Jihad and Islam in World War I

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3 (Not) Using Political Islam

The German Empire and Its Failed Propaganda Campaign in the Near and Middle East, 1914–1918 and Beyond

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Introduction

The defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II brought to an end what Bloch has termed the imperial phase of German history (1871–1945).¹ There is an ongoing debate whether Germany’s imperial policies were carefully planned or rather opportunist in nature. Archival evidence strongly suggests the latter, particularly where German policies in the Near and Middle East are concerned. Yet there were also authors suggesting the existence of a sinister German imperial project, aiming at the establishment of direct or indirect German control over the region’s peoples and resources. Events in and around World War I are frequently quoted to support this view: the German-Ottoman alliance was concluded between unequal partners; clearly the weaker party was the Ottoman Empire. The Armenian genocide is often referred to as a kind of test-run for the Holocaust. There is also the suggestion that German policies between 1914 and 1945 were marked by continuity; German military and political decision-makers in 1939 merely took out of the drawers the blueprints of 1914 that had been deposited in those drawers in 1918. Moreover, these German policies were, in turn, presumably the blueprints for all kinds of inhuman, brutal, anti-western and anti-semitic sentiments and the behaviour of Muslims up to the present.²

The myth that Germany pursued a deliberate and structured Near and Middle East policy with clearly defined ends is surprisingly resilient. Like every myth it contains several grains of truth. After 1890 Germany did indeed wish to create an empire of its own; and after 1898 the Germans did consider the Middle East as a promising region in which to set up an informal empire in alliance with the supposedly moribund Ottoman Empire.³ To that purpose, German capital was used to push forward the so-called “Baghdad Railway”, and to prepare the ground for a German imperial project entailing German settlers in Anatolia (which was soon
scraped for want of the ability to achieve it).⁴ Germany’s colonial rivals were greatly concerned with the strategic implications of these policies: with the Bagdad Railway extended towards Kuwait (its originally intended terminus) German soldiers could be transported to the Persian Gulf in less than a week; a march on British-held India would then be facilitated. Given the nineteenth century history of British obsessions with the “Great Game” and a Russian threat to India, this was a renewed Imperial scare. The good relations Germany enjoyed with the Ottoman government seemed to facilitate such policies even more.⁵

These ambitious schemes notwithstanding, Germany rather saw itself frustrated in its imperial undertakings before 1914. German imperial possessions did not seem to amount to much (but in strictly territorial terms were by no means unimpressive), yet German military and political decision-makers realized quite clearly that territory or population was not the backbone of empire: it was infrastructure. The British Empire might have been a patchwork of possessions of various sizes the world over, but Britain had not only the Royal Navy, but also the infrastructure to keep it operational. Germany possessed no such thing. By 1909, it was tacitly acknowledged that the Germans had lost the naval arms race, and no degree of technological superiority could obscure the fact that any German battle-cruiser far from home would eventually have to surrender for lack of fuel. Even for the most patriotic German an uncomfortable realization had dawned by 1914: Germany was weak, not strong, and surrounded by potentially hostile powers (a hostility German policies before 1914 had done nothing to ward off).⁶ A potential German ally in the Middle East was thus regarded as valuable.

The German-Ottoman Alliance

When representatives of the Ottoman and German Empires put their signatures to the treaty of alliance on 2 August 1914, two very strange partners were united. Germany was a heavily industrialized European Great Power. The Ottoman Empire was a predominantly agrarian empire with a multi-ethnic and multi-religious population, which suffered from several problems of long duration. First, an increasing number of non-Muslims in the Empire tried to break away from imperial control and desired to set up their own national states. By 1914, several such groups had already succeeded in doing so. A Greek national state became independent in 1832, a Serbian and Romanian state in 1878. At the time of the revolution of 1908 Bulgaria, having enjoyed de facto independence
since 1877, proclaimed full independence. Yet one should not be too hasty in judging the internal political climate within the empire, as more recent research has revealed. While there were doubtless separatists in every group, and even in the Muslim community there were some who were opposed to the ongoing preservation of a multi-ethnic and multi-religious mode of life, the majority of Muslims and non-Muslims seem to have preserved good mutual relations.⁷ Thus it appears that the fears of internal disintegration, which in all likelihood played a prominent part in the eventual decision of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) to create a Muslim national state rather than preserve a multi-ethnic empire, were probably exaggerated.

Internal disintegration thus seems to have been less of a problem. Colonial encroachment by the European powers, on the other hand, was an on-going and real threat to the Empire’s survival.⁸ Finding a protector against this encroachment consequently seemed of vital importance to the Ottoman government. Much has been written about the internal workings of alliances, yet while it is by now firmly established that very few alliances or ententes are “cordial” in nature, it is unusual for an ally to turn on another.⁹ Thus, if the impression can be created that the security of one ally (in this case the Ottoman Empire) is of importance—or even of vital importance—to the other (in this case Germany), the preconditions for an alliance are laid.

This was the military dimension of the German-Ottoman alliance. Germany might have been a strong industrial and military power, but it was located in the centre of Europe. Its choice of allies in the decades before the war had been as deficient as its general foreign policy: where Bismarck left a Germany with secure ties to all powers except France (thus practically guaranteeing an equilibrium and peace in Europe) in 1890, by 1914 Germany was allied with Austria, suffering from a weak industry and internal strife between its many nationalities, and Italy, the weakest of all the European industrial powers and politically highly unreliable due to its manifold political clashes with Austria. In addition, the almost criminal negligence or incompetence of Germany’s political elite caused most of Bismarck’s security architecture to be dismantled. In 1914 Germany faced a two-front war with weak allies.¹⁰ An alliance with the Ottoman Empire was an interesting proposition: the Ottomans might attack Russia from the south and thus subject the “Russian steam roller” to the same problems as Germany—a two-front war. Thus one of the reasons why Emperor Wilhelm II overruled the initial objections of German military and political decision-makers to the alliance was the German monarch’s conviction “that the Empire could do something against Russia.”¹¹
Yet, in German eyes, the real Ottoman secret weapon was something else: Islam. Since the sixteenth century, Ottoman sultans had added “caliph” to their long list of titles. For 300 years after the conquest of Egypt (1516–1517), little political use had been made of this title.¹² But when Ottoman sultan Abdülhamit II came to power the caliphate began to be used as an Ottoman diplomatic weapon – sometimes with considerable success, which doubtless fuelled German imagination.

The belief that Islam possessed a mobilizing potential for Muslims when it came to combatting colonizing powers was, in itself, neither naïve nor unfounded. The French in Algeria were the first to experience this phenomenon: in the absence of anything akin to Algerian nationalism, ‘Amir ‘Abd al-Qadir¹³ referred to Algeria as “Dar al-Islam”, which Muslims were called upon to defend against the infidel invaders. Similar situations occurred during the entire nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: examples include the Indian “mutiny” of 1857–1858 as well as the Mahdiyya in the Sudan (1881–1898), the protracted resistance of Mullah ‘Abdallah Hassan in Somalia against British, French and Italian colonization or the anti-Italian struggle of the Sanusiya Sufi-Order in Tripolitania.

Moreover, the substitution of “Islam” for “nationalism” had another effect: Europeans were increasingly led to believe that what motivated Muslims most was “Islam”, in the sense of a universal religion rather than particularist nationalism. Thus the idea that pan-Islam existed, and that Muslims were prepared to fight for what Europeans perceived to be “Islam”, and that such readiness to fight might be harnessed in the service of one of the warring camps seemingly was not entirely unfounded. Put to a reality check, however, such notions very quickly proved erroneous.

Perceptions of Islam

In the context of this chapter I shall not focus on “Islam” itself, but rather on the perception of Islam by the European powers in 1914, and on the meaning of “Islam” as a socio-political factor in Muslim societies. The basic question is: as what could Islam be perceived in 1914? Was it a universal religion? Was it a set of social and political values? Was it a militant ideology? And, secondly, which element in Islam was the more important: the universal global idea of the umma, which in principle ruled out the fact that Muslims could become nationalists, or local/regional culture, language, perhaps ethnicity, which made Muslims feel themselves to be inhabitants of their home regions first, and members of the umma.
second? It seems impossible to do these crucial questions justice in a short chapter; what one may do, however, is to analyse briefly how Europeans saw Islam by the outbreak of World War I.¹⁴

While Europeans regarded Islam mainly as a form of aberrant religion (from the Christian point of view) during the Middle Ages and the Early Modern Age, they became more interested in the social and political aspects of Muslim societies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.¹⁵ By the early twentieth century, one might argue that Islam had established itself firmly on the research agendas of European scholars. True, the number of “Orientalists” was small and their impact limited, but every European country by the outbreak of war in 1914 had a small number of specialist scholars at its disposal.¹⁶ Their ranks were swollen by career diplomats, administrators and politicians, who had often served in colonies with substantial Muslim populations; and, last but not least, there were the eccentrics: dilettantes dealing with “the Orient” in the most varied ways. Some of them, like Wilfred Scawen Blunt in Britain, became lifelong advocates of the rights of the colonized populations, and thorns in the flesh of colonial and colonizing politicians; some developed ingenuous, not altogether well-founded theories of how the colonized Muslims might be used for the interests of one European Great Power against its rivals. One of the most noteworthy examples of the latter kind was German baron Max Freiherr von Oppenheim, who may with some justification claim to be the most influential individual in bringing about the German pan-Islamic Propaganda during World War I.

No serious Orientalist could ever be accused of having misconceived Islam as one monolithic body. They were very well aware that “Islam”, even if regarded only as a religion, was deeply fragmented. The rather obvious split between Sunnis and Shi’ites was complemented by the existence of a multitude of other religious movements, some only in the widest sense “Islamic.” The differences in the socio-cultural expressions of Islam were also duly noted: to name but a few examples, there was the state Islam of the Ottoman Empire, headed by the sultan-caliph; there was the academic-legal Islam of Al-Azhar university in Cairo; there were, on the opposite end of the scale, Muslim brotherhoods in more remote areas of the world, for example all over Africa. These were usually treated with some contempt – German Orientalists cursorily brushed off African Islam as “Negerislam”, Black Islam, in the sense of a third- or fourth-rate Islam of no concern to Orientalists and colonial powers alike. But it was especially these highly de-centralized Muslim brotherhoods who had demonstrated their militant potential at several occasions: in Algeria, in Libya, the Sudan, Somalia, etc.¹⁷ “Islam” obviously could, and
did, make Muslims fight.¹⁸ Muslim resistance, without exception, had eventually been overcome, sometimes at a hefty price, but the crucial question remained: would it be possible to unite all Muslims in a revolt against colonialism per se, regardless of where and under what rule these Muslims lived? The Germans believed, or rather allowed themselves to be persuaded, that such a possibility did exist.¹⁹

They were not the only ones. Harold Nicolson, permanent under-secretary in the British Foreign Office, warned his superiors in 1911 of the dangers of Ottoman pan-Islamic propaganda: “[t]his would only assist towards the creation of a power which, I think, in the not too far distant future – should it become thoroughly consolidated and established – would be a very serious menace to us and also to Russia … Germany is fortunate in being able to view with comparative indifference the growth of the great Mussulman [sic] military power, she having no Mussulman [sic] subjects herself, and a union between her and Turkey would be one of the gravest dangers to the equilibrium between Europe and Asia.”²⁰

It was exactly this special German situation – her apparent status as a non-colonizer (Nicolson omitted the considerable concern German colonial administrators and missionaries expressed about anti-colonial Islamic activities in practically all German colonial territories) – and her emerging rivalry with Britain which had led German politicians and diplomats to cotton on to the potential appeal of a German-led Islamic propaganda campaign. As early as in 1889 the liberal Friedrich Naumann had prophesied that in case of a world war “the caliph of Constantinople will once more uplift the standard of Holy War. The sick man will rise himself for the last time to cry aloud to Egypt, to the Sudan, to East Africa, Persia, Afghanistan and India: “War against England!” It is not unimportant to know who will support him on his bed when he utters this cry!”²¹ Naumann’s views were echoed by Fritz Bronsart von Schellendorf, who was to become chief of the general staff of the Ottoman Army in 1914, and most importantly Max Freiherr von Oppenheim. Although at the margins of the German political establishment, the baron managed to persuade the German government to set up an elaborate apparatus for conducting pan-Islamic propaganda from 1914 to 1918.

With the benefit of hindsight it can be argued that this propaganda campaign failed: yet what were the reasons for this failure? Was the central mistake that the pan-Islam the Germans had been appealing to did not exist? Had the Germans, perhaps, been attributing too much importance to Muslims’ identity as Muslims, disregarding the great differences between Muslim societies?
Pan-Islam vs. Muslim Nationalism: Reality or Chimera?

The erroneous German view of Ottoman “Muslim policy” could be explained by what the Western powers must have viewed as the stirrings of global Muslim solidarity in the face of colonial encroachment. Muslims did fight when their independence was threatened: this had been amply proved in the cases of Algeria, the Sudan, the Caucasus, Libya, to name but a few. Yet even so a sober analysis of these localized conflicts pitching Muslims against Western colonizers could give the Western powers reason to be cautiously optimistic. Muslims had often held off colonial conquest for years, if not decades, yet they had ultimately been defeated.

On the other hand the Western powers were aware that Muslims could not accept such defeats as permanent. “Islam” was, after all, seen as a “fanatical religion”; it exhorted its adherents to conduct permanent holy war against the infidels, and particularly so where the infidels had conquered territories regarded as Dar al-Islam. Consequently, Muslim colonial populations were regarded with a great deal of apprehension. Even if they seemed to acquiesce in colonial control, there might be smouldering resentment, which the right call to Jihad at the right time under the right conditions could blow up into an open conflagration. Localized revolts or resistance movements might be overcome; a global Muslim Jihad against the colonial powers might not. As has already been pointed out, regardless of the rather disdainful views of Western Orientalists about the very existence of pan-Islam, politicians feared it greatly – that is to say, politicians of those powers which had colonial possessions to lose. The Germans, on the other hand, began to ponder the idea of using this “Muslim weapon” in case of need.

Pan-Islam, in principle, is a tautological expression. One of the very foundations of Islam is the idea of the umma, the world-wide community of all Muslims, which is supposed to have a deeper meaning than any particular ethnic, cultural or political identities. Pan-Islam, however, is a useful term to describe the political consequences of this feeling of solidarity and belonging together of Muslims. Pan-Islam centred, of course, on the figure of the caliph, and it is partly this orientation which must be seen as one of the central weaknesses of pan-Islam as a movement.

It might be argued that, amongst all Islamic institutions and legal terms, the caliphate is one of the worst-defined. Its very origins were an act of improvisation. After the death of the prophet two systems of succession were pitched against each other: that of election of the most dignified member of the community against that of family relationship with the prophet. The two positions eventually translated into Sunna and
Shi’a. The first caliph, Abu Bakr, came into office through an election, but this was not recognized by part of the community (which became the Shi’a). In later centuries all sorts of caliphal oddities could be observed: there could be more than one caliph (in the tenth century there was a Sunni caliph at Baghdad, a Shi’ite caliph at Cairo and a rival Sunni caliph at Cordoba). Caliphs also could be powerless figureheads, their spiritual influence notwithstanding. It might be argued that the Mongols abolished the caliphate for the first time, killing the Abbasid caliph of Baghdad in 1258 (thus in effect abolishing it 666 years before the Turkish Grand National Assembly). According to (official) Ottoman legend, in 1517 Ottoman sultan Selim I was proclaimed caliph by the last member of the Abbasid dynasty in Cairo. Becoming caliph meant a great increase of prestige for the Ottoman sultans.²² There is beautifully preserved diplomatic correspondence, for example, with the Indian Mughals;²³ externally they are oozing politeness, if not deference, to the addressee, yet on the other hand Ottoman correspondence is often full of subtle insults, such as depictions of an Indian Mughal seeking protection from the superior Ottoman sultan-caliph. It is generally acknowledged that the Ottoman sultan was accorded a particularly exalted position, as far as Muslim rulers were concerned, from the sixteenth century onwards.

Yet being caliph and interested in maintaining one’s credibility as the world’s most powerful Muslim ruler could also turn out to be troublesome and expensive.²⁴ Consequently, from the mid-sixteenth century on the Ottomans used their title of caliph rather sparingly. It was not until the long rule of sultan Abdulhamid II that Ottoman pan-Islamic activity was pursued with renewed vigour. Abdulhamid II was perhaps not the first to use the “Muslim weapon” against colonial encroachment, but certainly the Muslim ruler who used it with the greatest effect. Not only was he able to instil in Indian Muslims loyalty to the Ottoman sultanate – amongst other things evidenced by _hutba_ being read in his name in Indian mosques – but he was even able to demonstrate his pan-Islamic powers to colonial powers: the sultan could, if he saw fit, exert his influence on behalf of the colonial powers, and make sure that their Muslim subjects were quiet and obedient. The opposite, however, also held true: although never tried in practice, a call of the Ottoman sultan for Jihad could have potentially devastating consequences for the colonial powers. It was therefore in their interest not to treat the Ottoman Empire aggressively. This seemingly obvious conclusion was arrived at by all the colonial powers, notably Britain – and also by their potential rivals, notably Germany.

The Germans, then – and particularly diplomat cum dilettante-Orientalist Max Freiherr von Oppenheim – had it all pat. It sounded
too good to be true: ally Germany with the caliph; have the caliph declare Jihad; see the Muslims rising in revolt in droves, and see the enemies of Germany reeling from the pan-Islamic conflagration. And, of course, see Germany profit handsomely from these developments.

It was too good to be true. Muslims did indeed feel solidarity with the Ottoman Empire during World War I; but Muslim nationalists very soon made it overly clear that their main interest was the independence of their home countries from all outside powers – including the Ottomans. Yet the deep rifts between different interpretations of Islam had never been overcome. During the First World War many, if not most, Muslims in the Ottoman Empire and outside it realized that this was not their war; they feared the deprivations and ravages of war, saw it as entirely unnecessary and did their best to preserve their neutrality. Muslims thus were not “fanatical masses”, but rather coolly pragmatic. The lack of fanaticism was one of the most important reasons for the abject failure of the German pan-Islamic propaganda campaign. Yet how had the German – and not only German, but Western – misreading of the possible behaviour of Muslims come about?

The possible answer lies in two arguments: first, Muslims acted by and large pragmatically and not ideologically. Second, the Committee of Union and Progress had by 1914 already squandered a good deal of its Muslim credentials, the gravest of which was to reduce the sultan-caliph to little more than a figurehead.

### Political Errors: The Young Turks and the Sultan-Caliph

Although Kansu has argued to the contrary, the revolution of 1908 was not particularly revolutionary.²⁵ A long period of autocratic rule came to an end; but it has to be noted that the constitution of 1876 was reinstated, not created, at that time. There certainly was no regime change and more importantly, little desire for such. The sultan complied with the wishes of his loyal people, was duly celebrated with enraptured cries of “Padişahımız çok yaşa (Long live our sultan!)”, and seemed, for the time being, to have avoided the worst as regards his own person. Abdülhamid remained sultan-caliph. Matters came to a head less than a year later, when the attempted counter-revolution of 31 March 1909 failed. Abdülhamid was deposed and sent into internal exile.²⁶

At the time it seemed the obvious course to take for the Committee of Union and Progress. Abdülhamid, it appeared, was an incorrigible
autocrat; as long as he remained sultan the revolution and its achievements could not be safe, and consequently only by removing him could such safety be gained. Yet, on the other hand, it gradually dawned on the Young Turks that in doing so they had committed a grave political error: in the revolution of 1908 they had converted an autocratic into a constitutional monarchy. This did not clash with Islamic law. However, as the monarch in question also happened to claim the caliphate with some reason, the Young Turks had created the legal novelty of a constitutional caliph, which most Muslims regarded as impossible. Finally, in 1909, they had deposed the caliph, although, in terms of Islamic law, no charge could be brought against him. The caliphate was not abolished, but it was an open secret that sultan-caliph Mehmet V. Reshat was under the firm control of the Ottoman government (if not directly the Young Turks), and that both the sultanate and the caliphate had been seriously reduced in power.

For the leading political force of what claimed to be a Muslim empire, the Young Turks indeed had behaved strangely, if not to a certain extent suicidally.²⁷ For a long time this course of action has been explained by the Young Turks’ disregard for Islam, making them appear to be predecessors of Kemalist laïcism. However, now an alternative interpretation seems possible: the Young Turks, in their majority, did not discard Islam as an important socio-politic element, yet they strove to reform Islam, a reformation which would see a national Islam – or a Muslim nationalism – prevail over the *umma*-based pan-Islam espoused during the reign of Abdülhamid.

**The Reformation of Islam**

Today some Muslim scholars, as well as many Western observers of Islam critical of its supposed incompatibility with modernity, Western values, democracy and the rule of (secular) law, point to the need for a reformation of Islam. Yet it might be argued that such a reformation has already taken place, namely in and after World War I; and “reformation” is a term used intentionally, for this Islamic reformation did indeed have striking similarities to the European reformation of Christianity.

Two dimensions of this reformation have to be distinguished. On the one hand, there is the issue of religious reform. Luther initially had no intention to offer a fundamentally different interpretation of Catholic Christianity (and even less so did Henry viii of England). But, as it turned out, “reformation” would soon turn into a move away
from fundamental Catholic doctrines, and particularly the leadership of the pope. The accusation that I use here supposedly uncritically Christian developments as a parallel for developments in nineteenth century Islam might be countered by the fact that, for instance, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani pointed out that Islam in fact needed a reformation – with himself as a Martin Luther.²⁸ Yet the reformation of Islam was not transforming into a theological process of modernization, but into one of nationalization – which had also been an integral part of the European Christian reformation.

This phenomenon, transferred to the Muslim world, is what, for want of a better term, I would call the reformation of Islam. Muslim nationalists in the making realized that Islam was not opposed to nationalism, but on the contrary could serve as a vital social glue to form national communities. It was to serve the state and to be under state supervision; and the formation of national states of Muslims was not in contradiction to the concept of the umma: Muslims simply would have to develop a dual personality. On the one hand, as Muslims, they could continue to be part of the umma; on the other hand, as nationals, their loyalty was due to their nation and national state. It might be argued that these Muslim nationalists thus, many years before Clifford Geertz, had discovered that “Islam” might be a universal concept, but had a deeply different character depending on the ethnicity, place of residence and culture of Muslims all over the world.²⁹ World War I would see this new doctrine of “national Islam” being put into practice.³⁰

Rather than identifying nationalism as a danger to the idea of a Muslim ‘umma, intellectuals and politicians were beginning to regard nationalism as a helpful tool for the defence or acquisition of political independence for the Muslim community.³¹ It would not be wrong to argue that this symbiosis of Islam and nationalism was that which motivated most (eventually successful) anti-colonial movements in all parts of the Muslim world: many of the anti-colonial thinkers and political leaders adhered to concepts originating in Europe, such as nationalism and even socialism, but none of them rejected the mobilizing power of religion.³²

This topic is arguably far too vast to be done justice to within the context of a chapter of an edited volume; yet suffice it to say that European powers, including the Germans, were well aware of it by the outbreak of World War I. Rebekka Habermas has demonstrated that a lively debate on Islam, on its “positive” and “negative” aspects – always within the framework of German colonialism – existed at the very latest by around 1900.³³
Although the German-Ottoman alliance was concluded on 2 August 1914 – the day war broke out in Europe – the Ottoman government successfully procrastinated about entering the war. It was not until the end of October that the Ottoman fleet – greatly reinforced by two German cruisers having sought sanctuary in the Golden Horn and later been acquired by the Ottoman navy – was ordered to attack Russian harbours and shipping in the Black Sea. The inevitable Russian declaration of war was followed soon afterwards by similar declarations by Britain and France: the Ottoman Empire was at war. Two weeks later the event the Germans set such great stock by occurred: “Jihad-i Ekber (the greatest of all jihads)” was proclaimed in front of the Fatih Sultan Mehmet mosque in Istanbul. Eyewitnesses reported an enthusiastic reaction by the local Muslim populace. However, soon afterwards reports by German diplomats from the Ottoman provinces painted a less rosy picture: most Ottoman Muslims reacted with indifference to the proclamation. There was no indication at all of a global Muslim uprising on behalf of the Ottoman sultan-caliph. Clearly the proclamation and the lustre of the caliphate had been insufficient to produce the (German-)desired results. Max von Oppenheim was undeterred: if an Ottoman proclamation failed to produce a Jihad, a protracted German propaganda campaign would in due course lead to success. The practical outcome of this thinking was the “Nachrichtenstelle für den Orient (Intelligence Office for the East)”, an institution with the predominant task of carrying out pan-Islamic propaganda.

German Propaganda Operations: The Intelligence Office for the East (IOfE)

German officialdom was initially reluctant to accept Oppenheim’s proposals and also quite unwilling to bear the considerable (expected) cost of the IOfE. Oppenheim’s rather dubious personality, which led the German establishment to regard him more as a dandy than a diplomat, also might have been a reason for the lack of official enthusiasm for the IOfE. The baron’s views about pan-Islam were by no means unanimously accepted. They were based on the information he had obtained through intensive contacts with an older generation of Egyptian or other Middle Eastern elites, not through intensive study and detached observation or analysis. Oppenheim also had an inclination to exaggerate and invent, which both his official superiors and the
German Orientalists, who claimed the monopoly of qualified knowledge of Middle Eastern affairs, often frowned upon. Thus both the baron and the IOfE remained on the fringes of the Foreign Office and did not get the attention they thought they deserved. In all likelihood Oppenheim’s propaganda institutions, the IOfE and from April 1915 his “Nachrichtenstelle der Kaiserlich Deutschen Botschaft (Intelligence Office of the Imperial German Embassy)” in Istanbul, represented attempts to incorporate Oppenheim into the establishment, from which he felt excluded.³⁵

The IOfE, which the baron founded in September 1914, was initially paid for by Oppenheim himself; only in 1915 was the organization properly funded by the Foreign Office. At first it did not even get proper accommodation. Lack of office space necessitated its move from the Foreign Office building in the Wilhelmstrasse, Berlin, to the Reichskolonialamt (Imperial Colonial Office), and eventually to a spacious flat in the Tauentzienstrasse.³⁶ The IOfE began its existence as an organization short of both manpower and funds. In the beginning it set out to produce propaganda material, notably war reports about the situation on the Western Front, and a propaganda newspaper for Muslim POWs under the title al-Jihad; later both the personnel and tasks to be performed expanded continuously, often taxing the IOfE staff’s stamina to breaking point. This reflected the German official attitude, which regarded pan-Islamic propaganda as an interesting and potentially worthwhile experiment, but remained nevertheless focused on the Western Front. The war in the Middle East was regarded as Turkey’s business. Yet the differences in German and Ottoman interests in the Middle East, which were soon to emerge, made a central organization of German and Ottoman propaganda impossible and strongly contributed to its ultimate failure.

The personnel of the IOfE consisted of academics, diplomats, businessmen and missionaries, many of whom had practical experience of work in the Near and Middle East. In spite of official scepticism and their own doubts about the existence or appeal of pan-Islam before the war, a considerable number of German Orientalists served in the IOfE. As a later commentator noted, “The facility with which sincere and dextrous hands may shape cases on either side of a controversy, leaves no doubt that, in the future, the propagandist may count upon a battalion of honest professors to rewrite history, to serve the exigencies of the moment, and to provide the material for him to scatter hither and yon.”³⁷ The institution was structured into sections, each headed by a German and encompassing both German and Middle Eastern personnel.
Internal Organisation of the IOfE

I, 1: Arabic Section, German personnel:
– Professor Eugen Mittwoch, director (became director of IOfE 03/16–11/18)
– Dragoman Pröbster (served as vice-consul and dragoman in Morocco before the war)
– Dragoman Schabinger (Oppenheim’s successor as director of IOfE 03/15–02/16)
– Apprentice Dragoman Schröder
– Dr. Ruth Buka
– Dr. Curt Prüfer (became the leading German intelligence agent in Syria and Palestine)

I, 2: Arabic Section, Arab Personnel:
– Dr. Ahmad Vali (Egyptian, lecturer at Faculty of Oriental Languages, Berlin University)
– Shaykh Salih al-Sharif al-Tunisi (Tunisian, also a member of Teşkilat-i Mahsusa, the Unionist Secret Service led by Enver Pasha)
– Shaykh ’Abd al-’Aziz Shawish (Egyptian, famous pan-Islamic radical, also a member of TM)
– Dr. Muhammad Mansur Rifat (Egyptian doctor, nationalist radical in exile in Switzerland)
– 1st lieutenant Rabah Bou Kabouya (formerly of the French army, wrote propaganda leaflets under the name of Al-Hajj ’Abdallah)
– Two grandsons of the famous Algerian independence fighter ’Abd al-Qadir

II, 1: Persian section, German Personnel:
– Professor Oskar Mann, director (died in 1915)
– Dr. Sebastian Beck (succeeded Mann in 1915, later professor in Faculty of Oriental Languages, Berlin University)

II, 2: Persian Section, Iranian Personnel:
– ’Asadullah Khan Hidayah
– Takizade, a Persian constitutionalist
– Kazemzade (Hidayah, Takizade and Kazemzade formed Persian Committee in Berlin)

III, 1: Turkish Section, German Personnel:
– Professor Martin Hartmann, director
– Dr. Walter Lehmann
– Dr. Gotthard Jäschke
III, 2: Turkish Section, Turkish Personnel:
- Halil Halid Bey (former Ottoman consul-general in Bombay)
- Selaheddin (Ottoman naval commander, working as translator)
- Dr. Saadi (journalist, sacked for reasons of “unreliability and homosexuality”)

IV, 1: Indian Section, German Personnel:
- Ferdinand Grätsch, director (missionary)
- Dr. Helmut von Glasenapp
- Ernst Neuenhofer (businessman)
- Mr. Walter (missionary)

IV, 2: Indian Section, Indian Personnel:
- 18 members of the Indian Independence Committee in Berlin, among whom were:
  - Har Dayal (famous Hindu revolutionary)
  - Virendranath Chattophadhyaya (also acted as German agent in the Balkans)

V: Chinese Section:
- Dr. Herbert Müller

VI: Russian Section:
- Harald Cosack
- Georgian and Tataric members (most importantly Georgian National Committee active in the final months of the war)

Further Members:
- Heinrich Jacoby (businessman, director of “Persian Carpet Company”, representative of IOfE in Switzerland until 1918, organized contacts with Egyptian nationalists in Geneva)
- Dr. Willy Haas (replaced Jacoby in 1918)
- Friedrich Perzynski (specialist and dealer in oriental art, became the editor-in-chief of the “Neuer Orient (New Orient)”, the periodical publication of the IOfE)³⁸

The institution was organized as a “Kollegiatsbehörde (democratic institution)”, which had no hierarchy. If Oppenheim had designed it that way in the expectation that the expertise of different backgrounds and careers could be put to best use, the result was quite the opposite. According to Oppenheim’s successor, consul Schabinger, the absence of a hierarchy meant that decisions could only be made when consensus
between the members existed. This was, however, rarely the case. The director of the IOfE had only one, quite powerful, tool in order to ensure compliance: most of the members of the IOfE were of military age and could be threatened to be put at the disposal of the military authorities. This rather cynical instrument appears to have been necessary to provide at least some leadership, which was lacking in the initial months of the existence of the IOfE. Schabinger was arguably better suited to provide such leadership than Oppenheim; he was used to the hierarchical system of the diplomatic service and an authoritarian and energetic personality. While the consul sometimes trod on the toes of his subordinates, especially the oriental employees of the IOfE, many of whom were extremely sensitive with regard to protocol and personal honour, Schabinger’s task fully justified a tough stance; it was left to him to forge an efficient organization after Oppenheim’s departure for Istanbul in March 1915. Schabinger was often exasperated with the academics, as “they were not at all used to doing regular and punctual work.”³⁹ Such tensions between a professional civil servant on the one hand and academics on the other was probably inevitable; the frequent clashes between Schabinger and oriental employees of the IOfE or frequent contributors, such as the Egyptians Dr. Ahmad Vali and Dr. Muhammad Mansur Rifat, likewise might largely be ascribed to differences originating in cultural attitudes rather than to personal malice on either of the two sides.

The German staff members of the IOfE were also quite frequently at loggerheads with each other or otherwise dissatisfied with the state of affairs, as indicated by a lengthy report by Dr. Max Adler, who from September 1914 onwards was in charge of the POW newspaper Al-Jihad and of despatching periodical war reports. The report was written in response to harsh criticisms from the Foreign Office accusing the IOfE of ineffectual work and the production of useless material. Dr. Adler fully concurred. He proposed the transfer of responsibility for the war reports to local consulates in the Middle East, which were better suited to producing up-to-date material than the IOfE. Thus local attitudes and expectations could also be taken into account. The POW newspaper had two problems: only a fraction of the prisoners was literate, and the rather makeshift nature of the newspaper made the prisoners regard it with the greatest suspicion. Instead of Al-Jihad, he argued, Turkish newspapers should be used and read out by literate prisoners. Dr. Adler also complained that German members of the IOfE had not consulted him regarding the publication of suitable “oriental” articles in the German press. The organization for the supply of news to the Middle East also was sadly deficient, as was the sifting through the foreign press, especially
of the Entente states. Through such neglect a most valuable propaganda tool, namely to prove the Entente’s enmity towards Islam from its own press, was ignored. Under such circumstances Dr. Adler declared himself unable to continue his work for the institution and he left on 1 June 1915.⁴⁰

Although Oppenheim had designed the IOfE as an institution for both the gathering of intelligence and using this information for propaganda purposes, the second activity increasingly became the mainstay of the IOfE.⁴¹ The first task was gradually assumed by the national committees, with whom Oppenheim had inaugurated contacts from August 1914. Initially these consisted of an Indian Committee (“Indian Independence Committee”, hereafter IIC, in Berlin) and the “Young Egyptians” (in Geneva). The Young Egyptians were particularly useful for their ability to communicate with Egypt from neutral Switzerland. Later the IOfE came to cooperate with a Georgian and a Persian Committee. In 1915 Director Jacoby of the Persian Carpet Company Ltd. began to work with the Egyptian nationalists in Geneva, most intensively with Muhammad Farid and Muhammad Fahmy, the latter being the successor of Mustafa Kamil as leader of the Egyptian Hizb al-Watan. Jacoby seems to have been a charming and efficient character, and his work with the Egyptians in general yielded good results.⁴² In Berlin relations between Schabinger and “oriental” members of the institution or the nationalist committees were often strained, usually due more to differences of aims pursued by the Germans and the nationalists than to personal disagreements.⁴³ The Germans had a basically rational and logical attitude as far as the formulation of policies for the Entente colonies was concerned, which might be summed up as “win the war first, squabble about the spoils later.” The nationalist committees naturally put their own goals, foremost the independence of their countries, above those of Germany or the Ottoman Empire. None of them wanted a German Egypt or India, and the majority of Egyptians, although desirous of getting rid of the British, opposed a reincorporation of their country into the Ottoman Empire as an ordinary province. The leader of the Young Egyptian committee bluntly expressed this view by saying that “we would rather have British than Turkish rule.”⁴⁴

There were also deep rifts between rival factions of Egyptian nationalists. In their attempts to support all factions and Ottoman aspirations at the same time the Germans merely wasted their energy. In the case of the Egyptians, Khedive Abbas Hilmi desired to be reinstated as viceroy, but had a rival for his claim in Ottoman Grand Vizier Sa’id Halim Pasha. There was also little love lost between Abbas Hilmi and Enver Pasha, who suspected the Khedive of being ready to refrain from hostile acts against
the British in exchange for access to his enormous wealth in Egypt, in which Enver was probably correct. Once told that the Ottoman army would conquer the country for Turkey and not for Abbas Hilmi the Khedive swiftly lost interest and even tried his hand at counter-propaganda in Egypt. Frightened by an attempt on his life, which he blamed on the CUP, he went first to Vienna and later to Switzerland. While Enver and Sa’id Halim were probably glad to be rid of the Khedive the Germans continued to regard him as vital to the outbreak of a popular rebellion. Thus, although the Egyptian nationalists were ready to act without the Khedive’s support, the Germans thought this to be impossible.

While most of the Egyptian nationalists were of a fairly conservative upper class background the Indian Independence Committee consisted of avowedly radical revolutionaries. They had been marginalized by the course of moderation then adopted by the Indian national congress. The radicals were also deeply divided over the policies to pursue in order to achieve Indian independence. The result was frequent back-stabbing, the Indian revolutionaries often acting as if the “opponents” were not the British but other members of the committee. Under these circumstances success for Ottoman propaganda in India was most unlikely. In fact the only success scored by the IIC (as alleged by Schabinger, and not corroborated by other sources) was the acquisition of information which played a role in the torpedoing and sinking by a German submarine of the armoured cruiser HMS Hampshire, on which Lord Kitchener travelled to Russia in 1916.⁴⁵

In their recruitment of propaganda agents the Germans exhibited the same almost pathological mistrust as when dealing with potential intelligence agents. This attitude became more problematic as the Germans were not exactly spoilt for choice. The number of individuals who could carry out such work in the Near East was small, and there were no professional agents. The majority of volunteers for propaganda work failed to overcome the distrust of the German authorities and the IOfE.

Caution was in some cases justified, in regard to both individuals and proposed operations, and as to what the IOfE could hope to achieve generally. Schabinger reported to the Foreign Office on 5 February 1916 his misgivings about the plan to incite the Afghan army to march on India, then under consideration by the German military and civilian leadership. Schabinger believed that most probably the invading Afghans would be opposed both by the British and by a large part of the Indian population; worse, the Japanese might be tempted to invade India, which they had coveted for a long time.⁴⁶ The result could only be a conflagration in India which would prolong, and not shorten, the war. Britain could not
be expected to make peace with her enemies in Europe in order to retain
an unstable colony it might lose for good within a short time. Schabinger
instead proposed to have the Afghans march on Russian Central Asia
and Iran, where they could join the Turkish army.⁴⁷

The IOfE’s propagandist successes, on the whole, were modest, if not
disappointing. In a report of summer 1916 Schabinger listed rising anxiety
of the French and the British about the loyalty of their Muslim troops and
the colonies as among the most important successes. Defectors were few
in number. In one case the British replaced Indian troops on the Western
Front with British troops, due to the presence of Shaykh Salih al-Sharif
al-Tunisi, who had called for Holy War from the German trenches with
the aid of a megaphone.⁴⁸ British and French recruitment in the colonies
seems to have become more and more difficult in the course of the war,
but this may rather be ascribed to news from the front which described
the atrocious living and fighting conditions, and less to pan-Islamic
propaganda from the IOfE.

Schabinger’s conclusion was surprising, although possibly accurate:
the real fruits of the propaganda could be reaped only after the end
of the war (which Schabinger still expected to be won by Germany
in 1916).⁴⁹ Oppenheim himself was a trifle less modest. Although he
admitted that his revolutionary propaganda did not yield the expected
results (revolts in India), he maintained that the propaganda had
occasionally been reason for great anxiety for the British and had served
to keep them from sending additional troops to the Western Front.
The cooperation with the IOfE, in the baron’s opinion, nevertheless
had done the Indian nationalists no end of good. “The revolutionary
propaganda was a failure. But I always said that the Indian nationalists
would advance in their quest for national independence, and that
truly happened.”⁵⁰ While World War I certainly was a watershed in
British–Indian relations and inaugurated the end of British rule in the
subcontinent the results of the work of the IIC and the IOfE could only
be called negligible.

Conclusion

World War I was a crucial event in the history of the modern world,
and also in the history of the modern Middle East. It saw the end of
an era: after an existence of more than 600 years (the longest-lived
Muslim empire ever) the Ottoman period in the Middle East ended in
the aftermath of Ottoman defeat. In five turbulent years after the end of
the war Turkey emerged as a national republican state, while Iran and
Afghanistan saw the rise of authoritarian, modernizing monarchies. A large part of the remainder of the Middle East was put under mandatory rule by Britain and France.

There are two possible narratives to describe World War I and its aftermath in the Middle East. The first is that of an empire fighting its last struggle for survival. The Ottoman government set out to defend and reinforce the “sick man on the Bosporus”; in order to do so, it secured an alliance with Germany and fought – ultimately unsuccessfully – on nine different fronts. Defeat at the end of the war put paid to the idea of Ottoman survival. Abandoning the Ottoman idea as finished, the Turkish nationalists under the command of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk then rallied their forces, defeated the invaders of Anatolia and founded a national state. The alternative narrative sees the policy of the Ottoman government in a different light. It goes along with the idea that the Committee of Union and Progress did indeed wish to save the empire from defeat and dismemberment, but had already given up hope of securing strong internal cohesion. The war was consequently fought on two fronts: an exterior one, which aimed at defending the empire against Entente invasion, and an interior one, in which population groups suspected of disloyalty were earmarked for expulsion, if not physical eradication. The most prominent group experiencing this policy during the war was the Armenians (Assyrians were also affected), yet documents have surfaced which give reason to believe that Greeks and Jews might have been destined for the same fate, had the end of the war not intervened. The Young Turks thus showed comparatively little interest in defending the empire as it was, but performed important actions allowing the Turkish nationalists to complete their work after the war.

Both “battles”, in spite of all differences, were fought in the name of Islam. Yet the striking difference – and this was never properly understood by the German allies of the Ottomans – was the nature and character of the Islam in question: Islam as a propaganda tool to exhort Ottoman and non-Ottoman Muslims to fight for the defence of the Ottoman Empire was a classical Islam, the age-honoured concept of Muslims being requested to defend *dar al-Islam* against the forces of *dar al-harb*. The Islam of the second narrative, one might argue, was a reformed Islam: an Islam that served the interest of the nation, could be put under state control and was mainly a social glue to hold together the body politic of an emerging nation.
Notes


4 For German economic penetration of the Middle East see, for example, Kurt Grunwald, “Penetration Pacifique – The Financial Vehicles of Germany’s ‘Drang nach Osten,’” in Germany and the Middle East, ed. Jehuda Wallach (Tel Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, Faculty of Humanities, Aranne School of History, Institute of German History 1975), pp. 85–103. For German railway projects in the region see, for example, Pinhas Walter Pick, “German Railway Constructions in the Middle East”, in Germany and the Middle East, ed. Jehuda Wallach (Tel Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, Faculty of Humanities, Aranne School of History, Institute of German History 1975), pp. 72–85.

5 Lewin, Evans, The German Road to the East: An Account of the “Drang nach Osten” and of Teutonic Aims in the Near and Middle East (London: Heinemann 1916).


7 Doumanis, Nicholas, Before the Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2013).


9 See for example Alexander, Martin S., Knowing Your Friends: Intelligence inside Alliances and Coalitions from 1914 to the Cold War (London: Routledge Chapman & Hall 1998); Angelow, Jürgen, Kalkül und Prestige: Der Zweibund am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges (Cologne/ Weimar/ Vienna: Böhlau 2000).

10 Craig, Deutsche Geschichte, pp. 205–226.

11 Lüdtke, Tilman, Jihad made in Germany: Ottoman and German Propaganda and Intelligence Operations in the First World War (Münster: LIT-Verlag 2005), p. 43.


13 Abd al-Qadir (Sidi el-Haddsch Abd el-Kader Uled Mahiddin), 1808–1883 was a Muslim scholar who after the French invasion of Algeria in 1830 became the leader of Algerian resistance. In 1847 he had to surrender to the French. After five years in captivity in France he was released, and eventually settled in Damascus. Generously compensated by a French pension of 100,000 Francs he played a positive role during the upheavals of 1860, protecting many Christians.

14 There is a vast literature describing European Views on Islam – and vice versa. See for example Hourani, Albert, Europe and the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press 1980), pp. 1–18; Rosenthal, Franz, The Classical Heritage in Islam


16 For the evolution of Oriental studies in Germany see for example Wokoeck, Ursula, \textit{German Orientalism: The Study of the Middle East and Islam from 1800 to 1945} (London: Routledge 2009).


22 There are, however, indicators that becoming “curators of the holy places (Quddam al-Haramayn)” in Mekka and Medina held even greater prestige than the title of caliph. See Özcan, \textit{Pan-Islamism}, p. 8.


For the supposed opposition of Islam and Nationalism see for example Al-
Bazzaz, 'Abd al-Rahman, “Islam and Arab Nationalism”, Welt des Islams New
und Islam bei Mustafa Kamil: Ein Beitrag zur Ideengeschichte der ägyptischen
Haim, Syliva G., “Islam and the Theory of Arab Nationalism”, Welt des Islams,


See also Baram, Amatzia, “Territorial Nationalism in the Middle East”, in Middle
Eastern Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Oct., 1990), pp. 425–448; Yalman, Ahmet Emin,
Turkey in the World War (New Haven: Yale University Press 1930); Schulze,
Reinhard, Islamischer Internationalismus im 20. Jahrhundert (Leiden: Leiden
University Press 1990); Ayoob, Mohammed, “The Revolutionar Thrust of Islamic
Lee, Dwight E., “The Origins of Pan-Islamism”, The American Historical Review,

Habermas, Rebekka, “Debates on Islam in Imperial Germany”, in Islam and the
European Empires, ed. David Motadel (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014),
pp. 231–253.

Wilhelm Treue, “Max Freiherr von Oppenheim: Der Archäologe und die Politik”,

Schowingen, Karl Emil Schabinger von, Weltgeschichtliche Mosaiksplitter, Erleb-
nisse und Erinnerungen eines kaiserlichen Dragomans (unpublished ts, Baden-

Treu, “Max Freiherr von Oppenheim”, p. 60. Funding remained one of the main
problems of the IOfE. Consul Karl Emil Schabinger von Schowingen, Oppenheim’s
successor as director of the institution (23 March 1915 to 22 February 1916), pointed
out that during his term of office the IOfE was given a monthly allowance of
only 5,000 RM; the institution needed considerably more. Schabinger’s successor
Prof. Mittwoch asked the Imperial German treasury for 100,000 RM at the
end of the financial year 1917–1918. Oppenheim himself invested large sums of
money, which the imperial organizations refused to refund in February 1918.
Schabinger described this situation aptly by stating “that the Odol- Toothpaste-
and Mouthwash Company invests more in its advertising than Imperial Germany
for its war propaganda”. See also Schabinger, Mosaiksplitter, p. 150 ff.

Lasswell, Harold D., Propaganda Technique in the World War (London: K. Paul,

Opa, Ab, Chapter xiv: Political. Report by Prof. von Glasenapp on the members
of the IOfE, 05.06.1935.

Schabinger, Mosaiksplitter, p. 126.

PAFO, File R1501, A17982, Berlin, 05.06.1915: Adler to Wesendonk.

Schabinger, Mosaiksplitter, p. 132.

Ibid., p. 133.

Ibid., pp. 150–155.

PAFO, File R21126, AZ A33044, Geneva, 02.12.1914: Geissler to Foreign Office; File
R21127, AZ A2903, Berlin, 22.01.1915: Oppenheim to Foreign Office.
Schabinger, *Mosaiksplitter*, p. 133. The sinking of the *Hampshire* has become the object of a flourishing industry of speculation and conspiracy theories. Although there is no definite proof most naval historians agree that the ship probably struck a mine; however, if it was not a stray mine (the sinking thus being simply an accident), but a minefield laid by the Germans they would have had to know in advance the projected course of the cruiser, which deliberately avoided popular shipping routes. The same holds true for the sinking of the ship with torpedoes.

Although this idea sounds far-fetched, the Japanese had enjoyed high military prestige in Germany since their victory over the Russians in 1905. They were regarded as the expanding power in eastern Asia, particularly after the conquest of the German protectorate Kiauchow in late 1914.


Ibid., p. 145.

Ibid., pp. 146–149.

Oppenheim, *Zur Nachrichtenstelle der deutschen Botschaft in Konstantinopel*, p. 3.