The progressive movement within the Kansas Republican party grew to maturity in a political soil fertilized by factional unrest. Beginning in the nineteenth century, Kansas Republicans splintered into feuding groups, because the spoils of office were too few to satisfy all party leaders. The factionalism that contributed to the disorder that aided the rise of progressivism, however, dated from 1900, when a group known as the Boss-Busters began a systematic campaign to remove national committeeman Cyrus K. Leland and his "machine" from power. A fight within the Republican party made little sense at that time. William Jennings Bryan, who had dragged Kansas into the Democratic column in 1896, was still active in the affairs of his party. He seemed assured of renomination when the national convention met at Kansas City in July. Moreover, Populists, Democrats, and Silver Republicans had formed a coalition in the state. To be sure, Republicans had won off-year elections in 1898, when about 45,000 fewer voters had gone to the polls. But the Fusionists of 1898 had demonstrated a cohesion not evidenced before; and although some Democrats and Populists were pessimistic after the elections, others, such as John Breidenthal of Topeka, looked forward to getting reformers back to "first principles" so that they could win the state in 1900. Complacency did not seem to be the order of the day for Republicans; from the standpoint of party interest a factional fight was
unwarranted. Nonetheless, they had one under way as the new century began.¹

Cy Leland of Troy, the source of factional unrest, had dominated Republican affairs in the state during the decade when Populism waxed strong, and as a result he had created a potent group of enemies within the party. He was unable to satisfy the demands of all important members, and thus, unintentionally, he had created a combination of anti-Leland Republicans. In 1899 these dissatisfied leaders founded the Boss-Busters League. The aim of the organization was as simple as the cause of factionalism itself. The Boss-Busters planned to remove national committeeman Leland and his friends from office. In this way they believed that they could construct a firm foundation of party unity. Like participants in other antiboss movements occurring throughout the United States in those years, they claimed to oppose “boss rule” on principle and to desire the establishment of political leadership under democratic tenets. Their reform rhetoric disguised an opportunistic reality. The Boss-Busters were factionalists, not idealists.²

Whether one believes that Cy Leland bossed the Republican party of Kansas to the extent his opponents charged depends largely upon one’s conception of bossism. Certainly his opinions were significant in the decisions that Republicans made regarding policy, patronage, and state candidacies. But that he alone controlled these questions, as the Boss-Busters maintained, is undeniably false. From the time that he became national committeeman in 1884 until 1900 he always shared, or was forced to share, the prerogatives of power. Indeed, even in the years of his greatest strength, he had to accept the candidacies of men he did not like.

On certain occasions, however, Leland could be unbending. As the Boss-Busters knew, some politicians never received his help and were always thwarted by him. The reasons for his opposition varied, but in many cases they related to things that men had done to displease him in the past. Leland, like most Kansas Republicans, was a hardened factionalist. He had been “trained,” as William Allen White, renowned editor of the Emporia Gazette, expressed it, in a definite Republican camp in the 1860s; and to enemies of this group he remained permanently hostile. Only when no alternative was possible would he work with these traditional opponents, and then they always had to remember that Leland’s aid came out of necessity, not choice, and that at the first opportunity he would turn against them. Certainly, this attitude made him appear untrustworthy, but in the context of Kansas affairs it made him no more vicious than the typical party leader.
To some people who knew Leland intimately there was much to admire about him. White, who enjoyed his friendship for more than twenty years, approvingly viewed “Uncle Cy” as “a man who would stay in the game of politics, protect his ante, and play his cards, even after he had lost his major stake.” The most favorable comment concerning Leland came from William A. Johnston, chief justice of the Kansas Supreme Court. At Leland’s sixtieth birthday celebration Johnston asserted that Leland was “too brave to be aroused by power, too generous to be moved by revenge, too level-headed to be moved by flattery, and too manly and honorable to ever break a promise or desert a friend.”

Leland agreed with these evaluations. In his reminiscences, published in 1913, he claimed that he had never lied, welshed, or used money to buy votes or offices during his long career. He had, he said, depended for his success upon a private platform which was to “work in politics and keep everlastingly at it.”

If Leland had been all that he and Johnston claimed, trouble would have found him anyway in contentious Kansas politics. That many Republicans did not agree with these views made opposition to him more certain. E. N. Morrill, governor from 1895 to 1897, appraised his one-time friend as a man who “would scruple at nothing.” “He would,” Morrill charged, “disregard all pledges, all friendships, all principles of honor and right to work out his favorite plans.” The most graphic assessment of Leland came from attorney William P. Hackney, a bombastic orator from Winfield. “A dog he is,” Hackney said, “he was born a whelp.”

Actually, there was little in Leland’s physical appearance to suggest that he could be passionately disliked or admired. He possessed a strong, lionine face, but often graced it with a smile, a twinkling expression. He was five feet, six inches tall, of medium weight, had a ruddy-brown complexion, and in his later years wore a well kept, grayish beard and mustache. He was friendly, though quiet in conversation, and had a keen, agile mind, with an elephantlike memory. Like most state politicians, he was never known as a man of profound intellect. He reportedly walked with a slight swagger, but in general he might easily have been one of a number of well dressed, locally important politicians in Kansas at the turn of the century.

That Leland was not is obvious. Although he never reached the pinnacle of an all-powerful boss, as his opponents maintained, he did hold important positions of power within the Republican establishment. Not only was he national committeeman for sixteen years, in 1900 he was recognized as President William McKinley’s and Senator Mark...
Hanna's most trusted aide in the southwestern United States. He had been given this unofficial recognition after helping to secure McKinley's presidential nomination and election in 1896. Officially, McKinley appointed him commissioner of the richest and most powerful federal office in Kansas, the Missouri Valley pension agency.

Earlier, under President Benjamin Harrison, Leland had held another important federal office as collector of internal revenue for Kansas. But though his federal connections had helped him in the scramble for leadership, his reputation as a boss stemmed from a clever move that he engineered in 1894. That year he won the gubernatorial election for Morrill, a highly respected banker from Hiawatha and a member of one of the better-known political families in America. Although the nineties were not good years for the Republican party, in 1894 its Populist and Democratic opposition appeared to be on the verge of dividing their successful Fusionist organization because of internal disagreement. Leading Fusionists did, however, make a serious attempt at reconciliation early in 1894. At this juncture Leland supposedly managed to have disaffected Democrats produce a nominee of their own for governor. By splitting the opposition, he succeeded in electing Morrill with only 49 percent of the vote. He and his friends never let Kansas Republicans forget this maneuver. They recalled it on all appropriate occasions.

But there were other sources of Leland's power during the nineties. Like many successful Kansas politicians, he worked closely with powerful economic-interest groups in the state, especially the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company. With the help of one of its capable general solicitors, George Peck, Leland first became a major force within the Republican party. In 1900, however, Peck had become chief attorney for the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad Company in Illinois, and the Santa Fe purportedly had withdrawn from state politics. Furthermore, other Kansas railroads, once neutral or friendly towards Leland, now opposed him.8

Although the Boss-Busters paraded a form of antiboss idealism, the major reason for their opposition to Leland was his failure either to recommend their friends for office or to deal with them as political equals. For example, he angered Marcus A. Low, general attorney for the Rock Island, and J. R. Richards, state solicitor for the Missouri Pacific, by refusing to recommend one of their associates, Judge Albert Horton, for the federal bench in 1899. Leland opposed Joseph R. Burton of Abilene as a senatorial candidate on several occasions, and he blocked the Topeka banker David Mulvane from becoming Republican national committee-
man. Unwisely, he kept General Joseph K. Hudson, publisher of the Topeka Daily Capital, from being appointed consul to Mexico in 1898. A. W. ("Farmer") Smith, a former Republican gubernatorial candidate, felt that Leland had double-crossed him and caused his defeat in 1892; while Patrick Henry Coney, an official of the Kansas G.A.R., disliked Leland for his alleged mismanagement of the pension office as well as for his opposition to Coney’s friend Congressman Charles Curtis.⁹

Since many leaders of the Boss-Busters League were politicians from Topeka, its first meeting was held there in the summer of 1899. Initially the Boss-Busters were concerned with offsetting a campaign against Charles Curtis which was being waged by Leland and his protégé Congressman Willis J. Bailey.¹⁰ Although Curtis had spent three terms in the House of Representatives, he had served the First Congressional District, composed of northeastern Kansas counties, for only one year. He had represented the Fourth Congressional District in east central Kansas until a Fusionist redistricting measure had gone into effect in 1898. To foment trouble, the Fusionists had placed Curtis’s home county, Shawnee, in Leland’s First District. Before this time Leland and his friends had ruled the area unchallenged. When Curtis announced in 1898 that he would seek the nomination in his new district, Lelandites recognized the threat that this posed to their power.

Leland therefore picked his most popular adherent to oppose Curtis at the 1898 nominating convention in Horton, Kansas. He chose the amiable, intelligent banker from Nemaha County, Willis J. Bailey. Leland could not persuade Case Broderick, the incumbent of the old First District, to step aside. Broderick’s presence in the contest limited the support for Bailey, since both men had been members of the same faction. By the time Republicans met at Horton, it was apparent that Leland could not secure the nomination for Bailey. Nevertheless, a reported 701 ballots were taken before Leland compromised with Curtis’s backers. In one of the strangest exchanges in political history, Leland, with Bailey’s knowledge, gave Curtis the Republican nomination in the district. In return, Bailey was to have Curtis’s support in 1898 at the Republican state convention for the nomination as congressman-at-large. These men further agreed that two years later, in 1900, Curtis would run at-large and Bailey would seek the district position. This arrangement was called the Horton Agreement. Only part of it was kept.

In 1898 both men were nominated and elected as planned. But in 1899 Curtis, now well established in his new district and nearly certain of renomination, decided to break the agreement. When he repudiated it,
he insisted that only Marcus A. Low had been authorized to operate as his official representative at Horton and that because Low had made no agreements in 1898, he, Curtis, was not bound by what others might have done in his name. Among those who signed the Horton Agreement were two of Curtis’s staunchest supporters, David Mulvane and Judge Horton.11

Leland and Bailey were furious when it became apparent in 1899 that Curtis did not intend to fulfill the bargain. They planned to repay his treachery by demolishing him, but in their haste they miscalculated. They mounted a systematic attack on Curtis midway in 1899, thus causing the reaction that gave birth to the Boss-Busters League. Then they failed to appreciate the strength of the league. In letters to one of their confederates in Washington, Joseph L. Bristow, they derided the “clubs” of “old fossils” formed against them, and they scorned the league’s “brass band campaign.” A few weeks before the First District convention, however, some of Leland’s associates began to grow uneasy, and a few of them defected to the Boss-Busters. Leland’s “farobank style of politics” would not work this time, reported one friend. Curtis was renominated by the convention in February; he was subsequently reelected.12

Curtis’s candidacy called the Boss-Busters League into existence, then tested its strength. The success of the league caused its founders to expand their goals. In late 1899 Joseph Burton joined some of his friends who were already active in the league, thus giving the organization a statewide purpose. Burton decided that through the Boss-Busters he could demonstrate that he, not Leland, was the major political force in the Republican party. In this way he could further his ambition of replacing Lucien Baker when Republican legislators met in January 1901 to elect or reelect a U.S. senator. Because other Boss-Busters hoped to increase their political influence through a statewide campaign against Leland, they supported Burton under the Busters’ banner.

Joseph R. Burton, who determined the course of Boss-Buster affairs from February to May of 1900, had been a tireless worker within the Republican party for the past twenty years. He was an extremely handsome man, with a finely chiseled nose, deep-set eyes, and a bushy mustache; only extra large ears marred his otherwise classic visage. He spoke eloquently, with the trained voice of an actor, had an excellent command of the language, and could memorize lengthy speeches after one or two readings.

During the 1880s he became a leading member of the antiprohibitionist wing of the Republican party. He wrote the first Kansas antitrust law in 1889. Earlier, he was instrumental in securing the first legislation regu-
lating Kansas railroads. Misfortune befell him in 1889, when he was accused of accepting a bribe in connection with the passage of a bill allowing insurance companies to appeal decisions of the superintendent of insurance to state courts. According to his testimony, he was innocent of the charge. He had been employed by Topeka insurance interests, but only after the close of the session that passed the bill. Whether he told the truth in this instance is now an academic question; thereafter, his reputation suffered, although his career bloomed.13

In his bid for Congress in 1892 Burton was defeated by the Populist-Democratic organization. He first sought nomination to the Senate in 1894, when Lucien Baker, a compromise candidate promoted by Leland, defeated him. Two years later, Burton managed to carry the Republican caucus, but William Jennings Bryan's campaign had swept a majority of Fusionists into the state legislature, which elected a Democrat, William A. Harris. At the Republican state convention in 1898 Burton served as permanent chairman, but he was not strong enough to displace Leland in the party.14 In the next two years his political power increased considerably.

By the time of the 1900 state convention Burton reportedly numbered two-thirds of the delegates among his supporters. At the Boss-Busters caucus on May 15, over 353 delegates were present, and 200 others who were due to arrive at the convention were pledged to oppose Leland.15 Burton's purpose at the state meeting was to defeat Leland's forces and demonstrate his power within the party. Through the Boss-Busters he hoped to control the Kansas delegation to the national convention and to have it choose one of his friends as national committeeman. If his candidates made a good showing in the state convention, county leaders would be impressed, and Burton believed that they would influence state legislators to vote for him in the Republican legislative caucus that would select the U.S. senator in 1901. Legislators would also be watching affairs at Topeka so that they could catch any political bandwagons that started rolling there.

The major problem that Burton faced in fulfilling his ambitions resulted from the aspirations of an extremist wing of the Boss-Busters, which was determined to disgrace Leland. Although Burton disliked the "boss," he did not want a fight to develop that would leave Republicans divided in November. His dilemma was resolved in an unusual way. Recognizing that the Boss-Busters would control the convention, Leland diverted attention from the magnitude of his defeat by claiming that the "real contest" was the one concerning the Republican state chairmanship. In
reality, this position was not in question. According to traditional meth­ods, there was no way that Leland's close associate Mort Albaugh could be removed. Under the Kansas political system, the governor named the state chairman; Governor William E. Stanley, first nominated with "the machine's" help in 1898 and certain to be renominated, would undoubt­edly retain Albaugh. Taunted by Leland, the extremists among the Boss­Busters threatened to remove Albaugh by breaking tradition and carry­ing the selection of state chairman to the convention floor.\textsuperscript{16}

They probably could not have done this; but if they had tried, a fight would have developed that no one could have controlled. Understand­ably, Burton could not allow this to happen. He informed the Boss­Busters that the question of the state chairmanship was so disruptive to Republican harmony that he had to meet with Leland's friends and discuss a compromise. In a caucus just prior to the beginning of the convention, Burton and the Lelandites worked out an understanding. Stanley would name the state chairman; Burton would decide the Re­publican delegation to the national convention. Silas Porter, an ally of Leland's, would be temporary chairman of the convention, but Burton would choose the permanent chairman. This agreement was enforced to the letter on May 17.\textsuperscript{17}

The 1900 state convention, though viewed differently by some writers, was a defeat for Leland and a complete success for Burton, albeit extreme Boss-Busters were dissatisfied with Burton's conciliatory maneuvers. Not only did Burton's friends control the national delegation, which later elected Mulvane as national committeeman; Burton capped his conven­tion victory in January 1901, when he easily carried the Republican legislative caucus. Later in the month he was elected to the Senate. Of Leland's machine, Albaugh continued as state chairman, and Stanley was reelected governor. These developments kept Leland's defeat from being total.

The selection of Porter had disturbed A. W. ("Farmer") Smith, one of the extreme anti-Lelandites, but the retention of Albaugh threw him into a rage. Leland's defeat was less complete than Smith had expected. "I get madder and madder," he wrote an ally, "to think that we allowed ourselves to be misled and deceived by a lot of fellows that we ought to have known better than to have trusted."\textsuperscript{18} "Every mistake that was made at the convention," he added, "is traceable to the Burton camp or influ­ence. Instead of Burton coming there and working with us, he . . . [ran] a little side show of his own."\textsuperscript{19}

After the 1900 state convention the Boss-Busters League fell into tempo-
rary inactivity. It was revived briefly in late 1901, when Leland came up for reappointment as the Missouri Valley pension agent. In the fight over reappointment the Boss-Busters were again instrumental, helping to prejudice President Theodore Roosevelt against Leland. Roosevelt had asserted earlier that he was honor-bound to reappoint Leland, since McKinley had intended to do so. But Burton named his own candidate, Wilder Metcalfe, to oppose Leland; and Roosevelt, who had refused several other recommendations of Burton’s, did not want to further aggravate him.20

Although Roosevelt made much of Leland’s reputation, there is reason to believe that this had little to do with his decision not to reappoint the one-time boss. It may be, as John Blum maintains, that Leland was removed because of his close association with Senator Hanna, whom Roosevelt feared would contest his 1904 nomination.21 Although Blum does not document his assertion, in August 1901, the month before McKinley’s assassination, Roosevelt seemed favorably disposed towards Leland. Then he wrote William Allen White that he was “particularly struck” by what he had heard of Leland and that he wanted to meet him. “If he decides for me,” added the ambitious vice-president, “I want to take [him] . . . into my innermost councils and have him as one of the men who shapes the whole course of events.”22 Something or someone changed the president’s mind; Metcalfe was appointed.

Leland’s defeat removed him from the center of political agitation in Kansas, allowing him an opportunity to regroup. During early 1902, like the mythical Phoenix, he began quietly to arise from the ashes. Before 1901 he had begun to cultivate members of the less fanatical opposition among the Boss-Busters, such as Marcus Low, whose support Leland had acquired in the pension-agency fight. Low had gone to Washington, where he met with the president and tried to persuade him to reappoint Leland.23

Leland’s opportunity to regain stature within the party came in a much different and more secure fashion. In 1902 and early 1903 two of his former lieutenants, Willis J. Bailey and Congressman Chester I. Long, won important nominations and elections. Bailey, whom Leland had groomed for Congress, was nominated by the Republicans in May as their candidate for governor, and he easily defeated his Democratic opponent, W. H. Craddock, in November. Then, in January of 1903, after months of fighting, Long emerged as the victor in a scramble for William Harris’s senatorial seat. Leland was only a nominal factor in both elections, but these victories, coming to men closely associated with him,
improved his political standing immensely. When another antimachine
fight was mounted in 1904, Leland was still important enough to be
included as a machine leader. By then, however, Leland was not the
main target, Governor Bailey bore the brunt of the so-called reform
activities.

Bailey had been an active Republican during the last two decades of
the nineteenth century. From 1888 to 1900 he had continuously sought
public office. He had been a state representative, but had been defeated
three times in his efforts to obtain nomination in the First Congressional
District. He served as the congressman-at-large from 1899 to 1901. In
late 1901 he began to build support throughout Kansas for his nomination
as governor, and by January 1902 he was a serious contender.

Some politicians believed that Bailey’s candidacy would end in a failure
because of his close connections with Leland. Leland at first tried to
dissuade him from seeking the nomination; but once Bailey became
committed, Leland started to work covertly for him. In January the
former boss persuaded Low and his Rock Island friends to remain neutral
during the gubernatorial struggle. Their neutrality indicated that rail­
road interests would not oppose Bailey. Leland now felt secure, and he
began to work openly. He tapped sources that had made him powerful
before Boss-Busterism. In the Second Congressional District, for example,
he and a prominent newspaper friend, Billy Morgan, reportedly ran over
their opposition and packed the district convention with “Bailey’s
crowd.”

In county after county, Bailey won old-time Leland supporters
to his standard. But Bailey’s candidacy received its most significant boost
from other sources. Congressman Long and his campaign managers,
C. S. Jobes and Mort Albaugh, decided early in 1902 that Bailey’s success
in the gubernatorial race was indispensable to Long’s senatorial fight at
a later date. Cooperation with Bailey and the election of Bailey would
give Long and his friends the gubernatorial prestige and patronage that
they needed for victory in January 1903.

To be doubly sure that in supporting Bailey he was backing a winner,
Long told Bailey to line up the railroads. Their neutrality, which was
implied by Low’s actions, was not good enough. Long felt that the rail­
roads could be brought to Bailey’s side if Bailey became the “people’s
candidate.” Thus, Long advised Jobes and Albaugh to whip up grass­
roots support for Bailey and make him the “popular and leading candi­
date” before the state convention.

In Albaugh and Jobes, Long possessed allies who were unwilling to
chance the whims of a fickle public to convince railroad officials that
Bailey was their man. They preferred a more direct method. In April they arranged a meeting in St. Louis between Bailey and the general counsel of the Missouri Pacific, Alexander G. Cochrane. Cochrane was an active factor in Kansas politics; he served in part as a “political broker” between state politicians and the financial interests that owned western railroads.\textsuperscript{27} He could control Missouri Pacific support, and he could influence other railroad officers to support certain candidates.

It was at the conference between Cochrane and Bailey that the future governor of Kansas convinced the Missouri Pacific attorney that he would serve Cochrane's interests better than other candidates could. In a letter to Congressman Long, Jobes explained the importance of the Bailey-Cochrane meeting, noting that Cochrane had promised all of the Missouri Pacific’s political strength to Bailey. Cochrane also promised to keep other railroads from opposing Bailey. At the same time, Albaugh, fearful of an unexpected slip, arranged for the Union Pacific to support Bailey. He promised the general attorney of the Union Pacific, N. H. Loomis, that C. C. Coleman, a personal friend of Loomis's, would receive the Republican nomination for attorney general of the state if Albaugh's friends controlled the forthcoming convention in Wichita.\textsuperscript{28}

At about the time that Jobes and Albaugh struck their agreements with railroad officials, George Cole, a popular political figure who had been spoken of as the “railroad candidate,” withdrew from the gubernatorial race to become a staunch supporter of Bailey. With Cole's withdrawal, only one obstacle appeared to remain in Bailey's path to the statehouse. The followers of Senator Burton, with some exceptions, were backing James A. Troutman of Topeka as their candidate. Troutman was a well-known politician and a leading member of the prohibition wing of the Republican party. Troutman could have been a threat to Bailey. But to Bailey’s and Long's relief, three other candidates, who would take votes from Troutman, entered the race. Moreover, Troutman was receiving very little actual support from Burton and his lieutenants.\textsuperscript{29}

It is difficult to believe that Burton lacked a reason for his inactivity in 1902, but no evidence exists to explain his motives. He did not seem particularly concerned with the outcome of the gubernatorial nomination. Apparently, Burton was not interested in committing himself to a fight that might hurt his continued control of the national apparatus of the Kansas Republican party. As a Republican senator, he was now publicly responsible for the welfare of the party and was outwardly an avowed opponent of factionalism. The senator had another possible reason for being noncommittal in 1902. He was a favorite of the railroads, as was
George Cole at first. But Burton personally despised Cole and was not interested in helping him. Later, when the Missouri Pacific and the Union Pacific decided to support Bailey, Burton could not openly oppose their decisions, even though Bailey was a Lelandite.

Burton's major problem in 1902 stemmed from an earlier promise to help Charles Curtis's senatorial candidacy in 1903. If Curtis failed to make a strong political showing at the Wichita convention, it could be interpreted as weakness on Burton's part. If the Burtonites worked vigorously to defeat Bailey and then Bailey won, this, of course, would not only eliminate Curtis, it would also harm Burton's prestige. On the eve of the state convention the Topeka Daily Capital, a sometime Burton organ, carried a variety of anti-Bailey stories, which seemed to indicate that Burton might fight the Leland-backed gubernatorial candidate. By late May, however, a compromise slate of Republican candidates had been arranged, and Bailey was the predetermined choice for governor. Burton willingly acceded to the nomination of Bailey in return for other positions for Burtonites on the ticket. In this fashion he again averted a struggle between the factions.

The slate of candidates that Mort Albaugh prepared in conjunction with Burton's friends was eventually nominated, and the state convention was carried off as planned. Although the Daily Capital continued to publicize the magnitude of the struggle between Bailey and Troutman, on the final tally Bailey easily defeated the Topeka prohibitionist, by 561 votes to 217. And though the newspapers stressed the depth of the factional struggle at Wichita, on the day of the meeting the Daily Capital admitted that the 1902 gathering "was one of the most harmonious conventions ever held in the state."

Charles Curtis received a tremendous ovation when he addressed the convention, though he had said that he might naturally have felt sore over events that transpired at Wichita. He, as all other politically aware individuals, recognized that Long's senatorial candidacy received a tremendous boost because of Albaugh's deft management of affairs. Nevertheless, Curtis promised that he was leaving Wichita as a dedicated member of a Republican party "united and harmonious for a great victory."

Harmony also served as Senator Burton's theme. But the attention of the state convention in 1902 centered on Chester I. Long. When the permanent chairman finished his introductory remarks on Republican affairs, the delegates began to chant "Long, Long, Long"; and Long, responding, appeared on the convention stage. Though the would-be
senator spoke briefly, he emphasized that most of his time at Wichita had been spent arranging "business of much interest to himself." The convention understood his meaning and cheered wildly.\textsuperscript{34}

In retrospect it appears that Chester I. Long's decision to tie his candidacy to the success of Willis J. Bailey, thus controlling the state convention of 1902, was one of the wisest moves that he made as a Kansas politician. After the convention there was little question that Long was the man to beat in the senatorial race. His showing at Wichita impressed numerous local leaders, and many were certain that at the convention they had witnessed a preview of Long's eventual victory.\textsuperscript{35} Not only did Long prove his statewide power to local politicians, he also won the temporary devotion of Bailey. This would mean that he could eventually draw upon the power and prestige of the governor's office. Leland was also impressed, and he was thankful for Long's help. Although he remained publicly committed to Governor William E. Stanley and his senatorial aspirations, he privately endorsed Long. Leland's decision to remain publicly with Stanley, so Long said, was based on a fear that Stanley's supporters might switch to Curtis should the governor prove too soon to be a weak candidate.\textsuperscript{36}

But the election of Long, though it seemed probable in May of 1902, was no sure thing. Curtis, who would be his main opponent in January, still had the support of Burton and was in his own right no political lightweight where nominations were concerned. Furthermore, at the outset of the senatorial contest, Curtis seemed to be favored by at least three of the most powerful railroads in the state; and in senatorial fights many Kansas political leaders believed that the railroads determined who won. Thus, in 1902 Long was pressed to break what he felt was Curtis's stranglehold over the railroads. Stated simply, Long needed to win the backing of these lines.

As a political leader, Chester I. Long possessed more than the common gift of knowing when and how to get things done. He became involved in Republican politics in the late 1880s, when he was elected to the state senate, and for the eight years after 1892 he faced Jerry Simpson in four "Big Seventh" congressional races. During his battles against the "Sockless Socrates of the Plains," Long took a typically western-Kansas Republican stand in favor of the subtreasury idea, paper money, free silver, the tariff, overseas expansion, and imperialism. He won half of his contests against Simpson, defeating the versatile Populist in 1894 and 1898.\textsuperscript{37}

From 1900 onward, as a veteran Republican congressman, Long cautiously planned for the 1903 senatorial election. It was not until April
1902 that his chances improved substantially. Then, his first important contacts with powerful railroad leaders were made. In April, when Albaugh and Jobes arranged the conference between Alexander Cochrane and Bailey, Cochrane had expressed a desire to meet with Long. He told Jobes that, generally speaking, Long seemed to be a man who “should have the support of the Missouri Pacific for United States Senator.” In May, after discussions with Long in St. Louis, Cochrane decided that his assumption had been correct. Subsequently, Missouri Pacific efforts were directed towards election of Long.38

During the next few months both Cochrane and Long continued to cultivate railroad officials, until by December of 1902 all five major Kansas railroads supported Long’s candidacy. The account of how Long won solid support from the railroads in 1903 is one of the most intriguing chapters in Kansas Republican affairs and one that is most often misrepresented by Kansas scholars. After the backing of the Missouri Pacific had been secured, Cochrane persuaded Lyman Parker, the general solicitor for the Frisco Railroad, to arrange it so that his railroad would use its political power in Kansas to support Long.39 Together, Cochrane and Parker convinced E. D. Kenna to use Santa Fe’s strength in Long’s behalf. But Kenna was an uncertain quantity, since Santa Fe policy did not allow its general attorney to make the final decision in questions as important as a U.S. Senate race. Some better way had to be found to assure Long that the Santa Fe would not oppose him.40

Likewise, the Union Pacific and Rock Island, both political titans in Kansas, needed to be won over to Long. This could have proven doubly difficult, since the local attorneys for these roads were supporters of Burton and Curtis. Albaugh had managed to persuade Loomis of the Union Pacific to support Bailey, but he had had less success with Loomis in respect to the senatorial race. Low of the Rock Island could only be made to support Long if higher officials in the Rock Island forced him to do so. But there was a way in which all of these lines could be brought to support Long.

William C. Beer of New York had once served the New York Life Insurance Company as a “national political expert,” but at the beginning of the twentieth century he joined his former New York Life employer, George Perkins, in the House of Morgan. With Perkins, Beer was instrumental, as a Washington lobbyist, in securing the Bureau of Corporations Act in 1902.41 Through Perkins, Beer had connections with the managers of the Union Pacific, the Rock Island, and the Santa Fe. Aware of Beer’s political talents,42 Long contacted C. S. Jobes in June of 1902
and asked Jobes to request Charles S. Gleed, formerly general solicitor for the Santa Fe and then publisher of the *Kansas City Journal*, to secure active support for Long's candidacy from "Mr. Beer and his friends." Gleed refused to do so, because he opposed Long.

Undaunted, Long sought other ways to secure Beer's support. Having already returned to Kansas, he used Fourth Assistant Postmaster General Joseph L. Bristow as his contact with Beer in Washington. On September 16 Long received a coded telegram from Bristow. Deciphered, it read: "Beer telephoned that Perkins had talked with the Rock Island and Santa Fe people, and they have assured him that their interests will support you. He asks that I find out what their local people are doing and let him know. Give me situation as to attitude of M. A. Low and others.”

On the next day, Bristow, who had established a reputation as a reformer by uncovering corruption in the Cuban post office during American occupation of the island, wrote:

> Our New York friends seem to have made the request suggested. I had a telephone message yesterday stating that on Tuesday Mr. Perkins had a talk with the gentlemen controlling the interests referred to, and was assured that their interest would be in favor of your election. If this is correct it makes a sure thing; but it will not do to neglect the smallest detail and I am anxious that the local fellows out there be sounded to see whether they are in accord with the wishes of their superiors; so I telegraphed you as I did.

Although Long and Bristow failed to broach the problem of Union Pacific backing at that time, Winslow S. Pierce, general counsel for the railroad, wrote Long from New York in December, advising him that the Union Pacific management had decided to join the already great armada of railroads that supported him. This decision had been temporarily delayed by Loomis, the attorney for the Harriman line in Kansas. Cy Leland, in his recollections, remembered that in 1903 New York financiers sent George Beer to Kansas to superintend Long's election campaign, and he recalled that Loomis had been whipped into line. In 1906 a *Topeka Daily Capital* reporter recalled that during the 1903 senatorial election Loomis, who had "lobbied for weeks," had been "a most energetic factor" in Long's victory.

Not only did the legal departments of the great railroads assist Long through activities such as Loomis's; reportedly the lines also made large donations to the senator's campaign fund. In a 1907 polemic on what he styled "the commercial community of interests," Burton claimed that
Long received $67,000 from New York financiers so that he “might be enabled to make sure of the ratification by the Kansas Legislature of his election.” According to Burton, who was forced to resign from the Senate in 1906 because of a bribery conviction, Long was elected on “the 9th day of December, 1902, in the Equitable Building in New York.”\textsuperscript{49} William Allen White stated in 1912 that Long had received $30,000 from the Missouri Pacific to use in his election.\textsuperscript{50}

As senator, Long did several things that indicated his subservience to railroad interests. He tried, unsuccessfully, to secure an appointment to the United States Circuit Court for Cochrane. He did convince the federal government to revise a bridge-building contract for a subsidiary of the Missouri Pacific when it was unable to meet a previously arranged schedule. Thus the subsidiary was not required to pay a time-forfeiture penalty. In February of 1904 he and Senator Joseph W. Bailey of Texas managed to force two bills through Congress that allowed the Santa Fe to exchange certain of its holdings for Indian reservation lands.\textsuperscript{51}

Working with railroad officials was not always easy, as Long discovered in late 1902. Because of the power that the Speaker of the Kansas House could wield in the legislative caucus selecting a senator, Long needed a Speaker who was favorable to his candidacy. In arranging this, Long, Albaugh, and Leland chose J. T. Pringle. The Burton leaders in the legislature quite naturally opposed Pringle, who was closely identified with Leland. Either because of this or because he sincerely disliked Pringle, Low of the Rock Island threatened to begin an open political battle with Long. Low, who had an inflated view of his political power, apparently believed that Long could be forced to support whomever the attorney suggested. On the advice of Leland, Long brought pressure from eastern sources on Low, thus preventing disruption of his plans during an important period. Pringle was eventually chosen Speaker, and according to one statehouse reporter, “Pringle’s victory . . . went a long way towards determining that Charles Curtis would not be elected United States Senator in 1903.”\textsuperscript{52}

A number of other arrangements had to be made in January 1903 in order to satisfy Long and his campaign managers that there would be no slip-ups at the Republican caucus. To increase his political strength in the Fourth and Fifth Congressional Districts, Long, with the help of Leland and Albaugh, secured the support of Henry J. Allen and George Clark. Clark and Allen were both candidates for state printer in 1903, but the favorite in the race was Edward W. Hoch of Marion. Clark, who published a newspaper at Concordia, was a force in the Fifth District;
and Allen, from his *Ottawa Evening Herald* offices, had wide contacts in the Fourth District. Together, the supporters of Clark and Allen outnumbered Hoch's friends. It fell to Albaugh and Leland to arrange a trade between Allen and Clark. If both of them would work for Long's election, Clark was to receive the state printership, but he was to allow Allen to take half of the fees paid to the state printer during his term. All public printing was done by contract with private firms at that time. According to allegations, kickbacks on fees were common, and usually state printers used their own shops to print state materials. When the state-printership deal was consummated and when Clark was elected, a howl arose across the state. Fortunately for Long, the protest was directed at Leland and Governor Bailey, not at the interests that benefited from the arrangement.\(^{53}\)

The thing that bothered Long most in preparing for his senatorial candidacy was his fear that Governor Stanley would not eventually withdraw from the race as Leland had promised he would. Stanley was serious about his candidacy. Leland and other supporters of Stanley, however, knew that the governor could not command enough strength to win the nomination. If Stanley withdrew from the race too early, chances were that half of his friends would then vote for Curtis at the caucus in January. Leland believed that the wisest policy was for Stanley to continue in the contest until the balloting began at the caucus; then, in a dramatic switch, Leland and Long's managers would carry the majority of Stanley's votes to Long. This maneuver would keep most of Stanley's friends in line.\(^{54}\)

On 21 January 1903 the Republican legislative caucus convened at Topeka to name its choice for the U.S. Senate. As Leland had planned, Stanley's voting power represented the difference between victory and defeat for Curtis or Long. For six ballots Stanley continued his candidacy, and then on the seventh roll call he switched his votes to Long. Long was easily nominated on that ballot.\(^{55}\) A few days later his election to the Senate was certified by the legislature, where Republicans greatly outnumbered Democrats.

One result of Stanley's switch was his appointment to the Dawes Commission of the Five Civilized Tribes in Oklahoma. This act prompted some Kansas Republicans to remark that Long, like a faithful political leader, honored his political debts. Stanley only reluctantly accepted the position and then remained but a short time on the commission.\(^{66}\) It seemed to him a rather thankless reward. His failure to capture the
senatorial race in 1903 virtually eliminated him as a leader in the state party.

The demotion of one factional leader from a position of importance within the Republican party was only a minor result of the Long-Bailey elections. In 1902 Republicanism had a chance to recover from the Boss-Buster movement of two years earlier. Senator Burton, in office and free of reelection concerns, had become party conciliator. His new attitude allowed Leland and his friends to regain stature and offices within the party. The coalition that defeated the boss seemed to have been dissolved permanently, and the Kansas Republican party superficially appeared to be "reformed" by 1902.

Leland's amazing recovery, however, had given power to his friends, and it made some leaders realize that they needed to undertake a new reform movement to eliminate the machine. In 1903, when a number of scandals implicating high officials of the Leland faction became known to the public, rank-and-file Republicans also demanded a change. Consequently, factional fighting resumed, and a number of minor but potentially important Republicans were hurt by it.