The Roosevelt Foreign Policy Establishment and the "Good Neighbor"

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Published by University Press of Kansas

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The Roosevelt Foreign Policy Establishment and the "Good Neighbor": The United States and Argentina, 1941-1945.

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NOTES

PREFACE

2. Ibid.

CHAPTER 1

1. Among the most widely read and reliable accounts of United States policy toward Latin America are J. Lloyd Mecham, A Survey of United States-Latin American Relations (Boston, 1965); Samuel F. Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States (New York, 1943); Edward Lieuwen, U.S. Policy in Latin America (New York, 1965); and Dexter Perkins, A History of the Monroe Doctrine, 3d ed. (Boston, 1963).
2. For a provocative interpretation of the New Manifest Destiny see Ernest R. May, American Imperi-


10. Ibid., pp. 96-97.


25. Ibid., pp. 4–11.


31. For a view of the Socialist movement in particular and twentieth-century Argentine history in general see Juan José Real, *30 años de historia argentina* (Buenos Aires, 1962). Real was himself a prominent Socialist.


33. Ysabel F. Rennie, *The Argentine
34. Romero, History of Argentine Political Thought, p. 235.
38. Romero, History of Argentine Political Thought, pp. 239-40; and Hernández Arregui, La formación, pp. 392, 352.
41. Potash, Army & Politics, pp. 117, 119; and Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942 (Washington, D.C., 1961), 5:12-26 (hereafter, volumes in this series will be referred to as F.R.U.S.)
42. Romero, History of Argentine Political Thought, p. 238; and Potash, Army & Politics, pp. 3, 17.
43. Real, 30 años, pp. 56-57.
45. Bemis, Latin American Policy, pp. 290-93.
46. Whitaker, United States and Argentina, p. 106; and Smith, Yankee Diplomacy, pp. 28-31.
47. Smith, Yankee Diplomacy, p. 32.
51. Rennie, Argentine Republic, pp. 266-68.
52. Ruiz-Guiñazú, La política, pp. 39-48; and Real, 30 años, pp. 56-57.
53. Peterson, Argentina and the United States, pp. 399-402.
54. Smith, Yankee Diplomacy, pp. 47-49.
56. Whitaker, United States and Argentina, pp. 109-11.
CHAPTER 2

1. Circular Telegram to All Diplomatic Missions in the Other American Republics, 9 December 1941, 710, consultation 3/16A, RG 59, Department of State, National Archives (hereafter referred to as DOS); and P.R.U.S., 1941, 6:118-19.


4. Dean Acheson describes the bureaucratic situation in the State Department in 1941 quite succinctly: "The heads of all these divisions [American Republics, European, etc.] like barons in a feudal system weakened at the top by mutual suspicion and jealousy between king [Hull] and prince [Welles], were constantly at odds, if not at war." Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 15.


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19. Conversation between Hull and Maxim Litvinov, 2 January 1942, 710. consultation (3)/453, and Circular Telegram to All Diplomatic Missions in the Other American Republics, 9 December 1941, 710. consultation 3/16A, RG 59, DOS.


21. Even the FBI, which always tended to see the worst in Argentina, admitted that this was the case. J. Edgar Hoover to Harry Hopkins, June 1943, box 140, Papers of Harry Hopkins, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.


38. Armour to Hull, 12 December 1941, 835.00/1099, RG 59, DOS.
39. “Export-Import Bank Loans to Latin America,” *Foreign Policy Reports*, vol. 17, no. 7 (June 1941), pp. 84–89.
42. Assistance Rendered to Argentina by the United States, 20 December 1941, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 4, RG 59, Lot Files on Latin America, DOS.
44. Conversation between Berle, Dr. Cesar Varros Hurtado, and Dr. Aranjo, 13 January 1942, box 213, Berle Papers.
46. Frost (U.S. ambassador to Paraguay) to Welles, 26 December 1941, 710. consultation (3)/116, and Welles to Frost, 29 December 1941, 710. consultation 3/124, RG 59, DOS.
49. Stimson Diaries, 10 November 1942, 41:30; 4 May 1943, 42:12; and 29 March 1945, 50:209–10.
52. Department of the Army, “Relations of the Caribbean Defense Command with Argentina” (unpublished compilation), Military Records Division of National Archives.
53. Armour to Hull 9 January 1942, 710. consultations (3)/275 and (3)/278, and Welles to Hull, 24 January 1942, 710. consultation (3)/479, RG 59, DOS.
56. Sumner Welles, “Address by the Under Secretary of State,” *Department of State Bulletin*, vol. 6,
57. Welles to Hull, 22 January 1942, 710. consultation 3/436, and Armour to Hull, 9 January 1942, 710. consultation (3)/275, RG 59, DOS.


60. Conversation re Aid to Chile, 21 January 1942, box 213, Berle Papers.

61. Welles, Time for Decision, p. 231.


63. Argentina's position was aptly summed up by Foreign Minister Enrique Guzmán in a pre-conference interview with La Nación of Buenos Aires: “All international agreements must give primary consideration to the national interest in all its forms,” he declared. Inter-American solidarity was an expression of “defensive cooperation and does not imply alliances, least of all military alliances. . . . The Rio meeting is a consultative assembly only.” La Nación, 7 January 1942.


65. Ibid.


69. Welles to Hull, 22 January 1942, 710. consultation 3/436, RG 59, DOS.


71. Welles to Hull, 22 January 1942, 710. consultation 3/436, RG 59, DOS.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid.


76. Berle Diaries, 12 January 1942, box 213.


79. Welles to Hull and Roosevelt, 18 January 1942, box 7, South America Folder, President's Secretary's File, Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

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1. Berle Diaries, 1 and 2 February 1942, box 213.


6. See, for example, Nation, 24 January 1942 and 27 December 1941.


11. F.R.U.S., 1942, 5:38. On several occasions FDR gave the Latin Americanists reason to believe that he shared the internationalists’ sense of urgency in regard to persuading Argentina to adopt a pro-Allied posture. On April 18 he declared to the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union: “My own thought is that perhaps there is one word that we could use for this war, the word ‘survival’. . . . That is what it comes pretty close to being: the survival of our civilization, the survival of democracy, the survival of a hemisphere.” “Informal Remarks of the President to Members of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union,” Department of State Bulletin, vol. 6, no. 147 (18 April 1942), pp. 355–56.

12. Welles’s Speech to Cuban Chamber of Commerce, 15 February 1942, 710. consultation (3)/644, RG 59, DOS. See also his remarks in Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 5 March 1942.

13. F.R.U.S., 1942, 5:354–56; and Armour to Welles, 835.00/1145, RG 59, DOS.

14. Raul Damonte Taborda, a prominent pro-Allied, anti-Castillo member of the Chamber of Deputies had approached several United States firms with branches in Buenos Aires for funds with which to overthrow the administration and had even discussed the proposed rebellion with Armour. Both Armour and Welles agreed that Castillo would like nothing better than to link Washington with a domestic revolution, and thus they acted to persuade Taborda to cease and desist at once. Armour to Welles, 23 February 1942, and Welles to Armour, 24
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February 1942, 835.00/1145, RG 59, DOS.
19. Rockefeller to Welles, 17 April 1942, box 500, RG 229, OICAA; and Duggan to Hull, 18 December 1943, box 218, Secretary of State Hull Folder, Papers of Edward Stettinius, University of Virginia.
20. Conversation Between Duggan and Robert Wells (chairman of Coordination Committee for Argentina), 4 August 1942, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 4, RG 59, DOS.
21. Welles to Bonsal, 6 February 1943, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 3, RG 59, DOS.
22. Armour to Hull, 6 February 1943, 835.00/1358, RG 59, DOS.
28. Ibid.
29. Damonte Taborda to Welles, 6 February 1942, box 96, Welles Folder, President’s Secretary’s File, Roosevelt Papers.
31. Armour to Hull, 18 February 1943, 835.00/1363, RG 59, DOS.
34. Ibid.
43. Armour to Hull, 6 December 1940, 685.414, RG 59, DOS.
44. British Aide-Memoir, container 59–60, folder 216, Hull Papers.
46. Welles to FDR, 30 April 1943, box 96, Welles Folder, President’s Secretary’s File, Roosevelt Papers.
47. Berle Diaries, 24 January 1942, box 213.
48. For example see the Times (London), 10 June 1942.
49. Harrison to Bonsal, Duggan, and Welles, 10 June 1943, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 3, RG 59, DOS.
51. Report from Davies, 24 October 1942, O.S.S. 27124C; and Report on Political Situation in Argentina, 5 December 1941, O.S.S. 6589C, RG 226, General Records of the Office of Strategic Services (hereafter referred to as OSS), National Archives.
53. Welles to FDR, 6 February 1942, box 96, Welles Folder, President’s Secretary’s File, Roosevelt Papers.
54. Conversation between Blake-Tyler and Welles, 13 January 1943, Memoranda-Argentina, RG 59, DOS.

CHAPTER 4

1. Morgenthau was, of course, an ardent Germanophobe and an active Zionist. See, for example, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Germany Is Our Problem: A Plan for Germany (New York, 1945), and his message to the National Conference for Palestine, quoted in New York Times, 19 January 1942.
2. Morgenthau unofficially appointed White as assistant secretary for “foreign relations” on 15 December 1941. Order no. 43, 15 December 1941, box 122, RG 56, General Records of the Department of Treasury (hereafter referred to as DOT), National Archives.
7. There was a Treasury Department representative on virtually every governmental entity concerned with Argentina.
9. Jerry Greene to David Hulburd, 16 April 1942, box 5, notebook 13, Diaries of Henry A. Wallace, University of Iowa.
13. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
18. Ibid., pp. 78–79.
22. Ibid., p. 24.
23. Ibid., p. 77.
26. Blum, *Price of Vision*, pp. 67, 68, 77, 91, 99–100. See also Frank Coe to Milo Perkins, 1 June 1942, box 40, RG 169, General Records of the Foreign Economic Administration (hereafter referred to as FEA), Washington Federal Records Center. The spring of 1942 was a particularly tumultuous period for the Roosevelt foreign-policy establishment. While BEW, Treasury, and State fought “tooth and nail,” and the feud between Welles and Hull continued to simmer, Felix Frankfurter and a “pro-British” coterie in Washington were plotting to have Hull removed as secretary of state and to supplant him with Dean Acheson. Berle Diaries, 10 March and 25 April 1942, box 213.
28. The board had no doubt as to its supremacy in the area of export-import policy toward Argentina. In December 1942 Perkins informed Dean Acheson that “it is understood that the final export licensing authority is vested in and must remain with BEW... Further, it is essential to the most efficient conduct of our foreign relations that the Mission in Buenos Aires not be exposed to the criticism which might attend the exercise by it of final authority regarding export control.” Perkins to Acheson, 17 December 1942, box 40, RG 169, FEA. See also *F.R.U.S.*, 1942, 5:506.
29. Armour, in conformity with the undersecretary’s determination to avoid the appearance of blatant coercion, attempted to deal with Axis financial activities in Argentina by working through the Central Bank, many of whose officials were pro-American. In November the ambassador notified the State Department that both the Treasury Department’s demand that various financial institutions suspected of transacting business with Axis firms be frozen and its over-
all operation in Argentina were jeopardizing his liaison with the Central Bank. *F.R.U.S., 1942*, 5:506-8.


32. In late February, Treasury Department representatives testified before the Senate Internal Subcommittee that officials in charge of Foreign Funds Control and the Proclaimed List had to assume more direct control over the Allied economic-warfare activities in Latin America if they were to be effective. "A preliminary sounding out to the State Department," they complained, "indicates an unsympathetic attitude . . . apparently based on the fear that Treasury and the Board of Economic Warfare would be moving in on a field that the State Department wishes to keep exclusively under its own jurisdiction, even though it were to mean a much less efficient administration." White to Morgenthau, 24 February 1942, book 500, p. 265, Morgenthau Diaries.


34. Meeting of Sub-Committee of the Board of Economic Warfare, 14 May 1942, book 528, p. 217, Morgenthau Diaries.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.


40. Ibid., p. 471 n.58.


45. Acheson to Armour, 25 May 1942, box 40, RG 169, FEA.

46. White to Hull, 10 November 1942, book 578, p. 139, Morgenthau Diaries.

47. Paul to Morgenthau, 6 November 1942, book 582, p. 72, Morgenthau Diaries.

48. Ibid.

49. Philip Wright to Bonsal, 14 November 1942, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 3, RG 59, DOS.


52. Clarence H. Haring, *Argentina
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58. Ibid., 5:205–8.
59. Ibid.
60. Biddle to Hull, 17 August 1942, container 50, folder 150, Hull Papers.
61. Reed to Hull, 29 September 1942, 835.00/1280, RG 59, DOS.

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2. Ibid.
4. Spaeth to Hull, 27 December 1941, 710. consultation (3)/142, RG 59, DOS.
5. Wallace Diaries, 19 August 1943, box 8, notebook 23.
8. Ibid., pp. 228–30.
10. Ibid., pp. 236–37, 240.
12. Welles to Bonsal, 6 February 1943, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 3, RG 59, DOS; and Armour to Hull, 6 February 1943, 835.00/1358, RG 59, DOS.
19. Ibid.
23. Ibid., pp. 178-79.
28. For a sympathetic treatment of the formation and objectives of the GOU see Carlos Ibarguren, La historia que he vivido (Buenos Aires, 1955), pp. 497-98.
29. Felix Luna, El 45 (Buenos Aires, 1969), pp. 31-32. Marvin Goldwurt argues that the Radical party, "the major vehicle of the middle-class struggle against the oligarchy," played a key role in the rise of the integral nationalists in 1943. An all-consuming desire for power caused them to reject a popular front with the Socialists and Progressive Democrats and to offer the Radical presidential nomination to Ramfrez. Marvin Goldwurt, Democracy, Militarism, and Nationalism in Argentina, 1930-1966 (Austin, Tex., and London, 1972), pp. 77-78.
30. Juan José Real, 30 años de historia argentina (Buenos Aires, 1962), p. 64.
31. For a recitation of the events surrounding the June coup see Bartolomé Galfíndez, Apuntes de tres revoluciones (Buenos Aires, 1956).
32. Ibid.
34. Ibid., pp. 365-66.
35. Armour to Hull, 9 June 1943, 835.00/1501, RG 59, DOS.
36. Conversation between Jack Camp and Allan Dawson, 6 July 1943, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 3, RG 59, DOS.
37. Caffery to Hull, 9 June 1943, 835.00/1517, RG 59, DOS; and Armour to Hull, 6 June 1943, 835.00/1455, RG 59, DOS.
38. F.R.U.S., 1943, 5:371; and Conversation between Duggan and Armour, 7 June 1943, 835.00/1482, RG 59, DOS.
39. Armour to Hull, 9 June 1943, 835.00/1509, RG 59, DOS.
40. Armour to Hull, 14 June 1943, 835.00/1564, RG 59, DOS.
41. Armour to Hull, 13 July 1943, 835.00/1690, RG 59, DOS. At one point Armour even threatened to resign if Washington did not sign a pending petroleum agreement and make other concessions to the Ramfrez government. Conversation between Jack Camp, Bonsal,
and Duggan, 6 July 1943, 835.00/1644, RG 59, DOS.
43. Bonsal to Duggan, 26 June 1943, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 3, RG 59, DOS.
45. Wallace Diaries, 9 July 1943, box 8, notebook 23.
47. Wallace Diaries, 27 September 1943, box 8, notebook 23.
48. Wallace Diaries, 27 August 1943, box 8, notebook 23.
49. Crowley to Acheson, 21 April 1943, box 40, RG 169, FEA.
50. Ogden White to James McCamey, 3 June 1943; Objectives of the BEW in Argentina, 5 July 1943; and Arthur Paul to Lauchlin Currie, 30 November 1943, box 40, RG 169, FEA.
51. Dawson to Duggan et al., 5 June 1943, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 3, RG 59, DOS.
52. Dawson to Bonsal et al., 15 July 1943, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 3, RG 59, DOS.
53. According to Sir David Kelly, British ambassador to Argentina, United States news correspondents and government officials constantly misjudged the Argentine situation. A prime example was the June revolution—essentially a coup carried off by a group of army officers—which they hailed as a popular uprising by the Radicals. Sir David Kelly, The Ruling Few (London, 1952), p. 295.
55. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 5 June 1943.
57. Hoover to Hopkins, 8 and 12 June 1943, box 140, FBI Reports—Argentina, Hopkins Papers. Hoover and the FBI not only enjoyed direct access to the White House but even retained control over information transmitted to the Oval Office. In October 1943, Hopkins wrote to Hoover, assuring the director that he never passed on FBI intelligence to the State Department or any other agency: "I have never passed on anything you have given me to the Department because I assumed you would send them whatever you wanted to send them." Hopkins to Hoover, 23 October 1943, box 140, FBI Reports—Argentina, Hopkins Papers.
59. Armour to Hull, 13 July 1943, 835.00/1580, and Hull to Armour, 16 July 1943, 835.00/1643, RG 59, DOS.
60. New York Times, 8 June 1943.
63. Hull to Armour, 16 June 1943, 835.00/1485, RG 59, DOS.
64. Duggan to Welles, 24 June 1943,
835.00/1582, RG 59, DOS. According to some accounts, Storni, who was a liberal nationalist, had originally written a very conciliatory note. The aggressive passages and the demand for arms aid were inserted by Ramirez and the integral nationalists. Alberto Conil Paz and Gustavo Ferrari, *Argentina’s Foreign Policy, 1930–1962*, trans. John J. Kennedy (Notre Dame, Ind., 1966), p. 107.

67. *New York Times*, 28 July 1943; and Hull to Armour, 27 July 1943, 835.00/1689A, RG 59, DOS.
72. Reed to Hull, 23 September 1943, 835.00/1900 and 835.00/1901, RG 59, DOS.
75. *La Hora*, 7 September 1943; and *La Nación*, 8 September 1943.
76. Corrigan to Hull, 16 September 1943, 835.00/1902, RG 59, DOS.
77. Wilson to Hull, 9 September 1943, 835.00/1809, RG 59, DOS.

80. Military Intelligence Report on Argentina, 10 July 1943, 835.00/2134, RG 59, DOS.
81. Hoover to Hopkins, 12 June 1943, box 140, FBI Reports—Argentina, Hopkins Papers.
82. The ultranationalists were, to say the least, enraged by the outcome of the Hull-Storni affair and attempted to blame the whole thing on Washington. See Enrique Ruiz-Guiñazú, *La política argentina y el futuro de América* (Buenos Aires, 1944).
88. Wallace Diaries, 30 and 31 March 1943, box 5, notebook 13. Bullitt received certain “incriminating” documents pertaining to Welles from R. Walton Moore, whom Welles had edged out for the undersecretaryship. Moore, determined to have revenge on his rival, passed on the material and enlisted Bullitt’s aid as he, Moore, lay on his deathbed. Orville H. Bullitt, ed., *For the President: Personal and Secret* (Boston, 1972).
89. Wallace Diaries, 21 December 1944, box 11, notebook 13.
91. Fred L. Israel, ed., *The War Diary*


93. Israel, War Diary, p. 324.

94. Welles to FDR, 16 August 1943, box 95, Welles Folder, President's Secretary's File, Roosevelt Papers; and Conversation between Morgenthau and FDR, 7 March 1944, Presidential Diaries, vol. 5, pp. 1341-43, Morgenthau Papers.

95. Welles to FDR, 21 September 1943, box 95, Welles Folder, President's Secretary's File, Roosevelt Papers.

96. Berle Diaries, 1 September 1943, box 215.


100. Wallace Diaries, 24 August 1943, box 8, notebook 23; and Berle Diaries, 1 September 1943, box 215.


102. Ibid., p. 288.


104. E. Willard Jensen to Hopkins, 4 February 1939, box 109, Business Administration Council Folder, Hopkins Papers.


106. Conversation between Hull and Stettinius, 4 October 1943, box 237, Stettinius Papers.

107. Conversation between Stettinius and Duggan, 8 and 13 October 1943, and Berle to Stettinius, 22 October 1943, 835.00/2183, RG 59, DOS.


109. Drier to Bonsal, 22 May 1943, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 4, RG 59, DOS.

CHAPTER 6


4. Armour to Hull, 19 October 1943, 835.00/2026, RG 59, DOS.


6. Deerwester to Col. William Ad-
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- American embassy was profoundly disturbed by recent changes in the Ramfrez cabinet. It was also being subjected to heavy pressure from FEA representatives in Buenos Aires to turn to financial coercion as a means for solving both economic and political problems in Argentina. The same day the public was “informed” that financial controls were being considered, the ambassador cabled Washington and once again urged immediate freezing on the grounds that it would only add to the unpopularity of the Ramfrez government and contribute to its downfall. *F.R.U.S.*, 1943, 5:493–95.

- Treasury Group Discussion, 1 November 1943, book 762, pp. 6–7, Morgenthau Diaries.

- Stettinius to Hull, undated, box 218, Stettinius Papers.

- Meeting on Freezing of Argentine Funds, 2 November 1943, book 672, p. 142, Morgenthau Diaries.

- Morgenthau to Stettinius, 2 November 1943, book 672, pp. 166–72, Morgenthau Diaries.

- Conversation between Hull and Paraguayan Ambassador, 20 November 1943, boxes 59 and 60, folder 243, Hull Papers.


- Armour to Hull, 18 December 1943, 835.00/2234, RG 59, DOS.

- *El Mercurio*, 8 November 1943; and Armour to Hull, 9 November 1943, 835.00/2157, RG 59, DOS.


30. Manuel Seoane, “The South American Conspiracy,” Nation, 15 January 1944, p. 66. In the wake of the Bolivian uprising the New York Times urged the use of non-recognition to force the Ramírez administration to cease its machinations, explaining that “we have a right to do what we can to encourage a trend toward democracy anywhere in Latin America and discourage trends away from it.” New York Times, 26 January 1944, p. 18.


32. Ibid.

33. As early as 2 November 1943, Randolph Paul reported Duggan as having said that the overthrow of the Argentine government was in accordance with United States foreign policy. Paul to Morgenthau, 2 November 1943, book 672, p. 164, Morgenthau Diaries.


40. Inter-American Conference on War and Post-War Problems; Memo on Estrada Doctrine, 2 February 1945, box 9, Papers of Leo Pasvolsky, Library of Congress.

41. F.R.U.S., 1943, 5:34.

42. New York Times, 26 December 1943.

43. Conversation between Hull and Brazilian Ambassador, 3 January 1944, boxes 57 and 58, folder 192, Hull Papers.

44. Conversation between Hull and Peruvian Ambassador, 12 January 1944, 835.00/2305, RG 59, DOS; and Hull, Memoirs, 2:1390.

45. Alusna (Buenos Aires) to FDR, 24 January 1944, Map Room Files, box 18, folder 1, Roosevelt Papers.


47. Bonsal, Duggan, and Collado to Stettinius, 13 November 1943, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 4, RG 59, DOS.


49. There are those who feel that this would indeed have been the case. Louise Peffer has written that Ramírez would not have dared risk even a brief stoppage of meat exports. An embargo would have hurt all major branches of Argentine industry. Even if Argentina had been able to find markets on the spur of the moment, it lacked adequate refrigerated shipping. E. Louise Peffer, “Cordell Hull’s Argentine Policy and Britain’s Meat Supply,” Inter-American Economic Affairs 10 (Autumn, 1956): 5-13.


51. Conversation between Bonsal,
Blake-Tyler, and G. F. Theobald, 1 November 1943, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 4, RG 59, DOS.

52. Conversation between Hull and Halifax, 27 December 1943, boxes 59 and 60, folder 216, Hull Papers.


54. Conversation between Hull and Halifax, 5 January 1944, 711.35/222, RG 59, DOS.


56. Conversation between Hull and Campbell, 10 January 1944, and Blake-Tyler, 9 August 1943, 835.00/2285, RG 59, DOS.


59. Conversation between Hull and Peruvian Ambassador, 12 January 1944, 835.00/2305, RG 59, DOS.

60. Conversation between Hull and Halifax, 23 January 1944, boxes 59 and 60, folder 216, Hull Papers.


63. Berle Diaries, 10 January 1944, box 215.

64. Ibid.

65. Berle to FDR, 8 January 1944, box 32, Argentina Folder, President’s Secretary’s File, Roosevelt Papers.


67. Memo on Argentine Statement, 24 January 1944, Memoranda-Argentina, RG 59, DOS.

68. Ibid.


73. Conversation between Hull and Adrian Escobar, 2 February 1944, boxes 57 and 58, folder 187, Hull Papers.

74. Levene, *Presidentes argentinos*, p. 240; and Potash, *Army & Politics*, pp. 237-40. Aside from considerations of ideology and national interest, a number of generals and colonels violently opposed a severance because Germany was blackmailing them. According to one FBI report, the German embassy
had financed frolics at fashionable resorts and gambling casinos for members of Ramfrez's staff and other high-ranking officers. Berlin let it be known that the day Buenos Aires broke relations, Germany would publish a complete list of those Argentine officers who were on the take. Hoover to Hopkins, 9 December 1943, box 140, FBI Reports—Argentina, Hopkins Papers.

75. Ibid.
77. Ibid., pp. 386-87.
78. Ibid., p. 382.
79. Levene, Presidentes argentinos, pp. 244-45.

CHAPTER 7

2. Ibid. Actually the integral nationalists were, as a group, very anti-labor. Equating unions with socialism and/or communism, they jailed labor leaders and intervened in unions. Only with Perón's accession to the position of secretary of labor and social security did the government's antilabor campaign subside. He was to use this position to fashion a unique alliance between labor and the military. Marvin Goldwert's Democracy, Militarism, and Nationalism in Argentina, 1930-1966 (Austin, Tex., and London, 1972), pp. 86-88.
4. For an account of Ramfrez's last months in office and an analysis of the factors responsible for his loss of power see Felix Luna, El 45 (Buenos Aires, 1969), pp. 26-35.
8. Ibid., pp. 232-37.
10. For a discussion of Perón's relations with organized labor see Carlos S. Fayt, Naturaleza del peronismo (Buenos Aires, 1967), pp. 86-96.
11. In 1967 Fayt published the results of a study about the nature of Perónismo, which was conducted under the auspices of the faculty of political law at the University of Buenos Aires. After an exhaustive investigation, they concluded first that Perónismo was simply Perón. His will to power and his extreme, almost physical sense of reality prompted him to begin developing his own governmental and political structures while he was war minister, secretary of labor and social services, and vice-president during the Ramfrez interlude. Perónismo was a national movement with a popular base. For the middle and lower classes, Perón represented social and economic fulfillment
and participation by them in the political process. He used simple images that the people could understand, repetition of ideas to keep them in the public mind, and paternalism as tools to dominate and manipulate the masses. Moreover, this study asserts that Perónism was the Argentinean version of Italian fascism, its major characteristics being (1) the belief that action must precede doctrine; (2) the value of order, hierarchy, and discipline; (3) the negation of liberalism and Marxism; (4) the concept that the nation and the government must be dedicated to a single doctrine and a single will; and (5) advocacy of the corporate state. Finally, Fayt contends that Perónism was a product of the social and economic discontent that had been accumulating in Argentina since 1930; it was the political answer to the social and economic conditions of Argentina in 1943. Fayt, Naturreza, pp. 28-41.

13. Ibid.
16. See, for example, Los Angeles Times, 26 February 1944.
21. Ibid., pp. 294-95.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., pp. 259-60.
25. Hoover to Hopkins, 4 February 1944, box 140, FBI Reports—Argentina, Hopkins Papers. See also Stettinius to FDR, 15 February 1944, box 32, Stettinius Folder, President's Secretary's File, Roosevelt Papers.
27. See, for example, Statement of Policy by Hull, 21 June 1944, container 53, folder 168, Hull Papers.
29. Conversation between Hull and Morgenthau, 8 September 1944, book 77, p. 120, Morgenthau Diaries.
31. Bonsal to Duggan, 22 March 1944, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 4, RG 59, DOS.
32. Bonsal to Stettinius, 1 March 1944, and Bonsal to Duggan, 4 March 1944, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 4, RG 59, DOS.
33. Duggan to Hull, 26 June 1944, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 4, RG 59, DOS.
35. Conversation between Hull and Chilean Ambassador, 20 March 1944, boxes 57 and 58, folder 195, Hull Papers.
36. Draft of Speech on Argentine Sit-
u nation, 19 June 1944, container 53, folder 168, Hull Papers.

37. For RPA recommendations on the course to be pursued toward Argentina see Wendelin to Duggan, 2 March 1944, 835.00/2645, RG 59, DOS.

38. So great was Wendelin’s animus toward Argentina that at one point he refused to approve the passports of a group of Seventh Day Adventist missionaries who wanted to travel to Africa via Argentina. He feared that the Latin community might view such fraternalization as indicative of a thaw in Argentine-American relations. Wendelin to Shipley, 8 September 1944, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 4, RG 59, DOS.


41. J. K. Bacon to Bonsal and Duggan, 2 February 1944, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 4, RG 59, DOS.

42. Memorandum for the President, 30 March 1944, book 716, p. 254, Morgenthau Diaries.


44. Conversation between Morgenthau and FDR, 7 March 1944, Presidential Diaries, 5:1341-43, Morgenthau Papers.

45. Meeting on State Department’s policy toward Argentina, 9 March 1944, book 708, p. 8, Morgenthau Diaries.

46. Throughout late 1943 and early 1944 the FEA continued to advocate the most stringent action toward Argentina. “You are right: Action—and tough action—should be taken on the Argentine,” FEA counsel Oscar Cox wrote to Hopkins on 16 January 1944. “That’s the only language those fellows will understand. The only trouble with babying them is that it just doesn’t work. If we don’t act we stand a good chance that a lot of South America will be badly affected before the war is over.” Oscar Cox to Hopkins, 16 January 1944, box 148, Papers of Oscar Cox, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

47. Conversation between Morgenthau and Acheson, 27 April 1944, book 724, p. 256, Morgenthau Diaries.


51. Wallace Diaries, 4 April 1944, box 10, notebook 28.


53. Ibid., pp. 290, 291, 318.


57. Meeting on Freezing of Argen-

58. Ibid.


60. Stettinius to Acheson, 27 March 1944, box 215, Stettinius Papers; and Meeting on Freezing of Argentina, 27 April 1944, book 724, p. 244, Morgenthau Diaries.

61. When the Argentine matter came up at Quebec, Morgenthau said nothing. "I simply felt," he later told his staff, "I was doing more than I should and I just had my eye on the bull's eye, which was what is the future of Germany." Report on Quebec Conference, October 1944, book 772, p. 219, Morgenthau Diaries.

62. Spacht to Armour, 28 August 1944, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 4, RG 59, DOS.

63. Memorandum for the Secretary, 24 March 1944, book 713, p. 308, Morgenthau Diaries.

64. Meeting between Wallace, Jones, and Morgenthau, 29 March 1944, book 716, p. 65, Morgenthau Diaries.


66. Conversation between Morgenthau and Wallace, 27 April 1944, book 724, p. 239, Morgenthau Diaries. See also Wallace Diaries, 3 April 1944, box 10, notebook 28.

67. Hull and the internationalists were warmed in late May by a show of grass-roots support in the nation's capital. After the Argentine ambassador attempted to crash the Argentine Independence Day festivities of McKinley High School, the students boycotted the celebration. Said Barbara Benedict, president of the Spanish Club, "We thought we would be demonstrating friendship with the Argentine people and not with the Argentine Government until that Ambassador stuck his nose into the picture." The House of Representatives subsequently passed a resolution praising the "principal, teachers, and pupils of McKinley High School" for their stand. "The viciousness and hypocrisy of the dictatorship in Argentina," proclaimed a legislator, "has once again been exposed by courageous educators and the free American press." U.S., Congress, House, Argentine Fascist Intervention in American Affairs, 78th Cong., 2d sess., 26 May 1944, Congressional Record, 90:5037-38. See the Congressional Record for 1 August 1944, 90:A3497, for Celler's remarks; and New York Times, 25 May 1944.

68. Duggan to Hull, 1 February 1944, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 4, RG 59, DOS.

69. Questions the British May Raise, 11 March 1944, box 249, and State Department to Combined Food Board, 13 January 1944, box 250, Stettinius Papers.

70. Combined Food Board to Acheson and Campbell, 17 January 1945, box 250, Stettinius Papers.

71. Combined Food Board to Acheson and Hadow, 15 April 1944, box 250, Stettinius Papers.

72. Combined Raw Materials Board
to Acheson and Hadow, 17 January 1944, box 250, Stettinius Papers.

73. Combined Shipping Adjustment Board to Acheson and Campbell, 17 January 1944, box 250, Stettinius Papers.

74. Conversation between Member of London Embassy and Neville Butler, 23 September 1944, 835.00/9-2344, RG 59, DOS.

75. Reed to Armour, 17 July 1944, 835.00/7-1744, RG 59, DOS.

76. FDR to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24 January 1944, 091.3 Argentina, RG 218, General Records of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (hereafter referred to as COC).


79. Memo on Stettinius-Eden Conversations, 15 April 1944, box 225, Stettinius Papers; and Hull to FDR, 12 September 1944, President’s Secretary’s File, Roosevelt Papers.


81. Berle to Hull, 12 June 1944, box 58, Berle Papers.

82. FDR to Hull, 15 July 1944, Map Room Files, box 19, Roosevelt Papers.

83. Ibid.

84. In an effort to placate Hull, Roosevelt cabled Churchill and urged the “Former Naval Person” to let Argentina know, without endangering the meat contract, that “we are fed up with her pro-Axis sentiments and practices.” Churchill subsequently replied that he and his colleagues wanted to do everything possible to help the president and Mr. Hull with their South American problems, but the one point to remember was that whereas the United Kingdom had imported more than sixty-six million tons of beef in 1938, she was currently subsisting on twenty-five million. *F.R.U.S., 1944*, 7:333.

85. Ibid., pp. 102, 337; and Department of the Army, “Relations of the Caribbean Defense Command with Argentina” (unpublished compilation), Military Records Division of National Archives, pp. 11–12.

86. See also Hull to Stettinius, 5 August 1944, container 62, folder 261, Hull Papers.


88. Conversation between Hull and Halifax, 16 September 1944, 835.00/9-1644, RG 59, DOS.


90. Ibid., pp. 361–63.

91. Ibid., p. 360.

94. Duggan to Hull, 9 March 1944, 835.00/2669, RG 59, DOS.
95. Ibid.
96. J. F. Simmons to Hull, 11 March 1944, 835.00/2577, RG 59 DOS.
97. Conversation between Bonsal and Messersmith, 7 March 1944, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 4, RG 59, DOS.
98. Conversation between Berle and Dr. Carlos Martins, 6 January 1944, box 215, Berle Diaries.
100. Ibid.
101. See, for example, Conversation between Hull and Gajardo, 20 July 1944, boxes 57 and 58, folder 195, Hull Papers; and Conversation between Hull and Brazilian Ambassador, 16 August 1944, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 4, RG 59, DOS.
104. Ibid.
107. Armour to Hull, 5 June 1944, 835.00/2868, RG 59, DOS.
109. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
112. Significance of Perón’s Speech of 10 June 1944, 4 July 1944, R and A 2304, RG 226, OSS.
113. Ibid.
114. See, for example, Spaeth to Hull, 19 June 1944, container 188, Folder-Argentina, 1944, Papers of Breckinridge Long, Library of Congress.
115. In late June, Hull advised FDR that the attitude of several Latin American states, including Brazil, toward nonrecognition depended on the position assumed by the United Kingdom. If the British followed an independent course in the matter, he declared, then not only would Washington’s policy of nonrecognition be endangered, but the American people would be thoroughly aroused against the United States’ chief wartime ally. On July 13 FDR cabled Churchill that Armour was being recalled for consultation. Though “nearly all” the other American states were going to follow suit, the collective withdrawal would go largely for nought if Ambassador Kelly remained in Buenos Aires. Churchill reluctantly acquiesced in the president’s request. Winant to Hull, 17 July 1944, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 4, RG 59, DOS; Hull to FDR, 30 June 1944, Map Room Files, box 19, Roosevelt Papers; F.R.U.S., 1944, 7:298; and Churchill to FDR, 1 July 1944, container 53, folder 169, Hull Papers.
117. President’s Naval Aide to Secretary, Joint Chiefs, 29 June 1944, May Room Files, box 101, Roosevelt Papers.

119. Ibid.

120. La Nación and El Mundo, 27 June 1944.

121. New York Times, 10 September 1944.

122. Conversation between Armour and Uruguayan Ambassador, 28 August 1944, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 4, RG 59, DOS.

123. Conversation between Hull and Peruvian Ambassador, 17 August 1944, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 4, RG 59, DOS.

124. Conversation between Long and Foreign Minister of the Dominican Republic, 8 September 1944, container 188, folder Argentina 1944, Long Papers.

125. Churchill to FDR, 1 July 1944, container 53, folder 169, Hull Papers.

126. Robert Welles (chairman, Coordinating Committee for Argentina) to Rockefeller, 13 January 1944, box 50, RG 229, OCHIAA.


128. Ibid.


130. On March 4, according to Morgenthau, the secretary of state launched into his “usual tirade” declaring that everyone in the country was for him except Drew Pearson and Sumner Welles. The latter, said Hull, was telling everyone to disregard Cordell Hull, for he, Welles, would be “in the saddle” after the election. Conversation between Hull and Morgenthau, 4 May 1944, book 727, p. 204, Morgenthau Diaries. Support for Welles’s point of view both in Latin America and the United States became so alarming to Hull that he asked FDR to make a forceful statement in support of current American policy toward Argentina. The secretary complained that the “chief disseminator of pro-Argentine propaganda” was leaving the impression not only that FDR was his closest personal friend but also that the president was in full agreement with the critics of U.S. policy. The president complied with a press release that spoke vaguely about the need to honor international commitments. Hull to FDR, 26 September 1944, container 54, folder 170, Hull Papers; and F.R.U.S., 1944, 7:356-57.


132. Conversation between Hull and Bolivian Chargé d’Affaires, 12 July 1944, boxes 57 and 58, folder 191, Hull Papers.

133. Conversation between Hull and Chilean Chargé d’Affaires, 1 July 1944, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 4, RG 59, DOS.


135. See, for example, Berle Diaries, 12 December 1944, box 216.
136. Armour to Hull, 18 September 1944, container 54, folder 170, Hull Papers; and Duggan to Hull, March 1944, box 218, Stettinius Papers.

137. Conversation between Armour and MacIntosh, 27 October 1944, 835.00/2744, RG 59, DOS.

138. Lane (American ambassador to Colombia) to Hull, 26 October 1943, box 496, RG 229, OCIAA.


140. Ibid., pp. 34-37.

141. Ibid., pp. 29-30.

142. Ibid., pp. 28-29.

143. Inter-American Reactions to the Argentine Proposal for a Conference of Foreign Ministers, 20 November 1944, R and A 2714, RG 226, OSS.


146. See, for example, Conversation between Hull and Colombian Ambassador, 20 June 1944, 711.35/252, RG 59, DOS.


149. Wendelin to Armour, 20 November 1944, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 4, RG 59, DOS; and Stettinius to U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Mexico City, 2 November 1944, 710. consultation (4)10-3044, RG 59, DOS.

150. Wendelin to Armour, 20 November 1944, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 4, RG 59, DOS. Eric Wendelin continued to be the driving force behind opposition to détente. On November 7 he wrote to Frank Johnston, publisher of the *American Exporter*, that in coercing Argentina, Washington was simply trying to apply the lessons learned from its bitter experience with the Nazis in the 1930s and trying to prevent the continuing existence of this “fester sore” in the Americas. Wendelin to Johnston, 7 November 1944, found with 835.00/10-2544, RG 59, DOS.

151. Long to FDR, 11 November 1944, container 188, folder Argentina 1944, Long Papers.


153. Report by Foreign Activity Correlation, 14 November 1944, 835.00/11-1444, RG 59, DOS.


156. Ibid., pp. 54-55.

157. Stettinius to FDR, 21 November 1944, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 5, RG 59, DOS.

158. *F.R.U.S.*, 1944, 7:81-83; and Colombian Embassy to State Department, 8 January 1945, and U.S. Ambassador to Ecuador to Stettinius, 12 January 1945, 710. Conference War and Postwar 1-1245, RG 59, DOS.


161. Ibid., pp. 75, 80.

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2. Conversation between Hull and Morgenthau, 8 September 1944, book 770, p. 120, Morgenthau Diaries.
6. For Morgenthau’s attitude toward the Coordinator’s Office see Conversation between Morgenthau and Rockefeller, 12 January 1942, book 485, p. 116, Morgenthau Diaries.
7. On the OCIAA’s struggle to survive into the postwar era see, for example, Rockefeller to Stettinius, 7 January 1944, box 499, RG 229, OCIAA.
10. Welles to Rockefeller, 26 March 1942, box 500, RG 229, OCIAA; *F.R.U.S.*, 1945, 9:9; and Duggan to Rockefeller, 28 October 1943 and 31 January 1944, RG 229, OCIAA.
11. Rockefeller to Duggan, 29 March 1944, box 496, RG 229, OCIAA.
14. Lockwood to Johnstone, 28 October 1942, box 143, RG 229, OCIAA.
15. Rockefeller to Stettinius, 11 November 1943, box 499, and Duggan to Rockefeller, 31 January 1944, box 496, RG 229, OCIAA.
17. Duggan to Rockefeller, 28 October 1943, box 496, and Rockefeller to FDR, 1 May 1944, box 510, RG 229, OCIAA.
18. Rockefeller to E. B. Mann, 9 December 1949, Rockefeller Family Archives, Rockefeller Center, New York, N.Y.
19. Memoranda on Supply of Replacement Parts to Argentine Army and Navy, 1 March 1943, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 3, RG 59, DOS.
20. See, for example, J. K. Bacon to Bonsal, 23 October 1943, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 4, RG 59, DOS. In February 1945 Wendelin observed to Warren that the activities of Colonel Cavenah, head of the United States Air Mission in Buenos Aires, “had been a source of continuing embarrassment to us.” Wendelin to Warren, 2 February 1945, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 5, RG 59, DOS.
22. Department of the Army, “Relations of the Caribbean Defense Command with Argentina” (unpublished compilation), Military Division of National Archives, pp. 19, 24; and Bonsal to Hull, 30 December 1943, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 4, RG 59, DOS.


27. There was more than just a tacit alliance between the United States military and the American trading community. On 24 October 1944 Gen. George Brett wrote to Eric Johnston, president of the United States Chamber of Commerce: “The U.S. can establish itself on a basic business-like footing... there will be an increased solidarity among the American republics. Any military or commercial enterprise in any one of these countries must clearly indicate that the major benefit is for the country concerned, this benefit to create stability both politically and economically within that country.” He went on to say that the future of the world depended on the Western Hemisphere and that of the hemisphere, on the United States. “Relations of the Caribbean Defense Command,” pp. 21–22.

28. “America’s Corporate Stake Abroad—$7,000,000,000,” Business Week, 22 August 1942; and Memo on Value of U.S. Investments in Argentina, 18 January 1944, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 4, RG 59, DOS.

29. New York Times, 23 July 1944. Some businessmen were not willing to wait for the State Department to act. According to El Popular of Mexico City, officials of DuPont and Imperial Chemicals held a series of talks with Perón in Buenos Aires, looking toward a settlement of the Argentine question. Messersmith to Stettinius, 19 December 1944, 835.00/12-1944, RG 59, DOS.

30. Armand May to Hull, 13 April 1942, 835.00/1175, RG 59, DOS.


32. Alfred H. Benjamin to FDR, 12 May 1942, 835.00/1184, RG 59, DOS.

33. Conversation between Bonsal and Attorney for National City Bank of New York, 29 October 1943, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 4, RG 59, DOS.

34. For reports on official and semi-official British activities designed to facilitate postwar trade with Argentina, see Armour to Hull, 13 April 1944, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 4, RG 59, DOS. For Britain’s view of the wartime conduct and objectives of United
States traders in Argentina see Sir David Kelly, *The Ruling Few* (London, 1952), p. 293. United States exporters were particularly upset at rumors that Great Britain was reexporting lend-lease goods to Argentina in order to gain a trade advantage. Alleged Misuse of Lend-Lease by Great Britain, 7 July 1941, box 123, Papers of Harry Hopkins, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

35. Armour to Hull, 20 January 1944, 835.00/2298, RG 59, DOS; and Report on Argentine Export-Import Programs, 29 June 1944, box 218, Stettinius Papers.


37. “Tune in on Export.”


39. For an idea of the respect with which the United States business community viewed Argentina’s credit record see Frederick Stern, “Prospects for Argentine Bonds,” *Barron’s*, 2 February 1942.


41. Edward Reed (U.S. chargé d’affaires in Buenos Aires) to Stettinius, 2 March 1945, 835.00/3-245, RG 59, DOS.

42. Conversation between Armour and Shaw, 24 November 1944, box 19, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 5, RG 59, DOS.


46. See, for example, address by Eric Johnston to Economic Club of New York, quoted in *New York Times*, 2 April 1943; and “Abroad,” *Barron’s*, 25 January 1943.

47. See address by Robert J. Watt to Economic Club of New York, quoted in *New York Times*, 2 April 1942.


50. Press Report of “Softening in United States Attitude toward Argentina,” 7 December 1944; Wendelin to Lockwood, 3 January 1945; and Spaeth to Armour, 13 December 1944, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 5, RG 59, DOS.


52. Ibid.

53. Stettinius to Armour and Rockefeller, 11 December 1944, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 5, RG 59, DOS.

54. Memo for the President on U.S. Policy toward Argentina, 2 January 1945, 711.35/1-245, RG 59, DOS.

55. Division of River Plata Affairs to Lockwood, 3 January 1945, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 5, RG 59, DOS.

56. Warren to Stettinius, 28 February
1945, box 285, Stettinius Papers; and F.R.U.S., 1945, 9:100–101. See also President’s Work Sheet, 21 November 1944, box 95, Stettinius Folder, Roosevelt Papers.


58. Luis Fiore, the individual in charge of intervention of Axis firms in Argentina, assured American embassy officials that all firms with any Axis ties at all would be intervened and that the government was planning to call elections in the very near future. David Berger to Stettinius, 16 December 1944, file no. XL-9031, RG 226, OSS; and Division of River Plata Affairs to Division of American Republics Affairs, 10 March 1945, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 5, RG 59, DOS.


60. Ibid., p. 505.


63. Ibid., 7 February 1945, box 216.

64. Ibid.


67. La Noche, 4 January 1945.

68. La Razón, 4 January 1945; and El Tiempo, 4 January 1945.

69. Caffery to Stettinius, 16 January 1945, 710. Conference War and Postwar/2-145, RG 59, DOS.


71. La Noche, 15 January 1945.


73. Washington increased Latin America discontent in February 1945 by informing the six Latin American nations who had not declared war on the Axis that if they did not do so, they would be excluded from the UNCIO. Having received invitations to previous United Nations meetings without question, the nonbelligerent were surprised and angered by this last-minute demand that they declare war on the nearly defeated Axis countries. Laurence Duggan, The Americas: The Search for Hemispheric Security (New York, 1949), pp. 107–8.


76. Ibid., 9:24–25.

77. Stettinius to Joseph Grew (acting secretary of state), 18 February 1945, 711.32/2-1845, RG 59, DOS.

78. Meeting between Santos and FDR, 8 March 1945, box 285, Stettinius Papers.

79. F.R.U.S., 1944, 7:27–86; and Wire Service Reports Received by State Department, 10 March 1945, RG 59, DOS.


81. See Main Objectives of U.S. Delegation, 2 February 1945, box 10, Pasvolsky Papers.

82. New Left historians argue that
this was simply a stratagem to facilitate United States economic exploitation of Latin America. In his *Containment of Latin America*, David Green writes, in connection with the Chapultepec Conference: "From its low-tariff position to its attempted ban on state-run trading enterprises, the United States' position was an effort to make sure that the power of government would not be used in the postwar period to close off any bloc area, regional or national, to United States economic expansion." David Green, *The Containment of Latin America* (Chicago, 1971), pp. 178, 167.

83. Meeting between Santos and FDR, 8 March 1945, box 285, Stettinius Papers.
88. Stettinius to Grew for FDR, 22 February 1945, 835.00/2-2245, RG 59, DOS; and Memo on Political and Economic Relations with Argentina, 20 April 1946, box 62, folder 261, Hull Papers.
89. FDR to Stettinius, 24 February 1945, 835.00/2-2445, RG 59, DOS.
91. The secretary had made it plain to the numerous and very active Argentine agents in Mexico City that if their country took certain steps, "the door would not be slammed in her face." Minutes of the Steering Committee Meeting, 5 March 1945, box 286, Stettinius Papers.
92. "It is evident that there are two groups in the American Delegation: the group that thinks entirely globally and knows little about the hemisphere, and the group that thinks about the hemisphere first, and global matters second," Berle recorded in his diary on February 20. "I do not know whether they will come in contact or not." Berle Diaries, 20 February 1945, box 216.
94. Ibid., 20 February and 1 March 1945, box 216.
95. Ibid., 6 March 1945, box 216.
96. Ibid., 27 February and 6 March 1945, box 216.
97. Grew to FDR, 1 March 1945, box 95, Stettinius Folder, President's Secretary's File, Roosevelt Papers; and Berle Diaries, 1 March 1945, box 216.
98. Berle Diaries, 6 March 1945, box 216; and *New York Times*, 1 March 1945.
103. Minutes of Steering Committee Meeting, 5 March 1945; Handwritten Report of High-level United States Meeting, 7 March 1945; and Daily Record of Stettinius, 5 March 1945, box 286, Stettinius Papers.
105. Opinion in the United States was generally favorable both toward the Act of Chapultepec and the Argentine resolution. See, for example, Washington Post, 5 March 1945; and Chicago Tribune, 9 March 1945.
106. El Mercurio, 8 March 1945; and La Nación, 8 March 1945.
107. U.S. Ambassador to Panama to Stettinius, 8 March 1945, 710. Conference War and Postwar/3-845, RG 59, DOS.
108. La Nación, 8 March 1945; and El Mundo, 8 March 1945.
110. Wire Service Reports Received by State Department, 10 March 1945, 835.00/3-1045, RG 59, DOS.
112. Reed to Stettinius, 17 March 1945, 835.00/3-1745, RG 59, DOS.
113. See, for example, New York Times, 28 March 1945; and St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 28 March 1945. For latino reaction see U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay to Stettinius, 29 March 1945, 835.00/3-2945, RG 59, DOS.
114. For example, Lockwood curtly informed RPA on April 10 that Argentina, by signing the Final Act, had virtually ended any possibility that Axis agents would be able to use Argentina as a base of operations. Lockwood to Division of River Plata Affairs, 10 April 1945, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 5, RG 59, DOS.
117. FDR to Stettinius, 7 April 1945, Map Room Files, box 23, Roosevelt Papers.
118. Campbell, Masquerade Peace, p. 145.
119. By March 1945 Rockefeller and his colleagues were convinced that only by working both to reincorporate the errant state into the hemispheric family of nations and to secure an invitation for Argentina to join the United Nations could Washington prove that it had returned to its prewar concept of community. Statement of Events in Argentina since October 1944, undated, box 54, folder 172, Hull Papers; and Conversation between Martin Popper (National Lawyers Guild) and Lockwood, 4
April 1945, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 5, RG 59, DOS.

120. Warren to Stettinius, 18 April 1945, 711.35/4-1845, RG 59, DOS; and Juan Perón, *Tres revoluciones militares* (Buenos Aires, 1963), p. 96.

121. Warren to Stettinius, 18 April 1945, 711.35/4-1845, RG 59, DOS; and Juan Perón, *Tres revoluciones militares*, p. 96.

122. Reed to Stettinius, 19 April 1945, 711.35/4-1945, RG 59, DOS.

123. Warren to Stettinius, 21 April 1945, 711.35/4-2145, RG 59, DOS.


129. Messersmith to Stettinius and Rockefeller, 19 March 1945, 500.cc/3-1345; and Messersmith to Stettinius, 19 March 1945, 835.00/3-1545, RG 59, DOS. See also Berle Diaries, 20 March 1945, box 216.


131. The Colombian foreign minister had told newsmen that Secretary Stettinius had promised at the Chapultepec Conference that if Argentina "behaved really well," he would use his good offices to see that it was invited to the San Francisco meeting. U.S. Ambassador to Colombia to Stettinius, 14 April 1945, 500.cc/4-445, RG 59, DOS.


134. See, for example, Berle Diaries, 5 April 1945, box 216. Fearful of the wave of adverse opinion that would engulf the State Department in the wake of the seating of the two republics, Stettinius had tried in late March to deny to the Russians that a commitment had been made at Yalta. His efforts came to nought. Campbell, *Masquerade Peace*, p. 149.


137. Conversation between Stettinius and Anthony Eden, 21 April 1945, box 250, Stettinius Papers.

138. The hard-liners on the Argentine question were strengthened in their arguments by news received on April 23 that the Farrell-Perón government had ordered the arrest of over sixty officers and civilians for allegedly conspiring against the government. Included in their number were such ardent supporters of the Allies as Rawson, Tonazzi, and Santamarina. Wendelin to E. B. Butler and Dana Munro, 23 April 1945, Memoranda-Argentina, vol. 5, RG 59, DOS. Hull, *Memoirs*, 2:1405-7. During an interview with Stettinius shortly before the admission of Argentina, Hull agreed to United States support of Argen-
tine membership on the grounds that such a move would ensure the seating of the Ukraine and White Russia and thus prevent the Soviet Union from disrupting the meeting. Conversation between Hull and Stettinius, 27 April 1945, box 245, Stettinius Papers. See also Conversation between Hopkins and Morgenthau, 20 June 1945, Presidential Diaries, 7:1670-71, Morgenthau Papers.

140. Ibid., pp. 410-23, 417-18. Green writes that Vandenberg was at first adamantly opposed to an invitation for Argentina and to an invitation to the Soviet republics, but by April 30 he had dropped his opposition to the seating of Byelorussia and the Ukraine because Latin American opinion had become strongly anti-Soviet as a result of the episode. Green, *Containment of Latin America*, pp. 220, 222. It may be argued, however, that Vandenberg, undeniably a hard-line anti-Communist, reversed himself on the question both of the Argentine and of Soviet republics because he thought that such a change would compel the Kremlin to live up to its Yalta agreements.

141. *F.R.U.S.*, 1945, 1:395, 398, 417. Green maintains that the United States delegation at San Francisco agreed to link the issue of the Argentine and the Soviet republics because “most of the delegates were coming to see hemispheric solidarity as a tool to be used against Russia in the conference.” Green, *Containment of Latin America*, p. 217. If one recognizes that fulfillment of the Yalta pledges (“free” elections in Poland and east Europe) was the goal of America’s “anti-Russian” policy, this was, in a sense, true.

142. Stettinius to Joseph Grew, 27 April 1945, 500.cc/4-2745, RG 59, DOS; and Conversation between Stettinius and Truman, 26 April 1945, box 245, Stettinius Papers. Even though Truman had been in the White House for only a matter of days, he sensed that the admission of Argentina would produce a tidal wave of public outrage. Events proved him correct. The trickle of critical mail that began in late April turned into a mighty flood as Washington’s support of Argentine membership became apparent in early May. See, for example, Harold G. Cutwright to Truman, 27 April 1945; Maurice A. Hanline to Truman, 1 May 1945; B. C. Baxter et al. to Truman, 6 May 1945; and Frank E. Brennan to Truman, 15 May 1945, Department of State, folder 20, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Truman Library, Independence, Mo.

144. Ibid., pp. 486-87.
146. Conversation between Stettinius and Truman, 28 April 1945, box 245, Stettinius Papers.
147. Conversation between Eden and Stettinius, 29 April 1945, box 245, Stettinius Papers.
148. “Verbatim Minutes of the First
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2. Joseph Grew to Edward Stettinius, 27 April 1945, 500.cc/4-2745, RG 59, DOS.


4. Ibid., p. 448.

5. Ibid.


10. Ibid., pp. 454–55.

11. Ibid., pp. 455–56.

12. Ibid.

