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16 Symbolic Power: Political Rhetoric in a State of Exception

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16.1 Introduction
The so-called “war on terror” is being waged not only with weapons and intelligence but (and perhaps to an even greater extent) with words. Political leaders who are successful at manipulating linguistic symbols are able to mobilize popular support for their cause and to legitimize their actions (Edelman 1967). Pursuing a war requires some sort of shared understanding of who is to be considered a friend and who is to be considered an enemy and how the war should be waged. Generally speaking, the “war on terror” is being fought on behalf of “us” – people living in the “free world” – and directed against “them” – an unspecified group of “terrorists”, presumably of a fundamentalist Islamic persuasion. Because states belonging to the “free world” in general are dedicated to the Rule of Law in one way or another, they are not completely free in their selection of means. Unlike “terrorists” who may do whatever they like to spread terror on a global scale, political leaders in the West can act and react only with caution, as if their hands were tied (as the popular comparison goes). Nonetheless, they are increasingly resorting to measures that their critics (such as Chomsky 2006) consider to be at odds with fundamental principles of the Rule of Law. Here lies the greatest challenge for political rhetoric in our times: how is it possible to justify measures that apparently contradict everything “we” stand for and believe in?

In their fight against terrorism, modern states seem to install a permanent state of exception. Special competencies are being created that allow the authorities involved to violate fundamental rights, such as habeas corpus and the freedom of speech, for an unspecified period of time. Agamben (2005, pp. 6 and 50-51) denies that the state of exception is a “state of law”; instead it is an “emptiness of law”, a space “without” or “devoid of law”, in which nothing but a fictitious relation with the previously existing legal order can be es-
tablished. Whereas, in the past, the state of exception was intended to restore normalcy, governments currently seem to be maintaining a state of exception on a permanent basis. Especially with the institutionalization of abortion and euthanasia and the declaration of a global war on terrorism, the “juridically empty” space of the state of exception threatens to “coincide with the normal order.” The state of exception has been permanently institutionalized; the exception becomes the rule.

In our chapter, we will examine the role that notions connected to the Rule of Law play in key speeches delivered by two political leaders who had to defend exceptional measures in reaction to terrorist actions and threats: the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair and the current Prime Minister of Spain, Jose Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. We have chosen to focus on these two political leaders, because they both represent countries with longtime experiences with terrorism – IRA and ETA – and, moreover, they employ in their speeches two opposing rhetorical strategies: while Blair argues that exceptional times call for exceptional measures, Zapatero denies that there is anything extraordinary about his anti-terrorism approach.¹ In the speeches selected,² the two leaders react on crucial political events during their leadership: the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York on 11 September 2001, the attack on a train station in Madrid on 11 March 2004, and the London bombings on 7 July 2005. Our central research questions are as follows: How are the anti-terror measures taken justified in the speeches at hand? Are they, legally speaking, created “from nowhere”, as Agamben (following Schmitt 1996a) would claim, or are they still related in some way to positive law? In section 16.2 and 16.3 we will analyze the rhetorical devices that Blair and Zapatero respectively use in order to justify exceptional measures that seem at odds with the Rule of Law. In this rhetorical analysis we explore two questions: How are “friends” differentiated from “enemies”? And, what role, if any, do notions related to the Rule of Law play in defending the measures at hand? In section 16.4 the two opposing rhetorical strategies will be compared and evaluated.

¹ This chapter is part of a series of articles on the rhetoric of exception. In subsequent articles we will analyze other political leaders, including former US President George W. Bush and current US President Barack Obama.
² A list of the speeches can be found in the appendix. We have also used a number of statements and interviews as an additional source of information (although we do not refer to them as such in the text). We have translated Zapatero’s statements into English.
16.2 Blair’s rhetoric of exception
For Blair, 9/11 was a turning point both in the history of humanity and in his personal history as a leader. In a religious vein, he acknowledges that this attack, “without parallel in the bloody history of terrorism,” made him see his true vocation: “September 11th was for me a revelation” (Speech 4). What was revealed to him, was his political mission as a world leader: “I feel a most urgent sense of mission about today’s world” (Speech 3). His mission is to “re-order this world around us” (Speech 1) or, more precisely, to restore the world’s order: “The global threat to our security was clear. So was our duty: to act to eliminate it” (Speech 4). The world’s security is at stake, “our” life as well as “our” way of life.

Blair, a true champion of inclusive speech, frequently invokes a “we”. In different contexts this sign may denote different entities. As the Prime Minister of the UK at the time representing the country he was obviously authorized to speak on behalf of the British people and he often did so. In speeches delivered after the London bombings, “we” refers in particular to the authorities involved in tracking down and prosecuting the offenders: “We will pursue those responsible, not just the perpetrators but the planners of this outrage, wherever they are, and we will not rest until they are identified, and as far is humanly possible, brought to justice” (Speech 5). In his speech to the US Congress, the word “we” functions as a sign of solidarity with the American people after 9/11: “And our job, my nation that watched you grow, that you fought alongside and now fights alongside you, that takes enormous pride in our alliance and great affection in our common bond, our job is to be there with you” (Speech 3; italics added). Here, “we” obviously refers to the alliance of British and American people who stand united in their fight against terrorism (as they once stood united against fascism).

In many cases, “we” is used to denote an even wider circle of people: nothing less than “the entire international community” (Speech 7C). People building this “we” are not restricted to a certain space (e.g., the Western part of the world); they are defined by the sharing of a particular set of convictions: “We is not the West. ‘We’ are as much Muslim as Christian or Jew or Hindu. ‘We’ are those who believe in religious tolerance, openness to others, to democracy, liberty and human rights administered by secular courts” (Speech 7A); “We” cherish freedom and democracy. Moreover, “we” are tolerant toward people who think differently: “We are open societies. We feel enriched by diversity. We welcome dynamism and are tolerant of difference” (Speech
7B). “We” are not aggressive at all: “We are peaceful people” (Speech 2). People like “us” can also be found in the Arab and Muslim world:

Across the Arab and Muslim world such a struggle for democracy and liberty continues. . . [We must] stand up for and not walk away from those engaged in a life or death battle for freedom . . . many Muslims, millions of them the world over, including Europe, who want what we all want: to be ourselves free and for others to be free also; who regard tolerance as a virtue and respect for faith of others as part of our own faith. (Speech 7A)

According to Blair: “these are the true voices of Muslims and Arab people” (Speech 7C). “They” are not our enemy but our friend in the fight for freedom and democracy.

However, as inclusion always implies exclusion (see Lindahl 2004), not everyone in the “the entire international community” is “our” friend. Just as there are friends outside the international community stricto sensu – “they” who are like “us”, “our” peers in the Arab and Muslim world – there are people who support the enemy inside this community by defending a “policy of benign inactivity” (Speech 7A): “It is a posture of weakness, defeatism and most of all, deeply insulting to every Muslim who believes in freedom of the majority. Instead of challenging the extremism, this attitude panders to it and therefore instead of choking it, feeds its growth” (Speech 7A). Fellow-citizens, who are critical of the current American and European approach to terrorism, are (perhaps willy-nilly) contributing to the country’s destruction: “[Anti-Americanism or Euro-scepticism] are the surest route to the destruction of our true national interest” (Speech 8). According to Blair, these “false friends” are siding with the enemy: “The problem we have is that a part of opinion in our own countries agrees with them” (Speech 7B). “They”, the “real” enemy, are the “terrorists”, also referred to as “religious fanatics” (e.g., in Speech 1) or “extremists” (Speech 3). “They” are a new kind of enemy without precedent in history: “In this century, a new and unconventional enemy has appeared: a global terrorism, based on a thoroughly warped misinterpretation of Islam, which is fanatical and deadly” (Speech 8). In apparent contrast to conventional terrorist groups in Europe such as the IRA or ETA, new Islamic terrorist groups not only aim at spreading insecurity but also in killing people for its own sake (see Mendes 2008, p. 17). This “new and unconventional” enemy is described as bloodthirsty, barbarous and boundless: “These
fanatics who will stop at absolutely nothing to cause death and destruction on a mass scale” (Speech 4). “They” hate “us” and everything “we” and “our” peers stand for: “They disagree with our way of life, our values and in particular our tolerance. They hate us but probably hate those Muslims who believe in tolerance, even more, as apostates betraying the true faith,” (Speech 7C). The terrorist’s aim is to spread discord and destruction: “Its purpose is now plain: to provoke civil war” (Speech 8). In short, the enemy endorses an “evil ideology” (Speech 6) and is prepared “to bring about Armageddon” (Speech 4). Therefore, the possibility of compromise or communication between “us” and “them” is excluded altogether: “There is no compromise possible with such people, no meeting of minds, no point of understanding with such terror” (Speech 1).

In Blair’s view, the differentiation between friends and enemies ultimately boils down less to a clash of civilisations than to a “clash about civilisation” (Speech 7A; italics added). It is a “clash between extremism and progress”, “a life and death battle for freedom”, “a battle about modernity” and “a battle of values and progress” (Speech 7A). Terrorism is perceived as an existential threat to the modern way of life and its liberal and hedonistic values. According to Blair: “all civilised people, Muslim or other, feel revulsion at it” (Speech 6). By implication, terrorists are banned from civilization, the “entire international community” and probably – as agents of “evil”\(^3\) – from humanity as well.\(^4\)

In order to justify the extraordinary measures to be taken against terrorism, Blair resorts to roughly two different types of discourse: on the one hand a discourse of exception in which he argues that an exceptional threat requires an exceptional response, and a discourse of normalcy in which he states that, although the threat is exceptional, the response remains safely within the ‘ordinary’ boundaries of custom, morality and the Rule of Law (and, if it does not, these boundaries must be stretched somewhat to make it fit). Drawing on the discourse of exception, Blair claims that “we” are facing a “new type of war”\(^5\) that “will rest on intelligence to a greater degree than ever before. It

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\(^3\) The theme of “evil” is even more present in speeches by US President Bush (see Mral 2004, pp. 20–22).

\(^4\) As Schmitt (1996a, p. 37) notices, an intensification of the friend-enemy distinction may lead to pleas for the “endgültig letzten Krieg der Menschheit” (that is, the “absolute last war of humanity”, Schmitt 1996b, p. 36).
will rest on intelligence to a greater degree than ever before. It demands a different attitude to our own interests. It forces us to act even when so many comforts seem unaffected, and the threat so far off, if not illusory” (Speech 4). The exceptional threat – apparently distant but nevertheless “real and existential” (ibid.) – requires “us” “to be prepared to think sooner and act quicker” if “we” want to defend “our” values. What is needed is “progressive pre-emption” (Speech 7C). “We” have no other choice than to fight: “We can no more opt out of this struggle than we can opt out of the climate changing around us,” (Speech 7A). “If we want to secure our way of life, there is no alternative but to fight for it” (Speech 7B). Blair compares terrorism to a virus: “The virus is terrorism whose intent to inflict destruction is unconstrained by human feeling and whose capacity to inflict it is enlarged by technology” (Speech 3). If “we” do not stop this virus, the result will be disorder: “Our new world rests on order. The danger is disorder. And in today’s world, it can now spread like contagion” (Speech 3). It is “our” duty to act: “The global threat to our security was clear. So was our duty: to act to eliminate it” (Speech 4). Everything “we” can do to avert the threat, “we” must do: “We should take what security measures we can” (Speech 6).

Despite his frequent invocations of a “we”, it is clear that, in crucial moments, Blair is primarily thinking of himself – in his capacity as Prime Minister of the UK and one of the world’s leaders – as the one who must act, while others may “err on the side of caution” (Speech 4). In defence of his decision to go to war in Iraq, Blair argues that it is the task of leadership to expose and fight the global threat of terrorism. He acknowledges that the invasion in Iraq stirs “bitter emotions” in his own country and may be “ill-fitting the pre-occupations of the man and woman on the street” (ibid.). This does not, however, prevent him from taking the measures he deems necessary, building on his own judgment. By taking the decision to participate in Iraq’s invasion, Blair puts an end to a potential endless deliberation in an authoritarian and authoritative manner:

Prime Ministers don’t have the luxury of maintaining both sides of the argument. They can see both sides. But, ultimately, leadership is about deciding . . . Do we

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1 In contrast to Bush (see Mral 2004, pp. 17–20), Blair rarely uses the expression “war” and never speaks of a “war on terror”, but prefers seemingly softer notions like a “battle” or a “fight” against terrorism.
want to take the risk? That is the judgment. And my judgment then and now is that the risk of this new global terrorism and its interaction with states or organisations or individuals proliferating WMD [Weapons of Mass Destruction], is one I simply am not prepared to run. (ibid.)

In addition to appealing to his leadership and personal judgment as a last resort (“ultimately”), Blair persistently tries to gain a broad support for his decisions by using the discourse of normalcy. In defending his anti-terror approach, he draws his main arguments from both shared ideals and shared interests, in order to create “a happy marriage of conviction and Realpolitik” (Speech 8). As a matter of fact, Blair states that “we” have a shared interest in the world’s orderliness in particular for economic reasons: “All of us have an interest in stability and a fear of chaos. That’s the impact of interdependence,” (Speech 7C). Here, British self-interest collides with the world’s general interest. Therefore, “we” have to fight terrorism collectively on a global scale and take away the causes of its growth, such as poverty and inequality. Moreover, as Blair would argue soon after 9/11 (Speech 1), it is “our” “moral duty” to fight for the values in which “we” believe, especially freedom and justice: “So I believe this is a fight for freedom. And I want to make it a fight for justice too. Justice not only to punish the guilty; but justice to bring those same values of democracy and freedom to people round the world”. In a communitarian vein, Blair argues that the “power of community” should be combined with justice in order to become a “moral power”. In his view, justice consists of “fairness and people of equal worth . . . but also reason and tolerance”. These values are not specifically Western as some opponents have claimed, but are endorsed by the whole of humanity: “Ours are not Western values, they are universal values of the human spirit. And anywhere . . . the choice is the same: freedom not tyranny; democracy, not dictatorship; the rule of law; not the secret police” (Speech 3). The best way to defend “our” security is to spread these universal values all over the world (Speech 4). “The only way to win is: (...) to defeat it by values and ideas set in opposition to those of the terrorists” (Speech 7A). In other words:

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6 Whether New Labour under Blair really reflected, or was influenced by, communitarian thought is debatable (see MacMillan 2007).
To win, we have to win the battle of values, as much as arms. We have to show these are not Western still less American or Anglo-Saxon values but values in the common ownership of humanity, universal values that should be the right of the global citizen. (Speech 7B)

The quotation above marks the transition from the moral to the legal sphere: universal values, such as freedom and justice, should be “the right of the global citizen” (italics added). By using a normative phrase (“should be”), Blair acknowledges explicitly that citizens worldwide are not, or not yet, legally entitled to these fundamental values. In other passages, however, he makes it appear as if these values are already law: “We are fighting for the inalienable right of humankind – black or white, Christian or not, left, right or a million different – to be free (...)” (Speech 3). Particularly in his defence of the invasion of Iraq, Blair displays an ambivalent stance towards the law. On the one hand, he claims that the invasion is in full accordance with the right of self-defence, as granted by international law:

The best defence of our security lies in the spread of our values. But we cannot advance these values except within a framework that recognizes their universality. If it is a global threat, it needs a global response, based on global rules. The essence of a community is common rights and responsibilities. If we are threatened, we have a right to act. And we do not accept in a community that others have a right to oppress and brutalise their people. We value the freedom and dignity of the human race and each individual in it. (...) Emphatically I am not saying that every situation leads to military action. But we surely have a duty and a right to prevent the threat materialising; and we surely have a responsibility to act when a nation’s people are subjected to a regime such as Saddam’s. (Speech 4)

Blair further argues that Iraq contravened UN resolution no. 1441. It was, therefore, the UK’s duty to intervene: “We had to force conformity with international obligations that for years had been breached with the world turning a blind eye” (ibid.). “Our primary purpose was to enforce UN resolutions over Iraq and WMD” (ibid.).

On the other hand, Blair pleads for amending the existing international law in order to provide for a legal justification of interventions like this. He claims that “the rule book of international politics has been torn up”:
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Interdependence – the fact of a crisis somewhere becoming a crisis everywhere – makes a mockery of traditional views of national interest. (...) [These challenges] can only be effectively tackled together. And they require a pre-emptive and not simply reactive response. (...) What is more such action will often require intervention, far beyond our own boundaries. (...) What this means is that we have to act, not react; we have to do so on the basis of prediction not certainty (...). And what all that means is: that this can’t be done easily unless it is done on an agreed basis of principle, of values that are shared and fair. (Speech 7C)

According to Blair, the basic problem of existing international law is that it does not sanction a pre-emptive response:

It may well be that under international law as presently constituted, a regime can systematically brutalise and oppress its people and there is nothing anyone can do, when dialogue, diplomacy and even sanctions fail, unless it comes within the definition of a humanitarian catastrophe (though the 300,000 remains in mass graves already found in Iraq might be thought by some to be something of a catastrophe). This may be the law, but should it be? (Speech 4; italics added.)

In his view, therefore, the United Nations has to be reformed: “It means reforming the UN so its Security Council represents 21st century reality; and giving the UN the capability to act effectively as well as debate” (ibid.). “The Security Council should be reformed. We need a new international regime on the non-proliferation of WMDS” (Speech 3).

When confronted with legal objections to his course of action, Blair responds by referring to the allegedly political bias of his critics: “The lawyers continue to divide over it – with their legal opinions bearing a remarkable similarity to their political view of the war” (Speech 4). The cause seems to justify the means: “It is a cause that has none of the debatable nature of the decisions to go for regime change; it is an entirely noble one – to help people in need of our help in pursuit of liberty; and a self-interested one, since in their salvation lies our own security” (Speech 7). Here we find again (as earlier in this section) an allusion to “a happy marriage of conviction and Realpolitik”: by liberating other people, “we” protect “our” own security.
16.3 Zapatero’s rhetoric of normalcy
In contrast to Blair, Zapatero was not in charge when the 9/11 terrorist attacks took place. At that time he was leader of the Partido Socialista Obrero Español (PSOE), the main party of the opposition, while José María Aznar was Prime Minister of the Spanish government. Zapatero took office after (and to some extent because of) the terrorist attacks in 2004. He benefited from his promise of ending Spain’s support for Bush’s “war on terror” and withdrawing Spanish troops from Iraq.

Like Blair, Zapatero often makes use of inclusive speech. He uses a collective “we” to refer to the government over which he presides: the people of Spain, the democratic western citizens, all the civilized people (in contrast to terrorist and terrorist supporters). When addressing the Spanish people, Zapatero portrays his government as one in which “no one feels excluded”:

[A government that] listens to and pays attention to [citizens]; that always explains the reason of every decision adopted. It will be a Government who respects citizens, listens to their voices and criticisms no matter how hard they are. (Speech 13)

This openness to dialogue exists only among “us”, the Spanish society, “a tolerant, non-clerical, educated and developed society as it should be ours” (ibid.). Whereas “we” are “civilized”, “they”, the terrorists, represent the negation of everything we stand for:

[T]errorism is, in my opinion, the negation of democracy, terrorism is the negation of progress, terrorism is the negation of freedom, terrorism is the negation of speech which has made human beings, society and civilization stronger. (Speech 14)

Terrorists are thus excluded from the “we”, as it is not possible to reach a consensus with “them”. “They” are not rational:

[T]here is no reason in terrorism; there is no sense in terrorism; there is no politics in terrorism. There is only terror, death, blackmail. There is only the will to control, to subjugate, to destroy the morality of men, to eliminate their convictions. (Speech 13)

The open dialogue for which Zapatero pleads is meant to take place only among “us”, the democratic people seeking unity. According to him, “the
unity of democrats is the fundamental element in the fight against terrorism” (ibid.). As a member of the opposition, he tried to achieve this when he proposed the “Pact of freedoms and against terrorism” on the following ground: “United, we can beat terrorism. And that union is one of the most efficient weapons for achieving that goal” (Speech 17).

From the very beginning, Zapatero has tried to face international terrorist issues with this strategy of dialogue. Zapatero’s “major” project was thus the “Alliance of Civilizations”: a “forum” inside the UN structure to promote a dialogue among different civilizations opposed to the “clash of civilizations” announced by some American intellectuals. This forum allowed drawing a new line between the “civilized” Arab world and Islamic terrorist groups (e.g., Al Qaeda) and governments who supported them. According to Zapatero, these terrorist groups represent “international” instead of “Islamic terrorism”. He considers it to be a “great mistake” towards people of the Muslim faith that the adjective “Islamic” is used to refer to a kind of terrorism (Speech 14). Terrorist groups “do neither deserve to be recognized as followers of either a religion (...), a nation or the people” (ibid.). They are nothing but a group of “fanatics who are prepared to kill in order to impose their madness through force, ready to disseminate the seed of evil” (Speech 15).

Despite his exclusionary rhetoric, Zapatero did occasionally open the dialogue with the armed Basque separatist movement ETA. From the very beginning of his presidency he was engaged in an ambivalent process of negotiation. While the Spanish judiciary power had banned several political parties, NGOs and other social organizations that had ties with the Basque Separatists, a group of international negotiators tried to reach a peaceful solution with Zapatero’s approval. After ETA broke the cease-fire period in December 2006, however, Zapatero declared that “there will be no dialogue” (Speech 20), thus definitively excluding ETA from the possibility of becoming a part of “us”.

After having won the elections in 2004, Zapatero offered a speech of rational dialogue in reaction against his predecessor Aznar, who had supported Bush’s military interventions. Zapatero argued for counter-terrorism policies with respect for the Rule of Law and human rights. This respect is unconditional because:

no democratic conviction will be put under question by terrorism actions, nor
democratic law will be changed because of terrorist actions, no democratic practice
will be altered because we are in combat against terrorism. (Speech 14)
In the international sphere this commitment to legality implies that Spain will assume the international obligations that correspond to it in the defence of peace and security. Spain will always have one simple requirement: a previous decision of the United Nations or from any other organisation with multinational character. (Speech 13)

Despite his retirement of Spanish troops from Iraq, Zapatero has kept Spanish troops in Afghanistan, and he has even increased the amount of military power.

In the domestic sphere, Basque terrorism is being fought through “the activity of State Security Forces and Justice and (...) by the loss of social support to violence” (Speech 20). An important consequence of this strategy is that since 2002 five Basque political parties – supposed to be linked with ETA – have been banned.7

One major feature of Zapatero’s anti-terrorism policy is his belief in its legal foundation. He points out that “the response can come only from the law; that is to say, the response can come only from democracy” (Speech 14). However, despite Zapatero’s repeated references to the Rule of Law in Spain, denouncements of human-rights violations in the fight against terrorism have been launched by Basque human rights NGOs as well as by such prestigious international NGOs as Amnesty International8 and Human Rights Watch,9 in addition to the United Nations Special Rapporteurs on Torture, Theo Van Boven and Manfred Nowak.10

7 These parties represent 15% of the electorate, with approximately 150,000 votes. If the assumption that those parties “are” part of ETA is correct, this organization has an important base of support among the Basque population.
At first glance, Zapatero’s claim to act in accordance with the Rule of Law seems to contradict the reports on human rights violations by the Spanish government. In addition to recognizing the state of exception as most constitutions do, however, the Spanish Constitution also regulates a permanent exception with regard to terrorism issues in Article 55 II. This article regulates limitations to fundamental rights (e.g., longer periods of arrest, incommunicado detentions, the possibility of intercepting a suspect’s correspondence or any other communication and entering in any building without a search warrant in the prosecution of individuals in relation to investigations of terrorist crimes). From the very beginning of its democracy, Spain made provisions that allowed for exceptional measures and these constitutional restrictions were regulated in special anti-terrorism acts. In the process of normalizing the exception in 1988, anti-terrorism acts were promulgated and their provisions were included in the “normal” legislation, the Criminal Code and Procedure Criminal Law. The rulings of judges applying legal norms which were originally exceptional measures are now regarded as “normal”.

Furthermore, the exception is institutionalized by the modification of the law and its interpretation. A paradigmatic example is the banning of political parties linked with terrorist organization ETA. The Spanish Constitution allows the banning of organizations – and political parties fall into this category – only when they are catalysts of criminal activities. So, the law which regulated political parties required a criminal sentence previous to the banning. Since 1998, there was an ongoing criminal investigation on the links between Batasuna – a Basque radical separatist political party – and ETA. However, the investigation advanced slowly. As a consequence of Zapatero’s *Pact of freedoms and against terrorism* (see above), a new Act for regulating political parties was accepted. The Act introduced several new grounds on which political parties could be banned. It contravened the Spanish constitution, because it made it possible to ban a political party on the sheer basis of a “suspicion” that the party at hand supports terrorist groups. The Act also introduced a new procedure for the banning of political parties with fewer legal safeguards. For instance, a previous criminal sentence was no longer required.

In 2002, after the promulgation of the Act, the judge responsible for the old ongoing criminal investigation finally decided to suspend all Batasuna activities. This clearly demonstrates the political dimension of law enforcement. About this process of banning Basque political parties, Zapatero
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says that “[t]he prosecutors present their accusations based on their opinion, their legal understanding and their professionalism” (Speech 18). Moreover, he claims that his government is only responsible to “appoint the State General Prosecutor and to indicate a criminal policy to follow. What are the basic objectives of that criminal policy? Evidently: to fight against terrorism” (ibid.). Although Zapatero tried to present counter-terrorism measures as objective law enforcement with a minimum of political influence, under his leadership legislation has been introduced that contravenes fundamental constitutional rights. Consequently, even when formal rule of law is maintained, the substance of law is modified or re-interpreted according to political needs.

Zapatero’s rhetoric based on the rule of law is reinforced with militant arguments based on democracy. As a result, it is not only the rule of law but in fact democracy itself what is at stake in the fight against terrorism: “[N]obody in a democracy can engage in the political life and the institutions representing acronyms [implying ETA] that imply a lack of respect to democratic values” (Speech 21). And people who do not respect that are banned “in defence of a democratically ordered system of values such as freedom and security” (ibid.).

Another example that shows the underlying political interests of Zapatero’s “legal” strategy is his response to the criticism he received due to the treatment of a former Basque terrorist leader De Juana Chaos. De Juana Chaos was found guilty of various terrorist crimes and condemned to prison. According to the Spanish Prison Law, in 2006 he had the right to finish the rest of his sentence under the regime of parole. However, a powerful NGO, named Asociación Víctimas del Terrorismo (Terrorism Victims Association), and the Partido Popular (PP) pressured the government to keep De Juana Chaos in prison on the ground that he had not publicly expressed repentance. Pushed by public opinion, Zapatero’s government solved the problem by presenting new accusations against him in the same month he was meant to leave prison on parole. The State prosecutor accused De Juana Chaos of committing apology of terrorism in two articles which he had written a month before in a Basque newspaper. Facing a possible new sentence of 96 years of prison, De Juana Chaos started a hunger strike in protest against these accusations. At that time, ETA was under the cease-fire and in negotiations with the Spanish Government. Within this political context the accusation of the Prosecutor changed from 96 to 3 years. De Juana Chaos
remained at the centre of the polemics between the government and the opposition party, since his hunger strike forced the government to let him recover in a hospital in the Basque Country against the policy of preventing Basque terrorist criminals from serving their sentences in Basque territory.

Zapatero was severely criticized because these measures were considered a surrender to terrorist demands. He defended himself by saying that this was just the “enforcement of the law”. However, being tired of the criticism he received by the PP he said that during the “former Government they reduced his sentence with one year for writing a book that glorifies terrorism” (Speech 18). During his government Zapatero nonetheless claims: “for writing one or two articles where he does the same he receives three years of prison” (ibid.).

As a result, Zapatero’s overall rhetorical strategy aims to portray the fight against terrorism as nothing else than “just” law enforcement. However, exceptional measures normalized in the Spanish Constitution including incommunicado detentions, the banning of Basque political parties and the treatment of De Juana Chaos’ hunger strike contradict Zapatero’s normalcy portrayal of the Spanish fight against terrorism.

16.4 Words don’t come easy

Both Spain and the UK have a long time experience with terror originating from inside of their own political systems. Under Zapatero, however, Spain took another route than the one taken by the British government under Blair. Zapatero departed from Aznar’s and Blair’s course of following the United States and their “coalition of the willing” in fighting international forms of terrorism. In response to the growing criticism of the US anti-terrorism policy, Zapatero altered his stance and adapted his rhetoric accordingly, and he became a “strong” defender of the Rule of Law. This obviously had to do with the mandate that he received in the 2004 election. Apparently of even greater importance is the change of perspective: Zapatero took the opportunity to combine the problems of national and international terrorism and focused on the first. In this respect, he did not need to declare the “state of exception” like Blair in order to execute special measures, simply because Spain has preserved the exception in terrorist issues since the time of Franco.

Whereas Blair used the rhetoric of exception sustained by moral and political arguments in order to justify his policy while mobilizing consent and support for it at the same time, Zapatero normalized the exception by paying respect to internationally acknowledged standards of the Rule of
Law. Both political leaders were masterful in managing the discourse of inclusive speech, albeit for different purposes: Blair tried to build a consensus for a state of exception allowing the introduction of a just cause reasoning into the international law. Zapatero used an existing consensus (about the Rule of Law) to broaden the consensus for his way of dealing with the problem of national terrorism in Spain.

In hindsight, these rhetorical strategies ultimately proved unpersuasive: the British people were growing increasingly dissatisfied with Blair’s agenda of supporting the United States in their fight against terrorism (as clearly demonstrated by his steady decline in popularity),¹¹ and there was a increasing lack of support in Spain (with the exception of the Basque country) for re-opening negotiations with ETA, after Zapatero’s earlier attempts failed.¹² These rhetorical failures were primarily due to the “logic” of symbolic power. If the inclusive speech that both leaders used in the wake of terrorist attacks is contradicted by an eroding consensus, the weakness of symbolic power becomes apparent. To be sure, inclusive speech is an essential element of political rhetoric in general. Its exploitation by Blair and Zapatero was therefore nothing exceptional. Instead, it was the exception – the exceptional threat of terrorism – that enabled both leaders to use the anti-terror consent of the people for their own purposes, to fight terrorism either on a global scale (Blair) or at home (Zapatero). Nonetheless, this process of consensus-building proved fragile. Critics soon reclaimed the stage and redefined the battlefield: in Blair’s case they demanded a return to a state of normalcy where the Rule of Law holds sway. In Zapatero’s case, however, they dismantled his attempt to normalize the exception. It seems that, whenever there is a critical auditorium, symbolic power based on inclusive speech is itself an exception. Although it may be persuasive for a while, it will never last.


¹² In February 2006 77% of the Spanish people supported negotiations with ETA. See: http://www.elpais.com/elpaismedia/ultimahora/media/200602/20/espana/20060220eopunac_1_Pes_OTR.mht. In March 2007, two months after the end of the cease fire by ETA and a month before the general elections only 48% of the Spanish people supported to open new negotiations with ETA. See: http://www.opina.es/web/pdfs/90070%20E.pdf.
Appendix: Speeches, interviews, statements

Tony Blair

José María Aznar

José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero
SYMBOLIC POWER: POLITICAL RHETORIC IN A STATE OF EXCEPTION

References


