THE REPUBLICAN PRIMARY OF 1910
AND ITS AFTERMATH

President William Howard Taft's decision to withhold patronage from insurgents was only part of a program to defeat progressive Republicans in 1910. While formally reading insurgents out of the party, their arch­foe, Speaker Joseph G. Cannon, predicted that the year's primaries would be used as "snake hunts" against insurgents. Early in 1910 he and other regulars began to collect campaign funds to be used against incumbent progressives. They arranged speaking tours into the Middle West, the bastion of Republican insurgency. The president himself was recruited to speak in at least one state in the upper Mississippi Valley. High cabinet officers were also to be sent into America's heartland.¹

With these plans becoming public, a number of progressive-Republican leaders began to grow apprehensive. In February of 1910 William Allen White asked President Taft not to countenance the struggle that was being prepared against the Kansas insurgents. Progressive Republicans, he told Taft, did not oppose him. Their only interest was to "save Kansas for the Republican party." He promised that if the president would ignore the fight between conservatives and progressives that was impending in the state, the insurgents would support the Ohioan for renomination in 1912.²

Some regular Republicans in Kansas expected Taft to forgive the insurgents. Charles Gleed predicted that the president would gather
the insurgent chicks under his wings. Politicians were made that way, he suggested. But Taft differed considerably from the typical politician, and in the primaries of 1910 he hoped to sweep insurgents out of the Republican coop. His decision thus preordained the disruption of the Republican party in Kansas—and the defeat of his hopes. Political conditions in the state destined that 1910 would be the *annus mirabilis* of progressivism; and planning by regulars, in addition to Taft’s help, could do little to alter the inevitable.³

During 1909 and early 1910, progressive Republicans made some unusual and powerful additions to their factional alignment. Ed Madison, in the western part of the state, began to work actively with them, as did Arthur Capper in the eastern part. But more astoundingly, Cy Leland and Henry Allen enlisted in their ranks. According to White, Leland had been horned out of the old herd by younger bulls, and he was now interested in relighting friendship fires with Senator Bristow, White, and other former lieutenants. Leland, of course, claimed that the enthusiasm of the new movement sparked by Roosevelt had caused him to join the progressives. His poor showing against Governor Stubbs in 1908, however, seems to have had something to do with his switch to the ranks of the new rulers of Kansas.⁴

Allen’s entry into the ranks of the progressives was more difficult. He disliked Stubbs, and as late as 1908 he had written: “[Stubbs is] a freak, and I can’t get my gizzard down when I think of supporting him.” But Bristow and White were persistent, and by 1910 Allen was moderately reconciled to the governor. He could, at least, support Stubbs half-heartedly while working for the election of other progressive candidates. Bristow, a former business partner of Allen’s, was uncertain about the latter’s progressive opinions until 1912; but Allen’s amazing religious conversion by Billy Sunday seems to have convinced White much earlier that his old friend had taken a new lease on life. Allen, a powerful orator, was intensely emotional and easily moved by the moment. His conversion by Sunday has been described by Charles B. Driscoll as follows: “Henry Allen . . . stepped forward and grasped the great evangelist’s hand, weeping, while the inspired community arose as one man and shouted, ‘Glory to God!’” In 1906 Allen’s opponents had described him as a corrupt, unreliable, dishonest grafter; and Stubbs and Hoch had removed him from the chairmanship of the Kansas Board of Charities on these grounds. Nevertheless, his dynamic personality and broad acquaintances made him an important addition to progressivism.⁵

Before an effective counteroffensive could be launched against con-
PARTY LEADERS BY COUNTY OF RESIDENCE
(The names of regular Republicans are printed in roman type; those of insurgents/progressives, in italics.)
servative Republicans in 1910, the progressives had to solve an important problem that would face them two years thence. Senator Charles Curtis would stand for renomination then, and two progressives were interested in his job—Stubbs and Victor Murdock. Traditionally, either of these men would have tried to defeat the other in the 1910 primaries. But the fight developing between progressives and regulars precluded such action. In early 1910 they agreed to cooperate, but in so doing, they frightened Senator Bristow. Sensitive to all sorts of imaginary political deals, he feared that the Stubbs-Murdock arrangement meant that Stubbs would secure the senatorial candidacy in 1912 by promising that he would support Murdock instead of Bristow in 1914. Considerable effort was required to allay Bristow's suspicions; but by June he was satisfied, and he became intense in demanding progressive harmony. "We want to work as one man," he informed White, "burying any slight difference, and stand together for this great cause, because there are arrayed against us the most tremendous influences that ever were organized in American politics."7

By this time, White had become the engineer of insurgent politics in Kansas, and he acted as the "campaign manager" for his factional interests in the primary. Through his efforts, every incumbent conservative congressman was opposed by a candidate whom White deemed to be a progressive Republican. Neither Murdock nor Madison faced a fight for renomination, although White had to work hard to keep progressives in the Seventh District from challenging Madison. Murdock was enlisted in the primary in order to campaign nationally for insurgents, but Madison, claiming that the Ballinger-Pinchot affair was consuming most of his time, generally kept free of the intraparty struggle.7

The 1910 primary was a particularly difficult contest for Stubbs. He did not like President Taft, but one conservative congressman, Charles F. Scott, was an old friend whom he had helped to elect in 1906 and 1908. Scott was considered to be the worst Kansas offender against progressivism in Congress. Hoping to avoid a clash with his protégé, Stubbs quietly tried to get Scott appointed to Taft's cabinet as secretary of agriculture when it seemed that the president would remove James Wilson. His plan failed. Then, in July, the governor was forced to take a stand. On the pretext that Scott's newspapers in the Second Congressional District were opposing him, Stubbs began to include Scott among the reactionary forces to be defeated at the primaries. Scott was shocked. He wrote Stubbs that his newspapers were not unfriendly to the governor and that if some of his friends were opposing Stubbs, twice as many of
Stubbs's friends were fighting Scott. He claimed to have tried to stop Congressman Daniel R. Anthony's criticism of the governor during 1909. To a *Topeka Daily Capital* reporter he said: "I reply with the most emphatic negative at my command. I have not made a trade with the old machine politicians or with anybody else in the state or out of the state, involving my attitude in the gubernatorial contest." But Stubbs would not yield his opposition, and Scott was now the governor's foe.8

As a Republican governor, Stubbs at first had wished to avoid becoming involved in the national troubles caused by his progressive friends. Through 1909 he did nothing to discredit the insurgents, but he did not help them. The concerted effort to discredit Stubbs that was undertaken by regular leaders and Curtis in September consumed much of the governor's attention. The attacks in regular newspapers and in pamphlets written by Senator Curtis centered on costly reforms that Stubbs had initiated. The regulars maintained that Stubbs's programs had caused increased property taxes, allowing him to finance a political machine in the state.9

To counter these accusations, Stubbs demonstrated that taxes, though they had been increased in 1909, would be lowered in 1910. He argued that his programs were not responsible for the increase in 1909, although he noted that as government becomes more complex, it necessarily becomes more expensive. He added:

> The cry of high state taxes comes from the state agent of the school book trust, from the attorney of the Standard Oil Company, from the local attorneys for the railroads, and from the played out politicians of every county who find their occupations gone. It's the same old crowd that used to run Kansas under the convention system for the corporations.

In November 1909 a mysterious Republican official (probably Curtis) denounced Stubbs for being a "party wrecker" who was as detrimental to the welfare of the party as the congressional insurgents were. Despite these criticisms, Stubbs still did not want his reelection campaign to become involved with the split in Congress; but two events early in 1910 convinced him that he could not avoid being included in the larger trouble.10

On January 29 the annual meeting of the Kansas Day Club at Topeka was packed by anti-Stubbs, anti-insurgent Republicans. Led by Billy Morgan and David W. Mulvane, the meeting refused to endorse the Stubbs administration, and it criticized the governor and progressive legislators. Members of the Kansas Day Club lauded regular Republican
congressional leaders and Curtis. They elected a conservative board of
directors and chose Ralph Faxon, Chester Long’s former senatorial as­
sistant, as president of the club. Then they reported to Taft that the
regular forces in Kansas had bested his opponents. By linking the
governor and the insurgents in their nose-thumbing operation, the regu­
lars increased Stubbs’s appetite for revenge against them. Moreover,
White and Bristow insinuated to Stubbs that a close connection existed
between what had happened at the Kansas Day Club and what President
Taft felt should have happened.11

The second development that eventually brought Stubbs into the
national split occurred on March 13. Newspapers in the state reported
that the Republican congressional committee on campaigns was prepar­
ing to fight not only insurgent congressmen but also such insurgent gov­
ernors as Stubbs of Kansas. In a statement from Washington, regular
congressional leaders were quoted as follows:

We do not propose that a man shall be renominated for governor
by Republican votes, who is going about the state inciting a
rebellion against President Taft and the national administration.
That is exactly what Governor Stubbs is doing. It is not in the
cards for any man to be elected Governor of Kansas on the Re­
publican ticket, whose principal campaign issue is antagonism to
the national administration. Mr. Stubbs, with the insurgent
candidates for Congress, will have to stand for President Taft
and the new tariff law or forfeit Republican support.12

Stubbs thereafter began to increase the tempo of his complaints against
the party’s performance on tariff revision, but until May he refused to
identify the president with the forces of reaction. In May he opened his
bid for renomination by criticizing reactionaries, the federal courts,
boodlers, and, by inference, Taft.13

Regular Republicans apparently had a difficult time finding an ap­
propriate candidate to oppose Stubbs in 1910. Wanting to avoid the tried
but tainted old-line leaders, they selected a political novice from south­
eastern Kansas, Tom Wagstaff of Coffeyville. Wagstaff was thirty-five
years old at the time. A graduate of the New York University Law School,
he had been a city attorney, a county attorney, and an acting district
judge. As the son of Irish immigrants and the son-in-law of a leading
Coffeyville banker, Wagstaff had broad appeal in southeastern Kansas.
He was also a member of numerous civic clubs. He had one great short­
coming—he had been an employee of Standard Oil. Despite his earlier
employment, he received the endorsement of Standard Oil’s old foe,
former Governor Hoch. His managers were able to induce two other former governors, Bailey and Stanley, to support him. Hoch, Stanley, and Bailey all campaigned locally for Wagstaff.¹⁴

But Wagstaff’s debits outweighed his credits in the campaign. He was a political lightweight pitted against one of the strongest campaigners in Kansas. He lacked knowledge of state affairs and had an insufficient grasp of politics in general. His managers mistakenly allowed him to debate the governor in order to gain exposure or sympathy for the underdog. Stubbs’s stinging rebuttals and cogent arguments easily demonstrated the governor’s superiority. According to a biased *Topeka Daily Capital* reporter, Stubbs figuratively tore the Coffeyville novice apart in the exchange.¹⁵

Wagstaff had the misfortune, moreover, of being identified with those economic interests most distrusted in Kansas. Both W. J. Fitzgerald and A. C. Stich, who managed his campaign, were connected by legal and banking ties to Standard Oil. Simon Bear, another of his backers, was the recognized Bell Telephone lobbyist in Kansas, and the Republican national committeeman for Kansas, David W. Mulvane, who supported him, was considered to be a leading spokesman for railroads. Wagstaff was also designated by White as a standpat Republican, though he claimed to have Square Deal ideals.

On issues there was only one important facet to Wagstaff’s campaign. He revived the charges of 1909 that Stubbs’s reforms were costing Kansas taxpayers huge sums of money. A doggerel poem used by Wagstaff’s supporters illustrated the profundity of much of the anti-Stubbs argument:

Who raised the Farmer’s taxes?
Roscoe Stubbs!
Who’s always grinding axes?
Roscoe Stubbs!
Who busted up the old machine,
Built one with patronage and long green,
The finest you have ever seen?
Roscoe Stubbs!
Don’t you think it very funny,
Roscoe Stubbs!
How we part with all our money,
Roscoe Stubbs!
Don’t you think we ever tire,
As our taxes still mount higher?
Don’t you think it time to retire,
Roscoe Stubbs!¹⁶
Once again Curtis helped to spearhead the fight against Stubbs, knowing that the governor, if he were defeated, would be eliminated as a senatorial candidate in 1912. Curtis was naïve to assume that Stubbs would lose. Many of Curtis's friends believed that by injecting his own ambitions into the campaign, he was actually helping Stubbs, while also harming his own chances two years later. Curtis's action emphasized that the gubernatorial contest was really one of regular Republican versus progressive Republican. In the process, Wagstaff naturally became a secondary figure.

Even though Senator Curtis gave a national orientation to the gubernatorial contest, Bristow complained about Stubbs's unwillingness to speak on national issues. In June, Bristow wrote White that the governor was making a "defensive campaign talking about taxes." "He should," Bristow added, "begin campaigning along national lines, discussing the tariff . . . and general progressive policies. . . . Kansas is for progress, not reaction."17

Actually, Stubbs had spoken about a number of progressive laws that he wanted passed, particularly the public-utilities bill that failed in the 1909 legislative session. He did, as Bristow noted, spend considerable time discussing the positive accomplishments of his previous administration and the question of higher taxes. The tenor of his campaign was summed up in the following passage from one of his many speeches in 1910: "I challenge any man to name a single state in the Union that has anything like as efficient a state government, that does not . . . [spend] more money for the administration of its public affairs than Kansas." According to Stubbs, Kansas had managed to lower railroad rates, improve food inspection, guarantee bank deposits, eliminate graft from state printing, and save hundreds of thousands of dollars on school books.18

The Stubbs-Wagstaff campaign was a constant source of perturbation to White. From the first he labeled the contest a smoke screen designed to hide the real culprits of 1910—the six conservative congressmen. According to White's designation, the six included: Daniel R. Anthony, Charles F. Scott, Philip P. Campbell, James Monroe Miller, William A. Calderhead, and William Reeder. White believed, as did Bristow, that Kansas regulars felt that Stubbs was politically weaker than the Washington reformers and that the regulars hoped to distract public attention from the national aspects of the primary by focusing the campaign on the governor. Although not absolutely certain that Stubbs was the weaker candidate, White was positive that the six "Cannon congressmen"
should be defeated. He did not feel that they were dishonest, but that they were dispensers of patronage who traded “the economic welfare and political independence of Kansas” for mere “Indian beads.” In order to eliminate the six, White engineered a gigantic primary struggle. As in the 1908 senatorial primary, he put forth a prodigious effort; and this time he was helped not only by Bristow but also by Murdock, Stubbs, Capper, and other progressive Republicans who were standing for office.

White spent considerable time in late 1909 and early 1910 arranging a congressional slate. He was unable to find an acceptable opponent for the Third District, where Campbell stood for reelection, but he decided that Arthur Cranston of Pittsburg, who filed for the nomination on his own, was progressive enough to support. Diagonally across the state, in the northwesternmost Sixth District, matters were even touchier. Two men who claimed to be progressives were seeking the nomination against William Reeder. In White’s opinion neither man was a progressive, but he conceded that a victory by either would be better than returning Reeder to Congress. Reeder was especially outspoken in his opposition to the “Populistic element . . . masquerading under the name of ‘progressive Republicans.’” “The deportation of these men,” he said in May, “is justified, as the Republican party has a right to have all of its enemies in its front.” In the rest of the districts White faced no uncertainties. Madison and Murdock were tested progressives, and the four other candidates were men whom White and his factional allies had helped to induce into the race.

In the First Congressional District, White joined Capper and Stubbs to encourage a willing T. A. McNeal to run against Anthony, the son of a famous pioneer family in Leavenworth and a nephew of the women’s rights leader Susan B. Anthony. From White’s point of view, Anthony was by far the least objectionable of the conservatives. But Stubbs, who had never done well politically in northeastern Kansas, was fiercely opposed to Anthony; and Capper, after his protégé McNeal became involved, was equally hostile to Anthony. It was Stubbs and Capper who cleared the way for McNeal by convincing Robert Stone of Topeka not to run.

Accustomed to mudslinging campaigns in Cy Leland’s old district, Anthony started his renomination fight early, ignoring McNeal and attacking Capper. The Topeka publisher, Anthony charged, was a friend of criminals and a man who used immoral, dirty advertisements to sell vulgarities to unwary women and children who read his columns. Capper returned Anthony’s slurs kind for kind. But Anthony’s greatest difficulty
had nothing to do with name-calling. His trouble was party regularity. In an interview in May, he aligned himself with national Republican leaders and claimed that since these men were best qualified to solve the ills besetting America, all honest party members should support them. His district, being less reform-oriented than central and western Kansas, handily renominated him to Congress. He was subsequently reelected by a large margin.22

In the Fifth Congressional District, in the north central part of the state, Bristow was responsible for the entry of Judge Rollin Rees into the primary against Representative William A. Calderhead. Calderhead, who had been a member of the conference committee on the Payne-Aldrich tariff, personified the staunch, high-protectionist, old-guard Republican. Senator Bristow was particularly offended by the fact that the congressional district encompassing Salina sent a dyed-in-the-wool reactionary to Congress.23

The chances that Rees would defeat Calderhead were good, since the judge was a popular figure in north central Kansas, where he served on the bench of the Thirtieth District Court. He was a tariff revisionist, a proponent of an elastic currency, and a champion of the rigid regulation of railroads. The great drawback to his candidacy at first was his reluctance to run. Having failed in a prior bid, he was uncertain about whether he should seek office in a year when Republicans were badly divided. He feared losing the general election. Bristow appealed to a mutual friend, David Valentine of Clay Center, a veteran political leader and long-time clerk of the Kansas Supreme Court, asking him to convince Rees that he could win. Bristow, who had said that he would not interfere in congressional contests, promised Rees that he would work for him. In August, Rees, after he had defeated Calderhead, wrote that without Bristow's participation "the great victory in this district would not have been possible." William Allen White was also an ardent supporter of Rees, repeatedly referring to him as one of the strongest progressives in the state.24

White, however, was occupied more directly in two other congressional campaigns. In his own Fourth District of east central Kansas, he prevailed upon the attorney general of Kansas, Fred Jackson, to run; and he encouraged State Representative Alexander C. Mitchell of Lawrence to challenge Charles F. Scott for the Second District nomination. Scott was Cannon's closest friend in the Kansas delegation. He was popular, and he was considered the ablest, most intelligent, best informed conservative of the six who stood for reelection. Scott, a native Kansan,
published the *Iola Register*. He was a proficient orator, a facile writer, and a member of many educational, fraternal, and professional organizations. He served as a member of the Kansas Board of Regents and of the Board of Trustees of the College of Emporia, and he was a past president of the Kansas State Historical Society, the state editorial association, and the Kansas Day Club. In 1905 Scott had accompanied Taft, then secretary of war, on a tour of Japan and Korea.25

During October 1909 White, Stubbs, Bristow, and representatives of the *Kansas City Star* and the *Topeka Daily Capital* were all needed to convince Mitchell that he could win against so formidable a foe. Though Bristow had promised Scott that he would not interfere in the Second District, he did help to induce Mitchell to run by preparing a campaign program for the potential candidate. The senator also agreed to speak in the Second District, which he did in June of 1910, when he appeared before a Mitchell rally in Kansas City, Kansas.26

Stubbs made similar commitments to Mitchell, but with reluctance because of his friendship for Scott. Nevertheless, after Stubbs decided to oppose Scott by supporting Mitchell, he, too, became an active factor in the congressional race. “Mr. Scott’s service in Congress,” Stubbs said in July 1910, “has been so satisfactory that the corporations, that the attorneys for the railroads, the packing houses, the Metropolitan Street Railway company and the big breweries are said to be solidly lined up for him in this campaign.” “The old machine crowd . . . who fought him like tigers four years ago,” the governor continued, “are fighting just as hard for him today.”27

Scott claimed that although he was a regular Republican, he was also a supporter of progressive policies. “I am a ‘regular’ Republican,” he stated, “because I believe the only way a party can keep its pledges to the people is to have harmonious cooperation of President and Congress and to do this the majority of the majority party must be able to dictate the program of the party.” What was needed, he added, was “absolute, harmonious, ‘team work.’”28

The biblical admonition about protecting one from his friends rather than his enemies was particularly apropos in Scott’s case. In 1910 former Senator Long stumped the district for him, and part of a tour of Kansas by Speaker Cannon in August was in Scott’s behalf. With such help, Scott needed few enemies. Nevertheless, Murdock, Mitchell, Robert M. La Follette, Bristow, and Stubbs all campaigned against him.29

In White’s home area, the Fourth Congressional District, there were many who felt that the Emporia editor should be the candidate to unseat
James Monroe Miller. White, however, sought the backstage of politics, not its limelight. He preferred Attorney General Jackson, albeit a number of considerations kept Jackson from announcing his candidacy in 1909. Miller was a personal friend of Senator Curtis's, and Curtis was still influential in the area that had been his constituency ten years earlier. Besides, Miller was a crafty politician and a high official in the Kansas Grand Army of the Republic. Jackson was afraid that he could not beat the incumbent. Moreover, political leaders in Topeka were convinced that Jackson was the logical choice to succeed Stubbs as governor in 1912. Fortunately for the progressive movement, Jackson was not especially interested in the office of governor, although he considered the Topekans' advice.30

The most important deterrent to Jackson's candidacy seems to have been the lack of money. He felt that he could not afford an expensive campaign, and he also believed that he could not live on a congressman's salary in the fashion that was expected in Washington. On this count, Murdock, the spokesman of frugality, gave him no satisfaction. "Miller who boards and skimps," Murdock wrote, "saves money. The rest of the gang, incredible as it seems, have to fight to make a saving. I am ashamed of my extravagances." In December, Stubbs, White, and Bristow redoubled their efforts to make Jackson the Fourth District candidate, but not until late in January 1910 would he announce. His candidacy had the advantage, once he did enter, of having White's direct supervision. By April, White, who usually ran scared, was certain that Jackson would win. Miller's campaign was unusually quiet. The old Fourth District warhorse seemed to be tired by the political confusion that year.31

Despite Miller's subdued effort, the congressional campaign, which began in earnest in July, lived up to expectations. At first, Senator Bristow refused to involve himself publicly in congressional fights except for helping Rees and speaking once for Mitchell. In July, however, Kansas was overrun by regular Republicans of national stature. Speaker Cannon came into the state on a Chautauqua tour on July 15. He had come, or so he said, to set the record straight. "Kansas is the insurgent country, you know," he stated, "I understand that the mothers in that state send their sons to Congress with instructions to fight everything that comes up, just as the old Spartan mothers used to tell their boys to come back from the war a victor or a bloody corpse." The conservative Ed Howe of Atchison lamented the Speaker's arrival. "Cannon is an old man," Howe wrote, "not very good natured and very plain spoken. He will do the cause of the insurgents great good."32

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On July 17, in a ranting diatribe against Murdock and other Kansas insurgents, Cannon, "storming like a bull," collapsed from heat prostration. Nevertheless, he made appearances in Kansas for three more days, though he finally abbreviated his schedule. Wherever Cannon had appeared, a "truth squad" organized by Murdock arrived later. As fate would have it, when Cannon could no longer meet his Kansas engagements, Murdock was hired by the Chautauqua group to replace him. Murdock continued to spread what the Kansas City Journal chose to call Elephadonk propaganda. An Elephadonk, the Journal explained, was this new Kansas political creature with the head of a donkey and the rear of an elephant. Its motto—"In hoc signo vinces!"

When Cannon came to Kansas, Bristow decided that he should return home and take to the hustings. From mid July he spoke daily across the state, attacking Cannonism, Aldrichism, and the tariff. He was joined on the circuit by Senators Robert La Follette, Albert Cummins, and Thomas P. Gore, a Democrat from Oklahoma. La Follette came into the state armed with the voting record of each conservative congressman, and in rather hectic appearances he read their records amid rising hoots and catcalls. Cummins delivered "strong expositions of true progressive principles." "The whole campaign," wrote Bristow's father, "put me in the mind of a cyclone sweeping everything in its way."

On August 5, a few days after Kansas had held its second statewide primary, Bristow wrote a Senate colleague that "the seed sown" a year earlier in Washington had just been "harvested" in Kansas. "The reactionaries here are simply stunned." William Reeder had been very wrong when, early in the campaign, he had said: "We have elected our last specimen of this new variety of Republicans, who are Republicans at home . . . and Democrats when they reach Washington." Four of the six conservative congressmen were defeated, and Stubbs easily won renomination. Kansas had given insurgency a rousing vote of confidence.

As in 1908, the strength of progressivism was in the central and western parts of the state, but this time eastern Kansas responded in a limited way to reform. Although regular Republicans Anthony and Campbell were renominated in northeastern and southeastern Kansas, in the east central Second District, Mitchell defeated Scott. He won with huge majorities in Douglas and Wyandotte counties. In the other congressional areas, Jackson carried every county of the Fourth District, and Rees lost only Marshall County in the Fifth. Murdock and Madison had been unopposed. The gubernatorial race was an overwhelming victory for Stubbs. He received more than 60 percent of the vote and carried 98
of the state's 105 counties, 64 of them by more than 60 percent. He won the three largest counties—Wyandotte, Sedgwick, and Shawnee—the first two of which had voted against him in 1908. The antiprohibitionist strongholds in the southeast and northeast did not support him, nor did Reno County, where he lost by ten votes.36

Progressive newspapers in Kansas were ecstatic over the victory. They hailed it as a “personal tribute” to Stubbs, as a victory by the people over entrenched patronage and money, as a Republican “house-cleaning,” and as a fitting rebuke to the real traitors of Republicanism. Regular Republicans were subdued. “It is only a temporary triumph,” wrote the editor of the Iola Register, “brought about by a campaign of the most monumental misrepresentation.” The Abilene Reflector safely predicted that the world would not come to an end because of the victory. In the Atchison Globe, Ed Howe wrote: “Stubbs hasn’t a great deal to brag on . . . [he] defeated a college boy.” In contrast, Bristow’s Salina Journal predicted great things from the victory. Its editor noted that “the whole nation has been watching Kansas, . . . and [it] certainly saw something.”37

If the New York Evening Post was any indication, the nation had seen a “political revolution.” “In yesterday’s primaries,” a Post reporter stated, “[Kansas] fired a shot that will be heard ’round the country.” “The prairies are literally afire with insurgency,” said a Washington Times editorialist, while newsmen everywhere cheered or damned the election according to their own lights. There was no denying that progressive Republicanism had won a great victory. A pleased Senator Bristow wrote: “The old flapdoodle G.O.P. harangue would not count, . . . the people would not listen.” U. S. Guyer, progressivism’s manager in Kansas City, Kansas, gloated: “What doth it profit a Stand Pat Congressman if he saves his face in Washington and loses his hide in Kansas?”38

The one big lesson to be drawn from the victory, according to William Allen White, was that “the people in the long run will not be ruled by the bosses.” Unorganized, discouraged, like “Injuns fighting from behind the trees, we won,” he commented. President Taft was “sorely disappointed by the results,” but he told Curtis that Republicans should close ranks in November. According to Senator Long, Kansas suddenly had been given two Democratic parties. “The only gratifying thing . . . is to know,” he added, “that it cannot continue permanently.” The leading Socialist in the state, Fred Warren, publisher of the Appeal to Reason at Girard, scoffed. The progressives got Stubbs, he said, and the Republicans got the courts and the rest of the state administration.39 Warren
failed to add that the progressives had retained control of the Republican party, even increasing their hold.

During August, White and Bristow collected information from progressive leaders throughout the Middle West so that the Republican platform, to be approved at the party council on August 30, would be an advanced reformist document. A few days before the council was to meet, the top progressive Republicans gathered in Topeka to discuss proposals and actually write the platform that they would later support. There was a consensus among them on most reform propositions, but the initiative, referendum and recall, as well as the short ballot, caused concern. The majority of Republican leaders and the public did not seem to favor them. Only the desire to remain ideologically pure caused progressive Republicans to include these issues in the platform. At the party council, Curtis, Campbell, and Anthony opposed the platform that had been prepared by the progressives. They were easily defeated by steam-roller tactics similar to those that had been used by the reformers two years earlier. Recalling the meeting of the Kansas Day Club in January, when regulars had brushed aside insurgent leaders and jeeringly endorsed Taft while refusing to commend Stubbs, a Topeka reporter noted: “The Kansas standpatters sowed the wind last January and reaped the whirlwind in August.”

In the document drawn up at Topeka the progressive Republicans endorsed those efforts by Taft “to fulfill the party platform of 1908” and sent a flowery greeting to Theodore Roosevelt, “the new world’s champion of the rights of man in the world-old contest between rising humanity and . . . special privilege.” They lauded Stubbs’s past efforts and approved more than twenty new legislative proposals, ranging from state workmen’s compensation to the election of federal judges for inferior courts. They roundly condemned Aldrich and Cannon. The council adjourned abruptly so that many of its members could attend a speech that was to be delivered the next day by Roosevelt at Osawatomie.

Roosevelt played an important role in the 1910 progressive victory. The mystique of “Rooseveltian Policies” gave meaning to insurgency’s reform, and his silence following claims that Aldrich, Cannon, and Taft had violated “Rooseveltian Policies” made possible the vital issues in the election. Despite appearances, Roosevelt was not trying to hurt the Taft administration, and soon after the Kansas primary he set out on a tour to try to stem the Republican party’s growing polarization.

To keep a promise and to appease the town-boosters of Osawatomie, he agreed to speak at the opening of a state park commemorating John
Brown’s career in Kansas. His speech was by far the most momentous delivered by a Republican during the Progressive Era. Written by Gifford Pinchot with the help of William Allen White, it placed Roosevelt squarely in the camp of the progressives, and it gave new directions to both the ideas and the events in the reform movement. Because of its radical nature, it was denounced as “Anarchistic, Socialistic, and Communistic,” but it left the Kansas insurgent crowd bedazzled. The one man who might have spiked their plans had helped them. According to a Chicago Tribune reporter, when the former president had finished his Osawatomie address, Governor Stubbs leaped upon the stand and shouted, “My friends, we have just heard one of the greatest pronouncements for human welfare ever made. This is one of the big moments in the History of the United States.” “Either Roosevelt wrote the Kansas platform,” said Henry Allen, “or the insurgents wrote the speech.”

The progressives’ exultation over the Osawatomie appearance should have been more moderate, because Roosevelt’s address, whether they realized it or not, gave their intraparty rivals the materials they wanted. Hitherto, the Kansas movement had been characterized by a large amount of agrarian conservatism. The main issues had been molded into moral questions of an acceptable nature or into mild economic differences within a capitalistic framework. Now, wrote one regular journalist, F. Dumont Smith, the issue was clear. It was not a contest of men against wealth in politics; it was a pure assault on the basic tenets of capitalism. “It all really amounts to this,” he added, “how much money shall a man be allowed to make out of his capital and opportunities? How much shall be allotted to labor and how much to capital?” The fact that only “big business” was under fire should not fool the small-town, agricultural entrepreneur. Capital was capital, and when men were concerned with the question of how a man might use his own investments, size was unimportant. Smith warned that the same kind of assault that the Free Silver and Populist craze had produced was beginning again, and Kansans had better beware.

Many conservative Republicans decided after the primaries and after Roosevelt’s radical pronunciamento that they should vote Democratic at the general election. Writing to the Kansas City Star in September, a Republican veteran of the Civil War, who had voted for U. S. Grant for president, noted that the Democratic gubernatorial nominee, George Hodges, would get his vote in 1910. He wrote:

I am a “regular” as you call us. I have tried to be a good citizen. I have never stood for grafters and I object to being classed as
"an undesirable citizen" simply because I do not approve of the new and strange doctrines which have been incorporated into the Republican state platform and labeled Republicanism. . . . Kansas is not especially interested in the New Nationalism and "Conservation" . . . I am for George H. Hodges because if Democratic ideas must be put into operation, let us have them first hand.\textsuperscript{44}

The most important Republican leader to desert the party's nominees was Mort Albaugh. Albaugh tried to induce Long to join him in supporting Democrats, but the former senator refused. "If I . . . should make a choice between the two Democratic candidates for Governor," Long stated, "I would vote for Governor Stubbs, not because I endorse his administration, but because I prefer him to the other Democrat who had always been his follower."\textsuperscript{45}

In spite of ticket-splitting by Republicans and the switching of traditional allegiances, the November general election was a much quieter affair than might have been expected. The Democratic candidate for governor, Hodges, campaigned on a platform that was essentially the same as Stubbs's. From the time that he had commenced his political career in 1905 until the 1910 election, Hodges had been a close friend of Stubbsian reforms, even though he belonged to the opposition party. In 1910 he could only maintain that if elected, he would be more sincere than his opponent in presenting progressive ideals because he would not be plagued with a strong conservative element such as the one confronting Stubbs.

Hodges tried to win the \textit{Kansas City Star} to his candidacy, and he encouraged regular Republicans to vote Democratic. He was especially perturbed by Democrats who indicated they would probably vote for Stubbs because of the governor's reactionary Republican opponents. In February a number of Democrats, arriving for their state committee meeting and party banquet in Topeka, met with Stubbs to congratulate him for the manner in which he had performed as governor.

W. H. Ryan, former chairman of the Democratic state committee, bolted the party in order to support Stubbs. Democrats also refused to oppose Murdock in his bid for reelection, and progressive Republicans everywhere were moderating complaints against their traditional opponents, hoping in this way to woo Democratic votes. Some voiced the suggestion that progressives in both parties form a new organization. After the primary, Republican reformers pointed out that in Kansas their party could function as such an alliance. To a Topeka Democrat,
Bristow wrote: "In my judgment the most practicable way to bring about reforms is to . . . control . . . the Republican party. . . . There are so many people in absolute accord with our views who by tradition are attached to the old party organization."\textsuperscript{46}

Hodges, hopeful that he would win because of the Republican split, was angered when Stubbs defeated him with what he considered to be Democratic votes. He agreed with J. L. Caldwell, who said that the Democratic party had "saved the day for such asses as Stubbs." Caldwell added, "Honestly, . . . it's either a sad commentary on our own abilities, or a sad commentary on the wisdom of the Kansas voter, when such men as Stubbs and Mitchell can succeed with the dope they put out." During the campaign, Caldwell asked a Democratic voter if he would support Hodges. The voter answered that he thought Hodges was the best man for the job, but he would have to vote for Stubbs because Republicans planned to vote for Hodges. "The poor fool," Caldwell noted, "he was afraid to vote his ticket for fear we might elect a Governor." "You're right," Hodges replied, "the trouble with the idiots was, as you suggest, they were afraid that they would elect a Democratic Governor." "This very fact," wrote another Democratic leader, "the activity of . . . standpat Republicans for you, influenced a lot of FOOL Democrats to vote for Stubbs."\textsuperscript{47}

As usual, Republicans won the general election in Kansas. This time, however, newsmen and politicians considered the victory an extremely significant accomplishment. In other states where Republicans normally won, Democratic candidates were victorious; but in the progressive-Republican Middle West the party of Lincoln temporarily survived the challenge of the opposition. White was proud that Kansas remained Republican, since the victory vindicated his view that only by becoming progressive could Republicans succeed in 1910. On the other hand, Senator Bristow was "very much disappointed" because the margins were so close. "I guess," he concluded, "we were lucky at that." The eastern United States voted Democratic wholeheartedly, and Senator Albert Beveridge, an insurgent friend, lost in Indiana.\textsuperscript{48}

"It is too bad," wrote Mort Albaugh, "that a few more Republicans in Kansas didn't take my view . . . of which is the better Democrat—Stubbs or Hodges." Since the difference in votes had been close, Albaugh felt that "a little well directed work . . . would easily have defeated Stubbs" and would have taken "a little of the glamour from the 'tin God' business in this state."\textsuperscript{49} Stubbs was reelected, but as a minority governor, receiving only 49.8 percent of the vote.
In congressional races other than those involving Murdock and Anthony, the change in voting percentages, comparing the nonpresidential years of 1906 and 1910, ranged from an 8 percent decrease in Campbell's Third District to a 1.4 percent gain in the Fourth by Jackson. On the average, Republican congressional votes diminished by 2.5 percent from 1906 to 1910, with losses registered in the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh districts. Governor Stubbs received 1.5 percent more votes than Hoch had received in the 1906 election. Comparing Stubbs's showing in 1910 to his returns in 1908, when President Taft headed the ticket, the governor's winning margin was 2.7 percent smaller. Republicans were generally convinced that their party was losing strength because it could not bring its various elements into harmony. Unstated, but obvious, was the fact that Kansas had suffered a loss as the result of the primary defeats of Scott and Calderhead, who were important members of influential House committees.

Two state races exasperated both regular and progressive Republicans. Billy Morgan, seeking reelection to the Kansas house, was defeated in Reno County, while Stubbs's right-hand man, Jonathan Dolley, lost his bid to continue as the representative from Wabaunsee County. Some party leaders lamented Morgan's defeat; almost all mourned the loss of Dolley. As Republican state chairman, Dolley had treated conservatives so fairly that both the Topeka State Journal and the Kansas City Journal felt that he should have been supported by regular Republicans.

The breakdown of traditional voting patterns was of considerable concern to both wings of the Republican party, yet there was little immediate attention devoted to harmony in Kansas. The initial effort to reunite Republicans came not within the state but in Washington. In December 1910 President Taft called a harmony conference at the White House, which Bristow attended. Taft's prescription for unity did not please the senator, who left the meeting predicting a Republican disaster in the election of 1912. When Robert La Follette helped to organize the National Progressive Republican League (N.P.R.L.) in January 1911, Bristow endorsed its purpose of promoting progressive programs.

Bristow was joined by Stubbs, Murdock, Capper, and other Kansas reformers in heralding the birth of the N.P.R.L. Like Bristow, however, they favored its program but not La Follette's presumed presidential candidacy. The popular prospective candidate in early 1911 was Roosevelt. Until he finally decided to seek the Republican nomination, presidential politics in the state were a confused affair. Both La Follette and Taft had influential progressive-Republican supporters up to late 1911.
Taft lost his progressive backers in part because of his advocacy of Canadian Reciprocity and in part because of his veto of the "Farmers' Free List" tariff during the special session of Congress in 1911. The Farmers' Free List favored agricultural-rural interests over those of industrial-urban areas. Taft also suffered among progressives because of his unpopularity with rank-and-file Republicans as a result of the bad press that he had received during the Sixty-first Congress. When he visited Kansas as part of a transcontinental political tour in mid 1911, he was met with unusual silence. At the state fair in Hutchinson, where the president spoke, Senator Bristow was amazed to find so gloomy an atmosphere. "There was no demonstration," Bristow wrote, "the Hutchinson parade was more like a funeral than a political rally." In an era when college youths were respectful towards national leaders, Governor Stubbs warned University of Kansas students before Taft visited Lawrence that the president should be received with the dignities befitting his office and that he should not be abused. Taft left Kansas a discouraged man, his face illustrating his deep concern.

La Follette's presidential flirtation in Kansas was largely with Bristow and White. Ed Madison opposed the Wisconsin senator, while Stubbs and Capper refused to be identified with his candidacy. White privately committed himself to La Follette in January 1911. He dramatically told the senator: "Thy people shall be my people and thy God, my God." Although he claimed that Kansas progressives were trying in the autumn and early winter "to line up the state for Senator La Follette," he refused to organize an N.P.R.L. committee in Kansas. In October 1911 he wrote Roosevelt that he should get ready to run. "I think you might just as well prepare for the fireworks because it [the demand that he run] is coming [and] you can’t stave it off." Bristow's attitude towards La Follette was as confusing, but not as inconsistent, as White's. He endorsed the senator in June 1911. In August he agreed with Harold Chase that La Follette did not have a chance, because he was a "John the Baptist type leader." In December, while Roosevelt's candidacy was blossoming, Bristow wrote: "La Follette is a stronger man with the American people today than Roosevelt [and] . . . would get more votes if he were the nominee." When most progressive Republicans, including White, used La Follette's physical collapse during a speech in Philadelphia on 2 February 1912 as a pretext for no longer supporting him, Bristow did not. He wrote to La Follette's friends that he was sure that after a short rest La Follette would be back in the
campaign. Bristow once told White: “I shall stand for La Follette to the end.” On 15 March 1912 the end came, when he wrote to a friend, advising him to help nominate Roosevelt. Five days later, his newspaper, the Salina Journal, endorsed the former president. O. K. Davis said in Outlook Magazine that Bristow was “a politician of unusual sagacity . . . in close touch with the rapidly developing situation.”

Men such as Bristow deserted La Follette in Kansas because La Follette’s candidacy never took hold. Like Taft, La Follette did not seem to be capable of leading a united, successful Republican party in 1912. More than almost anything, Kansas progressive Republicans wanted to win election or reelection that year. The growing strength of their Democratic adversaries worried them, especially after two special elections late in 1911.

Midway through 1911 Congressmen Alexander Mitchell and Ed Madison died. Special elections to fill their seats were disasters for Republicans, as politicians friendly to Taft were defeated and Democrats were elected. After the second loss, when Madison’s old seat was filled, the Kansas City Star carried a report expressing a view that was widespread among progressives: “If ever the Republican party in Kansas needed a Moses to lead it out of the wilderness it needs him now. That Moses is Roosevelt.” Commenting on the Republican defeat in Madison’s district, Billy Morgan touched the tender spot of Kansas Republicans when he wrote: “I think, . . . any nominee who has been supported by the Republicans will be cut by the insurgents, not by the leaders perhaps, but by many of the privates. I am of the opinion that the same result would happen if the conditions had been reversed.” The losing candidate in the Seventh District, Frank Martin of Hutchinson, struck a significant chord after his loss when he noted: “Of course, Mr. Roosevelt would be very strong in this district among Republicans and Democrats.” White carried this to its logical conclusion: “It is Roosevelt or Bust!”

Although Roosevelt’s candidacy ultimately caused a bolt from the Republican party, at first it was seen as the only way to close the split. He was initially presented as the candidate of harmony. “The standpatters,” White wrote in January 1912, “will all vote for him because they think he can carry the state and . . . the progressives will take him in order to beat Taft.”

Roosevelt’s correspondence for the second half of 1911 and the early months of 1912 shows how he shifted from the determination not to run to the decision to seek the presidential nomination. The Taft administration’s prosecution of the United States Steel Corporation under the anti-
trust laws undoubtedly served as the catalyst to his candidacy by embarrass­
ning the former president. But local politicians also successfully pressured him into becoming a candidate. In these activities Kansans played important roles. For one thing, leaders such as Stubbs, Allen, Capper, and White created “grass-roots” demands for Roosevelt. They made him “the man of the hour.” During 1911 they frequently wrote letters imploring him to run. Stubbs was one of the governors who signed a round-robin letter, circulated under Roosevelt’s supervision, calling the Colonel into the race. In February of 1912 Roosevelt re­sponded to this letter with his famous declaration “my hat is in the ring.”

The big questions of 1910 and 1911 had been answered by then. Kan­
sas progressives were the majority group in the state’s Republican party. They had easily defeated their regular adversaries, but at the cost of splitting the party. In order to repair the split, most of them were now committed to Roosevelt’s presidential candidacy. What they could not know was that in endorsing Roosevelt they were creating a situation that would divide Republicans still further and would ultimately cause its progressive element to leave the party itself.