The Presidential Election of 1964

Barry M. Goldwater’s estate stood in Paradise Valley, a wealthy suburb near Phoenix, Arizona. Naming the home Be-Nun-I-Kin, “the house atop the hill” in the Navajo language, Goldwater used to enjoy a panoramic view of Camelback Mountain and the bleak red desert from its terrace. The main room was a sunken library-living room that held a small collection of books on Arizona and Indian lore. This space also had the owner’s desk and ham radio facilities with which he could monitor aviation frequencies and get complete weather reports. A stone wall in the living room opened for a movie projector and a screen was lowered automatically from the ceiling. Outside, a US flag flew from a pole that electronically raised the flag at dawn and lowered it at sunset. “Senator Goldwater loves gadgets, and his home and grounds are filled with them,” a newspaper reporter remarked.¹

The 1964 election was a historic moment for modern US conservatism as right-wing groups animated grassroots conservatives who had been scattered and unorganized in American society. When the conservative movement went national during the postwar years, “grassroots” became a magic word for conservatives to confirm their movement’s authenticity. Conservative activists have asserted that they started at the political fringes immediately after the Second World War and rose from grassroots to national prominence.² From the late 1950s to the mid-1960s, the John Birch Society (JBS) played a central role as the largest grassroots anticommunist group in organizing local chapters across the nation, calling on its members to influence other neighborhood associations, and supporting conservative candidates like Goldwater in election cycles. Although the founder Robert H. W. Welch’s extreme conspiracy theories were frequently controversial, even among conservatives, the JBS provided many antiliberals with opportunities to take action for conservative causes. As such right-wing organizations contacted millions of men and women to endorse Goldwater in 1964, activists could depict modern American conservatism as a
people’s movement arising from the bottom up, which would lead to the “Reagan Revolution” in 1980.

But at the same time, the Goldwater movement was also historic as the first political campaign successful at deploying targeted advertising in presidential elections. The first conservative candidate on the Republican ticket, Goldwater employed modern information technologies including computerized direct mail. Goldwater compiled lists of contributors to his campaign beginning with his first senatorial race of 1952, then his campaign managers systematically constructed an IBM computer-stored database of conservative voters by 1964. Local activists and political consultants made efforts to raise funds and reach out to voters on Goldwater’s behalf, while also sending the information of conservative prospects to the campaign headquarters. The data of individual donors increasingly swelled during the campaign, attracting large numbers of small contributions with some even just one dollar. The Goldwater backers revealed that they were discontent with liberalism, and after Election Day, the campaign handed down lists of supporters to the conservative movement. The mailing lists were a legacy of the Goldwater campaign, which would arouse grassroots conservative Americans in ensuing decades.

The Goldwater campaign did more than build up the conservative movement, as its alternative media strategy created a new kind of grassroots activism by revolutionizing fundraising activities. Direct mail’s function of selectivity made it possible for conservatives to carve out political niches, exploring conservative prospects and enlarging the financial base for the conservative movement. Consequently, direct mail brought great numbers of small donations to the Goldwater campaign, then transformed a long-standing pattern of political contribution from “fat cat money” by the few of giant businesses and wealthy philanthropists toward small funds from ordinary people. In a sense, direct mail fundraising democratized campaign finance by altering political donation into a more usual behavior than ever among the grassroots. But this sort of “grassroots” activity in direct mail politics was quite different from the tradition of American associational democracy, in which people organized voluntary groups, interacted with each other in person, and shored up democracy from the local level. Political direct mail redefined grassroots mobilization as the gathering of small involvements, which was distinctive from the building of face-to-face relationships in the traditional sense.

Among diverse groups and activists involved with the Goldwater movement in the 1964 race, two forces relied on the different types of grassroots mobilization, struggling with each other within the conservative movement. On the
one hand, the JBS drummed up support for Goldwater by mobilizing ordinary people in conventional ways: the organization established many local chapters particularly in the Sunbelt, encouraged its members to join the Goldwater campaign, and promoted face-to-face political engagement such as door-to-door canvassing and running local events. On the other hand, right-wing media activists in New York successfully gathered moral and financial support from the grassroots. If the JBS was a major grassroots conservative organization in the mid-1960s, William F. Buckley Jr.’s *National Review* was the key magazine for conservative intellectuals, offering a platform for writers and philosophers to shape American conservatism, when the majority of mass media dominated by liberals criticized Goldwater throughout the presidential race. Buckley and other media-savvy consultants in New York City, such as Marvin Liebman, actively drew on marketing strategies from Madison Avenue, wringing small money from the large numbers of individual donors and providing avenues for those citizens to participate in conservative politics. While the JBS organized the grassroots on a traditional model of local associations, New York consultants employed direct mailings to mobilize conservatives through loose networks. The conflict between the two conservative factions has been interpreted as an internal strife for “respectable” conservatism. But at the same time, it was also a clash of two sorts of grassroots activism.³

Barry Goldwater Prior to the 1960s

Barry Goldwater’s political belief was inextricably connected with his circumstances. When Goldwater was born in 1909, Arizona was still a remote territory. The population was small and the environment was brutal. Local politicians and economic interests traditionally assumed that the economy of arid Arizona was dependent largely on four C’s: cotton, copper, cattle, and climate. Far away from the Northeast geographically and mentally, political culture in Arizona stressed individualism, free enterprise, and small government. Goldwater belonged to the business elite of Phoenix as a member of the owner family of local department stores in Arizona. Since his early career, Goldwater emphasized probusiness principles, antiliberalism, and individual liberty, perceiving a big government and labor unions as threats to American freedom. As Franklin D. Roosevelt promoted liberalism as a solution to the Great Depression during the 1930s, Goldwater regarded the growth of the federal government as menacing what he believed to be the principles of Arizona as well as the United States. However, in the middle of the twentieth century, Arizona was dramatically transformed from an agricultural area toward part of the modern Sunbelt. In
attempts to maximize the benefits of industrialization and the inflow of population, local elites made Arizona a new frontier for businesses. They implemented policies such as fewer taxes and antilabor restrictions to make Arizona attractive to businesses. In Arizona, where the majority of registered voters were Democrats, Goldwater joined the efforts in altering the Phoenix Chamber of Commerce, city hall, and the Arizona Republican Party into instruments for antiliberals before he won a seat in the US Senate in 1952.4

Stephen C. Shadegg was a political consultant who directed the Goldwater campaign in the 1950s. Moving from Southern California to Arizona in 1932, Shadegg had worked as a freelance writer for radio production, newspapers, and Hollywood screen plays. When he settled in the Phoenix business community, Shadegg became engaged in local politics as a campaign manager beginning in 1938. Shadegg led the campaign of Democratic Senator Carl Hayden in 1950, and Goldwater asked the consultant to manage his campaign in 1952. Shadegg was in charge of various tasks. He prepared the scripts for radio and television, wrote speeches, and produced campaign literature for Goldwater. Working together in political elections throughout the 1950s, Shadegg became known as Goldwater’s “alter ego.”

Shadegg actively attempted to sell Goldwater as an innovative statesman through political advertisements. “The man is not the product of any political machine,” a pamphlet emphasized. The message acclaimed Goldwater for his entrepreneurship, saying that in his family business, “New styles were introduced. New values were offered. New methods of advertising and merchandising were employed, and Barry Goldwater demonstrated his ability as a business man.” Shadegg’s campaign literature also advertised Goldwater’s political beliefs, such as individualism, faith, and freedom. By contrasting liberalism with his political philosophies, the campaign also attacked the New Deal. A newspaper advertising noted, “Fear has been the catch word of the new dealers. . . . This nation was founded on faith in Almighty God and in man’s destiny. . . . Fear is the tool of tyranny . . . faith is the weapon of freedom.” Still another campaign advertisement of Goldwater specifically targeted his opponent Ernest McFarland, incumbent Arizona senator, by focusing on the Korean War. “Ask yourself this question: ‘Do I want to handicap Eisenhower’s positive and decisive efforts toward Peace in Korea and toward Decency and Thrift in government by saddling him with a Trumanite senator (McFarland) who, modeled by years of blind political servitude to the Truman Machine, will oppose Ike’s every move?’”

In tandem with newspaper and radio advertising, political mail was a significant weapon used by Shadegg. As Robert Humphreys at the Republican National Committee stressed the importance of the stay-at-homes in the 1952 presidential
race, Shadegg was convinced that crucial voters were the “Indifferents,” those who did not vote whatsoever or voted only in response to an emotional appeal. For the purpose of reaching out to the inactive voters, the campaign obtained lists of registered voters in each precinct, sending out fifty thousand selected mailings to Democrats who were the majority in the state. The letters and postcards urged the recipients to cross the party line in favor of the new Republican candidate. However, many people still doubted the effects of political mailing. Shadegg remembered that a Republican leader in Arizona told him that it was a waste of time to send postcards in order to persuade Democrats to vote for Goldwater. The actual impact of the mailings was unclear, but Shadegg suggested that many voters went to the polls with his postcards, and the Goldwater campaign continued to employ mailing solicitation in subsequent elections.9

Few people expected that Goldwater would win his first senate election. In 1952, he was not merely a political neophyte but also challenged McFarland, a two-term experienced Democratic politician and Senate majority leader. Goldwater defeated the Democrat in part because he rode the wave of Dwight Eisenhower’s popularity. Whereas Eisenhower was highly regarded as a World War II hero by Americans, President Harry Truman’s unpopularity obviously affected Democratic candidates. Shadegg recalled that Goldwater won the 1952 race because of “Democratic softness towards Communism, the corruption in Government and the Truman failure to win the war in Korea.” But another reason for Goldwater’s slim victory was that Joseph McCarthy had campaigned against McFarland in the 1952 election. Since McCarthy had visited Arizona for health reasons in the 1940s, Goldwater had been his personal friend. Even when President Eisenhower charged McCarthyism, Goldwater continued to endorse his colleague and later wrote, “I couldn’t approve of some of the charges McCarthy was making, but there was a tremendous amount of evidence to support his allegations.”10 Although Goldwater was not ideologically a vehement anticommunist, the freshman senator was close to the Republican Party’s right wing, like Robert Taft.

Senator Goldwater gradually emerged as a critic of Eisenhower’s modern Republicanism. When the president offered his vision in which the business community and labor unions cooperated in favor of national economic prosperity, Goldwater criticized such moderate policies as a compromise with New Deal liberalism. He gained national visibility as chairman of the Senator Republican Campaign Committee, traveling extensively throughout the United States to deliver speeches. On the road and on the Senate floor, Goldwater charged Eisenhower’s support for the welfare state. Furthermore, whereas Republicans lost
seats in the 1954 midterm election, the Arizonan’s fame was elevated as an anti-labor conservative during his fights with trade unions. Serving on the Labor and Public Welfare Committee, Goldwater attacked what he called “compulsory” unionism of the Congress of Industrial Organizations-Political Action Committee (CIO-PAC), which had poured a great deal of money into Democrats in the 1954 election. Goldwater also trained his fire on labor leaders. With the conservative Democrat John McClellan on the Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field, also known as the Rackets Committee, Goldwater castigated Jimmy Hoffa who wielded powerful influence on the Teamsters unions. When Goldwater targeted Walter Reuther, president of the United Auto Workers, during the 1950s Kohler strikes, the face-off catapulted the Arizona senator into national fame among conservatives, while trade unions deemed Goldwater as a big enemy by the late 1950s.12

In the 1958 reelection campaign, Goldwater and Shadegg intensely marshaled political direct mail. The candidate and political consultant had prepared lists of Goldwater’s supporters since his 1952 senatorial contest by compiling the information on voters throughout Arizona. Goldwater wrote to Shadegg in 1954, “My mailing list, which I am keeping extremely active and up to date, now numbers over 30,000 names,” and the number of names on his list grew to 50,000 by 1956.13 In July 1958, a political consultant wrote to Goldwater, stressing that direct mail could reach his supporters more effectively than mass media. “It has been proven, that a direct mail program can be the most important single item of your campaign. Too much money is spent by too many hopeful candidates, shot-gunning their messages through a mass media; messages that should be aimed at a segment of the populace.”14 Shadegg organized and used the information on Arizonan voters. The Goldwater campaign sent out mailings to the constituency with the names of such groups as “Friends of Barry Goldwater,” “Physicians for Barry Goldwater,” “Democrats for Arizona,” “Lawyers for Goldwater Committee,” “Attorneys for Goldwater Committee,” and “Bi-Partisan Small Business Committee for Barry Goldwater.”15

While gathering voters’ information, Goldwater and Shadegg also began to use state-of-the-art technology for direct mailing. “You and I are living in an age of electronics,” declared a pamphlet of Goldwater’s campaign, depicting how the campaign staff employed computer technology in their efforts to reach out to voters during the 1958 senatorial election. An IBM machine scanned punch cards and reproduced each voter’s address on an envelope exactly as the name appeared on the voting records in the county. As the machine printed thousands of labels every hour, it was much more time effective than handwriting.16 In a time
when many political candidates did not yet employ mass media such as radio and television in their campaigns, Goldwater and his campaign staff did not have qualms about testing the cutting edge of campaign technologies.

Shadegg deployed direct mail for multiple purposes in 1958, claiming that the mail campaigns were “extremely satisfactory.” In the early stage, Shadegg used direct mail for public opinion polling. He sent mailings to seven or eight hundred people in Arizona and asked them to fill out a questionnaire regarding issues that they were concerned with. Shadegg’s direct mail also urged the receivers to send their friends questionnaires. “It’s most important,” the political consultant stressed in his letter, “to address our attention to those issues which are currently occupying public concern.”

As in the previous election, Shadegg planned to mail out approximately 150,000 postcards to voters. Moreover, he distributed a letter from Goldwater and two “I’m for Barry” stickers to every registered Republican in the state. The letter encouraged the readers to put a sticker on their cars and to ask their friends to use the other. According to Shadegg’s memoir, five days after the stickers were mailed, he witnessed many vehicles had the stickers; and ten days after the distribution, he observed cars with the stickers in parking lots and shopping centers in the greater Phoenix area.

Indeed, Goldwater’s direct mail articulated his political principles, such as the private enterprise system and personal freedom of the individual, remarking “I have opposed Bigness—Big Spending, Big Government, Big Business, Big Unions.” However, direct mail of the Goldwater campaign distributed different messages suited for each group of voters. Small business was one of the major bases for Goldwater. The Goldwater campaign sent out a letter with the signature of John Ong, president of Ong Insurance Agency in Phoenix. Enumerating several reasons why he supported Goldwater, Ong stressed how the senator had contributed to the mining industry, cotton farming, and military installations in Arizona. But Ong highly regarded Goldwater’s role particularly in strengthening government functions such as “the Small Business Administration, helping small business firms to create new jobs for Arizonans.” In another letter, the Goldwater campaign crafted an elaborate rhetoric concerning the relationship of the federal government with small business. The letter was delivered to an employee of a developer in Phoenix. It acclaimed the homes that he had built under the Federal Housing Administration and Veterans Administration programs, saying, “This has been an interesting and a commendable example of private enterprise prospering with government encouragement but without the unfavorable side effects and the burden upon taxpayers that results from government subsidies.” In other words, despite Goldwater’s idea against
big government, the direct mailing for the developer acknowledged the effects of “government encouragement” that benefited small businesses.22

Like he had attempted in 1952, the senator tried to reach anyone who could support his conservatism without regard to party affiliation. “Whether you are Democrat or Republican, I hope that we can be together in this effort to retain decency in our government.”33 In another appeal, a group called Democrats for Arizona stated that they supported the Republican senator with a message against labor unions and Ernest McFarland. “Ex-Senator McFarland has lived on the public payrolls of our State and Nation for almost thirty years. He has never been a vigorous or forthright leader. He accepted a $4,000 check from Jimmy Hoffa’s Teamsters Union in return for his promise to support the Teamsters efforts to destroy a section of the Arizona law, and then he conveniently forgot to report that check, claiming he didn’t know about it, and blaming his campaign manager.”24 In Arizona with the “Jeffersonian” democratic tradition, which emphasized entrepreneurial individualism and opposition to governmental regulations, antiunion messages were significant when Goldwater made efforts in reaching beyond his own party. Shadegg also distributed direct mailings that enclosed copies of Goldwater’s speech in Detroit, where he vehemently criticized labor unions. “You will remember it was this speech which produced the hysterical outcry from Mr. Reuther, ‘Barry should see a psychiatrist, he is not sane.’”25

While Goldwater attacked trade unions during his first term, unions and the mainstream media denounced the senator, labeling him as an irrational politician. A Republican in Pima County, Arizona, described a typical impression about Goldwater, especially his antiunion opinion. “You wonder what people back here think of Goldwater. The most any of us can ascertain from newspaper, radio, and TV is that he is a destroyer. . . . Now I’ve watched him on TV and this is the only impression I can get.”26 In counterattacking the barrage of condemnation, Shadegg launched a direct mail campaign for revising negative images of Goldwater. His political opponents claimed that Goldwater was anti-Semitic, saying that Goldwater did not employ any Jews in his department store business. A letter from the Goldwater campaign headquarters denied the rumor: “This is not true. Goldwaters [sic] application blanks do not ask for any information on religious affiliations or racial background.”27

Jewish Americans were a group that Goldwater’s direct mail aimed at in the 1958 race. The campaign dispatched mailings to the Jewish community to call for their support. The solicitation was designed to convince Jewish Americans that Goldwater should be reelected by highlighting what the senator had achieved for minorities at home and abroad. To be sure, as the letter admitted,
Goldwater “is a conservative while many Jews traditionally align themselves with professed ‘liberal’ candidates.” But it maintained that his record demonstrated that he had consistently voted for the “extension of human rights.” The letter listed what Goldwater had done: He had voted for admission of more refugees from Europe; he had spoken against the persecution of minorities in Russia; he had taken a stand against colonialism; he had visited Israel and expressed admiration for the development of the nation; he supported the civil rights legislation to pass the US Congress; among others.  

In these direct mail drives during the 1958 senatorial election, the Goldwater campaign properly used different languages for each group and individual in Arizona so that his messages effectively generated responses. Shadegg asserted the direct mail campaign contributed to the impression that “Goldwater supporters were in the majority” among Arizonan voters, and Goldwater successfully won the reelection in 1958.  

The Goldwater Movement

Conservative activists showed signs of interest when the Arizona senator emerged as a rising star of conservatism. Several editors of the *Los Angeles Times* turned their attention to Goldwater. In late 1959, managing editor Nick Williams invited the Arizona senator to write a regular column for the newspaper. After discussing the project with Shadegg, Goldwater accepted the offer, and Shadegg served as a ghostwriter. With his columns in the most influential newspaper in Southern California, many people noticed the name of Barry Goldwater. Clarence Manion, a conservative broadcaster famous for his radio talk show, *Manion Forum*, planned to publish a book to propagate Goldwater’s conservative principles. Ghostwritten by L. Brent Bozell, William F. Buckley’s brother-in-law, *The Conscience of a Conservative* became a best seller. With three and a half million hardback and paperback copies sold after its publication in April 1960, the book was reviewed not only by conservative magazines including *National Review* and *Human Events*, but also in such established newspapers as the *Chicago Tribune*, the *Washington Post*, and *Barron’s*. The book catapulted Goldwater into national fame among conservative Americans.  

Whereas publishers disseminated Goldwater’s political philosophies and mass media spotlighted the senator, conservative activists rallied support for the newly emerging politician. Conservative university students organized the National Youth for Goldwater for Vice President after the Republican Party nominated Richard Nixon as the presidential candidate in 1960.  

Manion and
Bozell, too, formed “Americans for Goldwater” to establish conservatism as an alternative ideology to liberalism. Although Goldwater withdrew from the race for the presidential nomination at the Republican National Convention on July 25, he arose as a new standard-bearer of modern American conservatism.32

The 1964 presidential election witnessed two conservative factions with different approaches to the grassroots. On one hand, as the first right-wing force, the John Birch Society (JBS) was a significant but controversial group for the grassroots efforts to draft Goldwater as well as the conservative movement in general. Robert Welch, a candy manufacturer in Massachusetts, founded the society to prevent what he perceived to be a communist subversion within the United States. Established in December 1958, the JBS increasingly developed into a national organization, taking firm roots especially in the Southwest. Many local chapters mushroomed in Southern California, and middle-class men and women in wealthy suburbs participated in the conservative crusade while several business magnates joined and financed it. On the other hand, when the JBS emerged as a national conservative organization, intellectuals and the national media lambasted the founder for his conspiracy theories. Welch assumed that communists had infiltrated the federal government and, in his book The Politician, he went so far as to claim that President Eisenhower was a communist agent. Therefore, many pundits and journalists called the Birchers “extremists” or the “ultra-right,” and framed the conservative movement itself in those terms throughout the 1964 election.33

Despite his conspiracy theories and radical ideas, Welch structured his institution on an American tradition as the “nation of joiners.” Believing that it was significant to connect individuals at the local level, Welch ardently encouraged Birchers to build small local chapters around the country. Conservative women and men organized individual chapters in their neighborhoods, gathering regularly in members’ houses. In each chapter, the Birchers watched short films, listened to lectures, and at times joined letter-writing campaigns. Through formal and informal networks of family, friends, and associates, the members shared information and recruited new participants. Welch also encouraged JBS members to infiltrate local school boards and town commissions to spread conservative ideas in their neighborhoods. “We are not,” Welch said, “so loosely and tenuously held together that we resemble a gaseous fog far more than a solid body.”34 The JBS was dependent on a grassroots model that the rank and file were tightly connected and mobilized by dense grassroots networks.

In addition, JBS members established bookstores as public places for conservative grassroots readers. In his 1958 Blue Book, Welch called for “reading
rooms” operated by local members of the Birch Society. Some volunteers opened JBS reading rooms, but other members founded their own independent “patriotic bookstores” to deepen grassroots conservatism in local areas. As historian Michelle Nickerson demonstrated, these bookstores spread across the Los Angeles area, and female members of the JBS played a crucial role in opening the settings. By trading right-wing books, magazines, and newsletters, the JBS earned more than funds. The organization also constructed a collective identity as modern conservatives when they read, discussed, and circulated conservative literature. On the aspects of structure, recruitment, and activism, the John Birch Society was premised on face-to-face grassroots relationship.

Meanwhile, as the second force within the conservative movement, several activists in New York were giving shape to a Draft Goldwater campaign. William Rusher, F. Clifton White, and John Ashbrook were political allies since they had joined the Young Republican National Federation during the 1950s, pushing the Republican apparatus to the right. They remained active in conservative politics well into the 1960s as Rusher was involved with Buckley’s *National Review* as its publisher, White worked as a political consultant in New York, and Ashbrook was a congressman from Ohio. In the early 1960s, they were seeking a candidate for the 1964 presidential election who could turn the GOP into a vehicle for conservatives. White would later recall that they had known of Goldwater back in 1953. There had been a meeting of the Young Republicans in Colorado in the spring of the year, and Rusher had attended it and told White in New York, “I’ve just seen a man from out of the West that I think is going to be great. . . . Barry Goldwater, the Senator from Arizona.” They organized the Draft Goldwater Committee on October 8, 1961, to encourage the senator to run for president even though he was not yet willing to be nominated. Appointing state chairmen and running political operations at the precinct level, White took the lead in organizing the citizen movement and mobilized grassroots conservatives across the nation.

However, a cacophony lurked in the relationship between Goldwater and grassroots conservatives from the scratch. Goldwater indeed endorsed conservative philosophies that resonated with conservative activists. But his mercurial personality did not always go along with the conservative movement. His close friends well understood Goldwater’s “versatility.” Having worked with him in the 1952 and 1958 senatorial campaigns, Shadegg observed a gap between the politician and conservative activists, saying that Goldwater “is not an inflexible reactionary conservative. . . . Goldwater won’t be pushed to the right, he won’t become an inflexible, die-hard uncompromising conservative, because this is not
his nature.” The crack grew into a rift between Goldwater and conservative activists, as well as among right-wing organizations, in the 1964 presidential race.

The 1964 Presidential Election

While White and other conservative activists in New York established the Draft Goldwater Committee, a coterie of Goldwater’s intimate allies organized another committee on his behalf. After the 1962 midterm election concluded, a group of Arizonan supporters founded a national Goldwater for President Committee with headquarters in Phoenix, setting out to raise funds, print campaign materials, and create charters in other states. In the summer and fall of 1963, White and many activists of the Draft Goldwater Committee independently drummed up support in the precincts without encouragement from Senator Goldwater. When Goldwater finally announced that he would run for president on January 3, 1964, the National Goldwater for President Committee absorbed White’s Draft Goldwater Committee, and Goldwater’s old friends seized control of the campaign.

When Goldwater took over the draft committee, the candidate designated his close friends to the key positions in the campaign. Instead of Clifton White, Goldwater gave the responsibility for campaign management to Denison Kitchel, appointing him as general director of the Goldwater for President Committee. Another key man in the campaign was Dean Burch, a Tucson attorney who had worked with the senator as his administrative aide. Goldwater also designated Richard Kleindienst as codirector of field operations, and Daniel Gainey and G. R. Herberger to the Finance Committee. Kitchel and Kleindienst were lawyers in Phoenix, while Gainey was a Minnesotan businessman who owned ranches in Arizona, and Herberger was a department store owner and a land developer in the state. Although Kitchel and Kleindienst had some political experience, working in the Arizona Republican State Committee, they were not prominent in national politics. Considered “political amateurs who worked like professionals” by the mass media, the “Arizona Mafia” took the place of conservative activists in the campaign after July.

William J. Baroody was a central figure in the inner circle of Goldwater’s campaign. Baroody, son of a Lebanese immigrant and economist, had reshaped the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), initially named American Enterprise Association, from a small nonprofit organization toward an influential think tank in Washington, DC. Inviting conservative scholars as full-time and part-time researchers, the AEI provided members of Congress and the public
with academic analysis of current public policy or legislation. Although Baroody identified himself as neither a conservative nor a liberal, he emphasized economic enterprise, property rights, and religious values. Sharing several political philosophies, Goldwater and Baroody were personally close. In August 1964 Baroody explained, “Senator Goldwater and I have been friendly for a long time. He goes to my daughters’ weddings and I go to his daughters’ weddings.”

Kitchel invited Baroody to the Goldwater campaign as he expected the organizing genius would be helpful. Particularly after Goldwater’s nomination in San Francisco, his old advisers gave way to a brain trust recruited by Baroody. Lee Edwards, a YAF activist and director of public information of the Goldwater campaign, mentioned Baroody’s role in 1964. According to Edwards, a small group “headed up by Baroody” crafted Goldwater’s acceptance speech, which sparked controversies over the conservative’s radicalism when Goldwater stated, “I would remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice. And let me remind you also that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue.” Edwards and other conservatives had not reviewed the draft before the candidate read it at the Republican National Convention. Baroody’s strong leadership or behind-the-scenes power play alienated many within the campaign, and the small circle, including Kitchel and Baroody, contributed to the yawning gap between the Goldwater campaign headquarters and grassroots conservatives.

The Goldwater campaign headquarters, Sunbelt grassroots conservatives like JBS members, and New York political consultants took different approaches in voter outreach. A handbook of the Goldwater campaign headquarters stressed newspaper, radio, and television as effective ways for political advertising. But at the same time, it noted that canvassing “was a most important method used in increasing membership.” Similarly, another campaign manual emphasized that successful fundraising would be accomplished “through personal contact by someone known to the person being contacted.” As a traditional and reliable way, the handbooks encouraged campaign workers and volunteers to build up face-to-face relations in their neighborhoods by walking from door to door and making direct contact with people.

Vital grassroots efforts have been accounted as a remarkable characteristic of the 1964 Goldwater campaign. Such a grassroots activism for Goldwater was noticeable in the Sunbelt, particularly Southern California. One of its examples was “Operation Q,” which Southern Californians carried out to nominate Goldwater as a presidential candidate in the state primary. In March, his supporters invited their friends for coffee at their homes, while other volunteers canvassed houses in Orange County suburbs, asking them to fill in nominating
petitions. Conservative women and men successfully gathered more than eighty-six thousand signatures, much over the necessary thirteen thousand names, in three days. Besides, in the week before the primary, Goldwater’s campaign managers and Clifton White organized a vast drive to get out the vote. With lists of voters in California and detailed maps of Republicans, volunteers contacted many supporters to confirm that they had already cast a vote. Popular culture also played a role in grassroots conservative activism. In the summer of 1964, Fred Schwartz, a prominent anticommunist in Southern California and founder of Christian Anti-Communism Crusade, recruited a folksinger, Janet Greene. Schwartz announced that he would ask the singer to write anticommunist songs so that her voice and guitar “blend to produce satirical folk-type tunes attacking Communism, beatnik demonstrators and the Castro regime in Cuba” at rallies around the nation.

However, the Birchers were the most active group in the Goldwater movement at the community level. Especially after the Republican National Convention in San Francisco in July, an increasing number of JBS members penetrated the campaign. Robert Welch did not directly refer to Goldwater, but he encouraged his followers to work hard for “the candidates of your choice.” In the October 1964 issue of Bulletin, the group’s newsletter, Welch urged the Birchers to take efforts in recruitment by organizing more presentation meetings in the weeks before the general election. The Birchers were profoundly involved with the Goldwater campaign as individuals. Whereas some of the members played roles in the leadership and membership of the California Republican Assembly, others participated in conservative groups such as Young Americans for Freedom. The Birchers took part in the Goldwater campaign not merely because they were dedicated to the conservative candidate; they also used the campaign as an opportunity for their own propaganda and recruitment. The impact of the 1964 election on the JBS was evident in the Sunbelt. In the latter part of the 1960s, the membership of the JBS continued to grow, and several JBS members became officers of Republican organizations such as the California Young Republican organization and the California Republican Assembly.

While grassroots conservatives actively worked for Goldwater across the Sunbelt, the candidate’s managers and activists were engaged in compiling a giant database of conservative supporters. Despite the psychological distance between the Arizona Mafia and New York activists, the two camps together constructed a database of conservative Americans via fundraising drives throughout the 1964 election. Harry Rosenzweig, an intimate friend of Goldwater for more than fifty years, served as Arizona finance chairman of the Goldwater campaign.
From 1963 to 1964, Rosenzweig directed fundraising initially for Goldwater’s 1964 Senate race, then for the presidential campaign, by sending mailings in and outside Arizona. The solicitation campaign also served as public opinion polling. In an appeal of October 17, 1963, the campaign staff stressed, “What we are trying to do, Seth, is to set up a file of persons interested enough in the Senator to be willing to support him financially. At the present time, of course, we are raising funds for his campaign as the Senator from Arizona, however, as Harry [Rosenzweig] says, it is easy to see which way the wind is blowing, and if the Senator and his advisors decide the wind is right, we soon may be contacting people on a national basis for financial assistance in a campaign of national scope.” In replying to this appeal, a person in Cleveland, Ohio, sent back a check for $25 and a list of names of people who were expected to be interested in supporting Goldwater. In this way, the mailing lists increasingly grew as the Goldwater campaign expanded the network nationwide.

As in the 1958 senatorial election, Goldwater and his aides used innovative machines for political purposes in 1964. The staff in Arizona mentioned, “Through IBM computer-stored data, we can make them available to Senator Goldwater and the Republican Party, if and when the Senator becomes a candidate, our network of people ready to go to work in every area for his election.” The Goldwater for President headquarters in Washington, DC, also boasted about the IBM data processing system. A campaigning handbook of the Goldwater campaign stressed the role of computers, noting, “When a filled-out petition is received at National Headquarters, we will assign a membership number to each new applicant and have all of the information punched into IBM cards. These cards will then be converted to magnetic tape for use on any IBM computer.” The novel electronic apparatus functioned effectively in raising money and finding prospective conservatives at the local level.

New York conservative activists joined the fundraising campaign on behalf of Goldwater. After the Arizonan circle took over the national Goldwater for President campaign by August, Clifton White shifted his efforts toward activities in New York State. New York conservatives attempted to cooperate with the national Goldwater movement while also distinguishing their grassroots mobilization from the national headquarters of the Goldwater campaign and the Republican National Committee. In their view, the Goldwater movement in New York was “not concerned with formal Republican Party campaign efforts; rather it is concerned with independent and/or ‘citizens’ efforts. . . . If a national ‘citizens’ Goldwater movement is established from Washington, we will work as closely as possible with this.”
New York was critical for the 1964 Goldwater campaign. Big donors in the region, including the New York metropolitan area and Pennsylvania, had usually given funds to the Republican Party since 1936. However, avoiding Goldwater’s conservatism and his radical right followers, many Republicans gave practically nothing to the candidate in the 1964 election. Under the circumstances that Goldwaterites were not able to resort to the conventional sources of political funds, New York conservatives struggled to open up a new channel for campaign finance.

Marvin Liebman, a Madison Avenue political consultant associated with Buckley’s *National Review* and YAF, was responsible for operating a grassroots fundraising campaign in the state of New York during the 1964 general election. Liebman was involved with “organizing and mailing a fund raising appeal” to New Yorkers and “stimulating and directing local grass-roots fund raising activities throughout the state utilizing our ‘stock’ sales technique,” while simultaneously running other types of local fundraising efforts including dinners, luncheons, and others. Liebman put together the names and addresses from various prime lists, such as the membership of YAF and the Conservative Party of New York State, contributors to several anticommunist and conservative groups, and subscribers to conservative magazines including *National Review, Human Events,* and *America’s Future.* He sent each of the possible supporters a direct mailing, which held a letter, a piece of Goldwater literature, a sheet giving a short biography of each delegate and a picture, and a slip of blue paper announcing local political events and rallies.

Many individuals replied to the solicitation letters from the national Goldwater campaign and New York activists. In their replies, several citizens pointed out the rise of grassroots conservative support whom they witnessed. Ernest Hillman, a retired businessman in Pittsburgh, was a contributor to the Goldwater campaign. Sending his check for $500 to the finance committee in Washington, DC, he mentioned the enthusiastic movement for Goldwater increasingly grew but the grassroots supporters were at times out of control. “I am very happy to do this because I have long been an admirer of Senator Goldwater. . . . However, I am firmly convinced that there is a tremendous and ever growing demand, from the grassroots and the uncontrolled voter, for Barry Goldwater for President. There is more interest right now in the next election for President by the individual voter than I have ever seen before.” William Morris of Tuscumbia, Alabama, also highlighted the support of “ordinary men” for Goldwater. Noting that he had a conversation with another person about governmental fiscal policies, Morris endorsed Goldwater’s attack on the federal government because
the conservative did “bring the notice of the common man that the continual depreciation of the buying power of the dollar is being a strictly governmental mismanagement.”\textsuperscript{62} Morris donated funds to Goldwater so frequently that the campaign staff said, “Your money is coming in faster than my Gal Friday can keep track of it!”\textsuperscript{63}

Other contributors made donations due to their concerns over the Cold War. A. L. Hall, a grower and shipper of fancy-leaved caladium bulbs in Lake Placid, Florida, sent his check for $500. “I am not a wealthy man, but I am a veteran of both world wars, having spent two years in the 26th Division, mostly in France in the 1st War and 2 1/2 years in the [South] & Central Pacific in the 2nd world war, and I feel that we are in more dangers right now of losing our liberty & our way of life than at any time during my life.”\textsuperscript{64} Leon R. Clausen, who lived in Racine, Wisconsin, was concerned with “internationalism” and “pro-communism” under Democrats and moderate Republicans since the 1930s:

I am enclosing a check to further help because I believe, for the first time in thirty years, we have an opportunity to vote for a candidate who is not running out of the same stable as the Democratic Internationalist stooges who have been scuttling the United States of America. The Internationalists, pro-Communists, and phony liberal conspirators who have been running the show for the last three decades may think they are smart in undermining this country, but actually they are dumb beyond description. They are like the individual who burns down his house with the family in it in order to clear the ground for a new structure which is more to his liking.”\textsuperscript{65}

While many conservative Americans financially supported Goldwater by sending checks, some grassroots conservatives accused the candidate of his radical words. Marvin Liebman Associates, Inc. sent out direct mailings over the signature of E. V. Rickenbacker on October 17. Rickenbacker, a former chairman of the board of Eastern Airlines, winner of the Congressional Medal of Honor, and World War I flying ace, solicited contributions from the members of the Fighter Aces Association. Under the name of “Fighting Aces for Goldwater,” the statement in the direct mail invoked Goldwater’s famous speech at the Republican Convention, “extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice,” and claimed that military pilots were “extremists” by likening military services to enthusiastic political activism. The statement called on former pilots to take action for Goldwater, saying, “The undersigned were called upon by the Nation to take ‘extreme’ action in time of war. In the service of our country we took the lives of the enemy—the most ‘extreme’ action one man can take against another.”\textsuperscript{66}
Several former pilots furiously reacted to this appeal. “I have been, and am, a Republican all my life, and what I consider to be a conservative,” wrote a man called Doug Campbell. Yet he also wrote that he would always cast a vote for Republicans except when voting for president because he felt that “when one votes for a President, one is trying to vote for an individual who has demonstrated that he has good judgement. In my opinion, Mr. Goldwater does not qualify under this heading.” Another former pilot articulated his anti-Goldwater attitude. John M. Smith of Washington, DC, pointed to what Goldwater said when a reporter asked him how to define political extremism: “When asked what his own definition was, Goldwater responded that to him extremism meant Fascism, Nazism, Communism or something similar. This was the same man who only minutes before had spoken in defense of extremism.” Smith went on, “If your solicitation of support for Senator Goldwater indicates a policy of the Fighter Aces Association, then I as a member strongly protest.” He protested particularly the use of the phase “Fighting Aces for Goldwater” because the name might mislead the public into thinking that the organization took an official position. These voices suggested that some conservatives considered Goldwater an inappropriate candidate for conservatism.

The distinctiveness between “extreme” and “respectable” conservatives was a sensitive issue throughout the 1964 race. The John Birch Society was incessantly controversial in the conservative movement because it was the icon of the radical right. To be sure, the JBS was the largest grassroots organization of conservatism in the 1960s. But the conspiracy theories of the founder Robert Welch were problematic and dangerous for many conservatives, who were afraid that the lunatic ideas could taint their movement as a whole. Taking it on themselves to save respectable conservatism from extremism, the National Review crowd attempted to exclude the JBS leader from the conservative movement. In 1962, William F. Buckley had openly criticized Welch for his “silliness and injustice of utterance.” YAF, the university student organization under the auspices of National Review, was also alarmed at the emergence of the Birch Society within the movement. Although there were JBS sympathizers in the organization, YAF members frequently suffered from internal conflicts with the JBS and other right-wing group during the 1964 campaign.

The conservatives’ concern was appropriate. Democrats vehemently attacked Goldwater by emphasizing his image as an extremist during the general election. For this purpose, they employed television as the main medium for political advertising. On March 19, 1964, Lyndon Johnson signed a contract with Doyle Dane Bernbach (DDB), a Madison Avenue agency that had been famous for its TV spots
for Volkswagen, “Think Small.” In consultation with Tony Schwartz, a sound engineer in Hell’s Kitchen, DDB created an ad for the Johnson campaign. Plucking the petals from a daisy, a little girl awkwardly counts, “one, two, three, four, five, seven, six, six, eight, nine.” Then, the girl’s innocent voice is changed into a baleful adult’s countdown. At zero, the camera zooms in on her eye, on which the explosion of an atomic bomb is reflected. The famous “daisy ad” appeared just once on September 7; nevertheless the spot deeply etched the fear of nuclear annihilation in the popular mind. The spot did not mention Goldwater’s name or words. Yet, along with other antinuclear ads, the daisy commercial reminded many viewers of Goldwater’s remark about dropping atomic weapons on Vietnam, reinforcing his image as an extreme politician unsuitable for the US presidency.

The advertising operatives of the Johnson campaign also capitalized on moderate Republicans’ sentiment against Goldwater so as to widen the fissure within the Republican Party. In a four-minute ad titled “Confessions of a Republican,” actor William Bogert playing a Republican explains why Goldwater scares him. Suggesting the emergence of the “weird groups” among Goldwater supporters, such as the JBS and the Ku Klux Klan, the character in this commercial confesses that he and other Republicans want to leave their party if the radical right takes over the Republican Party. Such ads aimed to split the GOP by pointing to the anti-Goldwater emotions of many Republicans. But at the same time, those spots were designed to avoid criticism of negative campaigns. In 1964, negative advertising was already controversial and deemed unfair. By making Republicans show their frustrations, the ads effectively obscured the association of Johnson and Democrats with the anti-Goldwater campaigns.

The Goldwater campaign, too, launched massive television drives in attempt to evade the Johnson campaign’s negative advertising. On September 18, Goldwater’s first paid televised speech aired, which was written by Charles Lichenstein who handled much of the Goldwater campaign’s advertising. The thirty-minute address, however, worsened the public image of the conservative candidate, rather than countered the anti-Goldwater advertising. Goldwater began the speech by repeating the Johnson campaign’s charges that he was “impulsive, imprudent, and trigger-happy.” The televised address ended up making an impression that the Republican candidate was on the defensive. Stephen Shadegg, who served as a regional director for western states in 1964, said, “No one was happy with the speech.” Lichenstein further produced other television programs, including the “Conversation at Gettysburg” that displayed the talk between Dwight Eisenhower and Goldwater. But the Goldwater campaign could not effectively overturn the label of extremism put forward by Democrats’ advertisements.
Goldwater supporters did not necessarily expect that the conservative candidate would win the 1964 presidential election. Before Goldwater was nominated by the Republican Party, Ralph W. Applegate in Chicago, Illinois, donated money four times to the campaign by the end of May. As the California primary in June was around the corner, the insurance businessman in Chicago said, “California seems to be the big test and if he can win this one, with the [Henry Cabot] Lodge and [Nelson] Rockefeller forces in coalition against him, he should make the grade.” But at the same time, he wrote that the result of the election did not matter: “If nominated, Barry may not win, but LBJ will know that he has been in a political campaign.” Even after the election ended up with the landslide victory of Johnson, Goldwater supporters were optimistic. “The loss of the election was due to the great number of people who were either uninformed or misinformed. The solution and cure to our problem is for each one of us to inform two people. That will win.”

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The 1964 presidential election resulted in Lyndon Johnson’s landslide victory. In the popular vote, President Johnson gained 61 percent while Goldwater obtained 39 percent with a margin of 15,951,220 votes; Johnson won 486 votes of the Electoral College and Goldwater only 52 votes. Goldwater’s conservatism resonated among enthusiastic grassroots supporters in the Sunbelt, but on Election Day, he won just six states, his home state and five others in the Deep South. Goldwater remarked that the 1964 contest was “a choice, not an echo.” The choice was clear-cut and simple for conservatives. Goldwater was the first conservative candidate, neither liberal nor moderate Republican. But conservatives were definitely the minority of voters, and most Americans still endorsed the successor of John F. Kennedy and liberal politics in the mid-1960s.

With the benefit of hindsight, however, the Goldwater campaign paved the way for the advancement of conservative politics in the years to come. First and foremost, conservatives constructed a collective identity throughout the election period. As anticommutist organizations contacted millions of people, those ordinary people realized the existence of an antiliberal voice in the United States. For quite a few conservative activists, the 1964 election was the starting point of their political activism as the Goldwater campaign introduced them to the conservative movement. Also, the nomination of Goldwater at the GOP national convention was an unprecedented achievement for modern conservatives. It was the attainment that 1950s right-wing Republicans, such as Robert Taft and Joseph McCarthy, had attempted to no avail, suggesting that conservatives could possibly take over a major party as their own vehicle in the future. Furthermore,
grassroots supporters demonstrated that it was possible for the Republican Party to make further inroads into the South, the Southwest, and the West. As Kevin Phillips would point out, the “emerging Republican majority,” which centered in the South, the West, and in the urban-suburban districts, appeared by the 1968 presidential election. The sea change had taken place in 1964.78

In the context of electoral politics, television was the dominant medium from the 1950s onward. Goldwater’s campaign failed to change his image as an extremist that liberal media constructed, but it did not mean that the campaign headquarters dismissed the central role of mass media in politics. In 1964, the Republican Party spent a larger amount of money in political broadcasting. When Democrats used approximately $11 million for broadcasts, including radio and television, Republicans spent $13 million, spending 63 percent of the total money for the presidential election. Nevertheless, unlike the Democratic Party, the GOP concluded the campaign without a deficit.79

Despite or because of this fact that television became the central device of communication in elections, direct mail emerged as an indispensable tool for campaign finance. As both parties poured more money into political advertising, particularly expensive television spots, raising funds became a matter of urgency for politicians. Political scientist Dan Nimmo argued that direct mail fundraising drives modified a long-term pattern in American politics. Campaign funds used to depend on large contributors of $500 or more. In 1960, the Nixon campaign solicited approximately forty thousand individual donations. Four years later, however, the Goldwater campaign received funds from 650,000 people, collecting $5.8 million from the contributors by sending fifteen million letters. Many of the individual contributions were small such as $1 or $5. In the 1964 election, 28 percent of the Republicans’ income came from donations of $500 or more, while such big contributions occupied 69 percent of the Democrats’ campaign finance. Television campaigns, including Ronald Reagan’s televised speech known as “A Time for Choosing,” also contributed to collecting the small donations. Congressional Quarterly, Inc. estimated that Republicans raised over $2 million by television campaigns, while their direct mail collected over $5 million, almost one-third of the Goldwater campaign’s war chest. A report of Congressional Quarterly, Inc. noted, “For the first time in national politics, direct mail and television appeals for funds proved fully successful.”80

Grassroots conservatives were definitely the central driving force behind the Goldwater movement. Coupled with mailing drives, the Goldwater campaign mobilized a great number of volunteer workers in a traditional way. Goldwater’s campaign handbook stressed newspaper, radio, and television as devices
for advertising, but noted canvassing was “a most important method used in increasing membership.”

Mobilized by grassroots organizations like the JBS, four million women and men distributed publications and walked from door to door, contacting twelve million households. The army of volunteers demonstrated their enthusiastic devotion to Goldwater, but also sparked controversy among conservatives. In the wake of the election, the Register, a conservative newspaper in Orange County, California, carried a resident’s voice. The man claimed, “Personally, I feel the defeat was necessary and vital for the conservative cause. Too many Goldwater supporters became headstrong after their victory in San Francisco and as a result developed a lack of understanding, sympathy and compassions. . . . The election was lost not so much by Goldwater and the conservative philosophy. It was lost by his zealous grass roots supporters.”

In addition to the fervent door-to-door canvassing and other conventional field operations, however, direct mail shaped a new sort of grassroots mobilization. Whereas the JBS-type crusaders eagerly supported Goldwater, direct mail consultants constructed loosely connected networks of conservatives, amassing a large number of small funds instead of building face-to-face involvements. As a major political consequence of the Goldwater campaign, National Review publisher William Rusher remarked, “It sensitized large numbers of previously dormant conservatives, turned them into political activists, and introduced them to each other through direct-mail techniques.” Direct mail not only provided an alternative way for reaching out to voters. But the medium also transformed political engagement, opening up a new way for ordinary people to participate in politics by making small contributions as well as giving voice directly to the campaign. Distinguished from broadcasting that was designed to send messages to the masses, direct mail was a medium to promote the interactions between political leaders and the grassroots. Goldwater’s list of 221,000 contributors turned into a legacy for the Republican Party and the conservative movement by broadening the GOP’s financial base and exploring a new source of funds for conservative organizations.

With direct mail, conservative political consultants successfully explored a new terrain of the electorate by circulating personalized messages and emotional appeals. Goldwater’s campaign managers sought to gain votes by targeting politically indifferent voters, dissents among Democrats, ethnic groups like Jewish Americans who voted largely for Democratic politicians, and so on. Unlike mass media disseminating the same information to the masses, direct mail sent out personalized messages to each group on the basis of their political preferences. In those direct mailings, Goldwater was represented as a fighter against big unions.
for Arizonan Democrats, a champion of human rights for White ethnicities, and in the eyes of Arizonan small businesses, an adept politician who brought federal funds to the local economy. In order to draw enthusiasm from individuals who had never participated in conservative politics, political consultants also conveyed emotional messages in uncensored direct mailings. Following the strategy of 1950s political advertisers, conservative media activists deployed aggressive, “good and evil” rhetoric. Even though these passionate messages caused antipathy from liberals and even some conservatives, the strategy of stoking furious sentiments emanated from political marketers’ rational use of emotion. In the Goldwater campaign, the new grassroots activism went hand in hand with personalization and emotion.

Because the strategies of direct mail and broadcast advertising were aimed at inflaming emotions to promote voters’ political actions, the Goldwater campaign in 1964 spurred political partisanship in American politics. A mailing from a conservative group declared, “We believe that our voting population deserves an honest choice of candidates—not a liberal vs a liberal, but a CONSERVATIVE vs a liberal.” Harold Oram, who had engaged in direct mail fundraising for liberal organizations and worked with Marvin Liebman during the 1950s, realized that things had changed. As conservatism gathered steam in the 1964 presidential election, he lamented, “We are living in a period of political upheaval and partisan agitation.” Partisanship in direct mail politics highlighted the distinction between liberals and conservatives. But it also accelerated the conflicts within the conservative movement after the 1964 election.