When Joseph Bristow informed Kansas voters that he would remain a Republican, Victor Murdock countered by announcing that he would seek the Progressive-party nomination for the Senate. Murdock, rather than being disheartened by developments in late 1913, had been encouraged. He wrote that the Progressive was “distinctly a new type” politically, one that was here to stay: “He is not merely the old insurgent of a different degree—he is a different kind. The prototype is the new Roosevelt, the radical who came out of Africa, waded in at Osawatomie, and went in over his head at Columbus and emerged as out of the waters of the Jordan. The progressive Republican hasn’t got it, and can’t get it.”1

Congressman Murdock was about the only Kansan of importance to assume a buoyant attitude as the New Year dawned. With Bristow and Arthur Capper defecting, William Allen White was worried that Walter R. Stubbs would soon follow. Because of his defeat in 1912, Stubbs had allowed himself to be pushed aside during the past year. His close association with Capper since 1911 caused many to speculate that he would rejoin the Republican party. He had assumed a “spoiler’s” determination, some said, but he remained convinced that he was obligated to support Capper because of aid given to his senatorial candidacy by the Topeka Daily Capital in 1912. Since Stubbs seemed to be on the verge of joining Capper in January 1914, White worked at keeping him a Progressive. According to White, Stubbs had led him to the movement
eight years earlier, and Stubbs had been a main force in organizing the new party. As long as any chance of victory remained, White wrote, Stubbs was honor-bound to continue to work for the party.\(^2\)

The rumor that Stubbs might rejoin the Republican party worried national Progressive leaders as well, since the governor had been, as Chicago Tribune publisher Medill McCormick said, “a sort of Progressive Cato.” McCormick asked Stubbs: “What will be . . . [the standpatters’] jubilation, . . . when a two-fisted, iron-ribbed, battered-battler like yourself supports a Republican candidate for Governor, whatever his virtues?”\(^3\)

Despite outward appearances, Henry Allen’s allegiance to the party was also doubtful in December of 1913. He quieted fears, however, when he stated on 6 January 1914 that he would stand with the Progressives to the end. He added that he did not want to run for governor, which many reformers wanted him to do. He suggested that Lieutenant Governor Sheffield Ingalls be the party’s choice. In mid January he asked White how long he should wait before announcing publicly that he would not be the Bull Moose gubernatorial aspirant. White’s answer never came, since he, like almost every Progressive, wanted Allen to run. Fortunately, the new party could take advantage of an emotional nature that made Allen incapable of withstanding concerted pleas for his services. Billy Sunday had converted him to Christian fundamentalism at a revival meeting in 1911. Bull Moosers had made him weep for Roosevelt and a third party at Chicago. And at the Lincoln Day rally in 1914 the Progressives induced him to run for governor.\(^4\)

In early January, Mort Albaugh, the Republican wheel horse, predicted that an Allen boom would make the Wichita newspaperman a candidate in 1914. Albaugh explained:

> Henry isn’t a candidate now and he has no idea that he is going to be . . . but he is as emotional as a prima donna. The first time they get Henry in a corner, the Bull Moosers will start a pow wow. Henry’s feelings will be wrought upon and finally they will overpower him. In the end he will arise with tears in his eyes. He will choke with emotion and his voice will falter and break. After stuttering a little Henry will manage to say “I’ll take it!”

It happened essentially that way! At the Lincoln Day banquet, after an emotional session, Murdock advised the delegates to go to room 270 of the National Hotel in Topeka, take Allen by the hand and by the collar, and push him into the governor’s race. About half of the delegates began to push, and though Allen tried to ward them off, in the end he yielded.

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On the afternoon of February 12 his hat joined Murdock’s in the Bull Moose ring.5

The Lincoln Day meeting in 1914 was a gala affair, even though only half of the hoped for 2,400 delegates attended. Allen was the master of ceremonies, and he introduced the featured guests—Albert J. Beveridge and Raymond Robbins, who had been sent by national headquarters. Beveridge delivered the keynote speech, being joined in the oratorical lists by Robbins, Murdock, and Mrs. Eva M. Murphy, a representative of the W.C.T.U. The main order of business, in addition to subscribing funds, was to write a tentative party platform, one that could be amended in midyear, after the primaries. The goal was to present ideas that would represent some advances over previous years, but that would still retain the essential social-welfare emphasis of the new organization. The presence of large numbers of women among the delegates insured that the document would include strong welfare planks such as those asking for minimum-wage laws, widows’ pensions, and child-labor laws.6

The most radical suggestions came from Stubbs, who was unable to attend the rally because of illness. From Lawrence he sent a message encouraging the Progressives to make national prohibition and government ownership of communications and transportation networks part of the temporary platform. He was especially concerned with the possibility of state-owned and -operated railroads, and at the time he was preparing an article for the Saturday Evening Post on the subject.7

Despite worry caused by the disappointing attendance, the meeting was a smashing success for advocates of the new party. By now, most reluctant members had been winnowed from the group, and only the devoted remained. Some concern had existed because it had not been possible to find any important Kansas Democrat who would join the party so that the bipartisan heritage of the organization could be demonstrated. This did not, however, discourage many; and some found solace in the fact that the absence of Democrats showed that their party was based on more than the traditional national political divisions. A feeble attempt was made to identify the Progressive party with European liberal parties, and a few warped comparisons of White and David Lloyd George were made. Since there were no important primary contests facing the Progressives, little activity of a popular nature was planned before August. Progressives agreed that the party council should convene then to make final preparations and write a permanent platform. The meeting adjourned without incident and apparently with the hope that the future would be brighter than had previously been predicted.8
The major concerns of Progressives between February and August were national party affairs and the Republican senatorial primary. If Bristow should win in August, and most Progressives assumed that he would not, the chances that Murdock would make a strong showing in November would be appreciably lessened. If Curtis won, some Bull Moose leaders felt that they might be victorious at the general elections. They assumed that, in either case, the Bristow-Curtis battle could only aid their cause if disharmony between the two continued after August 5. They believed that unity in their own ranks was now certain, but they failed to consider national party developments in this appraisal.

At the national level a struggle had been brewing since 1912 between the national chairman, George Perkins, and the so-called radical members of the party. Because Perkins had blocked the antitrust plank offered at the Chicago convention and because he had been a partner of J. Pierpont Morgan, a number of Progressives were skeptical of his commitment to reform. During 1913 and early 1914 Amos and Gifford Pinchot quietly tried to have Perkins removed as head of the party; in May, having failed previously, Amos Pinchot sent a letter to state committeemen, condemning the New York financier and calling for his resignation. In it he charged Perkins with misdirecting the true intent of the Progressive party and with making it into a tool of big-business interests. In June, the Pinchot letter was made public.

Pinchot's assault came at the least propitious time for Progressives. They did not need a public quarrel over corporation influences in their organization when the party was facing its most crucial test. In a state like Kansas, Perkins had been an important issue in 1912, and the party's local leaders preferred that the presence of the Wall Street banker be felt financially rather than that he be seen or heard. When Progressives revived the distasteful Perkins issue in mid 1914, the Kansans were not merely displeased; they were utterly dismayed.

Moreover, some important Kansas Progressives, particularly White, were friendly towards Perkins, who had worked hard for the movement during the past two years. They had chafed under the attacks in 1912, but they were politicians who were capable of understanding the importance of the capitalist to the party. While White did not think that Perkins was an able politician, he understood that it would be disastrous if the multimillionaire's pocketbook were closed in the future. In addition, White believed that the attack on Perkins had resulted not from the New Yorker's stultifying effect on reform, but from his unwillingness to compromise with progressive Republicans. Apparently Perkins had decided that the
greatest malefactors in America were those political leaders who refused to join the new party, remaining instead with their old associations. Pinchot supposedly wanted to carry forth the crusade by supporting progressive Republicans wherever possible. Because of the Kansas situation, White and most local leaders were violently opposed to this position.9

In April, Gifford Pinchot contacted White to ask him if he would join in a call requesting Perkins to resign. Pinchot had heard that White was dissatisfied with the national chairman’s domination and that White felt that the time had arrived to push the financier aside. White, who may have criticized Perkins to Pinchot in private, was not in favor of such a move; he answered that Pinchot should stop complaining, since such activity damaged the party and did no one any good. He added, however, that if Perkins were removed, Stubbs would make an excellent national chairman. In June, following the publication of Amos Pinchot’s letter, White wrote Beveridge that it had been a “stupid” move made by a jealous politician. White predicted that Pinchot’s message would soon be used with full force against Progressivism.10

Considering that White and the Kansas Progressives believed that the Perkins-Pinchot feud had developed from Perkins’s desire to withhold aid from progressive Republicans, the Kansans must have been aghast when another blow to their hopes was delivered in June. They had been critical of Roosevelt’s silence regarding what attitude to take towards progressive Republicans who were seeking election on the old ticket. But because they thought that Perkins was opposed to helping these reformers, they assumed that Roosevelt intended to withhold his aid as well. In July, Roosevelt and Perkins both endorsed the Republican candidate for Governor of New York, Harvey D. Hinman.

Their action brought instantaneous complaints from Progressives across the country, and particularly from those in Kansas. State chairman U. S. Sartin predicted that the end had come for at least 75 percent of the Progressive parties in other areas, and he wondered whether Kansans should bother to go on. Charging that Roosevelt had turned the November elections into personality contests, Sartin questioned the wisdom of having Allen and Murdock continue in the race, since Capper and Bristow were also reformers. White, too, was angered by Roosevelt’s endorsement of Hinman, as were a number of minor leaders in the state organization. The woes of the Progressives, however, were meat to their hungry opponents, who hoped that the final disintegration of the new party had now begun. But by July there was no turning back; Bristow
might chortle about Roosevelt's actions, but he would still have to face his contest the next month without Progressive aid.11

Political campaigns normally have an identifying characteristic about them, and the 1914 primary race between Curtis and Bristow was no different in this respect. Six years earlier, Bristow's victory over Long had been characterized by Bristow's whirlwind tour of the state and by White's trenchant pen, which cut the ground from under the old senator. This year the fire of 1908 was gone, and in its stead Billy Morgan, Long's former manager, stepped forth. Bristow, who stayed out of Kansas during the preprimary period, allowed Morgan and Harrison to handle his affairs; and true to form, the result was a well-planned, dull, traditional campaign. Railroad henchmen were sent along the major lines to whip up support, and the lieutenants of the old Long faction went to work in their home areas. From Washington, Bristow and his staff franked several major speeches and other campaign literature to at least ninety thousand voters, and they solicited funds from some of the least progressive sources in the state.12

Back-room deals, too, had a place in the campaign, with Morgan executing a meaningful maneuver early. In January the Curtis faction seemed to control the Kansas Day Club meeting. Hoping to embarrass Bristow, the faction tried to have the state committee hold the 1914 Kansas Republican convention in May. According to tradition the party platform could be written then. Curtis's supporters assumed that a conservative document, which would illustrate that Bristow was out of line with the mainstream of the party, would be agreed upon. Morgan, with the aid of Harrison, blocked the move by a 37 to 34 vote. A compromise arrangement to write a preprimary declaration of general principles was fashioned, but the failure to provide for a meeting to do so kept this from coming to pass. It was finally agreed that the party council, as usual, would convene in August, after the primaries, to write the platform.13

The Curtis forces probably would have written a preprimary platform that would have illustrated the lack of Republican rejuvenation; but the assumption that, as such, it would have disagreed with the issues of Bristow's campaign was incorrect. Bristow, who for the most part had run out of steam as a reformer, discussed only the things that he had helped to accomplish in the past and a few long-established reform demands such as woman suffrage. Unlike the Progressives, he lacked new suggestions and avoided social-welfare ideas, which the Progressives stressed. The fact that he was less interested in new reforms was illus-
trated by a plea that he made in early 1914 to the old-guard boss of Crawford County, publisher J. T. ("Doc") Moore of the Pittsburg (Kansas) Headlight. To Moore, who had been anathema to the progressive Republicans after 1909, Bristow wrote that he did not think "Doc" and he "materially disagreed on public questions," and he noted that they certainly agreed on the importance of the party. Wouldn't "Doc" support him because of these facts?14

Until June, Bristow appeared confident about the election, despite Curtis's ability as a campaigner. He received reports from his managers indicating that he would assuredly win, and he even spent time considering how Murdock's antiprohibition, anti-woman-suffrage views would help his candidacy in November. Numerous Taft Republicans favored Bristow; and La Follette's old supporters, such as Rodney Elward, also endorsed him after the Wisconsin senator recommended that he be renominated. Strangely enough, White and the Progressives did not try to defeat Bristow, and they privately indicated that they felt little anger over what he had done. They did, White noted, think that Bristow had been dishonest in remaining a Republican only for the sake of keeping the office, but they planned no anti-Bristow campaign before the primaries. Old friendships died slowly with White, and it was Bristow, in the final analysis, who demonstrated a bitter attitude over the events of 1914.15

But while the Progressives held back, Curtis and other regular Republicans felt no limitations on what they could say about Bristow. Scott had been particularly incensed when Bristow's friends had stopped the movement for a preprimary convention, and he charged them with being afraid of a platform that said something. He added that Bristow wanted to go out "and fool the voters by pretending to be one thing to one man and another to another." Scott hoped that the senator's opportunism would convince "true Republicans" not to vote for him. Scott admitted that since 1912 Bristow had been a good party member, working hand in glove with Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge, and the rest; but in his first two years as a senator he had been an assistant Democrat and probably would have been a Chinaman if it would have helped him politically to be one. Curtis, he added, had been a great congressional leader, was industrious and influential, and had broad experience. If Kansas wanted a real senator, they had better send Curtis back to Washington and bring Bristow home.16

On June 10 Capper informed Bristow that Curtis, through an active personal campaign, was making inroads into Bristow's strength. He
suggested that Bristow return to Kansas to counterbalance the trend. Curtis’s advocacy of tariff protection for agricultural products was convincing Republican farmers of all persuasions to support him, and his handshaking walks through city streets were even more effective in lining up urban areas solidly behind him. Equally important, Curtis was spreading the word that Capper was in favor of his nomination, and Capper’s magnetic appeal was a significant factor in Republican politics. In July, Bristow appealed to Capper to stop these rumors by endorsing him, but Capper remained noncommittal. He offered Bristow full use of his newspaper columns, but he would not publicly intervene in the senatorial race.17

The primary campaign closed in August with an unfavorable turn of events for Bristow. Since Curtis had bolted Stubbs in 1912, there was considerable speculation that neither of the two current candidates would support the other after losing the primary. Curtis had publicly denied that he had such intentions, claiming that circumstances were different now. Bristow would not publicly make a similar admission. He told Harrison confidentially that he would not bolt, but he refused to state his position to newsmen. Bristow argued that if he were to say that he would support Curtis, he would lose progressive votes; if he stated that he would bolt, he would lose the support of regular Republicans. He decided, therefore, to say nothing. This attitude naturally gave Curtis’s backers an opportunity to assign to Bristow whatever position they wished to on the question of bolting. As a consequence, Bristow was bound to lose some support because of this issue.18

Progressive Republicans feared that there would be a smaller-than-usual turnout of voters in 1914. They assumed that this would hurt the incumbent, Bristow. The fact that Murdock was running on the Progressive ticket almost assured that fewer Republican votes would be cast in the primary. As expected, a light Republican vote was cast. The result was a victory for Curtis. He defeated Bristow by 1,890 votes, even though his vote in eastern Kansas was reduced somewhat by the candidacy of H. H. Tucker of Kansas City. The votes for the three leading Republican candidates for the Senate were: Curtis—44,612; Bristow—42,722; and Tucker—20,374.19

In comparing Curtis’s and Bristow’s returns, it becomes apparent that Curtis, as always, was strong in the eastern part of Kansas, while Bristow received his main support from west of the Flint Hills. This time, however, the Flint Hills district voted for Curtis. In previous years White had swung the area for progressive Republicans. This year he was
working in the Progressive primary. The support of the former Long machine had helped Bristow to increase his vote over his 1908 vote in the west, where he lost only nine of sixty-three counties. In comparison to Stubbs's senatorial returns in 1912, however, Bristow polled fewer votes in thirty-seven of these same counties. The Progressive candidate, Murdock, running unopposed, was particularly successful in half of the thirty-seven. Murdock was popular in his home Eighth Congressional District and in the Seventh District, which he had earlier represented in Congress.

When the 1914 support for Tucker is compared to the votes for Curtis in the 1912 and 1914 primaries, it appears that Tucker, a Kansas City oilman, hurt Curtis in twelve eastern counties, especially in the traditionally regular-Republican strongholds of Atchison, Leavenworth, Bourbon, Crawford, and Wyandotte counties. In evaluating his defeat, Bristow ignored Tucker's role, but he bitterly assailed Capper and the Progressive party. He said that Capper, after having enticed him into the race, had double-crossed him. On election night, just before the tallies for Shawnee County were reported, Bristow led Curtis by 500 votes; but when Bristow lost Shawnee by roughly 2,200 votes, he never again regained the lead. In Bristow's view, as well as in the view of his main supporters, the loss of Shawnee County indicated that Capper wanted Curtis on the Republican ticket in November and that he therefore had opposed Bristow in the county. If he had been objective, Bristow might have noted that Stubbs had lost the county to Curtis in 1912, polling fewer votes than Bristow received in 1914, and he might have considered that Topeka was Curtis's hometown. But Bristow was in no mood to be analytical, so he agreed with the observation that Capper had "sold him out."

Despite having lost the popular vote, Bristow would have won in 1914 had the primary law of 1908 still been in effect. In 1913, however, Democrats had rewritten it so that popular majorities rather than legislative districts would determine the nomination. Bristow had carried a majority of the districts, but he had lost the popular vote, so he understandably complained about the new departure. The one-time champion of the "average voter," the man who had authored the amendment to the United States Constitution that provided for the direct election of senators, now felt that the change to increased democracy had been a mistake. He lamented the fact that in order to be a senator a man had to "shake hands and palaver over his constituents" like a common sycophant. There was no reason, he added, why populous Shawnee County in east-
ern Kansas should have more say in a primary election than Barton County in western Kansas. The people, he hoped, would see the lack of wisdom in this change and would demand a new, proper system of representation. In a long letter reviewing his defeat, Bristow wrote that he was grateful to Morgan for his work. "I have," he added, "more resentment towards Will White than anybody else, though Henry Allen could have nominated me." He held similar views towards Stubbs, whose real interest, he said, was in Congressman George Neeley, who was the Democratic candidate for the Senate and was Stubbs's brother-in-law.22

On August 11 Bristow announced that he would not bolt the party by opposing Curtis. It might be the expedient thing to do, he stated, since Curtis had won under similar conditions two years after he had deserted Stubbs. "Don't worry," he said, "I have never done the expedient." Bristow later canvassed the state for Republican candidates, and in October he spoke in behalf of Curtis's election. He was permanently ensconced in the Republican party again, seemingly having lost his concern for the reform movement. He had paid politics' highest price because of his reunion, having been defeated in his struggle to be renominated. In the long run, of course, he would undoubtedly have been finished as a senator anyway. There is no reason to assume that, as the Progressive party candidate, he would have secured many more votes than Murdock received in November.23

The Progressive party's showing at the primary was poor, with Murdock, their most popular candidate, receiving twelve thousand votes. Their low tallies caused the Republican press to conclude that the results indicated that Progressivism as a separate organism was dead or, at least, dying. Party leaders denied these statements, claiming that the absence of contests caused most Progressive voters to stay home. They had hoped to make a strong showing in the primaries, but apparently they were sincere when they claimed that the results mattered little. Their greatest joy was that Bristow was defeated. They viewed his losing as proof positive that the Republican party was as reactionary as ever. Some said that his defeat illustrated what happened to authentic progressive politicians who remained Republicans. They failed to say what Capper's overwhelming victory in the gubernatorial primary represented, but they were sure that it did not demonstrate that Republicanism had been regenerated or that conservatives had been forced to relinquish their grip on the party.24

In late August the councils of both the Republican party and the
Progressive party met in Topeka to write their platforms. Although the Progressives charged that conservatives still dominated the Republican party, some old-guard leaders were not so certain, fearing that a “milk and water platform” would be adopted. They believed that it would be lacking in good, fundamental conservative doctrine. “Of course,” wrote Albaugh, “this will be Capper’s desire and realizing the precariousness of his situation . . . Curtis will not in my opinion want to stand up and make a fight for a real platform.” The only hope for conservatism, Albaugh predicted, would be James A. Troutman, who might be able to influence Capper to accept “a reasonably conservative” document.25

Had Albaugh understood the recent developments in Capper’s thinking, he would have known that the future governor would undoubtedly support moderately conservative measures. Capper sensed a new attitude among Kansas voters, and of late he had decided that the wisest policy was to deemphasize reform. “I look upon the affairs of Kansas as a business proposition,” he wrote in March, “and I stand pledged to give you a business administration, which will look after the business of the state, first, last and all the time.” When announcing his candidacy, Capper had stated that he was becoming “more progressive by the minute,” but his primary campaign consisted largely of promises to lower taxes, provide governmental economy, and build better roads.26

Still, Albaugh’s assertion that Capper would not want what Albaugh considered a “real platform” was a wise one. Despite Capper’s recognition of the new trend in Kansas, he was, unlike Albaugh, favorable to specific reforms, and he was interested in securing the remaining progressive-Republican votes. Progressives, who were more fully aware of Capper’s methods, speculated that no matter what type of document was written, Capper would call it progressive, since he had insisted that the progressive movement could survive only by rejoining the Republicans. True to form, the Topeka publisher did what was expected of him. His influence at the council forced some reform planks into the Republican platform, thereby giving more credence to his position than Progressives would admit. He maintained that little difference existed between the platforms of the Republican and Progressive parties in 1914, and he suggested a reconciliation between them on the basis of these documents.27

If Capper’s assertions were to remain unchallenged, they might affect the attitudes of independent or undecided voters. The honor of giving the lie to Capper’s statements fell to White. According to the Emporian,
the Republican platform was entirely different in spirit from that of the new party. The Republicans included the same old political "bilge" in theirs, and they used a vague terminology that was capable of allowing any candidate to take any position he liked. The two documents, White argued, were also dissimilar in that the Progressives went further than the Republicans in support of "advanced reform." To a degree, White was correct in his position. He had worried early in 1914 that the Progressive party would not develop a position that was sufficiently radical to justify its independence, but his fears had proved to be largely unfounded. His party brethren were not lax in bringing forth new ideas. Their platform was as comprehensive in its support of reform as any document written in Kansas from the 1890s to the depression years of the 1930s.

The ability of Kansas Progressives to conjure up new programs was not their biggest problem or their greatest worry in 1914. Interest in the new party and its finances were by far the major concerns. Despite White's boasts that Progressives had been organized in ninety-seven to a hundred counties and that a full ticket had been arranged in seventy-three, state chairman Sartin reported in late July that he could not even afford to call a party council meeting for August. Progressivism was bankrupt, and Sartin could no longer afford to meet expenses by advancing personal loans to the organization. He could not even buy stamps and stationery to make the call, and he suggested that unless White would assume the responsibility, the Progressive party of Kansas should be disbanded. But political parties rarely die from want of money alone, least of all because of a lack of funds to buy a few hundred stamps and some paper; so in mid August, White issued the necessary invitations.

On August 25, in response to White's instructions, representatives from forty-seven counties were present at Topeka for the first and last Progressive-party council. There they wrote their only state platform and discussed plans to establish a state headquarters. Sartin was reelected as state chairman. The council meeting was controlled by White, Murdoch, and Allen. Although these men wanted to have "advanced ideas" incorporated in the platform, they kept a proposal providing for a special tax on unused land from being included in it. They also managed to keep Stubbs's demand for government ownership of the railroads and communications systems out of the document. Stubbs had become an adamant champion of nationalization, and he insisted that it be embodied in the platform. The Kansas Progressives agreed at first. But Stubbs's Saturday Evening Post article about the proposal aroused Theodore
Roosevelt, who told White that he did not favor it. Roosevelt's opposition was enough to keep the one-time Populist doctrine out of the platform.\textsuperscript{30}

Roosevelt's equally strong complaint against national prohibition did not stop the Kansans from declaring in favor of that measure. Their attitude in part was controlled by a desire to secure W.C.T.U. votes. In all, White, Allen, Murdock, and the council wrote a platform that was fully consistent with their wish to take extreme positions. As such, it was essentially different in spirit from the Republican and Democratic documents in 1914. In specifics, however, it agreed with the Republican platform on a number of issues, giving some validity to Capper's claim that there were no differences between them. What happened was that the Progressives included every reform that the Republicans demanded, and then some.

Among the significant issues that the Progressives and Republicans both supported were a protective tariff to be written by a nonpartisan commission of experts, national prohibition, woman suffrage, presidential primaries, child-labor laws, and legislation regulating the condition of women in Kansas industry. In addition, the Progressives favored legislative and congressional caucuses that would be open to the public. They demanded minimum-wage laws, pensions for mothers, reorganization of county government to eliminate all elective offices, farm-credit measures, and a short-ballot law.

They requested a permanent board of arbitration to hear and settle disputes between labor and management, as well as a poll tax on individuals who were eligible to vote but did not do so, and a state-owned life-insurance system. In many ways they anticipated the next twenty years, since some of their suggestions, in different terminology, would become the so-called social-security laws and the Kansas Industrial Court Law. Their candidates, they said, were bound to uphold promises of the party, but otherwise they were free "to act conscientiously" as they saw "the right" on measures.\textsuperscript{31}

They did not say, but it was understood, that the candidates would advocate those portions of the document that they approved or favored most of all. Despite the presence of a full slate of congressional hopefuls and of many candidates for minor state offices, there were two contests that obscured all others in 1914. The candidates for governor and senator were not only top leaders in Kansas; they represented the national elite of the Progressive party. On their shoulders rested its future as a distinct party. Should Murdock or Allen make a strong showing or perhaps win,
there was reason to believe that the party might continue. On the other hand, should they lose badly, there were few who would want to go on. The haunting problem was how elections in other states would go, for although the Kansans were uncertain of their own chances, they were even more worried about those of other areas. A single state party could not hope to survive without a national affiliation, and the Kansas Progressives were doomed without a significant national party or without Roosevelt on hand to command the "Teddy vote." Roosevelt had shown a particular pessimism in endorsing Hinman of New York, but Hinman had not accepted the Colonel's terms and was not supported by him after all. By late 1914 Roosevelt was resigned to his own party and to the role that he would have to play in it. Late in the year he stumped the country for various candidates, paying his old political debts. The Kansas Progressives were enlivened by his activities. They were wise enough to know that eventually Roosevelt would determine what course they should follow, and his joining them on the stump seemed to augur well for their future.

Although there was nothing spectacular about the Progressive party's campaign in 1914, a moderate effort was made to elect Murdock and Allen. In September, campaign headquarters were opened, speaking tours were planned, and literature was disseminated to hundreds of voters. White was largely responsible for this activity, but the individual candidates also did their share. A certain optimism began to infect both Allen and Murdock; they began to predict victory. They said that their main opponents were the Democratic candidates on the ticket. Both Capper and Curtis, the Republican nominees, had similar feelings; that is, they felt that the Democrats constituted their major opposition. The Progressive party, the *Topeka Daily Capital* predicted, was as finished as last year's romance. "There is," it happily explained, "a revival of Republican spirit and interest in Kansas." On election eve the *Kansas City Journal*, while predicting a Democratic victory, thought that both Capper and Curtis might possibly win.

Curtis's campaign had been helped in October by Bristow, who spoke in his behalf; and as usual, Curtis made strong, personal, handshaking, backslapping tours of the state. Capper's candidacy had been attacked by some Republican newspapers after the primaries, the most notable being Frank McLennan's *Topeka State Journal*. McLennan was neither progressive nor conservative to any marked degree, but he was anti-Capper. In an effort to keep the record straight, the *State Journal* published a speech that Capper had made at Independence in December
of 1912. In it Capper seemed to support the Progressive party. The speech, the *State Journal* editor argued, placed Capper "in the light of a true progressive and an enemy of the Republican principles." Capper answered that his party fidelity was unmoved and that he had never been out of the Republican organization. He claimed that the *State Journal* had misquoted him, and he demanded an immediate retraction. No retraction came. Instead, the Progressives helped out by indicating that McLennan was substantially correct.34

This and other unfavorable comments by White and his cohorts caused a factotum of Capper's, Marco Morrow, to charge that the *Emporia Gazette* and the Progressives were playing "peanut politics." Capper made the George Hodges administration the main issue in 1914, attacking the governor for dishonesty and corruption. Here again, White and the Progressives contradicted Capper, claiming that his exaggerations were not designed to reveal alleged wrongs but to put an ambitious Republican into office. In a letter to White, Morrow wrote: "Don't stultify yourself . . . by excusing and minimizing the rottenness of Hodges and his unspeakable helpers."35

In 1914 Hodges, whose administration seems to have been honest, despite Morrow's asseverations, had his bid for reelection complicated by the presence of J. B. Billard, who had contested him in the 1912 Democratic primary and who was back now as an independent candidate for governor. Anti-Capper Republicans speculated that Capper had brought Billard into the race in order to limit Hodges's appeal in eastern Kansas. This may have been what happened. Billard certainly took "wet" votes from Hodges, since both the Progressive and the Republican candidate had the reputation of being "drier" than Hodges.

Capper's hopes for election were given a slight boost by the fact that Stubbs, though a Progressive, did not actively campaign against him; indeed, Stubbs allowed his former followers to endorse Capper. During the campaign, Stubbs remained silent on all races, seeming to be unconcerned about the fate of the Progressive party's nominees. It appears that his lack of effort was due to the desire of White, Murdock, and Allen to keep him unimportant in the new party, and Stubbs was a man who wanted to lead a political organization if he were to be involved in it at all.36

The main issues raised by Allen and Murdock during their speaking tours and in their campaign pamphlets were the reorganization of county government and the reorganization by Congress of its methods of conducting its own business. Early in 1914 Allen had been converted to a new plan for county government. He liked the idea because, to his
knowledge, no other politician had developed the issue. What he wanted was a nonpartisan county ballot and later, if possible, a civil-service system to replace elective officers at that level. Presumably, the ballot reform would be unnecessary after the classified service list was implemented, but Allen did not specifically note whether all county offices were to be on a merit basis in the future. When speaking in urban areas, he was particularly insistent in his arguments for this innovation. His campaign in metropolitan centers was helped by the fact that the Kansas Federation of Labor endorsed him in 1914. During the campaign, however, he was challenged by a printers' local, on the grounds that he operated a nonunion newspaper. He countered this by mailing his journal, which carried a union label, to labor leaders across the state. Possibly some local labor officials were reluctant to support Allen because he advocated compulsory arbitration, which the Progressive platform recommended.

Murdock's campaign centered largely on his work as a congressional leader, thus constituting what White called a "defensive contest," that is, a contest where few positive proposals were advanced. The most important aspects of Murdock's program was directed towards Senate rules regarding caucuses and unlimited debate. He favored open caucuses, opposed unlimited debate, and was against senatorial courtesy whenever it interfered with legislative procedures. His campaign, like those of other Progressives, was criticized for being too ideological and impractical. David Leahy, a Democrat-turned-Republican who was an employee of Murdock's, felt that established issues such as tax reform and governmental economy would win more votes.

By September, both Murdock and Allen were avoiding the most meaningful reforms offered by the platform of the state party. Their change in tempo undoubtedly reflected the impact of criticisms akin to that of Leahy. Presumably, they discovered what Capper had found out earlier—Kansas was not reform-minded in 1914. Why reform sentiment was diminishing is hard to tell, since the campaign was singularly free of foreign-policy issues and the war question. Nonetheless, a revision in sentiment regarding governmental change did take place. War news occupied a large place in Kansas newspapers after August; and it, in addition to the declining economy, was considered by White to be a cause for the new attitude towards reform.

On November 5, Kansans went to the polls, and by the weight of their marks in the Republican and Democratic columns indicated that they did not favor a third party. In all, half a million votes were cast in each
major election, and only 100,000, or roughly 20 percent of them, went to Progressive candidates. Because the Progressive party made such a poor showing, a statistical analysis is not particularly revealing. Murdock, who polled 116,755 votes in leading the ticket, carried only three counties, all in his former congressional district. He was second to Curtis or to George Neeley, the Democratic candidate, in fourteen others, mostly in the southwest. He did fairly well in a number of western counties, where he registered his highest percentages, but he gained most of his numerical total in the populous east.

The fact that Murdock's name was on the ballot limited traditional Republican strength in the western districts, where Neeley carried the majority of counties. Neeley, congressman from the Seventh District, won all but two counties in that area. Murdock may have taken some Democratic votes from Neeley in the east, for there Neeley fared poorly in Democratic strongholds. It is more than likely, however, that regular Republicans who had been voting against their progressive-Republican brethren in the past returned to the Curtis fold. This seems particularly true of Allen, Atchison, Crawford, Doniphan, Jefferson, Leavenworth, Miami, Shawnee, Wabaunsee, and Washington counties, where Curtis's vote jumped 5 to 10 percent over Republican returns in previous elections. Curtis's victory, as was to have been expected, was far from a stunning sweep. He defeated Neeley by 3,897 votes—seven-tenths of 1 percent of the ballots cast.\(^\text{40}\)

Capper's victory was significantly larger, with the Topekan defeating Hodges by approximately 48,000 votes, or a 9.1 percent difference. As was normally the case, more votes were cast in the gubernatorial race than in the senatorial contest. Despite this fact, it seems obvious that many people who voted for Capper did not support Curtis. Capper received about 30,000 more votes than Curtis, while Murdock received 32,000 more votes than Allen. The relationship of these figures indicates that after voting for Murdock, about 30,000 people switched over to vote for the Republican gubernatorial nominee.\(^\text{41}\) Allen polled 84,000 votes, or 15.9 percent of the total, carrying only Wyandotte and Sedgwick counties. Much of his deficit relative to Murdock's vote was in the Eighth Congressional District, which surrounded Wichita.

Compared to Roosevelt's showing in 1912, the election proved that, even with the addition of women voters the Progressive party had lost strength everywhere except in counties where the candidates or powerful party leaders lived. Statistically, Kansas Progressives were a third party of minor strength in 1914, not the second-ranking party that White envisioned. But
while statistics tell a uniform story, men do not always read results in the same manner, and those who worked hardest for the cause in 1914 came out of the campaign with varying opinions about the future.\textsuperscript{42}

Nationally, the showing of the Progressive party was worse than it was in Kansas. East of the Mississippi River, Progressives received less than 20 percent of the vote. Only in the Far West were a few Progressives elected to office. Before the sobering fact of what had happened nationally had dawned upon White, he was ready to “take up the fight” with full force, as were Allen and Murdock. Even former pessimists like Sartin felt that they had done “fairly well”; and a long-time champion of unpopular causes, Mrs. Eva Morley Murphy, wrote: “I cannot bring myself to believe that a party born of such a passion for justice, a party of such lofty purposes and ideals . . . can perish.”\textsuperscript{43}

By mid November, however, the meaning of the national disaster had impressed itself on White. He had become particularly critical of eastern Progressives and of the middle-class orientation of the movement, which had failed to inspire the working class. Editorially, he suggested that all seemed undone and that perhaps the party should be disbanded. But nothing could be gained by such actions, and even a party in its death throes was worth something. The first serious decision to be made came later in the month, when, on the advice of Roosevelt, leaders of the state party agreed to wait a year to eighteen months to see what would happen to Republicanism. Temporarily, then, the party was to be preserved, but in a state of “unanimated suspension.”\textsuperscript{44}

Progressive Republicans had viewed the election both with chagrin and with satisfaction. It had confirmed their belief that a third party was impractical and that progressivism could not survive in this form, but it had brought Curtis back to the Senate. Regular Republicans were naturally elated by what happened, but the man most comforted by developments was not a native of Kansas. From his home in Danville, Illinois, Joseph G. Cannon wrote: “I am satisfied that he [Murdock] failed. His career reminds me of Lincoln’s saying . . . ‘You cannot fool all the people all the time.’ Mr. Murdock has my permission, and I believe the people’s permission, to devote the remainder of his life to Chautauqua addresses and other private callings as he may desire.” Once again Cannon was to be disappointed by Murdock. Rather than retiring from public life, the Wichita editor, supported by almost all Progressive leaders, was elected to the national chairmanship of the party, and after the party had collapsed, he was appointed by President Woodrow Wilson to the Federal Trade Commission in 1917.\textsuperscript{45}