The Invasion of the Dutch East Indies

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Chapter III  Operational Preparations Prior to the War

1. Situation Until Summer 1941

As stated above, the Dutch government sought refuge in England on 13 May 1940. On 29 May, the British forces retreated from Dunkirk, and in June the French army surrendered to Germany. Now that a German landing on British soil was foreseeable and, like an orphaned child, the Dutch East Indies was left on its own in eastern Asia, IGHQ, for the first time, started research on a southern operation. At that time, as preparation for worst-case scenarios, IGHQ had drawn up operation plans for war against either the Soviet Union, the United States or Britain, or against two or more of them, while handling the China Incident at the same time. However, specific plans were made only for cases of dealing with a single country and, moreover, operations that assumed the Dutch East Indies as an hypothetical enemy had never been considered at all. Therefore, the Army Department of IGHQ assigned personnel to separately study the four areas of the Philippines, Malaya, Hong Kong, and the Dutch East Indies. Maj. Okamura Masayuki, staff officer of Section 2 (Operations Section), was ordered to conduct the investigation into the Dutch East Indies. He took up the assignment from 16 July onwards along with Maj. Shiho Kenkichi, head of the Resources and Materials Group of Section 3 (Organization and Mobilization Section), and Maj. Katō Tsukasa, member of the Economic Mobilization Bureau of the Ministry of War.\(^{17, 20}\) The findings of Staff Officer Okamura’s investigations were in outline as follows:\(^{17}\)

The military strength of Java is built around a core of two divisions, but with about two-thirds of the force consisting of indigenous troops, they do not have much of a fighting spirit. Although more and more pillbox positions are built in all areas of the Dutch East Indies, even those along the Bandung stronghold front are perfunctory and of a typical standard type. The barbed-wire entanglements that are being constructed are little more than a poor excuse. If it were possible to land unexpectedly and carry out a surprise attack, we could probably force the surrender of the whole Dutch East Indies Army on Java within a couple of days with only one of our brigades. However, from the point of international good faith we cannot do this. [On the other hand,] if we were to attack a militarily prepared Java, it would come down to an assault. In this case, we would need to deploy two divisions. But once the landing is carried out successfully, Java could be conquered in about one week because of its well-developed grid of good motorways.

In June and July, IGHQ judged that if Japan were to settle things in the southern area, Great Britain, which faced a crisis, and the United States, which was struggling to cope with the drastically changed situation in Europe, could not afford to interfere in the issues between Japan and the Netherlands.\(^{17, 18}\) However, from the beginning of August, the British gradually regained their self-confidence in defending their homeland. As stated above, IGHQ had stud-
ied the four areas separately, but in the middle of August it made a comprehensive study of these four areas together. In this study, the assessment was made that if Japan were to settle things in the southern area, both the Dutch and the British would put up resistance while maintaining an inseparable relationship; the United States, however, would maintain a cautious attitude in East Asia. Thus a plan was conceived which proposed the following: in dealing with the southern area one army with two divisions as its core would deliver a surprise attack on the Dutch East Indies, followed by an attack on Malaya by another army; if the situation should require it, the Dutch East Indies and Malaya were to be attacked simultaneously; when war against the United States was inevitable, again another army would attack the Philippines; the sequence of the attacks on the Dutch East Indies, Malaya and the Philippines was to be determined according to the contingency of a war against the United States.

As it was, the German air raids against Britain failed to show the desired results and gradually Britain showed signs of recovery. In the meantime, while actively supporting Britain, the United States showed a willingness to contain Japan. In the Navy Department of IGHQ the view grew stronger that if [Japan] were to resort to military force in order to settle the southern question, war against the United States would be inevitable because the United States and Britain were inseparably tied together. Therefore, on 28 August the Navy Department presented the Army Department with a memo about the interpretation of the Outline of the Main Principles for Coping with the Changing World Situation (as previously explained the decision by the Liaison Conference [between the IGHQ and the Government] on 27 July to “seize a favorable opportunity to settle the southern question”) and requested the Army Department to take it into careful consideration. At the time, the Army Department had been entirely preoccupied with the matter of stationing troops in northern French Indochina based on the Outline, and did not have any attention to spare for the Dutch East Indies issue. On 23 September, the stationing of troops in northern French Indochina became a fact. Then on 26 September, the United States declared an embargo on scrap iron against Japan. Included as members of the (aforementioned) Kobayashi Delegation, which had been dispatched in accordance with the Outline, were Col. Ishimoto Itsuo, chief of the Resource Section of the Ministry of War, and Lt. Col. Nakayama Yasuto, chief of Section 3 of General Affairs of the Army Aviation Headquarters (later in charge of the Military Administration Department of the Dutch East Indies invasion army), along with Navy Capt. Nakahara Yoshimas and Navy Lt. Cdr. of Engineering Nakasuji Tōichi. The party left Tokyo on 30 August and arrived in Java on 12 September, where they tried to negotiate the import of 3,150,000 or more tons of oil to Japan, but the negotiations were very tough. On 17 October, the delegation was recalled. The only result it had achieved was an agreement on the import of 1,800,000 tons of oil.

By advancing into northern French Indochina, Japan tried to shut down the supply route to the Chiang Kai-shek [Jiang Jieshi] regime, but it brought no prospects for settling the China Incident. Furthermore, after having put an embargo on scrap iron, the United States was showing signs of taking measures to put an embargo on oil. And, to top it all, the negotiations between Japan and the Netherlands gave only cause for pessimism. Under these circumstances, the southern question flared up again in October at IGHQ and the Army as well as the Navy Department engaged in another series of studies. The Army Department made the following judgment: “As the German forces are expected to land on the British mainland
next spring, and we may assume that the United States and Britain can be separately dealt with, we need to take advantage of the favorable opportunity to settle the South (Dutch East Indies and Malaya) in order to settle the China Incident.” Subsequently, the Army Department laid down its course of preparing “an operation to first capture the Dutch East Indies by a sudden attack with an army consisting of the 5th and the 48th Divisions as its core, and then to capture Malaya with another army with four divisions as its core, including the Imperial Guard Division and the 18th Division.” Accordingly, on 12 October, it issued orders that the 5th Division assemble at Shanghai, and, on the 22d, that the Imperial Guard Division assemble in Shantou [Swatow], the 18th Division in Guangdong [Canton] and the 48th Division on Hainan. The Navy Department initially agreed to this; however, at the end of the month, it stated to the Army Department that “dealing with the South would ultimately come down to war against the United States. If anything, Japan should [face this fact and] be determined to fight the United States from the start.”

On 15 November, the Navy Department put a preparatory fleet mobilization into motion. It was obvious that putting into motion a southern operation that would entail war with the United States had to be avoided. The above-mentioned plan of the Army Department drawn up in mid-October had already disappeared by the end of October. In the meantime, Maj. Kondō Dempachi had taken the place of Staff Officer Okamura as officer in charge of the Dutch East Indies [operation].

Late in November, a discussion arose about mediating the border dispute between French Indochina and Thailand [Franco-Thai War] that had just broken out. If this situation could be guided to our advantage, then air bases could be pushed forward into southern French Indochina and Thailand, which would facilitate the [Japanese] transoceanic operations. In the previous month, the United States, Britain and the Netherlands had held a [defense] conference in Singapore. On the recall of Special Envoy Kobayashi (he had left Surabaya on 22 October), it had been decided to dispatch again a special envoy, Yoshizawa Kenkichi, who took his departure on 30 November [editor’s note: in Chapter I, p. 3, it is said that he left Tokyo on 11 December, which agrees with Yoshizawa’s autobiography]. Ambassador Yoshizawa arrived in Batavia (Jakarta) on 28 December, and negotiations started from 2 January 1941.

The Army Department of IGHQ followed closely the start of Ambassador Yoshizawa’s negotiations and the progress of the mediation of the border dispute between French Indochina and Thailand. Earlier, when Special Envoy Kobayashi was to return home, Lt. Col. Nakayama Yasuto had been instructed to stay behind. Col. Ishimoto Itsuo, however, had died of illness on 29 September while in Java. When the new ambassador, Yoshizawa, headed for the Dutch East Indies, he was accompanied by Col. Harada Yoshikazu, staff officer of the Army Department of IGHQ (and later vice chief of staff of the Dutch East Indies invasion army), and Maj. Kuriya Tsugunori, member of the Army General Staff Office (and later staff officer of the Dutch East Indies invasion army), as members of the delegation. About two months after the arrival of these two officers, Col. Nakayama Yasuto (promoted to colonel in March) returned home.

Until around June or July 1940, the Army Department of IGHQ had thought that Great Britain and the Netherlands could basically be separately dealt with. Since about August, it had started considering Britain and the Netherlands as inseparable [when dealing with them], but the United States and Britain as still separable. However, by the end of 1940, it
had concluded that Britain, the United States and the Netherlands were inseparable. The reason was that the circumstances had changed: Britain had pulled itself together again and a German landing on British soil had become unlikely; the United States had started its active support for Britain, China and the Netherlands; moreover, in Singapore the [defense] conference between the United States, Britain and the Netherlands had [also] been held. The Army Department, considering it imperative to avoid war with the United States, kept a very close watch on the resumption of negotiations with the Dutch and on the [Japanese] mediation between French Indochina and Thailand. Nevertheless, it kept implementing the above-mentioned plans made in October when the southern question had resurged. The Thai-French Indochina Border Dispute [Franco-Thai War] was settled through [Japanese] mediation on 11 March 1941, but in the meantime the following measures had been put into effect:

1. In October the 5th Division was ordered to carry out landing operation exercises. Moreover in December, the Imperial Guard Division, the 18th and the 48th Division received orders to carry out exercises for operations in tropical environments, in particular for landing operations. These divisions had been unofficially informed that their area of operation would be Malaya.

2. In addition, in December the Research Department of the Taiwan Army was established and instructed to carry out investigations, examinations and tests of direct necessity to a southern operation by March 1941.

3. Concerning the Dutch East Indies, sorting of information had been started since about December. Lt. Col. Murakami Kimisuke, head of the Southern Group of Department 2 (Intelligence Bureau; and later intelligence staff officer of the Dutch East Indies invasion army), along with Lt. Cols Furuki Shigeyuki, Kadomatsu Shōichi and Ishikawa Susumu, and Maj. Hashida Sei, all of the same department, had been assigned to the study and sorting of data.

   Lt. Col. Sendō Shunzō, member of the Transport Section of the Economic Mobilization Bureau at the Ministry of War (and later staff officer for shipping of the Dutch East Indies invasion army) had been ordered to examine the data particularly from the standpoint of shipping transport and landing operations.

4. In about December, the Inspectorate General of Military Training (whose deputy chief was Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi, and whose chief of its General Affairs Department was Maj. Gen. Okazaki Seizaburō; Lieutenant General Imamura later became commander of the Dutch East Indies invasion army, and Major General Okazaki its chief of staff) conducted a study exercise of bicycle units from Toyohashi City to Kanamarugahara [Kanamaruhara] in Tochigi Prefecture simulating the traversing of Malaya from north to south.

5. From January through February 1941, a training trip for staff officers was held in Kyūshū, during which operation rehearsals, mainly for landing operations, were carried out by the relevant staff officers.

6. From late March through early April, the Army Department of IGHQ held an exercise of its ground, sea and air units with the 5th division serving as the core, in which after crossing the sea from eastern China and landing at Karatsu in northern Kyūshū, they were supposed to capture Sasebo. The exercise simulated the crossing of the ocean, landing at “the neck” or a narrow part of the Malay Peninsula, and then capturing Singapore. Com-
mander of the army of this exercise was Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi, the deputy chief of the Inspectorate General of Military Training.\(^{(17)}\)

As previously explained, the southern question, which had resurfaced in October of the previous year, outwardly quieted down while the negotiations between Japan and the Netherlands were resumed and the mediation of the border dispute between French Indochina and Thailand went on.

However, as soon as the mediation of the Thai-French Indochina border dispute was concluded on 11 March, Foreign Minister Matsuoka, receiving a magnificent send-off, set out to visit Germany, Italy and the USSR on the following day. On 13 April, the day the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact was signed,\(^{(7)}\) an assembly of army and division commanders was held, which was filled with an unusual air of excitement.\(^{(11)}\) During the assembly, 2d Division Commander, Lt. Gen. Yoshimoto Teiichi was informally instructed by the chief of Army General Staff to conduct research and training for a southern operation.\(^{(56)}\) The 2d Division, having returned home from Manchuria in November of the previous year (1940), had earned a reputation for bravery with, among others, the night attack on Gongchangling during the Russo-Japanese War. It had also played an active role as the division stationed in Manchuria when the Manchurian Incident had occurred.

On 27 September of the previous year the Tripartite Pact had been signed.\(^{(7)}\) On the 12th of the following month, the American President had declared that he would oppose this pact, and in the same month the United States had held the [defense] conference in Singapore with Britain and the Netherlands.\(^{(13)}\) In such circumstances, Foreign Minister Matsuoka’s recent visit to Germany, Italy and the USSR hinted at an important turning point. In the operation plan of the administrative year 1941 (drawn up at the end of 1940), it had been laid down that in a worst-case scenario of war with the United States, the corps in charge of the invasion of the Philippines would be the 7th and the 16th Divisions. The divisions, which had been instructed at the end of 1940 by IGHQ to carry out training while simulating an operation in Malaya, were, as already mentioned, the Imperial Guard Division and the 5th, the 18th and the 48th Divisions. No divisions were mentioned other than these. Now, however, the name of the 2d Division appeared, with Java as its target.\(^{(17)}\)

As a result of Foreign Minister Matsuoka’s European visit, the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, which was of great significance, had been signed in mid-April,\(^{(7)}\) and simultaneously Japan had started negotiations with America,\(^{(7, 10)}\) while on Java, Ambassador Yoshizawa still continued his invariably difficult negotiations.

In May, discussions to station troops in southern French Indochina appeared. However, these did not originate from a scheme to aggressively carry out a southern operation, but rather from the possibility to obtain [military] bases should the worst come to the worst, as continuing efforts were still being made to avoid war between Japan and the United States.\(^{(10, 17)}\) In the meantime, the 2d Division had been training local tactics in the vicinity of Onahama in Fukushima prefecture while simulating an operation on Java.\(^{(56)}\)

On 17 June, the negotiations between Japan and the Netherlands broke down and on the 22d of the same month Germany began its eastern campaign against Russia. On 2 July, the Outline of National Policies in View of the Changing Situation (i.e. proceeding with the advance into the South, while settling the northern question in response to the changing situation) was decided upon, after which, on 7 July, a mobilization of military forces directed at the northern
area (i.e. the Special Grand Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army or KANTOKUEN) was launched. On 25 July, the forces to be stationed in southern French Indochina departed Hainan Island. On the following 26th, the United States officially announced that it had frozen all of Japan’s assets in the United States. Britain and the Netherlands immediately followed suit. This sudden turn of events caused the Army and Navy Departments of IGHQ to seriously tackle the planning of operations against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, as well as an invasion of the southern areas. Before this opportunity arose, definite plans for an invasion of the southern areas had not yet been made, due to the developments mentioned above.\textsuperscript{(7, 10)}

The Yoshizawa delegation left Java for home on 27 June.\textsuperscript{(13)} Col. Harada Yoshikazu returned home at the same time, while Maj. Kuriya Tsugunori remained in Batavia (Jakarta).\textsuperscript{(37, 42)} He did not return home until one month prior to the opening of hostilities.\textsuperscript{(42)}

2. Preparations in the Summer and Fall of 1941

Start of Full-scale Research; Conception of a Three-division Plan for the Dutch East Indies

When the United States froze all Japanese assets on 26 July and essentially instituted an oil embargo in consequence of Japan’s advance into southern French Indochina, the Japanese Army, based on the \textit{Outline of National Policies} of 2 July, was in the midst of a large-scale mobilization of military forces directed against the North [the Soviets], and the concentrated transport [of troops] to Manchuria and Korea.\textsuperscript{(10)}

On 9 August, it was decided to abandon the idea of carrying out a northern operation within the present year, and [instead] to prepare a southern operation scheduled to be ready by the end of November should the negotiations with the United States fail.\textsuperscript{(10)} On this occasion, it was decided that for the time being Maj. Shigeno Nobuo, staff officer of Section 2, and Maj. Nishiura Setsuzō, staff officer of Section 3 of the Army Department of IGHQ, were to exclusively devote themselves to research on the Dutch East Indies operation.\textsuperscript{(45)} Later, Major Nishiura was appointed staff officer for the lines of communication of the Dutch East Indies invasion army.

It spoke for itself that the Navy, which was supposed to play the leading role in a war against the United States, took the lead over the Army in its research. In early mid-August the Navy Department was the first to hold a [tactical] map exercise.\textsuperscript{(10)} This Navy map exercise tentatively scheduled the Army’s capture of Singapore to take place about five months after the opening of hostilities because the problem of Thailand also had to be dealt with. Consequently, it advocated a “clockwise advance” (note: advancing via Malaya toward Java was referred to as a “counter-clockwise advance,” and advancing via the Philippines toward Java and Sumatra was called a “clockwise advance.”) The plan of this exercise was to capture the Philippines from the north in two months, followed by capturing Java sometime between day $x + 80$ and day $x + 90$ (note: $x$ represents the day of the opening of hostilities), then capturing Singapore through a pincer attack, i.e. by simultaneously attacking from Sumatra in the south and from Malaya in the north. In this map exercise the forces deployed by the Army for the capture of the Philippines consisted of two divisions, and the same number were deployed for the capture of the Dutch East Indies as well.\textsuperscript{(10)} The previous summer, Staff Officer Okamura had judged that two divisions should be deployed for the Dutch East Indies (Java),
which remained unchanged in this exercise. After handing over his charge of the Dutch East Indies to Staff Officer Kondō, Staff Officer Okamura was sent to inspect the 5th Division’s landing exercise in northern Kyūshū (March), the 48th Division’s invasion operation in Fuzhou (April) and the Twenty-fifth Army’s advance into southern French Indochina (July).\(^{(17)}\)

Against the Navy Department’s clockwise plan, the Army Department advocated a counter-clockwise plan, arguing that a swift advance via Malaya was imperative not only because it was sounder and would lead to an early overthrow of British authority as well as to the blocking of British reinforcements, but also because it might make a shortening of the schedule feasible.\(^{(10)}\)

After the above-mentioned Navy map exercise, the Army Department carried out its own war game on 14 – 15 August, which resulted in the following tentative conclusions:\(^{(10)}\)

1. The invasion of Malaya and the invasion of the Philippines are to be commenced at the same time. A slight delay in the invasion of Java on account of this will be all right.
2. The 48th Division is to be incorporated into the Philippines invasion army. After the capture of Manila, it is to be diverted to the Dutch East Indies invasion army and to land in Java.
3. After the capture of Hong Kong, the 38th Division is to land in southern Sumatra and occupy Palembang.
4. The 2d Division shall be employed for Java in accordance with the plan that has been nursed for a while.
5. Based on the above, the Dutch East Indies invasion army shall be reorganized into a force with three divisions as its core.
6. A paratroop unit shall be dropped at Palembang.

As a result, the following changes were made to the previous deployment plan of the armies:

**Malaya invasion army:** was to consist of the Imperial Guard Division (stationed in French Indochina at the time), the 5th Division (in eastern China at the time), the 18th Division (in southern China at the time) and the 48th Division (also in southern China at the time) as in the original plan, but the 48th Division was removed.

**Philippines invasion army:** was originally to consist of the 7th Division (in Hokkaidō at the time) and the 16th Division (in the Kyōto divisional district at the time), but [in the new plan] it was to consist of the 16th and the 48th Division.

**Dutch East Indies invasion army:** was to be made up of two divisions in the original plan, that is, the 2d Division (in the Sendai divisional district at the time) and another division, but it was now provided with three divisions: the 2d Division, the 38th Division (in southern China at the time and to join after the capture of Hong Kong), and the 48th Division (to join after the capture of Manila).

The deployment of a paratroop unit at Palembang was an idea that had been proposed by Staff Officer [Prince] Takeda-no-miya when Staff Officer Okamura Masayuki had presented his report on the outcome of his research on the Dutch East Indies operation in September of the previous year (1940).\(^{(17)}\) At that time, the Japanese forces did not have a paratroop unit, but three months later in December, a [Paratroop] Raiding Training Department was established for the first time within the Hamamatsu Army Flying School. The department had
only twelve members. These twelve had started their research by studying written information from the German military and by listening to the experiences of airmen who had to make jumps due to flight accidents. In April of the following year (1941), the [Paratroop] Raiding Training Department became the Baichengzi Army Flying School [Paratroop] Raiding Training Department, and was transferred from Hamamatsu to Baichengzi in Manchuria, where it had started to train several hundred men as paratroop specialists.\(^{(93)}\)

The 38th Division was stationed in a swampy area in southern China. This division had been formed following the China Incident, and its infantry regiments carried a regimental number in the two-hundreds. Nevertheless, the division was an elite division with abundant battle experience and highly valued by IGHQ, which was convinced that the division would be able to accomplish the capture of Palembang after capturing the Hong Kong stronghold. In order to capture Palembang, [the division] would have to travel up several rivers for about eighty to ninety kilometers as the crow flies, and carry out the operation on swampy ground. As the 38th Division was well accustomed to rivers and swampy lands in southern China, it was, also in this respect considered to be the most suitable division.\(^{(18)}\) The division’s troops had been recruited from the Nagoya divisional district.

The 48th Division was a division equipped with motor vehicles and organized in the previous fall. Its core was made up of the Taiwan Mixed Brigade (consisting of two regiments; known as the Hada Detachment, it had earned a reputation for bravery in the China Incident [1937]), and the 47th Infantry Regiment (originally based in Ōita City) of the 6th Division. Almost all of its men were from Kyūshū. As previously explained, since the previous fall the division had held an exercise simulating traversing Malaya lengthwise all the way down to capture Singapore, and it had carried out a landing operation at Fuzhou in the spring [of 1941] as well. The division had assembled on Hainan Island.

IGHQ later (around October) gave the following nicknames to the three divisions that it had decided to assign to the Dutch East Indies invasion in this [new deployment plan]; it may be understood that each of the names reflected the division’s history as well as its task at hand:

- 2d Division: Isamu-heidan [the “Braves”]
- 38th Division: Numa-heidan [the “Swampers”]
- 48th Division: Umi-heidan [the “Mariners”]

On 12 August, [the Army Department of] IGHQ ordered the 48th Division to transfer from Hainan to Taiwan. Following that (on 23 August), it instructed the division to carry out training on the assumption of capturing Surabaya on Java straight after capturing Manila.\(^{(1, 10)}\) In addition, it ordered the [Paratroop] Raiding Training Department, which was training in Baichengzi, to transfer to Takanabe in Miyazaki Prefecture.\(^{(93)}\)

In September, the [Paratroop] Raiding Training Department of the Baichengzi Flying School was upgraded and strengthened into the Army [Paratroop] Raiding Training Department under the direct control of the inspector general of Army Aviation, and transferred to Takanabe. Its structure was reorganized into one training regiment (four companies) and one
training air unit (two squadrons). At the Inspectorate General of Army Aviation, Lt. Col. Itoda Isamu took charge of the department’s organization and training. Later he was appointed staff officer of the Dutch East Indies invasion army and, as such, flew in over Palembang along with the raiding units and carried out a belly-landing while the troops parachuted.

During that period (mid-August) the main concern of the Army Department of IGHQ was whether it was feasible at all to impose double duty on the 38th and the 48th Division and whether the preparation of the paratroop unit would be ready in time. The department was not apprehensive about the operations after the landing on Java; it figured that the 48th Division would swiftly capture the Surabaya stronghold, and that the 2d Division, which had earned worldwide fame at Gongchangling, would conquer the Bandung stronghold right after the capture of Batavia.

Afterwards, on 23 August, the Army Department conducted another war game on the southern operation. When it had contacted the Navy Department on the previous day, it had been informed that the Navy Department “estimated that there was a probability of one-in-two of having to face east halfway through the execution of the southern operation in order to deal with the U.S. Pacific Fleet; that the Navy estimated that the timing of when it could put the Java invasion army ashore could be set to about ninety days after the opening of hostilities; and that it was working on [the possibility of] conducting an air strike on Hawaii with the full force of its main aircraft carriers right at the opening of hostilities.”

Several days before (in mid-August), the Navy Department had made a request to the Army Department for the Army’s cooperation in the capture of Rabaul. However, Vice Chief of the Army General Staff Tsukada Osamu flatly refused, saying, “[the Army] does not have any manpower to waste on such an undertaking.”

The war game of 23 August was conducted with reinforced forces (increased from six to ten divisions), compared to the previous game. While the force for the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies remained the same, the 21st Division (stationed in China), the 55th Division (in Zentsūji), and the 56th Division (in Kurume) were also included for operations in the French Indochina area, along with the Imperial Guard Division, as well as the 5th and the 18th Division.

[The Situation] After the Decision on the Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy of Early September (See Illustration No. 4)

Report to the Emperor on the Prospects for the Southern Operation

After the Liaison Conference between IGHQ and the Government on 2 September, an Imperial Conference was held on 6 September, and the Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy were decided upon; the most important point stated that “… resolved not to flinch from waging war against the United States (and Britain and the Netherlands), war preparations shall be completed approximately by late October.”

At this time, Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama reported to the Emperor that in [the Army’s] estimation, it was possible to complete the southern operation in about five months, including one month and a half for the Philippines, and about one hundred days...
for Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies. The power of the allied forces, relevant to the southern operation, as estimated at that time by IGHQ, was as follows:\(^{(2)}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Air Force Current</th>
<th>Increase by the end of October</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>10 aircraft</td>
<td>100 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>160 aircraft or more</td>
<td>150 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaya</td>
<td>200 aircraft or more</td>
<td>150 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>50 aircraft</td>
<td>50 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch East Indies</td>
<td>300 aircraft</td>
<td>150 aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In total</td>
<td>720 aircraft or more</td>
<td>450 aircraft</td>
</tr>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Navy Classification</th>
<th>Aircraft Carriers</th>
<th>Battleships</th>
<th>Cruisers</th>
<th>Destroyers</th>
<th>Submarines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Asiatic Fleet</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Pacific Fleet</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch East Indies</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British China Fleet</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Indies Fleet</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>15 or 16</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In total</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>83 or 84</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note by the author: it seems that the “aircraft carriers” [in this chart] include seaplane tenders and flying boat tenders.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>19,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaya</td>
<td>80,000 – 90,000 (of which 60,000 – 70,000 regular army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Borneo</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>163,000 (of which 43,000 regular army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guam</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch East Indies</td>
<td>70,000 (of which 50,000 in the inner territory [i.e. Java])</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Against this, the [Imperial Japanese] Army was considering to assign ten divisions, two numbered air forces (about 600 aircraft, supplemented by 500 Navy aircraft), and 2.1 million tons of army vessels. More specifically, the plan envisioned one division for French Indochina, five divisions for Malaya (of which one was to have part [of its force] advance into southeastern Burma while securing Thailand with its remaining force) and one numbered air force; two divisions and one numbered air force for the Philippines, and three divisions for the Dutch East Indies (of which one division would have double duty within the southern area).\(^{(2)}\)

When Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama explained the [Army’s] expectation that it would be possible to complete the southern operation in about five months, His Majesty pointed out the erroneous estimate that Chief of Staff Sugiyama had made on the China Incident as war minister, and strongly warned against [too much] optimism.\(^{(16)}\) Later (in November) when the headquarters of the Southern Army was organized, the staff of the
headquarters, hearing about the Emperor’s warning, made a resolve to “pledge on the honor of the southern armies to firmly live up to His Majesty’s considerations by completing the southern operation within the term scheduled by IGHQ.”(24)

Report to the Emperor on the Mobilization of Forces Scheduled for the Southern Operation

On 8 September, Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama reported to the Emperor about the following mobilization:(10)

First half of October: The 16th Division (Kyōto Division — to carry out the primary landing in the Philippines together with the 48th Division), the 55th Division (Zentsūji Division — to secure Thailand and occupy the border area of Thailand and Burma), one-third of the 56th Division (Kurume Division), (Sakaguchi Detachment — to capture Guam).

Note: As mentioned previously, in the operation plan for war against the United States, two divisions were assigned to the operations in the Philippines and three battalions to the operations in Guam. That is to say, the 16th and the 48th Divisions were charged with the Philippines, and the Sakaguchi Detachment with Guam. However, as explained hereinafter, the Army, advocating a counter-clockwise plan, and the Navy, adhering to a clockwise approach, later came to a compromise, in which the Sakaguchi Detachment was directed to the Makassar Strait front and an element of the 55th Division, the Horii Detachment (or South Seas Detachment), was formed for the operation in Guam.

Latter half of October: The 2d Division (Sendai Division — to be brought under the Dutch East Indies invasion army and head for west Java), the 65th Brigade ([from] Fukuyama — scheduled for the secondary landing in the Philippines as a reserve for the 48th Division’s redeployment).

During his report to the Emperor, Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama explained that there was a possibility that by the end of the year, [allied] reinforcements of 50,000 to 60,000 troops from Australia and New Zealand, 100,000 from India, and 10,000 to 20,000 troops from China would be sent to Malaya, Burma and the Dutch East Indies.(2)

Continuing Disagreement Between the Army and Navy on the Operation

On the same day (8 September), the Navy Department was still in favor of a clockwise plan. The Army Department, however, had proceeded with its research and considered the counter-clockwise plan a must. Staff Officer Imoto Kumao of Section 2 of the Army Department wrote a memo on that day that “for ‘Java,’ synchronized landings from the east and the west are more appropriate.”

On 10 September, the Navy Department again asked for “support to seize Rabaul,” which was flatly turned down as before by Vice Chief of Army General Staff Tsukada. Even when the Navy Department explained that [Rabaul] would “be nothing but an advance position of the Truk Islands,” and that it would “have naval guard units take over to return [the Army troops] after the capture,” the request was in vain. (9, 10)
Map Exercise at the Naval College

From the following day, the 11th until the 20th [of the month], the Combined Fleet conducted a map exercise at the Naval College.\(^{(105,106,111,113)}\) In the first half, this exercise dealt with general operations, while in the second half the air strike on Hawaii was investigated by only a limited number of staff in the utmost secrecy. The exercise showed that a surprise attack on Hawaii with the full force of all aircraft carriers right at the outset of the war was preferable. On the other hand, concerning the Philippines, the Navy Department wanted to have landings carried out right at the opening of hostilities at Davao as well as in Luzon Island, thereby separating the Philippines from the Dutch East Indies. Furthermore, it also wanted a speedy launch of the Dutch East Indies operation. At the time, the main force of the Philippine Army Air Corps covered the area from the vicinity of Manila to the north. However, as a matter of fact, the flying ranges of the Japanese Navy fighter planes at that time did not allow an attack from Taiwan to Manila and the vicinity, nor did they allow an attack from Palau to Davao and the vicinity (even though their flying range was considerably longer than those of the Army fighter planes). Therefore, if a full-force surprise attack on Hawaii were to be executed with carrier aircraft, then the idea of a landing at Davao right at the opening of hostilities had to be abandoned. So, this war game led to a course of first occupying northern Luzon and after advancing the air bases, occupying the southern Philippines (Davao and Jolo), followed by capturing the Dutch East Indies.\(^{(105,106,111,113)}\) The dates for capturing these areas were roughly as follows: northern Luzon on or immediately after the day of the opening of hostilities (day \(x\)), Davao and Jolo approximately between day \(x + 20\) and day \(x + 30\), Tarakan and Menado approximately on day \(x + 50\), Java approximately between day \(x + 80\) and day \(x + 90\).

Completion of the First Draft of the Southern Operation Plan and Issue of Summons to Prospective Staff Members

On 17 September, while the Navy was conducting its map exercise at the Naval College, the Army Department completed its first draft of the southern operation plan.\(^{(10)}\)

After that, the Army Department summoned the prospective staff officers of the armies for the South and held separate study sessions with the prospective staff officers of each army in the following order: on 25 September with the staff of the Southern Army, on the 26th with the staff of the Philippines invasion army, on the 27th with the staff of the Malaya invasion army, and on the 28th with the staff of the Dutch East Indies invasion army.\(^{(23)}\)

The officers summoned as prospective staff for the Dutch East Indies invasion army were the following:\(^{(23,36)}\)


Maj. Gen. [Col.] Manaki Takanobu (attached to the Military Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of War; as prospective vice chief of staff).

Lt. Col. Oda Akimitsu (he had been made staff of the Northern District Army since July for the KANTOKUEN [Special Grand Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army] after serving as instructor at the War College; as prospective staff officer in charge of operations).
Maj. Yamashita Yutaka (Appointments and Assignment Section of the Ministry of War; as prospective assistant staff officer of operations).

Lt. Col. Murakami Kimisuke (he had been transferred to the Information Department of the Ministry of War after serving as head of the Southern Group of Department 2 of the Army Department of IGHQ; as prospective staff officer of intelligence).

Lt. Col. Itoda Isamu (Inspectorate General of Army Aviation; as prospective staff officer for air operations and the [paratroop] raiding group).

Lt. Col. Saiki Ikuzō (Signal Communications Section of the Office of the Army General Staff; as prospective staff officer for signal communications).

Col. Kitamura Yoshifuto (War College; as prospective senior staff officer of Section 2 of the army).

Lt. Col. Sendō Shunzō (Transport Section of the Ministry of War; as prospective staff officer for shipping).

Maj. Takahashi Mitsuzō (War Preparations Section of the Ministry of War; as prospective staff officer for the lines of communication).

At that time, the Army and the Navy Departments [of IGHQ] were in serious conflict over the counter-clockwise plan versus the clockwise plan.\(^9,10\)

The primary causes of the conflict between the counter-clockwise and clockwise plans were: (1) Whereas the Army, considering the state of affairs with the Soviets in the next spring, wanted to ensure the swift capture of the Singapore stronghold, which fell under its responsibility, the Navy, on the contrary, wanted to quickly capture the Philippines and Java, and be ready for the U.S. main fleet to come to the attack; (2) The Army attached more importance to the naval and air forces of the allies around Singapore and their reinforcements coming across the Indian Ocean and from India, while the Navy put a high priority on the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Hawaii; (3) The Army was interested in the oil produced in Palembang, while the Navy was much attracted by the heavy oil produced in Borneo.

The Army had requested the Navy to station part of its air units in the Malaya area, but the Navy, which was strongly focusing on the Philippines, would not comply with the Army’s request.\(^9,10\) On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, the Navy had repeatedly asked for the Army’s support for the capture of Rabaul, but the Army had refused this.\(^9,10\)

Because of this polarity, both were suffering from the following issues:\(^9,10\) There were no major problems with [the operations in] the Philippines and Guam, as they had been pre-arranged in the operation plan for the [current] administrative year. [However, this was not the case with the following:]

The Navy wanted to occupy the oil fields of Miri on its own account right at the opening of hostilities. Moreover, it also strongly desired to capture Ambon and Kupang at an early point, but was short of the necessary strength [to do so].

The Army had found that the Malaya Operation might be slowed down substantially due to an overland journey of one thousand kilometers and because of the naval and air forces of the allies in Singapore, and that it might end up in a situation where attacks on Java and Sumatra were to be made [only] from the east.

Because of these circumstances, in the joint study sessions on the 28th by the Army Department staff of IGHQ and the prospective staff officers of the Dutch East Indies invasion army, a new plan was conceived to have the detachment, charged with the capture of Guam,
storm Palembang from the Java Sea after completing the capture of Guam. The assessments of the situation of the paratroop unit around that time indicated that 1,500 troops would be ready to be put into action at the end of October. The newly conceived plan was to have one detachment land in Palembang from the Java Sea and the main force of the army in eastern Java, without first destroying the allied air and naval forces in Singapore, Sumatra and western Java. However, it involved great risks. In this study they came to the conclusion that the loss of Army vessels at sea by the time that the invasion units were to arrive at the shores of Java and southern Sumatra would amount to 85 out of a total of 500 Army vessels (note: this number also includes the transport ships for the Malaya and Philippine invasion units), that is, one sixth of the total number. The Army Department of IGHQ decided that “[the plan] should be reconsidered as there existed a certain amount of concern about the cover provided by the Navy for the attack on the Dutch East Indies by the Dutch East Indies invasion army,” and that “the landing points of the main force of the Malaya invasion army should be changed in a positive way, and that [the date to attack] the Dutch East Indies should be advanced.” (Note by the author: this means that by moving the landing points in the Gulf of Thailand as far as possible to the south and, following the development of the operation, by also carrying out landings on the east coast of Malaya, the period [necessary] for the invasion of Malaya should be shortened, so that the landings in southern Sumatra and western Java could be made in a much shorter time frame. As explained above, as of 28 September [1941] the Navy desired: (1) to carry out a surprise attack on Hawaii with its main force of aircraft carriers right at the outset of the war, and also to enable its unit(s) to carry out a landing at Davao right at the opening of hostilities as well; and (2) to capture Rabaul, for which operation it absolutely wanted to have the Army’s support. The Army, on its part, wanted: (1) to absolutely have the support of Navy air units in order to speed up the Malaya operation as well as to reduce the loss of vessels; (2) to enable the 38th Division to land in Palembang via the South China Sea, as well as to realize the parachute drops of the paratroop unit; and (3) to carry out simultaneous landings on Java both from the east and the west.

The Situation in October

The Army Department [of IGHQ] tried to iron out the differences with the Navy Department. It decided to have the Guam invasion unit, after the capture of the island, proceed all the way down to Rabaul and capture it, which was fervently desired by the Navy, and once Rabaul was captured, have the unit turn round and head all the way back to take part in the Dutch East Indies invasion. In addition, the Army Department also decided to take on the capture of Miri, Kuching, Ambon and Kupang, which the Navy had been at pains to find a way to capture.

The Army Department performed a war game at the War College from 1 to 5 October. On this occasion, the prospective staff officers of the Dutch East Indies invasion army were completely taken aback to hear that the detachment which was scheduled to head for Palembang after the capture of Guam was also to capture Rabaul after seizing Guam, and that Ambon and Kupang were newly added to the targets to capture.
War Game at the War College

The outline of the war game held at the War College was as follows:°°
1. Accommodating the request of the Navy, the Army decided to provide units to invade Rabaul, Ambon, Kupang, Miri and Kuching, to receive in return support from an element of the Navy’s land-based air [unit] in the Malaya area in an effort to speed up the pace of the Malaya operation.
2. A surprise attack on Palembang was set to be carried out ten days before the invasion of Singapore, so that the landing on western Java would take place on the same day as the invasion of Singapore. The landing in western Java was set to be executed on day \( x + 95 \). [This date of] landing in Java might be about two weeks later than that of the Navy, which estimated its arrival at eastern Java between day \( x + 80 \) and day \( x + 90 \). However, if the U.S. Pacific Fleet were to launch an offensive [against our forces], the Navy would have to extract and deploy [some of] its air and sea strength [against it]. In such a case, [the Army] would be able to arrive in Java [before the Navy].
3. The strength to be employed was set at ten divisions (Imperial Guard, 5th, 18th, 55th, 56th, 21st, 16th, 48th, 38th and 2nd Divisions).
4. The operation was divided into three stages: The first stage would feature a practically simultaneous start of operations in the Philippines, Hong Kong and Malaya, after which Borneo, Celebes and Timor would be promptly captured. As the Malaya operation made progress, key locations in southern Sumatra would be seized. In the second stage Java and northern Sumatra would be captured, and in the third stage key areas would be secured.
5. Regarding the Dutch East Indies territory of Borneo and eastward, the Navy would capture Menado, Tarakan and Kendari on its own account. About Balikpapan, Ambon, Makassar, Banjarmasin and Kupang, a tentative plan to capture them through joint actions by the Army and the Navy had been made. However, the problem of how to share responsibilities with the Navy for the capture of the east coast line of Borneo and the Celebes front still remained unsolved.
6. The [army] troops would be deployed as follows:
   - The 38th Division would [first] capture Hong Kong, after which its main force would go to central and south Sumatra, while an element of its force (referred to as Detachment B) would [be sent to] capture Ambon and Timor.
   - One-third of the 55th Division (referred to as the South Seas Detachment or Detachment I) would seize Guam, followed by the capture of Rabaul, after which the detachment would reverse its course and head for the Dutch East Indies.
   - Note: this detachment was to be organized to replace Detachment A for capturing Guam and other [purposes].
   - One-third of the 56th Division (referred to as the Sakaguchi Detachment a.k.a. Detachment A) would carry out attacks along the east coastline of Borneo and the Celebes front southward (except for the locations which the Navy would attack on its own account).
   - Note: The detachment was relieved of the duty to capture Guam.
   - The 48th Division would have Detachment C carry out advance landings at Aparri, Vigan and Laoag, while the division’s main force would land at Lingayen and seize Manila. Afterwards, the division would [be directed to] eastern Java.
   - The 16th Division would detail Detachment D and Detachment E respectively to head in advance to Davao and Legaspi, while its main force would land in Lamon Bay and head for Manila.
   - An element of the 18th Division (Detachment F) and another element of the same division (Detachment G), and an element of the 55th Division (Detachment H) would be detailed (sent in
advance) [respectively] to Miri (followed by Kuching), and the southern and western coasts of the Gulf of Thailand. The main force of the 5th Division would land in northern Malaya and go southward along its west coast.

The Imperial Guard Division would stabilize Thailand and then head southward along the west coast of Malaya.

The main force of the 55th Division would stabilize Thailand as well as carry out operations in southeastern Burma along with the advance parties, after taking over from the Imperial Guard Division.

The main force of the 18th Division would land on the southwestern coast of the Gulf of Thailand and first head for the Penang stronghold.

The 56th Division (minus Detachment A) would land on the southeastern coast of Malaya.

The 21st Division would secure French Indochina.

7. The schedule of operations was planned as follows:\(^{(10)}\)

- day \(x\) landing of the advance parties along the Gulf of Thailand
- day \(x + 2\) landings of Detachment C at Aparri, Vigan, Laoag
- day \(x + 3\) landing of Detachment D at Davao
- day \(x + 5\) landing of Detachment E at Legaspi
- day \(x + 10\) landing of the Detachment I at Guam
- day \(x + 25\) occupation of Hong Kong by the 38th Division
- day \(x + 35\) Malaya invasion army’s [possible] battle [with the enemy] at the border [of Malaya], capture of Manila
- day \(x + 45\) start of concentration of the main force of the Dutch East Indies invasion army
- day \(x + 70\) occupation of key locations in Dutch Borneo and Celebes by Detachment A
- day \(x + 85\) occupation of key locations in the southern Sumatra by the 38th Division
- day \(x + 95\) occupation of Singapore
- day \(x + 120\) preparations for landing in northern Sumatra

During the war game, the participants became acutely aware of the fact that the Burma area was a cause for worry. Therefore it was decided to newly add the 33d Division (stationed in China) to the Burma area and to establish a new army with this division and the 55th Division, which would allow the Malaya invasion army to devote itself entirely to the Malay Peninsula.\(^{(10)}\) As a result, Maj. Gen. Isayama Haruki, who until now had been considered as prospective chief of staff for the Malaya invasion army, was made the prospective chief of staff of this newly established army, which in turn resulted in the putting forward of Maj. Gen. [Col.] Manaki Takanobu, who had been considered until now the prospective vice chief of staff for the Dutch East Indies invasion army, as prospective vice chief of staff for the Malaya invasion army.\(^{(36)}\) [Manaki was promoted to major general on 15 October.]

In this war game, the [role of] commander of the Dutch East Indies army was [played by] Lt. Col. Murakami Kimisuke, the role of commander in chief of the allied naval forces by Col. Kitamura Yoshifuto, and Maj. Kondō Dempachi played the role of the assistant to the leadership of the Dutch East Indies invasion army.\(^{(23)}\)

Immediately after the war game, the persons concerned in the Office of the Army General Staff, the Ministry of War, and the Army Aviation Department made plans to visit Takananbe in Miyazaki Prefecture. The [Paratroop] Raiding Training Department, which had been trans-
ferred from Baichengzi in Manchuria to Takanabe in September and had been working hard to establish the unit and provide training to it, was finally ready to hold the first air drop maneuver of the unit in mid-October.\(^{(93)}\)

**Report to the Emperor by the Chief of the Army General Staff**

After the war game, on 10 October, Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama reported to the Emperor that operations would be carried out in the Philippines, Malaya, French Indochina, Thailand, Hong Kong, Guam, British Borneo, Dutch Borneo, Celebes, the Bismarck Archipelago (note: Rabaul area), the Moluccas and Timor, followed by invasions of Java and Sumatra; that two divisions (the 16th and the 48th Divisions) as the core would be dispatched to the Philippines, four divisions (Imperial Guard, the 5th, the 18th and the 56th Divisions) as the core to Malaya, three divisions (the 2d Division, the 48th Division, which would be re-deployed after the capture of Manila, and the 38th Division, which would be redeployed after the capture of Hong Kong) as the core to the Dutch East Indies, and to Thailand and Burma two divisions (the 55th Division and the 33d Division, the latter being added as a result of the war game) as the core would be deployed; that after a major part of the southern operation was achieved, [the Army] was going to capture Burma at a favorable opportunity (which was decided as a result of the war game); and that it was estimated that in roughly five months it would be possible to occupy most of the key areas in the South.\(^{(2)}\)

**Kanoya Map Exercise** [Map exercise at Kanoya Naval Air Base]

In the meantime, from 4 to 6 October, the Eleventh Air Fleet (the land-based naval air fleet which was to operate in the Philippines and then the Dutch East Indies starting out from Taiwan) had carried out a map exercise at Kanoya, Kyūshū. This map exercise simulated a case where three aircraft carriers would be assigned to the air strikes on Hawaii, while the other carriers would provide support in the southern Philippines, and where the invasion of Davao was to be conducted on the same day as the opening of hostilities (day x), Legaspi on day x + 2, Jolo on day x + 14, and Menado on x + 16.

**The Nagato Map Exercise** [Map Exercise on the Battleship *Nagato*]

From 9 to 13 October, the Combined Fleet held a map exercise on board the battleship *Nagato*, which lay off Murozumi in Yamaguchi Prefecture.\(^{(9)}\) At that time, no top decision had been made as to the air strike on Hawaii. Concerning the flying ranges of the [naval] fighter aircraft, research had been moving ahead on the possibility of extending their flying range enough to attack Manila and vicinity. It appears that the Combined Fleet carried out this map exercise with the idea of using six aircraft carriers for Hawaii.\(^{(112,113)}\) As for the southern operation, the idea was that the Navy was to solely focus its air power on the Philippines and after that on the Dutch East Indies, leaving air operations in Malaya entirely up to the Army; that it would have the Dutch East Indies invasion army land in eastern Java on day x + 70 via the Makassar Strait, and in western Java on day x + 80; and that it would capture Singapore via southern Sumatra, synchronizing the attack with “the Army’s Malaya invasion army which would come down south through the Malay Peninsula.” Even though the Army had decided to provide support of in total [a strength of] about one division for Miri, Ambon, Kupang and Rabaul, the [Navy] plan did not include any air support for the Army in the
Malaya area. Whereas the Army’s plan was to run great risks to finally reach western Java on day \( x + 95 \), the Navy’s plan was to arrive in eastern Java on day \( x + 70 \), in western Java on day \( x + 80 \), and southern Sumatra on day \( x + 83 \).\(^9\) [The capture of] Davao, which had been set on day \( x \) in the Kanoya Map Exercise, was now set on day \( x + 4 \). The reason for this [change] had to do with the idea that part of the air strength, which was to engage in the initial northern Philippines operation, was to be redeployed from Taiwan to Palau. The start of using Menado and Tarakan [as bases] was set even one month earlier than that in the Naval College Map Exercise of mid-September. The schedule of landings was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location Description</th>
<th>Landing Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaya (advance parties)</td>
<td>day ( x )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advance parties for northern Luzon</td>
<td>day ( x + 1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miri in British Borneo</td>
<td>day ( x + 1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legaspi in Luzon</td>
<td>day ( x + 4 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davao</td>
<td>day ( x + 4 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main force of Malaya advance corps</td>
<td>day ( x + 5 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main force for Luzon</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuching in Borneo</td>
<td>day ( x + 15 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menado and Ambon</td>
<td>day ( x + 20 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarakan</td>
<td>day ( x + 25 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kendari</td>
<td>day ( x + 30 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balikpapan</td>
<td>day ( x + 35 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makassar</td>
<td>day ( x + 40 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Force for Malaya</td>
<td>day ( x + 42 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kupang</td>
<td>day ( x + 45 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banjarmasin</td>
<td>day ( x + 55 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Java</td>
<td>day ( x + 70 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Java</td>
<td>day ( x + 80 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangka in Southern Sumatra</td>
<td>day ( x + 83 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: no date is given in the original documents for the landing by the main force on Luzon.

On 14 October, the staff officers [Prince] Takeda-no-miya and Kumon, both of whom had observed the Nagato map exercise, returned to the Army Department to give their reports.\(^9\) Further adjustment was necessary\(^9,10\) in order to make simultaneous landings on eastern and western Java possible.

**Success of the Paratroop Exercise**

The first general paratroop drop exercise was carried out in Takanabe in mid-October as scheduled. The number of spectators was large enough to make people wonder whether it might even be bigger than the number of troops doing the drop.

**Solution of the Navy’s Aviation Problem**

On 19 October, Chief of Navy General Staff Nagano decided upon the surprise attack on Hawaii by six aircraft carriers (i.e. the First Air Fleet). It was the day after the Tōjō Cabinet
Illustration No. 4—Maps Showing the Changes in Operation Plans from Late September to Early October
was established. Also around this time the problem of extending the flying range of Navy fighter aircraft (by fitting a disposable tank) was solved.\(^{(140)}\) It was decided that the Eleventh Air Fleet (i.e. land-based aircraft), while deploying the strength of its 22d Air Flotilla as the core to Malaya, would have its remaining main force (consisting of the main force of the 21st and the 23d Air Flotilla) operate from Taiwan, and that the aircraft carrier *Ryūjō* (of the 4th Carrier Division) along with the seaplane tenders *Chitose* and *Mizuho* (of the 11th Seaplane Tender Division) would operate from Palau toward Davao and Legaspi.

**The Army and the Navy’s Completion of the Operation Plans in One Stroke**

From 9 to 10 October, the Army Department had roughly finished a southern operation plan and, from 16 to 18 October, deliberated on an overall operation plan.\(^{(10)}\) However, the solution to the Navy’s aviation problem enabled it to finalize its operation plan in one stroke. On 20 October, the Navy Department informally decided on the Imperial Japanese Navy Operations Policy. At the end of October, the Army and the Navy Department conferred about a Central Agreement between the Army and Navy and by the 29th [of the month] an agreement on the basic matters was reached.\(^{(9)}\) On the 29th, the Navy Department informally informed the Combined Fleet. An assessment made by the Army and the Navy Department estimated that it would be possible to capture Hong Kong in roughly four weeks, Manila in roughly forty to fifty days or more, Singapore in roughly one hundred days or more, and that it would be possible to occupy most of the key areas in the South in roughly five months.\(^{(2)}\)

**Postponement of the Tentative Date for the Opening of Hostilities**

The tentative date for opening hostilities was now being postponed. To be more precise, based on the *Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy*, which had been decided upon on 6 September at the Imperial Conference, it had been agreed to finish war preparations by late October, but, unable to decide on war or peace even in mid-October, the [third] Konoe Cabinet resigned. The decision on war or peace was further delayed due to the formation of the Tōjō Cabinet (18 October) and the Emperor’s instruction to [abandon the decision on the *Main Points* of September and] start reconsidering it from scratch. [At the time,] the government was wholly devoting itself to negotiations with the United States in order to avoid war, which led to a situation where a postponement of the date to open hostilities was inevitable.

**Situation of the Troops Scheduled to be Deployed for the Invasion of the Dutch East Indies**

From 16 to 21 September, the 2d Division carried out a Divisional B Maneuver, received an Operation A-**GO** [southern operation] training tour from 3 to 4 October, and did tactical research for a southern operation in early October.\(^{(58)}\) The division’s provisional formation, based on Army Order A No. 63, issued on 16 September, was started sometime between 8 and 16 October, and was completed around 22 October. The division had been unofficially
informed of the Java operation. The 48th Division, which had received a telegram from IGHQ in mid-August about the change in the division’s assignment from the Malaya operation to the Philippines and Java operations and had been transferred from Fuzhou to Taiwan in early September, was presently engaged in training for the Philippine operation. The 38th Division was in the midst of preparing for the invasion of Hong Kong and had not yet been informed about its assignment to participate in the Dutch East Indies operation. The 146th Infantry Regiment, which was to constitute the core force of Detachment A, had been given provisional formation orders on 23 October, and its formation had been completed on 30 October at Ōmura in Kyūshū.

3. Completion of Plans and Issue of Orders by Imperial General Headquarters

Completion of Plans on 1 November and Shipping Plan

(See Illustration No. 5)

In late October, while Prime Minister Tōjō was reconsidering from scratch the Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy of 6 September, the Army and Navy Departments of IGHQ concluded the Army-Navy Central Agreement. [Subsequently] on 27 and 28 October, the Army Department assembled the personnel concerned of each army of the Southern Army at Ujina Shipping Transport Command, and conducted studies on shipping. As a result, on 1 November, a shipping transport plan (as in the appended chart of the Army-Navy Central Agreement) was completed, in which landings on southern Sumatra were to be carried out approximately on day \( x + 84 \), and those on eastern and western Java simultaneously on approximately day \( x + 103 \). The shipping which the Army was going to employ for the southern operation amounted to about two million tons (detailed data will be given later). The shipping transport plan for the Dutch East Indies invasion army was in outline as follows:

**56th Mixed Infantry Group** (Detachment A or Sakaguchi Detachment, which consists of an element of the 56th Division as its core): After leaving Kyūshū, it shall get ready at Palau and capture Jolo and the east coast of Borneo southward. A tonnage of 50,000 tons shall be allotted to Detachment A for its continuous use from day \( x - 22 \) up to day \( x + 89 \). The ships shall be berthed and loaded at Moji from day \( x - 22 \) to day \( x - 18 \), and stand by at Palau from day \( x - 7 \) to day \( x - 3 \), after which the detachment shall operate in accordance with the arrangements to be made with the Navy.

**South Seas Detachment** (Detachment I, which consists of one-third of the 55th Division): After leaving Shikoku, it shall get ready at the Ogasawara Islands and join the Dutch East Indies operation after capturing Guam and Rabaul. A tonnage of 50,000 tons shall be allotted to Detachment I for its continuous use from day \( x - 17 \) to day \( x + 89 \). The ships shall be berthed and loaded at Sakaide (in Shikoku) from day \( x - 17 \) to day \( x - 12 \), and the detachment shall prepare for operations at the Ogasawara Islands from day \( x - 7 \) to day \( x - 3 \), after which it shall operate in accordance with the arrangements to be made with the Navy.

**38th Division**

The 38th Division shall head from Hong Kong to southern Sumatra via Cam Ranh. The division shall be divided into an advance party, its main force and the Itō Detachment ([at this point] the plan assumed that the South Seas Detachment would be able to capture Ambon and Kupang
after the capture of Rabaul, and that Detachment B would [remain in the Division] without being dispatched separately). The advance party shall be allotted a tonnage of 30,000 tons. After leaving Hong Kong, it shall rehearse its preparations at Cam Ranh Bay until day \( x + 64 \) before departure from the bay. It shall arrive in southern Sumatra on day \( x + 78 \) and finish disembarka-
tion on day $x + 81$. The main force shall be allotted a tonnage of 120,000 tons. The ships shall be
berthed and loaded in Hong Kong from day $x + 60$ until day $x + 65$. It shall rehearse its prep-
arrations at Cam Ranh Bay from day $x + 73$ to day $x + 78$, arrive in southern Sumatra on day $x + 
84$ and finish disembarking on day $x + 89$. The Itō Detachment (one-third of the division) shall
be allotted 40,000 tons. The ships shall be berthed and loaded in Hong Kong, from day $x + 64$
to day $x + 69$. It shall rehearse preparations in Cam Ranh Bay from day $x + 93$ to day $x + 98,$
arrive at the northern coast of central Java on day $x + 103$, and complete disembarking on day
$x + 108$.

**Sixteenth Army’s main force** (consisting of the 2d Division as its core)
The 2d Division shall be provided with 150,000 tons to cover the distance between the homeland
and Taiwan. From day $x + 36$ to day $x + 41$, the ships shall be berthed and loaded at Tokyo Bay
and they shall anchor and stand by in Taiwan from day $x + 49$ to day $x + 54$. From Taiwan and
southward, the division shall be united with the other units under the direct control of the Six-
teenth Army. The first transport shall be allotted 260,000 tons. The ships shall anchor in Cam
Ranh Bay from day $x + 93$ to day $x + 98$, arrive in western Java on day $x + 103$, and complete
dismounting on day $x + 108$.

The second transport shall be allotted 170,000 tons. The ships shall anchor in Cam Ranh Bay
from day $x + 100$ to day $x + 105$, arrive in western Java on day $x + 110$, and complete disem-
barking on day $x + 115$.

The third transport shall be allotted 130,000 tons. The ships shall anchor in Cam Ranh Bay from
day $x + 113$ to day $x + 118$, arrive in western Java on day $x + 123$, and complete disembarking
on day $x + 128$.

**Core unit of the 48th Division**
Its transportation from the Philippines to eastern Java shall be divided into two stages.
The first transport shall be provided with 170,000 tons. The ships shall be berthed and loaded
in Manila Bay from day $x + 89$ to day $x + 95$, arrive in eastern Java on day $x + 103$, and complete
dismounting on day $x + 108$.

The second transport shall be allotted 100,000 tons. The ships shall be berthed and loaded in
Manila Bay from day $x + 96$ to day $x + 102$, arrive in eastern Java on day $x + 109$, and complete
dismounting on day $x + 114$.

Initially, it was planned that Detachment A [the Sakaguchi Detachment] was to take charge of
the military administration of Dutch Borneo after its capture. Later, it was decided that the Navy was to take on the responsibility for the military administration of the area and that Detachment A was to join the main force of the division in Malaya. Either way, the detachment was not scheduled to participate in the invasion of Java. In the shipping plan above, it was for the first time that the Itō Detachment’s landing on central Java was mentioned. This was decided after the war game at the War College had shown that the Kali-
jati airfield, which was close to the north coast of central Java, should be attacked and occup-
pied right after the landing and put into use, even if this [action] were to carry a risk. In the plan, the 38th Division [itself] was not to participate in the invasion of Java, as it was assigned to occupy numerous oil fields and airfields situated over a vast area in southern Sumatra. [Furthermore,] the issue of when exactly the South Seas Detachment would be able to join the Dutch East Indies campaign from out of Rabaul became a troublesome item in drawing up the operational plans for the Dutch East Indies invasion army.
Illustration No. 6—Rough Overview of the Disposition of the Allied and Japanese Forces
Decision on the Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy, and Orders Issued by Imperial General Headquarters

At the Imperial Conference on 5 November, the Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy were decided upon. While resolved to wage war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands [if necessary] and setting the time for the start of military actions at the beginning of December and having the Army and the Navy complete their operational preparations [by that time], they stated that the launch of military actions would be aborted should the negotiations with the United States prove successful by 0000 on 1 December.\(^{(3,7)}\)

Based on the decisions taken at the Imperial Conference, the same day (5 [November]) orders were given for the provisional formation of the Southern Army headquarters and respectively the headquarters of the Fourteenth Army (Philippines), the Fifteenth Army (Thailand and Burma) and the Sixteenth Army (Dutch East Indies).\(^{(52)}\) The Malaya area was assigned to the headquarters of the Twenty-fifth Army, which heretofore was stationed in French Indochina, and its formation was revised as well [for the new assignment].

On the following day, the 6th, the order of battle (note: the formation of armies for a campaign, ordered by the Emperor in the incidence of war) for the Southern Army and the South Seas Detachment were issued, and orders were given [to the Southern Army] to prepare to occupy the southern key areas (and to the South Seas Detachment to capture Guam). On the same day, orders were sent to the China Expeditionary Army to prepare to seize Hong Kong.\(^{(1)}\) Also the orders of appointment of the commander in chief of the Southern Army and his subordinates were issued on that day.

Meanwhile on the 5th, the Navy ordered the Combined Fleet to implement the necessary preparations for operations against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands. At the same time, in preparation for the above-mentioned operations, the Navy Department of IGHQ instructed the Combined Fleet to have the units involved in the operation proceed to and be at the ready at the positions to be taken before the launch of the operations.\(^{(1)}\)

Then on 15 November, the Army and the Navy Departments of IGHQ carried out a war game in the presence of the Emperor and explained the plan of the southern operation.\(^{(2)}\) On this day, the Army Department issued the order to the Southern Army for the execution of the invasions of the southern key areas.\(^{(3)}\)

Needless to say, the date and time of the launch of the invasion operations was put on hold. On 21 November, the Navy Department ordered the Combined Fleet to have the units involved in the operations proceed to their stand-by positions at sea.\(^{(1)}\)

Assessment of the Current Position of the Enemy and the Prospects for the Campaign

On 3 and 5 November, Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama, alongside Chief of the Navy General Staff Nagano, reported to the Emperor about the operation plan. The position of the enemy at the beginning of September\(^{(2,7)}\) has already been related. The Japanese forces to be employed for the operation (compared to the total force), which had been recently determined, were in outline as follows:\(^{(2)}\)
Army

Ground forces: employment of eleven divisions for the southern operation out of a total of fifty-one divisions.

Air forces: two numbered air forces (seventy squadrons, seven hundred aircraft) were to be employed for the southern operation out of a total of five numbered air forces (151 squadrons, 1500 aircraft).

Navy

In his explanation to the Emperor, Chief of Army General Staff Sugiyama gave the following account: (2) *(See Illustration No. 6)*

1. With the outbreak of the Second European War, the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact and in particular our advance towards the southern regions, the military preparedness of the armies of the countries in the southern regions is gradually being built up. Malaya has an army strength of about 60,000 to 70,000 troops and about 320 aircraft. The Philippines has an army strength of about 42,000 troops and about 170 aircraft, the Dutch East Indies of about 85,000 troops and about 300 aircraft, and Burma of about 35,000 troops and about 60 aircraft. Compared to the numbers before the outbreak of the European war, the army strength in Malaya has increased by about eight times, that in the Philippines by about four times, that in the Dutch East Indies by about two-and-a-half times and that in Burma by about five times. At present, the total number amounts to about 200,000 troops and it is expected that the rate of increase will grow even further from now on. When it comes to an opening of hostilities, [further] reinforcements from India, Australia and New Zealand are expected. The current military strength in these areas is estimated to be 300,000 troops or more and about 200 aircraft in India, about 250,000 troops and about 300 aircraft in Australia, and about 70,000 troops and about 150 aircraft in New Zealand. The ground forces of these areas, although there may be regional differences, consist of indigenous troops, each with some 30 percent white soldiers from the homeland as the core. As their military training is insufficient, their fighting power is generally low. However, the fact that they are well accustomed to the tropical climate has to be kept in mind. In addition, due to superior aircraft performance and relatively skilled pilots, their air combat efficiency cannot be viewed lightly, compared to [the combat efficiency of] the ground forces.

2. Presently the Imperial [Japanese] Army consists of fifty-one divisions as its core with approximately two million troops altogether, of which some fifteen divisions are deployed in Manchuria.
and Korea as counterforce against [the Soviets] in the North, and some twenty-four divisions in China as counterforce against the Chinese. The military strength to be put into the southern operation is planned to be formed with one division currently in French Indochina, about five divisions currently in training and standing by in the [Japanese] homeland and Taiwan, and five divisions to be redeployed from China, which make a total of about eleven divisions, ready to be deployed as needed.

3. We would like to set the time of the opening of hostilities at the beginning of December due to the following matters: (1) As time progresses, Japan is put in a less and less favorable position in military preparedness compared to the United States. Especially the disparity in air armaments is expected to increase rapidly. (2) American preparations for war, including the defense of the Philippines, will make fast progress. (3) Defense ties between the United States, Britain and the Netherlands will grow increasingly tighter, and the total defensive strength in the southern regions will be reinforced rapidly. (4) The occurrence of a northern operation has also to be taken into account from next spring onward. (5) Weather conditions in and around the areas of operation [have also to be taken into consideration].

4. Prospects for the operations: The Southern Army, in conjunction with the Combined Fleet, starts operations simultaneously by means of preemptive sudden attacks against the Philippines and Malaya, and swiftly captures southern key areas. Territories to be captured are the Philippines, British Malaya, Burma, the Dutch East Indies, and Timor. Apart from this, the China Expeditionary Army captures Hong Kong with part of its forces. The main constituent of the army operations in the initial period as outlined above are, of course, the landing operations, which are to be carried out against defended strongholds under a scorching heat and after traveling a long distance over sea while clearing away attacks by enemy submarines and aircraft. Therefore, considerable difficulties are to be expected. Yet, seen in a broader perspective, the fighting power of the enemy is dispersed over a wide area and even separated by the sea, which makes it difficult for them to act in conjunction. Also, they are in a context where it is rather difficult to swiftly bring in reinforcements from India and Australia against our sudden attacks. On the contrary, our side will be able to defeat our enemies one by one by using our concentrated fighting power in a sudden offensive. Therefore, by making full use of our organization, equipment, resources, combat tactics and strategy, which have continuously been improved in a creative way, and coupled with a close cooperation between the Army and the Navy, we are convinced of certain victory. We believe that we have definitely all the odds in our favor for the operations after landing, considering the organization, equipment, potential and strength of the enemy and our side. After roughly wrapping up the invasion operations of the southern key areas, every effort is to be made to take the fight out of the enemy through both political and military strategy and to conclude the war as quickly as possible, but it is imperative to anticipate the possibility that the war will extend over a long period. Nevertheless, we can strategically maintain an unbeatable position by occupying and securing the military bases and air bases of the enemy, and by securing sea traffic, which will almost certainly enable us to destroy the enemy plans by employing every possible means.

5. As for the North, the chances of the Soviets advancing and actively taking the offensive are extremely small as long as the Kwantung Army stays in place.

**Operation Plan of the Army (See Illustrations No. 7 and No. 8)**

The operation plan drawn up by the Army Department of IGHQ principally concerned the southern operation. The gist of the southern operation was that at the opening of hostilities, the Twenty-fifth Army (consisting of the 5th Division at first, then joined by the Imperial Guard Division, the 18th and the 56th Division one after another in this order) would advance upon Malaya; then, the Fourteenth Army (advance parties at first, then joined by the main
force of the 48th and the 16th Divisions) would advance upon the Philippines; an element of the China Expeditionary Army (i.e. the 38th Division) would advance upon Hong Kong after confirmation of the landings in Malaya; as the invasions of Malaya and the Philippines progressed, the Sixteenth Army (consisting of the 2d Division, and joined by the 38th and the 48th Divisions after their captures of Hong Kong and Manila respectively) would advance upon the Dutch East Indies by using the above [places] as bases and occupy the key resource areas [in the Dutch East Indies]; apart from the above, the Fifteenth Army (which in the early stages has the Imperial Guard Division temporarily under its command, and which is joined by the 55th and the 33d Divisions sequentially in this order) would conduct operations in
Thailand and southeastern Burma; the 21st Division would stabilize and secure French Indochina; the Twenty-fifth Army would capture northern Sumatra after Malaya. As these operations progressed, the overall aim was to completely secure the southern areas. The summary of the plan was as follows. Based on the decisions of the Imperial Conference on the 5th of November, the forces to be deployed in the southern operation were supposed to change their positions by the end of November as shown in Illustration No. 7.

Summary of the General Operation Plan of the Imperial Japanese Army

I. Southern Operation

1. Operational objective: The objective of the southern operation is to destroy the major bases of the United States, Britain and the Dutch East Indies in East Asia and to occupy and secure the key areas of the South. The areas intended to be occupied in this operation are the Philippines, Guam, Hong Kong, British Malaya, Burma, Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, the Bismarck Archipelago, Dutch Timor, etc.

2. Mission: The Army and Navy, in close cooperation, shall simultaneously start operations in the Philippines and British Malaya, and strive to accomplish the operational objectives as quickly as possible.

3. Operational directives:

   (1) The operation shall start with the landing of advance corps in Malaya and air strikes on the Philippines, and taking advantage of the results of the air operations, the main forces of the armies in charge of each place shall be put ashore in the Philippines first, then in Malaya, and promptly capture the Philippines and Malaya. Apart from this, in the early stages of the operation, the strategic points of Guam, Hong Kong and British Borneo shall be captured and stability in Thailand and Indochina shall be secured. Meanwhile, the strategic points of the Bismarck Archipelago, Dutch Borneo and Celebes shall be captured as quickly as possible, and, as the Malaya operation progresses, the strategic points in southern Sumatra shall be occupied and the key resource areas secured, while making preparations for operations to attack Java. The strategic points of the Moluccas and Timor shall also be occupied.

   (2) While preparing the air bases to attack Java, superiority shall be gained over the enemy’s air power and Java shall be captured. After Singapore has been occupied, strategic areas in northern Sumatra shall be occupied in a timely manner.

   (3) Even when the Combined Fleet changes its deployment to an interception position in response to an action of the main U.S. fleet, or when the Soviets join the war during the above operations, the Philippine and Malaya operations shall be continued and the previously-defined objectives of the operation shall be accomplished as quickly as possible.

   (4) During the above operations, air bases in southern Burma shall be seized at favorable opportunities, and when most of the operations are wound up, operations to deal with Burma shall be carried out in as far as the situation permits.

   (5) In principle, the landing operations shall be carried out in the face of the enemy while clearing away attacks of its ground, naval and air forces.

   (6) Operations in case the British army invades Thailand ahead of us while we are preparing for the operations ... (Omitted by the author.)

   (7) If attacked by the enemy while preparing for operations, the units on location shall intercept the enemy at the right moment. If this attack should be made after the issue of the order to start the operation, an attack operation shall be launched immediately.

4. Strength employed:

The military strength to be employed for this operation as a whole shall consist of 11 divisions, 9 tank regiments, 2 numbered air forces, and other necessary units under the direct
control of the [Southern] Army as the core. The distribution of these forces and target areas is planned as follows:

The Southern Army

The Fourteenth Army shall consist of 2 divisions as its core and conduct operations in the Philippines area.

The Fifteenth Army shall consist of 2 divisions as its core and conduct operations in the Thailand and Burma areas.

The Sixteenth Army shall consist of 3 divisions (of which 2 divisions shall be diverted from other operations after their completion) as its core and conduct operations in the Dutch East Indies area.

The Twenty-fifth Army shall consist of 4 divisions as its core and conduct operations in the Malaya area.

The unit under the direct control of the Southern Army shall consist of 1 division, 1 mixed brigade, and 2 numbered air forces as its core.

The Twenty-third Army (under the command of the China Expeditionary Army) shall conduct operations in the Hong Kong area with a force of 1 division as its core.

The South Seas Detachment (under the direct control of [the Army Department of] IGHQ) shall consist of 3 infantry battalions as its core and conduct operations in Guam, the Bismarck Archipelago, etc.

5. Launch of the operation:

1. The date to start the operation (the first day of the operation) shall be specified separately... (Omitted by the author.)

6. Outline of the operations:

(1) Operation against the Philippines

The objective of the operation against the Philippines is to defeat the enemy in the Philippines and destroy its major bases. Right at the outset of the war, the air units of the Army and the Navy, in conjunction with each other, shall carry out air strikes against the air power and the naval vessels of the enemy in the Philippines from the direction of Taiwan and Palau as well as from the sea. The Navy units shall make a sudden attack on Batan Island and immediately get the airfield ready for use. Advance parties shall leave the assembly points after the evening of the day before the first air strike against the Philippines, and with the cooperation of the Army and the Navy land in or around Aparri, Vigan (and then Laoag), Legaspi, and Davao, occupy the air bases first and get them ready for use. Then they shall occupy Jolo as quickly as possible, and get the air base ready for use. Hand in hand with the above operations, the air units of the Army and the Navy shall advance the air bases and continue the air operations. Exploiting the results of these operations, the Fourteenth Army shall start landing, by around the 15th day of the operations at the latest, its main force around Lingayen Gulf and part of its force around Lamon Bay escorted by a [naval] unit consisting of the Third Fleet as its core. It shall promptly capture Manila and occupy key places in the islands. After the landing of the main force of the army, a mixed brigade shall advance on Luzon Island at the right moment. When the objective of the operation is almost achieved, the 48th Division shall assemble in or around Manila [to be redeployed] as part of the force for the capture of the Dutch East Indies.

(2) Operation against British Malaya

The objective of the operation against British Malaya is to defeat the enemy in this area, capture its strategic points, Singapore in particular, and destroy the British bases in East Asia. The unit [to attack British Malaya] consisting of the Twenty-fifth Army, the Third Air Force and the Southern Expeditionary Fleet as its core, shall make surprise landings in or around Ban Don, Nakhon, Singora and Pattani with advance corps on the first day
of the operation, promptly occupy airfields, and get them ready for use, while air units of the Army and the Navy, on and after the first day of the operation, carry out preemptive air strikes against the air power and the naval vessels of the enemy mainly in British Malaya from the direction of southern Indochina. ([The next] part, omitted by the author, concerned operations in case the landings experienced difficulties due to obstruction by the enemy.) Depending on the arrival of some of the ships that have escorted the main force of the Fourteenth Army [for the invasion of the Philippines], the main force of the Twenty-fifth Army shall be put ashore in southern Thailand in quick succession, and expanding on the military gains achieved by the advance landing corps in Malaya, it shall promptly capture Singapore. As the operation progresses, one corps shall seize an opportunity and shall land on the east coast of Malaya at a point as far to the south as possible.

(3) Operation against British Borneo
The objective of the operation against British Borneo is to occupy and secure key resource areas and air bases. Right at the opening of hostilities, an element of the unit under the direct control of the Southern Army shall carry out a sudden attack on Miri, occupy the place, and secure its key resource areas and its air base. Once Miri is occupied, it shall occupy Kuching, secure its air base and get it ready for use in order to let the Navy advance its air units.

(4) Operation against Hong Kong
The objective of the operation against Hong Kong is to defeat the enemy and capture Hong Kong. After confirming the landings of the advance corps or air strikes in Malaya, the unit consisting of a corps of the Twenty-third Army and the Second China Expeditionary Fleet as its core shall start the operation. First, it shall destroy the warships of the enemy on location, break through the enemy’s position on Kowloon Peninsula, and then capture Hong Kong Island. After completion of the capture of Hong Kong, the corps concerned shall assemble near Hong Kong [to be redeployed] as [part of] the force for the capture of the Dutch East Indies.

(5) Operation against Guam and the Bismarck Archipelago
The objective of the operation against Guam and the Bismarck Archipelago is to capture Guam first, then occupy air base(s) in the Bismarck Archipelago, and pin down the threat of the enemy in the equatorial Pacific Islands area. At the beginning of the operations, the unit consisting of the South Seas Detachment and the Fourth Fleet as its core shall capture Guam. There the South Seas Detachment turns over [its task of] guarding Guam to the [naval] landing force. [Then] the Army and the Navy in conjunction shall seize an opportunity to occupy Rabaul and secure the air base. After that, the South Seas Detachment shall turn over [its task of] guarding Rabaul to the [naval] landing force as quickly as possible, and move toward the vicinity of Palau.

(6) Operation against the Dutch East Indies
The objective of the operation against the Dutch East Indies is to defeat the enemy in the Dutch East Indies, capture their bases, and occupy and secure key resource areas. While the Philippines operation is underway, the Army and the Navy, in conjunction, shall support an element of the Sixteenth Army to capture Tarakan as quickly as possible. Then, depending on the situation of the Philippines and Malaya operations, they shall successively capture Balikpapan and Banjarmasin, and seizing an opportunity in the course of the above operations or after their completion, capture Ambon and Kupang, get the necessary air bases ready for use, and secure key resource areas as well. Meanwhile about the same time as the capture of Tarakan, the Navy on its own account shall occupy and secure Menado first, then Kendari and Makassar. The guarding of Tarakan and Ambon shall be taken over by the Navy as quickly as possible when the major part of each op-
operation in these areas is finished. Apart from [this], as the operations in British Malaya progress, another element of the Sixteenth Army shall seize an opportunity to occupy the strategic points of Bangka Island and Palembang, get the air bases ready for use, and secure the key resource areas as well. After having brought the air power of the enemy on Java under control while preparing the air bases, the main force of the Sixteenth Army and a corps diverted from the Philippine Islands shall land in the vicinity of Batavia in western Java and in the vicinity of Surabaya in eastern Java respectively. They shall promptly occupy Batavia, Bandung and Surabaya, and continue to mop up other key areas on Java. Once it becomes possible to take control of the Strait of Malacca after the occupation of Singapore, an element of the Twenty-fifth Army shall land at the right moment in the vicinity of Medan from the direction of the west coast of the Malay Peninsula to occupy key areas in the Aceh region and, seizing an opportunity, Sabang Island.

(7) Operations against Thailand and Burma
The objective of the initial operations against Thailand and Burma is to secure the stability of Thailand, facilitate the operations in Malaya, and prepare for subsequent operations in Burma. Right at the opening of hostilities, the Fifteenth Army shall have an element of its force make its way into central and southern Thailand from southern Indochina by land and by sea, and secure key places in these areas, while occupying with part of this force the vicinity of Victoria Point. One corps of the main force of the Fifteenth Army shall leave Indochina mainly by land right after the opening of hostilities, while another corps shall leave port in northern China after the opening of hostilities. Each corps shall advance toward the vicinity of Bangkok from around the 40th day of the operation, and occupy key places in Thailand. As the main force of the Fifteenth Army arrives, an element of the Twenty-fifth Army shall be diverted toward the area of its main force by land and by sea as soon as possible. The Fifteenth Army shall seize an opportunity to occupy Moulmein and other air bases with a part of its force.

(8) Apart from [the above], a corps under the direct control of the Southern Army shall leave port in northern China in the wake of the reinforcements for the Fifteenth Army, and arriving in Indochina, take charge of securing stability in this area. In particular, it shall be on the watch for an approach of the Chinese Army.

7. Outline of the air operation
(1) Mission: The air units of the Army, in conjunction with those of the Navy, shall carry out preemptive air strikes on enemy air bases right at the outset of the war, gain command of the air and facilitate the landings of the landing troops, after which they shall support ground operations.

(2) Outline
(a) The air operation of the Army shall give priority to the Malaya area.
(b) Before the start of the war, air bases shall be advanced as follows:
   To southern Taiwan for the attack on the Philippines;
   To southern Indochina for the attack on Malaya.
(c) Air strike operations shall start on day x, i.e. the day of the start of the landings by the ground troops. However, if [our air units] are seriously attacked by the enemy on day x or before, they shall start advancing at the right moment in conjunction with the Navy. Also, if enemy planes seem to repeatedly reconnoiter our important bases and convoys, they shall be shot down.
(d) The Army air units shall mainly take charge of covering the convoys of the landing troops, to which they are assigned on days x – 1 and x – 2.
(e) The operation to advance air units shall start at dawn on day x; [the units] shall pin down the enemy’s [ability for] action by surprise attacks on their main bases all at once and facilitate the operations of the landing troops.
For this purpose, the strikes shall be focused on airfields where bombers, torpedo bombers in particular, of the enemy are stationed.

(f) Once the landing troops have landed, [the air units] shall promptly advance their bases to the enemy’s territory and closely cooperate with the ground operations. For this, about half of the ground duty units shall accompany the first landing units, occupy the airfields and get them ready for use.

(3) Disposition of the forces:

(a) The Third Air Force (consisting of 5 fighter air groups, 4 light bomber air groups, 4 heavy bomber air groups, and 1 reconnaissance plane air group as its core, including 1 air group each out of the Fifth Air Force’s fighter, light bomber, and heavy bomber air groups) shall first create a diversion through a Kunming operation by temporarily deploying in southern China and northern Indochina, and then advance rapidly to deploy in southern Indochina just before the opening of hostilities to take charge of covering the convoy of the advance corps of the Twenty-fifth Army in the Gulf of Thailand. On day x, it shall carry out preemptive air strikes on air bases in northern Malaya with its main force and those in southern Thailand with part of its force in order to facilitate the landing operations. After that, the Third Air Force shall promptly advance its main force to Malaya and part of its force to Thailand as rapidly as possible and cooperate directly with the ground operations while continuing to destroy the air power of the enemy.

(b) The Fifth Air Force (consisting of 1 fighter air group, 2 light bomber air groups, 1 heavy bomber air group, and 1 reconnaissance plane air group as its core, minus 1 fighter, light bomber and heavy bomber air group each) shall deploy in southern Taiwan, and in conjunction with Navy air units carry out preemptive air strikes on the air bases located at latitude 16º north and northward on Luzon Island to facilitate the landing operations. After that, it shall take charge of covering the convoy of the main force of the Fourteenth Army, and advance its main force to Luzon Island as rapidly as possible to cooperate directly with the ground operations while continuing to destroy the air power of the enemy. Just before the opening of hostilities, 1 fighter air group shall be added.

8. Outline of the lines of communication

(1) Southern French Indochina shall be designated as the main lines-of-communication relay point for the southern operation as a whole; Taiwan shall be designated as a supply transfer base, and Guangdong [Canton] as an auxiliary supply transfer base.

(2) Line-of-communication units required in the South shall mainly be provided by diverting units from Manchuria, while all the units in China shall be kept in reserve without being diverted.

(3) Based on the principle that most of the military power of the nation shall be committed to the southern operation, operation materials in the homeland as well as in Manchuria shall be gathered and appropriated for the southern operation, and [all] the matériel required by the Southern Army for one campaign shall be sent in the first [transport] simultaneously with the transport for the landing operation or immediately [after] that.

(4) The supply to our armed forces shall be focused on [the forces] in the South. Manchuria and China shall be designated as sources of supply of materials; concerning [the forces] in China in particular, measures to enable them to support themselves on site on their own account shall be stepped up to the limit.

II. Operations against China in the wake of the start of the Southern Operation (Omitted by the author)
III. Operations against Russia in the wake of the start of the Southern Operation (Omitted by the author)

Operation Plan of the Navy

The Navy Department of IGHQ drew up the following operation plan,\(^{(1)}\) based on which the Combined Fleet made a detailed plan in which from the Combined Fleet the Second Fleet was assigned the southern operation in general, the Eleventh Air Fleet the air operations mainly in the Philippines and subsequently the Dutch East Indies, the Third Fleet the sea operations in these areas, and the Southern Expeditionary Fleet the sea operations in the Malaya area. From way back, the Third Fleet had been the fleet intended for the Philippines operations in the event of an outbreak of war with the United States. The Combined Fleet had been carefully considering a case in which the U.S. Pacific Fleet would come to the attack in the middle of a southern operation.

Mission of the Imperial Japanese Navy for War against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands

Part 1. Mission in Case War against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands Breaks Out During the Operation Against China

Chapter 1. Summary

1. The outline of the operational policy of the Imperial Japanese Navy — while continuing [operations] to take control of the Chinese coast and the lower reaches of the Yangzi basin — is to promptly destroy the enemy fleet and air power in the East, to occupy and secure strategic regions in the South, to build up a sustainable and unbeatable position, and [eventually] to destroy [more of] the enemy’s fleet and in the end take the fight out of the enemy.

Chapter 2. Mission of the Combined Fleet

Section 1. Stage-one operations

2. The unit consisting of the Second Fleet, the Third Fleet, the Southern Expeditionary Fleet, and the Eleventh Air Fleet as its core shall clear the sea in the Philippines, British Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies of the enemy fleet, destroy them and in conjunction with the Army carry out the following operations:

   (1) [The unit] shall launch operations against British Malaya and the Philippines simultaneously, conduct preemptive air strikes on the air and naval forces of the enemy in these areas and [at the same time] put ashore the Army’s advance corps in the key areas in Malaya and the Philippines as quickly as possible in order to push ahead the air units and intensify the air operations.

   (2) After the above operations [in 2.(1)] produce results, the main force of the Army’s invasion force shall be put ashore in the Philippines and then in Malaya to promptly capture the Philippines and British Malaya.

   (3) In the early stages of the operations, strategic places in British Borneo shall be occupied, followed by those in Dutch Borneo, the Celebes, and southern Sumatra at the earliest opportunity. Key places in the Moluccas and Timor shall [also] be occupied at favorable opportunities and the air bases there shall be made ready for use.

   (4) As soon as the air bases mentioned in the above [2.(3)] have been made ready for use, air units shall be advanced one after another to suppress the air power of the enemy in the Java
area. After [the operation] gets results, the main force of the Army’s invasion force shall be put ashore on Java and capture it.

(5) After capturing Singapore, strategic areas in northern Sumatra shall be occupied and operations against Burma shall be conducted at the right moment in order to block the enemy’s supply route to China.

3. The unit with the Fourth Fleet as its core is assigned to defend and patrol the equatorial Pacific Islands and protect the sea-lanes in the area. It shall capture Wake Island right at the opening of hostilities and, in conjunction with the Army, capture Guam and then the strategic places in the Bismarck Archipelago at the right moment. Further, it shall attack and destroy advance bases of the enemy in the South Pacific at the right moment.

4. The unit consisting of the Fifth Fleet as its core shall patrol the sea to the east of Japan, be ready for surprise attacks of the enemy, and keep watch on the Aleutian Islands area. It shall also defend the Ogasawara Islands and protect sea traffic in the area. At the same time it shall be on its alert for Russia.

5. The unit with the Sixth Fleet as its core shall be dispatched to the Hawaiian Islands and the U.S. West Coast right at the opening of hostilities. It is assigned to reconnoiter and watch on the enemy fleet, conduct surprise attacks on it, and disrupt the sea-lanes [of the enemy] in the area.

6. The unit consisting of the First Air Fleet as its core shall conduct a surprise attack on the enemy fleet in Hawaii right at the outset of the war and strive to degrade its power. After that, it shall mainly be assigned to support the operations of the Fourth Fleet and the southern operation.

7. The main force of the Combined Fleet shall be assigned to support operations as a whole and take action at the right moment according to the movements of the enemy fleet.

8. An element of the Combined Fleet shall be assigned to disrupt the sea-lanes of the enemy in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas at the right moment.

9. As for Thailand and French Indochina, efforts shall be made to the utmost extent not to arouse the hostility of the people while making them accept our operations. However, if any hostile behavior is observed, armed force shall be used without hesitation so as not to let them hinder our operations.

Section 2. Stage-two operations
(Omitted by the author. [It concerns] operations after the capture of strategic regions in the South.)

Chapter 3. Mission of the China Area Fleet (Omitted by the author)

Chapter 4. Mission of the units stationed at naval stations and strategic ports (Omitted by the author)

Part 2. Mission in Case War Against Russia Breaks Out During the Operations Against the United States, Britain, the Netherlands and China (Omitted by the author)

The First Fleet (covering the Inland Sea of Japan) consisted of eight battleships as its core, the Second Fleet consisted of thirteen heavy cruisers as its core, the Third and the Fourth Fleet of three (and the Fifth of two) light cruisers as their core. The Sixth Fleet was a submarine fleet, the First Air Fleet was an aircraft carrier [unit], and the Eleventh Air Fleet was a land-based air unit.
The Order Issued by the Army Department of Imperial General Headquarters to Prepare for Attack, the Instructions Given by the Chief of the Army General Staff, and the [Army-Navy] Central Agreement

The order of battle of the Southern Army, issued on 6 November, was in outline as follows:

Commander in chief of the Southern Army: General Terauchi Hisaichi
General Headquarters of the Southern Army
Fourteenth Army: Army commander, Lt. Gen. Homma Masaharu; [consisting of] the 16th and the 48th Divisions and the 65th Brigade as its core
Fifteenth Army: Army commander, Lt. Gen. Iida Shōjirō; [consisting of] the 33d and the 55th Divisions (minus an element of the division) as its core
Sixteenth Army: Army commander, Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi; [consisting of] the 2d Division and the 56th Mixed Infantry Group as its core
Twenty-fifth Army: Army commander, Lt. Gen. Yamashita Tomoyuki; [consisting of] the Imperial Guard Division, the 5th, the 18th, and the 56th Divisions as its core
21st Division
21st Independent Mixed Brigade
4th Independent Mixed Regiment
Third Air Force: Commander, Lt. Gen. Sugawara Michio; [consisting of] the 3d, the 7th, and the 12th Air Divisions, and the 81st Air Group as its core
Fifth Air Force: Commander, Lt. Gen. Obata Hideyoshi; [consisting of] the 4th and the 10th Air Divisions as its core
10th, 21st and 83d Independent Air Units

The order of battle of the South Seas Detachment issued on the same day was as follows:

Detachment commander: Maj. Gen. Horii Tomitarō, commander of the 55th Infantry Group; [consisting of] the 55th Division’s Infantry Group headquarters and the 144th Infantry Regiment as its core.\(^{(22)}\)

The order given by the Army Department of IGHQ [Tairikumei] on 6 November to the commander in chief of the Southern Army to prepare for attack read:

(1) IGHQ shall prepare for the seizure of strategic regions in the South. (2) The commander in chief of the Southern Army, in cooperation with the Navy, shall assemble the main force of his army in Indochina, southern China, Taiwan, the Southwest Islands [stretching between the south of Kyūshū and the north of Taiwan], and the equatorial Pacific Islands and prepare to seize strategic areas in the South. Separate orders shall be issued for offensive operations (… the rest is omitted [by the author]).\(^{(1)}\)

The order given by the Army Department of IGHQ on the same day to the South Seas Detachment commander read:
The commander of the South Seas Detachment, in conjunction with the Navy, shall proceed to the Ogasawara Islands and prepare for the capture of Guam. Separate orders shall be issued for offensive operations.\(^{(1)}\)

On the same day (the 6th), based on the above IGHQ Army Department Order, Chief of the Army General Staff Sugiyama issued an instruction [Tairikushi] to the commander in chief of the Southern Army:

> Based on IGHQ Army Department Order No. 556, I instruct you as follows: (1) Summary of the operations of the Southern Army and the Army-Navy Central Agreement for the Southern Operation to which the commander in chief of the Southern Army shall conform in making preparations for the southern operation are specified in the separate volume. (2) The commander in chief of the Southern Army shall finish preparations for the operation by around the end of November (… the rest is omitted by the author).\(^{(1)}\)

The above-mentioned “Summary of the operations of the Southern Army” was an extract of required information from the previously mentioned “Summary of the General Operation Plan of the Imperial Japanese Army.”\(^{(23)}\) The above-mentioned “Army-Navy Central Agreement” was an agreement made by central command [i.e. the Army and the Navy Department of IGHQ] to establish the cooperation between the two forces, which consisted of: (1) Operational objectives, (2) Mission, (3) Strength employed, (4) Launch of the operation, (5) Outline of the operations, (6) Arrangements about command, (7) Aviation, (8) Sea transportation and communications, (9) Supply and medical affairs, (10) Transport and escort, (11) Time and date of the launch of operations and the time to be used for the operations, (12) Agreement between the Army and the Navy commanders, (13) Information, (14) Operation name and tactical map, (15) Exchange of intelligence, etc. And the separate volume on “The Army-Navy Central Agreement on the air [operations] for the Southern Operation” contained agreements on (1) Strength employed, (2) Outline of the Philippines operations, (3) Outline of Malaya, Burma, British Borneo operations, and (4) Outline of the Dutch East Indies operations.\(^{(23)}\)

The main points relevant to the Dutch East Indies operations in the Army-Navy central agreement for the southern operation and the Army-Navy central agreement on the air [operations] for the southern operation were in outline as follows:\(^{(23)}\)

1. In the southern operation (Operation A-GÔ), operations against the Philippines (Operation M), against Malaya (Operation E), against British Borneo (Operation B), and subsequently against the Dutch East Indies (Operation H) shall be carried out. Assigned to the Sixteenth Army charged with the Dutch East Indies operation are the 2d Division, the 38th Division (to be diverted after the Hong Kong operation), and the 48th Division (to be diverted after capturing Manila), the 56th Mixed Infantry Group (Sakaguchi Detachment), South Seas Detachment (to be diverted after the captures of Guam and Rabaul), three tank regiments, five artillery battalions under the direct control of the Army, and eighty-eight antiaircraft guns as the core.

2. The Fourteenth Army shall conduct operations against the Philippines from Taiwan, the Penghu Islands, the Southwest Islands, and Palau; the Twenty-fifth Army shall conduct operations against Malaya from Hainan Island and southern French Indochina; and one detachment under the direct control of the Southern Army (the Kawaguchi Detachment, an element of the 18th Division) shall conduct operations against Miri, and subsequently Kuching in British Borneo from Cam Ranh Bay, and get the air bases there ready for use. Out of the advance parties to attack the Philippines, the unit charged with the capture of Legaspi and Davao shall leave Palau after
Illustration No. 8 - Overview of the Operation Plan of the Army

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the evening of the day before the first air strike against the Philippines, make a landing, and first of all occupy the air bases and get them ready for use. Then, it shall occupy Jolo and set up an air base ready for use as quickly as possible. The guarding of Jolo shall be taken over by naval units.

3. The main points in conducting the Dutch East Indies operation are as described in the “General Operation Plan of the Imperial Japanese Army.” However, the assembly points for the attack units are only roughly determined as Palau for the units to capture Borneo and the Moluccas, as Hong Kong for the units to capture Sumatra, as Luzon Island for the units to land in eastern Java, and as Taiwan and Hong Kong for the units to land in western Java.

4. The operations of the Second, the Third, and the Southern Expeditionary Fleets are as described in the above “Mission of the Imperial Japanese Navy.” The strength to be employed for the Second Fleet is the 4th, the 5th, and the 7th Cruiser Divisions (heavy cruisers), the 2d and the 4th Destroyer Squadrons, and the 3d Battleship Division (depending on the situation). The strength to be employed for the Third Fleet is the 16th Cruiser Division (light cruisers) and the 17th Minelayer Division, the 5th Destroyer Squadron, the 6th Submarine Squadron, the 12th Seaplane Tender Division, and the 1st and the 2d Base Forces. The strength to be employed for the Southern Expeditionary Fleet is the Kashii (a training cruiser), the Shimushu (a coastal defense ship), and the 9th Base Force, to which one cruiser division, one destroyer squadron, one aircraft carrier, and two seaplane tenders shall be added in the early stage of the war.

5. The agreement on the air operations was as follows: At the beginning, 279 aircraft of the main force of the Eleventh Air Fleet, 40 reconnaissance seaplanes of the Third Fleet, and 144 aircraft of the Fifth Air Force (apart from this, 30 aircraft are for the air defense of Taiwan) shall start operations in the Philippines area, and 447 aircraft of the Third Air Force, 117 aircraft of the 22d Air Flotilla, and 20 aircraft of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet shall start operations in the Malaya, Burma and British Borneo areas. Air operations in the Burma and Thailand areas are assigned to the Army, those in the Malaya area are mainly the charge of the Army, those in British Borneo are assigned to the Navy, and those in the Philippines shall be conducted jointly by the Army and the Navy. The air cover for the landings of the advance parties in Legaspi and Davao shall be provided by the Navy only. As the Philippines operations make progress, the Eleventh Air Fleet shall proceed to the Dutch East Indies operations by exclusively using airfields in the central and southern Philippines, and the Fifth Air Force shall shift its position toward Thailand. Although air operations against the Dutch East Indies shall be conducted mainly by the Navy, those against northern Sumatra shall be conducted mainly by the Army, and those against southern Sumatra and western Java shall be conducted jointly by the Army and the Navy.

6. An attack schedule shall be made based on the shipping plan completed on 1 November, which sets approximately day x + 85 for the landing in southern Sumatra and approximately day x + 103 for the landings in (both eastern and western) Java.

7. If a decision shall be made to wage war (note: that is “provided the Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy are approved at the Imperial Conference on 5 November”), the following commanders are supposed to promptly conclude [specific] arrangements between them:

(1) [The commanders in chief of] the Southern Army and the Combined Fleet and the Second Fleet

(2) [The commanders in chief of] the Southern Army and the Southern Expeditionary Fleet

(3) [The commanders of] the Fourteenth and the Sixteenth Armies and [the commander in chief of] the Third Fleet

(4) [The commanders of] the Fifteenth and the Twenty-fifth Armies and [the commander in chief of] the Southern Expeditionary Fleet
This central agreement was finally completed after its outline was agreed upon by 29 October and the shipping plan on 1 November. Since the agreement came shortly after the final decision on the Hawaii air strikes and the solution of the problem of extending the flying range of naval fighter aircraft, the result was that much of this agreement was generally based on the Army’s draft, which left the agreement with inevitable issues such as discrepancies between central command and the Shipping Transport Command, and the yet unspecified utilization plan of Navy ships.

The Order Issued by the Navy Department of Imperial General Headquarters to Prepare for Attack, the Instructions Given by the Chief of the Navy General Staff

As soon as the Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy were decided upon on 5 November, the Navy Department of IGHQ transmitted on the same day to the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet Yamamoto IGHQ Navy Department Order [Daikairei] No. 1, ordering him to prepare for operations. The order read as follows:

1. The Empire [of Japan] has decided to complete all preparations for operations, expecting to wage war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands in early December for the sake of its self-preservation and self-defense.
2. The commander in chief of the Combined Fleet shall carry out the necessary preparations for the operations.
3. For particulars, the chief of the Navy General Staff is appointed to give instructions.

Following the above Imperial Navy Order, Chief of the Navy General Staff Nagano, on the same day gave the following instruction to the commander in chief of the Combined Fleet:

The Combined Fleet shall have the necessary units advance at the right moment to take their preparatory positions before the launch of operations should the opening of hostilities with the United States, Britain and the Netherlands in early December be inevitable (… the rest is omitted by the author). (Note by the author: [this is] an instruction given by the chief of staff of the Navy Department of IGHQ [Daikaiishi].)

Orders for Invasion and Deployment

The South Seas Detachment charged with the capture of Guam and Rabaul began boarding at Sakaide in Shikoku as early as 10 November, left port on the 13th, and first headed for the Ogasawara Islands. The 56th Mixed Infantry Group charged with capture of the east coast of Borneo was assembling from Kurume divisional district for boarding at Moji due to start from the 17th onwards.
On 15 November, the Army Department of IGHQ transmitted the following IGHQ Army Department Order to capture strategic regions in the South to the Southern Army. Needless to say, negotiations with the United States were [still] in progress.

1. IGHQ intends to capture the strategic regions of the South for the sake of the Empire’s self-preservation and self-defense and the establishment of a Greater East Asia New Order.
2. The commander in chief of the Southern Army shall in cooperation with the Navy promptly capture the strategic regions in the South in accordance with the following points:
   (1) The regions to be occupied shall be the strategic areas of the Philippines, British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, and a part of Burma, etc.
   (2) (Item concerning Thailand and French Indochina. Omitted by the author.)
   (3) In implementing the operations, propaganda and disinformation activities shall be carried out mainly in the interest of conducting the prosecution of the operations in our favor.
   (4) A military administration shall be established in the occupied areas in order to restore public order and secure important national defense resources as well as means for the Army to maintain itself on its own account (... the rest omitted by the author).

When on 21 November the Navy Department of IGHQ issued its order that “the commander in chief of the Combined Fleet shall start directing the units required for conducting operations at the right moment toward the standby positions at sea,” the Carrier Task Force charged with the air strikes on Hawaii had already left the Inland Sea separately in individual ships or in small units from around the 18th onwards and was assembling in Hitokappu Bay in the southern Kuril Islands. The 56th Mixed Infantry Group (i.e. the Sakaguchi Detachment) had left Moji on the 19th for Palau. Detachment E charged with capture of Legaspi and Detachment D charged with capture of Davao, too, had left Nagoya on the 20th for Palau.

4. The Southern Army’s Plan and Orders

On 6 November, General Terauchi Hisaichi was appointed commander in chief of the Southern Army by the Emperor and on the same day received the previously described IGHQ Army Department Order to “prepare for invasion.” The principal staff officers, as described above, had been called up by the Army Department of IGHQ from late September onwards as prospective staff personnel of the Southern Army, and since then they had engaged in research side by side with the Army Department.

After receiving the IGHQ Army Department Order to prepare for invasion, the staff of the Southern Army made arrangements with the staff of the Combined Fleet and the Second Fleet on 8 and 9 November. On
the following day, Commander in Chief Terauchi signed the “Agreement between the Combined Fleet and the Southern Army” and the “Agreement between the commander in chief of the Navy in the Southern Area and the commander in chief of the Southern Army” at the War College with Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku and Commander in Chief of the Second Fleet (Navy Southern Task Force Commander) V. Adm. Kondō Nobutake. The Southern Army thereafter referred to the first as “General Agreement [Sōkyō] No. 1” (i.e. Agreement between all the forces for the South), and the latter as “General Agreement No. 2.”(23, 24)

On that day (10 November), Commander in Chief Terauchi finalized the operation plan of the Southern Army and also on the same day summoned all the army commanders under his command to the premises of the Army Department of IGHQ and gave them orders concerning the preparations for the operation.(23)

Earlier, upon receiving the previously described IGHQ Navy Department Order on 5 November, the commander in chief of the Combined Fleet released the operation plans to each unit by Operation Order No. 1 of the same date. Subsequently on 7 November, by Operation Order No. 2, he gave orders to “[Execute] the first preparations for the opening of hostilities and set Day Y on 8 December.”(107)

As the provisional formation of the headquarters of each army ordered on 5 November had been concluded, the Southern Army’s command [over these armies] came into effect on 15 November.(1, 23) On the same day, as previously described, the Army Department of IGHQ carried out a war game in the presence of the Emperor and gave the order to invade [the South]. At this time, the armies of the Southern Army, in accordance with the above-mentioned Central Agreement, were drawing up arrangements at Iwakuni in Yamaguchi Prefecture (from 14 to 16 November ) and in Saigon (from 15 to 17 November) with the fleets concerned.(23, 24) Based on the results of these arrangements, the commander in chief of the Southern Army on 20 November gave the order to invade [the South].(23, 24) [Meanwhile,] Detachment A (i.e. the Sakaguchi Detachment), which was to carry out operational preparations at Palau, had made its departure on the previous day, and Detachments D and E (the Miura and Kimura Detachments), [which] also [were to prepare at Palau], left on this day respectively from Moji and Nagoya.(53)

On 15 November, the commander in chief of the Navy in the Southern Area (i.e. the commander of the Navy Southern Task Force), V. Adm. Kondō Nobutake, gave the [Navy] Southern Task Force Operation Order No. 1. On 23 November, the commander of the Philippines ([and later] the Dutch East Indies) Unit (i.e. the commander in chief of the Third Fleet) V. Adm. Takahashi Ibō, gave the [Navy] Philippines Unit Operation Order No. 1 at the Terashima-suidō [Channel]. On 20 November, the commander of the Malaya Unit (i.e. the commander in chief of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet), V. Adm.
Ozawa Jisaburō, gave the [Navy] Malaya Unit Operation Order No. 1\(^{(110)}\) at Saigon. Around 20 November, the commander of the Air Unit (i.e. the commander in chief of the Eleventh Air Fleet), V. Adm. Tsukahara Nishizō, gave the [Navy] Air Unit Operation Order No. 1\(^{(113)}\) at Gaoxiong, Taiwan.

The Combined Fleet’s Plan and Orders

As stated above, the Combined Fleet issued Operation Order No. 1, dated 5 November. Briefly told, it ran as follows:\(^{(107)}\)

1. Stage-one operations shall be divided into three phases:
   (1) Phase-one operations: [concerns the period] from the opening of hostilities roughly until the landing of the main force of the Philippines invasion army (approx. until day \(x + 20\))
   (2) Phase-two operations: [concerns the period] from [the end of] the previous phase roughly until the landing of the main force of the British Malaya invasion army (approx. until day \(x + 40\))
   (3) Phase-three operations: [concerns the period] from [the end of] the previous phase until roughly the completion of the major part of the invasion of the Dutch East Indies.

2. Disposition of forces for phase-one shall be as follows: Main force units (under the direct control of the commander in chief of the Combined Fleet, whose core is the First Fleet, consisting of 6 battleships, 2 aircraft carriers and 2 light cruisers as the core, shall be deployed to the Inland Sea); the Carrier Task Force (whose core is the First Air Fleet, consisting of 6 aircraft carriers, 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers and 1 light cruiser as its core, shall be deployed for the air strikes on Hawaii); the Advance Unit (whose core is the Sixth Fleet, consisting of 27 submarines as the core, shall be deployed to the Hawaii area); the South Seas [Pacific Islands] Unit (whose core is the Fourth Fleet, consisting of 4 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 1 training cruiser and 1 seaplane tender as the core, shall be deployed for the capture of Guam, Wake and Rabaul); the Southern Task Force (to be explained later); the Northern Task Force (whose core is the Fifth Fleet, consisting of 2 light cruisers, 2 auxiliary cruisers and 1 seaplane tender as the core, shall be deployed for patrolling the waters east of Honshū and other tasks); the Supply Unit and others.

3. The Southern Task Force mentioned above, shall have the commander in chief of the Second Fleet as its commander and shall be subdivided as follows:
   The Main Unit shall consist of the Second Fleet as its core, with 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 10 destroyers and 12 carrier-aircraft.
   The Philippines Unit shall consist of the Third Fleet as its core, with 1 aircraft carrier, 5 heavy cruisers, 5 light cruisers, 3 seaplane tenders, 29 destroyers, base forces, and 104 carrier-aircraft.
   The Malaya Unit shall consist of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet as its core, with 5 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, 1 training cruiser, 3 seaplane tenders, 15 destroyers, 2½ land-based air units, 2 base forces, 191 aircraft.
   The Air Unit shall consist of the Eleventh Air Fleet as its core, with 5½ land-based air units, 2 destroyers, 308 aircraft [of the units].
   The Submarine Unit shall consist of the 5th Submarine Squadron as its core with 16 submarines.

4. In phase-one operations, the Southern Task Force shall be responsible for the air operations, the occupation of Batan Island, landing operations at Aparri, Vigan (Laoag), Davao, Legaspi and Jolo, the escort of the main force of the Philippines invasion army, the escort and landing operations of the Malaya invasion advance corps, the Thailand occupation units and the British Borneo invasion units.

5. In phase-two operations, the Southern Task Force shall: (1) continue with phase-one operations, [further] extend military achievements, restructure the forces for the Philippines operation,
[change focus and] prepare for invasion of the Dutch East Indies, and intensify [operations to]
destroy the air and naval war potential of the enemy in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies; (2)
escort the main force of the Malaya invasion army; (3) organize the “Dutch East Indies Unit”
from almost the same forces that constituted the “Philippines Unit” which engaged in Phase
One Operations, while leaving units to defend occupied key areas in the Philippines, whereas
the Dutch East Indies Unit shall execute invasion operations in the order of: (1) Menado,
Tarakan, (2) Balikpapan, Kendari, (3) Banjarmasin, Makassar, and depending on the situation,
Sorong, Ambon and Kupang. The 12th Seaplane Tender Division shall be added to the [Navy]
Malaya Unit before the landing of the main force of the Army’s Malaya invasion army.

6. In phase-three operations, the Southern Task Force shall: (1) continue with phase-two operations
and [further] extend military achievements; (2) escort the invasion army for Sumatra and Java;
(3) destroy sea traffic in the southern areas.

7. Disposition of the forces of the Combined Fleet in phase-two and three operations shall
be roughly the same as in phase-one operations. All units except the Southern Task Force shall con-
tinue with phase-one operations.

8. Stage-two operations
Areas to be occupied or destroyed are: (1) eastern New Guinea, New Britain, Fiji, Samoa; (2) the
Aleutians, Midway; (3) Andaman Islands, and (4) key locations in Australia.

The Agreements Between the Southern Army, the Combined Fleet, and the
Southern Task Force

As previously described, on receiving on 6 November the IGHQ Army Department Order
[Tairikumei] to prepare for invasion, the Southern Army concluded agreements with the Com-
bined Fleet and the Southern Task Force [separately] on the 10th [of the month]. In these agree-
ments (General Agreements Nos. 1 and 2) there was a matter that deserves special mention
with respect to the Dutch East Indies operation, i.e. the invasion schedule.

The Southern Army, which had heard that the prospect of being able to complete the
southern operation within 150 days had been presented to the Emperor, made it a point of
honor and became firmly determined to try as hard as possible to shorten the schedule even
further. It negotiated with the Navy and obtained an agreement which set the [estimated]
landing in Java on “approximately day x + 80” instead of “approximately day x + 103,” as
indicated in the Central Agreement at IGHQ. As previously described, draft agreements
had [already] been reached between the staffs on the 8th and the 9th, and thus [the agree-
ments] were concluded in a short time on the following day at the War College in the presence
of both chiefs of the Army and the Navy General Staff. [However, the ceremony] presented
an odd sight: Contrary to the Navy Department’s quick agreement to this plan to substanc-
tially advance the schedule, the Army Department of IGHQ, which should have been most
pleased about the advancing of the schedule, looked sullen. The reason why the Navy De-
partment quickly agreed was because it was also eager to shorten the invasion schedule,
mindful of an attack by the U.S. main fleet. Moreover, not being fully aware of [the size of]
the Army’s massive lines of communication units that accompanied it, the Navy took the
convoy escorts too lightly. In contrast to the Navy Department, the cause of the Army De-
partment’s sullen looks was not simply a matter of losing face because it had been the Army
Department that had put forward the Central Agreement schedule which [mentioned] ap-
proximately day x + 103 [as the day to land in Java] ([to be precise,] this schedule was made
at Shipping Transport Command). Rather, the reason was that the schedule had been con-
ceived to operate about two million tons of tonnage so that all ships would move as efficiently as possible between the homeland, Manchuria, China and the southern areas, back and forth (north and south), left and right (east and west) considering the current position and task of each ship for the deployment of over 300,000 troops, and this could not be modified so easily. The Army Department watched the conclusion of the agreements by the Southern Army with a sullen look, hoping that it would turn out to be an impractical idea or wishful thinking.\footnote{23, 24, 105}

The “Memorandum of Agreement between the Combined Fleet and the Southern Army (dated 10 November)” signed by General Terauchi and Admiral Yamamoto was a simple document of no more than a few lines.\footnote{23} This was because the Combined Fleet had left the specific arrangements to the Southern Task Force.

The “Memorandum of Agreement between the commander in chief of the Navy in the Southern Area and the commander in chief of the Southern Army (dated 10 November),”\footnote{23} signed by V. Adm. Kondô Nobutake and General Terauchi Hisaichi was in outline as follows:

1. Policy for joint operations. In conformity with the Central Agreement of 6 November, the objectives of the southern operation shall be accomplished within a short period of time in an atmosphere of immediate and proper cooperation.
2. Launch of the operations (omitted by the author).
3. Standard dates [to implement operations] of capturing. “[In the following chart] are the key areas, which the Army and Navy in cooperation with each other, shall capture, as well as the date of landing (along with assembly points and key areas the Navy shall capture unassisted as well as the date of landing):”

Note: M stands for [operations against] the Philippines, E for Malaya, B for British Borneo and H for the Dutch East Indies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of start of landing</th>
<th>Key areas to capture (*stands for the areas which the Navy will capture unassisted)</th>
<th>Assembly points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Day x</td>
<td>*M: Batan Island, E: Vicinities of Ban Don, Nakhon, Singora, Pattani</td>
<td>M: Magong, E: Sanya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day x + 1</td>
<td>M: Vicinity of Vigan or vicinity of Laoag and vicinity of Aparri</td>
<td>Magong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depending on the proviso of 5.2.a)</td>
<td>E: Vicinity of Kota Bharu</td>
<td>Sanya (note by the author: “Depending on the proviso of 5.2.a)” means that this will be entrusted to the agreement between the commander of the Twenty-fifth Army and the commander of the Malaya Unit)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By day x + 4</td>
<td>M: Vicinity of Legaspi</td>
<td>Palau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By day x + 6</td>
<td>M: Vicinity of Davao</td>
<td>Palau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around day x + 8</td>
<td>E: Vicinities of Singora and Pattani</td>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around day x + 8</td>
<td>B: Vicinity of Miri</td>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. Disposition of forces:
   Area H: the Sixteenth Army, consisting of the 2nd Division ([stationed in the] homeland), the 38th Division ([in] Operation C in the initial stage), the 48th Division ([in] Operation M in the initial stage), the 56th Mixed Infantry Group (i.e. the Sakaguchi Detachment: [in] Palau) and the South Seas Detachment ([in] Operations G and R in the initial stage) as its core, shall occupy Jolo, Tarakan, Balikpapan and Banjarmasin.
   Note: C refers to southern China and Hong Kong, G to Guam and R to Rabaul.
   Area B: One infantry regiment as its core, under the command of Maj. Gen. Kawaguchi Kiyo-take.
   (Other areas of which the Southern Army is in charge are omitted by the author.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Around day $x + 13$</th>
<th>B: Vicinity of Kuching</th>
<th>Miri</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Around day $x + 13$</td>
<td>M: Jolo</td>
<td>Davao</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By around day $x + 14$</td>
<td>M: Lingayen Gulf, Vicinity of Lamon Bay</td>
<td>Penghu Islands [for the unit] for Lingayen Gulf, Amami Oshima [for the unit] for Lamon Bay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around day $x + 23$</td>
<td>*H: Vicinity of Menado</td>
<td>Palau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By around day $x + 25$</td>
<td>E: South Thailand or East Coast of Malaya ([for the first [landing] of the main force], H: Vicinity of Tarakan</td>
<td>Penghu Islands (Guangdong) for Op. E, Palau for Op. H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around day $x + 35$</td>
<td>*H: Vicinity of Kendari</td>
<td>Menado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around day $x + 35$</td>
<td>H: Vicinity of Balikpapan</td>
<td>Tarakan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around day $x + 45$</td>
<td>*H: Vicinity of Makassar</td>
<td>Kendari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By and large around day $x + 50$</td>
<td>H: Vicinity of Banjarmasin</td>
<td>Balikpapan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Around day $x + 60$</td>
<td>E: South Thailand or East Coast of Malaya ([for the second [landing] of the main force])</td>
<td>Cam Ranh Bay (Sanya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By around day $x + 60$</td>
<td>H: Ambon and Kupang (as far as possible)</td>
<td>Palau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By and large around day $x + 80$</td>
<td>H: Java, Sumatra</td>
<td>Hong Kong for the capture of Sumatra, Manila for eastern Java, Taiwan and Hong Kong for western Java</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other [targets] depend on the arrangements between commanders of the Army and the Navy of each area.
the Philippines in connection with the transport of Detachments A, D, and E, which
started their operations from Palau. It roughly decided its initial disposition as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units</th>
<th>Battleship</th>
<th>Heavy cruiser</th>
<th>Light cruiser</th>
<th>Destroyer</th>
<th>Submarine</th>
<th>Aircraft Carrier</th>
<th>Seaplane Tender</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Southern Task Force: Main units</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Task Force: Eastern Support Unit</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaya Unit</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines Unit</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Outline of the Operations
The take-over of the defense of Jolo shall be arranged between the Sixteenth Army and the Philippines Unit, and that of Tarakan and Ambon shall be arranged between the Sixteenth Army and the Dutch East Indies Unit.
The assembly of the 48th Division around Manila shall be scheduled for approx. day $x + 55$, and its departure from the point of assembly for approx. day $x + 70$. The [Navy] Philippines (Dutch East Indies) Unit shall provide escort for the redeployment.
The transfer of the corps to capture Bangka Island and southern Sumatra (consisting of an element of the Sixteenth Army) shall be escorted by the [Navy] Malaya Unit.
The transfer (for the capture of Java) of the element of the 38th Division (from Hong Kong), along with the main force of the Sixteenth Army (which shall move from Taiwan and later from southern French Indochina to western Java), shall be escorted by the [Navy] Dutch East Indies Unit.

Escort for the transfer and redeployment (between Palau and Hong Kong, and departure from Palau or Hong Kong) of the units to capture Ambon and Kupang (consisting of elements of Sixteenth Army) shall be arranged between the [Navy] Dutch East Indies Unit and the Sixteenth Army (the rest omitted by the author).

6. About the 40th and the 120th day of operations, meetings shall be held between the commanders concerned of both the Army and the Navy (the rest omitted by the author).

The Order Issued by the Southern Army to Prepare for Attack, and Its Operation Plan

On 10 November, Commander in Chief Terauchi concluded the previously mentioned agreements (General Agreement Nos. 1 and 2) at the War College, finalized the operation plan of the Southern Army, and in the afternoon at the War Ministry assembled the commanders of the Fourteenth, the Sixteenth and the Twenty-fifth Armies and their respective chiefs of staff, the chief of staff of the Fifteenth Army, the commander and chief of staff of the Third Air Force, and Commander Kawaguchi of the Kawaguchi Detachment (the Twenty-fifth Army commander here was Lieutenant General Yamashita; the newly appointed Fifteenth Army Commander Lt. Gen. Iida Shōjirō was at this time still in French Indochina as commander of the Twenty-fifth Army). Commander in Chief Terauchi gave the following instruction to be handed to all rank and file:
All officers and men shall fully understand the true meaning of this sacred war, never forget their heavy responsibility, and with an iron will shall be devoted throughout. Firmly united you shall maintain in everything the harmony and cooperation between Army and Navy, and demonstrate the very best of your strength. Trusting in certain victory through our superior valor, you must be determined to achieve the objectives of the expedition in a short period of time. Moreover, to innocent officials and common civilians, you must by offering kindness, relief, guidance and encouragement, fully extol the dignity of the Imperial Army and not violate it in the least.

Along with this, he gave the following order to prepare for attack (as well as the operation plan). However, as a previous order by IGHQ had set the start of the exercise of command on 15 November, this order bore the date of the 15th even though it was handed down on the 10th.

Southern Army Operation Order A, No. 1.1

Southern Army Order

Tokyo, 15 November

1. In conjunction with the Navy, I intend to swiftly prepare to invade the strategic areas in the South ... (omitted by the author). The distribution of forces of the Southern Army is as given in the separate volume (omitted by the author).

2. Preparations for the operation shall be completed by approx. [month] [day] (note by the author: left blank in the original document). Excerpts of the operation plan of the Southern Army are as given in the separate volume ... (the rest is omitted by the author).

3. The commanders of the Fourteenth, the Fifteenth, the Sixteenth and the Twenty-fifth Armies, the commander of the Third Air Force and Commander Kawaguchi of the Kawaguchi Detachment shall make arrangements on operations with the Navy commanders concerned, based on the excerpts of the Army-Navy Central Agreement, and the General Agreement No. 2, i.e. the Memorandum of Agreement between the commander in chief of the Navy in the Southern Area and the commander in chief of the Southern Army.

4. The commander of the Fourteenth Army shall prepare for Operation M (note by the author: the Philippines operation).

5. The commander of the Fifteenth Army shall prepare for the operation to enter Thailand while ... (the rest is omitted by author).

6. The commander of the Twenty-fifth Army shall prepare for Operation E (note by the author: the Malaya operation). (Items 8 – 11 omitted by the author.)

7. The commander of the Sixteenth Army shall prepare for the occupation of Jolo and Tarakan as well as the subsequent operations against the eastern outer territories of the Dutch East Indies.

8. In the event of an attack by U.S., British and Dutch forces or by any one of these forces, the commanders of the Fourteenth, the Fifteenth, the Sixteenth and the Twenty-fifth Armies and [the commander of] the Third Air Force shall intercept this attack with the forces at their disposal for the purpose of self-defense. However, such a situation as the above should be settled locally with the utmost effort.

Separate orders shall be issued for the execution of the advance.

9. Commander Kawaguchi of the Kawaguchi Detachment shall prepare for Operation B (note by the author: British Borneo operation) ... (the rest omitted by the author).

Separate volume, excerpts of the operation plan of the Southern Army

Section 1: Operational objective
Article 1: The objective of the southern operation is to destroy the major bases of the United States, Britain and the Netherlands in East Asia and to occupy and secure the key areas of the South.

Article 2: The areas to be occupied by the Southern Army are the Philippines, British Malaya, Burma, Java and the Islands of Sumatra, Borneo and Timor.

Section 2: Mission
Article 3: The Southern Army shall, in conjunction with the Combined Fleet, launch the operations in the Philippines and British Malaya simultaneously by means of preemptive air strikes and strive to accomplish the objective of the operations within a short term.

Section 3: Operational directives
Article 4: The operations shall be conducted in accordance with the previous sections in the following manner:

Phase-one operations
1. Operations shall start with a sudden landing of an advance corps (or a preemptive air strike depending on the situation) against Malaya and a preemptive air strike against the U.S. forces in the Philippines. Then taking advantage of the results of the air operations, the main force of each invasion corps shall be put ashore first in the Philippines, then in Malaya, and swiftly capture the Philippines and British Malaya. Apart from this, strategic locations in British Borneo shall be occupied right at the opening of hostilities, and stability in Thailand and Indochina shall be secured.
2. The date for the start of the operations (day 1 of operations) shall be given by separate order. Even if the air strikes both in the Philippines and in Malaya on day 1 of operations are impossible to execute due to the weather, the sudden landing in Malaya shall be carried through as long as sea conditions permit. However, the landing of the advance parties in the Philippines shall be postponed depending on the launch of the air operations in the area.
3. During the above operations, key locations in Dutch Borneo shall be occupied as quickly as possible, followed by key locations in southern Sumatra as the Malaya operation progresses, where vital resource areas shall be secured and preparations for operations against Java shall be made. During or after this, key locations in the Moluccas as well as on Timor shall be occupied at favorable opportunities.

Phase-two operations
As preparations for the above-mentioned operations make progress, command over enemy air power in the Java area shall be gained swiftly to seize the island. Also, key areas of northern Sumatra shall be occupied at the right moment after the capture of Singapore. During phase-one and phase-two operations, air bases in southern Burma shall be captured at favorable opportunities.

Phase-three operations
The occupied areas shall be stabilized and secured. Further, as far as circumstances permit, an operation for dealing with Burma shall be carried out. Separate orders shall be issued for implementation of this operation.

Section 4: Outline of the distribution of forces and their mission
Article 5: The outline of the distribution of forces of the Southern Army and their mission for Phase One Operations is as follows:
The Philippines
The Fourteenth Army (consisting of two divisions as its core), in conjunction with the Navy, shall swiftly capture Manila, and then occupy key locations within the archipelago. After the capture of Manila, a unit with the 48th Division as its core shall be assembled in Manila or its vicinity and prepared so that it is ready to be diverted to the Sixteenth Army.

Malaya
The Twenty-fifth Army (consisting of four divisions as its core), in conjunction with the Navy, shall swiftly capture Singapore.

Thailand and Burma
The Fifteenth Army (consisting of two divisions as its core), in conjunction with the Navy, shall secure the stability of Thailand, facilitate the operations in Malaya, and [at the same time] prepare for subsequent operations against Burma.

The Dutch East Indies
The Sixteenth Army (consisting of three divisions as its core, of which two divisions as the core shall be redeployed from the Fourteenth Army and the Twenty-third Army), in conjunction with the Navy, shall occupy vital resource areas of Dutch Borneo, the Moluccas, Timor and southern Sumatra, secure air bases and make them ready for use.

Units under the direct control of the Southern Army shall consist of one division, two numbered air forces and other units. The division concerned shall be charged to stabilize and secure Indochina.

At the beginning of the operations, an element of the Twenty-fifth Army shall be brought under the direct control [of the Southern Army] to occupy key locations in British Borneo.

The numbered air forces, in conjunction with the Navy air unit, shall first destroy enemy air power in the Philippines, Malaya and Burma, while supporting the operations of the Fourteenth and the Fifteenth Armies with an element of each [air force], and the operations of the Twenty-fifth Army with their main force. Then, they shall support the Sixteenth Army in its operation in southern Sumatra. Furthermore, they shall be charged to cut off the enemy’s rear lines of communication as well as to attack locations of strategic (and political) importance at the right moments.

Article 6: The outline of the distribution of forces of the Southern Army and their mission for phase-two operations is planned as follows:

The Philippines
The Fourteenth Army (consisting of one division and one mixed brigade as its core), in conjunction with the Navy, shall stabilize and secure key locations within the Philippine Archipelago. At the arrival of another mixed brigade, the division and other units shall get ready for redeployment.

British Malaya and Northern Sumatra
The Twenty-fifth Army, in conjunction with the Navy, shall secure key locations in Malaya such as Singapore, and Penang, and [at the same time] have a part of its force occupy key areas of northern Sumatra. In the meantime, preparations shall be made so that the unit under the direct control of the Twenty-fifth Army can be diverted to the Sixteenth Army as quickly as possible, and also the extraction of about 1 division shall be prepared.

Java [Editor’s note: The original text says “Sixteenth Army.” Vol. 34, p. 144 of the War History Series says “Java,” which is probably correct.]
The Sixteenth Army, in conjunction with the Navy, shall occupy Java.

The numbered air forces, in conjunction with the Navy air unit, shall support the operations of the Fourteenth, the Fifteenth and the Twenty-fifth Armies with an element of each [air force], and the operations of the Sixteenth Army in Java with a force as large as possible.
The rest shall largely be the same as in phase-one operations.

Article 7: The outline of the distribution of forces of the Southern Army and their mission for phase-three operations is roughly set as follows:

The Philippines
The mission of the Fourteenth Army (consisting of two mixed brigades as its core) shall be the same as in phase two.

British Malaya
The Twenty-fifth Army (consisting of three divisions as its core) shall stabilize and secure the key areas in British Malaya, British Borneo as well as in northern Sumatra.

The Dutch East Indies
The Sixteenth Army (consisting of two divisions as its core) shall stabilize and secure the key areas of the Dutch East Indies (excluding northern Sumatra).

When implementing the Burma operation, the Fifteenth Army (with part of its strength reinforced), in conjunction with the Navy, shall occupy key areas of Burma.

The numbered air forces, in conjunction with the Navy air unit, shall support the operations of the Fourteenth, the Sixteenth and the Twenty-fifth Armies with an element of each [group], and with a powerful element support the Fifteenth Army in its Burma operation.

The [Navy] Southern Task Force’s Plan and Orders

The [Navy] Southern Task Force received the above-mentioned order of the Combined Fleet dated 5 November (note: although this order bore the date of 5 November, the whole contents were completed only after the 10th) and on 15 November issued its Operation Order No. 1. This order stated that “in conjunction with the Army, the U.S., British and Dutch warships and air power in the Far East shall be completely destroyed, all bases in the Philippines, British Malaya, Burma and the Dutch East Indies shall be demolished, and key areas in these territories shall be captured, while preparations shall be made to intercept attacks by the U.S. mainland fleets and others.” [Furthermore] the order described plans to divide the operations [of Stage One] into three phases (until approximately day \( x + 20 \), until approximately day \( x + 40 \), and until the completion of a major part of [the operation into] the South); to start the operations with preemptive air strikes and the swift disembarkation of part [of the force] in Malaya; to support the landing operations of the main force of the Fourteenth Army and then the main force of the Twenty-fifth Army after having supported the landings of the Army advance parties; to make efforts to destroy the allied warships in Singapore with air and naval power, as well as obstructing them with mine and submarine warfare; to make [air bases in] Davao and Jolo ready for use and advance the main force of the Eleventh Air Fleet from Taiwan to start the Dutch East Indies operation; to deploy submarines on the sea-lanes in the southern part of the Celebes Sea and capture Menado, Kendari and Makassar one after another, while capturing Tarakan, Balikpapan, and Banjarmasin one by one in cooperation with the Army, and then at favorable opportunities, to occupy Ambon, followed by Kupang, which is intended as a base for operations against Australia; to have the 22d Air Flotilla divert from the Malaya area to Miri and Kuching, and to advance submarines to the Indian Ocean in order to carry out invasion operations against southern Sumatra and later against Java; and to use paratroop units depending on the situation. It was decided to advance the 6th Submarine Squadron first to Sanya, leaving the Inland Sea on 21 November, the 5th Submarine Squadron first to Palau, leaving the Inland Sea on 25 November, and to advance the
main force of the Southern Task Force to Magong on 2 December, leaving the Inland Sea on
the 29th [of November]. The disposition of forces for the first phase was set as follows:(110)

Main Force
Main Unit: under the direct command of the commander in chief of the Second Fleet, [consisting of] the main force of the 4th Cuiser Division ([consisting of] 2 heavy cruisers), part of the 3d Battleship Division ([consisting of] 1 battleship), and 6 destroyers
Eastern Support Unit: [consisting of] 1 battleship of the 3d Battleship Division, 1 heavy cruiser of the 4th Cruiser Division and 2 destroyers ([assigned to] support operations in the eastern waters of the Philippines)
Philippines Unit: under the command of the commander in chief of the Third Fleet, [consisting of] the Third Fleet (minus the 2d Section of the 17th [Minelayer] Division, the 6th Submarine Squadron and the 12th Seaplane Tender Division), the 5th Cruiser Division ([consisting of] 3 heavy cruisers), the main force of the 4th Carrier Division ([consisting of] 1 aircraft carrier), the main force of the 2d Destroyer Squadron, the main force of the 4th Destroyer Squadron, and the 11th Seaplane Tender Division ([consisting of] 2 seaplane tenders)
Malaya Unit: under the command of the commander in chief of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet, [consisting of] the Southern Expeditionary Fleet, 1 heavy cruiser of the 4th Cruiser Division, the 7th Cruiser Division (consisting of 4 heavy cruisers), the 3d Destroyer Squadron, the 4th Submarine Squadron, 1 division of the 6th Submarine Squadron, the 2d Section of the 17th Minelayer Division, the 12th Air Seaplane Tender Division (consisting of seaplane tenders), the 22d Air Flotilla (land-based aircraft), 42 aircraft of the 23d Air Flotilla
Air Unit: under the command of the commander in chief of the Eleventh Air Fleet, [consisting of] the Eleventh Air Fleet (minus the 22d Air Flotilla and 42 aircraft of the 23d Air Flotilla), 2 battalions of the [naval] special landing forces
Submarine Unit: under the command of the commander of the 5th Submarine Squadron, [consisting of] the 5th Submarine Squadron, and the main force of the 6th Submarine Squadron
Note: The basic formation of the Third Fleet consisted of the 16th Cruiser Division (consisting of 2 light cruisers), the 17th Minelayer Division (consisting of 2 minelayers), the 5th Destroyer Squadron (consisting of 1 light cruiser and 8 destroyers), the 6th Submarine Squadron, the 12th Seaplane Tender Division (consisting of 2 seaplane tenders). The basic formation of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet consisted of 1 training cruiser, 1 escort ship, 1 gunboat and others.(101)

The Southern Army’s Invasion Order
The Southern Army, which had passed down the order to prepare to invade the southern key areas, then issued the order to invade the southern key areas (dated 20 November).(23, 24) This order prescribed the actions of each army for the next forty to fifty days.(24)

With respect to the Dutch East Indies operation, this order contains two points that should be specially mentioned. The first point is that, regardless of previous orders, this order assigned the Sixteenth Army to capture Davao. The reason was that when, in accordance with the above-mentioned General Agreement No. 1, arrangements were made between the Fourteenth and the Sixteenth Armies and the Navy Philippines Unit at Iwakuni, problems arose which will be explained later. The second point is that although the date of issue [of the order] was set as the 20th and it was transmitted to each army on that day, the Sixteenth Army had been given a verbal notification when on the 19th its chief of staff, Okazaki Seizaburō, had
been especially summoned. This was because the 56th Mixed Infantry Group [of the Sixteenth Army] (i.e. the Sakaguchi Detachment) was leaving Moji on the night of 19th for Palau.\(^{23, 24, 36}\)

The excerpt of relevant articles of this Southern Army order (Southern Army Operation Order A, No. 2) is as follows:\(^{23}\)

1–3. In conjunction with the Navy, I intend to swiftly invade the southern key areas. Separate orders shall be issued for the launch of offensive operations (excerpted by the author).

4. The Fourteenth Army shall swiftly capture the main bases on the Philippines, Manila in particular (summarized by the author).

5. The Twenty-fifth Army shall make a sudden landing in Malaya and make efforts to establish a forward foothold in order to capture Singapore (summarized by the author).

6–10. The Fifteenth Army shall advance into Thailand and secure stability [there] while preparing for the subsequent operations against Burma (summarized and excerpted by the author).

11. The commander of the Sixteenth Army shall swiftly occupy Davao, Jolo, Tarakan and then Balikpapan, Banjarmasin with an element of his force and secure necessary air bases as well as vital resource areas. The commander of the Sixteenth Army shall direct the units, which are under the command of or led by the Fourteenth Army commander, to guard the assembly point of Palau. The unit to occupy Davao shall receive directions from the Fourteenth Army commander as to the date and time to depart from its assembly point. After the capture of Davao, the occupation units in Davao, which were originally under the command of the Fourteenth Army commander (along with the shipping units and part of the matériel), shall be returned to the Fourteenth Army. The defense of Jolo and Tarakan shall be turned over to the Navy swiftly as soon as the major part of each operation in these areas is finished.

12. Commander Kawaguchi of the Kawaguchi Detachment shall depart from the assembly point after the opening of hostilities, carry out a sudden attack, and occupy Miri and Seria first, secure vital resource areas as well as air bases and, immediately after that, occupy the air base near Kuching as quickly as possible. (13–14 are omitted by the author).

15. In order to restore order, obtain resources crucial to national defense and secure the means for the armies to maintain themselves on their own account in the occupied territories, each army commander and Commander Kawaguchi shall take charge of establishing a military administration in each area. Separate orders shall be issued concerning the details of the establishment of a military administration (summarized by the author).

After issuing this order, Commander in Chief Terauchi left Tokyo on 25 November and first headed for Taipei.\(^{23}\)

5. Operational Preparations of the Sixteenth Army

Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi had just been transferred to become commander of the Twenty-third Army in Guangdong in June after taking part as commander in a maneuver from Shanghai to northern Kyūshū that simulated a transoceanic landing on Malaya to capture Singapore, when, on 6 November, he received a telegram from War Minister Tōjō Hideki that read: “You have been appointed commander of the Sixteenth Army by the Emperor today. Come to Tokyo tomorrow, the 7th, by the airplane specially sent by central command [IGHQ] and turn over your duty to incoming commander Lt. Gen. Sakai Takashi.” Lieutenant General Imamura left Guangdong on the 7th with no idea what his new task was, landed at Tachikawa Airfield on the 10th, and was met by Maj. Gen. Okazaki Seizaburō, with whom he had worked
at the Inspectorate General of Military Training until four months before. The major general informed him that the Sixteenth Army would be dispatched to Java should diplomatic negotiations fail, and that he, Major General Okazaki, had been appointed chief of staff of the army.\(^{(35)}\)

On 5 November, the day before Lieutenant General Imamura received the above-mentioned telegram in Guangdong [Canton], the *Main Points for the Implementation of Imperial National Policy*, which expressed the determination to wage war against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands, had been decided upon at the Imperial Conference in Tokyo. On the same day, outlines for the provisional formation of the headquarters of the Sixteenth and the other armies had been issued by Army Order A, No. 79.\(^{(3, 52)}\) The detailed regulations of this outline stipulated that the Fourteenth Army, which was to cross the sea and land in the Philippines, would be called “Wataru-shūdan,” (Crossing Corps) and that the Sixteenth Army, which was to conquer the Dutch East Indies, would go by the name of “Osamu-shūdan” (Pacifying Corps).\(^{(52)}\) When Lieutenant General Imamura read the detailed regulations of this army order, he realized that the completion of the conquest of the Dutch East Indies by the Sixteenth Army meant the completion of the southern operation and that the Sixteenth Army was expected to implement an appropriate military administration in particular.\(^{(35)}\) The formation of the Sixteenth Army headquarters was completed on 13 November at the War College under the supervision of the Eastern District Army commander.\(^{(32, 52)}\)

On 6 November, the day when in Guangdong Lieutenant General Imamura received the above-mentioned telegram from the War Minister, the order of battle of the Southern Army was announced in Tokyo, as well as the Army Department of IGHQ’s order to prepare for attack, and the appointment of army commanders and lesser officers.\(^{(1, 23)}\)

On the 10th, when Lieutenant General Imamura arrived in Tokyo, Commander in Chief [of the Southern Army] Terauchi made agreements with Commander in Chief [of the Combined Fleet] Yamamoto Isoroku and Commander in Chief [of the Second Fleet] Kondō Nobutake at the War College. After that, he gathered together Sixteenth Army Commander Imamura and his colleagues at the War Ministry and gave the previously described instruction and the Southern Army Order to prepare for attack.\(^{(23)}\)

Right after the formation of the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters was completed on 13 November, Army Commander Imamura departed Tokyo on the same day for Iwakuni, where from the 14th to the 16th he made arrangements with the commander in chief of the Third Fleet.\(^{(52)}\)

In the meantime, as of 0000 on 15 November, the units included in the order of battle of the Sixteenth Army were transferred to the command of Army Commander Imamura. (However, units still in [various distant parts of] homeland Japan, Korea, Manchuria, northern China and eastern China after that time were to be transferred to his command on leaving their respective ports of departure.) Further, an order of the Army Department of IGHQ stipulated that Army Commander Imamura was given authority to give commands concerning preparations for operations to units that were in the order of battle of the army but had not yet been transferred to his command after 0000 on November 15. This day (15 November) was the day when IGHQ issued the previously described order of invasion.\(^{(1)}\)

On concluding the Iwakuni Agreement, Army Commander Imamura on the 16th left Iwakuni for Moji where he took command of the 56th Mixed Infantry Group (Detachment A
a.k.a. the Sakaguchi Detachment) which was embarking there, gave instructions and encouraged them. The next day on the 17th, he left Moji to fly back to Tokyo. On the 18th, Maj. Gen. Harada Yoshikazu, vice chief of staff [of the Sixteenth Army] took up his post. The major general, who worked for the Kwantung Army after his return from Java with Ambassador Yoshizawa Kenkichi, had previously worked in Section 1 of the Army General Staff Office, along with Lieutenant General Imamura and Major General Okazaki. He was posted [vice chief of staff] due to the previously described change in Major General Manaki’s task.

On the 19th, a formal ceremony was held at the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters [provisionally situated] in the War College where all subordinate officers presented themselves to their commander, after which Army Commander Imamura gave his instructions. In the evening, Chief of Staff Okazaki was summoned to the General Headquarters [of the Southern Army] and unofficially informed of the Southern Army’s previously described order of invasion (including the decision that the Sixteenth Army should capture Davao as well). The Sakaguchi Detachment left Moji that night and headed for Palau first.

From the 24th to the 25th, Army Commander Imamura visited the Sendai divisional district, where the 2d Division Commander Lt. Gen. Maruyama Masao and his subordinates presented themselves to him. He gave them instructions, inspected the division’s exercises and encouraged the officers and men.

On 1 December, the Imperial Decision to open hostilities was made, which was followed by the issue on the next day, 2 [December], of the Imperial Order of “Exercise of Armed Force on 8 December.” However on 1 December, the Sakaguchi Detachment was already in Palau (it had arrived in Palau on 28 November) and the 2d Division had started moving to maneuvering grounds in Narashino, Fuji, Toyohashi, etc., in order to vacate its station in the Sendai divisional district and conduct military exercises. [Even then,] the Sixteenth Army headquarters was still at the War College in Aoyama, Tokyo, and devoted itself to drawing up its plan of operation.

Order of Battle [of the Sixteenth Army] (See the table in the appendix.)

The order of battle of the Sixteenth Army (issued on 6 November) was in outline as follows, details are as shown in the table in the appendix to this volume:

**Order of Battle of the Sixteenth Army**

- Commander of the Sixteenth Army: Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi
- Headquarters of the Sixteenth Army
- 2d Division
- 56th Mixed Infantry Group (organization as shown in table No. 1)
- 8th Tank Regiment, 17th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment (A), 18th Field Antiaircraft Defense Unit headquarters, 44th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (B), 16th Antiaircraft Artillery Regiment, 1st Independent Engineer Regiment (E), 1st Independent Engineer Company (electricity), 4th Independent Engineer Company ([to facilitate] the river-crossing of heavy equipment), 168th Railway Depot headquarters (B), Sixteenth Army Signal Unit (organization as shown in attached table No. 2), 29th Bridge Building Material Company, Imperial Guard Division River-crossing Material Company, 6th Division Bridge Building Material Company, 3d Field Military Police
Unit, Line-of-Communication Unit under the direct control of the Sixteenth Army (organization as shown in table No. 3)

Table No. 1
Organization of the 56th Mixed Infantry Group
Commander: the commander of the 56th Infantry Group, Maj. Gen. Sakaguchi Shizuo
56th Infantry Group headquarters, 146th Infantry Regiment, 56th Infantry Group Armored Car Unit, 56th Field Artillery Regiment 1st Battalion, 56th Engineer Regiment 1st Company, 56th Transport Regiment 2d Company, 56th Infantry Group Medical Unit, and 56th Divisional 1st Field Hospital

Table No. 2
Organization of the Sixteenth Army Signal Unit
Commander: the commander of the 15th Telegraph Regiment
15th Telegraph Regiment, 3d, 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 13th Independent Radio Platoons (motorized), 60th Radio Telegraph Platoon (horse-carried), 33d, 34th, 45th, 46th, and 55th Fixed Radio Units

Table No. 3
Line-of-Communication unit under the direct control of the Sixteenth Army
43d and 48th Line-of-Communication Area Units, 2d Field Transport headquarters, 39th and 102d Independent Motor Transport Battalions, 261st Independent Motor Transport Company, 42d and 44th Field Road Units, 5th and 16th Field Well-drilling Companies, 14th Field Duty Unit (commander: 14th Field Duty Unit commander, 14th Field Duty Unit headquarters, 107th and 108th Shore Duty Companies, 45th Sea Duty Company), 61st and 62d Construction Duty Companies, 18th Field Postal Unit, 18th Line-of-Communication Medical Unit (commander: 18th Line-of-Communication Medical Unit commander, 18th Line-of-Communication Medical Unit headquarters, 67th, 115th, 116th, and 121st Line-of-Communication Hospitals), 16th Patient Transport Unit (Commander: the 16th Patient Transport Unit commander, the 16th Patient Transport Unit headquarters, 65th, 66th, and 68th Patient Transport Platoons), 22d Field Water Supply and Purification Department (B), 13th Line-of-Communication Sick Horse Depot, 19th Veterinary Quarantine Depot (B), 24th Field Ordnance Depot, 24th Field Motor Transport Depot, 24th Field Freight Depot

About half of the above units under the direct control of the [Sixteenth] Army, other than the division and the infantry group, were units in Manchuria that had been mobilized for the KANTOKUEN [Special Grand Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army], and those that were stationed in China. They were to be transported to Moji or Gaoxiong to join the 56th Mixed Infantry Group and the main force of the Sixteenth Army. The well-drilling companies were intended to restore and develop oil fields. As mentioned previously, [the Army Department of] IGHQ and the Southern Army planned to divert the 38th and the 48th Divisions, the South Seas Detachment, and many other units under the direct control of other armies to the Sixteenth Army as the capture of Hong Kong, the Philippines, Malaya, Guam, and Rabaul progressed.

The order of battle of the South Seas Detachment, which was scheduled to be put under the command of the Sixteenth Army after the capture of Guam and Rabaul, was as shown in the table in the appendix to this volume.
Lineup of the Sixteenth Army Headquarters

Main personnel of the Sixteenth Army headquarters was as follows:

Commander of the Army: Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi
Chief of Staff: Maj. Gen. Okazaki Seizaburō
Vice Chief of Staff: Maj. Gen. Harada Yoshikazu

Staff Officers of Section 1
Senior Staff: Col. Takashima Tatsuhiko
Chief Intelligence Staff: Lt. Col. [Col.] Murakami Kimisuke
Chief Aviation Staff: Lt. Col. Itoda Isamu
Chief Operations Staff: Lt. Col. Oda Akimitsu
Staff Officer Intelligence: Maj. Kuriya Tsugunori
Assistant Operations Staff Officer: Maj. Yamashita Yutaka

Staff Officers of Section 2
Senior Staff: Col. Kitamura Yoshifuto
Chief Signal Communication Staff: Lt. Col. Saiki Ikuzō
Chief Shipping Staff: Lt. Col. Sendō Shunzō
Staff Officer Line of Communication: Maj. Takahashi Mitsuzō
Staff Officer Line of Communication: Maj. Nishiura Setsuzō

Attached to the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters: Col. Nakayama Yasuto
Ordnance Department Director: Maj. Gen. Yamada Hisamatsu
Intendance Department Director: Maj. Gen. Mukai Kinjirō
Medical Department Director: Maj. Gen. Nakajima Haruhiko
Veterinary Department Director: Col. Kurokawa Sanjirō
Legal Department Director: Col. Tsumura Mikizō

The staff officers of the army headquarters were selected from those who were working at the central offices of the Army in Miyakezaka, or who were teaching at the War College in Aoyama at that time, or from those who had had such careers. This, along with the personality of the army commander and the chief of staff and the previous relationships among the people concerned, might have helped to create an atmosphere where from the beginning the staff got along well and worked harmoniously. Among the staff officers, Colonel Kitamura and Lieutenant Colonel Sendō were experts in shipping who had worked in the Shipping Section of the Army General Staff Office and given lectures on shipping at the War College. Major General Harada, Colonel Nakayama, and Major Kuriya had accompanied the Kobayashi and Yoshizawa delegations to Java, and Colonel Murakami, Lieutenant Colonel Sendō, and Major Nishiura were officers who had studied the Dutch East Indies operation for a long time.

Formation and Personnel of the Divisions and the Infantry Group

Included in the order of battle of the Sixteenth Army from the very beginning were the 2d Division and the 56th Mixed Infantry Group. The 38th and 48th Divisions and the South Seas Detachment were to be added at later stages. The outline of how these units were constituted and composed, and of their main personnel is shown in the table in the appendix. The details of their formation were as follows:
2d Division (“Isamu-heidan,” The Braves)

Division commander: Lt. Gen. Maruyama Masao

This division was formed by Army Order A, No. 63 on 16 September. However, as will be told later, it was reorganized by Army Order A, No. 5 on 30 January [1942,] because the moving up of the timing of the Java operation caused a shortage of tonnage, and because the results of the Fourteenth and Twenty-fifth Army operations created organizational problems. Consequently, the number of personnel and horses was reduced by respectively 448 men and 1,700 horses, whereas the number of motor vehicles was increased instead.\(^{(52, 31)}\) After reformation, the regular strength of the division became 13,755 men, 1,335 horses, and 586 motor vehicles.\(^{(52)}\) Units integrated into the division and their details were as follows:\(^{(52, 1, 53)}\)

2d Division headquarters: 305 men, no horses and 40 motor vehicles.
2d Infantry Group headquarters: 93 men, no horses and 8 motor vehicles.
4th Infantry Regiment: 2,719 men, 203 horses and 36 motor vehicles.
   The regiment was [composed of] regimental headquarters, 3 battalions, 1 regimental artillery battery (with 4 mountain guns), 1 antitank gun company (with 4 guns), and 1 signal company.
   The battalions were [composed of] 3 companies, 1 machine gun company (with 8 guns), and 1 battalion artillery section (with 2 guns). (Note: According to the action report of the 3d Battalion, the actual numbers of men and horses of the battalion were 791 and 51 respectively, and there were no motor vehicles.)
   The regiment had sufficient bicycles to cover the needs of one-third of its infantry companies. In addition it was equipped with two-wheeled trailers for heavy firearms.
16th Infantry Regiment: same as above.
29th Infantry Regiment: same as above.
2d Reconnaissance Regiment: regimental headquarters and 4 companies; 439 men, no horses and 59 motor vehicles.
2d Field Artillery Regiment: regimental headquarters and 3 battalions. The battalions were [composed of] their headquarters and 3 batteries (with 4 guns each). The Regiment consisted of 1,738 men, 726 horses and 68 motor vehicles. The 1st Battalion was equipped with motor vehicles; the other battalions were equipped with draft horses.
2d Engineer Regiment: regimental headquarters, 3 companies and 1 equipment platoon; 872 men, no horses and 32 motor vehicles.
2d Transport Regiment: headquarters and 3 companies; 381 men, no horses and 105 motor vehicles.
2d Divisional Signal Unit: unit headquarters and 3 platoons; 182 men, no horses and 18 motor vehicles.
2d Divisional Medical Unit: 491 men, no horses and 36 motor vehicles.
2d Divisional Ordnance Service Unit: 123 men, no horses and 13 motor vehicles.
2d Divisional 1st Field Hospital: 242 men, no horses and 22 motor vehicles.
2d Divisional 2d Field Hospital: same as above.
2d Divisional 4th Field Hospital: 247 men, no horses and 23 motor vehicles.
2d Divisional Sick Horse Depot: 47 men, no horses and 7 motor vehicles.
56th Mixed Infantry Group (Sakaguchi Detachment)

Infantry Group commander: Maj. Gen. Sakaguchi Shizuo
Composition, personnel, etc. were as shown in the table in the appendix. The formation of the unit corresponded to that of the 2d Division. The numbers of men, horses, and motor vehicles of the detachment were 5,200, 1,200, and 100 respectively.\(^\text{24}\)

38th Division ("Numa-heidan" The Swampers)

Division commander: Lt. Gen. Sano Tadayoshi
The division was scheduled to transfer [to the command of the Sixteenth Army] after the capture of Hong Kong. Composition and main personnel were as shown in the table in the appendix.
Its infantry regiments consisted of regimental headquarters, 3 infantry battalions, [1] infantry artillery unit (with 4 mountain guns) and [1] signal unit. Each infantry battalion consisted of battalion headquarters, 4 companies, and 1 machine gun company. Its mountain artillery regiment consisted of regimental headquarters and 3 battalions, and the battalions consisted of 3 batteries. (Each battery was equipped with 4 mountain guns [Type41 and Type94 mountain guns, 2 for each]).\(^\text{71}\)
The division was formed for operations against China in 1939, and its formation and equipment were inferior to those of the 2d Division, which was planned and prepared to be mobilized for operations against the Soviet Union.

48th Division ("Umi-heidan" The Mariners)

Division commander: Lt. Gen. Tsuchihashi Yūitsu
Scheduled to transfer [to the command of the Sixteenth Army] after the capture of Manila. Composition and main personnel were as shown in the table in the appendix.
The division had originally been formed in November 1940 and been designed to charge toward Singapore after traversing the whole length of the Malay Peninsula. Accordingly, it was composed of motor-vehicle-based units, which made it different from the 2d and 38th Divisions.
The infantry regiments consisted of regimental headquarters, 3 battalions, [1] regimental artillery battery, [1] antitank gun company, [1] signal company, and [1] motor vehicle squad. The regiment had about 2,550 men, 100 trucks, 4 passenger cars, 5 sidecars, and 1,000 bicycles. The battalions consisted of their headquarters, 4 companies, [1] machine gun company (with 8 guns), and [1] battalion artillery section (with 2 guns). The regimental artillery battery and the antitank gun company were equipped with 4 guns each. Basically the mobile strength of the regiment consisted in motor vehicles, bicycles, and marching on foot, about one-third each. Usually, the regimental headquarters, one of the battalions, the regimental artillery battery, the antitank gun company, and the signal company were transported by the 100 trucks, and the other 2 battalions rode bicycles, marched on foot, or were shuttled by motor vehicles.\(^\text{53, 84}\)
However, during the period between the invasion of the Philippines and its departure [from the Philippines] for Java, the regiment increased its number of motor vehicles so that its full force could travel by motor vehicles all together.
The reconnaissance regiment consisted of its headquarters ([equipped with] 7 motor vehicles, 2 sidecars, and 25 bicycles), 1 signal platoon (with 4 vehicles), the 1st and the 2d Companies (with
8 motor vehicles and a sidecar each), the 3d and the 4th Companies (with 8 light-armored cars, 2 motor vehicles, and a sidecar each), and [1] motorcycle unit (with 60 motorcycles and a van).\(^{(86)}\)

The mountain artillery regiment consisted of its headquarters and 4 battalions. Each battalion consisted of 2 batteries. In the Philippine operations, the 4th Battalion had [still] used pack horses while the others were equipped with motor vehicles, but the whole regiment became motor-vehicle-based in the Java operations.\(^{(80)}\)

The engineer regiment consisted of 3 companies and was equipped with motor vehicles.\(^{(80)}\)

The transport regiment also consisted of 3 companies and was equipped with motor vehicles.\(^{(80)}\)

The other units were also equipped with motor vehicles.

Note: The above was [mainly] based on the recollection of the commanders and fragmentary historical materials of the units. Composition and equipment of the 48th Division as designated in Army Order A, No. 57 of 1940 were as follows:\(^{(52)}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units integrated [into the Division]</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Horses</th>
<th>Motor vehicles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>48th Division headquarters</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48th Infantry Group headquarters</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Taiwan Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>2,580</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Taiwan Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>2,580</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47th Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>2,580</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48th Reconnaissance Regiment</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48th Mountain Artillery Regiment</td>
<td>1,783</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48th Engineer Regiment</td>
<td>759</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48th Divisional Signal Unit</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48th Transport Regiment</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48th Divisional Ordnance Service Unit</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48th Divisional Medical Unit</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48th Divisional 1st Field Hospital</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48th Divisional 4th Field Hospital</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 47th Infantry Regiment was equipped with 85 motor vehicles as of 16 January 1941, and 800 bicycles were provided on the same day.\(^{(53)}\)

**South Seas Detachment**

The detachment was scheduled to assemble in Palau after the capture of Guam and Rabaul, and to transfer to the command of the Sixteenth Army. Its composition was as shown in the table in the appendix. The number of men and horses was 4,470 and 1,090 respectively.\(^{(5)}\)

**Iwakuni Agreement** *(See Illustrations No. 10 to No. 12)*

Having received the order to prepare for the operation to invade the South from Commander in Chief Terauchi on 10 November, Sixteenth Army Commander Imamura, as previously related, left Tokyo on the 13th, on the same day as the formation of the headquarters of the army had been completed, and made arrangements with the Navy at Iwakuni from the 14th through the 16th.

Based on the agreement of the 10th between General Terauchi and Admiral Yamamoto, and [that between General Terauchi and Vice Admiral Kondō (General Agreement No. 1 and No. 2), this Iwakuni Agreement was supposed to arrange matters between the commanders of the Fourteenth and the Sixteenth Armies and the Fifth Air Force on the one hand
and the commanders in chief of the Third Fleet and the Eleventh Air Fleet. It was a matter of course that at the time of this agreement the arrangements involving the Sixteenth Army had to wait until later due to the sequence of the invasions.

On 18 [November], at almost the same time as this [Iwakuni] Agreement, specific arrangements were made in Saigon between the Fifteenth and the Twenty-fifth Armies on the one hand and the relevant naval units.

Let us first see how arrangements were made to coordinate the operations of the Fourteenth and the Twenty-fifth Armies and the Kawaguchi Detachment (assigned to capture British Borneo) and those of the relevant air and naval units, which preceded the Dutch East Indies operation.

In early November, IGHQ rated the strength of the allied forces as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Warships</th>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>Ground troops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines Area</td>
<td>2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 14 destroyers and 17 submarines</td>
<td>238 aircraft</td>
<td>46,500 troops, additionally 110,500 troops in mobilization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaya Area</td>
<td>5 or 6 light cruisers, 5 or 6 destroyers; other than these, 3 destroyers in Hong Kong, 4 battleships and 3–6 heavy cruisers in the Indian Ocean</td>
<td>317 aircraft (including those in British Borneo)</td>
<td>68,000 troops (including those in British Borneo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch East Indies Area</td>
<td>5 light cruisers, 3 destroyers, and 19 submarines</td>
<td>391 aircraft</td>
<td>85,000 troops</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Against these forces, the plan was that the aircraft of the Third Air Force (under the direct control of the Southern Army) and those of the Southern Expeditionary Fleet would conduct preemptive air strikes in Malaya and that those of the Eleventh Air Fleet, the [Navy] Philippines Unit and those of the Fifth Air Force (assigned to the Fourteenth Army) would do likewise in the Philippines; that submarine squadrons would be positioned as far as possible to the south to prevent the allied fleets from coming up north; that other naval units would have destroyer squadrons convoy the advance and other units [of the Army]; and that two battleships, nine heavy cruisers, etc. would be deployed in such a way that they could destroy the allied fleets anywhere should they come up north. An outline of the air and naval forces [to execute the plan] was agreed upon in Iwakuni and Saigon as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft</th>
<th>The Philippines: 149 army aircraft, 356 navy aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malaya:</td>
<td>459 army aircraft, 158 navy aircraft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warships</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The main unit of the main force of the Southern Task Force, [consisting of] 1 battleship, 2 heavy cruisers, and 4 destroyers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Philippines area:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The main force of the Philippines Unit, [consisting of] 1 heavy cruiser, 3 light cruisers, and 16 destroyers as its core</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Southern Philippines Area Task Force of the Philippines Unit (to cover the areas of Davao and Legaspi), consisting of 3 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 1 aircraft carrier and 17 destroyers as its core
Eastern Support Unit of the main force of the Southern Task Force (to cover the eastern waters of the Philippines), consisting of 1 battleship, 1 heavy cruiser, and 2 destroyers as its core
Malaya area:
- Malaya Unit, consisting of 5 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers and 14 destroyers as its core

The plan envisioned a sudden attack with an air strength twice as strong as that of the enemy and with an overwhelmingly superior naval strength; and although the priority of the Navy in the initial stages was [the attack on] the Philippines, the main force of the Southern Task Force would consider heading for the eastern waters of Malaya should the British fleet move up north.

The operational arrangements in the Malaya area agreed upon in Saigon on the 18th were in outline as follows:(23)

1. A full-scale sudden air attack shall be launched on day x.
2. The Twenty-fifth Army headquarters, the main force of the 5th Division ([consisting of] 9 battalions), and 3 battalions of the 18th Division (i.e. the Takumi Detachment) shall leave Sanya on day x – 4 and land [respectively] in Singora, Pattani and Kota Bharu on day x. Also 3 battalions of the 55th Division (i.e. the Uno Detachment) shall land on the same day in the western part of the Gulf of Thailand.
3. Vehicles and other [equipment] ([loaded on] 44 ships) for the above-mentioned main force of the 5th Division and the Takumi Detachment shall leave Cam Ranh Bay on day x + 5 and arrive on day x + 8 catching up [with the main force].
4. Three battalions of the 5th Division, the main force of the 18th Division ([consisting of] 6 battalions), and the primary units under the direct control of the Army shall leave Guangdong [Canton] and/or Taiwan on day x + 18, and arrive in Singora (and partly in Pattani) on day x + 25.
5. Three battalions of the Imperial Guard Division (which shall be stationed in Thailand under the command of the Fifteenth Army in the initial stage) shall leave Saigon for Singora on or after day x + 25.
6. The secondary units under the direct control of the Army shall arrive in Singora around day x + 50.
7. The main force of the 56th Division ([consisting of] 6 battalions) shall arrive in the area between Kuantan and Mersing around day x + 60.
8. The tertiary units under the direct control of the Twenty-fifth Army shall arrive in Singora and Mersing around day x + 60.
9. The items from No. 5 through No. 8 in the above are yet to be fixed.
10. The [Navy] Malaya Unit, in Phase One of its operations (until approx. day x + 20), shall start transporting the advance parties of the Twenty-fifth and the Fifteenth Armies each from [Phase One] disposition A, then it shall change to [Phase One] disposition B, and support the Kawaguchi Detachment’s operations against British Borneo as well.

Such was the outline of operations and its defining feature was that even though the arrangements for the operations in Malaya up to about day x + 25 were generally fixed, those after that remained vague and far too vague to mention anything at all concerning Sumatra.
The arrangements for the operations in the Philippines were made on the 16th (the last
day of the Iwakuni meeting) and were in outline as follows:\(^{(23)}\)

1. A full-scale sudden air attack shall be launched on day x.
2. Navy units and army airfield units shall leave Gaoxiong on day x – 1 and land on Batan Island
   on day x; the Tanaka Detachment ([consisting of] ½ battalion of the 48th Division) shall leave
   Magong on day x – 1, or day x, and land in Appari on day x + 2; the Kanno Detachment ([consi-
   sting of] ½ battalion of the same division) shall leave Magong on the same [departure] day
   [as above] and land in Vigan on the same [landing] day [as above]; the Kimura Detachment
   ([consisting of] 2 battalions of the 16th Division) shall leave Palau on day x and land in Legaspi
   on day x + 4, supported by the [Navy] 4th Raid Unit ([consisting of] 1 light cruiser and 8 de-
   stroyers); the Miura Detachment ([consisting of] 1 battalion of the same division) shall leave
   Palau on day x + 3 and land in Davao on day x + 6, supported by the [Navy] 5th Raid Unit ([con-
   sisting of] 1 light cruiser and 8 destroyers). In addition, the Kimura and the Miura Detachment
   shall also be supported by the [Navy] Southern Philippines Area Task Force of the Philippines
   Unit (whose strength was previously mentioned,) and the [Navy] Eastern Support Unit from
   the main force of the Southern Task Force (whose strength was also previously mentioned).
3. The main force of the 48th Division (which comprises the main force of the Fourteenth Army)
   shall leave Magong, Keelung [Jilong] and Gaoxiong on day x + 10 (escorted by 2 light cruisers
   and 16 destroyers), and land around Lingayen Gulf on day x + 14; the main force of the 16th Di-
   vision shall leave Amami Ōshima on day x + 10 escorted by 1 light cruiser and 8 destroyers,
   and land around Lamon Bay on day x + 16.

Let us return to the Iwakuni Agreement. On 14 November, scores of top-ranking commanders
and staff officers entered the gate of Iwakuni Naval Air Force [Base] in plain clothes.\(^{(43)}\) The
three-day meeting started with the arrangements between the Fourteenth Army, the Fifth
Air Force ([most of] which was under the command of the Fourteenth Army), the Third Fleet,
and the Eleventh Air Fleet, and after that the arrangements between the Sixteenth Army and
the Third Fleet were taken up. A draft of the latter arrangements had been prepared by the
Third Fleet. Whereas the operational arrangements after about day x + 25 in the arrangements
made [in Saigon] between the Southern Expeditionary Fleet and the Twenty-fifth Army re-
ained vague, this draft was quite specific, [and covered] even the period up to [the landing
on] Java. This is because the draft was drawn up by the Third Fleet, a leading player of the
Navy, which had totally stuck to the “clockwise” plan. The outline of the draft arrangement
was as follows:\(^{(23)}\) (See Illustrations No. 10 to No.12)

1. The Jolo Detachment ([consisting of] about half a battalion) of the Sakaguchi Detachment ([con-
   sisting of] the 56th Mixed Infantry Group as its core) shall sail together with the Miura Detach-
   ment of the Fourteenth Army to anchor outside Davao port on day x + 6 and land on Jolo
   around day x + 13; the main force of the Sakaguchi Detachment shall leave Palau around day x
   + 25 and land on Tarakan around day x + 30; then the Sakaguchi Detachment shall reunite with
   the Jolo Detachment, turn over [its task of] guarding Tarakan to a Navy unit and land in Balik-
   papan around day x + 35; after that, the detachment shall have an element of its force land in
   Banjarmasin around day x + 54 and strive to seize Bali around day x + 70 with [another] element
   of its force.
2. Detachment B ([consisting of] two battalions of the 38th Division as its core) shall leave Hong
   Kong around day x + 40 to assemble in Palau and seize Ambon around day x + 60, followed by
   Kupang.
3. The South Seas Detachment shall assemble in Palau around day x + 40 and sail to Cam Ranh Bay (the area where the main force of the army is stationed).

4. Depending on the situation, the South Seas Detachment shall capture Ambon and Kupang instead of Detachment B.

5. The 48th Division shall leave Manila around day x + 71 and land in eastern Java around day x + 80; its transport shall be completed in two transports at an interval of 6 days.

6. The main force of the Sixteenth Army (consisting of) the 2d Division and an element of the 38th Division as its core) shall assemble in Taiwan by around day x + 50 and then head for Cam Ranh Bay; it shall leave the Bay around day x + 75 and land in western Java around day x + 80; its transportation and landing shall be completed in four transports at an interval of 7 days.

7. In the capture of Tarakan, a naval landing force shall also make a landing under the command of Detachment Commander Sakaguchi; a naval paratroop unit shall also join in the capture of Balikpapan; depending on the situation, the paratroop unit shall join in the capture of Banjarmasin as well.

8. The main points of the capture of Banjarmasin and Bali shall be discussed and decided upon, based on the situation at the time, by the commander of the Navy Dutch East Indies Unit and Detachment Commander Sakaguchi.

9. Further arrangements concerning corps and detachments other than the Sakaguchi Detachment shall be made around day x + 40.

The significant main points of this arrangement, whose full text will be discussed later, are as follows:

1. [In this arrangement,] the capture of Ambon and Kupang with Detachment B instead of the South Seas Detachment became the rule.

   The war game at the War College in early October had studied the possibility of executing the capture of Ambon and Kupang with the South Seas Detachment after the capture of Guam and Rabaul. The [Army-Navy] Central Agreement on 6 November also followed this idea. However, due to the strong desire for an early termination of the southern operation expressed by the Southern Army on 10 November, it had been changed in such a way that [the capture of Ambon and Kupang would be executed] “by the South Seas Detachment or an element of the 38th Division.” Now it was [again] changed to “in principle by an element of the 38th Division (Detachment B).” This was because it was expected that it would take the South Seas Detachment at least forty days to capture Guam and Rabaul and then turn around and head back to the vicinity of Palau, making the whole schedule uncertain.

2. [In this arrangement,] Bali, which had never been brought up in either the Central Agreement or in the agreement between the Southern Army and the [Navy] Southern Task Force, was newly added as a target worth trying to capture.

   The [main] reasons were that it was discovered that there was a good airfield on Bali, that the island was small enough to be captured with a small force even though it might involve some risks because it was very close to Java, especially to the [Dutch East Indies] naval port of Surabaya, and that the occupation of Bali would make it possible to cut off support from the United States and Australia and provide effective air support in the capture of Java.

3. The dates to capture each place were scheduled as follows:

   Davao: day x + 6 (as specified in the General Agreement)
Jolo: day $x + 13$ (as specified in the General Agreement)
Tarakan: around day $x + 30$ (specified as “by around day $x + 25$” in the General Agreement)
Balikpapan: around day $x + 35$ (as specified in the General Agreement)
Banjarmasin: around day $x + 54$ (specified as “around day $x + 50$” in the General Agreement)
Bali: around day $x + 70$ (not mentioned at all in the General Agreement)
Java: around day $x + 80$ (as specified in the General Agreement)
The date for the capture of Tarakan would automatically become around day $x + 30$, when the main force of the [Navy] Philippines Unit would be able to turn around and join after supporting the landing of the main force of the Fourteenth Army in Lingayen Gulf and replenishing its supplies.\(^{(9)}\)

4. The arrangement concerning the main force of the 38th Division was not included.
This was because this arrangement was supposed to be made between the Sixteenth Army and the [Navy] Malaya Unit.

5. The plan was not realistic.
Due to the fact that the Southern Army strongly requested to shorten the operation period and that the whole arrangement was drafted by the Navy, the plan unrealistically expected that a large slow-moving convoy (sailing at some five or six knots) would cover the distance between Manila and Java (about 1,550 nautical miles) in less than nine days, and the distance between Cam Ranh and Java (about 1,140 nautical miles) in less than five days.

6. The Navy envisioned parachute droppings in Menado and Balikpapan (and depending on the situation, in Banjarmasin as well). [However,] when discussing at the meeting the use of a [naval] paratroop unit in Balikpapan, [Army] Detachment Commander Sakaguchi and the staff officer of the Detachment, Yano Tsuneo, stated that since they intended to land at night and advance to the airfield and into the city at once, they did not hope for a [naval] paratroop unit to drop into the battles during the landing or just after. [Consequently,] it was arranged that the [naval] paratroop unit would descend at a suitable moment after the landing of Sakaguchi Detachment.\(^{(9)}\)

The text of the Iwakuni Agreement concerning the Dutch East Indies Operation was as follows:\(^{(23)}\)

**Arrangement Between the Commander of the Navy Dutch East Indies Unit and the Commander of the Sixteenth Army**

16 November, 1941
V. Adm. Takahashi Ibō, commander of the Navy Dutch East Indies Unit
Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi, commander of the Sixteenth Army

I. Outline of the Operations
1. The Sakaguchi Detachment ([consisting of] 3 infantry battalions and 1 artillery battalion as its core):
   [The Sakaguchi Detachment] shall assemble in Palau around day $y + 23$.
The Jolo Detachment shall land on Jolo around day $x + 13$ (it sails together with the Davao invasion unit of the Fourteenth Army up to Davao).
The Sakaguchi Detachment (minus the Jolo Detachment) shall leave Palau around day \( x + 25 \) and land in Tarakan around day \( x + 30 \).

[The Sakaguchi Detachment] shall land in Balikpapan around day \( x + 35 \).

[ditto] in Banjarmasin around day \( x + 54 \).

[ditto] in Bali around day \( x + 70 \) (day \( z - 10 \)).

The day of landing in Java by the main force of the army is indicated as “\( z \),” which is by and large scheduled for approx. day \( x + 80 \).

2. Detachment B ([consisting of] 2 infantry battalions and 1 artillery battalion as its core):

Shall leave Hong Kong around day \( x + 40 \) and assemble in Palau.

Shall land on Ambon around day \( x + 60 \), followed by Kupang.

3. The South Seas Detachment ([consisting of] 3 infantry battalions and 1 artillery battalion as its core):

Shall assemble in Palau around day \( x + 40 \) and sail to the area of the main force of the army (Cam Ranh Bay) as quickly as possible.

4. Depending on the situation, the South Seas Detachment may land in Ambon and Kupang instead of Detachment B. In such a case, a part of Detachment B’s force shall be transported from the area of Detachment B (i.e. Hong Kong) to Palau if required. Which of the above plans should be adopted shall be decided by around day \( x + 40 \), and the Sixteenth Army commander shall inform the commander in chief of the Third Fleet.

5. The 48th Division:

Shall assemble in Manila around day \( x + 60 \).

Shall depart from Manila on day \( z - 9 \) (depending on the situation, the division may advance its assembly point to Menado beforehand, and leave there on day \( z - 5 \)); shall go ashore in eastern Java on day \( z \) after being transported in two transports at an interval of six days.

6. The main force of the army ([consisting of] the 2d Division and an element of the 38th Division as its core):

Shall assemble in Taiwan by around day \( x + 50 \), move to southern French Indochina, leave port of the area on day \( z - 5 \), and go ashore in western Java on day \( z \) after being transported in four transports at an interval of about seven days.

7. Transportation of part of the army:

During the period from day \( x + 60 \) to day \( x + 80 \), parts of the army shall be transported between Hong Kong, southern French Indochina and Manila.

II. Outline of the arrangements

8. The arrangement concerning the Sakaguchi Detachment is as in the separate volume No. 1.

9. The arrangement on communications is as in the separate volume No. 2 (omitted by the author).

10. [Detailed] arrangements concerning Detachment B and others shall be concluded either in Taipei, Davao, or Palau around day \( x + 40 \). The Army and the Navy shall round off discussions and make decisions by day \( x + 35 \).

Note: The Eleventh Air Fleet shall also conclude arrangements simultaneously with the above.

Arrangement between the commander of the Navy Dutch East Indies Unit and the commander of the Sixteenth Army: Separate volume No. 1 (Concerning the Sakaguchi Detachment)

16 November, 1941

V. Adm. Takahashi Ibō, commander in chief of the Navy Dutch East Indies Unit

Lt. Gen. Imamura Hitoshi, commander of the Sixteenth Army

(See Illustrations No. 10 and No. 11)
I. General Directives

1. The [Sakaguchi] Detachment shall assemble in Palau around day y + 23.

2. The Jolo Detachment (consisting of 1 infantry battalion (minus 2 companies), 1 field field artillery section, and 1 transport squad) shall board the transport ships of the Miura Detachment of the Fourteenth Army (a unit for the capture of Davao), sail together with this detachment and arrive off Davao on day x + 6. Then it shall land in Jolo around day x + 13 and capture its air base. After clearing the key areas of Jolo, the detachment shall promptly turn over [its task of] guarding [the island] to the Navy and prepare for transfer towards the area where the main force of the Sakaguchi Detachment [is deployed]. The transfer shall be effected after the Sakaguchi Detachment’s landing on Tarakan, which is roughly scheduled for approx. day x + 33. Depending on the situation of the operations in Davao, that is, if the Jolo Detachment cannot leave for Jolo or a significant delay is expected [in its transfer], the Sakaguchi Detachment may be required to form another unit for capturing Jolo [out of the detachment] and have naval war vessels transport the unit.

3. The Sakaguchi Detachment shall land in Tarakan around day x + 30, occupy its air base, and secure the oil resources there as well. After clearing the key areas of Tarakan, the detachment shall turn over the guarding [of the area] to the Navy, and land in and around Balikpapan and Samarinda as quickly as possible, occupy air bases, and secure the oil resources [there] as well. Depending on the situation, the capture of Balikpapan shall be carried out ahead of the capture of Samarinda. [The detachment] shall then send its transport ships to Palau for water and coal supply, after which an element of the detachment ([consisting of] approx. 1 infantry battalion and 1 artillery battery as its core) shall land in Banjarmasin and occupy its air base.

4. When the landing of the main force of the army draws near (the first day of the landing [in Java] is indicated as “z,” which is by and large scheduled for approx. day x + 80.), [the Sakaguchi Detachment] shall capture Bali ahead of the landing (around day z – 10) with an element of its force ([consisting of] about half an infantry battalion) and strive to facilitate the advancement of [the Army’s] air base [to the island].

5. The responsibility for guarding and maintaining security in Balikpapan (including the area in and around Samarinda), Banjarmasin and Bali shall fall on the Army until otherwise ordered.

6. The Sakaguchi Detachment shall be required to set up provisional landing bases in each landing point, and, in addition [to these], to establish a main landing base in Balikpapan during the period of operations of the detachment.

7. Concerning the replenishment of supplies for the Sakaguchi Detachment, the hospitalization and evacuation of its patients and the sending back of mail, the Navy shall provide the necessary support until [the detachment] is able to secure its line of communication with the main force of the army (evacuation locations shall be set either in Taiwan or in Palau). The details [of these arrangements] shall be discussed between the commanders of the Navy and the Army on site.

8. For details of the above, follow the “II. Outline for capturing the [target] areas.”

II. Outline for capturing the [target] areas

1. Capture of Jolo
   (1) Landing points and their reconnaissance:

   [1] Landing point: the coast northeast of the town of Jolo. If the landing point needs to be changed depending on the situation, the commander of the escort shall decide after due consultation with the Jolo Detachment commander.

   [2] Reconnaissance by (Navy) aircraft: If possible, [navy aircraft] shall carry out reconnaissance and provide data necessary for the Jolo landing operation.
Note: The Eleventh Air Fleet shall conduct the required reconnaissance and provide aerial photographs necessary [for the operations].

(2) Arrival at the assembly point, departure date, and anchorage:
[The detachment] shall assemble in Palau around day y + 23. It shall change ships and board the transport ships of the Fourteenth Army’s unit for capturing Davao at an appropriate time before leaving.
It shall leave Palau on day x + 3. After the Davao Detachment has captured Davao, [the Jolo Detachment] shall leave Davao for Jolo as soon as the situation at the Navy, particularly that of its air operations, shall permit.

(3) Starting date and time of landing and landing schedule:
The landing is scheduled to start before dawn on day x + 13. Landing shall be completed within one day.

(4) Distribution of the convoy of transport ships, their movements and, if required, the commander’s whereabouts:
[The ships are] in the order of the Myōgi and the Yamazuki [Yamatsuki]; the commander of the Jolo Detachment shall board the Myōgi.
The formation of the Jolo Detachment is as follows:
Commander: Lt. Col. Matsumoto Tadasu, commander of the 3d Battalion of the 146th Infantry Regiment
3d Battalion of the 146th Infantry Regiment (minus 2 companies)
1 Field artillery section
1 Transport squad

(5) Escort at sea and course of the convoy:
1. Forces to be employed for the escort: 1 light cruiser and 4 destroyers
   Commander of the escort: R. Adm. Tanaka Raizō ([on board] of the Jintsu)
2. Course of the convoy: to be decided by the commander of the escort after due consultation with the detachment commander.

(6) Diversions:
Shall not be executed.

(7) Use of air units:
[1] Forces to be employed: part of the Eleventh Air Fleet
[2] Main points on cooperation: [Air units] shall cover the convoy under sail as well as at the anchorage, and, at the request of the landing units, support them in their combat.
Note: The Eleventh Air Fleet shall give the above support with an element of both of its land-based attack plane and fighter plane units, while destroying the enemy air power.

(8) Outline of the approach to the anchorage and the time of anchoring:
The anchorage shall be at sea to the northeast of Jolo. [Time] to anchor is at 0100 on the 13th.
Other details shall be decided by the escort commander after due consultation with the detachment commander.

(9) Landing attack and covering fire:
[1] [The detachment] shall land on the coast northeast of the town of Jolo, occupy the airfield and the radio station promptly. At the same time it shall search for enemy units on site, and destroy them.
[2] Naval warships shall open fire [only] at the request of the landing unit.

(10) Cooperation between the Navy and the Army after landing:
[1] Once the key areas in and around Jolo are cleared, the detachment shall promptly turn over [its task of] guarding [the area] to the Navy, assemble in the area of Jolo,
and as soon as possible join the main force of the Sakaguchi Detachment. Transport ships necessary for this [transfer] shall be brought from the main force of the Sakaguchi Detachment. The details of the escort [of the convoy] shall be decided, based on the situation at the moment, by the escort commander, after due consultation with the Detachment Commander Sakaguchi.

[2] Once the landing is completed, the emptied ships (the Myōgi and the Yamazuki [Yamatsuki]) shall be returned to Davao together with the naval vessels.

(11) Communications:
As specified in the separate volume.

2. Capture of Tarakan
(1) Landing points and their reconnaissance
[1] Landing points:
The main force [shall land on] the coast from Cape Batu to the Karungan River. Part of the detachment [shall land on] the coast northwest of the Karungan River. Depending on the circumstances, part of the detachment or the main force may land in Lingkas from the beginning or if the situation requires it.

[2] Reconnaissance:
In order to keep the tactics secret, no reconnaissance shall be conducted other than specified in the following note:
Note: The Eleventh Air Fleet, while being mindful that the tactics should be kept secret, shall prepare aerial photos of the area including Batu, the oil fields, and

Illustration No. 10 — Overview of Tarakan Island
Sadau, and send them to the Sakaguchi Detachment before its departure from Palau (around day x + 25).

(2) Disposition of landing corps, convoy’s arrival at the assembly point, departure date, and anchorage:

[1] The detachment shall assemble in Palau around day y + 23, leave Palau as soon as the situation at the Navy permits (which is roughly scheduled for around day x + 25), and arrive at the landing point in a single transport. The detachment is formed as follows:

Commander: Maj. Gen. Sakaguchi Shizuo, commander of the 56th Mixed Infantry Group

56th Mixed Infantry Group (headquarters, 146th Infantry Regiment, armored car unit, 1st Field Artillery Battalion, 1st Engineer Company, 2d Transport Company, medical unit, and 1st Field Hospital)

44th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion

6th and the 7th Independent Radio Platoons, and the 33d Fixed Radio Unit

[2] Anchorage at the assembly point is as shown in the attached Illustration No. 1 (omitted by the author).

(3) Starting date and time of landing and landing schedule:

The landing is scheduled to start before dawn on day x + 30 and shall be completed within two days. The commander of the Navy’s Dutch East Indies Unit shall decide the above starting date of landing after due consultation with the Sixteenth Army commander, and both of them shall transmit the date in the form of an order to respectively the escort commander and the detachment commander by the day before [the detachment] leaves Palau at the latest. However, if it suddenly becomes imperative to change the schedule after leaving Palau, the escort commander shall make the decision after due consultation with the detachment commander, and they shall report the decision to respectively the commander of the Navy’s Dutch East Indies Unit and the Sixteenth Army commander without delay.

(4) Distribution of the convoy of transport ships, their movements and, if required, the commander’s whereabouts:

Shall depend on the arrangements between the escort commander and the detachment commander.

(5) Escort at sea and course of the convoy:

Forces to be employed for the escort: 1 light cruiser, 8 destroyers, and 4 to 6 minesweepers

Commander [of the escort]: R. Adm. Nishimura Shōji (on board of the Naka)

(6) Diversions:

Shall not be executed.

(7) Use of air units:

1. Forces to be employed: part of the Eleventh Air Fleet

2. Main points on cooperation: [Air units] shall cover the convoy under sail as well as at the anchorages, and, on the request of the landing units, support them in their combat.

Note: The Eleventh Air Fleet shall give the above support with an element of both of its land-based attack plane and fighter plane units, while destroying the enemy air power.

(8) Outline of the anchorages, the approach to them, and the time of the convoy’s anchorage and the formation at the anchorage:
The 1st anchorage shall be at sea to the southeast of Cape Batu. Time [to anchor] is 3½ hours before dawn. Other details shall be decided by the escort commander after due consultation with the detachment commander.

(9) Landing attack, cover and support for the disembarkation operations:

[1] The naval landing force shall come under the command of Detachment Commander Sakaguchi with respect to the operations during the period from landing on Tarakan till the completion of clearing the key areas.

[2] Directives for the landing attack:

[a] Although the landing shall be made as a surprise landing in principle, it shall be carried out by assault if the situation should require it. The change [of plan] shall be ordered by the detachment commander.

[b] The detachment shall have its main force land on the coast southeast of the Karungan River, while part [of the detachment] shall land on the coast northwest of the river. They shall promptly seize the Batu battery in the first place. They shall search for the main force of the enemy, wherever it may be, and destroy it and promptly occupy the towns of Tarakan and Lingkas. The naval landing force shall land on the right flank of the Army units.

[c] Once the towns of Tarakan and Lingkas have been occupied, the detachment shall have part of its force secure the airfield, the oil fields, and the areas around Sadau without missing any opportunity, while clearing up the remnants of enemy troops with its main force.

[d] Each of the above units is supposed to start its advance without waiting for the completion of the landing [of the whole detachment] and strive to quickly achieve battle results.

[e] During the above operations, the Navy shall have some of its warships make efforts to block the enemy fleeing by sea.

[f] Although [the attack] is planned as described above, its execution is subject to change due to consultations based on the situation at the moment, between the commanders of the Navy and the Army on the spot.

[g] The Navy shall capture Menado with another part [of its units] at about the same time as the detachment’s capture of Tarakan.

[3] Covering fire for the landing [of the detachment]:

The naval warships shall fire after daybreak at the enemy’s fort at Batu and other places, such as the enemy’s artillery in particular, at the request of the Army units.

(10) Cooperation between the Navy and the Army after landing:

Once the key areas of Tarakan have been cleared, the detachment shall promptly turn over [its task of] guarding [the area] to the Navy, assemble in the area of [the town of] Tarakan, and prepare for the next operation, i.e. the capture of Balikpapan. Depending on the situation, the Navy and the Army, in conjunction, may occupy key areas, mainly the oil fields in the neighborhood, following the capture of Tarakan. However, it goes against the [original] aim to postpone the capture of Balikpapan for
this [task]. The Jolo Detachment has to be brought to Tarakan without delay. The details of the escort shall be decided by the escort commander, after due consultation with Detachment Commander Sakaguchi.

(11) Move of the transport ships after the completion of landing:
The transport ships which complete unloading shall be kept on standby on site.

(12) Communications:
As specified in the separate volume (omitted by the author).

3. Capture of Balikpapan, Banjarmasin and Bali

(1) Capture of Balikpapan:
(a) The naval landing force shall come under the command of Detachment Commander Sakaguchi with respect to the operations from the time of landing.
Note: The 1001 Unit (note by the author: [naval] paratroop unit) under the command of the Eleventh Air Fleet commander shall [provisionally] come under the command of Detachment Commander Sakaguchi with respect to the operations during the period after its parachute landing until the clearing of key areas.
(b) Directives for the landing attack:
[1] Balikpapan area:
The detachment shall have its main force land near the Balikpapan pier and parts of the detachment near the Baru and Sepuluh batteries (note by the author: supposedly south of Balikpapan), and promptly occupy the oil refineries in particular.
Note: The Navy 1001 Unit shall descend upon key points at the right moment in concert with the Sakaguchi Detachment’s landing, and secure these spots.
[2] Samarinda area:
For the landings in Samarinda and Sanga Sanga, [units] go [upstream] in landing boats from the mouth of the Pegah River.
[3] Once the key areas are cleared, the Army units shall be responsible for the guarding in general, the securing of resources as well as various facilities, and maintaining public order etc., while the Navy units shall be responsible for making the airfields ready for use and securing them.
[4] Although [the attack] is planned as described above, its execution is subject to change due to consultations based on the situation at the moment, between the commanders of the Navy and the Army on the spot.

(2) Capture of Banjarmasin:
Shall be decided by the commander of the Navy’s Dutch East Indies Unit, based on the situation at the moment, after due consultation with the detachment commander.
Note: The Navy 1001 Unit may cooperate in [the operation].

(3) Capture of Bali:
Shall be decided by the commander of the Navy’s Dutch East Indies Unit, based on the situation at the moment, after due consultation with the detachment commander.

On concluding the above arrangement, the following problems occurred:

1. The problem of the responsibility for the capture of Davao.
Davao, along with Jolo Island, was a key place suitable not only for preventing the enemy in the Philippines from fleeing but also to be used as a base for the Dutch East Indies operation. Moreover, there were about twenty thousand Japanese residents in Davao, for whose rescue the Emperor reportedly had a particularly deep concern. As mentioned
Illustration No. 12 — The Iwakuni Agreement
previously, the Fourteenth Army planned to have the Miura Detachment (with one battalion as its core) and the Kimura Detachment (with two battalions as its core) of the 16th Division land in Davao and in Legaspi respectively, and have the main force of the 16th Division (with three battalions as its core) land in Lamon Bay. Although it wanted to increase the force for Davao in view of the importance of the place, in relation to other concerns, it had limited the core strength to one battalion. Meanwhile, a draft arrangement between the [Navy] Dutch East Indies Unit and the Sixteenth Army specified that (1) the Jolo Detachment would sail to Davao together with the Miura Detachment, and [from there] head for Jolo Island, while the main force of the Sakaguchi Detachment would leave Palau for Tarakan on the 12th day after the landing of the Jolo Detachment on the island; (2) depending on the situation of the Miura Detachment’s operations in the Davao area, that is, if the Jolo Detachment were not able to turn to Jolo or significant delay would be expected in its turn [to Jolo,] the Sakaguchi Detachment might be required to organize another unit for capturing Jolo [out of the detachment].

All of a sudden this became a focus of discussion. Whether the Miura Detachment would be able to capture Davao on its own was a cause for concern. The Third Fleet suggested “the possibility of having the main force of the Sakaguchi Detachment, which had been assigned for capture of Tarakan, stand by at the port of Davao instead of Palau.” The Sixteenth Army stated its view that “it did not want a situation where the Sakaguchi Detachment were dragged into war, unable to stand to see the Miura Detachment fighting an uphill battle, which might end up hindering the operations in Tarakan.” It added that “if such a situation could be expected, then it might as well have the Sakaguchi Detachment capture Davao from the beginning.” Hearing that, the Fourteenth Army made a request for “having the Sakaguchi Detachment under its command during capture of Davao, because the capture of Davao was the Fourteenth Army’s task.” This led to opposite opinions between the staff officers of the Fourteenth Army and those of the Sixteenth Army over the command of the Sakaguchi Detachment. That night Maeda Masami, chief of staff of the Fourteenth Army visited Imamura, commander of the Sixteenth Army, in his quarters and asked him to agree to putting the Sakaguchi Detachment under the command of the Fourteenth Army during the capture of Davao. Commander Imamura replied that “he would follow the decision of IGHQ.” Staff officers of IGHQ and the Southern Army, who attended this [series of] meetings and paid close attention to the progress of the Davao issue, noticed that the Fourteenth Army staff gradually turned to the idea that “it might leave capture of Davao to the Sixteenth Army,” and they judged the Fourteenth Army lacking in enthusiasm. In the directive of [the Army Department of] IGHQ and the Southern Army’s order, it was specified that “the Fourteenth Army shall capture Davao.” But the Miura Detachment was [merely] made up of one battalion as its core and commanded by a lieutenant colonel, whereas, according to sources, the strength of the U.S.-Filipino army in Davao was three thousand troops. [On the other hand,] the Sakaguchi Detachment was made up of one regiment as its core, and commanded by a major general. However, it was the one and only corps that the Sixteenth Army could use for operations for the moment.

After this series of meetings at Iwakuni was over (on the 16th), on the 19th (the day when the Sakaguchi Detachment left Moji) the Southern Army received approval of [the Army Department of] IGHQ to change the plan and have the Sixteenth Army capture
Davao, and gave the order as specified in the above-mentioned Southern Army Operation Order A, No. 2 on the same day. (9, 24)

2. The next problem was the description in 2.(9) of the draft arrangement concerning the Sakaguchi Detachment. In the Central Agreement, the capture of Menado was agreed upon as “to be carried out about the same time as that of Tarakan,” and in the agreement between the Southern Army and the Southern Task Force it was agreed upon as “around day x + 23” (note: that of Tarakan as around day x + 25). [However,] the above-mentioned draft [arrangement] prepared by the Third Fleet for this Iwakuni Agreement specified: “[the capture of] Menado on day x + 23 and that of Tarakan on day x + 30.” In the meeting the Army insisted that “Menado and Tarakan are the first targets in the Dutch East Indies operation and that these two should be captured on the same day from a political and war strategy viewpoint.” In response to this, the Navy made the concession that “Menado shall be captured about the same time as Tarakan.” (9)

3. The third problem was that, whereas the Southern Army, which desired an early ending of the southern operation, wanted to arrange the concrete details up to capture of Banjarmasin, the Navy insisted that it would make no further arrangements after Tarakan. (9) [In other words,] the Southern Army wanted to give an order to control its actions until about forty days after the start of war and assign the Sixteenth Army missions up to capture of Banjarmasin, (24) whereas the Navy, which regarded operational stages in a different way than the Southern Army, was moreover concerned about changes in the situation such as the U.S. Pacific Fleet coming to the attack.

4. The fourth problem was that the resourceful Staff Officer Yano Tsuneo of the Sakaguchi Detachment, seeing that the plan for the capture of Tarakan and Balikpapan entailed, as previously mentioned, assault landings against the best prepared and strongest front of the enemy, sought “regardless of this arrangement, permission to have a new arrangement based on a surprise attack agreed upon between the units of the Army and the Navy on the spot.” (36, 87) While the Navy had been interested in this area from early on and made efforts to gather information, the Army had paid little attention to it, so the Sixteenth Army had no materials to criticize the Navy’s proposal. Moreover, some showed sympathetic views since the Third Fleet had gone to the trouble to prepare a draft, while others supported the original plan by pointing out the example of the landing that had been made in the face of the enemy at Wusong in the Shanghai Incident. (36) In the end, it came down to a decision that it was permitted to interpret in a broad sense the item that “Although [the attack] is planned as described above, its execution is subject to change due to consultations, based on the situation at the moment, between the commanders of the Navy and the Army on the spot.” (9, 36, 87)

How Staff Officer Yano Tsuneo demonstrated his resourcefulness will be described later.

[Lieutenant General Imamura] Takes Command of the Sakaguchi Detachment and Sends It Off

As soon as the Iwakuni Agreement was concluded on the 16th, Army Commander Imamura went to Moji (32) where he took command of the Sakaguchi Detachment. On the 17th, he gave instructions [to the detachment] and demanded that, as the vanguard of the Sixteenth Army, the officers and men of the Sakaguchi Detachment should always keep in mind the impor-
tance of this war and operation, and the duty of the detachment, that they should achieve results in their first campaign with loyalty and bravery, take all possible measures to enhance and maintain their health, military discipline and morals, and extol the dignity of the Imperial Army in and outside the occupied areas.\(^{(88)}\)

The Sakaguchi Detachment was organized by adding to the 56th Mixed Infantry Group, organized at the Kurume divisional district, the previously mentioned units under the direct control of the army, one of which was the 44th Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion (commander: Maj. Takagi Takeo). [This battalion] was put under the command of Detachment Commander Sakaguchi on the 16th on its arrival in Moji after its return from Mudanjiang, Manchuria, by the order of [the Army Department] of IGHQ of 6 November, which had been given soon after their arrival there for the KANTOKUEN [Special Grand Maneuvers of the Kwantung Army].\(^{(88)}\)

The Sakaguchi Detachment (5,200 troops, 1,200 horses, 100 motor vehicles, 15 large motorized [landing] craft, and 15 small motorized [landing] craft), embarked on 8 ships, i.e. the Liverpool-maru, the Hankow-maru, the Tsuruga-maru, the Havana-maru, the Kuretake-maru, the Nichiai-maru, the Nisshō-maru [Hiteru-maru], and the Teiryū-maru (45,682 gross tons in total)\(^{(24)}\) and on 19 November left Moji for the assembly/standby spot in Palau first. Soon after the departure, one of the hawks circling in the blue sky perched on the mast of the Teiryū Maru which had the detachment commander on board.\(^{(88)}\) All officers and men took this as a good omen and headed straight for the south, confident of their fortunes of war.\(^{(88)}\)

The [Navy] Philippines (Dutch East Indies) Unit Operation Order No. 1

V. Adm. Takahashi Ibō (the commander in chief of the Third Fleet and) commander of the Philippines (Dutch East Indies) Unit, which would first operate as the Philippines Unit and then as the Dutch East Indies Unit, issued [Navy] Philippines Unit Operation Order No. 1 at Terashima-suido [Channel] on 23 November in accordance with the above-mentioned [Navy] Southern Task Force Operation Order No. 1 and the Iwakuni Agreement,\(^{(110)}\) left the Channel on the 26th, and advanced to Magong on the 29th.\(^{(103)}\)

In this order Commander in Chief Takahashi stated the date of landing in Menado, which the Navy was supposed to capture on its own account, as “around day x + 33” and that of the landing on Tarakan, which the Army and the Navy were to capture in conjunction, as “around day x + 35.”\(^{(110)}\) From a political and war strategy viewpoint, it was desirable that the capture of these two [places] be carried out on the same day, and eventually it happened that way. How it happened will be described later.

The disposition of forces given in the [Navy] Philippines Unit Operation Order No. 1 was in outline as follows. The 5th Raid Unit was charged with the direct escort of the Sakaguchi Detachment and the Southern Philippines Area Task Force was charged with its indirect guard.\(^{(110)}\) As mentioned previously, the Southern Task Force organized the Eastern Support Unit (1 battleship, 1 heavy cruiser and 2 destroyers) and assigned it for further indirect guard.

Main unit (from Magong to the waters west of Luzon Island): directly led by the commander in chief [of the Philippines Unit], [consisting of] the heavy cruiser Ashigara and the light cruiser Kuma of the 16th Cruiser Division and 2 destroyers of the 5th Destroyer Squadron.

1st Raid Unit (from Magong to Aparri): [consisting of] the light cruiser Natori and 6 destroyers under the command of the 5th Destroyer Squadron commander.
2d Raid Unit (from Magong to Vigan): [consisting of] the light cruiser *Naka* and 7 destroyers under the command of the 4th Destroyer Squadron commander.

3d Raid Unit (from Gaoyxiang to Batan Island): [consisting of] 1 destroyer under the command of the 2d Base Force commander.

4th Raid Unit (from Palau to Legaspi): [consisting of] the light cruiser *Nagara* (of the 16th Cruiser Division) and 8 destroyers under the command of the 1st Base Force commander.

5th Raid Unit (from Palau to Davao), [consisting of] the light cruiser *Jintsu* and 8 destroyers under the command of the 2d Destroyer Squadron commander.

Southern Philippines Area Task Force (from Palau): composed of the 5th Cruiser Division ([consisting of] the heavy cruisers *Myōkō*, *Haguro* and *Nachi*), the 4th Carrier Division ([consisting of] the aircraft carrier *Ryūjō* and 1 destroyer), and the 11th Seaplane Tender Division ([consisting of] the seaplane tenders *Chitose* and *Mizuho*) under the command of the 5th Cruiser Division commander.

Minelayer Unit (from Palau): under the command of the 17th Minelayer Division commander.

**Operation Plan of the Sixteenth Army** *(See Illustration No. 13)*

After concluding the arrangement with the Third Fleet at Iwakuni, the Sixteenth Army started to work on its operation plan in earnest.

The operation plan had undergone changes as the IGHQ plan, the Southern Army’s plan, the Iwakuni Agreement, and the Southern Army’s revised plan (of the 19th) were made successively, and, as of 19 November, the Sixteenth Army was supposed to deploy its forces in the following way:

Sakaguchi Detachment: shall move from Palau to Davao (the detachment shall take control of the Miura Detachment as well) and [further] to Jolo (an element of the detachment), Tarakan (the main force of the detachment), Balikpapan (the full force of the detachment), Banjarmasin (an element of the detachment), and Bali ([the Sixteenth Army] had made an arrangement with the Third Fleet that “the Sakaguchi Detachment would strive to capture Bali with part of its forces,” although this was not mentioned in the directive of IGHQ or in the order given by the Southern Army).

Detachment B (two battalions): shall move from Hong Kong to Ambon and Kupang

South Seas Detachment (three battalions): shall move toward Java via Cam Ranh after capturing Rabaul (depending on the situation, it shall move to Ambon and Kupang instead of Detachment B).

38th Division (minus Detachment B and the Itō Detachment): shall move from Hong Kong toward southern Sumatra via Cam Ranh. It shall be divided into an advance party and the main force.

2d Division: shall move toward western Java via Taiwan and Cam Ranh.

Itō Detachment (three battalions): shall move from Hong Kong toward central Java via Cam Ranh.

48th Division: shall move from Luzon toward eastern Java.

At that time, the Sixteenth Army had a rough idea of the following facts in addition to the already mentioned Dutch East Indies topography, military preparedness, etc.:

Tarakan and Balikpapan had strong defenses in the cities’ coastal areas where oil refinery and storage facilities were located, and where many pillboxes were put in place. Tarakan was particularly [strongly] fortified. At Lingkas there were obstacles along the beach and three lines of
trenches, while batteries were located at the northwest and southeast ends of the island. In Ambon there were strong defenses in the city and at the mouth of its bay, and also in Kupang. Palembang had many pillboxes in the area of the oil refineries (at the south bank of the Musi River), and Bangka had some defense facilities in and near Mentok.

On Java (See Illustration No. 13) Bandung and Malang were garrison towns. The Bandung stronghold had pillboxes and barbed-wire entanglements on the ridges of the mountains surrounding the city. Especially the areas along the northbound and westbound roads were strongly fortified. The Surabaya stronghold had batteries, pillboxes, and barbed-wire entanglements along the Madura Strait and in the areas of Gresik, the west side of Surabaya, and Wonokromo. As for its land front, the northwest front in particular had strong defenses with three lines of barbed-wire entanglements. Porong, midway between Surabaya and Malang, had fortress-like trenches with pillboxes and barbed-wire entanglements.

Entrenched positions with pillboxes were placed along the perimeter of the capital Batavia. In particular, Tangerang and vicinity in the west of the capital seemed to be a strategic place among the positions along the outer perimeter with entrenched positions with pillboxes in the west and northwest of Tangerang. There was an entrenched position too near Leuwiliang, located to the south of the town. Tangerang and Leuwiliang were meant to serve as bases for offensive and defensive battles in the western Java area. In Cirebon and [near] the ports of Tanjung Priok, Semarang and Cilacap, etc. were entrenched positions with batteries. Furthermore, entrenched positions had been set up everywhere on every promontory or suitable landing spot on the north and northwest coasts of Java.

In the previously mentioned apportioning of shipping, the main force of the 38th Division, which would be used for the operations in southern Sumatra, was further divided into an advance party and the main force. This was based on the idea that, while having the advance group seize the Mentok airfield and, in concert with a paratroop unit, raid the oil refineries in Palembang and seize them, the main force of the division would subsequently come ashore, make sure that the oil resources were securely held, and promptly seize the airfields in Palembang, Tanjungkarang, etc., and make them ready for use. The concept of forming the corps that was to land on Java out of the army’s main force consisting of the 2d Division as its core, the Itō Detachment ([consisting of] three battalions of the 38th Division as its core), and the core units of the 48th Division, was based on the idea that the main force of the army consisting of the 2d Division as its core should land in western Java and seize the capital Batavia, while the Itō Detachment should land on the north coast of central Java, raid the Kalijati airfield, secure the place, and act in concert with the main force of the army in capturing Batavia, after which both of them should capture the Bandung stronghold, and that [in the meantime] the core units of the 48th Division should land in eastern Java and capture the Surabaya stronghold. (36)

Originally, the Java operation was to be carried out by landing only the 2d and the 48th Divisions in western and eastern Java [respectively]. However, the Itō Detachment was added, because soon after the war game held at the War College in early October, Lt. Col. Itoda Isamu had suggested that “air operations against western Java can be conducted from southern Sumatra and Kuching and those against eastern Java can be done from southern Celebes and Banjarmasin, but south-central Java will be left as a blind spot, which makes it seem appropriate to me to raid, occupy, and use the Kalijati airfield. This unit will also be effective in connecting the corps in eastern and western [Java].” Thus it was decided to put this idea into practice even though considerable risks were anticipated. (39)
The Sixteenth Army’s operation plan, which had been worked on in earnest after the conclusion of the Iwakuni Agreement (on 16 November), was finished around the 21st of the following month. On 21 December, Col. Kume Seiichi, commander of the 1st [Paratroop] Raiding Group visited the Sixteenth Army headquarters and studied it.\(^{33}\) The lines-of-communication plan of the Sixteenth Army was completed on 25 December.\(^{5}\)

A remarkable change had occurred in the period between the Iwakuni Agreement and the completion of the Sixteenth Army’s operation plan. Amazingly successful battle results were achieved in various regions just after the opening of hostilities on 8 December, and the 38th Division had already landed in Hong Kong (on the 18th). On the other hand, the Fourth Fleet [still] failed to capture Wake Island, which consequently meant a postponement of the capture of Rabaul by the South Seas Detachment. That is to say, the responsibility for the capture of Ambon and Kupang would inevitably have to be settled on Detachment B. However, this change in the situation was reflected neither in the Sixteenth Army’s operation plan of around 21 December nor in its lines-of-communication plan of 25 December. On the day when the lines-of-communication plan was completed, the British army in Hong Kong surrendered, and the South Seas Detachment was still in Guam, but this was not reflected in the lines-of-communication plan, either.

The Sixteenth Army’s operation plan, completed around 21 December, was in outline as follows:\(^{5, 36}\) (See Illustration No. 13)

**Sixteenth Army’s Operation Plan**

1. Mission:

   The Sixteenth Army (97,800 men once the 38th and the 48th Division, the South Seas Detachment and others are attached (excluding the 10,000 ground personnel of the air units), and 11,750 horses) shall, in conjunction with the Navy, capture Davao, Jolo, then Tarakan and Balikpapan with the Sakaguchi Detachment (5,980 men and 860 horses), and further capture Banjarmasin and Bali with part of this detachment. [The Army] shall also capture Ambon and Kupang with Detachment B (2 battalions of the 38th Division as its core, 3,300 men and 560 horses) and, in conjunction with the army air unit and the navy unit, capture Bangka, Palembang, and other key locations in southern Sumatra with the main force of the 38th Division (4 battalions as its core, i.e. 12,360 men, and 1,910 horses, excluding the 10,000 personnel of the air units), secure resources and air bases, and at the same time make preparations for the capture of Java which shall be carried out by the main force of the army. Concerning Davao, Jolo, Tarakan and Ambon, the guarding of these places shall be turned over to the Navy units once they are seized.

   As soon as the main force of the army has been concentrated, it shall, almost simultaneously and in concert, put ashore in western Java the main force consisting of the 2d Division as its core (27,730 men and 4,970 horses) and the units under the direct control of the army, in the north of central Java the Itō Detachment (1 regiment as its core, commanded by the commander of the 38th Division’s Infantry Group, consisting of 5,910 men and 910 horses), and in eastern Java the unit consisting of the 48th Division as its core (24,600 men and 1,210 horses). They shall capture Batavia, Surabaya, and Bandung, and then pacify the entire island.

   The South Seas Detachment (4,470 men and 1,090 horses) is scheduled to be used [in the capture of] the mainland of Java. However, depending on the situation, it may [also] be assigned to capture Ambon and Kupang instead of Detachment B.
As for the transport [of the army], the unit with the main force of the 38th Division as its core, which is responsible for capturing southern Sumatra, shall be divided into an advance party and the main force, and be transported in one transport each. The [unit for] eastern Java shall be divided into two transports. As for the units for western Java, the troops shall be divided into three transports and the military supplies into four transports. Others shall be transported in one transport each.

2. Southern Sumatra Operations:
   The outline of the southern Sumatra operations by the main force of the 38th Division ([consisting of] 4 battalions as its core) is as follows:
   (1) It shall have an advance party ([consisting of] 2 battalions as its core) proceed under air and naval cover, and raid and capture Mentok with an element of the party, and have the main force of the party go up the Musi and other rivers by boat, capture Palembang in concert with the paratroop unit, and secure the oil resources.
   (2) The main force shall follow the advance party and make sure that the oil resources and the airfield in Palembang area are securely held, then promptly occupy the Tanjungkarang airfield, get it ready for use, and after that mop up [the enemy] in southern Sumatra.

3. The operations of the Sakaguchi Detachment:
   Shall be executed in accordance with the arrangement between the Sixteenth Army and the [Navy] Dutch East Indies Unit in Iwakuni, and in accordance with the one to be concluded between the Sakaguchi Detachment and the naval unit on site.

4. Ambon and Kupang Operations:
   (1) Shall be carried out by Detachment B (or by the South Seas Detachment depending on the situation).
   (2) In the operations for capturing Ambon, [the detachment concerned] shall land on the eastern coast of the island and head for the city of Ambon and the Laha airfield. In the operations for capturing Kupang, [the detachment concerned] shall land on the south coast and head for the city of Kupang and the airfield.

5. Java Operations:
   (1) Batavia, Surabaya and Bandung shall be promptly captured and subsequently the entire island shall be pacified.
   (2) The 48th Division shall land in the area of Rembang. Using Rembang as its base, it shall promptly capture Surabaya, and then, using Surabaya as its base, act in concert with the operations of the main force of the army.
   (3) The main force of the army shall promptly capture Batavia, and then, using this city as its base, capture the Bundung stronghold. In order [to realize this]:
      (1) The first landing units shall be divided into the Noguchi Detachment ([consisting of] the 2d Reconnaissance Regiment as its core, 2,700 men and 100 horses), the 2d Division (minus the Noguchi Detachment, 18,880 men and 1,870 horses), and the Itō Detachment ([consisting of] the 38th Infantry Group headquarters and 1 infantry regiment of the 38th Division as its core, 5,910 men and 910 horses).
      (2) The Noguchi Detachment shall land around Carita, charge toward Buitenzorg [Bogor], facilitate the capture of Batavia by the main force of the 2d Division, and take action so as to gain advantage for the next operation.
         The 2d Division shall land its main force near Merak and Anyer-Lor, and part of its force near Mauk, and then promptly occupy Batavia and the port of Tanjung Priok.
         The Itō Detachment shall land near Cilamaya and then secure the Kalijati airfield. Further, it shall facilitate the capture of Batavia by the main force of the army and gain advantage for subsequent operations.
      (3) Next, the 2d Division shall advance its main force to Buitenzorg [Bogor] and part of the division to Cikampek from Batavia in concert with the Itō Detachment.
Illustration No. 13 — The Operation Plan of the Sixteenth Army as of 21 December 1941
Next, the main force of the army shall make preparations for the attack [on the Bandung stronghold] along the line connecting Buitenzorg [Bogor], Purwakarta and Subang (i.e. the line which stretches from the west front to the north front of the stronghold), and attack it from the direction of Buitenzorg [Bogor] with the main force. Depending on the situation [the army] shall attack the stronghold southward from the direction of Subang with its main force. (Note: an attack from the west front was anticipated to be difficult because the force had to cross several steep gorges, but [this course was supported] particularly by the staff in charge of the line of communication, who held that in any event it would be superior in safety and certainty. (36))

Detachment D (i.e. the South Seas Detachment, if the South Seas Detachment shall be charged with the capture of Ambon and Kupang, this operation shall be assigned to Detachment B of the 38th Division) shall land in Cirebon, dash forward to Cilacap, cut off the allied forces’ route for reinforcements from, or escape to, the Indian Ocean, and give the army an advantage in its operations.

The second landing units (6,150 men and 3,000 horses) of the 2d Division and other units shall join the operations of the main force of the army after landing. The 48th Division, after its capture of Surabaya, shall use the town as a base and turn toward central Java. In line with the situation, it shall act in concert with the main force of the army in its operations.

The main line of communication of the main force of the army shall be established initially from Merak to Batavia and later from Tanjung Priok to Batavia, Buitenzorg [Bogor], and Bandung.

Following the capture of the Bandung stronghold, the entire island shall be pacified.

The amount of arms and equipment to be provided to the Sixteenth Army (consisting of the 2d, the 38th, and the 48th Divisions, the Sakaguchi and the South Seas Detachment as its core) was planned as follows: (5)

48,411 rifles, 1,147 light machine guns, 88 vehicle-mounted light machine guns, 362 heavy machine guns, 247 vehicle-mounted heavy machine guns, 10 antiaircraft heavy machine guns, 1,156 Type89 heavy grenade launchers, 52 Type10 light grenade launchers, 20 Type97 antitank rifles, 66 Type92 infantry guns, 4 Type11 infantry mortars, 70 Type94 37-mm. guns, 169 TypeRa [Rheinmetall-model] 37-mm. antitank guns, 112 Type4 37-mm. tank guns, 44 Type90 57-mm. tank guns, 57 Type41 mountain guns (regimental guns), 21 converted Type38 field guns, 74 Type94 mountain guns, 24 Type91 10-cm. howitzers, 24 Type96 15-cm. howitzers, 92 Type88 7-cm. antiaircraft guns, 36 Type94 light trench mortars, 16 Type89 mortars, 4,898 motor vehicles (5,898 motor vehicles in total, when combined with airfield units), 11 Type94 tankettes, 40 Type97 tankettes, 98 Type95 light tanks, and 44 Type89 medium tanks.

As mentioned previously, the Sixteenth Army completed its line-of-communication plan on 25 December based on its operation plan and the line-of-communication plan of the Southern Army. The most noteworthy points of the plan were as follows: (5)

1. The main supply points for the [Sixteenth] Army were set by the Southern Army at Batavia, Surabaya and Palembang.
2. Twenty-four units from mainland Japan, eight units from Manchuria, one unit from southern China, four units from the Philippines, and two units from Malaya were supposed to be incorporated into the line-of-communication units of the army sometime between day x + 25 and day x + 80. The army decided to apportion necessary line-of-communication units to each corps and
detachment, organize the line-of-communication department of the army with the main force of the remaining units, and have Vice Chief of Staff Harada serve also as director of the line-of-communication department of the army. It also decided to attach the Sumatra oil-drilling unit (commander: head of the oil-drilling group of the 21st Field Ordnance Depot) to the 38th Division and the Java oil-drilling unit of the Army to the 48th Division for the Cepu and other oil fields.

3. In the plan it was decided that the main supplies to be delivered to the army would be for about the first six months of operations, that is, ammunition for about one campaign, fuel, provisions and fodder for about three months, and medical supplies, veterinary goods etc. for about six months, and that, after that, ammunition and some other supplies would be delivered roughly every six months.

4. In the plan, the base supply point for the 48th Division was initially set at Rembang and later at Surabaya. The main force of the army would initially be supplied through the first landing point, and later through Batavia, the main line-of-communication center.

5. It was decided that the signal communication center of the army would be moved, following the developments of the operations, to Saigon, a signal ship, [a point] near Merak, Batavia and, if necessary, Serang and Tangerang one after another.

6. The use of the railway unit of the army ([consisting of] the main force of the 6th Railway Regiment and the 168th Railway Depot headquarters as its core, and assigned to the area of the main force of the army) was roughly planned as follows:

(1) The army railway unit shall have parts of the unit land in Merak, Mauk, Carita and Cilamaya along with the first landing units, seize the existing railways quickly and, by operating them, temporarily carry out the transport of units and munitions toward Batavia, and make its way into the city without delay. After entering into the city, it shall restore the railway between Tanjung Priok and Buitenzorg [Bogor] via Batavia.

(2) The main force of the army railway unit shall land near Batavia or Merak ahead of each of the second and the third landing units. While also directing the parts of the unit that had landed earlier, it shall restore in the first place the railway between Tanjung Priok and Buitenzorg [Bogor] via Batavia with a part of the unit or with its main force, get it ready for conducting the transport through close cooperation with the logistics unit or, if necessary, by assigning part of the unit to the army line-of-communication unit. Meanwhile, the unit shall have its main force, or a part of the unit, handle the mobile transport of Detachment D to Cilacap via Cirebon, and plan for railway combats. The use of the railway unit of the army after the capture of key locations shall depend on the situation at that time.

(3) During the period from the landings in Merak, Anyer-Lor, Carita, Mauk, and Cilamaya to [entering into] Batavia, the railway unit of the army shall not do repairs except minor ones. It should first of all advance into Batavia by quickly seizing the existing railways. Depending on the degree of destruction of the railways, it shall be expected to promptly advance into Batavia by motor vehicles without repairing the railways.

(4) The railway between Tanjung Priok and Buitenzorg [Bogor] via Batavia has to be quickly restored and maintained to the extent that one hundred tons [of transport] per day can be dealt with, and the necessary disembarkation facilities have to be equipped. The railway between Batavia and Cilacap via Cirebon has to be repaired so as to move Detachment D forward as much as possible. If necessary, motor vehicles can be used to go forward first in order to restore [the railway].

(5) During the initial stages after landings, the railway unit of the army shall provide makeshift armored trains and operate them to advance toward Cirebon from Batavia.

How long did those involved at the time estimate the time required for capturing Java? Before the opening of hostilities, it seemed to be roughly estimated at twenty to sixty days, though
the estimation differed from person to person depending on their judgment of the strength, capability, equipment, and defense facilities of the Dutch East Indies Army, their judgment of our damage during sea transportation, and their judgment of the reinforcements provided by the British, U.S. and Australian forces. Some among the staff [of the Army Department] of IGHQ, who were well-informed of [the strength of] the enemy and ourselves, took it relatively easy, but those who [were charged to] execute the operation were cautious. It seems that [the Army Department of] IGHQ unofficially announced to the staff of the Southern Army that “it expected the landing on Java to be on day x + 103 and the completion of the conquest of Java on day x + 120,” but Staff Officer Yamashita Yutaka (an up-and-coming major), who was appointed staff (assistant operations staff officer) of the Sixteenth Army from being a member of a section of the War Ministry, recalls: “I estimated [the time required for the conquest of Java] to be two months.”

After the opening of hostilities, everyone came to change their estimation of the time necessary to capture Java as they were hearing more and more about the military gains in the Philippines, Malaya, and other areas and became aware that the date of the Java operation could be advanced. [Intelligence] Staff Officer Kuriya Tsugunori (who had returned to Japan from Java in the month before the opening of hostilities) recalled that when he had been asked about his judgment [on the necessary time] by Staff Officer Arao Okikatsu, chief of operations of the Southern Army some time before the convoy for capturing Java had left Cam Ranh Bay, his answer had been that it could be captured in the time required [for the army] to march and travel through [the land], that is, a week, or ten days including contingency time. However, Army Commander Imamura described the judgment he had formed at almost the same time as Staff Officer Kuriya above, as follows: “At the end of early February, the chief of the Operations Bureau of the Army Department of IGHQ, Tanaka Shin’ichi, came to Saigon and asked me whether it was possible to dispose of the entire Java invasion within fourteen days (two weeks). I answered that at that moment I could not tell how many ships would be able to arrive and disembark while braving enemy torpedoes, and that, though I wished in my mind that we could make the enemy surrender within a month, my conscience did not allow me to declare that we could [promise to] make it happen.” (Note: Will be described later [p. 427].)

As mentioned previously, the Sixteenth Army headquarters [temporarily] situated in the War College completed its operation plan with Commander Kume of the [Paratroop] Raiding Group on 21 December. However the next day, on the 22d, Col. Takashima Tatsuhiko, senior staff officer of Section 1 [of the headquarters] went to IGHQ and requested the following matters:

1. The staff of the Sixteenth Army should be increased so that all of its detachments would have their own staff officers attached.
2. The capture of Rabaul by the South Seas Detachment should be carried out promptly so that the detachment could be diverted to the Sixteenth Army soon.
3. Ways to capture both Palembang and Balikpapan simultaneously should be sought out [at the Army Department]. (Note: at that moment, the operation in the Malaya area was unexpectedly making sudden progress. Nevertheless, there were no arrangements yet on the Palembang operation between the Sixteenth Army and the Southern Expeditionary Fleet.)
4. The capture of Ambon should be rescheduled for around 10 January. (Note: the 38th Division had already landed on Hong Kong Island on 18 December, which ensured the likelihood of an early redeployment of Detachment B.)
5. The Davao unit (note: the Sakaguchi Detachment had already landed in Davao on the 20th) should be promptly replenished because of the serious damage incurred.

6. Ex-ante reinforcement (note: increased assignment of supernumerary personnel for filling vacancies before launching the operations) to the 2d Division should be approved.

On this day (the 22d), Staff Officer Oda Akimitsu, chief of operations [of the Sixteenth Army headquarters], took off from Tokyo for the Southern Army headquarters in Saigon with the operation plan that had just been completed. At that time, the Sixteenth Army headquarters assumed that it would still have about another month before its departure from Tokyo. For this reason, Staff Officer Oda Akimitsu had intended to return to Tokyo as soon as he finished briefing the Southern Army. However, when on the next day, the 23d, Staff Officer Oda reported to the headquarters [of the Southern Army] in Saigon, he received an entirely unexpected command to stay in Saigon, being told that it was doing a study of advancing the Java operations by about one month from the [original] plan of IGHQ.

Taking Command of the 2d Division and Encouraging the Sakaguchi Detachment

Army Commander Imamura, who had taken command of the Sakaguchi Detachment and sent it off at Moji, dispatched his Vice Chief of Staff Harada Yoshikazu (accompanied by Staff Officer Itoda Isamu) to Palau upon the safe arrival of the detachment there on 28 November, to inspect the detachment and give directions as to the final preparation for the operations as well as to encourage the officers and men. Army Commander Imamura also visited the Sendai divisional district from 24 to 25 November, where, after the cadre of the 2d Division presented themselves before him, he gave instructions, inspected its maneuvers, and gave directions. The 2d Division left Sendai, Wakamatsu and Shibata one after another from 1 to 16 December, arrived at the maneuver areas in Narashino, at the foot of Mt. Fuji, in Toyohashi, and Inuyama from 1 to 17 December, and continued training. Before the opening of hostilities, the 2d Division [was ordered to] pretend to “be off to the Kunming operations.” Division Commander Maruyama Masao reported to the [Sixteenth] Army headquarters on 9 December and after that stayed at the Narashino maneuver area.

Preparation of a Propaganda Group

The propaganda group of the Sixteenth Army was formed as an agency supervised by Staff Section 1, and was making preparations to be dispatched. Its mission mainly consisted in counterpropaganda and the breaking of the enemy’s fighting spirit; at the same time, considering the special characteristics of the Dutch East Indies, it also included the prevention of the destruction of resources, the heightening of the morale of the officers and men of the Imperial Army, the news coverage sent to the homeland, the conducting of pacification activities to stabilize popular feeling right after occupation, etc. The propaganda group of the army was granted three million yen as expenses for its formation and equipment before leaving for the front. The group, led by Lt. Col. Machida Keiji, consisted of eleven officers, twenty-six noncommissioned officers, seventy-three men, eighty-seven drafted personnel, and forty-eight employed personnel. The drafted personnel included men such as Ōya Sōichi, Matsui
Suisei, Abe Tomoji, Tomizawa Uio, Kitahara Takeo, Ōe Kenji, Takeda Rintarō, Ōki Atsuo, Asano Akira, Ono Saseo, Yokoyama Ryūichi, Iida Nobuo, Ishimoto Tōkichi, Kurata Fumindo, Kōno Takashi, Ōchi Hiroshi, Minami Masayoshi, and Shimizu Hitoshi, who represented various professions such as writer, painter, musician, movie director, printer, stenographer and advertising balloon manufacturer. The drafted personnel had been given military training for about ten days and each of them was making preparations for the propaganda activities; painters and printers were creating posters, propaganda leaflets, etc., while writers were drafting advertisement copy.

Preparations for the Military Administration

A military administration department was formed within the organization of the headquarters of the army. Maj. Gen. Harada Yoshikazu, vice chief of staff, was concurrently assigned director to the department, while Col. Nakayama Yasuto was head of the department, and some twenty personnel of senior official class, some 150 clerical staff and others were assigned to it. But it was kept on a small scale with the intention of making use of the local administrative structure and personnel as much as possible. IGHQ had issued “Directives for implementing an administration in the southern occupied areas” on 26 November. In the previously-mentioned “Transportation, Lines-of-communication and Signal Communications Plan of the Sixteenth Army,” the army had specified: “In the early stages of the operation, the administration of the occupied areas shall focus on promptly securing public order and acquiring important national defense resources, liquid fuel in particular, as well as on enabling the army that conducts the operation to support itself on site; when implementing the administration, it shall use the remaining [administrative] structures as much as possible and run them while especially respecting the traditional organizations and ethnic customs in order to reduce the burden of the army in achieving its aims; the currency used in the area of operations shall be a military scrip for the time being, etc.” Based on these rules, it proceeded with research on and preparations for the military administration.