken met gedetineerden in Irak (The Hague 18 June 2007) – hereafter Van den Berg Committee – and Ctivd no. 15 Inzake het onderzoek naar het optreden van mvo-medewerkers in Irak bij het ondervragen van gedetineerden (The Hague 18 June 2007).

85 Van den Berg Committee, 4, 18, 30-31 and 47. The Van den Berg Committee’s report wrongly states on page 30 that Dutch troops were in principle not authorised to “apprehend” civilians in the occupied area, only to state correctly elsewhere two relevant and sizeable exceptions, i.e. “those suspected of crimes, labelled as detainees” and “persons who pose a threat to [the troops’] security, labelled as internees”. The authors of this book use the term ‘arrest’, as in practice nl.bg was authorised to arrest suspects and in Dutch the term ‘to detain’ is usually associated with ‘taking someone into custody’ or ‘incarceration’.


87 See for the mou in this respect: Van den Berg Committee, 29-30: Ctivd no. 15, 9-10. RoE 182 dealt with the authorisation to detain suspects.

88 Frago no. 004/03, nl.det irak Detainment procedures, 27 July 2003, in: Nimh, Sfir Collection, box 1. Simply by making the presence of his own legal adviser mandatory, the Dutch commander deviated from the British division order. See: Van den Berg Committee, 32.

89 Major M. Geeratz to C-I(NL) Det Irak, ‘Detainee’, 1 September 2003, in: SSA Defensie, Contco Stabilisation Force Iraq 2 Records, box no. 45, hard drive, Batst as-Samawah\algemeen\Jurist
As the Netherlands was not permitted to ‘intern’ people, from the moment of their apprehension to their handover to the British the battle group also described civilians who posed a threat to the Coalition (i.e. internees) as detainees.


92 Van den Berg Committee, 84.


94 Legal adviser to C-I(NL) Det Irak, ‘Detainee’, 1 September 2003, in: SSA Defensie, Contco Stabilisation Force Iraq 2 Records, box no. 45, hard drive, BATST AS-SAMAWAH\ALGEMEEN\JURIST PRINSEN, MR F.K\SFIR 3\Geeratz\Brieven\Detenee.doc.

95 E-mail ’re: hvt in NL BG AO’, 2 September 2003. See also the preceding E-mail correspondence in: SSA Defensie, SFIR Records, back-up files SFIR-1 up to and including SFIR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFIR extra\SFIR MND-SE legal files\NL issues\re hvt in NL BG AO2.htm.

96 Report of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq During Arrest, Internment and Interrogation (February 2004). ICRC reports of this kind are confidential, but this one was leaked to the press and can be found in various locations on the internet.


100 Idem, 4, 18 and 70; CTIVD no. 15, 15-16.

101 Both the Van den Berg Committee and the CTIVD concluded in their reports that in most cases the “interviews” had all the hallmarks of questioning or an interrogation.

102 Van den Berg Committee, 32-33; CTIVD no. 15, 21.

103 Van den Berg Committee, 4-5, 46 and 56. See also: CTIVD no. 15, 19 and 21.

104 Van den Berg Committee, 35, 45 and 84.

105 Idem, 5.

106 Idem, 36.

107 Idem, 5, 56-57; CTIVD no. 15, 24.

108 Van den Berg Committee, 36. See also: CTIVD no. 15, 15.

109 Van den Berg Committee, 36.


111 Van den Berg Committee, 46.
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CDM directive no. 100 (Stabilisation Force Iraq), 30 June 2003, in: SSA Defensie, Record Office of the Naval Staff Operations Division, file 68; Van den Berg Committee report, 59.


CIMIC section 15 August 2003, Website 1 nldetirak.


The analysis of Operation Greenfield by the NIMH authors deviates on one point from the analysis in the Van den Berg Committee Report. In the archives, no direct proof was found that the action “was primarily aimed at force protection”, an assertion which was put forward by the Committee to justify the conclusion that the operation came within the mandate. Colonel Swijgman stressed during an interview for this publication that – although the arms being traded in As Samawah could of course have been used against the Dutch – the main motive for the operation was to protect the population against criminal violence.

Interview with Swijgman.

Van den Berg Committee, 61.


Stewart, Prince of the Marshes, 21-25.


Sitrep by political adviser, 21 August 2003.

Bulmer, ‘Our men in Al Muthanna’ (published in The Craftsman, the British Army Engineer’s magazine); Sitrep by political adviser, 21 August 2003.

Sitrep by political adviser, 21 August 2003.

Contribution from CIMIC section 15 August 2003, Website 1 nldetirak.

Sitrep by political adviser, 21 August 2003; Herinneringsboek SFIR 1, 20 and 161.


The analysis of Operation Greenfield by the NIMH authors deviates on one point from the analysis in the Van den Berg Committee Report. In the archives, no direct proof was found that the action “was primarily aimed at force protection”, an assertion which was put forward by the Committee to justify the conclusion that the operation came within the mandate. Colonel Swijgman stressed during an interview for this publication that – although the arms being traded in As Samawah could of course have been used against the Dutch – the main motive for the operation was to protect the population against criminal violence.

Interview with Swijgman.


Sitrep by political adviser, 4 August 2003.

Stewart, Prince of the Marshes, 21-25.


Sitrep by political adviser, 21 August 2003.

Bulmer, ‘Our men in Al Muthanna’ (published in The Craftsman, the British Army Engineer’s magazine); Sitrep by political adviser, 21 August 2003.

Sitrep by political adviser, 21 August 2003.

Contribution from CIMIC section 15 August 2003, Website 1 nldetirak.

Sitrep by political adviser, 21 August 2003; Herinneringsboek SFIR 1, 20 and 161.


C 1 nldetirak to DCBC, Evaluation by DART team, Annex to Sitrep by Contco 046, 11 September 2003.

Sitrep by political adviser, 21 August 2003.


Interview with Swijgman.


Interview with Swijgman.
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141 Swijgman in Herinneringsboek SFIR 1, 22.
142 See representation of the MND SE Masterplan and the four lines of operation in Herinneringsboek SFIR 2, 18.
143 Sitrep by political adviser, 3 January 2004.
144 Evaluatie SFIR I conform aanwijzing CDS nr. A-5.7.
145 The British division initially asked for a Dutch political adviser (“to supply a polad”), but following some reticence by the Dutch the formal request was changed “to supply polad support”, to which the Netherlands agreed. Correspondence between the authors and Rentenaar, 8 February 2008.
146 Interview with Colonel (Rtd.) M. Bulmer (by phone, 11 February 2008).
147 Interviews with Swijgman and Rentenaar.

Chapter 3
Governing in the midst of chaos

1 Sitrep by Contco 08/2003, 3 August 2003; Sitrep 12 inf coy, 3 August 2003, in: SSA Defensie, Contco Stabilisation Force Iraq 1 Records, CD-ROM no. 9, Al Khidr\Vastlegger\CC 12 Coy\Daily Sitreps Irak\a. Aug. 2003\Daily Sitrep Contco 001, 3 aug 2003.doc
2 ‘Operations: General observations’ (undated reconnaissance report), in: SSA Defensie, Contco Stabilisation Force Iraq 1 Records, CD-ROM no. 2, S-3\Irak\OPORD\RECCE Fact finding\Operations.doc; For “an unsavoury and unreliable individual”, see: Herinneringsboek SFIR 1, 33.
4 Sitrep by political adviser 1, 30 July 2003.
5 E-mail from Rentenaar to RTI/LGP, 3 January 2004, in: NIMH, SFIR Collection, box 1.
6 Sitrep by political adviser 1, 28 July 2003.
7 Ibid.
8 Interview with Bulmer, and Bulmer, ‘Our Men in Al Muthanna’.
9 Sitrep by political adviser 1, 14 August 2003.
13 E-mail ‘Al Muthanna visit to Baghdad’, 4 August 2003, in: SSA Defensie, Contco Stabilisation Force Iraq 1 Records (2003), box 17.
14 Sitrep by political adviser 1, 4 and 8 August 2003; interview with Bulmer.
15 Sitrep by political adviser 1, 11 September 2003; for the CPA’s half-hearted stance on decentralisation, see: Sitrep by Contco 014/2003, 9 August 2003.
16 Sitrep by political adviser 1, 15 September 2003.
17 Sitrep by Contco 045/2003, 9 September 2003; see also Sitrep by political adviser 1, 15 September 2003.
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21 Bulmer, Rentenaar and Blunt also accused Andrews of a complete lack of cultural sensitivity and bluntness in his dealings with Sami. Sitrep by Contco 52/2003, 15 September 2003; Correspondence between authors and Rentenaar, 8 February 2008; E-mail from Blunt, 24 September 2003, in: NIMH, SFIR Collection, box 1; Interview with Bulmer.
22 Minutes of Ar Rumaythah city council meetings, 13 August 2003 up to and including 10 November 2003, in: SSA Defensie, Contco Stabilisation Force Iraq 1 Records, CD-ROM no. 5, City Council Ar Rumaythah; Sitrep by political adviser 1, 3 November 2003.
23 E-mail correspondence between 18 September and 25 September 2003, in: SSA BUZA, DVB Records, file 03125 (August 2003).
26 E-mail from Rentenaar to RTI/LGP, 3 January 2003, in: NIMH, SFIR Collection, box 1.
27 Sitrep by political adviser 1, 14 October 2003, in: NIMH, SFIR Collection.
28 Ibid.
29 Brief ‘CV’ of new governor of Al Muthanna, in: SSA Defensie, Contco Stabilisation Force Iraq 1 Records, CD-ROM no. 11, Intel Rep Information 16-10\Political\CV Gouverneur.doc.
30 Correspondence with Rentenaar, 8 February 2008.
31 Sitrep by political adviser 2, 20 October 2003.
33 Sitrep by political adviser 2, 20 October 2003; For “strong man”, see: Sitrep by political adviser 2, 20 October 2003, in: NIMH, SFIR Collection, box 1.
34 Herinneringsboek SFIR 2, 17.
36 E-mail from political adviser 1, 30 October 2003, in: SSA BUZA, DVB Records, file 03125 (August 2003).
38 Interview with Swijgman; Van den Berg Committee, 42 and 63.
39 Van den Berg Committee, 42.
44 Sitrep by Contco 81/2003, 1 October 2003.
45 Herring and Rangwala, Iraq in fragments, 202-203.
Notes to chapter 3


49 Sitrep by political adviser 2, 20 October 2003.

50 Allawi, The occupation of Iraq, 212-213.


53 E-mail from Rentenaar to RGI/LGP, 3 January 2004; Minutes of meeting of City Council Ar Rumaythah, 6 November 2003, in: SSA Defensie, Contco Stabilisation Force Iraq 1 Records, CD-ROM no. 5, CC13\City Council Ar Rumaythah.

54 Sitrep by Contco 81/2003, 1 October 2003; Sitrep by Contco 90/2003, 10 October 2003.


56 Sitreps by Contco 045/2003 and 075/2003, 9 September 2003; Sitrep by political adviser 1, 4 November 2003.

57 Herinneringsboek sfir 1, 46-48, 188.


59 Interview with Bulmer. See also: Rory Stewart, The Prince of the Marshes. And other occupational hazards of a year in Iraq (London etc. 2006) 87 and 273-274.

60 Interview with Rentenaar.

61 Coordinating committee of political parties and movements in the province of Al Muthanna, ‘De eisen’, 31 August 2003, in: SSA Defensie, Contco Stabilisation Force Iraq 1 Records, CD-ROM no. 6, Nommensen\Verslagen.

62 Sitreps by Contco 074/2003 and 075/2003, 8 and 9 October 2003; Sitrep by political adviser 1, 4 November 2003. See also: Minutes of meeting of City Council Ar Rumaythah, 29 October 2003, in: SSA Defensie, Contco Stabilisation Force Iraq 1 Records, CD-ROM no. 5, CC13\City Council Ar Rumaythah (6 November 2003).

63 Sitrep by Contco 045/2003, 9 September 2003. The new governor was said to have argued in favour of merging the police force with the local Badr Brigades.

64 Sitrep by Contco 107/2003, 10 November 2003; Interview with Swijgman.

65 Sitrep by Contco 141/2003, 12 December 2003; Interview with Rentenaar.

66 See ‘cv Lcol Kareem’ in: SSA Defensie, SFR Records, back-up files SFR 1 up to and including SFR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFR extra\SFR 5\01_SIE S2\RESTRICTED\Thema’s\IP Overview\01) AS SAMAWAH\01) SURVEILLANCE DIENST\01) HQ IF AS SAMAWAH.


68 Interview with Oppelaar.

69 Operational journal C-Contco, 10 November 2003.

70 Stability Operations in Iraq (OP TELIC 2-5): an analysis from a land perspective (prepared under the direction of the Chief of the General Staff, July 2006). This confidential report was leaked via the Wikileaks website. See also: Rod Norland, ‘Iraq’s repairman’, Newsweek 5 July 2004.

71 Sitrep by political adviser, 18 November 2003.

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73 ‘Future Ops’, 18 November 2003, in: NIMH, SFIR Collection, box 2b. See also: Operation Deep Purple, 4-7 December 2003, in: SSA Defensie, SFIR Records, back-up files SFIR-1 up to and including SFIR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\051012\Operaties\Alphabetisch\Deep Purple 2MB\DEEP PURPLE.ppt.

74 Illustrations and an explanation of the modus operandi in: Royal Netherlands Navy Audiovisual Service, video ‘Stabilisation Force Iraq. Reportage uit het missiegebied, SFIR’.


78 Steven Derix, ‘Afgedankt Orion-vliegtuig blijkt nog niet overbodig’.


81 Fax from Oppelaar, 27 November 2003.

82 Sitrep by political adviser 2, 15 October 2003, in: SSA BUZA, DVBR Records, inv. no. 03729 (June-September 2003).


84 Operational journal C-Contco, 25 and 30 November 2003; Fax from Oppelaar, 27 November 2003.


87 Stewart, Prince of the Marshes, 183.

88 Sitrep by political adviser, 30 November 2003, in: NIMH, SFIR Collection, box 1.

89 E-mail from L. Paul Bremer, ‘Subject: Local Government Plan, Post-November 15’, 27 November 2003, in: NIMH, SFIR Collection, box 1; E-mail from Julie Chappell, ‘Subject: Transitional Government / big Role for Councils’, 15 November 2003, idem; E-mail from Howard Pittman, ‘Subject: refreshment’. See also: Stewart, Prince of the Marshes, 246.


91 Sitrep by political adviser 1, 12 January 2004; Nicholas Blanford, ‘In Iraq’s South, democracy buds: US administrator Paul Bremer wants to repeat the “Muthanna model” around the rest of the country’, Christian Science Monitor 16 December 2003.

92 Sitrep by political adviser 1, 23 December 2003; Sitrep by political adviser 1, 12 January 2004.

93 Blanford, ‘In Iraq’s South, democracy buds’; Idem, ‘Al-Muthanna elections an emerging success story’. The only public Dutch source in which the term ‘Al Muthanna model’ is used is: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, Towards a new Iraq: making the transition work, the role of the international community, The Hague, 6 February 2004 (Seminar Proceedings). International public sources which refer to Al Muthanna as a model include: ICG Middle East Report 33, Iraq: can local governance save central government? (27 October 2004) and Stewart, Prince of the Marshes, 246 (not literally); In his memoirs about being a CPA administrator, Hilary Synnott ascribes all the honour for the October 2003 Provincial Govenate elections to Jim Soriano. The US diplomat, whom he calls “Jim Saliero”,
had not actually arrived in Al Muthanna at that point. Hilary Synnott, Bad days in Basra, 94-95.

94 E-mail from Soriano, ‘Al Muthanna caucuses’, 31 December 2003, in: NMH, SFIR Collection, box 1. Incidentally, the roles of Alistair Blunt, and at a much earlier stage, Major Fellinger, were in fact downplayed in Soriano’s praises. For Rentenaar’s important role: interviews with Bulmer, Swijgman and Oppelaar; Sitrep by Contco 011/2004, 11 January 2004.

95 Sitrep by political adviser 1, 12 January 2004.

96 See: United States Institute for Peace (USIP), Special Report 139, The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Governance in Iraq, Lesson Identified (May 2005); ICG Middle East Report 33, Iraq: can local governance save central government?, 12 and 17.

97 Etherington, Revolt on the Tigris, 236-237 and 261.

98 Sitrep by political adviser 1, 23 December 2003.

Chapter 4
Creating a secure environment

1 Sitrep by political adviser, 8 December 2003; Sitrep by Contco 136/2003, 8 December 2003.

2 Frago 003/03 Op rent a car, 24 November 2003, in: NMH, SFIR Collection, box 2b.


4 Ricks, Fiasco, 246-247, 321.

5 Andrew Rathmell et al, Developing Iraq’s security sector: the Coalition Provisional Authority’s experience (Santa Monica 2005).


7 Rathmell, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector, 44-45.

8 Interview with Swijgman; 2/5 Marines S-2, ’Iraq Current Situation Brief Al Muthanna’, 28 May 2003, in: SSA Defensie, SFIR Records, back-up files SFIR-1 up to and including SFIR-5, hard drive no. 156, FC\SFIR 051012\Ontplooiing\Briefing us tbv ontplowering SFIR-1.ppt; interview with Major C.D. Klein (17 April 2009).


10 ‘Juridisch proces Irak’; Sitrep by Contco 010/2003.


14 Herinneringsboek SFIR 1 , 148; ‘Het “Al Muthanna politie-project”’, in: NMH, SFIR Collection, box 1.

15 Interview with Klein.
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19 MND SE aimed to form and train a single battalion for the New Iraqi Army (NIA). Herinneringsboek SFIR 2, 45.


22 2NLBG op order no. 001/04 ICDC, 8 January 2004, in: NIMH, SFIR Collection, box 2b.


24 Rathmell, Developing Iraq’s security sector, 38 and 40.


27 Rathmell, Developing Iraq’s security sector, 10-13.


31 Muller, ‘Security Sector Reform’, 167.

32 The PJCC was ultimately supposed to take on four tasks: incident room, Joint Operations Room with communications to all security services, Joint Planning Staff and Joint Intelligence Committee for the exchange of intelligence. See: E. Muller, ‘Security Sector Reform’ 167-172.

33 This involved the TAC team, the liaison team for MND CS and the anti-tank platoon, which trained the 80-strong Iraqi border police. Herinneringsboek SFIR 2, 46.

34 SFIR End Evaluation, 14-15.

35 SFIR 2 Evaluation Report, 5-6.

36 Sitrep by political adviser, 3 January 2004; E-mail from Soriano, (Two civilians killed in job-related violence’, 3 January 2004, in: NIMH, SFIR Collection, box 4.


39 Idem; Sitrep by political adviser, 3 January 2004.


43 Sitrep by political adviser, 9 January 2004.
44 SFIR 2 Evaluation Report, 2.
46 Operational journal C-Contco, 2 December 2003; Sitrep by Contco 130/2003, 2 December 2003.
49 Commander report 030/03, 9 December 2003, in: NIMH, SFIR Collection, box 1.
53 Public Prosecution Service press release, Arnhem, 12 June 2008, 'Onderzoek naar aangiften over schietincident Irak afgerond'.
58 On 25 February 2004, Minister Kamp announced via a spokesperson that the instructions on the use of force for military personnel were "clear and unambiguous". The instructions were called clear and sufficiently robust in both the SFIR 1 Evaluation under CDS Directives no. A-5 and in the SFIR 2 Evaluation Report drawn up by the battle group commanders and their staffs.
59 Interview with Bulmer.
60 NRC Handelsblad 9 January 2004.
67 Interview with Oppelaar.
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75 Quotation from Rentenaar in: Blanford, ‘Dutch take a “slowly” tact in Iraq’.


77 Interview with Rentenaar.

78 Sitrep by political adviser, 9 January 2004.

79 Van den Berg Committee, 66.


81 22 Infcoy Frago no. 001/04 Operatie Thunderstruck, 29 January 2003.

82 Herinneringsboek sfir 2, 41.


86 Ministry of Defence press releases made no mention of targeted operations in the period from 2 NLBG to operation Gonzalo. Defence Staff evaluations did not deal with the kts and arrest operations either.

87 The Spanish had come very close to catching number 1 on the list of suspects. Sitrep by Contco 059/2003, 28 February 2004.


89 2 NLBG op ord no. 001/04 KDC, 8 January 2004, in: nimh, sfir Collection, box 2b.


91 Idem; 2 NLBG to the Governor of the Province of Al Muthanna, ‘Iraqi Police’, 4 January 2004, in: SSA Defensie, Contco Stabilisation Force Iraq 2 Records, box no. 45, hard drive, BATST AS-SAMAWAH\ALGEMEEN\Jurist Prinsen, Mr F.K\sfir 3\Machteld legal\ssr\ssr slechte politiemensen.doc.


93 Defensiekrant, 15 April 2004.

Chapter 5
Caught between a power struggle and an uprising

1 Document ‘Op Swatter briefing’, in: SSA Defensie, SFIR Records, back-up files SFIR-1 up to and including SFIR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFIR 051012\Operaties\Alphabetisch\Swatter.


4 Op Swatter Briefing; E-mail from Colonel Van Harskamp, 22 September 2007.


10 Herring and Rangwala, Iraq in fragments, 203.

11 The Americans released 12 of these 21 detainees after a few weeks. A couple of months later the other 9 were handed over to the British, who interned them in the DTF in Shaibah and released them soon after. The list can be found in the ‘detainees.xls’ file in: SSA Defensie, SFIR Records, back-up files SFIR-1 up to and including SFIR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFIR extra\SFIR MND-SE legal files\mail\nl.


13 Several Sitreps by Contco between 15 March and 1 April 2004.


18 Herring and Rangwala, Iraq in fragments, 202-203.


20 Allawi, The occupation of Iraq, 270.


28 Ibid.


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33 Several NLB intelligence summaries from this period, including those of 10 April and 15 April.
35 Document ‘beveiligingsmaatregelen’, in: SSA Defensie, SFIR Records, back-up files SFIR-1 up to and including SFIR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFIR 051012\Veiligheid\Personele veiligheid, and E-mail of 19 April 2004 and ‘Aantekening’ in: SSA Defensie, Records 3 (NL) Contco Iraq, box 30.
36 See ‘040530 rapportage MCOP week 22’ and ‘040606 rapportage MCOP week 23’.
38 Operational order ‘Opord 002 (SFIR 3)’ of 26 April 2004 and operational order ‘Opord 002a SFIR 3’ of 9 June 2004 in: SSA Defensie, SFIR Records back-up files SFIR-1 up to and including SFIR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFIR 051012\Operaties\Contingency plans and operations\NLB SFIR3 CONOPS. Also: interview with Colonel R.H. van Harskamp (20 April 2008).
39 Already during pre-deployment preparations this objective was thought to have been achieved. See: Presentation ‘1e operationele verkenning’, in: SSA Defensie, SFIR Records, back-up files SFIR-1 up to and including SFIR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFIR 051012\Evaluaties en verslagen\SFIR3\Verslag Operationele Verkenning.
43 Commander’s update report 22-04-04, in: SSA Defensie, SFIR Records, back-up files SFIR-1 up to and including SFIR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFIR 051012\Rapportages\NLB\Daily commanders update.
44 Report ‘040425 rapportage MCOP week 17’.
46 Formation and Readiness Order no. 106 C (deployment of mortar tracking radar) from CDS dated 28 April 2004, in: NIMH, SFIR Collection, box 17.
58 Commander’s update report 28-04-04.
59 As Samawah, april - mei 2004, 7.
Notes to chapter 5


63 Commander’s update report 11-05-04.


67 Report ‘040516 rapportage mcop week 20’.


70 Interview with Major A.A.J.M. Witkamp (1 May 2008).


74 NRC Handelsblad 21 May 2004.

75 Letter from Minister of Defence to the House of Representatives dated 21 May 2004.


82 Report by political adviser 2, 12 June 2004 and report by political adviser 1, 13 June 2004, in: NIMH, SFIR Collection, box 5.


87 de Volkskrant 29 June 2004.


89 Sitrep by Contco 205/2004.


91 Sitrep by Contco 204/2004.


95 NLBG intelligence summaries, 7 August 2004.


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105 NLBG intelligence summaries, 14 August 2004.


107 Interview with Major J.E. Mustert (23 November 2009).


112 Witness statements from Lance Corporal A. Ybema and Sergeant J. Maat in Zembla documentary ‘Dodelijke hinderlaag in Irak’.

113 Ar Rumaythah 14 - 15 augustus 2004. Reconstructie van gebeurtenissen, 13. Five were so severely wounded that they were evacuated to the Netherlands for further treatment.

114 Sitrep by Contco 228/2004.


118 Several NLBG intelligence summaries between 15 and 23 August.


120 NLBG intelligence summary, 14 August 2004.

121 NLBG intelligence summary, 16 August 2004.


126 Interview with Major E.G.B. Wieffer (18 June 2010); Interview with Major P.J. Hageman (31 March 2010); Interview with Mustert.

127 E-mail correspondence between Colonel Matthijssen and authors, 29 April 2010.

128 Ar Rumaythah 14 - 15 augustus 2004. Reconstructie van gebeurtenissen; Interview with Wieffer; Interview with Mustert; Interview with Hageman.


Notes to chapter 6

139 Sitrep by Contco 249/2004. See also ‘Frago 47.04 Kyodo’, in: SSA Defensie, SFIR Records, back-up files SFIR-1 up to and including SFIR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFIR 051012\Operaties\Alfabetisch\Kyodo.
145 In their Counterinsurgency Field Manual (2007), the US armed forces also use the term ‘mosaic war’.
146 See Army Doctrine Publication II C.
148 This comparison was used in many Sitreps by the NLBGs and in the ministry’s press releases.

Chapter 6
Reconstruction

5 The overall SFIR operation cost 144.5 million euros. See SFIR End Evaluation 19.
7 Interview with Swijgman.
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13 For inadequate training for cimic personnel see: cimic Evaluation, 17.

14 ‘Minutes of Meeting 1 Aug 06’, in: SSA Defensie, Contco Stabilisation Force Iraq 1 Records, CD-ROM no. 6, Nommensen\cimic\Minutes of Meeting1 Aug 06.doc.

15 Interview with Major W. van den Berg (9 May 2008).

16 Interview with Swijgman; ‘Contacten militair en civiel’, in: nimi, sfir Collection, box 4.


18 Chr. Van Dinteren, ‘cimic: significant langs de zijlijn’, Qua Patet Orbis (September 2004) 32-33.


20 Erdbrink, ‘Met soldaten én geld in Zuid-Irak’; Herinneringsboek sfir 2, 149-150.

21 Sitrep by political adviser 2, 20 October 2003, in: nimi, sfir Collection, box 1.

22 Interview with Swijgman; Interview with Rentenaar.

23 Interview with Rentenaar.

24 Sitrep by political adviser 1, 11 September 2003.


26 Herinneringsboek sfir 2, 162.


29 Sitrep by political adviser 1, 30 November 2003.


32 ‘Handover files c-cse’, in: SSA Defensie, Contco Stabilisation Force Iraq 2 Records, box 45, hard drive: C:\cimic as-samawah\CDS\nl CMC\support_element\posthumus, M.J.\Handover files c.doc.


34 Memo c 2NLDETRAK 007/04, 1 February 2004.


36 E-mail correspondence with Major M.J. Posthumus, 22 April 2008.


Notes to chapter 6

39 See: ‘Overzicht (geschatte) financiën SFIR 1 t/m 5’, in: NIMH, SFIR Collection, box 21.


43 Herinneringsboek SFIR 2, 14.


45 E-mail correspondence with Posthumus.

46 The balance sheet deficit for 2 NLBG was transformed into a surplus of over 44,460 US dollars when the battle group’s projects listed in MND SE administration were added. See: ‘Statement’, 20 July 2004, in: NIMH, SFIR Collection, box 4. For the allegations of corruption: VARA, De Ochtenden, ‘Militairen in Irak nemen steekpenningen aan’, 24 March 2004.

47 Ricks, Fiasco, 326.


49 Sitrep by political adviser 1, 26 February 2004, in: NIMH, SFIR Collection, box 4.

50 Sitrep by political adviser 1, 22 February 2004 and Sitrep by political adviser 1, 8 March 2004, in: NIMH, SFIR Collection, box 4.


54 For the estimate of 11 million US dollars see: NIMH SFIR/CIMIC intern research, annex 4, in: NIMH, SFIR Collection, box 21.

55 Progress report for the period 8 August up to and including 13 August 2004, in: SSA Defensie, SFIR Records, back-up files SFIR-1 up to and including SFIR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFIR extra\CIMIC\CIMIC team leader spul\correspondentie\verslag 8.

56 Herinneringsboek SFIR 2, 148.

57 Sitrep by political adviser 1, 26 February 2004.

58 Ibid.


60 ‘Fiche n.a.v. gesprek met Japanse Defat en 1e Secretaris’, 28 July 2004, in: SSA Defensie, SFIR Records, back-up files SFIR-1 up to and including SFIR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFIR 105102\ Correspondentie DOC\DCBC0669.ZIP.

61 ‘Ervaringen met Japanners tijdens SFIR 3 in de periode van 15 maart t/m 26 mei 2004’, in: NIMH, SFIR Collection, box 5.


64 CPA Memorandum, 14 June 2004.


66 SCO to C-3(NL)CONTCO IRAK, 23 June 2004, in: SSA Defensie, SFIR Records, back-up files SFIR-1 up to and including SFIR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFIR 051012\ Correspondentie DOC\DCBC0565 goodwill geld.ZIP.
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69 DOC/3BL to C-3(NL) Contco Iraq, ‘Diversen’, 14 June 2004, in: SSA Defensie, SFIR Records, back-up files SFIR-1 up to and including SFIR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFIR 051012\Correspondentie DOC (specifically: DCBC0036); SCO to C-3(NL) Contco Iraq, ‘Stavaza diverse onderwerpen’, 23 June 2004, in: SSA Defensie, SFIR Records, back-up files SFIR-1 up to and including SFIR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFIR 051012\Correspondentie DOC\DCBC0032 Cobelens Harskamp.zip.
71 SCO to C-3(NL) DET IRAQ, ‘Assessment’, 13 July 2004, in: SSA Defensie, SFIR Records, back-up files SFIR-1 up to and including SFIR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFIR 051012\Correspondentie DOC\DCBC0065 goodwill geld.zip.
73 Sitrep by political adviser 2, 26 June 2004, in: NIMH, SFIR Collection, box 5.
74 ‘Actiepunten’, 28 July 2004, in: SSA Defensie, SFIR Records, back-up files SFIR-1 up to and including SFIR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\Backup uitgepakt\Groups\Contco\Hypert\Contco\Ontvangen.
75 Interview with Major B.E. de Heer (29 May 2008).
77 Sitrep by Contco 197/2004, 15 July 2004, Assessment C-4(NL)BG; For the Italian brigade, Major de Heer named the sum of four to six million euros. Interview with De Heer.
80 Interview with Lieutenant Colonel W.J.A. Smeets (23 May 2008); Interview with De Heer.
81 Sitrep by Contco 197/2004, 15 July 2004, Assessment C-4(NL)BG.
82 The succession and personal protection of the political advisers were a constant source of worry. Finding successors for both the political advisers continued to be a problem in 2004-2005. See, among others: Sitrep by Contco 053/2004.
83 E-mail correspondence between Colonel Matthijssen and the authors, 29 April 2010.
84 Interview with De Heer; CIMIC Evaluation, 19.
85 Interview with De Heer; Interview with Van den Berg.
89 See ‘061004 Fact sheet Traffic Police’ and ‘021004 Fact sheet Spoorweg politie’, in: SSA Defensie, SFIR Records, back-up files SFIR-1 up to and including SFIR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFIR extra\SFIR 5\02-SIE 82\RESTRICTED\Thema’s\ip Overview\01) AS SAMAWAH\04) AANVERWANTE DIENSTEN (VALLEN NIET ONDER IP).
91 PICC SFIR 3 Evaluation Report, in: SSA Defensie, SFIR Records, back-up files SFIR-1 up to and including SFIR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFIR extra\PICC\Evaluatieverslagen PICC.
93 ‘Rapportage week 31’ as annex e to Sitrep by Contco 214/2004.
94 SSR SFIR 4 Step-by-step plan.
95 See ‘040627 rapportage MCOF week 26’.
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96 Cv Lt. Col. Kareem and Cv Kareem, in: SSA Defensie, SFR Records, back-up files SFR-1 up to and including SFR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFR extra\SFR 5\A-team\TIC\SFR4 en 5\HOT UK. See also document ‘281004 1B Voorbeelden corruptie Kareem PCC’ in: SSA Defensie, SFR Records, back-up files SFR-1 up to and including SFR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFR extra\SFR 5\A-team\TIC\SFR4 en 5\(02) ARCHIEF(00) PATROUILLE RAPPORTEN\2004\10) Oktober.

97 ‘Rapportage week 24’, annex e to Sitrep by Contco 165/2004. See also: ‘Outslagbrief Kareem’, in: SSA Defensie, SFR Records, back-up files SFR-1 up to and including SFR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFR extra\SFR 5\A-team\TIC\KMAR data\Politie map.


102 E-mail correspondence between Captain (Rtd.) J. Steller and the authors, 26 November 2008.


111 Presentations ‘Buzzard staf’ and ‘frago 73.O4 BUZZARD’, in: SSA Defensie, SFR Records, back-up files SFR-1 up to and including SFR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFR extra\SFR 5\O3_SIE S3\RESTRICTED\SIE S3 HFD\FRAG0\SFR4\OP BUZZARD.


114 E-mail correspondence between Colonel Van Dooren and the authors, 5 November 2008.


116 Sitrep by NLBG, 15 November 2004. See also: chronicle of 11 (NLD) Battle Group SFR 5 in Herinneringsboek SFR 5, 252.


119 de Volkskrant 3 November 2004.

120 Report by political adviser, 10 December 2004.

121 SSR report by political adviser, 20 December 2004.

122 Document ‘ING 71st Bde Muthana 10.pdf’, in: SSA Defensie, SFR Records, back-up files SFR-1 up to and including SFR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFR extra\SFR 5\O2_SIE S2\RESTRICTED\Theme\SSR (kan gebrand worden)\Irqi Army\71st Bde. Also: Sitreps by NLBG, 13, 18, 19 and 27 December 2004.

123 Document ‘IRAQI ARMY (new names)’, in: SSA Defensie, SFR Records, back-up files SFR-1 up to and including SFR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFR extra\SFR 5\O2_SIE S2\RESTRICTED\Theme\SSR (kan gebrand worden).
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126 Sitreps by NLBG, 19 and 20 November 2004.
129 Sitrep by NLBG, 7 December 2004.
130 Sitrep by NLBG, 3 December 2004.
134 Report by political adviser, 30 November 2004.
135 Report by political adviser, 9 September 2004.
136 Sitrep by NLBG, 4 December 2004.
137 See Sitreps by NLBG, 3 and 4 December 2004.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
144 Sitrep by NLBG, 11 January 2005.
145 Sitrep by NLBG, 14 January 2005.
146 Sitreps by NLBG, 17 and 19 January 2005.
150 Sitrep by NLBG, 30 January 2005.
153 For the CIMIC criteria of 4 NLBG, see: ‘Projectplanning additionele CIMIC-gelden’, 25 August 2004, in: SSA Defensie, SFIR Records, back-up files SFIR-1 up to and including SFIR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFIR 051012\CIMIC\Financieel\040825 Brief 013 projectplanning CIMIC gelden.doc.
154 Idem, 11 and 18.
155 Idem, 23.
156 Over 600 projects is the official figure as stated in the SFIR End Evaluation, 28. This figure is probably too low, as in total SFIR 4 and 5 alone completed 375 projects (219 projects from Dutch funds and 156 from CERP funds). The first three rotations each completed over 200 projects using higher budgets, resulting in the likely total being over 1,000. The sum of sixteen million US dollars is a cautious estimate by NIMH based on several statements. See: NIMH SFIR/CIMIC intern research, annex 4, in: NIMH, SFIR Collection, box 21.
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157 See for figures on SFIR 4 and 5: CIMIC SFIR 5 FEZ End Report, 6 March 2005, in: SSA Defensie, SFIR Records, back-up files SFIR-1 up to and including SFIR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\051012\CIMIC\ financieel; See also ‘Verslag MOS-gelden’, 2004-2005, 8.

158 SFIR End Evaluation, 29.

159 Interview with Lussenburg; Major John Smeets, ‘CIMIC in Iraq’, Intercom 1 (2005) 52.


162 On Point II, 378; Linda Robinson, Tell me how this ends: General Petraeus and the search for a new way out of Iraq (New York 2008) 69.

Chapter 7

Dutch approach?

1 Reconstruction in de Volkskrant 19 February 2005.


3 Wikileaks, US Embassy Cable 05THEHAGUE406.

4 Sitrep by NLBG, 31 December 2004.


6 NRC Handelsblad 13 January 2005.

7 NRC Handelsblad 29 December 2004.

8 Reconstruction in de Volkskrant 19 February 2005.

9 Sitrep by political adviser, 24 February 2005, in: NIMH, SFIR Collection, box 11.

10 E-mail from Rentenaar to Soriano, ‘Re: Greetings’, 22 February 2005.

11 Sitrep by 5 NLBG, 12 February 2005; Sitrep by political adviser, 5 March 2005, in: NIMH, SFIR Collection, box 11.

12 Sitrep by 5 NLBG, 15 March 2005.


14 SFIR End Evaluation, 19.

15 Sitrep by 5 NLBG, 7 March 2005; Defensiekrant 10 March 2005.

16 NRC Handelsblad 8 March 2005.

17 Report by C-RedOstDet SFIR, week 12, in: SSA Defensie, SFIR Records, back-up files SFIR-1 up to and including SFIR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\\051012\Rapportages\NLBG\Redeployment Ondersteunings Detachment.


22 Sitrep by 5 NLBG, 15 November 2004.
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24 Interview with Colonel F.B. van Dooren (6 August 2009).
27 NRC Handelsblad 25 October 2004. An Arabic translation was published in newspapers Tareeq al Shaab (Iraq), Al Riyadh Tareeq (Saudi Arabia) and Al Sharqalawsat (London).
33 Lammers, Vreemde Overheersing; Idem, ‘Nederland als bezettende mogendheid’, 87-88.
34 de Volkskrant 21 July 2008. For the emphasis on patrols in open vehicles, see also: Juul Platenburg, ‘Nederlandse troepen in Irak’, available on www.airmanoeuvrebrigade.nl/3_publicaties.php.
38 See: Henk Sollie, Opbouw en hervorming van inheemse politiekorpsen: ervaring van de Nederlandse krijgsmacht na 1989 (Graduation thesis University of Twente, 2009) 159. This interpretation, based on an interview with the commander of 5 NLBG’s MP platoon, was confirmed for Ar Rumaythah by Major O.J.A. Lagas in an interview with the authors (16 September 2009). Colonel Matthijssen (correspondence 1 July 2009) states in retrospect that the Royal Marechaussee in Ar Rumaythah had “possibly” resumed its tasks “later, but to a restricted degree”.
39 Contribution from Major Peter Hengeveld to Evaluatie SFR 2, ‘g. Operationele aspecten’, in: SSA Defensie, Contco Stabilisation Force Iraq 2 Records, box 45, hard drive: BATST AS-SAMAWAH\S-3\HPD SECTIE 3 HENGEVELD. J.P.\Irak\Terugkoppeling\CD\evaluatie.doc.
40 Interview with Klein.
41 Interview with Mustert. For restrictions on freedom of movement and patrols by 4 NLBG in Ar Rumaythah: Interviews with Van Dooren and Lagas.
42 Interviews with Van Dooren and Lagas.
43 Sitrep by NLBG, 15 November 2004. For the resumption of foot patrols in Ar Rumaythah, see also: ‘Nederlanders lopen weer door ar-Rumaythah’, ANP 6 December 2004; Interviews with Van Dooren and Lagas.
44 See: Sitrep by NLBG 18 November 2004. In contrast to his predecessors, Lieutenant Colonel Van Dooren ignored the mayor of Ar Rumaythah’s request to stay clear of the town. Also: interviews with Van Dooren and Lagas.
45 Daily Sitrep by Tijger-coy (asaIt), 29 November 2004, in: SSA Defensie, SFR Records, back-up files SFR-1 up to and including SFR-5, hard drive no. 156, F:\SFR extra\SFR 5\B-team\02_Ciestaf\Public\Rapportages.
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47 Interview with Lagas.

48 Sitreps by NLBG, 18, 19 and 20 November 2004.

49 Interview with Lagas; Interview with Van Dooren.

50 Sitrep by NLBG, 8 March 2005; NLBG intelligence summary, 28 February 2005.

51 Interview with Van Dooren.

52 Sitrep by NLBG, 9 March 2005.

53 Interview with Matthijssen in Netwerk (television news programme) 28 June 2004.

54 Sitrep by NLBG, 9 January 2005.

55 Synnott, Bad days in Basrah, xii.

56 House of Commons, ‘Iraq’, 36.


58 See chapter 2.

59 Richard Holmes, Dusty warriors: modern soldiers at war (New York etc. 2007) 100.

60 Burke, ‘British tread softly’.

61 See: Holmes, Dusty warriors, 185 and 187.


63 Ricks, Fiasco, 346.

64 Rory Stewart, Prince of the Marshes, 69, 296-297.

65 Peter Graff, ‘Americans don’t know how to be peacekeepers’, The Independent Online 29 April 2004.


70 OP TELIC. Unless otherwise stated, the British self-criticism in this and the next two paragraphs comes from this report.

71 Holmes, Dusty warriors, 112-113.

72 Idem, 123-124.

73 Synnott, Bad days in Basra, 42, 61; See also: Hilary Synnott, ‘State-building in Southern Iraq’.
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74 Quoted in: Knights and Williams, ‘The calm before the storm’, 27 and 35.
76 Hazel, ‘Matching British coin’.
78 Idem, b-7.
82 Knights and Williams, ‘The calm before storm’, 30.
87 Interview with Bulmer.
89 American Forces Press Service, ‘Coalition Troops to leave Muthanna province in Iraq, 22 June 2003’.
91 de Volkskrant 20 August 2007; Associated Press 20 August 2007.
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99 Lawrence, ‘Twenty-seven articles’.

100 For this brief summary, use was made of: Ricks, The gamble; Linda Robinson, Tell me how this ends; David Kilcullen, The accidental guerrilla: fighting small wars in the midst of a big one (London 2009) 115-185.


102 The attribution theory was developed by Austro-American Fritz Heider in the late 1950s.


104 Interview with Rentenaar.

105 Ibid.

106 Interview with Bulmer.


108 For the formal interpretation of CIMIC see also: speech on behalf of the Minister of Defence on presentation of the book Managing Civil-Military Cooperation, 22 October 2008.


111 Kilcullen, The accidental guerrilla, 152.

112 Dirk Bogarde, A gentle occupation (London 1980).