Chapter VI  The Drafting of the Java Invasion Operation Plan

1. The Circumstances Until the Launch of the Operation

[The Circumstances] up to the Manila Conference

Although no extant documents concerning the Army-Navy Central Agreement of 5 November 1941 clearly mention fixed dates for the Java invasion, it seems that the high command had in mind to let the forces land on Java roughly around day X + 100 and capture the island within twenty days after the landing.\(^\text{34}\)

Then in the Tokyo Agreement of 10 November, the outline of the plan became fairly concrete, and the following points were agreed upon:\(^\text{34}\)

1. The landing on Java shall be scheduled by and large for Day X + 80 (26 February). However, the Army Department of IGHQ expressed disapproval of this schedule in terms of the available tonnage and the shipping schedule.
2. The Sixteenth Army ([consisting of] the 2d, the 48th Divisions and one element of the 38th Division as the core) shall be employed for the invasion of Java, and the Navy Dutch East Indies Unit shall provide the escort at sea.
3. The air operation against Java shall be conducted in the following way:
   (1) Prior to the landing on Java, air campaigns on eastern and western Java shall be carried out in concert from the following seized bases.
      [1] Eastern Java: Banjarmasim and Makassar as the frontline [bases], including Balikpapan and Kendari
      [2] Western Java: Southern Sumatra and Kuching
   (2) Responsibility for the air campaigns
      [1] Eastern Java: the Navy (the Eleventh Air Fleet)
4. Others
   (1) The 48th Division shall be diverted from the operations in the Philippines and be scheduled to leave Manila on Day X + 70 (16 February).
   (2) The main force of the Sixteenth Army shall head for western Java from Taiwan and southern Indochina, while the element of the 38th Division shall head there from Hong Kong.

(As previously told), in [Navy] Southern Task Force Order Classified No. 1 issued on 15 November in accordance with these agreements, the Java operation was envisioned roughly as follows:\(^\text{47}\)
1. In concert with the Air Unit, the [naval] special landing forces shall seize Menado, Kendari and Makassar. Apart from this and in parallel with the above, Tarakan, Balikpapan and Banjarmasin shall be captured in conjunction with the Army to advance air bases to each place.

2. As the operations in the Malaya area progress, Bangka and Palembang shall be seized at an appropriate opportunity, and air bases [there] shall be made ready for use.

3. The concerted air campaigns against eastern and western [Java] shall be intensified from the bases in the items above in order to tighten the envelopment and neutralize the enemy air power, after which the Sixteenth Army shall be disembarked near Batavia and Surabaya.

4. One submarine element shall be advanced to the Indian Ocean to cut off the shipping of supplies to the Dutch East Indies from the south.

In Dutch East Indies Unit (Philippines Unit) Operation Order No. 1, which was issued on 23 November in accordance with the above, the following operational outline was indicated:

1. The following three lines of operations shall be pursued:
   - The Makassar Strait area: The line leading to Tarakan, Balikpapan and Banjarmasin
   - The area east of Celebes: The line leading to Menado, Kendari and Makassar
   - The Banda Sea area: The line leading to Ambon and Kupang
   Note: The Ambon, Kupang line was supposed to be implemented at an appropriate opportunity, depending on the progress of the other two operations.

2. The Air Unit shall be advanced to the Makassar Strait area to intensify the air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in Java. Assisted by this air campaign, the main force of the Sixteenth Army shall be put ashore near Batavia and another corps near Surabaya to swiftly capture Java.

Around that time, the [operation] to capture southern Sumatra had not yet been given shape.

With this operational concept in mind, the plunge was taken and hostilities were opened, but since the operations, including the Hawaii [operation], the sea engagement off Malaya, the Philippines invasion operation and the Malaya invasion operation, had made smooth progress, the Southern Army headquarters judged that it would be advantageous to complete the [entire] operation as soon as possible and planned to move up the schedule of the invasion operations. It led to the conference at Cam Ranh Bay on 29 December, where revisions were made to the Tokyo Agreement of 10 November, and (as previously told) the invasion schedule was changed as in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Central Agreement of 5 November</th>
<th>Tokyo Agreement of 10 November</th>
<th>Iwakuni Agreement of 16 November</th>
<th>Cam Ranh Agreement [discussed] on 29 December</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Makassar</td>
<td>Around Day X + 45*</td>
<td>Day X + 54</td>
<td>Day X + 53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banjarmasin</td>
<td>By and large around Day X + 50</td>
<td>Day X + 54</td>
<td>Day X + 53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangka and Palembang</td>
<td>Day X + 85**</td>
<td>By and large around Day X + 80</td>
<td>Roughly day X + 60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The text mistakenly has 54.
** The text mistakenly has 58.
However, after the launch of the operation to advance the air bases, it was strongly asserted at the operational meeting between the Southern Task Force, the Dutch East Indies Unit and the Air Unit on 18 January at Palau that, taking into consideration the preparation of the seized air bases, the allocation of escort naval vessels and the minesweeping schedule of the anchorages for the invasion [operations], etc., it was not feasible to execute [the operations] exactly according to the schedule specified in the Cam Ranh Agreement. Thus, as described previously, from 21 January onwards a conference to revise the Cam Ranh Agreement was held at Manila (the Manila Conference) and, on 28 January, the invasion [operation] schedule was changed in the following way:

1. The invasion schedule shall be changed as follows:
   - Western Java: Day X + 75* (21 February; postponed for five days)
   - Eastern Java: Day X + 77 (23 February; postponed for seven days)
   - Southern Sumatra: Day X + 64 (10 February; postponed for four days)
   - Makassar: Day X + 63 (9 February; postponed for ten days)
2. The seaborne [operation] to seize Banjarmasin shall be called off; instead, Bali shall be captured around day X + 75* (two days prior to the landing on eastern Java) in order to make use of it as a base for the air operations at the time of the invasion of eastern Java.

[The Circumstances] After the Manila Conference Until the Launch of the Operation

The Situation of the Units to Be Involved [in the Operation]

The situation of the units to be involved in the Java invasion [operation] as of 28 January was roughly as follows:

1. The Dutch East Indies Unit
   - The main unit (directly led by the Ashigara): at Davao, directing the whole operation
   - The 4th Destroyer Squadron (minus 4th Destroyer Division and the Yamagumo): in the course of the Balikpapan operation
   - The 2d Base Force: in the course of the Balikpapan operation (one element in Tarakan)
   - The 5th Destroyer Squadron: assembling in Gaoxiong to escort the 48th Division
   - The 2d Destroyer Squadron (minus the 18th Destroyer Division): in the course of the Ambon operation along with the 21st Minesweeper Division and the 1st Subchaser Division
   - The 5th Cruiser Division (minus the Myōkō): in the course of supporting the Ambon operation along with the 2d Section of the 6th Destroyer Division

* The text mistakenly has 57.
The 1st Base Force (minus the 21st Minesweeper Division and the 1st Subchaser Division): two patrol boats were in the course of the Kendari operation (one element at the Bangka anchorage).
The 11th Seaplane Tender Division and two patrol boats: in the course of supporting the Kendari and the Ambon operations.

2. The Air Unit
The Eleventh Air Fleet headquarters: at Davao; directing the whole operation.
The 21st Air Flotilla (minus the main body of the Kanoya Air Group) and the 3d Air Group: in charge of the air operations in Celebes, the Banda Sea as well as in the central and southern Philippines, with its main force in Kendari and one element in Menado and Davao.
The 23d Air Flotilla (minus the 3d Air Group): in the course of air operations in the Makassar area with its main force in Tarakan (and all land-based attack planes in Jolo).
The 2d Carrier Division, the *Maya*, the 7th Destroyer division, and the 2d Section of the 27th Destroyer Division: after completing the Ambon operation, arrived at Palau on the 28th.

3. The Malaya Unit
The main unit (directly led by the *Chōkai*): in Cam Ranh Bay; directing the whole operation.
The 7th Cruiser Division, and a few destroyers of the 3d Destroyer Squadron: in the course of supporting the Endau and the Anambas operations.
The 3d Destroyer Squadron (minus one element): in the course of the Endau operation.
The main force of the 9th Base Force: in the course of the Anambas operation.
The 22d Air Flotilla: conducting air campaigns in the Malaya area, with its main force in southern French Indochina.
The 4th Submarine Squadron: in Cam Ranh Bay; in preparation for the subsequent operations.

4. The Submarine Unit
The 5th Submarine Squadron: in the course of the Indian Ocean operation (with its headquarters in Penang).
The 6th Submarine Squadron: returning to Davao from the Port Darwin operation.

5. The main body of the Southern Task Force
The 1st Section of the 4th Cruiser Division, the 2d Section of the 3d Battleship Division, the 4th Destroyer Division: in Palau, directing the whole operation.

6. The Army Units
The Sixteenth Army headquarters and the 2d Division: assembling in Gaoxiong and Tainan.
The 48th Division: in the course of assembling at Lingayen Gulf in the Philippines (the delay in the capture of the Bataan Peninsula prevented them from departing from Manila Bay).
The 38th Division (the Shōji Detachment): in Hong Kong (due to leave 29 January and assemble at Gaoxiong on the 31st).

The Outline of the Arrangements Between the Commanders of the Army and the Navy

The arrangements between the Army and the Navy commanders were made on 24 January in accordance with the Manila Agreement, and following the formal implementation of the Manila Agreement on the 28th, they came into effect on the 30th. The outline of the parts relevant to the Java invasion was as follows (details will be described later):

1. The landing areas and dates
   - Area No. 1: Bantam Bay and Merak Bay (the main force of the Sixteenth Army), on Day H (21 February).
   - Area No. 2: Patrol (Shōji Detachment).
   - Area No. 3: Kragan (48th division) on Day I (23 February).

2. Assembly points and departure dates
The units for Areas No. 1 and No. 2: Gaoxiong and then Cam Ranh Bay on Day H – 8
The units for Area No. 3: Lingayen Gulf and then Jolo on Day I – 7

3. The responsibility for the air operations
   (1) The air operations against Java: the Army shall take charge of western [Java] and the Navy of central and eastern [Java]
   (2) Guard against [enemy] submarines (of the transport ships under sail and the anchorages): entirely assigned to the Navy
   (3) Antiaircraft guard in the air (ditto): the Army [shall take charge of the units for] Area No. 1 and the Navy of those for Area No. 2 (the Army [shall take charge of the guard] after [the Shōji Detachment] has separated [from the main convoy]); the Navy [shall take charge of] those for Area No. 3.
   (4) Support for the ground operations: the Army [is responsible for] western [Java] and the Navy [for] eastern [Java]
   (5) Attacks on enemy naval vessels: mainly [the task of] the Navy

The Operational Policy of the Southern Task Force Commander

As mentioned previously [p. 331], on 9 February, the Southern Task Force Commander V. Adm. Kondō Nobutake announced his plan for the entire southern operation by means of Southern Task Force Telegraphic Order No. 92, which was in outline as follows:

1. The Malaya Unit is currently carrying out an attack on the port of Singapore and intends to capture Bangka and Palembang in mid-February.
2. Following the capture of Makassar, the Dutch East Indies Unit and the Air Unit are going to capture Bali and Timor around 20 February, and launch [the operation to] capture Java from 25 February onwards.
3. The Carrier Task Force shall try to completely destroy the enemy air power in the Port Darwin area as well as catch and destroy enemy fleets and transport convoys, while attacking the enemy forces in the Java area from their rear by carrying out carrier operations in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean in order to accelerate the clearing [of the enemy] from the Dutch East Indies in general.
4. The Submarine Unit shall watch and patrol the area to the north of Australia, Ceylon, the coastal areas of India, the Malacca Strait and the area south of Java.
5. The main body of the Southern Task Force shall advance into the Indian Ocean in tandem with the Carrier Task Force to support the whole operation.

The Operational Policy of the Dutch East Indies Unit Commander

As mentioned previously, on 28 January, the day when the Manila Agreement came into effect, the [Navy] Dutch East Indies Unit Commander V. Adm. Takahashi Ibō announced his plan for the operations of the Dutch East Indies Unit after the Makassar operation and until the Java invasion operation by means of Operation Order No. 9, which was (as previously told) in outline as follows:

1. After the capture of Ambon, the Eastern Support Unit, the 2d Escort Unit, the 1st Base Unit and the 2d Air Unit shall capture Makassar, Bali, and Kupang.
2. The 3d Escort Unit and the 1st Air Unit shall escort and disembark the Sixteenth Army in western Java, while the 1st Escort Unit, the 2d Base Unit and the 2d Air Unit [shall do the same] in eastern Java.
3. The date of the landing on western Java is set for 21 February (Day H), and that on eastern Java for 23 February (Day I).

The Problems in the Java Invasion [Operation] in Terms of Strength

The Dutch East Indies Unit’s plan to capture Java contained considerable problems in terms of strength.

1. The shortage of escort strength
   (1) Because [now] four operational lines toward eastern and western Java, Bali and Kupang are supposed to be simultaneously pursued in parallel, extreme lack of strength, particular that of escort forces is anticipated.
   (2) Concerning [the operational line towards] western Java in particular, merely two light cruisers, thirteen or fourteen destroyers and several minesweepers are allotted as the core strength to escort a large convoy made up of as many as fifty-five transport ships. A reinforcement of escort forces as well as minesweepers and naval defense vessels is required.
   (3) Since the 2d Destroyer Squadron and the 1st Base Force are executing operations almost concurrently in Celebes and the Banda Sea, destroyer forces are particularly lacking.
   (4) Summing up, a reinforcement of a total of about three destroyer divisions, [namely] at least another destroyer division for western Java and two more for the area to the north of Australia and eastern Java all together, is required.

2. The shortage of support forces
   Because [the units] in all areas are tied up with escorting the invasion units, leaving no strength to spare, it is anticipated that in case of a full-scale counterattack by powerful enemy surface vessels, the lack of support strength will lead to serious consequences.

Against these problems, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō took the following measures:

1. A reinforcement of destroyers
   (1) [He] transferred the 21st Destroyer Division ([consisting of] four destroyers), which had advanced to Davao on 21 January escorting the 101st Fuel Depot, to the Dutch East Indies Unit.
   (2) On 28 January, [he] transferred as of 30 January the 7th Destroyer Division ([consisting of] three destroyers) and the 1st Section ([consisting of] two destroyers) of the 6th Destroyer Division to the Dutch East Indies Unit respectively from the carrier-based air unit and from the Air Unit. (The former was supposed to return to its original unit after completing the Timor operation on the 24th [of February].)
   With these [measures], three destroyer divisions (nine destroyers) were added.

2. The support strength
   (1) [The forces in] the eastern Java area shall be provided with support by the main body of the Southern Task Force and the carrier-based air unit in concert with the Air Unit and the Submarine Unit. For this purpose, [an] appropriate advance base for the fleet and submarines shall be set up in the Banda Sea area.
   (2) For [the forces in] the western Java area, support by the forces of the Malaya Unit shall be considered, depending on the war situation in the southern Sumatra and Malaya areas.
The Preparations of Each Unit

In response to the reinforcement of destroyers, Dutch East Indies Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi incorporated the 21st and the 7th Destroyer Divisions into the Eastern Attack Unit, intending to assign them for the time being to the operations in the area of the 5th Cruiser Division, the 2d Destroyer Squadron and the 1st Base Force, while planning to add the 1st Section of the 6th Destroyer Division to [the forces in] the western Java area. Also, at 1600 on 29 January, in consequence of the Manila Agreement, the Dutch East Indies Unit commander ordered 4th Destroyer Squadron Commander R. Adm. Nishimura Shōji to sail to Lingayen, leading one destroyer division as the core on 30 and 31 January to escort and bring the 48th Division to Jolo by around 12 February, while having the other forces of the 4th Destroyer Squadron remain in Balikpapan and be put under the command of 2d Base Force Commander R. Adm. Hirose Suēto.

From 20 January onwards, the 5th Destroyer Squadron (commander: R. Adm. Hara Kenzaburō) in charge of the western Java [operation] had in Taiwan steadily made preparations for the operation. On 27 January, it had already at Gaoliong concluded the Army-Navy arrangements concerning the invasion operation with the Sixteenth Army, the 2d Division and the Shōji Detachment (of the 38th Division). [The preparations of] the other units [can be gathered] from the following order issued by the Dutch East Indies Unit commander on 29 January:(63)

1. The forces to be incorporated to the 3d Escort Unit from the 1st Base Force for the Batavia operation shall be the Shirataka, two minesweepers and one half of the 1st Defense Unit.
2. The San’yō-maru shall join the Shirataka en route and sail to Cam Ranh Bay by 7 February; the two minesweepers as well as the one half of the 1st Defense Unit in the above item [shall sail there] by 10 February.
3. The 1st Section of the 6th Destroyer Division shall sail to Cam Ranh Bay by 10 February by way of Davao.
4. The 1st Base Force shall be relieved of the task to guard Ambon, which was ordered by means of Third Fleet Classified Telegram No. 907.

Notes by the author:
1. The 1st Section of the 6th Destroyer Division was at that time under the command of the Air Unit and in charge of escorting the ship[s] transporting air base matériel to Kendari from Davao.
2. The Shirataka and the 1st Base Force were stationed at the Bangka anchorage and engaged in the defense of the area.
3. The minesweeper unit of the 1st Base Force was participating in the Ambon operation following the Kendari operation.
4. Although it had been planned to also send the Sanuki-maru to Cam Ranh Bay along with the San’yō-maru, the former sustained damage in the [enemy] air raid at Balikpapan on 27 January, which led to the cancellation of her sailing [to Cam Ranh Bay].

In the meantime, the Malaya Unit had by 30 January designated the 11th Destroyer Division (three destroyers), the 12th Destroyer Division (two destroyers) and the 1st Minesweeper Division (five minesweepers) as [respectively] the two destroyer divisions of the 3d Destroyer Squadron and one of the minesweeper divisions of the 9th Base Force that were to participate.
Chapter VI / The Drafting of the Java Invasion Operation Plan

in the western Java operation, and communicated this to the Dutch East Indies Unit commander and 5th Destroyer Squadron Commander R. Adm. Hara Kenzaburō.

Meanwhile on 9 February, Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō issued, by means of Telegraphic Order No. 93, the order to organize the 2d Submarine Squadron into Submarine Unit C and the 4th and the 6th Submarine Squadrons into Submarine Unit A (as of 18 February). He also ordered, by means of Telegraphic Order No. 94, the 2d Carrier Division and the 1st Section of the 7th [4th] Destroyer Division to respectively return to the Carrier Task Force and to the main body [of the Southern Task Force] as of 10 February.\(^{(53)}\)

Partial Changes in the Disposition of Forces of the Dutch East Indies Unit

1. The measures taken after the 21st Minesweeper Division had sustained damage

   Since (as previously told) the 21st Minesweeper Division had sustained the loss of having Minesweeper No. 9 sunk and Minesweepers No. 11 and No. 12 damaged in the Ambon Bay minesweeping operation, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi called off the division’s participation in the western Java operation. Instead, he changed the disposition of forces having the 1st Section (two torpedo boats) of the 21st Torpedo Boat Division of the 2d Base Force, which was engaged in protecting the shipping lanes in the rear in the Makassar Strait and the Celebes Sea, join the western Java operation. The Dutch East Indies Unit, which was already suffering from a lack of strength to protect the shipping lanes in the rear, requested reinforcements and, as a result, the minelayers *Tsubame* and *Kamome*, attached to the Sasebo naval station, were put by means of IGHQ Navy Department Instruction No. 50 under the operational command of the commander in chief of the Combined Fleet as of 5 February and transferred to the Dutch East Indies Unit of the Southern Task Force. These two boats were put under the command of the 2d Base Force commander, replacing the 1st Section of the 21st Torpedo Boat Division, to take charge of protecting the shipping lanes.

2. The measures taken following the damage to the *Sanuki-maru*

   Since the *Sanuki-maru* had been crippled due to the damage inflicted by the [enemy] bombings at Balikpapan on 27 January, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi decided on the same day to keep her in Balikpapan and issued an order to put her (with Patrol Boat No. 36 and two fishing boats attached to her) under the command of 2d Base Force Commander Rear Admiral Hirose, with instructions to assign her the task of neutralizing enemy submarines in the Makassar Strait and later from 7 February onwards to incorporate her in the 1st Base Force.

3. The problem of the continuous employment of the 11th Seaplane Tender Division

   In the initial plan, the 11th Seaplane Tender division was supposed to break off [its operations] after the capture of Ambon and Makassar until its deployment for the invasion operation against eastern Java. However, the division was engaged in both the Kendari and Ambon operations for a longer period than anticipated, which put it in a situation that it barely had time to service its aircraft. Therefore, on 2 February, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi gave informal instructions that the *Chitose* should sail to Jolo to prepare for the eastern Java operation when the Ambon operation was largely completed, while the *Mizuho* should continue to carry out the Ambon and the Makassar operations, after which she should enter Staring Bay for service, and that it would be all right if she were not ready in time for the eastern Java operation.
The Postponement of the Landing Date [on Java] Until 26 February

[The landing dates] arranged in the Manila Agreement were the 10th of February for Bangka and Palembang, and the 21st and 23d for western and eastern Java respectively. However (as previously told), due to the delay in the Bangka and Palembang operations, the landing on Java had necessarily been postponed as well. After conferring with the Southern Army headquarters on 9 February, [the new landing dates] were set on Day X + 81 (27 February) for western Java and no later than Day X + 81 for eastern Java. However, on the 9th, when this order was issued, Malaya Unit Commander V. Adm. Ozawa Jisaburō launched Operation L one day earlier, because the outlook for the construction of bases and the deployment of the air unit had become clear. Following the advance of [Operation] L by one day, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi (at Davao) conferred with the Sixteenth Army (at Cam Ranh Bay) by telegram and on the next day, 11 February, he issued the following order to change the invasion schedule:(54)

1. Batavia and Surabaya: [on] 26 February (Day X + 80)
2. Kupang and Dili: [on] 20 February
3. Bali: [on] 18 February

With this [change], the landings on both eastern and western Java came to be carried out on 26 February.

The Assembling of the Invasion Convoys Completed

1. The units for the western Java invasion [operation] assemble in Cam Ranh Bay (10 February)

   On 29 January, all fifty-five ships of the convoy of the main force of the Sixteenth Army had assembled in Gaoxiong. The convoy [then] advanced to Cam Ranh Bay in the following four groups. Fifth Destroyer Squadron Commander Rear Admiral Hara (the 3d Escort Unit commander) sailed ahead, leading the Natori, and arrived in Cam Ranh Bay on 3 February prior [to the convoy’s arrival].

   **1st Group**: twelve ships; escorted by the 2d Section (the Nagatsuki and the Minazuki) of the 22d Destroyer Division
   Departed at 1200 on 1 February; arrived at 0900 on 6 February

   **2d Group**: seventeen ships; escorted by the 1st Section (the Harukaze and the Hatakaze) of the 5th Destroyer Division
   Departed at 1200 on 3 February; arrived at 0900 on 8 February

   **3d Group**: eighteen ships; escorted by the 1st Section (the Fumizuki and the Satsuki) of the 22d Destroyer Division
   Departed at 1000 on 5 February; arrived at 0900 on 10 February

   **4th Group**: eight ships; escorted by the 2d Section (the Asakaze and the Matsukaze) of the 5th Destroyer Division
   Departed at 1200 on 6 February; arrived at 0900 on 10 February

In the meantime, from the eastern part of the Dutch East Indies, the Shirataka, the Myōkōmaru (a transport ship of about 5,000 tons), the 1st Section (the Hatsukari and the Chidori) of the 21st Torpedo Boat Division arrived at 1200 on 9 February, and again, at 1200 on the
10th, the 1st Section (the Akatsuki and the Hibiki) of the 6th Destroyer Division, the San’yōmaru and Patrol Boat No. 35 arrived in Cam Ranh Bay. Thus, all the units for the western Java invasion [operation], except for the forces from the Malaya Unit that were to join en route, had assembled in Cam Ranh Bay.

2. The units for the eastern Java invasion [operation] assemble in Jolo (13 February)

Fourth Destroyer Squadron Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura (the 1st Escort Unit commander), who had left Balikpapan leading the Naka and the 2d Destroyer Division (minus the Harusame) on 30 January, arrived in Lingayen Gulf on 2 February. The Harusame, which was to join from Davao en route, [first] called at Tarakan for replenishment and arrived in Lingayen Gulf on 3 February. The remaining force of the 4th Destroyer Squadron in Balikpapan had been instructed to arrive in Jolo on the 13th or the 14th, after cooperating in the Makassar invasion operation of the 2d Base Force under the command of 2d Base Force Commander Rear Admiral Hirose.

At 0800 on 8 February, 1st Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura, leading the Naka and the 2d Destroyer Division and having put the 53d Subchaser Division (three auxiliary submarine chasers) of the Third Southern Expeditionary Fleet under his command and supported by the Kuma also of the Third Southern Expeditionary Fleet, left Lingayen, escorting the thirty-nine transport ships of the 48th Division. The commander had requested 2d Base Force Commander Rear Admiral Hirose to provide him with a reinforcement of escort strength and had gotten a reinforcement of three submarine chasers. By 1400 on 13 February, all of the convoy put in at Jolo.

In the meantime, the 2d Base Force and the remaining force of the 4th Destroyer Squadron had left Balikpapan on the 8th. After having participated in the Makassar operation on the 9th, they called off the support for the operation on the evening of the 10th, sailed north and reached Jolo on the 13th. Also, calling off the Makassar operation at 1930 on 10 February, the Chitose, Patrol boats Nos. 34 and 38 of the 11th Seaplane Tender Division sailed north and arrived in Jolo at 1830 on the 13th, which completed the assembly of almost the whole strength of the unit for the eastern Java invasion [operation] at Jolo.

3. The advance of the main unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit to Jolo (14 February)

At 1700 on 13 February, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi left Davao leading the Ashigara and the Yamakaze. After having been joined by the Murasame and the Samidare, which had sailed from Jolo to meet and guard them on the next day, the 14th, he put in at Jolo at 1530.

Insufficient Results of the Air Campaign to Destroy the Enemy Air Power

1. Eastern Java

The main force of the land-based air unit, which had advanced to the line Balikpapan — Kendari in late January, launched an air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in eastern Java (Operation Z) and reported the following military gains (as previously told [pp. 233-244]).

3d [of February]: It had shot down or destroyed about sixty enemy aircraft and inflicted damage to twenty.
4th: It had sunk two [enemy] cruisers and inflicted serious damage to another, and some or minor damage to another two.
5th: It had shot down or destroyed eleven [enemy] fighter planes.

It was considered that this three-day air operation had destroyed the main force of the enemy naval surface vessels and delivered a serious blow to the enemy air power in eastern Java.

After that, the land-based air unit carried out air strikes on Surabaya, Malang, Bali and other places with more than a dozen aircraft on the 7th, the 8th and the 9th. From the 10th onwards, in order to act in concert with the first carrier operation of the Carrier Task Force, it shifted the focus of its attacks to western New Guinea as well as the Arafura Sea. From mid-February, with the Bali operation ahead, the land-based air units again planned to conduct attacks on eastern Java [p. 311]. However, due to bad weather, which lasted for several days, it was not able to carry out air operations other than just an attack on Surabaya with twenty-three land-based attack planes and eight fighter planes on 18 February, one day before the raid on Bali. In the attack, the unit engaged with twenty [enemy] P-40 fighter planes above Surabaya and reported military gains of having shot down nine (three of which unconfirmed).\(^7\)

2. Western Java

As for [the air campaign on] western Java, on 9 February, sixteen fighter planes of the Air Unit of the Malaya Unit carried out strikes on Batavia for the first time from Kuching [p. 281]. Then on 11 February, twenty-seven land-based attack planes made a sortie for the first time from the Malay Peninsula for an attack on western Java. (However, due to bad weather the fighter plane unit was unable to participate, and the target of the attack was changed to [enemy] naval vessels in the Bangka area [pp. 290-291].)

After that, the Navy air units were day after day busily occupied with attacking enemy naval vessels in the Bangka area [pp. 291-292]. Also, the poor condition of the airfield at Kuching did not allow the aircraft [to take off] with a full load of fuel, which made it difficult for them to conduct air strikes on Java. On the other hand, the Army air unit had advanced powerful fighter plane and bomber units to Palembang from the 17th to the 18th of February, and launched a large-scale air campaign to destroy the enemy air power in western Java day in and day out from the 19th onwards. As many as thirty to fifty fighter planes and bombers were employed day after day, directing their attacks towards the airfields in Buitenzorg, Bandung, Kalijati, Batavia, etc.\(^11\)

The Malaya Unit’s Cooperation in the Western Java Operation

As described previously, the western Java invasion unit was particularly short of escort and support strength. However, before the Manila Conference the outlook for the war situation in the Singapore area was still dim, which made it impossible to estimate how much support could be expected from the Malaya Unit. In late January, after the Manila Conference, it was decided that, apart from the 5th Destroyer Squadron, two destroyer divisions, one minesweeper division, and the Yura from the Malaya Unit, some minesweeping and defense strength from the 1st Base Force as well as the 1st Section of the 6th Destroyer Division of the main body of the Southern Task Force should be added, which considerably increased the escort strength. However, since considerable counterattacks by [enemy] air as well as surface and submarine forces were expected against the advance of a large convoy of as many
as fifty-five ships to Batavia, the last bastion of the allied forces, it was feared that even with this [reinforced] strength, the direct escort forces would still be insufficient, and that in case of a counterattack by an enemy fleet, the convoy would be totally bereft of support forces. On advancing to Cam Ranh Bay on 3 February, 5th Destroyer Squadron Commander Rear Admiral Hara had made a request to First Southern Expeditionary Fleet Commander in Chief Vice Admiral Ozawa for [the latter’s] support and cooperation at the time of the western Java invasion [operation]. In response to the request of the 5th Destroyer Squadron commander, Commander in Chief [Ozawa] had advised that the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet would cooperate as much as possible if the war situation in the Malaya area would permit it, and that [Rear Admiral Hara] should offer his opinion to the Second Fleet since [such a matter] should be dealt with through the fleet, while indicating that he would dispatch the 7th Cruiser Division for support if it should prove necessary.

On the evening of 16 February, when the outlook for the Bangka and Palembang operations had become clear, Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa informed the Southern Task Force of his cooperation in the Java operation: “Regarding the Java operation, we won’t mind if from 21 February onwards the Yura, the 11th and the 12th Destroyer Divisions, the 1st Minesweeper Division, the Kamikawa-maru, two auxiliary submarine chasers, two fishing boats and the supply ship Tsurumi should be transferred to the Dutch East Indies Unit.” Also on the 17th, without waiting for orders from the Southern Task Force, he issued on his own initiative an order to 7th Cruiser Division Commander R. Adm. Kurita Takeo about the support for the 5th Destroyer Squadron: “The 7th Cruiser Division commander shall lead both the 7th Cruiser Division as well as 19th Destroyer Division (minus the Isonami) and take charge of the support for the 3d Escort Unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit at the time of the Java operation.”

Having been notified by the Malaya Unit, the Southern Task Force issued on the 17th a preliminary order to transfer one element of the surface forces of the Malaya Unit to the Dutch East Indies Unit; at the same time it announced its plan to put the main force of the 22d Air Flotilla of the Air Unit of the Malaya Unit back under the command of Eleventh Air Fleet Commander in Chief Vice Admiral Tsukahara in order to conduct the air campaign on Java under a unified command. The order read:

**Second Fleet Classified Telegram No. 978**

Southern Task Force Telegraphic Order No. 103 [idem p. 298]

1. As of 21 February, the disposition of forces shall be changed as follows:

   (a) [To be transferred] from the Malaya Unit to the Dutch east Indies Unit: The Yura, the 11th and the 12th Destroyer Divisions, the 1st Minesweeper Division, the Kamikawa-maru, two auxiliary submarine chasers, two fishing boats, and the Tsurumi.

   (b) [To be transferred] from the Malaya Unit to the Air Unit: The 22d Air Flotilla (minus the Mi-horo Air Group), a detachment from the 21st Air Flotilla and a detachment (minus Type–96 carrier-based fighter planes) from the 23d Air Flotilla.

2. The Malaya Unit shall cooperate in the western Java invasion operation, while staying engaged in its own mission.
On the early morning of the 18th, 5th Destroyer Squadron Commander Rear Admiral Hara sent a request to the chief of staff of the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet concerning the cooperation by the Malaya Unit.\(^{(63)}\)

1. Besides carrying out a preliminary air campaign to destroy the enemy air power, I request that in the western Java operation there will be conducted at the same time an operation to destroy enemy naval vessels in the western part of the Java Sea as well as in the Sunda Strait.

2. Concerning the cooperation by the 7th Cruiser Division, I request that, in the light of the recent increase in enemy naval vessels in the western part of the Java Sea, the 7th Cruiser Division will [first] operate near the Karimata Strait, and thereafter sail by and large along with the transport ships while staying in close contact so that it can immediately destroy enemy vessels. Also, if possible, I would like the *Ryūjō* to take appropriate actions and provide support as well, so that it will be able to attack enemy naval vessels.

3. Our unit will leave Cam Ranh Bay on 18 February.

Having received this telegram of request, Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa gave on the 18th an order to 22d Air Flotilla Commander Rear Admiral Matsunaga concerning the air operations against western Java: “The 1st Air Unit shall contact the Eleventh Air Fleet and assume the responsibility for conducting a timely search and attack mission on enemy naval vessels in the western part of the Java Sea and the Sunda Strait, in addition to its mission of destroying the enemy air power in western Java.”\(^{(63)}\) By this order, the units for the western Java invasion [operation] were able to depart from Cam Ranh Bay with the prospect of being able to obtain from the Malaya Unit by and large the support and cover they had hoped for.

The Participation of the Sakaguchi Detachment in the Eastern Java Invasion Operation

After having captured Davao, Jolo, Tarakan and Balikpapan one after another and dispatched one element to capture Banjarmasin, the Sakaguchi Detachment was in charge of clearing Balikpapan [of the enemy] and maintaining public order with its main force. However, since it was decided that the Navy should take charge of the military administration and the guarding of Dutch Borneo, the detachment was successively handing over the tasks to the Navy side. Then, the successive delays in the schedule of the Java operation gave the Sakaguchi Detachment some leeway in its schedule to reorganize the unit after the seizure of Balikpapan. On 10 February, when the seizure of Banjarmasin was accomplished, the detachment offered to the Sixteenth Army a proposal to participate in the eastern Java operation. The Sixteenth Army then assigned the Sakaguchi Detachment to land in eastern Java and charge to Cilacap to seize the place. Thus, leaving about one battalion to maintain public order in Samarinda and Balikpapan, most of the rest of the Sakaguchi Detachment came to participate in the Java operation.

On the 17th, 4th Destroyer Squadron Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura held talks on the escort for the Sakaguchi Detachment with 48th Division Commander Lt. Gen. Tsuchihashi Yūitsu in Jolo, where the following was decided:\(^{(56)}\) (Summary)

1. The Sakaguchi Detachment shall embark on the *Ehime-maru* and the *Havana-maru*, and join the convoy of the 48th Division in the Makassar Strait. The Navy shall assign the *Kawakaze* and Submarine Chaser No. 4 of the 1st Escort Unit for its escort.
2. As for the rear units of the detachment, since the *Sasako-maru* and the *Sagami-maru*, [currently] engaged in the [operation to] capture Bali, will return to Makassar on 20 February or later, they shall be sent to Banjarmasin to embark the [rear units of the] detachment, and disembark them roughly by about 27 February. The Navy shall escort these ships with forces of the 2d Base Force.

**The Situation Right Before the Invasion [Operation]**

The western and the eastern Java invasion units of the Dutch East Indies Unit had respectively assembled in Cam Ranh Bay and Jolo on 12 and 13 February, and were hurriedly preparing for the operation, aiming to land on 26 February. The developments until 21 February right before the invasion of Java were in summary as follows:

14 February: The positions of the units involved as of that day were as follows:
- Cam Ranh Bay: The 5th Destroyer Sqdn (the *Natori*, the 5th and the 22d Destroyer Divs), the 1st Section of the 6th Destroyer Div, the *Shirataka*, the *Myōkō-maru*, the 1st Section of the 21st Torpedo Boat Div, the *San'yō-maru*, Patrol Boat No. 35 and fifty-five transport ships of the Army (the main force of the Sixteenth Army)
- Jolo: The *Ashigara* (the flagship of the Third Fleet), the 4th Destroyer Sqdn (the *Naka*, the 2d Destroyer Div, the 9th Destroyer Div (minus the *Yamagumo*), the 24th Destroyer Div (minus the *Suzukaze*)), the *Itsukushima* (the flagship of the 2d Base Force), the *Wakataka*, the 11th, the 30th and the 20th Minesweeper Divs,* the 21st Subchaser Div (six submarine chasers), the *Chitose*, Patrol Boats No. 34 and No. 38, the 54th Subchaser Div and thirty-nine transport ships of the Army (the 48th Div)
- Balikpapan: The 2d Section of the 21st Torpedo Boat Div (the *Tomozuru*), the *Sanuki-maru* (minus the aircraft unit) and two transport ships of the Army (the Sakaguchi Det)
- Makassar: The aircraft unit of the *Sanuki-maru* and Patrol Boat No. 36
- Palau: The 4th Cruiser Div (minus the *Chōkai*, the flagship of the Second Fleet [Malaya Unit]), the 3d Battleship Div, the 8th Cruiser Div, the 1st Destroyer Sqdn (the *Abukuma*, the 17th Destroyer Div, the 2d Section of the 27th Destroyer Div), the 1st Carrier Div (the flagship of the First Air Fleet), the 2d Carrier Div, the 4th Destroyer Div, the 18th Destroyer Div (minus two destroyers) and the *Akigumo*

15 February
1. The Carrier Task Force (the 1st and the 2d Carrier Divs, the *Takao*, the *Maya*, the 8th Cruiser Div, the 1st Destroyer Sqdn (minus the 6th Destroyer Div, the 1st Section of the 27th Destroyer Div and the 21st Destroyer Div), the 18th Destroyer Div (minus two destroyers) and the *Akigumo*) left Palau for Port Darwin for the first carrier operation.\(^{(68)}\)
2. The Dutch East Indies Unit commander postponed for one day the departure of the main unit (the *Ashigara* and the *Yamakaze*) from Jolo, scheduled for the 16th, to the 17th, so as to arrive in Staring Bay on the 19th.\(^{(93)}\) It was because the schedule of the Dutch East Indies operation was postponed and also because the meetings in Jolo took too much time.
3. The Malaya Unit launched [the operation to] capture Bangka and Palembang (as previously told [p. 295]).
4. Singapore, Britain’s largest base in East Asia, surrendered.

16 February
1. Since it was not possible to conduct the expected search and attack missions in the Surabaya area due to bad weather in the Makassar Strait area day after day, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi decided to postpone the operation to capture Bali for one day, to be executed on the 19th, (as previously told [p. 311]).\(^{(78)}\)

---

* Actually: the 11th and 30th Minesweeper Divs, and Minesweeper No. 20. See p. 126.
2. Since considerably powerful [enemy] naval surface vessels including cruisers were spotted by an air reconnaissance over the Surabaya area, the Dutch East Indies Unit commander called off the main unit’s sailing to Staring Bay and changed [its destination] so as to advance to Balikpapan to be ready for the Bali operation.\(^\text{62}\)

3. Malaya Unit Commander Vice Admiral Ozawa reported to the Southern Task Force that he would not mind if the forces [in his unit] that were supposed to participate in the western Java invasion operation would be transferred to the Dutch East Indies Unit from 21 February onwards (as previously told [p. 369]).

4. At midnight, the Sixteenth Army communicated that it would request arrangements to be made with the 48th Div concerning the participation of the Sakaguchi Det and the escort to be provided (as previously told [p. 370]).

5. At 1840 on that day, the Dutch East Indies Unit commander incorporated the aircraft unit of the Sanuki-maru, Patrol Boat No. 36 and two fishing boats (at Makassar) into the 2d Air Unit.

17 February
1. At 0615, the Dutch East Indies Unit commander left Jolo for Balikpapan, leading the main unit (the Ashigara, the Kawakaze and the Yamakaze).
2. Fourth Destroyer Sqdn Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura held talks in Jolo concerning the outline of the escort of the Sakaguchi Det.
3. The Malaya Unit commander issued an order to the 7th Cruiser Div and the 19th Destroyer Div to support the 5th Destroyer Sqdn at the time of the western Java invasion [operation] (as previously told [p. 369]).
4. Southern Task Force Commander Vice Admiral Kondō issued preliminarily orders to the forces of the Malaya Unit that were to be transferred to the Dutch East Indies Unit and the Air Unit as of 21 February [for the Java operation], while issuing an order to the Malaya Unit to support the western Java invasion operation (as previously told [pp. 298, 369-370]).

18 February
1. At 1000, the unit for the western Java invasion [operation] left Cam Ranh Bay.
2. The unit to capture Bali left Makassar before dawn (as previously told [p. 311]).
3. The main body of the Southern Task Force and the remaining force of the Carrier Task Force (the Atago, the 3d Battleship Div and the 4th Destroyer Sqdn\(^*\)) left Palau for Staring Bay.
4. At 1400, the main unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit advanced to Balikpapan.

19 February
1. In the early morning, the unit for the first [phase of the] Bali raiding operation successfully made a surprise landing on Bali (as previously told [p. 312]).
2. The Carrier Task Force carried out a surprise attack on Port Darwin, and the land-based attack planes of the Air Unit also attacked the place in concert with the former; they reported having sunk twenty or more enemy ships in the port, shot down or destroyed twenty or more enemy aircraft while having inflicted serious damage to the airfield, port facilities and others (as previously told [p. 341]).
3. The unit for the western Java invasion [operation] was sailing southward on the waters east of Puolo Condore.
4. At 0800, the unit for the eastern Java invasion [operation] left Jolo.
5. In the evening, the Chitose left Jolo.
6. The 22d Air Flotilla was transferred to the 3d Air Raid Unit (as previously told).

20 February
1. In the early morning, the 2d Escort Unit disembarked the Army Itō Detachment at Kupang and Dili (as previously told [pp. 351, 355-356]).
2. The 3d Yokosuka Special Landing Force parachuted down near Kupang (as previously told [p. 351]).

\(^*\) Actually: Division
3. Before dawn, the 8th Destroyer Division in the course of the Bali operation had engagements with a powerful enemy surface unit and reported military gains of having sunk three destroyers and seriously damaging one cruiser (as previously told*); [also] before dawn, the Dutch East Indies Unit commander left Balikpapan for Bali, leading the Ashigara, the Kawakaze (dispatched from the 4th Destroyer Squadron for the direct escort of the main unit) and the Yamakaze, to support the 7th Destroyer Division** (as previously told).

4. In the evening, the unit for the western Java invasion [operation] reached the waters between Fuolo Condore and the Anambas Islands and sent the destroyers and the lesser escort naval vessels ahead to the Anambas Islands one after another for replenishment.

5. The unit for the eastern Java invasion [operation] was sailing southward in the Celebes Sea and approached the north entrance of the Makassar Strat in the evening. [Meanwhile] at 0800, the Chitose reached Dondon Bay*** in the northwestern part of Celebes, to [start] her mission to guard the invasion unit against [enemy] submarines.

6. Due to the appearance of an enemy task force on the waters northeast of Rabaul, the Combined Fleet ordered the 1st Air Group to advance to the area of the [equatorial] Pacific Islands by means of Telegraphic Order No. 76.

7. The Army 38th Division marched overland southward from Palembang and captured Tanjiangkarang on the shore of the Sunda Strait opposite from Java.

8. The fighter plane unit of the Air Unit advanced to Bali (as previously told [p.321]).

21 February

1. At 0800, the forces transferred from the Malaya Unit joined the unit for the western Java invasion [operation] about 100 nautical miles north of the Anambas Islands.

2. The Southern Task Force commander officially announced the date of Java invasion (day Z) as 26 February (as previously told.****).

3. In the morning, the main body of the Southern Task Force and the Carrier Task force, both having departed from Palau, the latter of which had finished the air strike on Port Darwin, arrived in Staring Bay (as previously told [p. 341]).

4. Because the sea engagement off Bali was over and no [immediate] counterattacks by the enemy fleet were expected anymore, the main unit of the Dutch East Indies Unit, which had been heading for the Bali area to support the 8th Destroyer Division, changed course en route and headed for Staring Bay (as previously told [p. 322]).

5. The Dutch East Indies Unit commander issued the following change of the disposition of his forces:

   (1) He ordered the Mizuho and Patrol Boat No. 39, engaged in the Kupang operation, to return to their original unit (which had taken up positions for the eastern Java invasion operation, as previously told [p. 365]).

   (2) He incorporated the 8th Destroyer Division into the main unit and had it stay on standby in Makassar (as previously told*****).

6. In the early morning, the unit for the eastern Java invasion [operation] reached the north entrance of the Makassar Strait. In the evening, it reached a point about 80 nautical miles off Samarinda and heading for a point off Balikpapan, it sailed along the western side of the strait.

* Probably p. 320 is meant, but there different figures are cited.
** Probably the 8th Destroyer Division is meant. See also below: item 4 under 21 February
*** Dondo Bay?
**** Probably p. 366, but there the announcement is made by the Dutch East Indies Unit commander. See also Vol. 3, pp. 440-41.
***** Probably p. 319, but there the date is mistakenly given as 22 February. See also Vol. 3, pp. 440-41.
2. The Army–Navy Arrangement and the Plan of Operations of Each Unit

The Army–Navy Arrangement for the Java Invasion Operation ([at] Manila)

On 23 and 24 January, after having come to terms at the Manila Conference, the units to be involved in the Java invasion operation made the following Army-Navy arrangements (the outline of which has already been given [pp. 361-362]). The arrangement had the following contents\(^{(148)}\) and came into effect along with the Manila Agreement of 28 January.\(^*\)

Memorandum of the Arrangements for Operation H between the Sixteenth Army, the Third Air Force, the Third Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet [See also Vol. 3, pp. 226-233]

I. Distribution of the landing forces, landing points, names for landing sectors and their reconnaissance

1. Landing points and names for landing sectors
   - (1) Units in the first transport
     (1) Area No. 1 ([assigned to] the 2d Division and the main force of the units under the direct control of the army)
        Sector A Landing Unit ([consisting of] 2 infantry battalions and a reconnaissance regiment as its core): on the south side of Merak
        Sector B Landing Unit ([consisting of] 2 infantry battalions as its core): on the north side of Merak
        Sector C Landing Unit ([consisting of] the main force of the [2d] Division and the main force of the units under the direct control of the army): along Bantam Bay
     (2) Area No. 2 ([assigned to] the Shōji Detachment, [consisting of] 2 infantry battalions as its core): [on the coast near] Patrol
     (3) Area No. 3 ([assigned to] the 48th Division as its core)
        Sector D: Right Wing Unit ([consisting of] 3 infantry battalions as its core): on the north side of Kragan
        Sector E: Left Wing Unit ([consisting of] the main force of the division): on the south side of Kragan
   - (2) Units in the second transport
     Area No. 1: Batavia (or Bantam) about 100,000 tons
     Area No. 3 Surabaya (or Kragan) about 50,000 tons
   - (3) Units in the third transport
     Area No. 1: Batavia (or Bantam) about 100,000 tons

2. Reconnaissance of the landing points
   - (1) Reconnaissance by aircraft
     Army: Thirty copies of the photomaps roughly on a scale of 1 to 25,000 of the landing coasts of Areas No. 1 and No. 2 shall be delivered to the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters in Saigon by around 10 February (three copies of which shall be delivered to the 12th Seaplane Tender Division (the \textit{Kamikawa-maru}) in Cam Ranh).
     Navy: Thirty copies of the photomaps roughly on a scale of 1 to 25,000 of the landing coast of Area No. 3 shall be delivered to the 48th Division in Jolo (the Pata anchorage) by around 10 February.

\(^*\) The document referred to in note 148 could not be located. We have generally followed here the version given in Vol. 3.
(2) Other prior reconnaissance, if necessary, shall be conducted by arrangement between
the commanders of the landing corps, escort units and air units.

II. Assembly points, arrival and departure dates of the transport ships (as shown in the follow-
ing table)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transport</th>
<th>Areas</th>
<th>Assembly Points</th>
<th>Dates of Arrival</th>
<th>Dates of Departure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First</td>
<td>Areas No. 1 and No. 2</td>
<td>Gaoxiong then Cam Ranh</td>
<td>Leave Gaoxiong during the period between the beginning till the 6th of February one after another and assemble in Cam Ranh</td>
<td>Day H – 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area No. 3</td>
<td>Lingayen then the Jolo/Pata anchorage</td>
<td>Complete embarkation by 7 February, leave on 8 February and assemble at the Pata anchorage on 12 February</td>
<td>Day I – 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>Area No. 1</td>
<td>Advance from the mainland [Japan] to Cam Ranh first, and then go ashore in Batavia (or Bantam)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area No. 3</td>
<td>Advance from Lingayen to Jolo or Davao and then go ashore in Surabaya (or Kra-gan)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Remarks   | The Sixteenth Army commander shall determine the second and later transports after due cons-
|           | ultation with the commanders of the 4th and the 5th Destroyer Sqdns. |                                                        |                    |

III. Starting date and time of the landings and the schedule
1. Starting date and time of the landings and the schedule
   The first day of the landings are set as follows:
   Eastern Java: on Day I
   Western Java: on Day H
   Although Days H and I are scheduled for “XX” (note by the author: pending), the Sixteenth Army commander shall fix [them] after due consultation with the commander in chief of the Third Fleet by 1200 on Day H – 9. However, if further changes to these [dates] become necessary after the departure [of the units], [new dates] shall be decided upon through cons-
   ultations each time.
2. Start of the landings
   Entry into the anchorage shall be made around 0000 for both Day H and Day I. Although the start of the landings is set at 0200 for both Day H and Day I, [the landings] in each area shall be started as soon as [the units] in the area are ready.
3. Landing schedule
   (1) Units in the first transport
       Area No. 1: [shall be completed] roughly in seven days.
       Area No. 2: [shall be completed] roughly in five days. Depending on the circumstances, on Day H + 2 and onwards, units yet to be disembarked may be [again] transported and put ashore at Area No. 1. The decision of whether to implement [this] shall be made by the Sixteenth Army commander after due consultation with the 4th Destroyer Squadron* commander.
       Area No. 3: [shall be completed] roughly in five days.
   (2) Units in the second transport
       Area No. 1: [shall be completed] roughly in five days.
       Area No. 3: [shall be completed] roughly in five days.

* Actually: 5th Destroyer Squadron.
IV. Distribution of the convoy of transport ships, the commander’s whereabouts, and the escort forces:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transport</th>
<th>Areas and Groups</th>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Number of Ships</th>
<th>Commander’s Whereabouts</th>
<th>Escort Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area No. 1</td>
<td>1st Group</td>
<td>Sector A landing unit</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Inf Gp Cdr: Kōyō-maru</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2d Group</td>
<td>Sector B landing unit</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Rgt Cdr: Reiyō-maru</td>
<td>Natori</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3d Group</td>
<td>Sector C landing Unit (main force of the [2d] Div and main force of the units under the direct control [of the 16th Army])</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>2 munition ships, 1 No. 333, 1 water supply ship, 1 coaling ship, 1 repair ship</td>
<td>5th Destroyer Sqdn and 6 destroyers, 1 light cruiser, and 5 minesweepers of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet as the core</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area No. 2</td>
<td>4th Group</td>
<td>Shōji Det</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Rgt Cdr: Suwa-maru</td>
<td>Yura or Sendai (depending on the situation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5th Group</td>
<td>Right Wing Unit</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Rgt Cdr: Aden-maru</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area No. 3</td>
<td>6th Group</td>
<td>Left Wing Unit (main force of the [48th] Div)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2 munition ships, 1 water supply ship, 1 coaling ship, 1 hospital ship, 1 repair ship</td>
<td>Naka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Div Cdr: Teiyō-maru</td>
<td>Inf Gp Cdr: Tonegawa-maru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second</td>
<td>Area No. 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Area No. 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To be determined depending on the situation at the time
V. Route of the convoys  
As shown in Supplement No. 1 (omitted by the author)

VI. Reconnaissance and diversions  
The Navy air units shall conduct feint bombings of enemy naval bases and others in the Probolinggo area (note by the author: southeast of Surabaya).

VII. Anchorage and the formation at the anchorage  
Anchorages and the transport ships’ formation at the anchorage shall be determined by the commander of the landing corps after due consultation with the commander in charge of the escort.

VIII. Outline of landing attack  
Although [the landing shall be made as] a surprise landing in principle, it shall be carried out by assault if the situation should require it.

IX. Use of air units  
1. Forces to be employed  
   (1) The Eleventh Air Fleet  
      About 80 Type–1 land-based attack planes, about 35 Type–96 land-based attack planes, about 70 Type–0 fighter planes, and about 5 land-based reconnaissance planes  
   (2) The Third Fleet  
      About 50 reconnaissance seaplanes  
   (3) The [Army] Third Air Force  
      About 15 command reconnaissance planes, about 4 army reconnaissance planes, about 40 Type–1 fighter planes, about 50 Type–97 fighter planes, about 20 assault planes, about 20 twin-engine light bombers, and about 30 heavy bombers  
      The above forces may slightly be increased or decreased depending on the situation.

2. Bases to be used  
   (1) [Bases] in Sumatra, Borneo and others  
      [1] The Palembang [airfield] shall be made ready and used by the Army. The Navy may use this [base] by advancing some land-based attack planes, or as a staging base for about thirty-six land-based attack planes when attacks on enemy surface forces in the Indian Ocean are necessary.  
      [2] The Mentok [airfield] shall be made ready for use mainly by the Army, but with the cooperation of the Navy. The Army and the Navy shall share the airfield with about thirty fighter planes each. However, when the Army starts using the Tanjungkarang airfield, the Navy shall exclusively use the Mentok airfield.  
      [3] The Ledo [airfield] shall be used by the Navy. However, the Army may advance several command reconnaissance planes there.  
      [4] As for the airfields other than the above, those in Sumatra shall be used by the Army, and those in Borneo by the Navy.

   (2) [Bases] in Java  
      [1] [The airfields in] Batavia and Cililitan (note by the author: east of Batavia*) shall be made ready for use by the Army and shared by the Army and the Navy in the following way:  
         The Navy: about 36 land-based attack planes and about 27 fighter planes  
         The Army: about 20 twin-engine light bombers and about 15 command reconnaissance planes  
      [2] The Buitenzorg [Bogor] and Kalijati [airfields] shall be made ready and used by the Army. However, if the Batavia or Cililitan airfields cannot be used or if it takes more time than expected to make them ready, the Navy shall advance about 27 fighter planes to the Kalijati [airfield].

   * Actually: South of Batavia; the civil airfield, Kemayoran, was east of the city
3. Outline of operations

(1) We shall promptly destroy the enemy air power in Java. The areas assigned to the Army or the Navy in particular are as follows:

[1] The areas assigned to the Army and the Navy after the advance of the Army air units to Palembang are roughly decided as follows:

- The Navy: [the area] east of 108°E
- The Army: [the area] west of 108°E

[2] In general, the Navy shall mainly take charge of destroying the remnants of the enemy air power after the Army has gone ashore.

(2) The attack on enemy naval vessels shall be mainly assigned to the Navy.

(3) Cover of the convoy under sail and at anchorage

[1] The main force of the Sixteenth Army

(a) The Navy shall be charged with the cover before and on Day H – 2.

Note: The cover in the area north of 5°N shall be provided by the First Southern Expeditionary Fleet.

(b) The cover of the transport convoy up to the point of separation of the Shōji Detachment from the main force of the army ([indicated as] point “J” in Supplement No. 1) on Day H – 1 shall be charged to the Navy. After that, the Navy shall take charge of the cover of the Shōji Detachment, and the Army of the cover of the rest of the main force of the [Sixteenth] Army. However, guarding against enemy submarines shall be wholly assigned to the Navy.

[2] The 48th Division

Along with guarding against enemy submarines, the Third Fleet shall take charge of guarding in the air [against enemy aircraft over the anchorage] as well, from the time when the transport convoy enters the anchorage until the advance of the fighter plane unit of the Eleventh Air Fleet there. After that, the Eleventh Air Fleet shall take over [the task of] guarding.

[3] The antiaircraft guarding in the air over the anchorage

The guarding in the air against enemy aircraft shall be provided by the Army all the time until sunset on Day H + 2 over the anchorage for the units landing in Bantam, and on Day H + 1 over that for the units landing in Merak. After that, it shall provide cover in the air [against enemy aircraft] as needed depending on the situation.

(4) Support of the ground operations

[1] The area of the main force of the Sixteenth Army

(a) The Army shall be in charge of the direct support of the ground operations.

(b) The Navy shall be in charge of cutting off the transport routes of the enemy in the Cilacap area. It shall [also] be in charge of attacking enemy reinforcements or forces in retreat when requested by the Army.

[2] The area of the 48th Division

The Third Fleet shall be in charge of direct support of the ground operations and the Eleventh Air Fleet shall appropriately provide support at the request of the Army. The Army shall join in [the direct support] if possible.

4. Information

(1) Military gains of the campaign to destroy the enemy air power, the results of reconnaissance of enemy airfields, weather information and others shall promptly be shared between the Army and the Navy air units.

(2) Other information concerning enemy movements and others shall be exchanged every time [it is obtained].

5. Allotment [of facilities] and rules about the use of the shared airfields
The allotment [of facilities] and rules about the use of the airfields shared by the Army and the Navy shall be arranged between senior commanding officers of the Army and the Navy [units] which [actually] use the airfield.

6. Identification of friends
Conforms to the agreement between the Southern Army and the Combined Fleet.

X. Defense facilities of landing bases
1. The landing bases shall be set up as follows:
   For Areas No. 1 and No. 2: Batavia (Bantam shall be used at the beginning.)
   For Area No. 3: Surabaya (Kragan shall be used at the beginning).
2. The Navy shall take charge of the sea defense, the Army of the defense on land, and both shall jointly take charge of the air defense.

XI. Move of the transport ships after the completion of disembarkation
   After completing disembarkation, [the transport ships] shall separately return under the direct or indirect cover of the escort unit in the area to the required areas.

XII. Signal Communications
   As specified in the signal communication arrangement in the separate volume (omitted by the author)

XIII. Others
1. The 48th Division shall have an element seize the Bali airfield in conjunction with the Navy no later than Day I – 2 to make it ready for use, with the aim of advancing a naval air base.
2. The Navy, in concert with the ground operations, shall neutralize [the enemy on] the waters south of Java, and block the enemy’s retreat.
3. Details other than the above shall be discussed and decided between the commanders of the landing corps, escort forces and air units concerned.

As mentioned before, along with the Manila Agreement, which had officially become effective on 28 January, this draft of the arrangements for Operation H (of 23 January) [officially] came into effect on 30 January. Although the dates of Day H and Day I had been respectively set for Day X + 75 (21 February) and Day X + 77 (23 February), later on 10 February, due to the delay in the southern Sumatra operation, the dates of Day H and Day I were revised to 26 February [for both].

The Plan of Operations of the Dutch East Indies Unit

As previously told, on 28 January, Dutch East Indies Unit Commander Vice Admiral Takahashi announced the plan of operations of the Dutch East Indies Unit from the Makassar operation until the Java invasion operation ([by means of] Operation Order No. 9), the outline of which was as follows: \(^{(54, 55, 56)}\)

I. Mission
   After the capture of Ambon, the Dutch East Indies Unit shall capture Makassar, Bali and Kupang with the Eastern Support Unit, the 2d Escort Unit, the 1st Base Unit and the 2d Air Unit. At the same time, it shall escort and put ashore the Sixteenth Army on western Java with the 3d Escort Unit and the 1st Air Unit, and on eastern Java with the 1st Escort Unit, the 2d Base Unit and the 2d Air Unit. The date of landing in western Java is scheduled for 21 February (Day H) and that in eastern Java for 23 February (Day I).

II. Disposition of forces
   The disposition of forces shall be planned as in the following table and set in motion by special orders after occupying Ambon.
# Chapter VI / The Drafting of the Java Invasion Operation Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Main Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Main Unit**      |                          | 16th Cruiser Div (minus the *Nagara*) and 24th Destroyer Div 2d Section | 1. To support the entire operation  
2. To support the operation in the Makassar Strait and the operation to capture Surabaya     |
| **1st Escort Unit**| Cdr in Chief, 3d Fleet   | 4th Destroyer Sqdn (minus 4th Destroyer Div, 24th Destroyer Div 2d Section, and the *Yamagumo*)  
5 minesweepers of the 2d Base Force, 21st Subchaser Div, the *Wakataka*, one half of the 2d Defense Unit | 1. To escort the 48th Div and capture the Surabaya area  
2. To destroy enemy surface forces on the waters to the east and the south of Borneo  
3. To cover the second transport of the 48th Div |
| **2d Escort Unit** | 4th Destroyer Sqdn Cdr   | 2d Base Force (minus 5 minesweepers, 21st Subchaser Div, the *Wakataka*, 2d Gunboat Div 2d Section, one half of the 2d Defense Unit), the *Itsukushima*, Patrol Boats Nos. 36 and 37, 2d Kure SLF, 11 fishing boats and 1 small cargo ship | 1. To escort the 48th Div and set up the landing base  
2. To secure the shipping lanes in the Celebes Sea and the Makassar Strait  
3. To ready the airfields in Tarakan and Balikpapan  
4. To cooperate with the Sakaguchi Det in its capture of Banjarmasin  
5. To cooperate in guarding against [enemy] submarines at Jolo and Davao  
6. To set up defenses at Surabaya (by special orders) |
| **2d Air Unit**    | Cdr in Chief, 3d Fleet   | 11th Seaplane Tender Div, Patrol Boats Nos. 34, 38, and 39, 1 plt of the Sasebo Combined SLF, 6 fishing boats and 1 small cargo ship | 1. To support the 1st Escort Unit and the 2d Base Unit  
2. To guard the transport convoys against [enemy] aircraft and submarines and to support the landing combat of the 48th Div |
| **3rd Escort Unit**| 5th Destroyer Sqdn Cdr   | 5th Destroyer Sqdn, the *Yura*, 2 destroyer divs of the 3d Destroyer Sqdn, 5 minesweepers of the 9th Base Force, one element of the 1st Base Force | 1. To escort the main force of the 16th Army and to capture the Batavia area  
2. To set up the landing base  
3. To escort the second and the third transport of the main force of the Army  
4. To destroy enemy surface forces on the waters southwest of Borneo |
| **1st Air Unit**   | Capt of the *Kamikawa-maru* | The *Kamikawa-maru*, the *San'yō-maru*, Patrol Boat No. 35, 2 submarine chasers of the 9th Base Force, the *Chōsa-maru*, 1 plt of the 2d Kure SLF | 1. To support the 3d Escort Unit  
2. To guard transport convoys against [enemy] aircraft and submarines |
| **Eastern Support Unit** | 5th Cruiser Div Cdr | 5th Cruiser Div (minus the *Myōkō*), 7th Destroyer Div, 6th Destroyer Div 2d Section | 1. To support the 2d Escort Unit and the 1st Base Unit  
2. To destroy enemy surface forces in the Molucca, the Banda and the Flores Seas |
### III. The main points of the execution of the Java operation and the outline of operations of each unit

1. **Western Java**

1. After making arrangements with the Sixteenth Army commander at Gaoxiong, the 3d Escort Unit commander shall advance to Cam Ranh Bay roughly by around 4 February to make the necessary preparations for the operation.

2. The convoy of the Sixteenth Army shall advance from Gaoxiong to Cam Ranh Bay by around 10 February under the direct escort of the 5th Destroyer Squadron.

3. The 3d Escort Unit (other than the forces to be transferred from the Malaya Unit) shall leave Cam Ranh Bay around 13 February, escorting the convoy of the main force of the Sixteenth Army. It shall take command of the forces transferred from the Malaya Unit en route around 17 February and, with the support and under the cover of the Air Unit of the Malaya Unit and the Army air units, it shall put ashore the army units at Bantam Bay, Merak and Patrol before dawn on 21 February. While taking charge of cover and support of the landing operations, it shall [also] take charge of clearing the areas surrounding the anchorage of enemy submarines and destroying enemy surface forces there. It shall also set up a landing base along Bantam Bay with one element.

| 2d Escort Unit | 2d Destroyer Sqdn (minus 18th Destroyer Div), 9th Construction Squad, 2 pts of the Sasebo Combined SLF, one element of the 3d Military Supplies Dept, 3 minesweepers of the 1st Base Force (at the time of [the operation to] capture Kupang) | 1. To escort the Army Itō Det and capture Kupang 2. To rapidly prepare and secure the airfield there 3. To destroy enemy surface forces in the Molucca, the Banda and the Flores Seas 4. To guard the sea near Menado and Ambon after the capture of Kupang |
| 1st Base Unit | 1st Base Force (minus one element), the Nagara, 21st Destroyer Div (minus the Hatsuharu), 1st Patrol Boat Div (minus 6 patrol boats), 5th and 6th Construction Squads, bulk of the Sasebo Combined SLF (until [the operation to] capture Makassar), one element of the 3d Military Supplies Dept, 5 fishing boats, 8th Destroyer Div (until [the operation to capture] Bali), 15th Destroyer Div (until [the operation to capture] Makassar) | 1. To seize Makassar and rapidly prepare the airfield there, while destroying enemy surface forces on the waters in the area 2. To escort the army units, carry out a sudden attack on Bali and rapidly prepare the airfield there 3. To set up defenses at Batavia (by special orders) |
| Celebes Guard Unit | Bulk of the Sasebo Combined SLF (after the capture of Makassar), 2d Gunboat Div 2d Section | To guard Menado, Kendari and Makassar |
| Ambon Guard Unit | 24th Special Base Force (from 5 February onwards) 1st Kure SLF (except for the units kept in Legaspi and Jolo) | To guard Ambon |
(4) The San’yō-maru and Patrol Boat No. 35 shall, by separate orders, arrive in Cam Ranh Bay by around 11 February, leave the bay around 13 February and join the Kamikawa-maru around 16 February, while taking charge of the guarding of the transport convoy against [enemy] aircraft and submarines. After that, the 1st Air Unit shall continue the guarding of the transport convoy against [enemy] aircraft and submarines and support the 3d Escort Unit.

(5) By special orders, the 1st Base Force shall set up defenses at the port of Batavia.

2. Eastern Java

(1) After making arrangements with the 48th Division commander at Gaoxiong,* the 1st Escort Unit commander shall escort the convoy of the division, which is at Lingayen, with the 4th Destroyer Squadron and advance to Jolo by around 12 or 13 February.

(2) The 2d Base Unit commander shall have the forces, which are to be incorporated into the 1st Escort Unit, advance to Jolo by 12 February, cooperate in sweeping the anchorage [of mines] and clearing enemy submarines in the neighboring areas, and join the 1st Escort Unit after the 4th Destroyer Squadron arrives in Jolo.

(3) The 1st Escort Unit shall leave Jolo around 16 February, escorting the convoy of the 48th Division, and with the support and under the cover of the 2d Air Unit and the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force, it shall put ashore the army units at Kragan before dawn on 23 February. While in charge of the cover and support of the landing operation, it shall also take charge of clearing the areas surrounding the anchorage of enemy submarines as well as destroying enemy surface forces there.

(4) The 2d Air Unit shall sail to Jolo after the Makassar operation, after which it shall cooperate with the 1st Escort Unit by guarding the transport convoy against [enemy] aircraft and submarines while roughly sailing along the 1st Escort Unit, and support the landing combat and ground combat of the army units.

(5) The 2d Base Unit shall deploy its forces at key places along the Makassar Strait and take charge of clearing enemy submarines from the sailing routes of the 1st Escort Unit. It shall also by and large follow in the wake of the unit to the Kragan anchorage and set up a landing base there. [Then] when required, it shall take back its forces that have been temporarily incorporated in the 1st Escort Unit, after which it shall clear the waterway leading to the Surabaya port, clear the area within the port and set up defenses there.

Due to changes in the circumstances, the disposition of forces in Operation Order No. 9 was later changed to some extent in the following way:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Ashigara, the Kawakaze and 8th Destroyer Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Support Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td>5th Cruiser Div (theachi and the Haguro), the Ikazuchi and the Akebono</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Escort Unit</td>
<td>Cdr in Cdr of the 3d Fleet</td>
<td>2d Destroyer Sqdn Cdr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Cruiser Div Cdr</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Jintsū, 15th and 16th Destroyer Divs, 7th Destroyer Div</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Section, 1st Patrol Boat Div and 21st Minesweeper Div</td>
<td></td>
<td>1st Section, 1st Patrol Boat Div and 21st Minesweeper Div</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Actually at Manila, see p. 391
### Chapter VI / The Drafting of the Java Invasion Operation Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Eastern Attack Unit</th>
<th>1st Base Unit</th>
<th>5th Cruiser Div Cdr, 1st Base Force Cdr</th>
<th>The Nagara, 21st Destroyer Div (minus the Hatsuharu), the Tsukushi, 1st, 2d, 5th [52d?], and 12th Subchaser Divs, the Kimishima-maru, the Ikushima-maru, the Aotaka, the Hakusan-maru, one half of the 1st Defense Unit, 1st Signal Unit and the Sanuki-maru [According to the order of the 3d Fleet, the latter was under the command of the 2d Base Force until 6 February, and the 1st Base Force after 7 February. See p. 365].</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3d Escort Unit</td>
<td>5th Destroyer Sqdn Cdr, Capt of the Kamikawa-maru</td>
<td>5th Destroyer Sqdn (the Natori, 5th and 22d Destroyer Divs), the Yura, 11th and 12th Destroyer Divs, 1st Minesweeper Div, 6th Destroyer Div 1st Section, the Shirataka, the Myōkō-maru and 21st Torpedo Boat Div 1st Section</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Air Unit</td>
<td>Cdr in Chief of the 3d Fleet</td>
<td>The Kamikawa-maru, the San’yō-maru, Patrol Boat No. 35, 91st Subchaser Div and 2 fishing boats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Escort Unit</td>
<td>4th Destroyer Sqdn Cdr, Cdr in Chief of the 3d Fleet</td>
<td>The Naka, 2d Destroyer Div, 9th Destroyer Div (minus the Yama-gumo), 24th Destroyer Div (minus three destroyers), 11th and 21st [30th?] Minesweeper Divs, Patrol Boat [ Minesweeper?] No. 20, 21st Subchaser Div, the Wakataka and one half of the 2d Defense Unit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Base Unit</td>
<td>2d Base Force Cdr</td>
<td>The Itsukushima, 21st Torpedo Boat Div 2d Section, 2d Gunboat Div 1st Section, 31st Subchaser Div, one half of the 2d Defense Unit, 2d Signal Unit, the Sanuki-maru (minus the aircraft unit), Patrol Boat No. 37, 8 auxiliary naval vessels, 9 fishing boats and the 2d Kure SLF</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Air Unit</td>
<td>11th Seaplane Tender Div Cdr</td>
<td>11th Seaplane Tender Div (the Chitose and the Mizuho), Patrol Boats Nos. 34, 38, 39 and 36, the aircraft unit of the Sanuki-maru, and 2 fishing boats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remark: The terms Eastern Attack Unit, and Eastern and Western Java Invasion Units have been employed by the author for convenience’ sake.

### The Units Involved in the Western Java Invasion [Operation]

The Army-Navy Arrangements Between the Sixteenth Army and the 5th Destroyer Squadron

The outline of the arrangement made at Gaoliong on 27 January was as follows.\(^{(63)}\)
1. The signatories
   The Sixteenth Army commander, the 2d Division commander, the Shōji Detachment commander and the 5th Destroyer Division commander

2. The assembly points and the program at the assembly points
   (a) The transport ships shall successively arrive at Gaoxiong by 5 February, and then assemble at Cam Ranh Bay by 10 February.
   (b) The program at Cam Ranh Bay
       11 February: Meetings between the landing units of each sector and the escort units of each area, meetings between the captains of the ships and meetings concerning communications
       12 February: Training by the army as such

3. The distribution of the transport ships (omitted)

4. The landing points and the distribution of forces (as in the following table)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the Areas</th>
<th>Landing Points</th>
<th>Core Forces (Commander)</th>
<th>Transport Ships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area No. 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector A</td>
<td>South of Merak</td>
<td>2 Inf bns and a reconnaissance unit (Major General Nasu)</td>
<td>1st Group; 8 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector B</td>
<td>North of Merak</td>
<td>2 Inf bns (Colonel Fukushima)</td>
<td>2d Group; 7 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector C</td>
<td>Western part of Bantam Bay</td>
<td>The main force of the [2d] Div and the main force of the units under the direct control of the [16th] Army (Colonel Satō)</td>
<td>3d Group; 32 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area No. 2</td>
<td>Coast of Patrol</td>
<td>2 Inf bns (Colonel Shōji)</td>
<td>4th Group; 7 ships</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. The times and dates of the landings and the schedules (omitted)

6. The outline of the escort
   (1) Scheduled sailing route: As shown in Separate Illustration No. 77 (omitted by the author)
   (2) The sailing speed: 8 knots at normal speed
   (3) Direct escort shall be provided.
       The forces: the Natori, the Yura, sixteen destroyers, five minesweepers, and another vessel, of which the Yura, six destroyers and five minesweepers shall join en route.
   (4) The protective sailing formation (omitted)

7. The entry into the anchorages, the landing combat and the cover (omitted)

8. The movements of the transport ships after the landing and the later-arriving transport ships (omitted)

9. Others (omitted)

The Plan of Operations of the 3d Escort Unit

In accordance with Dutch East Indies Unit Operation Order No. 9, the aforementioned Army-Navy arrangement and the subsequent orders and instructions, 3d Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Hara announced on 1 February en route from Gaoxiong to Cam Ranh Bay his plan of operations for the capture of western Java by means of 3d Escort Unit Order No. 2, which was in outline as follows:
1. The distribution of forces
   (1) The 1st distribution of forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Main Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Natori, 11th Destroyer Div, 1st Minesweeper Div (minus 1 minesweeper), the Shirataka, the Myōkō-maru and one half of 1st Defense Unit</td>
<td>To support the entire escort as well as the operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Guide Unit</td>
<td>5th Destroyer Div Cdr</td>
<td>5th Destroyer Div</td>
<td>To guide and escort the 3d Group (Sections 1 to 4 until the the point where the 2d Guide Unit separates [from the main convoy])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Guide Unit</td>
<td>22d Destroyer Div Cdr</td>
<td>22d Destroyer Div,* 12th Destroyer Div and 21st Torpedo Boat Div 1st Section</td>
<td>To guide and escort the 1st and 2d Groups (and also Sections 5 and 6 of the 3d Group until the separation point)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Guide Unit</td>
<td>Capt of the Yura</td>
<td>The Yura, 6th Destroyer Div 1st Section, 22d Destroyer Div 2d Section, and 1 Minesweeper of the 1st Minesweeper Div</td>
<td>To guide and escort the 4th Group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Remarks:
1. The Yura, the 11th and the 12th Destroyer Divs and the 1st Minesweeper Div shall be transferred to the 3d Escort Unit around 16 February.
2. Until being joined by the Yura, the 6th Destroyer Division commander shall take command of the 3d Guide Unit.

(2) The 2d distribution of forces (from the entry into the anchorages onwards)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Main Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Natori</td>
<td>To support and direct the entire operation, and provide guard to the whole [convoy]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Guard Unit</td>
<td>22d Destroyer Div Cdr</td>
<td>22d Destroyer Div 1st Section, 12th Destroyer Div, 21st Torpedo Boat Div 1st Section</td>
<td>To guard Sectors A and B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Guard Unit</td>
<td>5th Destroyer Div Cdr</td>
<td>5th Destroyer Div</td>
<td>To guard Sector C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* According to the original archival document: minus the 2d Section. See also the item directly below it.
Concerning the outline of operations of the five fishing boats deployed as rescue ships for the army transport ships, 3d Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Hara gave the outline by Order No. 3 below on 10 February.\\(^{63}\)

1. The names of the fishing boats
   - The Kōyō-maru No. 6 (73 tons), the Taiei-maru No. 2 (61 tons), the Nanshin-maru No. 48 (50 tons), the Rokkō-maru No. 12 (56 tons), and the Tenjin-maru (40 tons)
2. The Natori shall dispatch about ten armed communications personnel led by a sub-lieutenant or ensign.
3. The fishing boats shall sail ahead to the Anambas Islands, leaving Cam Ranh Bay on Day H – 10. Then, they shall leave the islands on the afternoon of Day H – 6 and, by way of Point D, join the 3d Escort Unit near Point I, after which they shall sail in the wake of the escort unit and enter into the anchorage of Area C.
4. After their arrival at the landing sector, the fishing boats shall be attached to the 1st Defense Unit until separately ordered otherwise, and stand by for rescue [operations] of the army transport ships.

In addition, the 3d Escort Unit commander issued orders on the outline of setting up of a land [base] at Batavia (by the means of Order No. 6 on 15 February), the supply plan at the landing points (by means of Order No. 6 on 15 February), and the outline of the second transport of the main force of the Sixteenth Army (by means of Order No. 6 on 15 February).\\(^{63}\)

After having been assigned to support the 3d Escort Unit by Malaya Unit Telegraphic Operation Order No. 39 on 17 February [p. 369], 7th Cruiser Division Commander Rear Admiral
Kurita announced the outline of the support for the 3d Escort Unit on 21 February as follows:  

The 7th Cruiser Division and the 19th Destroyer Division (minus the *Ayamami*) shall leave Anambas at 1800 on 22 February (Day H – 4), and reach an area close to the transport convoy at 1200 on 24 February, after which they shall appropriately operate on the western part of the Java Sea to support the 3d Escort Unit.

**The Plan of Operations of the 1st Air Unit**

On 12 February at Cam Ranh Bay, 1st Air Unit Commander R. Adm. Fujita Ruitarō* announced the operations of the 1st Air Unit in the Java invasion operation by means of Operation Order No. 1, which was in outline as follows:

1. The outline of tasks and operations of the naval vessels (as shown in the following table)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Ships</th>
<th>Main Tasks</th>
<th>Operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| *Kamikawa-maru*   | Support for and guard of base operations at the Anambas Islands and the Batavia area | 1. She shall stay at anchor while on guard near the Anambas Base.  
2. Subsequent operations shall be ordered later. |
| *San’yo-maru*     | Support for and guard of base operations at the Anambas Islands and the Batavia area | 1. She shall advance to the Anambas [area] by Day H – 7.  
2. Subsequent operations shall be ordered later. |
| Patrol Boat No. 35| Transport of base personnel and matériel               | 1. She shall advance to Mentok on the morning of Day H – 7.  
2. She shall sail to Lepar Island from Mentok on Day H – 6.  
3. She shall leave Lepar Island on Day H - 1, arrive in Bantam Bay on the morning of Day H, refuel from the *Tsurumi* on Day H, leave the bay on the morning of Day H + 1 and arrive at Patrol on the afternoon of Day H + 1.  
4. Subsequent operations shall be ordered later. |
| *Shōnan-maru* No. 7 and No. 12 | Guard of the base and the mother ships under sail | 1. They shall guard the Anambas base.  
2. Subsequent operations shall be ordered later. |
| Two fishing boats | Transport of base personnel and matériel and guard of the base | 1. They shall sail to Lepar Island from Mentok on Day H – 6.  
2. On Day H, after the takeoff of the aircraft unit, they shall dismantle the Lepar base, and sail to Bantam Bay.  
3. Subsequent operations shall be ordered later. |

* According to the tables on pp. 380, 383, the captain of the *Kamikawa-maru* (Capt. Shinoda Tarohachi) was the commander of the 1st Air Unit. According to pp. 163, 218, R. Adm. Fujita Ruitarō was the commander of the 2d Air Unit, which was to support the eastern Java operation.
2. The distribution [of forces] for the air campaign*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
<th>Departure (land) Arrival Points</th>
<th>Times of Takeoff (and Return)</th>
<th>Numbers and Types of Aircraft Employed</th>
<th>Launching Vessels</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Day H – 5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Direct escort of the transport convoy against enemy submarines</td>
<td>Anambas (Ditto)</td>
<td>0800 (1215)</td>
<td>1 Three-seater recon. seaplane</td>
<td>San’yō-maru</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1015 (1430)</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1230 (1545)</td>
<td>1 Observation seaplane</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1345 (1645)</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1445 (1745)</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1545 (1845)</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1645 (1950)</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day H – 4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Direct escort of the transport convoy against enemy submarines</td>
<td>Anambas (Ditto)</td>
<td>0800 (1200)</td>
<td>1 Observation seaplane</td>
<td>Kamikawa-maru</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1015 (1415)</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>San’yō-maru</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1130 (1530)</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Kamikawa-maru</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1245 (1745)</td>
<td>1 Three-seater recon. seaplane</td>
<td>San’yō-maru</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1445 (1845)</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Kamikawa-maru</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1545 (1950)</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>San’yō-maru</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day H – 2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Moving of the base</td>
<td>Anambas (Lepar Island)</td>
<td>0900</td>
<td>4 Observation seaplanes</td>
<td>Kamikawa-maru</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4 Observation seaplanes</td>
<td>San’yō-maru</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The following table is based on the “Action Report of the San’yō-maru.” See: JACAR (https://www.jacar.go.jp/) Ref: C08030661900 昭和16年11月7日～昭和17年5月23日 山陽丸戦闘詳報(4). There are, however, a number of differences. The major ones are: (1) The departure and arrival points on Day H – 2: Lepar Island (Ditto); (2) The tasks of the San’yō-maru on Day H – 1: Direct escort of the transport convoy (of) the detachment unit) against enemy submarines; and (3) On Day H, two observation seaplanes of the Kamikawa-maru and the San’yō-maru shall depart from Lepar Island and advance to Patrol.
### Day H – 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Vessel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0900 (1300)</td>
<td>Direct escort of the transport convoy against enemy submarines</td>
<td>Lepar Island (Ditto)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900 (1300)</td>
<td>Observation seaplane</td>
<td>Kamikawa-maru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 (1400)</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>San’yō-maru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100 (1500)</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Kamikawa-maru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1215 (1615)</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>San’yō-maru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1330 (1730)</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Kamikawa-maru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1445 (1845)</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>San’yō-maru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1545 (1950)</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Kamikawa-maru</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Day H – 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Vessel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0800 (1200)</td>
<td>Direct escort of the transport convoy against enemy submarines</td>
<td>Anambas (Lepar Island)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0900 (1300)</td>
<td>Observation seaplanes</td>
<td>Kamikawa-maru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000 (1400)</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>San’yō-maru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100 (1500)</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>Kamikawa-maru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1215 (1615)</td>
<td>2 Three-seater recon. seaplanes</td>
<td>Kamikawa-maru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1330 (1730)</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>San’yō-maru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1445 (1845)</td>
<td>2 Observation seaplanes</td>
<td>Kamikawa-maru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1645 (1950)</td>
<td>Ditto</td>
<td>San’yō-maru</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Day H – 1

#### Lepar Island (Ditto)
- **Direct escort of the transport convoy ([of] the main unit) against enemy submarines**
- **Day H – 1**
  - **0800 (1100)**  
    - 1 Observation seaplane  
      - Kamikawa-maru
  - **0900 (1200)**  
    - Ditto
  - **1000 (1300)**  
    - Ditto
  - **1100 (1400)**  
    - Ditto
  - **1215 (1515)**  
    - Ditto
  - **1330 (1730)**  
    - 1 Three-seater recon. seaplane  
      - Kamikawa-maru
  - **1545 (1950)**  
    - Ditto

#### Day H

- **Moving of the base**
  - **Lepar Island (Bantam Bay)**
  - **Immediately after the availability of base[s] becomes clear**
  - **3 Observation seaplanes**  
    - Kamikawa-maru
  - **2 Three-seater recon. seaplanes**
  - **3 Observation seaplanes**  
    - San’yō-maru
  - **2 Three-seater recon. seaplanes**
  - **2 observation seaplanes**  
    - Kamikawa-maru
  - **Ditto**  
    - San’yō-maru

The planes shall take off in the order of the observation seaplanes and the reconnaissance seaplanes. After the landing at the base, three observation seaplanes of the Kamikawa-maru shall continue the guard over the anchorage. After the landing on the base [at Patrol], two observation seaplanes of the San’yō-maru shall continue the guard of the anchorage. The others shall immediately refuel. The actions thereafter shall be ordered later.
3. The setup of bases (omitted by the author)  
4. Communications (omitted by the author)  
5. Communications with the fishing boats (omitted by the author)  

The Units Involved in the Eastern Java Invasion (Operation)  

The Arrangements Between the 4th Destroyer Squadron and the [Army] 48th Division  

Having reached Manila from Lingayen Gulf overland, 4th Destroyer Squadron Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura concluded on 4 February with the [Army] 48th Division commander the Army-Navy arrangements on the eastern Java invasion operation. The outline of the arrangements was as follows: \(^{(56)}\)  

1. The outline of the operation  
   [The units shall] leave Lingayen Gulf on 8 February, arrive in Jolo on 12 or 13 February, and after making necessary preparations there, leave Jolo on Day I - 7 (note: 16 February) and enter into the anchorage for the landing points at night on Day I - 1.  

2. The program at the assembly points:  
   - 7 February at Lingayen at 1330 Meetings between the captains of the ships and those concerning communications  
   - 14 February at Jolo at 0930 Meetings on details between the escort unit and the [transport] ships  
   - at Jolo at 1330 Meetings between the captains of the ships  

3. The main points concerning the sail from Lingayen Gulf to Jolo (omitted)  
4. The distribution of the transport ships (omitted by the author)  
5. The landing points and the distribution of forces to the landing points (as in the following table)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Core Forces (Commander)</th>
<th>Landing Point</th>
<th>Places to Advance to After Landing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imai Unit</td>
<td>2 Inf bns and 1 mountain artillery bn (Colonel Imai)</td>
<td>Kragan, Sector B</td>
<td>Sedan, Meduran*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitamura Unit</td>
<td>Reconnaissance Regt (Lieutenant Colonel Kitamura)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Bojonegoro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abe Unit</td>
<td>3 Inf bns, 2 tank sqdns, 2 mountain artillery bns (Major General Abe)</td>
<td>Kragan, Sector A</td>
<td>“Bonjōru” (“Burujaku”)** [Bancar (Bulujawa)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanaka Unit</td>
<td>2 Inf bns and 1 mountain artillery bn (Colonel Tanaka)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cepu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. The time and date of the landing and the landing schedule  
   (1) The date of the start of the landing, Day I, is set on Day \(X + 77\) (23 February). [The units shall] leave Jolo on Day I - 7, drop anchor at 0100 on Day I, and start landing at 0200 on that day. However, if there are mines at the anchorage and their clearing is expected to require time, [the units] may enter the anchorage when the clearing is completed.  

* The text says Mazuran. In Vol. 3, p. 238, it is Mazaran. The “Action Report of the 4th Destroyer Squadron” (第4水雷戦隊戦闘詳報42/2/8-3/10(5); JACAR Ref: C08030111000, pdf 31/51) says that it is a place about 3 km southeast of Cape Bendo. This would be Meduran. The supposition in Vol. 3, p. 238 that it might be a corruption of Semarang is wrong.  
** The reference cited above proves the identification of Bonjōru/Ponjōru and Bulūjaku with Bancar and Bulujowo or Bulujawa in Vol. 3 to be correct.
The landing schedule

[The landing shall be completed] roughly in five days, and in terms of the disembarkation of the military supplies, [the transport ships] shall change anchorage to an area to the east of Cape Bendo from Day 1 + 2 onwards.

7. The outline of the escort

(1) The scheduled sailing route: As shown in Separate Illustration No. 84 (omitted by the author)
(2) The sailing speed: 8 knots at normal speed
(3) Direct escort shall be provided. The strength [of the escort] is:
   Between Lingayen and Jolo: One cruiser and four destroyers (to which three submarine chasers and one minelayer shall be added up until the Apo [Reef] Channel.)
   Between Jolo and Kragan: One cruiser, nine destroyers, two minesweepers, six submarine chasers and one minelayer
(4) The protective sailing formation (omitted by the author)

8. The entry into the anchorage, the landing combat and the cover (omitted by the author)

9. The movements of the transport ships after the landing (omitted by the author)

10. Others (omitted by the author)

The Plan of Operations of the 1st Escort Unit

1. The plan of escort for the sailing from Lingayen to Jolo ([as in] Operation Order No. 4; [issued on] 6 February; contents omitted)
2. The general plan of landing operation ([as in] Operation Order No. 6; [issued on] 12 February)

On 12 February, 1st Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura advanced to Jolo where, after discussions with 2d Base Force Commander Rear Admiral Hirose and 11th Seaplane Tender Division Commander Rear Admiral Fujita, he announced his plan for the landing operation, which in summary was as follows:(56)

(1) The distribution of forces

[1] First distribution of forces (from the departure from Jolo until the issue of the order to change into the formation to enter into the anchorage)
(Note by the author: as in the following table)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Main Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Naka</td>
<td>To support the entire operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clearing Unit</td>
<td>2d Destroyer Div Cdr</td>
<td>2d Destroyer Div, 21st Subchaser Div and the Kawakaze</td>
<td>To clear the sailing route ahead of the transport ship unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport Ship Unit</td>
<td>24th Destroyer Div Cdr</td>
<td>24th Destroyer Div (the Umikaze), the Wakataka, 11th, 30th, the 20th Minesweeper Divs,* the Myōkō-maru, one half of the 1st Defense Unit**</td>
<td>To guide the transport ships, providing direct escort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rear Guard Unit</td>
<td>9th Destroyer Div Cdr</td>
<td>9th Destroyer Div (minus the Yamagumo)</td>
<td>To guard the rear of the transport ship unit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Actually: 11th and 30th Minesweeper Divs, and Minesweeper No. 20
** Actually: 2d Defense Unit. See pp. 380, 383.
Since it was decided that the Sakaguchi Detachment should participate in the eastern Java operation, 1st Escort Unit Commander Rear Admiral Nishimura issued an order that the *Kawakaze* and the Submarine Chaser No. 4 should be dispatched to Balikpapan to escort the *Havana-maru* and the *Ehime-maru* with the Sakaguchi Detachment on board to join [the main convoy].

**The Plan of Operations of the 2d Base Unit**

1. The disposition of forces (as in the following table)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Main Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Unit</td>
<td>1st** Base Force Cdr</td>
<td>The <em>Itsukushima</em></td>
<td>To support the entire operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Guard Unit</td>
<td>31st Subchaser Div Cdr</td>
<td>31st Subchaser Div (3 submarine chasers)</td>
<td>To clear the waters south of the Makassar Strait of enemy submarines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Guard Unit</td>
<td>1st* Base Capt [of the boats]</td>
<td>21st Torpedo Boat Div 2d Section</td>
<td>To escort the second landing unit of the Sakaguchi Det **</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Actually: 30th Minesweeper Div and Minesweeper No. 20.
** Actually: 2d. See p. 383.
2. The outline of the operations of each unit

(1) The main unit (The Itsukushima)

[The unit shall] leave Jolo principally ahead of the convoy of the 1st Escort Unit, and while supporting [the unit], [sailing] by way of Tarakan, Balikpapan and Banjarmasin, enter Kragan around Day H + 1,*** and support the operation to occupy Surabaya.

(2) The 1st Guard Unit (The 31st Subchaser Division)

[The unit] shall operate principally in the Balikpapan area and take charge of clearing enemy submarines on the scheduled sailing route of the 1st Escort Unit in the area south of the Makassar Strait.

(3) The 2d Guard Unit (The 2d Section of the 21st Torpedo Boat Division)

[The unit shall] sail to Makassar and escort the Army transport ships Sasako-maru and Sagamimaru from there to Banjarmasin to embark the Sakaguchi Detachment, after which the unit shall escort them to Kragan.

(4) The 3d Guard Unit (The 1st Section of the 2d Gunboat Division and the 54th Subchaser Division)

[The unit shall] principally be responsible for clearing the areas of Davao, Jolo and Tarakan of enemy submarines, while protecting the sea lines of communication.

(5) The Surabaya invasion unit (The 30th, the 11th and the 20th Minesweeper Divisions** and the 21st Subchaser Division)

After entering into the Kragan anchorage and sweeping the anchorage for mines and providing guard there under the command of the 1st Escort Unit commander, [the unit shall] come back under the command of the 2d Base Force commander from the time when they would be required to take charge of occupying the port of Surabaya and clearing the waterways.

(6) The unit attached (omitted)

Note by the author: The names of units were given by the author for convenience’s sake.

---

* Actually: 2d. See p. 383.

** Actually: 30th and 11th Minesweeper Divs and Minesweeper No. 20.

*** Or Day I + 1. Day I was the code name for the eastern Java operation; Day H the code name for the western Java operation.
The Plan of Operations of the 2d Air Unit and Its Circumstances

The 2d Air Unit, which consisted of the 11th Seaplane Tender Division, Patrol Boats Nos. 34, 38 and 39, one platoon of the Sasebo Combined Special Landing Force, six fishing boats and one small cargo ship, was supposed to support the 1st Escort Unit and the 2d Base Unit by guarding the transport convoy against [enemy] aircraft and submarines as well as to support the [Army] 48th Division in its landing combat (as previously told).

On 18 February, the 11th Seaplane Tender Division staff (at the Pata anchorage of Jolo) communicated the following operation schedule of the division to the staff of the 4th Destroyer Squadron:(62)

1. The operation schedule of our unit (minus the Mizuho, Patrol Boat No. 39 and the Ebisu-maru) until the morning of the 20th is as follows:
   (a) The Chitose: shall leave this anchorage at 1915 on the 19th; [sailing] at a speed of 24 knots, she shall pass by the waters east of your unit around 0000 on the 20th and arrive in Dondo Bay (note by the author: located to the north of the Gulf of Tomini [on the northwest coast] of Celebes) around 0830 on the 20th.
   (b) Patrol Boat No. 34: shall leave Tarakan around 1300 on the 19th and arrive in Dondo Bay around 0600 on the 20th.
   (c) Patrol Boat No. 38: shall leave this anchorage around 0900 on the 19th, and [by sailing] at a speed of 14 knots, arrive in Dondo Bay at 0800 on the 20th.

2. The Ebisu-maru shall follow in the wake of the transport convoy up to the Wota* (note by the author: unknown) anchorage.

3. The Mizuho and Patrol Boat No 39 are expected to join our unit around 24th or the 25th.

4. The aircraft unit of the Sanuki-maru is studying [the possibility] to move to somewhere near Baha** (note by the author: to the west of Gulf of Tomini [on the west coast] of Celebes) from around the 21st.

The Mizuho, which had been incorporated in the 2d Escort Unit to engage in the Kupang operation, returned to her original unit at 1000 on the 21st and headed for Celebes.(54)

The Plan of Operations of the Land-Based Air Unit

The arrangements for the Java operation between the Sixteenth Army, the [Army] Third Air Force, the Third Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet came into effect on 28 January; their contents have been previously related [p. 374-97]. Moreover, the outline of [the land-based air unit’s] support for the first and the second carrier operations of the Carrier Task Force has also been described [p. 331]. On 19 February (two days earlier than the scheduled day, the 21st) the 22d Air Flotilla headquarters, the Genzan Air Group, the main body of the Kanoya Air Group and the Type–0 fighter plane unit of the 22d Air Flotilla of the Air Unit of the Malay Unit were transferred to the 3d Air Raid Unit, so as to participate in the Java operation under the unified command of the Eleventh Air Fleet commander in chief in accordance with the phase-three disposition of forces. The phase-three disposition of forces of the Air Unit of the Southern Task Force was as follows:(135)

* Most likely Oti is meant.
** Most likely Baya is meant.
### Unit Commander Forces Deployment Main Tasks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Commander</th>
<th>Forces</th>
<th>Deployment</th>
<th>Main Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Air Raid Unit</td>
<td>21st Air Flotilla Cdr</td>
<td>21st Air Flotilla (minus the main body of the Kanoya Air Gp, 1st Air Gp and the Katsuragi-maru), and the 3d Air Gp</td>
<td>Kendari, Kupang and Ambon areas</td>
<td>1. To destroy the enemy air power in the Sunda Islands, the northwestern part of Australia and the northwestern part of New Guinea 2. To search for and attack enemy naval vessels on the waters to the south of the Sunda Islands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Air Raid Unit</td>
<td>23rd Air Flotilla Cdr</td>
<td>23rd Air Flotilla (minus 3d Air Gp and the Komaki-maru)</td>
<td>Bali area</td>
<td>1. To destroy the enemy air power in eastern Java 2. To search for and attack enemy naval vessels in the Java and the Sunda Seas as well as on the waters to the south of Java 3. To support the eastern Java invasion operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3d Air Raid Unit</td>
<td>22d Air Flotilla Cdr</td>
<td>22d Air Flotilla (minus the Fujikawa-maru) and the main body of the Kanoya Air Gp</td>
<td>Mentok, Kuching and Gelumbang areas</td>
<td>1. To destroy the enemy air power in western Java 2. To search for and attack enemy naval vessels in the Java Sea and on the waters to the south of Java and Sumatra 3. To support the western Java invasion operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1001 Unit</td>
<td>1st Air Gp transport plane unit, 1st and 3d Yokosuka SLFs</td>
<td>Kendari, Menado and Kupang areas</td>
<td>1. Transportation 2. Patrolling 3. Guarding of the bases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34th Destroyer Div</td>
<td>1st Air Gp transport plane unit, 1st and 3d Yokosuka SLFs</td>
<td>Kendari, Menado and Kupang areas</td>
<td>1. Escort at sea 2. Support for the move of bases 3. Guarding of the bases</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The Kamogawa-maru was sunk at the north entrance of the Lombok Strait on 2 March.
That is, the Air Unit planned to accelerate the air campaign over Java with the 23d Air Flotilla from the east and the 22d Air Flotilla from the west, while carrying out consecutive attacks on key places in northwestern Australia with the 21st Air Flotilla and the 3d Air Group to contain the operations of the enemy. Also, in concert with the operations of the Carrier Task Force, the unit was supposed to carry out search and attack missions in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean to catch and destroy enemy surface forces.

The Plan of Operations of the Army Units

On 20 January, the Southern Army commander issued the following order to capture Java by way of Southern Army Operation Order Classified No. 43.

Southern Army Order [See also Vol. 3, p. 155.]

1. The overall operations of the Southern Army are progressing as scheduled.
2. In conjunction with the Navy, I intend to swiftly capture Java.
   The cooperation with the Navy shall be based on General Agreements No. 2 and No. 4.
3. The commander of the Sixteenth Army shall swiftly capture Java in the following manner:
   (a) Exploiting the results of the neutralization of [the enemy] air power on Java, he shall almost simultaneously land his main force in western Java and an element in eastern Java. When conducting the landing operations, interference from enemy naval and air forces is expected.
   (b) After the landing, he shall defeat the enemy and promptly seize Batavia, Surabaya and Bandung.
   (c) He shall swiftly make air bases in Java ready for use.
4. The commander of the Third Air Force shall support the Sixteenth Army’s operation in the following manner:
   (a) As soon as the airfields on Bangka Island and southern Sumatra have been made ready for use, he shall advance there, without missing an opportunity, as much strength as possible, swiftly destroy the enemy air power in western Java, and directly and closely support the landing operations of the main force of the Sixteenth Army.
   (b) As soon as the air bases in Java are ready for use, he shall swiftly advance an element of his force.
5. The captain general of the Shipping Transport Command shall closely support the operations conducted by the commanders of the Sixteenth Army and the Third Air Force.

The plan of operations of the Southern Army at that time was as follows:

- **Western Java**: [The units] under the direct command of the Sixteenth Army, 2d Division, and two battalions of the 38th Division
- **Eastern Java**: 48th Division ([consisting of] nine infantry battalions as the core)
- **Sumatra**: the main force of the 38th Division ([consisting of] four infantry battalions as the core)
- **Eastern Borneo**: The Sakaguchi Detachment
- **The areas north of Australia**: The Ito Detachment ([consisting of] three battalions of the 38th Division)

Note: The operation to capture Bali was not yet on the table around that time.

The Sixteenth Army’s plan for the Java invasion operation ([as of] 27 January) was in outline as follows:
1. Mission

(1) The main force of the Sixteenth Army shall, in conjunction with the Navy, land with the units of first transport in western Java ([at] Merak, Bantam Bay and Patrol) before dawn on Day H, defeat the enemy and swiftly capture first Batavia and then Bandung without a break.

(2) The 48th Division shall land in eastern Java ([at] Kragan) before dawn on Day I, capture Surabaya and then Malang, and swiftly subjugate eastern Java.

(3) In order to advance a naval air base to be used at the time of [the operation to] capture eastern Java, the 48th Division shall on Day I – 5 in conjunction with the Navy carry out a sudden attack on Bali with one element, swiftly seize the airfield there and make it ready for use.

2. Disposition of forces for the capture of western Java

(1) The 2d Division ([consisting of] seven infantry battalions, three field artillery battalions, one heavy field artillery battalion and one tank regiment as the core)

1] Before dawn on Day H, one element shall land near Merak and the main force along Bantam Bay, to swiftly advance to the line of Ciujung River first.

2] One powerful element shall be swiftly dispatched toward Buitenzorg to divide the enemy in the Batavia and the Bandung areas and secure as forward as possible a footing for the seizure of Bandung.

3] The main force of the division shall advance through the areas along the road connecting Serang, Tangerang and Batavia toward Batavia and the sector to its south, and swiftly capture the place.

(2) The Shōji Detachment ([consisting of] two infantry battalions and one mountain artillery battalion of the 38th Division as the core)

1] The detachment shall land in Patrol before dawn on Day H and swiftly secure the Kali-jati airfield.

2] The detachment shall take control of the crossing point of the Citarum River to divide the enemy in the Bandung and the Batavia areas, and depending on the situation, shall capture Batavia with one element.

(3) The disposition of forces for the capture of eastern Java

The 48th Division ([consisting of] eight infantry battalions and four mountain artillery battalions as the core)

1] The division shall land in Kragan before dawn on Day I, defeat the enemy and swiftly seize Surabaya.

2] The division shall have one powerful element charge toward Cilacap to cut off the escape routes of the enemy.

3] The division shall land in Surabaya swiftly after capturing the place and set up a base, while clearing eastern Java [of the enemy].

(4) The disposition of forces for the capture of Bali

The 48th Division shall have one element ([consisting of] one infantry battalion as the core) conduct a sudden attack on Bali on Day I – 5 to seize the airfield there.

Since it was decided, as previously told, that the Sakaguchi Detachment should participate in the eastern Java invasion operation, [a new] disposition of forces was decided upon as follows by around 17 February:

1. The bulk of the Sakaguchi Detachment ([consisting of] two and a half infantry battalions as the core) shall participate in the operation in eastern Java.

2. The Sakaguchi Detachment shall first of all embark in Balikpapan its detachment headquarters and one infantry battalion in the transport ships and sail south under the escort of the Navy.
After joining the 48th Division en route, it shall sail together and land near Kragan along with the 48th Division before dawn on Day I.

3. Then, the detachment shall have the transport ships sail back to Banjarmasin to embark its remaining force of about one and a half battalion and bring them to Kragan.

4. After having completed preparations and assembling its force near Kragan, the detachment shall charge toward Cilacap at a dash, seize the place, and cut off the escape routes of the enemy from Batavia and Bandung.

5. The 48th Division shall be relieved of the task to charge toward and seize Cilacap.

6. The 48th Division commander shall make the necessary revisions in the arrangements with the 4th Destroyer Squadron commander concerning the participation of the Sakaguchi Detachment and arrange for the detachment the escort during the sailing and the outline of the landings, etc.