Jihad and Islam in World War I

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4 Domestic Aspects of Ottoman Jihad

The Role of Religious Motifs and Religious Agents in the Mobilization of the Ottoman Army

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Introduction

Discussions on the Ottoman proclamation of the Great Jihad (*Cihad-ı Ekber*) in World War I usually focus only on its repercussions on the Muslim communities living outside Anatolia and tend to take Anatolian Muslims for granted. In fact, the Ottoman Jihad propaganda had a very important Anatolian dimension as well.¹ From its declaration of general mobilization on 2 August 1914 through to the end of the war, the Ottoman government constantly had recourse to the Jihad rhetoric to justify its mobilization effort in Anatolia, especially in the field of military recruitment. It put it about that Islam was under attack by the infidel enemy and that therefore it was incumbent upon every Muslim to join the fight against that enemy.

The instrumentalization of religion was a widespread phenomenon in European countries during World War I, and every belligerent state used religious motifs in one way or another to mobilize greater support for its war cause.² But, as this chapter argues, the Ottoman case had one distinctive characteristic in this respect: The rhetoric of Jihad was a military necessity; it was the only mobilizing theme that could justify the conscription system which constituted the basis of Ottoman manpower mobilization.³ In this sense, this chapter also suggests that, regardless of a proclamation of an official Jihad at a specific date for a grand politico-military objective, a less ambitious and motley, or more ordinary and quotidian form of Jihad rhetoric was already embedded in the Ottoman discourse aiming to justify military service and mobilization. If the sultan-caliph had not proclaimed an official “Great Jihad” on 14 November 1914, the Ottoman state would still have needed, and resorted to, the Jihad rhetoric to legitimize its domestic mobilization of manpower. As will be discussed in detail below, this Jihad rhetoric was not invented with the Ottoman entry into World War I; it was already there, almost as an everyday phenomenon in the
state’s repeated uses of Jihad, perhaps since the beginning of Ottoman conscription in the early nineteenth century, as the centralizing state “understood and employed the powerful ideological energies that jihad could mobilize.”⁴ But the extent of the mobilization in World War I pushed the Ottoman state to intensify the Jihad rhetoric by employing new religious propaganda motifs and tools and revitalizing those that already existed. This chapter sheds light on these motifs and tools by arguing that in the transmission of Jihad rhetoric to the masses oral methods of propaganda were as important as printed words and images, and imams, both in mosques and in the army, were the main agents of this transmission.

**Jihad Rhetoric as a Military Necessity**

A rhetoric of Jihad as a military necessity involved two main aspects. The first is related to the socio-cultural identity of the Ottoman army. At the threshold of, and during, World War I the Ottoman military was overwhelmingly a Muslim institution and the majority of the enlisted men were peasants from Anatolia. Attempts had been made after the 1908 Revolution to include non-Muslim Ottomans in the military; with changes made to the conscription laws in 1909 and especially in 1914, more non-Muslims were conscripted.⁵ But more inclusion did not mean equality. Especially after the Ottoman defeat in the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, the performance of non-Muslim soldiers in the Ottoman army was severely questioned by various Ottoman commanders and nationalist Young Turk circles, many of whom claimed that non-Muslim soldiers’ reluctance to fight and desertions constituted a main factor bringing about the Ottoman defeat.⁶ As the idea of Ottomanism began to die away and Turkish nationalism quickly arose after the Balkan defeat, the suspicion about the reliability of non-Muslims increased. Thereafter, whereas the enlistment of non-Muslim Ottomans continued, they were treated in a discriminating way and usually employed in unarmed labour battalions.⁷ The defeat at Sarıkamış in the early phase of World War I on the Caucasus front turned this discrimination into a more widespread and standard practice, especially for Ottoman Armenians.⁸ Moreover, the inclusion of non-Muslims did not change the Islamic ideological character of the Ottoman military, nor did it change the everyday symbols and soldiers’ subculture. In fact, except for occasional reference to a vague Ottoman brotherhood,⁹ the discourse of military service served to re-Islamize the Ottoman identity rather than create a secular Ottoman citizenry.
Because of the rural background of the serving men, Islamic themes and symbols constituted a common language which the Ottoman state could draw on when motivating the masses. Islamic discourse offered a cognitive framework which was actually the only common ground on which the elitist nationalist perspective of the urban Young Turks could meet rural Muslim masses. Patriotic messages were not entirely ineffective, but they were meaningful only as long as they were communicated within a religious envelope.¹⁰ Islamic discourse in its popular form was the only available language by which the two parties could understand each other. As Erik-Jan Zürcher has stated, “most of the empire’s soldiers hailed from Anatolia” and, therefore, when the need to mobilize the population in times of war emerged, “appealing to the religious worldview of the peasant population of Anatolia made good sense.”¹¹ And, no less importantly, it was also the only language that could be used for the mobilization of non-Turkish Muslim peoples of Anatolia, such as the Kurds, the Circassians and the Laz people.

The second aspect of the military necessity is related to morale, or the need to convince soldiers to remain in service and continue fighting until the end of the war. World War I was a prolonged conflict of attrition. Therefore, maintaining soldiers’ endurance and morale was as important as recruiting them. Religious motifs seem to have played an important role in increasing the endurance level of the troops, especially in coping with the unpredictable and uncontrollable nature of the battlefield, as Alexander Watson has observed in the cases of the British and German armies during World War I.¹² Research has shown that the Ottoman conscription system had always suffered from a legitimacy crisis from its beginning; avoiding military service in the form of desertion had been a chronic problem since the beginning of the system.¹³ The problem of desertion became much more widespread during World War I. As will be shown below, the Jihad rhetoric, it was hoped, would also be useful in preventing desertions.

**Jihad Pamphlets and Religious Books for the Soldier**

Against this background, it is not surprising that the number of propaganda pamphlets that were devoted to explaining Jihad to the Anatolian masses increased remarkably with the declaration of Ottoman mobilization.¹⁴ Such pamphlets were written in simple language or, to use a description by an author of such a pamphlet, “in a language that everybody could understand”.¹⁵ Citing relevant verses from the Koran and
the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad, they almost invariably described military service as a binding religious duty \( \text{farż-ı 'ayn} \) for all Muslims.\(^{16}\) Sometimes the very title of the pamphlet directly stated this religious duty, as in the case of an anonymous text the title of which is “The Holy Jihad is a Binding Religious Duty”.\(^{17}\)

In Islam, the term “\( \text{farż-ı 'ayn} \)” implies that when the Muslim community is under attack, that is, when the Muslim community needs to defend itself against an infidel enemy, joining the Jihad becomes an individual obligation for each member of the Muslim community.\(^{18}\) Therefore, such pamphlets often needed to emphasize the point that the Ottoman Empire as the representative of the world’s Muslim community was on the defensive in this war as it was attacked by the wicked Christian powers of Europe, such as Britain, France and Russia. As a continuation of this line of argument, these propaganda pamphlets frequently mentioned the 126\(^{th}\) verse of Nahl sura of the Koran\(^{19}\) and claimed that it was the right of the Ottomans to wage war against the attacking infidels with the same kinds of weapons and methods (\textit{mukabele-i bilmisl}).\(^{20}\)

Another considerable point that the Jihad pamphlets frequently stressed is that whereas serving in the military and fighting on the battlefield was incumbent upon eligible men, the other sections of society also could and should serve the war effort in various ways. Since the mobilization order initially involved recruiting men between the ages of 20 and 45, a Jihad pamphlet claimed that those who were younger than 20 and older than 45 were also included in the Jihad duty, to which each one was supposed to contribute “as much as his strength and power” would allow.\(^{21}\) In congruence with the totalizing nature of warfare during World War I, the author argued by citing the 60\(^{th}\) verse\(^{22}\) of the al-Anfal sura of the Koran that the Muslim community was religiously held responsible for a total mobilization involving not only military preparation, but also economic and technological readiness for war.\(^{23}\) The role of Muslim women was also stressed in this respect. The Jihad pamphlets frequently stated that when they were needed to help the fighting men, Muslim women were also supposed to participate in the jihad effort by doing such jobs as sewing uniforms, knitting socks and preparing bandages for the troops. Such jobs were defined as the religious duties of women.\(^{24}\)

While most of these Jihad pamphlets were written in the format of a short prose item, there are also examples that were published as collections of poems, which are quite short, simple and easy for soldiers to memorize.\(^{25}\) Some of these Jihad pamphlets were published and distributed free of charge by the National Defence League (\textit{Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti}), a semi-voluntary association which had organic ties
with the Committee of Union and Progress (hereafter, CUP) government and contributed to its war policies with various activities including propaganda.²⁶

Similarly, a dramatic increase occurred during the war in the number of religious manuals/pamphlets which were usually published under the title of “religion book for the soldier” (askere din kitabı). Again written in simple language, such religious manuals were meant to have a double function. On the one hand, they were written to provide Ottoman Muslim soldiers with a basic religious (Islamic and Sunni) education. On the other hand, they aimed to remind potential draftees, enlisted men and also officers why military service was also a religious duty and why a good Muslim also needed to be a good soldier and vice versa. Apparently, one of the main reasons for a remarkable increase in this literature on the eve of and during World War I was the need to strengthen and reinforce the soldiers’ morale which had been constantly eroded due to almost continuous Ottoman wars and defeats.²⁷ Indeed, whereas the practice of using religious manuals as a tool of both education and propaganda in the Ottoman army goes as far back as the establishment of a modern army during the reign of Mahmud II, their number remarkably increased on the eve of and during World War I.²⁸ Those which were written after the Ottoman entry into World War I put more specific emphasis on the necessity to join the Jihad and obey the conscription.

On the other hand, it should be added that, rather than being an individual intellectual production on the part of the Ottoman ulema, these manuals were usually directly commissioned from their authors by the CUP government and the War Ministry. So, if the practice of religious education and propaganda in the Ottoman army opened up a new space to be filled by an Islamic discourse, this space was under the supervision of the authorities. Therefore, if Ottoman Muslim soldiers were to be educated in terms of religion, this education was expected to be given within the official version of Islam, namely according to the religious approach that was regarded as “correct” by the Ottoman state. In this sense, the government preferred to work with those religious figures which it considered to be practising the “correct” version of Islam and regarded as “trustworthy.” Members of the ulema such as Ömer Fevzi, Üryanizade Ali Vahid or İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, who were chosen to write such manuals, came from the religious circles that were close to the CUP government; they either already had organic ties with the CUP government or, if they did not have such overt political engagements, still supported the government’s war effort during World War I.²⁹

These religion books for the soldier invariably emphasized that Islam required all Muslims to be good soldiers and that obeying the call to arms
was not only a religious but also a moral obligation. One such manual simply stated that “only those who do not withhold from sacrificing their lives and souls for their fatherland can go to heaven”; then it continued to explain that a Muslim man would be interrogated in the next life about how well he performed his military service, just as he would be interrogated about his performance of prayer and fast.³⁰ Another religion book for the soldier equated service for the fatherland with the true faith and claimed that any Muslim who betrays his fatherland also betrays his religion.³¹ Such manuals described evasion of service and desertion as great sins to be punished severely in the next life. They also repeatedly stressed that Muslims should go to war willingly and enthusiastically since this was among the Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad.

Oral Propaganda

There is no doubt that printed words and images became extremely important propaganda tools during World War I, and the Jihad pamphlets and religion books for the soldier that have been mentioned above constituted a significant element in Ottoman wartime propaganda. But the print propaganda also posed a major challenge in the Ottoman case. First of all, there was the problem of illiteracy. The literacy rate of Ottoman society did not exceed 10 per cent in 1914 and it did not get any better during the war years.³² Moreover, even this low literacy rate was mainly an urban phenomenon; the Ottoman peasant soldiers were almost entirely illiterate.³³ Then, how could propaganda messages that were contained in such publications as Jihad pamphlets or religion books for the soldier reach their target audience in an overwhelmingly illiterate society? Secondly, there was the problem of poor infrastructure. One of the infrastructural aspects that differentiated the Ottoman Empire from other belligerents in World War I was its very low level of development in terms of the means of communications and transportation.³⁴ Then, by what means could the mobilizing Jihad rhetoric be conveyed to the rural masses?

Before discussing the consequences of these problems and questions, we first need to approach the concept of propaganda from a multidimensional perspective. The phenomenon of modern propaganda is usually understood as the written and published word and image,³⁵ conveyed through modern means of communications, which Benedict Anderson defined as “print capitalism.”³⁶ It is true that Ottoman print capitalism had been on the rise since the reign of Abdülhamid II (1876–1909), and a noteworthy increase occurred in the number of
published newspapers and periodicals in the Second Constitutional Era (1908–1918).³⁷ Yet, this increase was still far from being a considerable transformation in the infrastructure, especially as regards its effect on provincial Anatolia. The poor infrastructure of modern media technologies in the Ottoman context has led some scholars to conclude that Ottoman propaganda in World War I failed (and it was even doomed to fail), especially in comparison with those in European countries.³⁸

In fact, the approach that confines the phenomenon of propaganda in World War I within the limits of printed word, and image tends to be technologically determinist. This approach underestimates, for example, the importance of oral methods that constituted a significant element of wartime propaganda. Oral propaganda methods, both modern and “traditional”, were as important and widely used as print propaganda in the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the repertoire of Ottoman wartime propaganda was actually much wider than assumed, which included such oral means as sermons, religious memorial services (mevlid), religious advice, folk songs and even rumours. As is obvious, religious oral methods of propaganda were numerous, and they provided a fertile ground for the transmission of the jihad propaganda.

However, enlarging the scope of our approach to wartime propaganda still leaves an important question unanswered: how could these oral methods resonate with the rural masses and enlisted men? In this respect, the role of the lesser ulema, namely the middle- and low-ranking religious functionaries such as prayer leaders (imams), was critical in communicating the religious motifs of Ottoman Jihad propaganda to its target audience. It was not only the imams of village and town mosques across Anatolia, who acted as leaders of religious practices in their own local Muslim communities, but also the imams who were employed in the Ottoman army who played an important intermediary role in convincing people to support the Ottoman mobilization for war.

Imams and Their Sermons

In fact, the use of sermons and the preachings of the lesser ulema as a political tool for shaping public opinion expanded considerably right after the 1908 Revolution. The new Young Turk regime quickly realized the potential of this tool in mobilizing greater political support in a society where the rate of literacy was so low.³⁹ The political power of the period also wanted to use sermons and preaching as a tool to define “the correct form of religion” according to its own perspective.⁴⁰ In its programmes of 1908, 1909 and 1911, the CUP had already attributed
considerable importance to organizing and carrying out “admonitions, sermons, and religious guidance” (“vaaz, hutbe ve irşad”) in order to gain more legitimacy in society.⁴¹ The CUP’s club of Şehzadebaşı in Istanbul established a committee of ulema members, including such religious figures as Ömer Adil, Musa Kazım, Abdüreşid İbrahim, Manastırlı İsmail Hakki, Aksekili Ahmed Hamdi.⁴² This committee issued various popular publications, the most prominent of which was the series called “religious admonitions” (mevaiz-i diniye).⁴³ Moreover, in order both to provide sufficient and proper training for prospective imams and preachers and to fill the vacancies in village and town mosques, two new schools (Medresetü’l Vaizin and Medresetü’l Eimme ve’l Huteba) were established in 1913.⁴⁴

Another aspect of the instrumentalization of sermons and preaching for political purposes on the eve of World War I was the debate on the simplification of Friday sermons in terms of both their content and language. Friday sermons had traditionally been delivered in Arabic in the mosques across the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁵ But the desire to make them have a greater effect on the Muslim people was accompanied by the wish to make them also more understandable for them. This debate involved opinions ranging from a radical view arguing that sermons must be delivered entirely in Turkish to an opposing point of view arguing that they should remain in Arabic. Responding to such demands, the office of the shaykh ül-Islam avoided making a radical change, but could also not entirely disregard the demands for simplification. As a consequence, the office proposed a solution halfway between the two extremes, and established a post of “pulpit preacher” (kürsü şeyhi) in the Friday mosques, who would provide the congregation with an interpretation of the sermon in Turkish. And, in practice, Friday sermons in Anatolia in this period began to include Turkish statements to varying degrees.⁴⁶

On the other hand, it should also be noted that the relationship of religious functionaries with the Young Turk regime was not always trouble-free, especially where the issue of military service was concerned. For example, when in 1909 a new conscription regulation stipulated that medrese students who had not passed their exams on time were no longer exempt from military service, considerable discontent developed among religious circles.⁴⁷ But their relationship with the government generally became more cooperative on the eve of World War I, basically due to two main factors. Firstly, whereas their traditional exemption status was restricted, the new conscription law of 1914 clarified ambiguities and made it certain that, along with certified imams, those who were uncertified but had permanent jobs in village mosques would also be
exempt. Secondly, the financial situation of imams was improved with rises in their salaries and additional posts of employment in 1914.

Religious propaganda activities that were carried out by imams on the Ottoman home front (namely in the civilian sphere) have been relatively well documented. For example, immediately after the declaration of the Great Jihad Friday sermons in mosques throughout the empire emphasized the duty of all Muslims to join the war effort. The imams who were employed in mosques in the provinces and villages were assigned the task of providing oral presentations about the Jihad fatwa for the illiterate. Religious memorial services that were devoted to those who died on the battlefield began to be performed in mosques from the early days of the war. Invitations to these religious services were usually publicized in newspapers. Their purpose was usually described as “praying for the permanent victory and success of our army and navy.”

Imams were the main performers of such propaganda activities through mosques. Sermons supporting the Ottoman war cause began to be delivered regularly as part of an organized programme. In İstanbul and various provincial centres, the National Defence League organized many such sermons for propaganda purposes at mosques on the eve of the war. These sermons were delivered in a series not only on Fridays but also on other days of the week. At least one day a week was usually reserved for women. For such sermons, the imams were specifically assigned the task to “preach to, advise and encourage” (vaaz, nasihat ve teşvikât) those attending. The imams who were selected for this task were members of a committee of the ulema that was constituted within the office of the shaykh ül-Islam; the committee oversaw that the imams selected were properly preaching to the people about their religious duty in the war.

Village imams were influential outside mosques as well. They were prominent figures in organizing military recruitment at the village level. The mobilization procedure in 1914 required all eligible men in a village to get ready at the same time, gathering in the village square. Then the imam, together with the village headman (muhtar), was in charge of overseeing this gathering process and then escorting the group to the nearest town’s recruiting office.

**Army Imams**

On the other hand, authorities regarded the role of army imams as equally important in terms of maintaining enlisted men’s endurance and morale.
throughout the war. The personnel structure of the Ottoman army had permanent posts for religious functionaries who were supposed to act like army chaplains. In fact, the practice of employing imams in the military as religious educators and motivators of the troops began as early as the military reforms of Selim III (r. 1789–1807); then it became a more standardized practice after Mahmud II (r. 1808–1839) abolished the Janissaries and established a Western style standing army (Mansure Ordusu).⁵⁷ Attempts at military modernization in the Ottoman Empire throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did not aim to exclude religion from the military sphere; on the contrary, routine religious obligations were observed, even during fighting. From the state authority’s point of view, as in many other European modernization projects of the time, military modernization and religion were definitely not mutually exclusive, as long as the state itself defined the correct form of religion and that form served to legitimize the state.

When the Ottoman army underwent a major reorganization after the Balkan defeat in 1913 to create a more efficient army structure,⁵⁸ the system of army imams was also revised. In parallel with the increasing number of units and personnel, a new organization and salary structure was set up to provide appointments and training for imams who would serve in the Ottoman battalions and regiments. In the new arrangement, each battalion was to have a permanent imam in its personnel – hence the popular name in Turkish, “battalion imams” (tabur imamları) – and battalion imams in a regiment would be supervised by the regimental imam, who was also called “regimental mufti” (alay müftüsü). After the declaration of mobilization on 2 August 1914, the size of the Ottoman army increased remarkably, and accordingly the need for army imams also increased. To match this increasing demand, additional posts were introduced to bring about more standardization.⁵⁹

What exactly was the job description of army imams? Their job was actually quite varied, since they were expected not only to lead prayers, recite the Koran and perform other Islamic rituals, but also to promote troop morale during the war. A battalion imam was primarily supposed to provide the troops with basic religious education. This seems to have been taken seriously by Ottoman commanders. For example, Vasfi (Sarisözen), who served in the Ottoman army as a reserve officer during the war, notes in his memoirs that when Vehip (Kaçı) Pasha, the commander of the Third Army after February 1915, came to Kelkit (today a district of Gümüşhane) to inspect a military unit stationed there, he examined soldiers’ religious knowledge and, as he saw their poor level of religious education, ordered the battalion imam to be imprisoned temporarily with only basic rations.⁶⁰ Moreover, a good battalion imam was also
supposed to arouse the troops’ fighting enthusiasm not only with his preaching, but also by setting an example such as the one observed by Erich R. Prigge, a German officer who served as an aide-de-camp of the commander of the Fifth Army, Liman von Sanders, in Gallipoli; he notes in his diaries a scene, in which a battalion imam was the first one getting out of the trench to start a fight against the landing enemy forces.⁶¹ Again in Gallipoli, the commander of the 19th division Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) gave an order on 15 May 1915 which demanded that battalion imams be placed in the front row during combat to encourage the fighting spirit of soldiers.⁶²

The help of army imams was particularly useful at difficult times such as when desertions increased or discipline dissolved on the battlefront. Especially in the second half of the war, the Ottoman army suffered from increased desertion rates. Almost 17 per cent of all the men enlisted (approximately 500,000) deserted.⁶³ In trying to prevent desertions, Ottoman military authorities frequently assigned battalion imams to preach to soldiers against desertion.⁶⁴ Such preaching usually exalted martyrdom and being a holy warrior (şehitlik ve gazilik); by reciting relevant verses from the Koran (especially the al-Anfal sura, verses 15–16)⁶⁵ and mentioning the deeds of Prophet Muhammad.⁶⁶ These sermons also emphasized that desertion was a great sin forbidden by Islam. In 1918, the Ottoman War Ministry even needed to organize a special series of sermons against desertion, performed by a group of mobile imams sent from Istanbul to the battlefronts. Troops were obliged to attend these sermons which usually took place in front of the whole regiment.⁶⁷

The army imams worked to confirm and justify the official military discipline in religious terms. They also aimed to create ethical pressure on those who were not enthusiastic fighters. For example, as part of the punishment for desertion, battalion imams refused to administer burial services for those soldiers who committed suicide.⁶⁸ There is also evidence that commanders sometimes asked battalion imams to preach against self-mutilation, which was another way of avoiding service.⁶⁹

As for the deserters who never showed up for duty or, having already escaped service, roamed the countryside, imams were also useful for the official attempts to convince them to rejoin the forces. For this purpose, Ottoman authorities sometimes formed groups of intermediaries who would talk to deserters in their vicinity, advising them to surrender to the authorities. Such groups were called “advisory commissions” (heyet-i nasiha), which usually included local imams, as well as local notables and government officials.⁷⁰
Was Jihad Rhetoric Really Effective?

How effective were the religious motifs for the Ottoman mobilization of manpower in World War I? Was the Jihad rhetoric’s target audience, namely the Muslim rural masses, really convinced and moved by it? While it is difficult to give an accurate answer to such questions, we can approach them on two levels. The first is the individual level, namely the war experiences of individual soldiers as expressed in their documents, namely their memoirs and diaries. Of course, though their number has fortunately increased in recent years, such texts of individual experiences are not as many in the Ottoman case as they are in European countries, mainly because Ottoman enlisted men were overwhelmingly illiterate.

Regarding the reception of Islamic religious motifs in general and the Jihad rhetoric in particular, the available documents mostly reveal an ambivalent attitude on the part of Ottoman soldiers. While one can argue that at a general level Ottoman soldiers became more religious in the face of the hardships of war, the reception of religious propaganda conveyed through imams was not uniform. For example, Private Emin (Çöl), who served both on the Gallipoli and Sinai-Palestine fronts throughout the war, notes in his memoirs that when he was in Gallipoli he was frankly moved by the dedication of an imam sent from Istanbul to preach to his regiment. Military authorities also sometimes observed the extensiveness of such attitude, as in the case of the 30th Division headquarters on the Caucasus front, which reported on 10 October 1914 that the sermons delivered by battalion imams had positive effects on the troops’ morale. Moreover, turning to religion and praying regularly also seem to have been common among Ottoman POWs. For example, Private Hüseyin Fehmi (Genişol), who was held captive by the British on the Iraq/Mesopotamia front and imprisoned in the Bellary camp in India, observes in his diary that most Ottoman POWs in the camp started to pray regularly, respected imams and attended religious rituals en masse. In such examples, one can observe that, as was the case with soldiers in European armies, there was a tendency among Ottoman soldiers to turn to religion during World War I. But it is obvious from soldiers’ own documents that this “religiosity” did not amount to running to their deaths because of some blind acceptance of martyrdom; it was rather an indication of their belief that God’s mercy would allow them to return to their homes alive.

On the other hand, not every soldier was so easily inclined to be moved by the Jihad rhetoric and army imams’ sermons. For example, the reserve officer Süleyman Nuri, who served on the Gallipoli and Caucasus fronts and then deserted, saw the army imams as nothing but
the mouthpiece of the corrupt CUP government. For him, their sermons only served to cover up the meaningless war, in which the Ottoman soldier was sent to his death in vain. Moreover, it is also important to note that not all army imams were uniform in their acceptance of the authorities’ attitudes and messages. Sometimes the army imams themselves could be critical of certain practices in the army, as in the case of Abdullah Fevzi Efendi, a medrese teacher who joined the army as a volunteer and became a battalion prayer leader. For example, he condemned the harsh treatment of enlisted men by officers, such as by beating, as one of the main factors that undermined the morale and cohesion of Ottoman troops.

A similar dual, or ambivalent, situation can also be observed at the general level. On the one hand, the Ottoman state was able to mobilize some three million men and managed to keep its armies on the battlefront until the last days of the war; compared to its failure in mobilization during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, this was a remarkable success. Based on this fact, it is possible to argue that the Ottoman religious propaganda in World War I was actually effective in terms of mobilization of manpower, which in turn contributed to the increased vigour of the army. But on the other hand, one can also say that, as mentioned earlier, neither severe penal laws nor references to the jihad rhetoric against avoiding military service could prevent desertion from becoming a major problem. However, it should not be forgotten that, in either case, religious propaganda constituted only one factor among many.

Jihad and Anatolian Alevis

The main religious references of the Jihad rhetoric came from the Sunni tradition, but Anatolia was also the home of the non-Sunni Alevi population. How did the Ottoman Jihad propaganda target the Anatolian Alevis in general and the Alevi enlisted men in the army in particular? How did they react to such propaganda? While the case of the Alevis in the Ottoman mobilization still remains an understudied subject, it is certain that there were no permanent posts in the Ottoman army for Alevi religious functionaries, nor were there any signs that any such religious men were employed temporarily by the Ottoman military during World War I.

Available evidence suggests that a practical way of communicating the Jihad rhetoric to the potential and serving Alevi enlisted men was to get help from the Bektashi order. In fact, the Bektashi order had many followers and supporters among the Young Turks; some even claimed that
Enver and Talat pashas were followers of the order. It is certain that such close ties facilitated political cooperation between two groups. In 1915, with the “wish and consent” of Enver Pasha, the Bektashi order formed a volunteer regiment (Bektaşi Alayı or Mücahidin-i Bektaşiye) under the leadership of Çelebi Cemaleddin Efendi, the sheikh of the Hacı Bektaş Lodge during the war. While accurate numbers are lacking, estimates of the number of men that the Bektashi volunteer regiment recruited, mostly from the Alevi population, included many as 7,000 men. But besides recruiting volunteers, the order was also expected to ensure the support of the Alevis for the war effort and increase the morale of Alevi enlisted men in the army. Unlike the non-combatant character and mostly logistical services of the the Mevlevi Volunteer Battalion that was established for similar purposes, the Bektaşi Regiment was also used as a combatant militia force on the Gallipoli and the Caucasus fronts.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has examined the Ottoman Jihad rhetoric as a military necessity in justifying conscription and large-scale mobilization of manpower during World War I. It has argued that the Jihad rhetoric had a very important domestic dimension in that it targeted the Anatolian Muslim masses, which constituted the backbone of the Ottoman army, no less than it targeted Muslims living outside Anatolia. Jihad as a rhetoric justifying military service actually existed before World War I; therefore, wartime uses of jihad were not necessarily connected with the proclamation of the Great Jihad on 11 November 1914, but that declaration certainly intensified such uses. As has been shown, in transmitting the Jihad rhetoric to the masses oral methods of religious propaganda were as important as and, perhaps, more extensive than, print propaganda. Imams were the main agents of this transmission, and the chapter has shed light particularly on the army imams, hitherto an understudied subject in the history of Ottoman World War I.

Did the Ottoman Jihad propaganda leave a legacy for Republican Turkey? As concluding remarks, this study can give only some speculative answers to this question, leaving the floor open for further discussions and prospective research on the subject. First of all, one can suggest that the enormous amount of energy invested by the wartime government in religious propaganda to communicate with the Anatolian population further reinforced the already existing Islamic language in Turkish nationalism, facilitating the association of Turkishness with being Muslim. This is at least visible in the continuation of justifying conscription
in Islamic terms in the republican era, even when the state became militantly secular. Secondly, when the state got extensively engaged in religious propaganda during World War I, it also attained a larger space of intervention in the realm of religion, as a result of which it produced a religious discourse according to its own definition of “correct” Islam. It can be speculated that this increase in the state’s power of intervention in the realm of religion, which further increased during the mobilization of the National Struggle (1919–1922) of the Ankara government, was inherited by the republican state.

Notes

1 Hasan Kayalı’s important study must be acknowledged for pointing at the domestic aspect of the Ottoman Jihad declaration in World War I, though his study’s scope of “domestic” seems to have tended to focus more on the Ottoman Middle East: Hasan Kayalı, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908–1918 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), pp. 187–188.


8 After the Sarıkamış defeat, during which various Ottoman commanders claimed that many Armenians collaborated with the Russians, the acting commander-in-chief Enver Pasha issued an order to all military units on 25 February 1915 instructing that “Armenians shall strictly not be employed in mobile armies, in mobile and stationary gendarmeries, or in any armed service.” See Kamuran Gürün, The Armenian File: The Myth of Innocence Exposed (Nicosia: Rustem, 2001), p. 206.

9 It is important to note that the discourse of “comradeship in arms” (silah arkadaşlığı), which began to be expressed in newspapers and journals by Young Turk intellectuals discussing the 1909 regulations as a motif that would unify Muslim and non-Muslim Ottomans was hardly visible on the eve of and during World War I. See, for example, Hüseyin Cahid, Tanin, 23 June 1909. Also see Gülsoy, Osmanlı Gayrimüslimlerinin Askerlik Serüveni, p. 128.

10 This is not to say that Turkish nationalism and Islamic discourse were mutually exclusive. On the contrary, as Hobsbawm argues, nationalism and religion were often close allies. See Eric J. Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 124, 150.


16 See, for example, İsmail Faik, Cihad (İstanbul: Koçunyan Matbaası, 1915), p. 1; Halil Hilmi, Cihadda İslamın Vazifesi (İstanbul: Ncm-i İstikbal Matbaası, 1914), p. 7; Hasan Fehmi, Kürs-i İslaman Bir Hitab, p. 10.
17 Cihad-ı Mukaddes Farzdır (İstanbul: n.p., 1916).
18 When Jihad involves expanding Islam and the Muslim community, then Jihad is a collective community (farz-ı kifaye), and joining it is a voluntary choice. See Tobias Heinzelmann, Cihaddan Vatan Savunmasına: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nda Genel Askerlik Yükümlülüğü, 1826–1856, trans. Türkis Noyan (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2009), p. 14.
19 Nahl sura, verse 126: “And if you punish [an enemy, O believers], punish with an equivalent of that with which you were harmed.” See http://quran.com/16/126 (accessed on 6 December 2014).
20 See, for example, Musa Kâzım, İslamda Cihad (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Hayriye ve Şüreki, 1917).
21 Halil Hilmi, Cihadda İslâmın Vazifesı, p. 8.
22 Anfal sura, verse 60: “And prepare against them whatever you are able of power and of steeds of war by which you may terrify the enemy of Allah and your enemy and others besides them whom you do not know [but] whom Allah knows. And whatever you spend the cause of Allah will be fully repaid to you, and you will not be wrong.” See http://quran.com/8/60 (accessed on 6 December 2014).
23 Halil Hilmi, Cihadda İslâmın Vazifesi, pp. 2–3.
24 See, for example, Mehmed Halis, Cihad-ı Ekber (İstanbul: Kanaat Kitabhanesi, 1917), p. 6. Also see Hasan Fehmi, Kürsî-ı İslamdan Bir Hitab, 15; Halil Hilmi, Cihadda İslâmın Vazifesı, p. 5.
25 See, for example, Feyzullah Sacid, Ordumuza Armağan: Ordunun Tekbiri, Cihad-ı Ekber Destanı, Gökten Ses (İstanbul: İkbâl Kitâbhanesi, 1914). Here is an example of the poems this pamphlet contains: “O the army of Islam, the army of revenge! / March, overtake, attack, go beyond! / Never mind deserts, nor mountains and stones / Time is up: Attack! / So let hell break loose” (“Ey İslam ordusu, İntikam ordusu! / Yürü, geç, atıl, aş / Ne çöl bil, ne dağ taş! / Vakit oldu: Hücum et / Ki kopsun kıyamet!”) (p. 13).
26 For a few such examples see Cihad-ı Ekber: Her Müslüman Okusun ve Okutsun (İstanbul: Ahenk Matbaası, 1914); Musa Kazım, İslamda Cihad. And quite a few of the ones that were sold, not free of charge, declared on their front pages that their sales revenues would be donated, partly or entirely, to the Ottoman war effort. See, for example, Halil Hilmi, Cihadda İslâmın Vazifesı; Mehmed Halis, Cihad-ı Ekber.
27 See İsmail Kara, “Cumhuriyet Devrinde Askere Din Dersleri: ‘İyi Asker İyi Müslüman, İyi Müslüman İyi Asker Olur’”, Toplumsal Tarih, no. 166 (October 2007), pp. 48–53. This essay is a brief survey of the religion book for the soldier literature from the late Ottoman period to early republican Turkey.
28 For a few examples of this increased literature see Ömer Fevzi, Osmanlı Efradına Maneviyat-ı Askeriye Dersleri: Maneviyat Askerin Ruhudur (İstanbul: Mekteb-i Harbiye Matbaası, 1909); this book had new editions in 1910 and 1911; Ömer Fevzi, Maneviyat-ı Askeriye Makaleleri (İstanbul: Mekteb-i Harbiye Matbaası, 1911); Ali Rahmi, Orduda Terbiye-ı Maneviye ve Ruhîye (İstanbul: Ahmed İhsan ve Şüreki, 1911); Hüseyin Hakki, Osmanlı Efradının Türkviye-ı Maneviyati (İstanbul: Reşadiye Matbaası, 1914); İzmirli İsmail Hakki, Gazilere Armağan (İstanbul: n.p., 1915); Üryanizade Ali Vahid, Askerin İlimihali (İstanbul: Ahmed İhsan ve Şüreki, 1917).


31 İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, Gazilere Armağan, p. 43.
32 Ibid, another religion book for the soldier, which was written later during the early years of the Turkish republic at the request of Fevzi Çakmak, the chief of the Turkish general staff, emphasized that "military service is the sixth pillar of Islam" and if it was not carried out well, the other pillars would be incomplete too. Ahmet Hamdi Akseki, Askere Din Kitabı, 2nd edition (İstanbul: Ebüzziya Matbaası, 1945), p. 195.

33 Benjamin C. Fortna, Learning to Read in the Late Ottoman Empire and the Early Turkish Republic (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 20–21.


35 Of course, we should also add film here, since cinema was also used to a certain extent for propaganda during World War I in all the belligerent countries, including the Ottoman Empire.


38 This is, for example, Erol Köroğlu’s argument in his otherwise excellent research on Ottoman propaganda and literature in World War I. See Erol Köroğlu, Propagandadan Millî Kimlik İnşasına: Türk Edebiyatı ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı, 1914–1918 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004). This book remains a seminal study in its field.

39 Kara, İslâmcılar Siyasi Görüşleri, p. 85.


41 Tarık Zafer Tunaya, Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler, 1: İkinci Meşrutiyet Dönemi (İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1984), pp. 72, 90; Kara, İslâmcılar Siyasi Görüşleri, p. 88.


43 Mevaiz-i Diniye, vol. 1, (İstanbul: Daru’l-Tibaatü’l Amire, 1912); Mevaiz-i Diniye, vol. 2 (İstanbul: Matbaa-yi Amire, 1913).


52 See, for example, “Mevlid-i Nebevi Kırıaati”, *İkdâm*, 25 November 1914.

53 “Ayasofya’dı Mevlid-i Nebevi”, *İkdâm*, 14 November 1914. For similar mevlids which were organized by the National Defence League see “Mevlid-i Nebevi Kırıaati”, *İkdâm*, 24 November 1914; “Mevlid-i Nebevi Kırıaati”, *İkdâm*, 25 November 1914; “Mevlid-i Nebevi Kırıaati”, *İkdâm*, 17 February 1915.

54 “Vaaç ve Nasihat”, *İkdâm*, 24 September 1914.


56 For a first-hand account of such a gathering scene in a village by a reserve officer see Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, 15th edition (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2004), p. 63.


63 For a detailed analysis of the problem of desertion in the Ottoman army in World War I see Beşikçi, *Between Voluntarism and Resistance*, Chapter 5.

64 Birinci Dünya Harbi’nde Türk Harbi, *vol. 4, part 2: Sina-Filistin Cephesi* (Ankara:
Genelkurmay Askeri Tarih ve Stratejik Etüt Başkanlığı Yayınları, 1986), p. 762. For similar religious practices, for example, on the Gallipoli front see Emin Çöl, Bir Erin Anıları: Çanakkale-Sına Savaşları, ed. by Celal Kazdağlı (İstanbul: Nöbetçi Yayınları, 2009), p. 59.

Anfal sura, verse 15: “O you who have believed, when you meet those who disbelieve advancing [for battle], do not turn to them your backs [in flight].” Verse 16: “And whoever turns his back to them on such a day, unless swerving [as a strategy] for war or joining [another] company, has certainly returned with anger [upon him] from Allah, and his refuge is Hell – and wretched is the destination.” http://quran.com/8/15, 16 (accessed on 6 December 2014). This verse was quoted, for example, in İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, Gaziere Armağan, pp. 6–7.

For an analysis on this point see Gottfried Hagen, “The Prophet Muhammad as an Exemplar in War – Ottoman Views on the Eve of World War I”, New Perspectives on Turkey, no. 22 (Spring 2000), pp. 145–172.

See, for example, Sami Yengin, Dramadan Sına-Filistinê Savas Gunnülügi (1917–1918) (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basimevi, 2007), p. 79.


BOA, DH.KMS., 49/1/8, 31 October 1918; BOA, DH.İD., 180/52, 4 June 1914.


Emin Çöl, Bir Erin Anıları, p. 59.


Hüseyin Fehmi Genişol, Çanakkale’den Bağdat’a Esaretten Kurtuluş Savaşı’na: Cephele Sekiz Yil Sekiz Ay (1914–1923), ed. by Mustafa Yeni (İstanbul: İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2014), pp. 92, 100, 136.

Süleyman Nuri, Uyanan Esirler, pp. 137–142.

Abdullah Fevzi Efendi, Çanakkale Cephesinde Bir Müderris, ed. by Ali Osman Koçkuzu (İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 2010), pp. 129, 144, 170–171.

On the Ottoman army’s transformation from its Balkan failure to its increasing performance in World War I see Mehmet Beşikçi, “Balkan Harbîinde Osmanlı Seferberliği ve Redif Teşkilatının İflası”, Türkiye Günülüği, no. 110 (Spring 2012), pp. 27–43; Beşikçi, Between Voluntarism and Resistance, Chapter 2. Also see Mesut Uyar and E. Erickson, A Military History of the Ottomans: From Osman to Atatürk (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2009), pp. 235–279.


Turkish General Staff Military Archives, Ankara (ATASE), BDH, Klasör 1942, Dosya 223, Fihrist 1–19.
80 Küçük, *Kurtuluş Savaşı’nda Bekaşiler*, p. 103.
81 On the Mevlevi volunteers see Nüri Köstüklü, *Vatan Savunmasında Mevlevihaneler: Balkan Savaşlarından Milli Mücadeleye* (İstanbul: Çizgi Kitabevi, 2005).