Jihad and Islam in World War I

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8 Architectural Jihad

The “Halbmondlager” Mosque of Wünsdorf as an Instrument of Propaganda

Martin Gussone

In the camp at Wunstorf a splendid mosque, correct in every architectural feature, had been erected as a gift of the Kaiser to the Mohammedans of the camp. … The photographs represent how successful the Germans were in their propaganda.¹

During World War I two camps for Muslim prisoners of war were established in Wünsdorf and Zossen about 50 km south of Berlin: the Halbmondlager and the Weinberglager. In the Halbmondlager a mosque was built and a cemetery for the prisoners was located in the nearby village of Zehrensdorf. (Fig. 8.1) These efforts were not an end in itself, but were part of the Jihad concept of the German Intelligence Office for the East (NfO = Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient). This project intended to persuade Muslim prisoners of war to change sides and join the Ottoman–German Alliance against the British and French Entente.

Based on contemporary photos, plans and archival material this chapter presents an analysis of the history of the two camps and the mosque, interpreting them as the materialization of Germany’s Jihad propaganda. The incorporation of the mosque into the Jihad concept will be demonstrated by the stylistic analysis of its architectural and epigraphic programme. A brief outline of the propaganda in the camps and an evaluation of its results complement this overview.²

Special Camps for Muslim Prisoners of War as Part of a Jihad Concept

Soon after the beginning of the war the number of prisoners reached an unexpectedly high number.³ Among them were Muslims, because auxiliary troops from the Indian and African colonies were fighting on the side of the British and the French, whereas the Russians employed troops from the Crimea, Kazan and the Caucasus.⁴ Ger-
Figure 8.1 Map of the area south of Berlin where the camps were located, based on topographic map, 'Truppenübungspalt Zossen', M 1:100.000, Reichsamt für Landesaufnahme, Berlin 1936
man propaganda criticized this deployment of non-European soldiers, using racist arguments and chauvinist caricatures and slogans such as “Circus of the peoples of our enemies” (= ’Völkerzirkus unserer Feinde’).⁵

At the same time, however, the German side planned to use the Muslim prisoners to serve its military and political ends.⁶ In this context prisoners from North Africa and India were valued more highly than the prisoners who fought on the side of the Russians.⁷

Just before Turkey’s entry into the war, in September 1914, a group of selected Muslim prisoners of war was transported to Istanbul, exposing them as extras in the staging of the declaration of the “Holy War”.⁸ At about that time, in autumn 1914, the renowned archaeologist and expert on the Near East, Max von Oppenheim, developed the concept of gathering the Muslim prisoners of war in a special camp,⁹ where they would be demonstratively well treated, instead of “releasing” (= deporting) them in great numbers to Turkey as originally planned.¹⁰ The underlying idea was to stir up the prisoners of war and to initiate a Jihad, together with the Ottoman Empire, which would be coordinated by the Intelligence Office for the East.¹¹

The “special treatment” of the Muslim prisoners of war as “guests” of the German Emperor Wilhelm II was a propagandistic means to win sympathy and support for the Central Powers. It referred to the emperor’s well-known journeys to the “Orient”, his good relations with the Ottoman sultan, and his notorious Damascene promise of friendship to the “300 million Mohammedans” (= “300 Millionen Muhammedaner”).¹² Moreover, it was intended to motivate Muslim combatants fighting on the side of the Entente to change sides. Finally, the programme aimed at incitement to rebellion and turmoil in the English and French colonies (= “Revolutionierung der islamischen Gebiete unserer Feinde”),¹³ in order to keep in the colonies forces that were actually needed in European theatres of war.

For the African/French and Indian/British prisoners of war the so-called Halbmondlager was erected close to the military facilities of Wünsdorf about 50 km south of Berlin. The Asian/Russian Muslim prisoners of war were kept in the Weinberglager, near Zossen, situated approx. 6 km to the northeast. Allegedly the camps were built “according to specified guidelines”, and their planning principles were to comply with the “character of modern settlements.”¹⁴ In addition, a cemetery for the deceased inmates of the camps was located in the nearby village of Zehrensdorf.¹⁵

In its finished condition the Halbmondlager included 50 barracks and associated outbuildings for 4,000 prisoners. The prisoners were housed
Figure 8.2a  Prisoners of war at Wünsdorf during prayer (Der Große Krieg in Bildern, 1915, 10 and 17)

Figure 8.2b  Plan of the 'Halbmondlager' at Wünsdorf, with the mosque in the middle (section of topographic map 3846, M 1: 25,000, 1920)
separately, divided “by sects [i.e. religion] and nationalities” in three distinct areas. According to functional zoning criteria the meeting place and the mosque with the central bath house were located at the centre of the camp. The main façade of the mosque was orientated to the south, aligned with the camp entrance.

The *Weinberglager* was planned to keep 12,000 prisoners. It included 12 fenced areas with barracks and utilities separated by open spaces, and three separate special areas. Each of the 12 basic units corresponded to a battalion of 1,000 men being divided into four barracks and outbuildings. The three special areas contained washing and bathing facilities with 12 tents, hospital and sick-bay. The entrance was on the west side; the quarters for the guards and food storage were situated to the south, as in the case of the *Halbmondlager*.

The analysis of the layout of both camps and their ratio of occupancy shows clearly that whereas the camps share similar structures, their design differs significantly in details. Both camps were divided into sections for battalions of about 1,000 men, each section being provided with supply facilities. But whereas the *Weinberglager* was planned for a dense occupation with a factor of 60 m² camp area per prisoner, the *Halbmondlager* had a factor of approximately 103 m² camp area per prisoner. Moreover, the occupancy rate of the barracks, which was regarded as the standard of quality,¹⁶ was much higher in the *Weinberglager* with 200–250 prisoners per barracks, than in the *Halbmondlager* with 80 inmates per barracks. In addition, it appears that the sanitary facilities in the *Halbmondlager* were more generously proportioned than those in the *Weinberglager*.

The comparison of the two camps shows that the abovementioned “planning guidelines” were interpreted differently. Obviously the demands for the layout of the two camps were measured using double standards. The *Weinberglager*, initially occupied by diverse nationalities with mixed religious affiliation and later mainly designated for Russian Muslim prisoners, represented the “second class” standard solution, whereas the *Halbmondlager* was a privileged flagship facility, intended to demonstrate the good treatment of Muslim prisoners of war.
Figure 8.3a Picture of the Weinberg Camp during World War I (Field service postcard 1917, archive author)

Figure 8.3b Plan of the former Weinberg Camp superimposed on a map of the area (based on section of topographic map 3746, M 1: 25,000, and plan of prisoner camp, after August Gärtner, “Einrichtung und Hygiene der Kriegsgefangenenlager,” in Wilhem Hoffmann, ed., Hygiene. Handbuch der ärztlichen Erfahrungen im Weltkriege 1914–1918, 7, Leipzig: Barth, 1922, Fig. 50
The Design of the Wünsdorf Mosque – Architecture as Means of Propaganda

The Wünsdorf mosque is the first mosque in Germany that was planned for religious functions and use, and that was erected with architectural ambitions. Although the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries already saw the creation of several “follies” situated in landscape gardens and described as “Mosque” or “Moorish Temple”, these structures served as fancy buildings or staffage architecture and had no religious function.¹⁷ Apart from that it is very likely that existing premises were fitted for religious use for Muslims who stayed for some time in Germany as the members of Ottoman embassies (since 1763) or prisoners of war (e.g. 1735 or 1870–1871).¹⁸ In the case of the Wünsdorf Mosque, however, different prerequisites had to be fulfilled. Particular care was given to its design, which was deemed to be of particular importance as “the mosque should not be a construct of fantasy, that agrees with European taste, but may offend the religious sensibilities of the indigenous.”¹⁹

From the outset the erection of a mosque was part of Max von Oppenheim’s propaganda concept. He suggested in his memorandum “Exploitation of Muslim prisoners of war” (= “Benutzung der kriegsgefangenen Muhammedaner”, dated 2 October 1914):

One should build a small mosque for them. It will be easy to erect a cheap timber construction and facilities to perform their religious obligations (washings)⁰, furthermore “an appropriate ‘Muhammadan’ clergy (prayer leader) has to be provided for them.”²⁰

In his memorandum von Oppenheim possibly incorporated initiatives of Ottoman representatives as similar proposals had also been communicated by Freiherr von Wangenheim, German ambassador in Istanbul. He reported in early December 1914 that the Shaykh ül-Islam had expressed the wish that a mosque for worship should be provided for the Muslim prisoners of war in Germany.²¹ Soon afterwards, at the end of December 1914, the Foreign Office, the Vice General Staff and the War Ministry reached an agreement to build a mosque and, after further negotiations, that the funds should be provided by the War Ministry and the General Staff.²² In the first half of January, the design for the mosque was developed and sent to the Vice General Staff, together with a cost estimate, following a meeting in the War Ministry on 17 January, as mentioned by Rudolf Nadolny, who served as representative of the Foreign Office at the Vice General Staff and became director of its political section.²³
It seems that several variants for the layout of the mosque were designed. On 20 February 1915 two drafts with cost estimates of 20,000 and 80,000 Marks are discussed. The lower cost alternative was deemed sufficient to erect an appropriate building.²⁴ Therefore the construction had to be inexpensive and to comply with the provisional character of the building. At the same time, a proper and dignified appearance was to be achieved:

For the design [of the mosque] an architectural expression has to be found, to satisfy – as far as possible – the senses and imagination of the Muhammadan believers.²⁵

One month later, on 18 March 1915, a new draft for the mosque was presented, which had been designed by the construction department of the War Ministry (in consultation with the Vice General Staff) in a sort of “peer review” process: The original design was made by “governmental builder” Erich Richter (title: “Regierungsbauinspektor”) and revised (“expanded and complemented”) by “privy senior building counsellor” August Schultze (title: “Geheimer Oberbaudirektor”).²⁶

The cost was estimated at 45,000 Marks, which corresponds to an average of the first estimates, mentioned above, and exactly to the actual construction costs.²⁷

For the design expert advice was obtained from the Tunisian propagandist Salih al-Sharif, who was engaged by the Sublime Porte, as well as from Max von Oppenheim. They submitted detailed proposals for the construction and furnishing of the mosque that took into account both functional and ritual aspects.²⁸

Salih al-Sharif proposed rules for the prisoners of war camps which comprised, among others, precise rules for the use of the planned mosque.²⁹ The idea to build a mosque for each group of the “French, Russian and Indian Mohammedans, to respond to their specific cultural characteristics”, which was also taken up and supported by von Oppenheim, probably came from Salih al-Sharif.³⁰

This was not realized, presumably for reasons of cost. Instead, two tent barracks were converted into a prayer room in the Weinberglager of Zossen and a minaret was erected in August 1915.³¹

The converted barracks, however, had no specific characteristics of Islamic architecture and should be regarded as purely functional buildings without architectural ambition. After all, it is difficult to know to what extent the architectural design of the mosque was influenced by Max von Oppenheim and Salih al-Sharif, but it is very likely that they were responsible for its spatial and functional programme.
Finally the mosque was erected within five weeks in summer 1915 as a timber-frame construction by the company Stiebitz & Köpchen from Berlin-Charlottenburg,³² but prisoners of the camps were probably also involved in the building process, as was usual for the erection of barracks.³³

The mosque was inaugurated on 13 July 1915, at the beginning of Ramadan. The event was celebrated with speeches, religious ceremonies
and prayers and dignified by the presence of the Ottoman ambassador, several generals and representatives of the General Staff. The opening itself, though, was supposed to take place with just a small number of German representatives.³⁴

Subsequently the event was discussed extensively in German newspapers highlighting the good treatment of the prisoners: “nearly as guests of the German people” (= “fast als Gäste des deutschen Volkes”).³⁵

Originally it was intended by Rudolf Nadolny³⁶ and the Intelligence Office for the East that the construction cost should be funded at least partly by Emperor (Kaiser) Wilhelm II,³⁷ in order to present the mosque as a gift from the German Kaiser to the Muslims.³⁸ It is difficult to know whether Wilhelm II actually saw the design of the mosque, but at least he knew and initially supported Oppenheim's memorandum to make
use of the Muslim prisoners of war, which was one precondition to the establishment of the Intelligence Office for the East and the establishment of the Halbmondlager.³⁹ As the construction of a mosque in the planned Muslim prisoners’ camp was already proposed at that time, it is very likely that the plans concerning the mosque were also known and approved by Wilhelm II. The funding from his private purse, however, failed because of the resistance of the treasury. Instead, the mosque’s construction was financed from the regular budget of the military administration of the prison camps.⁴⁰ Regardless of these facts the myth of the “sponsoring” of the mosque by the Kaiser was circulated and lived on.⁴¹ Thus the diplomatic efforts and the construction of legends led to the intended result in terms of popular perception and later reception. Wilhelm II was regarded if not as the factual principal of the Wünsdorf Mosque, at least as the ideal or implied sponsor. This rather obscure relation corresponds to the assessment of the mosque as a propagandistic means that was developed in a “tug of war” between the various offices and bureaucratic apparatuses.

The design of the Wünsdorf Mosque is a collage compiled from a number of models. Parts of its elements served functional purposes, whereas other “modules” were probably intended to reflect the heterogeneous origins of its inmates, thus resembling a historicist “Mosque-model kit.”⁴²

Prior to the iconographical analysis of the various elements of the mosque it seems appropriate to point out that the fancy constructions of exoticism are characterized by a certain degree of vagueness or fuzziness.⁴³ Similarly, the Wünsdorf Mosque seems also to refer to a number of models and diagnostic stylistic features of Islamic Art. On a closer look at the construction in detail, however, the structure rather turns out to be a purely Prussian functional building.

The most important model for the Wünsdorf Mosque is the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, even though its layout shows clear deviations.

This is to say that it is not an exact copy, but a free adaptation. Thus, the Dome of the Rock is a solitaire,⁴⁴ whereas the Wünsdorf Mosque is not freestanding, but a composite of various structures. The Dome of the Rock was the model for the core structure with the prayer room; the other parts of the building follow different models. A vestibule with additional functional rooms extends the core structure to the south, with a minaret rising on the eastern wing of the vestibule. To the north is placed a courtyard with ablution facilities. The ensemble is completed by a bathhouse which is situated on the northern edge of the courtyard. The bathhouse appears to be a subordinate annex. Actually it was built before the mosque und represents the origin of the entire structure, which is proven by a photograph of it before the mosque was built.⁴⁵ Next to the
orientation towards Mekka it defined the orientation and placement of the mosque.

The common features of the Dome of the Rock and the core structure of the Wünsdorf Mosque are essentially structural, which is clearly recognizable in the ground plan and in sectional views: both show a basilical cross section with a central dome-vaulted room surrounded by one or two lower ambulatories, which are accessible by four entrances that are aligned with the cardinal directions.

The interior of the Wünsdorf Mosque is composed of a central domed space and an ambulatory. Compared to the Dome of the Rock, however, the size ratio of the central space and the ambulatory differs significantly and the role of these two elements is reversed. Whereas in the Dome of the Rock the central, domed space is occupied by the sacred rock and remains inaccessible, in Wünsdorf it serves as central prayer room. The ambulatory, on the other hand, which in Wünsdorf is blocked by the minbar and the mihrab, lost its “original function” for the ritual circumambulation of the sacred rock at the temple mound in Jerusalem and became a kind of aisle.

The mihrab plays only a subordinate role in the spatial concept of the Dome of the Rock; in Wünsdorf it is the central focal point of the prayer room, together with the minbar. Formal details of the mihrab and the minbar resemble Ayyubid or Mamluk furnishings. A comparative example can be found at the Aqsa-Mosque in Jerusalem – in close
proximity to the Dome of the Rock. The basic shape of the Wünsdorf minbar, however, rather evokes the interior fittings of German classicist-protestant churches.

The row of arcades serving as a connecting link between the Dome of the Rock and the surrounding area of the Temple mount was probably used as model for the Wünsdorf Mosque as well. The combination of these arcades and the Dome of the Rock was a popular motif on contemporary photographs, where the arcades appear to fuse with the Dome of the Rock. This corresponds to the situation at the Wünsdorf Mosque, where they served as a model for the vestibule in front of the domed central structure.

Even if the details of the origins and background of the construction of the Dome of the Rock are debated and controversial,⁴⁶ its importance for the architectural history of Islam is beyond doubt: the Dome of the Rock “is not only the oldest surviving major monument of Islam, but in all
probability also the first Islamic monument, by which an aesthetic work of rank should be created”: a building of exceptional beauty, significance and perfection.⁴⁷ Equally beyond doubt is its religious significance to Islam, as this “time-honored rock [is considered] as the most sacred place on earth next to the Ka’aba” in Mekka.⁴⁸ It is in keeping with this essential significance of the Dome of the Rock that it was chosen as the perfect model for the Wünsdorf mosque. The Dome of the Rock is – next to the Ka’aba and the mosque of Medina – the one Islamic sacral building of universal importance for the overwhelming majority of Muslims⁴⁹ and – due to its singular layout and freestanding placement on the temple mound – it has a very strong visual significance.

The Dome of the Rock is not only a Muslim sanctuary, but was also associated with and revered by Christians as the location of Solomon’s temple and Templum Domini since its occupation by the crusaders.⁵⁰ Its relevance for the German (European) audience at the end of the nineteenth century is indicated by the sheer volume of travel literature on the Middle East which increased dramatically after the 1870s.⁵¹ These books were mainly written by Christian authors as a combination of tourist travel guide and “pilgrimage manual”, with extensive descriptions of the “Holy Places.” In the present context this is of interest, as it testifies to the long-lasting Christian appropriation of Jerusalem and the Dome of the Rock, which continued well into the early twentieth century.
One of the most prominent pilgrims to Jerusalem was Emperor Wilhelm II (the Kaiser), who made the “pilgrimage to the Holy Land” in 1898 with an extensive sightseeing programme. The tour of the “Holy sites” included a visit to the temple mound and the Dome of The Rock, which earned particular appreciation and high esteem from the emperor.⁵²

His voyage on the occasion of the inauguration of the Church of the Redeemer in Jerusalem was part of the complex ecclesiastical policy of the Hohenzollern dynasty⁵³ and was closely connected with Prussian political and economic interests in the “Orient.”⁵⁴ This became apparent when the emperor showed demonstrative friendliness towards the Ottoman empire and the Muslims, claiming friendship with “300 million Mohammedans”,⁵⁵ in combination with allusions to the crusades by the use of symbols of medieval crusader states and references to emperor Friedrich II.⁵⁶ Illustrated reports of this voyage repeatedly show the Dome of the Rock⁵⁷ as a kind of visual mediator that endows the new Prussian buildings in Jerusalem with a superior sense of mission.

Further enhanced by the legend of the emperor’s present to the Muslims, the Wünsdorf Mosque appears to have become part of the imperial self-image, which evokes the Dome of the Rock not just as a sign of his closeness to the Muslim world and a souvenir of his pilgrimage, but also as an idealized allusion to the medieval crusader states. This is not to say that in designing the Wünsdorf Mosque it was intended to refer to this complex ideological background. Given the mass distribution of illus-
Figure 8.10  German album commemorating the German emperor’s visit to Palestine in 1898 (Ludwig Schneller, Die Kaiserfahrt durchs Heilige Land, Leipzig: Wallmann, 1899, front cover)
Figure 8.11 Contemporary cartoon mocking the emperor as “Cook’s Crusader” (a reference to the tour operator Thomas Cook), postcard based on sketch in Punch, 15 October 1898 (archive author)
trated pilgrim guides and memory-books of the pilgrimage of Wilhelm II, however, it seems reasonable to conclude that for the contemporary beholder the latent content of these visual triggers was clear enough.

Apart from the Dome of the Rock the design of the Wünsdorf mosque shows several references to prominent examples of Islamic architecture which combine clear regional references with politically motivated associations.⁵⁸

Thus, the decoration of the triple-arched entrance façade with its sebka design (a decorative pattern derived from intertwining arcs) clearly refers to Andalusian models. Most prominent examples are the Alhambra of Granada or the Giralda and the Alcazar in Seville. These examples stand for the sphere of west Islamic architecture, which at that time was known to a wide audience in Germany and used extensively as a model by designers via pattern books.

The walls of the side wings of the mosque are organized horizontally by alternating coloured bands in red and grey. The standard model for this type of surface design was Mamluk architecture, in particular the tomb mosques in the necropolises of Cairo. The most famous prototype from this group is the Qaitbay Mosque which was one of the icons of nineteenth century Orientalism.

Another detail that points to this direction is the combination of turret-like substructure and minaret, despite the latter being clearly inspired by Ottoman models. Since around 1900 the outer appearance of Ottoman mosques with a domed central structure and round, pointed minaret had come to represent the stereotype model of the mosque. In this case, however, it should probably also be understood as a reference to the allied Ottoman empire.

Finally, the ogee arches of the forecourt are a characteristic feature of Indo-Islamic architecture of the Mughal period, which had already entered nineteenth century oriental revival architecture, but still kept its Indian provenance, even if its appearance at the Wünsdorf Mosque is just a vague hint.

To sum up, it is obvious that the Wünsdorf Mosque is a compilation of a number of elements and models from different regions and periods of the Islamic World that were known from the art-historical survey literature. The stylistic eclecticism of the Wünsdorf Mosque with its many unrelated details conforms formally with the late period of Historicism, while its design mirrors the state of research of Islamic art history in Germany and its preferences. The citation of Islamic architecture from al-Andalus and Cairo should probably embrace the prisoners of war coming from the French colonies, while the faint memory of Mughal architecture was a reference to the Indian prisoners. According to the
lesser regard for the Russian prisoners of war from the Crimea, Kazan and the Caucasus, it seems to be consistent that the Wünsdorf Mosque did not show any references to this region or to Central Asia.⁵⁹

Thus the formation of details and the choice of regional models are not arbitrary but rather determined by geo-political considerations, although they obviously reflect more the ideas and projections of their German builders than what the prisoners from those countries might have perceived as a correspondence to their “domestic architecture.”

**Inscriptions and Epigraphic Programme**

The Wünsdorf Mosque was decorated with inscriptions, the majority of which were located inside the prayer room. The analysis of the integration of the Wünsdorf Mosque in the concept of propaganda surrounding the *Halbmondlager* is complemented by the reading of the inscriptions and a partial reconstruction of its epigraphic programme.

The function of the inscriptions can be seen from various perspectives. On the one hand inscriptions with religious significance or information
on builders, etc., belong to the usual decorative programme of Islamic religious buildings.⁶⁰ On the other, the graphical appearance of Arabic writing supports the “Islamic” or at least “Oriental” character of a building or object designed for European viewers – as various pseudo-arabic script-like decorations testify, which found their ways into European art.⁶¹ For the target group of the Wünsdorf Mosque, the Muslim prisoners of war, Arabic writing conveyed religious content as it represented their sacred language⁶² – no matter whether the person in question was literate or illiterate. For the literate viewer the symbolic meaning of the writing was complemented by its semantic function. But in most cases inscriptions are not to be read, but estimated by their inherent symbolic value, thus being understandable for illiterate or non-Arabs as well. As Ettinghausen stressed:

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**Figure 8.13** Map showing the origin of the architectural references used in the mosque as well as the geographical origins of the Muslim prisoners of war, based on map in Leo Frobenius and Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven, eds, Deutschlands Gegner im Weltkriege, Berlin-Grunewald: Klemm, [1925], suppl.; other images s. Gussone, “Die Moschee im Wünsdorfer ‘Halbmondlager’,” 2010, Fig. 5–11
An inscription in impressive Arabic letters, the vehicle of the Koran, had the most sacred and solemn connotations and made the viewer conscious of being a member of the umma, the community of Muslims. Thus writing can have a symbolic meaning.⁶³
Unfortunately it is not possible to reconstruct the entire inscription programme since – to the best of my knowledge – not all areas were recorded photographically.⁶⁴ Those parts that were recorded comprise the area of the mihrab and minbar in the south of the mosque and about a quarter of the interior between the eastern and the southern exits. The remaining 3/4 of the interior space – and the inscriptions that were presumably placed in this part – is not documented.

The painting of the mosque’s interior was done by the court painter André of Potsdam.⁶⁵ It is highly probable that he was also responsible for the implementation of the inscription, which was probably predesigned by Max von Oppenheim and/or Salih al-Sharif.⁶⁶ From details of the design it is very obvious that the inscriptions were not written by an Arab calligrapher.⁶⁷ Rather they were, as can be seen from their execution, copied by someone from a template (not written), who could not write Arabic and did not know the criteria by which Arabic calligraphy is judged.

The Arabic characters appear not fluently and written, but rather stiff and constructed. This lack of understanding or ability is also visible in the disproportion of the characters to each other and the inaccurate and incorrect execution of individual letters.⁶⁸ The division and separation of individual components of the inscription on separate lunettes can be regarded as atypical; otherwise rather compression and entanglement
of individual characters can be observed in calligraphic realizations of religious formulas.⁶⁹

The inscription above the entrance in the northern courtyard is not readable. Only the hexagram which frames the inscription can be discerned.⁷⁰ According to Islamic folklore, the hexagram is the seal of King Solomon and is used to ward off demons, which have to obey him.⁷¹

The most prominent position was held by the large-scale inscription with “Quran verses in yellowish tint on green bottom artistically framed” divided between the 16 lunettes above the openings towards the ambulatory.⁷² Altogether eight of them are documented. They contain a fragment of the shahada, the Islamic confession of faith, which thus occupied half of the lunettes. The content of the remaining half can not be reconstructed without further photographic records.

In the inscription on the mihrab we can read the basmala – one of the most important religious formulas in Islam, which is therefore
also most commonly used in calligraphy and building inscriptions – intertwined with spiral tendrils in a similar manner as the inscriptions in the lunettes.  

In addition, rectangular panels were placed above the four exits. Their inscriptions on a light background were rather plain, lacking ornamental decoration and calligraphic ambition.  

Above the southern entrance the panel on the right hand side shows a two-line greeting and blessing formula.  

Above the eastern entrance, a part of a two-line text is preserved, which can be recognized as the 8th (7) Verse of Sura 47, “Mohammad”.  

"O believers, if you help God, | He will help you, | and confirm your feet.”

The analysis of the recognizable inscriptions makes a strong argument that they were placed according to a preconceived programme. The writing is no pseudo-script, but readable and it is very likely that the decision for a certain text was not arbitrary, but was meant to communicate a specific, comprehensible message to its reader. The choice of texts and symbols – the hexagram as Seal of Solomon, the shahada and basmala as well as a greeting and blessing formula give rise to the assumption that the substantive claim and the complexity of the inscription programme were rather limited. Most components as shahada and basmala can also be found in many other buildings, so that we may see them as the “lowest common denominator”.

This corresponds to the observation that the stylistic appearance of the mosque was designed to be of universal validity (with regional priorities). In this sense the inscriptions had also to be limited to the most essential formulas and concepts of faith, to be generally comprehensible and easily recognized by all Muslim prisoners of war – no matter whether they came from North Africa or India or whether they were educated or illiterate. Considering that the sophisticated propaganda which was compiled for them in the prisoners’ magazine al-Jihad by the academic agitators was inaccessible to the majority of the prisoners of war who came from simple, uneducated backgrounds, an elaborate inscription programme with subtle meanings would have been useless anyway. In this respect the selection of the inscriptions does not appear to be random, but very specifically focused on the (probably) simple needs of Muslim prisoners of war of the Halbmondlager.

There is, however, one exception to this general assertion. The Koranic quotation of sura 47 “Mohammad”, verse 8 (7) is more specific and meaningful. This sura, whose other verses have to be considered as well, was also called War (“Der Krieg”) as Max Henning pointed out.  

It is interpreted in this sense in comments to Rückerts’ transmission, in which this sura was characterized as “a thundering sermon for battle” (= “donnernde
Kampfpredigt”) containing “a clear declaration of war, to those who oppose the mission of Muhammad.” This was obviously transferable to war opponents of the Ottoman–German Alliance. Moreover, it was in accordance with Ottoman Jihad-preaching and should be interpreted as a call to the prisoners of war to join the Jihad.

The link to contemporary Jihad literature can be established in the person of Salih al-Sharif, already mentioned above as responsible – together with von Oppenheim – for the functional concept of the mosque. In his book Die Wahrheit über den Glaubenskrieg (The Truth about the religious war) he explains the nature and meaning of Jihad to a German audience. He addresses the final question: what the duties of the warrior on the path of God may be. He enumerates ten duties and supports his argument by references to the Koran. First comes “Valour” (Tapferkeit), second “Trust in God” (Vertrauen auf Gott) is designated: “the belief that he will fulfill well his promise to let us win, when we stand up to the enemy and follow his orders and fully comply with the means by which the overcoming of the enemy is brought about in accordance with our power …” By explaining this second duty he refers to the Koran and to sura 47, as shown above, the one which was also written above the exit to the east inside the mosque: ‘as God told (47, 8): If you help God, he will help you, and confirm your feet.’

It seems very likely, that this coincidence is not accidental, but proves the integration of the Wünsdorf Mosque in the Jihad concept of the Intelligence Office for the East with epigraphic means.

Actors

Several actors were involved in the further development of the propaganda concept and its implementation in the prisoners of war camps in Wünsdorf and Zossen, but their cooperation was not always productive. There was a conflict of responsibilities between the military and the civilian spheres: as described above, the concept of a camp for Muslim prisoners of war and the related propaganda was initiated by von Oppenheim and further developed by civilian experts for the Middle East at the Intelligence Office for the East (NfO), which was assigned to the Foreign Office. On the other hand, the War Ministry and the General Staff, clearly associated with the military sphere, represented on site by the camp commanders, were responsible for the maintenance and the organization of the camps.

Initially propaganda in the camps was supposed to be disseminated mainly by indigenous propagandists. These propagandists were con-
connected with the NfO, but subordinate to the camp commander, who was responsible for the propaganda in the camps. But also in this case the civilian and military sides had differing ideas about the propagandistic approach and the treatment of the prisoners of war, so mutual mistrust and quarrelling about questions of authority were inevitable. This difficult situation was additionally complicated by differing perceptions of the treatment of the Muslim prisoners by the Ottoman-German allies.

Finally, an important but very heterogeneous group of actors were the prisoners of war themselves. However, they appear only rarely as active individuals, but were mainly depicted as anonymous types, on which racist stereotypes were projected.

**Propaganda with and in the Prison Camps**

Basically, the propaganda was motivated by various considerations. In addition to the propaganda writings aimed at the Islamic world, the *Halbmondlager* and its mosque were also intended to demonstrate to the European opponents the exemplary treatment of prisoners of war by the German side.

The supply of prisoners of war in World War I was not just a logistical problem. The general treatment of prisoners of war was still insufficiently regulated by international law, which led to reciprocal recriminations of “inhumane treatment of prisoners of war” by the opponents. Against this background picture postcards as well as descriptions and illustrations in books and magazines should demonstrate “reality footage from German prison camps” (= “Wirklichkeitsaufnahmen aus deutschen Gefangenenlagern”), which suggested above all normality, fair treatment of the prisoners and friendly behaviour of the prison staff, and the adequate supply and free exercise of religion in the camps.

Apart from the propaganda directed towards foreign recipients, the internal perspective, i.e. objectives oriented to the German audience, should be considered. It has been argued that one goal of the dissemination of images of “exotic prisoners of war” was the intention to present German superiority over the variety “of the peoples of his enemies.” However, the presentation of the mosque in conjunction with information campaigns about Islam and the proclamation of the friendship of the Kaiser to the Muslim world can also be seen as a promotion for the acceptance of the Ottoman–German Alliance within Germany.
architectural form were perceived and “read”, and inevitably entails a consideration of the respective reception requirements of the different target groups.

After initial secrecy considerations photos and reports of the prisoners were produced in large numbers and disseminated widely. The distribution was carried out by postcards, by reports in the general propaganda newspapers with appropriate visual material and by the agencies of the Intelligence Office for the East abroad. Visits of high-ranking Ottoman politicians and journalists were also part of the propaganda. However, the main focus of the propaganda, which began in February 1915, was targeted at the inmates of the prisoner of war camps. The correspondence of the prisoners with their relatives was intended also to enhance the propaganda effect in their homelands which were considered as an “area to be revolutionized” (= “Revolutionierungsgebiet”).

The underlying idea was developed by Max von Oppenheim with his Intelligence Office for the East, and later modified by Rudolf Nadolny. The aim was to win the prisoners for military use in the “Orient.” Another general objective was to bring about sympathy for Germany among the prisoners, so that they would return to their homelands as Germany’s “followers.” To achieve these goals, various means of propaganda were used: “a. religious influence; b. Guidance and education through meetings and lectures, lessons, groups trips to the capital, etc.; c. good
treatment, supply and clothing.”¹⁰⁴ Thus the living conditions in the camps ought to be subordinated to the objectives of the propaganda. The Muslim prisoners of war were enabled to pray and were supplied with food according to their religious rules. Furthermore, the special treatment also affected the labour of the prisoners that was to be done without compromising the propaganda.¹⁰⁵

However, since the implementation of the propaganda was directed and supervised by the camp commanders and the military supervisory staff, it was militarized after a short time, and the originally rather idealistic goals and approach soon focused on pragmatic and military goals, as Gerhard Höpp has stressed.¹⁰⁶ To this end, a combination of political education and religious instruction was carried out in the camps. The lectures about history, geography and economy were politically biased, intending to agitate: “to plant hatred against the oppressors of the Muslim peoples, aiming at the liberation of North Africa.”¹⁰⁷ The propaganda efforts were supplemented by newspapers in several languages, some of them suggestively named al-Jihad.¹⁰⁸ For educational purposes libraries with selected books in the languages of the prisoners of war were installed. Also drill took up a lot of time, even if, due to the lack of training staff, they still used the French regulations and commands.¹⁰⁹

As a consequence of these efforts in September 1915 about 800 volunteers were registered in the Halbmondlager and about 1,000 volunteers in the Weinberglager.¹¹⁰ Earlier considerations to integrate the Muslim Jihad volunteers into German troop contingents were dismissed. Instead, they were supposed to become part of the Ottoman army. In October 1915, negotiations with the Ottoman authorities resulted in an agreement regarding the equipping and use of the Muslim prisoners of war. Between February 1916 and April 1917 several units of Jihadists were transported to Turkey. Gerhard Höpp counted a total of 1,100 Tatars, 1,084 Arab and 49 Indian prisoners of war who were formally enlisted as volunteers in the Ottoman army.¹¹¹ A small number of volunteers were engaged as translators or for special missions to promote Jihad in other regions such as Persia or Afghanistan.¹¹²

That is to say that the German propaganda strategy was partly successful in recruiting volunteers, although this was probably motivated rather by better conditions for the Jihad volunteers in the prison camps than by the persuasiveness of the propagandists and their credibility.¹¹³
Failure and/or Success of the Jihad Concept and Its Related Propaganda

It is commonly assumed that the recruitment of Muslim prisoners of war in the Zossen and Wünsdorf camps to fight a Holy War failed. One reason for this was the structural deficits of the general Jihad strategy. Apart from that, it was probably illusory to expect that the assignment of the Muslim prisoners of war might have a decisive effect – even if we assume that the prisoners of war “just escaped from a bloody battlefield” – might have been motivated to join another war campaign, as Höpp has pointed out.

Additionally – especially with regard to the French prisoners of war – reprisals against their relatives were feared. Furthermore, the Muslim prisoners of war who had served in the French or British army expected a loss of pension claims if they changed sides.

But most decisive were probably fundamentally different views and a “lack of coordination between the military and civilian authorities” on the German side about the design of their Jihad propaganda and its implementation. From the beginning there were differences and conflicts over authority. Thus, for instance, the Foreign Office and the NfO supported the massive dissemination of information about the Halbmondlager – as they expected from its construction alone a positive propaganda effect. On the other hand, the General Staff and the War Ministry referred to security concerns and the need for secrecy with respect to militarily relevant information, arguing against extensive publishing activities. Finally, the belief that propaganda concerning the Halbmondlager would be beneficial won out, but the permanent controversies were not productive.

A further reason for complications was rivalries between the various indigenous agitators, and the fact that their suitability and loyalty were appreciated differently by the military (camp commander and personal) and the civilian protagonists (NfO, AA). Already in the summer of 1915 the camp commander tried to engage mainly German agitators for the propaganda on site. He considered appointing “Merchants, who were familiar with the Arab customs and the … colloquial language”, so that “they should act enlightening through lectures” – but of course “in close consultation with the Commandant”, etc. The assignment of indigenous propagandists as well as the influence of the NfO was, however, to be pushed back, if not even eliminated.

More discrepancies arose from the intention of the Ottoman side to acquire more influence on the propaganda in the camps. One example is the appointment of the successor to Imam Ibrāhim in the Weinberglager...
in the spring of 1916 by Ottoman authorities without consultation with the German Foreign Office.¹²² Another reason for irritation had been visits by high-ranking Ottoman politicians, expressing views about the propaganda work that did not always correspond to the ideas of the German War Ministry.¹²³

The disagreement between the Ottoman–German Alliance partners in terms of Jihad propaganda became more visible when Jihad volunteers were to be sent to the Ottoman empire. Thus, the Ottoman Minister of War, Enver Pasha, suggested omitting the swearing in of Jihad volunteers. Moreover, the Ottoman offer to settle in the Ottoman empire craftsmen from among the Muslim prisoners of war who did not want to participate in the war led to irritation on the part of the German War Office, as this would undermine its Jihad propaganda.¹²⁴

Lastly, the Ottomans used the Jihad volunteers mainly at the Iraqi front where they were expected to write enthusiastic letters to their fellow jihadists still remaining in Wünsdorf and Zossen describing their successful inclusion in the Ottoman army and the weakness of the British enemy. In fact, however, there was a lot of dissatisfaction due to inadequate accommodation, subsistence and poor treatment by the Ottoman officers, which led to insubordination and desertion.¹²⁵

As the Ottoman authorities anyway preferred settlers and workers instead of soldiers, the Jihad propaganda was ended at the end of 1916; protests by the French and Russian governments against the recruitment of Jihad volunteers probably played no decisive role.¹²⁶

The deportation of Muslim prisoners of war to Turkey as settlers was also delayed. Instead, the Muslim prisoners of war were now increasingly used – because of a general shortage of labour forces – outside the camps for work in factories and in agriculture, which probably mainly affected the Weinberglager. Moreover, the occupancy of the Halbmondlager was reduced by the fact that African and Indian prisoners of war were transferred to Romania in March 1917 because they could not bear the climate in Wünsdorf and suffered heavy losses.¹²⁷

Thus Jihad propaganda in the Muslim prisoner of war camps of Wünsdorf and Zossen was effectively achieved only from February 1915 until December 1916. It appears evident that the military goals of the Jihad concept and its related propaganda focused on the prisoners failed, but it has to be concluded, however, that there were nevertheless some notable effects, if we may judge the success of propaganda as being influential and disseminating disinformation.

In this regard the report by Conrad Hoffmann, an American YMCA secretary, is of interest:
In the camp at Wunstorf a splendid mosque, correct in every architectural feature, had been erected as a gift of the Kaiser to the Mohammedans of the camp. Every detail of equipment had been carefully copied, including the courtyard with its marble footbaths, the colored lights of the mosque, prayer rugs, and all.

The photographs represent how successful the Germans were in their propaganda. [Emphasis mine]

I was told that some 15,000 Mohammedans from these camps were thus recruited, disciplined, goose-stepped, equipped with German uniforms, and sent to Macedonia and Palestine to supplement the German and Turkish armies there.

When I visited the camp for Russian Mohammedans I saw several companies of these men who had volunteered, return to the camp in full dress parade order. At the head were the German officers on horseback, followed by a band, and after them row on row of well-disciplined Russians now transformed into efficient German troops.¹²⁸

It can therefore be concluded that the propaganda was not successful enough “to create usable troops” of military significance, let alone to win the Great War, but was highly influential in posing a severe threat to the colonial empires of France and Great Britain.¹²⁹
It is clear that the initial ambitious concept of Jihad propaganda was already condemned to failure by the conflicting objectives and the lack of agreement between the parties involved as well as by the uncoordinated processes of realization. Moreover, it has to be concluded that there was no coherent German Jihad concept that was implemented consistently. Rather there existed a heterogeneous network of diverse interests and ambitions which mutually disabled and weakened each other.

However, the Wünsdorf Mosque with its strong visual impact seems to have fulfilled at least its pretended purpose: to express the friendship of the German Reich to the Muslim peoples’ ("das Freundschaftsverhältnis des Deutschen Reiches zu den islamitischen Völkern zum Ausdruck zu bringen")\(^{130}\) by providing the long lasting myth of German friendship towards the Muslims with an iconographic condensation of the German stirring up of the Muslim prisoners of war.

**Aftermath**

Following the end of World War I the two camps were closed and the remaining prisoners largely repatriated. Until the early 1920s predominantly former Russian prisoners of war still remained. The Halbmondlager was used until the mid-1920s, when the last Muslim residents left Wünsdorf due to the economic crisis.\(^{131}\) The mosque was still visited on high holidays from Berlin. In around 1930, the mosque was demolished after the building had allegedly fallen into disrepair due to lack of care and the Turkish embassy had expressed no interest in its further preservation.\(^{132}\) It is likely that after the more conveniently located mosque in Berlin-Wilmersdorf was inaugurated in April 1925\(^{133}\) there was no need to maintain the Wünsdorf mosque any more. At the beginning of the 1930s barrack garages for tanks were built in the area of the former Halbmondlager, in the area of the former Weinberglager a settlement was located.\(^{134}\)

**Notes**

2. The presentation of the historical background of the Halbmondlager and Weinberglager (Crescent camp and Vineyard camp) is based on material in the archive of the Federal Foreign Office, Berlin (PA-AA), all research regarding this topic is beholden to the seminal work of the late Gerhard

Gerhard Höpp's legacy is kept at the Zentrum Moderner Orient Berlin. Extensive pictorial material is kept at the Museum Europäischer Kulturen, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin (legacy Otto Stiehl). Gratitude is owed to these institutions for support and the opportunity to study their exhibits.


11 Regarding Oppenheim’s activities during World War I, the Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient (NfO) and the German-Ottoman Jihad concept see Lüdke, Jihad Made in Germany, 2005; Maren Bragulla, Die Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient. Fallstudie einer Propagandainstitution im Ersten Weltkrieg, Saarbrücken: vdm, 2007; Kreutzer, Dschihad für den deutschen Kaiser, 2012; Wilfried Loth and Marc Hanisch, eds, Erster Weltkrieg und Dschihad. Die Deutschen und die Revolutionierung des Ostens, München: Oldenbourg, 2014; and also the chapter by Tilman Lüdke in this volume.
15 Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, pp. 131–137.

Well known are the monuments of Sanspareil (1744), Schwetzingen (1779–1791) and Potsdam (1792 and 1841–1843), a great number of temporary structures of the late 18th and early 19th century, erected in smaller gardens, disappeared soon, overview s. Stefan Koppelkamm, *Der imaginäre Orient. Exotische Bauten des achtzehnten und neunzehnten Jahrhunderts in Europa*, Berlin: Ernst, 1987, pp. 28–39.


“*eine Phantasie-Moschee . . ., die zwar nach unseren Begriffen stilvoll ist, das Gefühl der Eingeborenen aber beleidigt*,” remark of Rittmeister Zürn after a visit to the Halbmondlager, 20 February 1914, PA-AA, R 21245, f. 36 (32).

Opheim 1914 (“Benutzung”): “*Man sollte ihnen eine kleine Moschee einrichten, was sehr leicht durch einen billigen Bretterbau möglich ist, ferner eine Gelegenheit zur Verrichtung ihrer religiösen Verpflichtungen (Wäschen),* and “*einer eigener muhammedanischer Geistlicher (Vorbeter) wäre für sie zu bestellen,”* PA-AA, R 21244, f. 4 (3).

PA-AA, R 21244, f. 51 (38).


PA-AA, R 21245, f. 36 (32).


Schultze was also author of the report about the mosque: ZdB 36, 25.03.1916 (25).


PA-AA, R 21245, f. 64 (49).

al-Sharif al-Tunisi 1915 (“*Ordnung des Betriebes in den Dingen der Gäste, die gezwungenenmassen gegen uns in den Reihen unserer Feinde gekämpft haben*” = “*Organization of the operations in the things of the guests who have fought by force against us in the ranks of our enemies*”), 18 February 1915, PA-AA, R 21245-2, f. 25 (21).

Opheim 1915 (“Denkschrift über die Organisation der Behandlung der muhammedanischen und indischen Kriegsgefangenen” = ”*Memorandum on the organization of the treatment of the Muhammedan and Indian prisoners of war*”), 27 February 1915, PA-AA, R 21245-2, f. 64 (49).


33 Doegen, Der Kriegsgefangenen Haltung und Schicksal in Deutschland, Kriegsgefangene Völker 1, Berlin: Politik und Wirtschaft, 1921, p. 38; cf. Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, p. 60.


35 The euphemism “more guests than prisoners” often appears in contemporary reports about the Halbmondlager, for example in Illustrierte Geschichte des Weltkrieges 1914/15 [1915], no. 44, p. 376.

36 PA-AA, R 21244-2, f. 81 (61); PA-AA, R 21245, f. 164 (119).

37 At least Salih al-Sharif al-Tunisi was received by Wilhelm II in audience on 9 February 1915, cf. Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, p. 114, even if he could not take up the issue in the audience: see Schabinger, Weltgeschichtliche Mosaiksplitter, 1967, p. 113.

38 PA-AA, R 21245, f. 165–166 (120).


41 Teltower Kreisblatt, 17 July 1915, 4 (Legacy Höpp ZMO); the founding myth of the Wünsdorf Mosque being a present from emperor Wilhelm II to the Muslim prisoners of war circulated until the 1980s, see ‘Abdallah, Geschichte des Islams in Deutschland, 1981, p. 24; until it was corrected by Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, p. 119.


45 Backhaus, Die Kriegsgefangenen in Deutschland, 1915, p. 26, Fig. 2: showing the bathhouse with poles in front of it, probably as tentative markings of the mosque’s position.


49 To make use of the kaaba would obviously have been impossible.


52 Mirbach, *Das deutsche Kaiserpaar im Heiligen Lande im Herbst 1898, 1899."


57 Schneller, *Die Kaiserfahrt durchs Heilige Land 1899*, p. 196.

58 Here only a short overview is given. For a more detailed analysis with further reading see Guccione, “Die Moschee im Wünsdorfer ‘Halbmondlager’ zwischen Gihad-Propaganda und Orientalismus,” 2010.


66 As explained above, Oppenheim and Salih al-Sharif were responsible for the
functional concept of the Wünsdorf Mosque. In this regard they are also very likely to be the originators of the epigraphic programme which linked the mosque with the Jihad propaganda.

For the reading and translation of the inscriptions and discussions about their importance for the construction I would like to thank particularly Martina Müller-Wiener and Daniel Redlinger. All possible errors are mine.

For example at the tambour the ligatures mīm˙hāʾ and dāl are wrong in lunette 3 ’Muhammad’; on the panel above the exit to the south in each case by the words ʾillā und ʾallāh the alif is written as lām, courtesy M. Müller-Wiener Bonn/Berlin.


Postcard: “Halbmond-Lager in Wünsdorf-Zossen. Vorhof der Moschee,” cf. Gerhard Kaiser and Bernd Herrmann, Vom Sperrgebiet zur Waldstadt. Die Geschichte der geheimen Kommandozentralen in Wünsdorf und Umgebung, Berlin: Links, 2007 (4), p. 42; at the entrances of the south and west no inscriptions are visible (see Kahleyss, Muslime in Brandenburg, 1998, pp. 120–123, Fig. 60–62), and at the eastern entrance they are not to be expected due to symmetry.


The panels on the exits to the east and the south can be seen on the abovementioned photo of the interior. The two corresponding exits to the north and the west are likely to have been provided with similar panels. SMB-PK MEK, VIII-EU-27498; equal to Kahleyss, Muslime in Brandenburg, 1998, p. 123, Fig. 63, for readability see above.
Above can be read “as-Salam …” below “wa ... rahmatu,” which can be supplemented to the greeting and blessing formula “as-Salam ['alaikum] wa rahmatu [Allah wa barakåtuhu]”: “Peace [be with you] and mercy [of God, and his blessing].”

“In tânsûrû allâh yânšûrûkum wa yuţabbît aqâdâmâkum”: For the reading of the texts and Koranic assignment I would like to thank Ibrahim Salman (Tartus/Berlin).


Höpp, Fremde Erfahrungen, 1996, p. 103; Bragulla, Die Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient, 2007, p. 84.


“4. Und wenn ihr die Ungläubigen trefft, dann herunter mit dem Haupts, bis ihr ein Gemetzel unter ihnen angereicht habt; dann schnüret die Bande. 5. … Und hätte Allah gewollt, wahrlich er hätte selber Rache genommen; jedoch wollte er die einen von euch durch die anderen prüfen.” (“4. When you meet the unbelievers, smite their necks, then, when you have made wide slaughter among them, tie fast the bonds; 5. … He would have avenged Himself upon them; but that He may try some of you by means of others.”), German: Henning, Der Koran, 1901, p. 238; English interpretation: Arberry, The Koran interpreted, 1955; commentary: cf. Henning, Werner and Rudolph, Der Koran, 1968, p. 436.


“[D]er Glaube daran, dass er sein Versprechen, uns siegen zu lassen, durchaus erfüllen wird, wenn wir dem Feinde standhalten und seine Befehle befolgen und die Mittel vollkommen beachten, durch die die Überwindung des Feindes herbeigeführt wird, nach Maßgabe unserer Kraft; …”

88 Doegen, *Der Kriegsgefangenen Haltung und Schicksal in Deutschland*, 1921; Gärtner, “Einrichtung und Hygiene der Kriegsgefangenenlager,” 1922.
93 This section about the propaganda in the prison camps, based on the seminal work of Gerhard Höpp and expanded by results of recent research, was integrated in this chapter to contextualize the architectural record.
96 Backhaus, *Die Kriegsgefangenen in Deutschland*, 1915.
97 Frobenius, *Der Völkerzirkus unserer Feinde*, 1916; Backhaus, *Die Kriegsgefangenen in Deutschland*, 1915, pp. 6 and 22.
100 For an overview about images of the camps see Kahleyss, *Muslime in Branden-

102 Oppenheim 1914 (”Revolutionierung”).
103 Oppenheim 1914 (Organisation der Behandlung), PA-AA, R 21245-2, f. 74 (69).
106 Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, p. 70.
115 Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, p. 89.
117 The conflicts between the military and civilian/political spheres also affected the activities abroad, clearly to be seen by comparison of the respective protagonists’ memoirs. For example Nadolny and Wollstein, Mein Beitrag. Erinnerungen eines Botschafters des Deutschen Reiches, 1985, pp. 85–106; vs. Gerold von Gleich, Vom Balkan nach Bagdad: militärisch-politische Erinnerungen an den Orient, Berlin: Scherl, 1921; cf. Hans Werner Neulen, Feldgrau in Jerusalem: das Levantekorps des


123 Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, pp. 73–74; Höpp, “Frontenwechsel: Muslimische Deserteure,” 2000, p. 312. This is to be seen in the context of the complex relation between the German-Ottoman allies, being also a recurrent issue in the memoirs mentioned above: see, for example, Gleich, Vom Balkan nach Bagdad, 1921, in accordance with the German point of view; in contrast Joseph Pomiankowski, Der Zusammenbruch des Osmanischen Reiches: Erinnerungen an die Türkei aus der Zeit des Weltkrieges, Zürich: Amalthea, 1928, critical about the attitude of superiority demonstrated by German officers; cf. Neulen, Feldgrau in Jerusalem, 1991, pp. 181–189; Lüdke, Jihad Made in Germany, 2005, pp. 140–149; Kreutzer, Dschihad für den deutschen Kaiser, 2012, pp. 112–117.


125 See reports of the German consul in Aleppo, PA-AA, R 21255, and of the German ambassador in Istanbul, PA-AA, R 21256; also comments on this topic in several memoirs, for example Gleich, Vom Balkan nach Bagdad, 1921, pp. 138–139; cf. Höpp, Muslime in der Mark, 1997, pp. 83–84.


128 Hoffmann, In the Prison Camps of Germany, 1920, p. 82, to be regarded as critical observer, is citing wrong information (“gift of the Kaiser”) or strongly
exaggerated ("15,000 volunteers"). Apart from errors such as the incorrect spelling "Wunstorf" (or mix-up with the town near Hannover), it is apparent that he is replicating disinformation, thus – as an example – confirming unintentionally that German propaganda efforts were to a certain degree successful. The impact of disinformation seems to have been effective until recently, cf. Steuer, *The American YMCA and Prisoner of War Diplomacy*, 2009, ch. 11.


