CHAPTER 1. EVALUATING DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE IN COMMUNITY POLICYMAKING

1. This quotation is from one of 239 interviews conducted with the participants in recent policy issues in Lawrence. Because anonymity was promised to persons participating in interviews, the sources of these quotations are provided only if the remarks also appeared in public reports, such as stories in the *Lawrence Journal-World (LJW)*, or if participants subsequently consented to the use of their quoted remarks. Quotations without attribution and without citation were provided by participants in the interviews.


3. The developers and realtors involved in this issue were not among the top economic and social notables in Lawrence, as revealed by the reputational analysis of community power presented below.

4. Elite theorists may concede that relatively unimportant allocational issues—those dealing with locational matters (e.g., where to build a new school) and housekeeping services (e.g., garbage collection)—are immune from elite control.


12. Lindblom, "The Science of ‘Muddling Through.’"


15. Newton, "Feeble Governments and Private Power."


20. Ibid., 4, 36.
22. Huntington, "The Democratic Distemper."
23. Wolfinger, "Reputation and Reality in the Study of Community Power."
24. Ricci, "Receiving Ideas in Political Analysis."
25. Ball, "From Paradigms to Research Programs."
33. Waste, "Community Power and Pluralist Theory."
39. Peterson, *City Limits*.
40. Ibid., 142.
41. Ibid., 132.
42. Peterson, "A Unitary Model of Local Taxation and Expenditure Policies."
43. According to Peterson, neither elitist nor pluralist models explain redistributive policies well—a third type of urban policy besides developmental and allocative policies. Proposals to develop services for the poor are usually banished from local political agendas; in a decentralized federal system their negative economic consequences are particularly acute at the local level. In order to compete with other communities that also want to pursue their economic interests and attract mobile capital and skilled labor, officials of all cities have incentives to minimize taxes that pay for welfare services.
45. Ibid., 38.
46. Ibid., 37.
51. Held, *The Public Interest and Private Interests*.
52. Elkin, *City and Regime in the American Republic*, 148.
53. Ibid., 1-4.
58. Elkin, City and Regime in the American Republic, 83.
61. Elkin, City and Regime in the American Republic, 169.
63. These studies are reviewed in Hawley and Svara, The Study of Community Power: A Bibliographical Review.

CHAPTER 2. THREE IDEALS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY

1. See Lane, “Market Justice, Political Justice,” and the literature cited there for a discussion of the skepticism about egalitarian goals that exists among the American public.
3. Many factors may affect variations in the achievement of the ideals of principle-policy congruence, responsible representation, and complex equality. Because of the limitations of the Lawrence data, only some hypotheses are explored here. Additionally, the analysis here focuses on explaining the inequalities of power among political interests—a task that is built into the analysis of complex equality. No attempt is made to explain the differences between Lawrence and other communities at achieving complex equality.
5. Truman, The Governmental Process; Dahl, Who Governs?
10. Because citizens in pluralist societies are subjected to alternative views about competing principles, they may view competing principles as equally valid.
11. Elazar, American Federalism, 84-126.
13. This procedure is described in the “Policy Change” subsection of Chapter 3.
14. This hypothesis is drawn from the economistic paradigm developed in Peterson's City Limits and discussed in Chapter 1.
15. Pitkin's Concept of Representation remains the most important treatment of various perspectives on representation. The liberal position on representative government is perhaps best expressed by Mill in Considerations on Representative Government. The classic statement of the conservative position remains Burke's Appeal to the Old Whigs from the New. For a typical socialist position, see Durbin, The Politics of Democratic Socialism.
16. Congruence does not necessarily imply power; an outcome can be consistent
with the preferences of certain types of actors even though these actors have not had any impact on the outcome. For example, policymakers may be unaware of citizen's preferences on an issue and thus uninfluenced by them. Yet it may turn out that the decision is congruent with the preferences of the majority of citizens who are aware of the issue and who have an unambiguous preference about it. To have power, actors must not only have preferences congruent with the outcome, but their preferences must affect the outcome. The power of various types of actors—estimated by the causal relationships between the preferences of various actors and policy outcomes—is considered in Chapter 12.

19. Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*.
21. Mobilizers are people who claim to represent an organized group on policy issues. They include those who organize others, hold positions in groups, and are active on behalf of the group. In the empirical analysis of group power in Chapter 12, the preferences of mobilizers are weighted by the size, cohesion, and activity of the groups they represent. This procedure enables summary measures of "dominant mobilizer preferences" to weigh the demands of mobilizers representing large, cohesive, and active groups more heavily than the demands of mobilizers representing small, divided, and passive groups.
22. Only one issue in the Lawrence sample was resolved by an appointed (hospital) board, and its responsible representation score was somewhat below the average of that for other issues.
24. Peterson, *City Limits*.
27. In *Spheres of Justice* (pp. 3–30), Walzer uses the concept of "monopoly" to describe simple inequalities of social goods (such as political power), and he uses the term "dominant" to describe those social goods that most often illegitimately invade distributions of other social goods (thus upsetting his conception of complex equality). In the present analysis, the term "dominance" corresponds to Walzer's concept of monopoly but conforms to conventional terminology.
28. In *Equalities*, Rae has shown that there are many forms of equality. Thus, providing "bloc-regarding" equality among these interests on a group basis may result in "individual-regarding" inequalities.
30. According to Walzer (Spheres of Justice, 304), complex equality is achieved in the sphere of political power when inequalities of power are explained by differences in people's persuasiveness. Because the persuasiveness of various interests defies objective measurement, no attempt is made here to account for simple inequalities in terms of persuasiveness. Nevertheless, Walzer's formulation points to violations of complex equality that can guide empirical research. Complex equality is violated if inequalities are rooted in factors that are not germane to persuasiveness. Arguments should not be more persuasive just because they are made by wealthy or socially prominent people. Other arguments should not be discounted merely because they are made by women, minorities, "radicals" or people having other characteristics irrelevant to an unbiased consideration of the merits of each case.
CHAPTER 3. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF TWENTY-NINE LAWRENCE ISSUES

1. Although the methodology developed here may be applicable to larger political systems, such as the American states or various national governments, the principles at stake and the patterns of power within these larger systems may be very different than those in local American communities.

2. Data about the population of Lawrence and the United States generally are drawn from the United States Census of the Population for 1980.

3. According to the Municipal Yearbook: 1978, 48 percent of all American cities with populations over 100,000 have council-manager forms of government (41 percent have the next most prominent form, the mayor-council system), 69 percent elect council members at-large, 73 percent elect their mayors directly, and over 75 percent have nonpartisan ballots. The median size of city councils in the United States is five.


5. The decisional method examines only the first face of power, the dimension of power that is exercised by participating in and achieving one's goals in the resolution of issues that already are on the agenda. According to Bachrach and Baratz (in Power and Poverty), a second face of power is exercised in setting the agenda. According to Gaventa (in Power and Powerlessness), a third face of power involves influencing the preferences of other participants.

6. In Who Governs? Dahl includes party nominations among his issues. In contrast, a comparative-issues approach focuses on policy issues only. Thus, inferences about democratic performance that are derived from the comparative-issues method are limited to the policy domain.

7. Inferences about whose preferences cause policy decisions are discussed in the section on “Responsiveness and Direct Power” in Chapter 12. See Note 18 of Chapter 12 for an explanation of why causal inferences about power require larger samples of issues.

8. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory, 96.

9. Only the outcome of the 1977 referendum to change the form of government was known before the issue was selected. Because of the importance of this issue in understanding the political setting of Lawrence politics, and since many aspects of the issue (including the nature of the cleavages that formed on the issue and thus who won and lost on the issue) were unknown at the time, it was included in the sample.


11. The numerous typologies in the urban and policy literatures for classifying issues—such as those by Williams and Adrian (in Four Cities) and Peterson (in City Limits)—do not claim to form a basis for sampling community issues.

12. Proponents of the positional approach to the study of power correctly insist that the incumbents of major institutions in the community must be examined. By analyzing the preferences of representatives and bureaucrats and relating these preferences to policy outcomes, the power of governmental officials can be estimated.
Thus, the comparative-issues approach directly examines the assumption of proponents of the positional method (e.g., Dye, *Who's Running America?* 59–112) that “great power” resides in those “who occupy the top positions in the institutional structure” of communities. By assuming that great power may be found only in institutional roles, the positional method neither offers a basis for assessing the limits on the power of officeholders nor permits an assessment of the power of public officials relative to that of other participants. In contrast, the comparative-issues approach permits some assessment of these matters by considering the notions that governmental officeholders may put aside their own preferences and act as agents of others and that they may be defeated, both individually and collectively, on policy issues.

13. This study is described in Bolland, “The Limits to Pluralism: Power and Leadership in a Nonparticipatory Society,” 69–88. In “Reputation and Reality in the Study of Community Power,” Wolfinger questions the validity of reputational studies because they mistake reputations for power with the actual wielding of power and because they fail to provide a basis for assessing the limits on the power of the top elite. Although such difficulties can limit the utility of the reputational method for providing an overall description of community power, this method does permit identification of the community elite. See Peterson, *City Limits*, 138–39.

14. Photocopies of the instruments used in these studies and of their results are available from John Bolland, Department of Political Science, the University of Alabama.

15. Such notables were identified by other community leaders as having the most economic and social resources in the community. In *Who Governs?* Dahl identified social notables on the basis of the invitation list to the annual assemblies of the New Haven Lawn Club, and he identified economic notables on the basis of positions in important economic organizations (banks, public utilities, and corporations with higher property assessments or employee payrolls) and on the basis of extensive property holdings. Such specific criteria for inclusion among the notables of a community lead to the possible exclusion of important persons. The more open-ended specification of notables using the reputational method allows for inclusion of persons affiliated with a variety of prestigious community organizations and holding diverse economic resources.

16. Measures of community support for alternative policy principles are most conveniently described in Chapter 4.

17. Occasionally representatives were involved in issues in a nonofficial capacity; only the preferences of representatives in office when major decisions were made on issues were included in measuring representative preferences. On a few occasions, elected officials expressed “mixed feelings,” which were omitted in calculating the preferences of elected officials.

18. Notables sometimes claimed no involvement on issues, whereas others saw them as their most important supporters and opponents. Thus, the reputational method in combination with the comparative-issues approach permits measures of the less visible involvements of elites. It is precisely such “behind-the-scenes” involvements that the decisional method alone is said to miss.

19. Group leaders provided the estimates of ACTIVISTS, MEMBERS, and COHESION for their groups. When several group leaders were interviewed about a group’s involvement on an issue, their estimates were averaged.

20. Other measures of group preferences were calculated to take into account the fact that groups differ in their possession of other resources, such as continuing access to policymakers and full-time professional staffs. However, none of these measures had greater predictive power than the measure described in the text; thus, these measures were not employed in the results reported below.
21. Except for the TOWNCENTER issue, the public referenda results were within three percentage points of those in the surveys. In April 1986, 57 percent of the survey respondents with unambiguous preferences said they supported TOWNCENTER, although only 45 percent approved of the $4 million in local public financing required for the project. In April 1987, the two advisory referenda questions dealing most directly with the TOWNCENTER project drew only 21 and 24 percent support. In the interim, the physical size and financial scope of the project expanded significantly, and an extensive campaign was waged against the project.

22. University students were omitted in determining class cleavages because their occupational status is unclear, and their parents' incomes are often more relevant to their class standing than are their own incomes.

23. The mean property values of neighborhoods are in 1984 prices as estimated by local realtors.

24. Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science."

CHAPTER 4. COMPETING PRINCIPLES AND URBAN IDEOLOGIES

1. Conservatives, liberals, and democratic socialists are friends of pluralism because they recognize that their ideological opponents have the right to criticize their principles, to propose alternatives, and to govern according to these alternative principles if elected to public office.

2. For a discussion of why the United States is exceptional among Western industrial democracies for the weakness of attachments to socialist principles, see Sombart, Why There Is No Socialism in America, and Hochschild, What's Fair? 1–26.


4. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 135. Philosophical inquiries that propose and justify such principles—exemplified by the work of Rawls—are nevertheless important in pluralist politics because they clarify the meaning of certain principles and because they provide arguments—often compelling arguments—for why these principles should be more widely adopted.

5. See, for example, Arkes, The Philosopher in the City, and Henig, Federalism and Public Policy.

6. The prevalence of liberal and conservative ideological labeling among Lawrence citizens is further evidence that Lawrence is characterized by pluralist politics. See Alford and Friedland, Powers of Theory, 412–15.

7. Set responses from respondents were discouraged by sometimes first preventing the more conservative viewpoint and by other times first presenting the more liberal viewpoint.

8. Though confidence levels are reported for both participants and citizens, they are most relevant to the interpretation of the principles of citizens, who were randomly sampled. Because interviews were conducted with most participants on the issues studied here, the sample statistics closely describe the various participant populations.

9. Regression analysis was conducted for all participants combined rather than for particular types of participants because the small numbers of representatives, bureaucrats, and notables (combined with the large number [nine] of independent variables) would make unstable the resulting beta coefficients for the subsamples.

For participants, two additional principles have weak independent impacts on ideological orientation, but their retention in the regression model continued to yield an adjusted $R^2$ of .42.
12. Ibid., 24.
13. In communities with high unemployment rates, economic growth may, of course, be of greatest economic benefit to the existing population. However, Lawrence had a low unemployment rate (between 4 and 5 percent of its labor force) throughout the period of this study, suggesting that the provision of more jobs through economic-development strategies requires new residents to fill these jobs.
15. The wording of principles may, of course, affect the distribution of support for them. While efforts have been made to minimize bias in the phrasing of principles, advocates of particular principles may prefer alternative phrasing. For example, growth advocates may object that the statements here point out some of the costs of growth without pointing out its benefits. Opponents of growth may object that other important costs are ignored.
17. Ibid., 149.
18. In general, principles regarding growth and land use are significantly related. The correlations between holding pro-growth principles and property-rights principles is .29 for participants and .14 for citizens. However, at least in Lawrence, 48 percent of the participants and 45 percent of citizens hold both economic-growth and neighborhood-protection principles.
23. Ibid., 37–43.
24. Ibid., 43.
27. Walzer, *Spheres of Justice*, 84.
29. Nisbit, *Twilight of Authority*.
33. Public administrators have traditionally been socialized to accept progressive values. However, the data in Table 4.1 show bureaucrats split between supporting economic and political criteria. One explanation for this finding may be that urban administrators have increasingly adopted the values of "the new public administration," centering on the political involvement of citizens; see Thomas, *Between Citizen and City*, 72–88. A second explanation for this finding may be the way the contrasting principles were formulated. By asking whether local government is primarily concerned with politics or economics, administrators may often have responded that government is political, not because they value political criteria but because they often perceive that their preferred economic criteria are compromised by political pressures.
35. Ibid., 29.
38. Because most policies and public projects distribute some burdens, the notion of "significant burden" was stressed. If interviewees asked for clarification of this principle, they were told that our goal was to measure different degrees of concern for those who are disadvantaged by policy proposals. It was suggested that some people thought that the interest of the community as a whole should yield to concerns about the disadvantaged when a significant number of people are harmed by a policy proposal, when the harm to a small number of people is extensive, and/or when those harmed are already among the most economically and socially disadvantaged people in the community.

39. According to Barry (in *The Liberal Theory of Justice*), liberalism has embraced Rawls's theory of justice. If this is so, perhaps a Rawlsian formulation of the alternative to utilitarianism would link distributive principles more closely to liberal ideology.
43. For example, abstract evaluative issues dealing with public safety and crime—issues of great importance to urban public policy—are omitted here.
44. See Knoke, "Urban Political Cultures."
45. Clark and Ferguson, *City Money*, 175.
46. The positive, but weak, zero-order correlations between these principles and self-defined ideology (presented in Table 4.1) provide some justification for such labeling. Another justification is the large number of significant zero-order correlations among principles held by participants (P) and citizens (C) as specified in the following table:

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*P < .05  
**P < .01

Pro-growth principles are positively and significantly associated with conservative prin-
principles on all other abstract policy issues. Aggregative conceptions of justice and the de-emphasis of citizen participation are also positively and often significantly related to conservative principles. However, the weakness of these relationships also suggests that principles regarding economic growth, justice, and democratic process are only loosely linked to urban ideologies.

48. See, for example, Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People*, 60–75; and Riker, *The Art of Political Manipulation*.

CHAPTER 5. CHALLENGING EXISTING INSTITUTIONS AND LEADERSHIP

1. Although Lawrence calls its legislative body a “commission” and its members “commissioners,” it does not have a typical commission form of government; its commissioners do not serve as heads of particular administrative departments.
2. Challenges against reformed institutions in other communities are described in Adrian and Sullivan, “The Urban Appointed City Executive, Past and Future,” and in Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, *Protest Is Not Enough*, 201.
3. The quotes in this section and elsewhere were derived from the 239 interviews conducted for this study or from public documents and newspaper accounts. When quotes are not attributed to particular people, they were derived from interviews in which anonymity was promised.
4. Occasionally, participants in the wards issue argued that the policy orientations of local government might be different if there were a change in governmental structure. For example, an official with the chamber of commerce argued that economic growth might be hindered by the passage of the wards proposal because “prospective employers will not move into a community without the professionalism in government that a city manager provides.” Also, some activists thought that creating wards would significantly enhance their access to decision makers, increasing their chances of protecting neighborhoods from intrusive developments. However, neither participants nor citizens significantly related their economic-growth or neighborhood-protection principles to their preferences on the wards issue. By downplaying the relevance of such policy principles, participants implicitly acknowledged the growing consensus among urbanists in political science that differences in governmental structures have only minimal policy effects (see Morgan and Pelissero, “Urban Policy: Does Political Structure Matter?”).
7. See Table 2.2 for definitions of these opposing interests. Although a fuller description of the winning and losing segments of the community is necessary for the subsequent analysis of complex equality in Chapter 13, some winners and losers are identified here and on subsequent issues for purposes of illustration.
8. It should not be concluded that pro-growth principles are irrelevant to this issue. These principles may fail to be significantly related to positions on the mayor issue in the multivariate regression model because the small number of cases make unstable the estimates of the effects of these principles. The methodological criteria employed here simply do not permit the conclusion that these principles are relevant to the mayor issue.
9. Although it is possible to indicate how policy outcomes contribute to simple inequality by providing yet another victory for those interests who usually win on
issues (and yet another loss for those interests who usually lose on issues), such in-
equalities do not necessarily imply a failure to achieve complex equality. Whether or
not complex equality is achieved, despite the existence of simple inequalities, can only
be indicated for a larger sample of issues, as shown in Chapter 13.

10. Ironically, the commission’s action failed to prevent Marci Francisco from assum-
ing the mayoral office, as she was twice elected to the post by newly elected liberals
Shontz and Gleason. Nevertheless, the new method of selecting the mayor did prevent
other persons who threatened the interests of the Growth Machine (particularly Nancy
Shontz) from simply rotating into the office of the mayor.

11. By the methodological criteria employed here, only aggregative principles are
relevant to the manager issue, as there is no direct relationship between support for
economic criteria and support for Watson.

CHAPTER 6. DEVELOPING THE LOCAL ECONOMY

1. Foster and Berger, Public-Private Partnership in American Cities.
2. Subsequent chapters will consider neighborhood and downtown redevelopment
issues which also involved economic-growth principles.
5. Personal interview, 4 June 1984.
8. Because neighborhoods were not threatened by the RAIL proposal, the lack of
significant relationships between neighborhood-protection principles and preferences
regarding the industrial park (as shown in Table A) is not surprising. However, the
relevance of restrictive land-use principles is suggested by analysis of people’s responses
to the question of whether they gave higher priority to economic growth or to “effec-
tive land-use planning.” The more participants gave priority to land-use planning over
growth, the more they opposed the RAIL proposal (r_p = .40).
10. Although the Eastern Hills issue has not been systematically studied, casual
observation suggests that there has been little opposition to it. Thus, the larger issue
of developing an appropriate industrial park has apparently been resolved without
any significant interests suffering a defeat.
11. This study uncovered the names of only seven people who actively opposed
the research park. Because many proponents of the research park held neighborhood-
protection principles, there was only a weak and statistically insignificant relationship
between holding neighborhood-protection principles and opposing the research park
(r_p = -.23).
13. The taxpayers of a city have not been at risk when their government issues IRBs
because it holds title to land or buildings purchased with the principal and merely
“acts as a banker” in the transaction.
14. Usually the commission granted the ten-year tax exemption but required busi-
nesses to pay a fee for essential city services (like police and fire protection) in lieu
of taxes.

The federal tax advantages of IRBs was phased out between 1986 and 1990. In
order to retain the capacity of local government to make certain inducements to
industry, Kansas voters approved a property-tax abatement amendment in August 1986. The amendment allows ten-year local property tax-exemptions for new job-creating facilities. Within six months, the Lawrence City Commission had granted its first tax exemption under the law.

15. Peterson, *City Limits*.

CHAPTER 7. PROTECTING THE NEIGHBORHOODS

1. In *The Logic of Collective Action*, Olson describes the obstacles to mobilization. That such obstacles can be overcome is suggested by Henig, *Neighborhood Mobilization: Redevelopment and Response*, and Thomas, *Between Citizen and City*.

2. In June 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in *First English Evangelical Church* that property owners are entitled to compensation from local governments when new regulations deprive them of reasonable use of their land. This ruling encouraged opponents of the second Oread downzoning proposal to threaten to sue the city to recover the difference between the value of their property before and after downzoning.

3. In this respect, the resolution of the Bluffs issue may illustrate hyperpluralist politics—a perverted form of pluralism where groups are too strong and representatives are too weak. For discussions of hyperpluralism, see Jones, *Governing Urban America*, 190–92, and Waste, “Community Power and Pluralist Theory.”


CHAPTER 8. RESTRICTING INDIVIDUAL CHOICES

1. One recurrent theme in discussions of the environmental code was that the liberties at stake went beyond property rights, as there is the widespread perception that the code is selectively enforced against those community activists who complain about the policy directions and management of the city.


3. Twelve percent of the respondents in the 1984 and 1986 citizen surveys indicated that they were neutral about these two principles.


5. *The TRIBES Value Clarification Program* was developed in 1978 by the Center for Human Development in Walnut Creek, Calif.

6. It is appropriate for community power studies to include the resolution of issues by such quasi-governmental bodies as the board of trustees of public hospitals. Despite being largely independent of local governments, LMH is, according to state law, a city hospital and its policies affect the health care available to Lawrence citizens.


CHAPTER 9. PROVIDING PUBLIC SERVICES AND WELFARE

1. Additional controversies involving the provision of communal services and welfare include: (a) privatization (whether publicly financed goods and services are most effectively and efficiently delivered by governmental agencies or by private businesses), and (b) equity (whether public services are available to citizens on some
sort of equal or equitable basis). Such controversies were not apparent in the Lawrence sample.

4. Because 60 percent of the public supported school closings, the board also had to choose between responding to citizen preferences or the preferences of issue-specific activists.

5. Parents argued that having neighborhood schools was their legal right because the legislation creating statewide school district consolidation and bringing the rural schools into the Lawrence School District provided that their schools could not be closed without their consent; however, the Kansas attorney general rejected this claim. Still, the parents could argue that neighborhood schools were a "right in usage" if not a right in law; see Weber, *On Law in Economy and Society*.

7. Although most gas utilities in Kansas are regulated by the Kansas Corporation Commission, the gas utility in Lawrence—Kansas Public Service (KPS)—was regulated by the city commission at the time of the lifeline issue because it served only Lawrence.

13. Although the data in Chapter 4 show little support for distributive principles generally, the survey questions used in that analysis did not measure support for specifically Rawlsian distributive principles.


17. Supporters and opponents of social services have expressed several kinds of discontent. For example, supporters expressed concern that "new and innovative" agencies often have difficulty acquiring any funding, that some agencies have been terminated under controversial circumstances, and that the city staff controls much of the input into revenue sharing and CDBG allocations. Opponents of social-service allocations have been concerned that the availability of extensive social services attracts the wandering poor and repels upper-income taxpayers, that there is adequate oversight of social-service agencies, and that governmental funding creates agency dependence on the city.

18. Bureaucrats thought that the intangibles tax was superior to property taxes in one respect. Receipts from the intangibles tax increased with inflation, helping local governments meet the increasing costs of municipal services without increasing tax rates. In contrast, receipts from property taxes do not rise as a result of inflation unless real estate is continuously reappraised.

22. Two main explanations have been offered for such local inaction. First, the county appraiser argued that the problem was more apparent than real because reappraisal did occur when improvements were made on property; however, such reappraisals were not based on the market value of property but rather on a formula for
determining "replacement value," which included a depreciation factor that lowered the assessed value of older homes. Second, local officials feared that local action on reappraisal could stimulate a tax revolt, since people had become accustomed to prevailing practices. Though these practices overtaxed utilities and perhaps other businesses, the "hidden taxes" in the form of higher costs to consumers were not apparent to taxpayers. Although older homes might be undertaxed, such tax breaks were generally acceptable because they served to encourage the revitalization of older neighborhoods.


CHAPTER 10. SAVING THE DOWNTOWN

1. No significant relationships were found between the preferences of various actors regarding the Cornfield Mall and their economic-growth and neighborhood-protection principles as measured for Table 4.1. However, these measures of growth and land-use principles do not adequately capture the principles involved in the Cornfield Mall proposal. The grow measure asks about beliefs that government should or should not subsidize growth, but the Cornfield Mall was attractive to some people precisely because it promised growth without the need for governmental subsidies. The neigh question asks whether neighborhoods should be protected from unrestricted uses of private property, but there was no residential neighborhood at the proposed site of the Cornfield Mall. Thus, for the Cornfield Mall issue only, alternative measures of abstract principles were employed. Participants and citizens were asked to indicate their priority among several governmental functions including: (a) promoting economic growth and (b) providing effective land-use planning. From these data, ordinal scales of support for growth and protection were developed.

2. Surveys commissioned by the city commission in 1980 and 1987 found high levels of citizen satisfaction with and attachment to the existing downtown, especially its aesthetic and historic qualities.

3. At least this was true until April 1987, when 76 percent of Lawrence voters indicated that they opposed public financing of a shopping mall downtown. However, the interpretation of this result is unclear as a subsequent survey suggested that citizens' votes on the public-funding question were not explained by their spending-and-taxation principles. See Schumaker and Maynard-Moody, *Downtown Redevelopment and Public Opinion*.

4. When the parking lot was first approved, it was thought that the project would serve as a partial inducement for Maupintour, a large national travel agency, to build its new main office in the 600 block of Massachusetts. However, Maupintour decided to build its office near the Alvamar Country Club in western Lawrence.


6. Tom Gleason did not seek reelection. Marci Francisco initially intended to step down from the commission but changed her mind after the filing deadline; her bid as a write-in candidate was unsuccessful. Don Binns lost. Barkley Clark resigned from the commission shortly after the election, and Howard Hill was appointed as his replacement. None of the new commissioners campaigned against the project.


8. A survey of DLA members revealed strong support for developing a special-benefit district to help finance public improvements required for the Sizeler mall.

9. The rest of the funding was projected to come from a federal UDAG grant, revenue-producing utility bonds, a special-benefit district, and tax-increment financing (TIFs). TIFs permits local governments to apply increased sales and property-tax
revenues derived from redevelopment in a blighted area toward repayment of TIF bonds; under Kansas State Law, TIFs must be approved by public referendum.

10. The first question asked whether "Massachusetts Street and Vermont Street shall be closed or vacated from Sixth Street to Eleventh Street." Although the Towncenter proposal would have required that only one block of these streets be vacated, such wording may have heightened perceptions that the project would have been highly disruptive to the downtown. The second question asked whether or not the city should spend funds for the purpose of assisting in the development of an enclosed mall in the central business district. The third question asked whether or not the city should permit vacating any street in the CBD for purposes of constructing an enclosed mall.

11. Land use principles (NEIGH) may have been even more relevant to the resolution of the issue than suggested by Table A (as the data on land-use principles and Towncenter preferences were collected prior to the enlargement of the mall's footprint). Initially, Towncenter did not seem to encroach on residential neighborhoods, but the site plan submitted in October 1986, moved the mall to within a block of Old West Lawrence (OWL), where neighborhood-protection and historic-preservation values are strong. As a consequence, members of the OWL Association became highly visible opponents of the mall, and they appealed to the neighborhood-protection values of others in the community.

12. LJW, 16 March 1986, 1.

13. In March 1989, a U.S. district court judge dismissed a suit filed by JVJ against the city and thus upheld the right of the city commission to plan commercial development through zoning policies.

In 1988 a riverfront plaza, a smaller development adjacent to downtown, was approved. Mall opponents and supporters continue to debate whether this project will solve local shopping needs.

CHAPTER 11. POLITICAL CULTURE: PRINCIPLES, PREFERENCES, AND POLICIES

1. See Knoke, "Urban Political Cultures," and the studies cited there.

2. The analysis in this chapter seeks to be both evaluative and explanatory. When the term "principle-policy congruence" is employed, the concern is primarily evaluative, as descriptions are provided of the extent to which a democratic ideal is realized. When the term "cultural perspective" is employed, the concern is primarily explanatory, as analysis focuses on the extent to which policy outcomes are explained by dominant cultural principles. In general, the analyses presented in Chapters 11 through 13 seek to show that explanations of policy outcomes can provide evaluations of these outcomes when the relationships between policy outcomes and explanatory variables concern democratic ideals.

3. Baskin, American Pluralist Democracy, 91-93. The relationships between preferences and policy outcomes (and the power that is indicated by such relationships) are addressed in Chapters 12 and 13 below.

4. Some dominant principles might be directly related to policies in the sense that they cause outcomes irrespective of people's preferences. Perhaps the notion that there are economic imperatives that require decision makers to emphasize economic growth illustrates such a direct relationship.

5. In "Diversity and Complexity in American Public Opinion," Kinder summarizes the literature dealing with the orthodox pluralist contention that people (especially the mass public) are "ideologically innocent"—that their policy preferences are not
connected to larger overarching principles. An important challenge to the theory of ideological innocence was provided recently by Peffley and Hurwitz. In "A Hierarchical Model of Attitude Constraint," Peffley and Hurwitz note that research confirming the ideological innocence of people is based on the weakness of horizontal interrelationships among policy preferences. They argue that an examination of the vertical interrelationships between ideology, principles, and policy preferences reveals more sophisticated political thinking than suggested by the idea of ideological innocence.

6. The incompatibility of economic-growth principles and liberal public-welfare principles, which are both dominant in Lawrence, has been argued by Peterson in *City Limits*, 167–71. However, the two issues in the sample that most clearly involved welfare principles—the LIFELINE proposal and the funding of social services—were not especially opposed by those with pro-growth principles. Only on the issue of retaining the city manager did these principles compete, probably because such officials help set priorities between pursuing economic growth and providing more public welfare. This suggests that there may be little overt competition between economic growth and public welfare; conflict is avoided by banishing redistributive issues from local agendas.

7. See, for example, Elazar, *American Federalism*, 96–99.

8. The relevance of a principle to an issue was measured by adding the absolute values of the beta weights linking principles to preferences for both participants and citizens (which are reported in Table A). Thus, the cultural support score, modified for the relevance of principles, for the wards issue (shown in Table 5.1) was .20 because creating wards would have been inconsistent with emphasizing economic criteria (which had a weight of .35 reflecting the degree to which participants linked this principle to their position on wards) while it would have been consistent with enhancing citizen participation (which had a weight of .55 reflecting the degree to which support for wards was linked to the citizen-participation principles (DEMO) of participants (.39) and citizens (.16).

9. The degree of public support for a principle is simply the sum of the mean scores for participants and citizens, shown graphically in Table 4.1. Thus, the cultural support score, modified for the degree of support for relevant principles, for the wards issue was −.14, reflecting divided community support for the principle of citizen participation (.65 for citizens but −.18 for participants, yielding a net support score of .47 on demo) and more consistent opposition for emphasizing political criteria (−.33 for participants and −.28 for citizens, yielding a net support score of −.61 on econ).

10. A more demanding test of the idea that the potency of principles depends on their degree of dominance in the culture involves a case-by-case examination of the issues listed in Tables 5.1 through 10.1. In most cases, instances of principle-policy incongruence are accounted for by the relevance to the issue of another more consensually held principle. For example, on the wards issue, citizen-participation principles (which are strongly held by citizens but not participants) were trumped by the concerns about the priority of economic criteria (which were shared by both most citizens and participants).


12. Peterson, *City Limits*.

13. The index of economic imperatives is also based on the analyses reported in Chapters 5 through 10. For each issue, the number of relevant principles supporting change that were inconsistent with Peterson's economic imperatives were subtracted from the principles that were consistent. For example, the proposal to create wards had an economic imperative score of "−2" because it was inconsistent with emphasizing economic criteria and with minimizing public participation. The TOWNCENTER pro-
posal had a score of "2" because it was consistent with subsidizing growth and minimizing public participation.

14. Peterson, City Limits, 27.
17. Ibid., 71–77.
18. Ibid., 150–66.
19. Analyses within the pluralist framework are often criticized for their inability to appreciate systemic power; see, for example, Friedland, "Commentary: The Politics of Economic Growth." In this chapter, I have attempted to show that pluralist analyses can contribute to an understanding of the importance and limitations of systemic power, and systemic power can help to explain some of the conservative biases within pluralist politics.

20. Alford and Friedland, Powers of Theory, 84.

CHAPTER 12. POLITICAL POWER: PARTICIPANTS, CITIZENS, AND DEMOCRACY

1. Representatives and citizens also had different dominant preferences regarding social services; such differences are more easily compromised on expenditure issues (since allocations can be provided midway between the preferences of opposing actors) than on, for example, land-use issues (where developments either are or are not permitted).

On the video tax issue the public was split; the preferences of representatives and citizens did not collide. In interviews, representatives indicated little concern about public preferences but noted the persuasive lobbying effort of opponents of the tax. Thus, the issue has been classified as a case of minority persuasiveness (Level 7 of responsible representation), but because dominant citizen preferences were not violated, a higher score could be assigned to the issue.

2. Lineberry and Fowler, "Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities."
5. Northrop and Dutton, "Municipal Reform and Group Influence."
6. Research in a larger sample of cities is needed to establish the effects of different forms of government on responsible representation. In Urban Reform and Its Consequences, Welch and Bledsoe suggest that the deleterious effects of reformism may be overestimated, but their study does not attempt to assess responsible representation directly.

7. Wider variances in responsible representation than the limited range discovered here would facilitate explorations into the factors that impede and facilitate this aspect of democratic performance.

8. The zero-order correlation between the level of responsible representation and whether the issues were resolved by the 1981–83 commission is .30, which is significant at the .10 level.

11. The number of participants on each issue was determined by procedures described under Data Collection in Chapter 3.
12. The levels of citizen awareness on each issue were measured in the citizen surveys.
by asking respondents whether they were familiar with the issues in the sample (prior to seeking their preferences on these issues).


15. The index of economic imperatives was first discussed in note 13 of Chapter 11.

16. The reAPPRAISAL issue is omitted from this analysis because of the widespread perception that it was a state-level issue and because proponents of reappraisal suffered many losses before finally succeeding in 1986.

17. Because the sample of issues is not random, significance levels cannot reveal the probability that our results are valid for a universe of community issues. Significance levels are reported only as benchmarks of the importance of relationships.

18. Nagel, *The Descriptive Analysis of Power*, 23–34. Two caveats accompany this conception of power. First, power has other dimensions than the “first face” that is revealed in an analysis of who influences policy outcomes; see Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*. Second, the first face of power can only be estimated over a broad sample of issues; the analysis of this face of power cannot determine who caused a specific outcome. Recall the city manager case, where the outcome was consistent with the dominant preferences of representatives, bureaucrats, notables, mobilizers, activists, and citizens. Although the outcome was responsive to each of these categories, it is only possible to speculate about which, if any, of them influenced the outcome. Before concluding that citizen preferences, for example, were the determining factor—and thus that citizens wield power—one must look at other issues in which most citizens preferred one outcome and most participants preferred a different one. If citizen preferences still prevailed on such issues, the inference that citizens determine outcomes would be more valid.

19. The results presented in Table 12.2 are based on ordinary least-squares regression procedures. Other regression procedures produce somewhat different coefficients but generally support the major theoretical finding that direct power resides largely in the hands of representatives.

20. Theoretical specification of the causal relationships among the preferences of various kinds of actors is needed to employ regression analysis to distinguish indirect power (i.e., when certain types of people influence the preferences of other types of people, who in turn influence outcomes) from spurious relationships (i.e., when certain types of people get what they want simply because their preferences coincide with the preferences of those who exercise direct influence). Previous theory and research do not provide a clear basis for specifying such interrelationships, and the number of cases at hand is insufficient to examine adequately alternative theoretical possibilities. Thus, contextual information about the Lawrence cases—derived primarily from interviews with representatives—is used to interpret whether indirect power has been applied or whether spuriousness or noncausal responsiveness has occurred.

21. The formal introduction of ordinances and resolutions onto the governmental agenda is probably not an important dimension of power, as officeholders with these formal powers often introduce bills at the urging of others. What is important is the initiation of issues—the formulation and incubation of proposals for policy changes. Such agenda-setting power is part of the second face of power. Of course, focusing on who has initiated the issues in the Lawrence sample fails to estimate the power that actors have exercised in keeping other issues off the agenda. See Bachrach and Baratz, *Power and Poverty*, 3–16.

22. The data on the roles of representatives were derived from interviews. During a series of questions about each issue, Lawrence commissioners were asked whether they viewed their involvement as: (a) initiators, (b) strong supporters or opponents,
(c) weak supporters or opponents, or (d) neutral referees. They were also asked to name those people who played important roles in initiating each issue.

23. In Protest Is Not Enough, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb note that the power of individual (minority) commissioners depends on whether they are incorporated into a dominant coalition. The Lawrence data replicate this finding. Because Ed Carter and Bob Schummm were part of the pro-growth coalition that dominated the commission between 1979 and 1981, the positions that they supported prevailed on almost every issue. In contrast, Marci Francisco and Nancy Shontz won on only about 40 percent of the issues in which they participated as commissioners, and Tom Gleason won only 50 percent of the time. These commissioners were much less successful because they formed a fragile liberal coalition between 1981 and 1983. If one of these representatives defected from the coalition on a specific issue, the other members of the coalition suffered defeats.

24. When commissioners were referees on issues, they usually articulated substantive reasons for their ultimate positions. In such cases, their preferences are interpreted as independent judgments. About 3 percent of the time, commissioners expressed a clear preference for outcomes different from that indicated by their votes; in such cases, commissioners usually indicated that they responded to citizen-based pressures.


26. Watson said he was involved in all issues in the sample resolved by the city commission, except for the less important drug paraphernalia and video tax issues; however, on some issues—such as the various mall proposals—that involvement was restrained.

27. This section is coauthored by John Bolland.

28. The method used to identify community notables is briefly described under Data Collection in Chapter 3.

29. Bolland, “The Limits to Pluralism.”

30. Six notables participated in the stormwater fee controversy, with four opposing the fee. Thus, most notables won, and most representatives lost. This issue was decided by public referendum, however, and it is difficult to see how it can be construed as a case of elite domination.

31. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People, 35.


33. Evans, “Women and Politics: A Reappraisal.”

34. Groups were identified by methods described under Data Collection in Chapter 3.

35. The media are important in all communities, and they have unique qualities that make them different from other political groups. The Lawrence Journal-World has not been included in the analysis of groups below because its positions on issues seem to reflect primarily the views of its publisher, Dolph Simons, Jr., whose views are included among those of other notables.

36. For a discussion of this measure of dominant group pressure, see the subsection on “Group Leader Preferences” in Chapter 3.

37. The measures of most group characteristics listed in Table 12.6 were derived from interviews with group leaders and members. Respondents were asked to estimate the percentage of members of the upper class (those having incomes in the top quartile of the community), women, and minorities in their group. They were also asked to estimate, on five-point scales, the length of time that their group had been in existence (longevity); the extent to which group leaders and members organized group meetings, signed petitions, and engaged in various kinds of protest (mobilization); the number of members in the group (size); the number of group members who were
active participants on a given issue; the amount of agreement among group members regarding the issue (cohesion); the extent to which group leaders and members contacted representatives and bureaucrats and spoke at commission meetings (persuasive participation); and the amount of time that group leaders expended on the issue. The estimates of various respondents were averaged to attain the measures of group characteristics used in the analysis reported in Table 12.6.

38. In a similar analysis of unequal responsiveness to various groups in fifty-one American communities during the early 1970s, some bias against minorities could not be explained; see Schumaker and Billeaux, “Group Representation in Local Bureaucracies.”

39. The policy goals of various groups were coded on a five-point scale. Groups seeking benefits that would be available only to specific people—such as LIFELINE gas rates—were scored as “5,” and groups seeking benefits that would be available to everyone—such as the elimination of the STORMwater fee on water bills—were scored as “1”. The judgments of two coders on these subjective scales were averaged.


41. Drawing on Peterson’s arguments in City Limits, groups pursuing allocation policies were ranked at the neutral midpoint (3) on this five-point scale of growth orientation. Groups pursuing developmental policies were ranked as advantaged (4), because they contribute to the economic interest of the city. The goals of the chamber of commerce were ranked higher (5) than other pro-growth groups because of the chamber’s leading role in pro-growth coalitions. Groups protesting developmental policies were ranked as relatively disadvantaged (2), because satisfying their goals can reduce the gains sought through developmental policies. Groups seeking redistributive policies were ranked as most disadvantaged (1), because satisfying their goals can have a negative effect on the local economy.

42. Stone, “Systemic Power in Community Decision Making.”

43. The measures of net support used in Table 12.6 were obtained by adding the group weights (described under Group Leader Preferences in Chapter 3) for each group ally and subtracting the group weights for each group opponent.

44. Lipsky, Protest in City Politics; Schumaker, “Policy Responsiveness to Protest Group Demands.”

45. Lowi, The End of Liberalism.

46. Yates, The Ungovernable City.


49. Between 56 and 61 percent of all people who were active on the Lawrence issues were classified as individual activists. The low estimate is based on only those people who were interviewed. The high estimate is based on both those who were interviewed and those who were attributed participation by others. People who were attributed participation were coded as individual activists unless data about their elite status or group involvements were available. The latter procedure may overestimate the extensiveness of involvement by individual activists since available information may not have allowed the identification of all group members.

50. Many pluralists argue that democracy requires only opportunities for participation and citizen belief in such opportunities; low levels of actual participation are necessary for stability. See Alford and Friedland, Powers of Theory, 59–111.

51. The representation ratios for individual activists are reported under Nongroup Members in Table 12.5.

52. Only with respect to democratic-involvement principles do citizens and individual
activists differ significantly. Although the finding that activists are less committed to “public involvement” than are citizens seems paradoxical, one must recall that this principle deals with the appropriateness of resolving issues through referenda. Though the normally inactive public strongly endorses referenda as a means of ensuring greater responsiveness to their preferences, individual activists may understand that referenda tend to equalize the power of activists and citizens generally. Activists may believe that their participation will be more effective when it is targeted at representatives rather than voters who may be less attentive to their concerns.


54. The Pearson correlation coefficients between the preferences of individual activists and those of representatives and citizens are .56 and .62, respectively.


56. A more stringent definition of the attentive public is found in Devine, *The Attentive Public: Polyarchic Democracy*.

57. Converse, “Attitudes and Non-attitudes.”


59. See Table 5.2 in Chapter 5.

60. Clubb and Traugott, “National Patterns of Referenda Voting.”


63. Pomper, *Elections in America*.

64. Verba and Nie, *Participation in America*.


67. If policy choices are binary (pro or con), there are four possible distributions of dominant citizen and representative preferences: (1) citizen support and representative support, (2) citizen support and representative opposition, (3) citizen opposition and representative support, and (4) citizen opposition and representative opposition. Without any mechanism for linking citizen and representative preferences, the first and last possibilities will each occur randomly one-fourth of the time.

68. In *Public Opinion and Popular Government* (222–42), Weissberg uses the term “manipulation” to describe this process because it points to actions by governmental officials to generate support for their goals. Nevertheless, the argument will be developed that the term is a bit too dramatic.


70. Wahlke, “Policy Demands and System Support: The Role of the Represented.”

71. The concern here is not to justify unresponsive policies on these issues. It can be argued that the tendency to “localize” issues is fundamentally undemocratic. By considering only the immediate interests involved, representatives ignore not only broader public preferences on the issue (however limited and indecisive they may be) but also the broader principles that predominate in the public. Thus, while few citizens may have been aware of the issue, the tendency of citizens to oppose rezoning the BLUFFS and to support OREAD downzoning reflected widespread citizen concerns about neighborhood protection throughout the community.

72. The data in Table 4.1 on democratic-process principles suggest the prevalence of trustee role orientations in Lawrence. For a more general discussion of trusteeship in local politics, see Eulau and Prewitt, *Labyrinths of Democracy*, 407–23.

73. Kuklinski, “Representativeness and Elections.”
CHAPTER 13. POLITICAL JUSTICE: 
DIVISIONS, STANDINGS, AND COMPLEX EQUALITY

1. In *Spheres of Justice* (304), Walzer argues that simple inequalities of power become complex equalities of power if such inequalities are based on persuasiveness and independent of the possession of other social resources (e.g., wealth or social status). In the present analysis, simple inequalities of success on policy issues become complex equalities of power if these inequalities have any of a variety of legitimate explanations.

2. See, for example, Karnig and Welch, *Black Representation and Urban Policy.*

3. Table 2.2 defines the teams that compete in each of these thirteen divisions. The operational definitions used to sort persons among competing interests are provided in Chapter 3, pp. 46–47.

4. During the interviews, persons were prompted about each of the cleavages listed in Table 13.1 except for those involving gender, age, sector of employment, and length of residency in the community.

5. One reason why the total number of victories does not always equal the total number of losses within a division is because of such alliances.

6. Because the samples of citizens are much larger than those of participants and because cleavages are defined on the basis of statistical differences (which are much easier to discover in larger samples), methodological considerations would lead to finding more cleavages in the citizen samples than in the participant samples.

7. Miller, "Pluralism and Social Choice."

8. In an earlier collaboration with Nancy Burns ("Gender Cleavages and the Resolution of Local Policy Issues"), we reported more significant gender biases against women participants. Such findings were based on the political standings in Lawrence at the end of 1984. Subsequently, more stringent enforcement of the SIGNS ordinance transformed a tie into a narrow victory for women. More importantly, the public referendum in 1987 that doomed TOWNCENTER also transformed what had been judged a loss for women into a victory. These changes make clear that political standings are continuously subject to revision, and they suggest the growing effectiveness of women in community politics.

9. The concern here is with cleavages as descriptive phenomena at the aggregate level, not with the independent causal effect of class, gender, age, and so forth on policy preferences among individuals. For example, gender cleavages may be explained by the differences between men and women in their attitudes, but this would not make gender theoretically or politically insignificant. If men tend to be Market Providers and members of the Growth Machine, and women tend to be Public Providers and Preservationists, victories by Market Providers and the Growth Machine will be victories for men over women.

10. The factor scores reported here were derived by varimax rotation. The measures of the extent of various cleavages on each issue were based on a simple scale using the measures of participant cleavages, citizen cleavages, and official perceptions of cleavage. For each of these measures, a "0" was assigned to an issue if a particular cleavage was absent. A "1" was assigned if there was a weak cleavage or a significant difference, and a "2" was assigned if there was a strong cleavage ("-1" or "-2" were assigned if such cleavages were resolved in favor of the least potent teams in each division). These scores for participant cleavages, citizen cleavages, and perceived cleavages were then summed to form an index of the degree of conflict in each division on each issue.

11. Schumaker and Getter, "Responsiveness Bias in 51 American Communities."
12. Using the twenty-nine issues as units of analysis, the following simple regression model was analyzed:

\[ PP = B_1 LC + B_2 MC + B_3 UC + e, \]

where

- \( PP \) is policy outcomes (the extent of public policy changes)
- \( LC \) is percentage of lower-class participants supporting change
- \( MC \) is percentage of middle-class participants supporting change
- \( UC \) is percentage of upper-class participants supporting change

13. The procedures used to determine the class of citizens is described under The Preferences of Competing Interests, Chapter 3, pp. 46-47. In order to permit comparisons between participants and citizens, the same scores used as quartile cutpoints to define the classes in the citizen sample were used to determine class membership in the participant sample.

14. Interviewed participants were asked to estimate on five-point rating scales the number of times they contacted representatives, contacted bureaucrats, and addressed officials at public meetings. The scores reported on Table 13.5 are the averages over all twenty-nine issues of these scores for each class. Scores of 2.0 in the table indicate that the lower-class participants reported averaging two to three such actions per issue.

15. Interviewed participants were also asked to estimate on five-point rating scales the number of times they mobilized others into groups, circulated petitions, publicized issues in the media, and engaged in demonstrations and boycotts. The scores reported in Table 13.5 are the averages over all issues of these scores for each class.

16. Net participation is simply the number of persons (of a particular class or group) supporting policy change minus the number of such persons opposing policy change. Although the analyses in the second and third rows of Table 13.4 relate policy changes to the percentage of lower-class, middle-class, and upper-class participants who support such changes, the analyses in the fourth through ninth rows relate policy changes to the net participation of persons of various classes. This is an important difference because percentage support is a measure independent of the number of persons involved, and net participation is a function both of the number of persons involved and their policy preferences.

Although conceptually distinct, measures of percent support and net participation are strongly correlated empirically across the twenty-nine issues. Because of problems of multicollinearity, measures of percent support and net participation cannot be analyzed simultaneously. In the multivariate analyses reported herein, measures of net participation are employed because they include measures of participation. The alternative "net support" measures ignore class differences in participation.

17. The data in the fifth through ninth rows of Table 13.4 are based on the following regression model.

\[ PP = B_1 NETLC + B_2 NETMC + B_3 NETUC + B_4 CONT_i + e, \]

where:

- \( PP \) is the policy outcome (extent of policy change);
- \( NETLC \) is the number of lower-class proponents minus the number of lower-class opponents
- \( NETMC \) is the number of middle-class proponents minus the number of middle-class opponents
- \( NETUC \) is the number of upper-class proponents minus the number of upper-class opponents
- \( CONT_i \) are various control variables (the extent of middle-class representation, public support for policy changes, etc.) introduced in the sixth through ninth rows of Table 13.3.

If \( B_1 = B_2 = B_3 \) (where \( B_i \) are standardized regression coefficients, or Beta-weights, estimating the independent effect on policy changes of the net number of
lower-class, middle-class, and upper-class participants), then policy changes are equally responsive to increases in the number of persons of various classes who support or oppose policy changes. Significant inequalities in the $B_i$'s indicate that the participation of various classes is unequally effective.

18. The representation-citizenship ratios reported in Table 13.5 (and subsequently in Tables 13.8, 13.11, and 13.14) are the percent of representatives divided by the percent of citizens of each class (or other categories of citizens). The representation-participation ratios reported in these tables are the percent of representatives divided by the percent of participants of each class.

19. The measure of middle-class representation is simply the percent of representatives involved in each issue who are members of the middle class.

20. The index of cultural support is the modified index described in note 9 of Chapter 11.

21. The index of economic imperatives is described in note 13 of Chapter 11.

22. The analyses in the last two rows of Table 13.4 require splitting the sample into issues having class conflict among participants ($N = 9$) and issues without such conflict ($N = 20$). The small number of cases here precludes multivariate analysis.

23. The procedures for measuring the extensiveness of various cleavages (including the class and neighborhood cleavages correlated here) were discussed in note 10.

Although Cellar Dwellers are often members of the lower class, many participants from neighborhoods having lower property values were highly educated professionals whose socioeconomic status placed them in the middle and upper classes. Although Country Clubbers are usually members of the upper class, many participants from neighborhoods having higher property values were businessmen whose modest educational attainments and occupational status placed them in the middle class.

24. The sixth row of Table 13.7 shows that variations in Cellar Dweller representation do not affect the gap between the effectiveness of participation by Cellar Dwellers and Split Levellers. Even when Cellar Dwellers were more highly represented on issues, they lacked a dominant coalition that could control issue outcomes.

25. In “Politics and Older Americans,” Cigler and Swanson provide a comprehensive review of the literature on age differences regarding political preferences and participation. Though the literature shows that “older American seem to be somewhat more culturally and morally conservative than younger Americans,” Cigler and Swanson argue that there is “little age cleavage” in America.

26. This analysis, reported in the sixth row of Table 13.7, is based on a model similar to that described in note 17 above except that the net participation of Rookies, Veterans, and Seniors on each issue was calculated after the participation of each person was weighted by the index of persuasive participation described in note 14.

27. Marci Francisco—the youngest commissioner in Lawrence—turned thirty before resolving any of the issues in the sample.

28. In a noteworthy exception, Jeffrey Henig, in Public Policy and Federalism, describes state and local issues from neoconservative, liberal, and radical perspectives.

29. Wilson and Banfield, “Political Ethos Revisited.”

30. In Urban Policies and Politics in a Bureaucratic Age (110), Stone, Whelan, and Murin describe the core Managerial beliefs: “There is an overriding public interest that is superior to particular interests,” which can be discovered through cooperation and technical problem solving. “Politics is therefore to be minimized.” In contrast, Politicos doubt that a single definition of the public interest exists and that there is one best solution to community problems; they challenge the neutrality of experts and seek political representation of their alternative views.
31. Molotch, "The City as a Growth Machine"; Kann, *Middle Class Radicalism in Santa Monica*.
32. This conflict corresponds roughly to that between fiscal conservatives and fiscal liberals described by Clark and Ferguson in *City Money*.
33. Citizens surveyed in public opinion polls and interviewed participants were asked to indicate their priorities among four governmental roles. Respondents were designated as Market Providers if they said that their highest priority for local governments was "keeping taxes to a minimum" and as Public Providers if they said that their highest priority was "providing higher levels of governmental and social services." Those indicating that "promoting economic growth" was their highest priority were regarded as members of the Growth Machine, and those indicating that "providing careful land-use planning" was their highest priority were regarded as Preservationists. Market Providers and Public Providers comprise only 54 percent of all citizens and participants; others indicated their allegiance to the values of the Growth Machine or to Preservationists.
34. In *Protest Is Not Enough*, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb develop the argument that relatively powerless interests must be not only represented but "incorporated" (or represented in coalitions that dominate governing bodies) in order to enhance their influence in policymaking.

CHAPTER 14. CRITICAL PLURALISM AND THE RULES OF THE GAME

5. Issue voting occurs when voters choose candidates whose policy positions mirror their own policy positions. For a more precise definition and analysis of issue voting, see Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, *The Changing American Voter*, 156–73.
7. Because polyarchal rules provide an inadequate basis for understanding both the distribution of power and the regulation of quests for power within communities, Arthur Bentley (in *The Process of Government*) introduced the concept of "the habit background" to refer to the prevailing cultural, social, and political norms that define the limit beyond which players seldom go in seeking victories on political issues. In *The Governmenal Process*, Truman referred to such norms as "the rules of the game" and argued that such rules were enforced by "potential groups"—groups that are normally latent but emerge to bring counterforce to bear on the bullies who do not play by the rules of moderation and tolerance.
8. The comparative-issues method is not sufficient, however, to answer every question about complex equality. At least as developed for this study, this method does not probe into the inequalities that are explained by differences in representation, participation, and public support. Perhaps such differences are rooted in illegitimate factors, and perhaps these factors can be uncovered by complementary political research. For example, in *Urban Reform and Its Consequences*, Welch and Bledsoe have shown how unequal representation of different classes is brought about by electoral arrangements. In *Participation in America*, Verba and Nie show how voluntary organizations promote inequalities in participation. In *Power and Powerlessness*,
Gaventa shows how absentee corporate interests affect citizen receptivity to various policy initiatives.

9. In Lawrence, owners adjacent to land that is proposed for zoning changes to permit higher-density developments may sign protest petitions against the rezoning. If a valid petition is submitted, the rezoning can occur only by approval of an extraordinary majority of the commission (i.e., by a 4–1 vote).


11. This does imply that principle-policy congruence, responsible representation, and complex equality are complementary criteria that can be simultaneously achieved. They are distinct and, at least for the twenty-nine Lawrence issues, they are empirically independent. The empirical relationships concerning the achievement of three goals have been assessed, using the modified index of cultural support (described in note 9 of Chapter 11), the scale of responsible representation (provided in Table 2.1), and a measure of the extent to which each outcome was consistent with the preferences of relatively powerful interests. To obtain this index of (in)equality of treatment, the indices of degree of conflict within each division on each issue (described in note 10 of Chapter 13) were summed for each issue. Thus, an issue had a high positive inequality of treatment score if the most successful teams prevailed. An issue had a high negative inequality of treatment score if the least successful teams prevailed. Inequality of treatment scores approached zero for those issues without cleavages in any of the divisions or with outcomes favoring relatively weak teams in some divisions and relatively strong teams in others. The Pearson correlation coefficients between these measures of policy-principle congruence, responsible representation, and inequality of treatment are as follows:

- Inequality of treatment and responsible representation: 0.12
- Inequality of treatment and policy-principle congruence: 0.08
- Responsible Representation and policy-principle congruence: −0.06

The independence of these three criteria suggest that reforms to achieve higher performances on one criterion are unlikely to achieve higher performances on other criteria.


13. In *American Federalism* (96–107), Elazar defines moralistic and individualistic political cultures and provides maps suggesting the distribution of these cultures throughout the United States.

APPENDIX. DETERMINING THE PRINCIPLES AT STAKE ON CONCRETE ISSUES

1. In Chapter 4 (and Table 4.1), measures of support for alternative principles were coded such that higher scores indicated support for conservative principles. Because liberal neighborhood protection, public-service, public-welfare, social-liberty, and public-involvement (DEMO) principles are dominant in Lawrence's political culture, the measures of these abstract issues have been reverse coded to attain the results presented in Table A.

2. In this study all correlations involving unarticulated principles were found spurious in the multiple regression analyses. However, significant relationships between principles and preferences could persist in the multiple-regression analyses even
if related alternative principles were not articulated by participants on both sides of those issues as relevant to the controversy. Thus, relating principles to preferences may be a useful method for uncovering the hidden (unarticulated but nevertheless relevant) interests that are at work on policy issues.

3. A .10 level of statistical significance was employed in the multiple-regression analyses for participants because—even if relationships were strong—it was sometimes difficult to obtain the .05 level of significance when there were several independent variables and Np was small.
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