Notes

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NOTES

2. Ibid., 7.

INTRODUCTION


14. Brooks, "Japanese Colonialism," 233–34. The marriage of Korean women to Japanese men appears to have been infrequent, which Brooks speculates may account for the government’s enthusiastic promotion of these unions.


23. David Howell describes the “geography of civilization” as a way of conceiving of early modern Japan that defined the borders of the realm and the differences between subjects of the shogun from others as the separation of “the civilized from the barbarian.” In Howell’s argument, the Meiji state spatialized the status component of this geography—over time, equating Japanese ethnicity with civility and the space of civilization with the territory of the state. I also use the term to evoke the kind of core-periphery geography that Howell is describing. But as I use it, the modern geography of civilization was not a totalizing
geography of state-ethnicity-territory. Rather, it encapsulated a number of modes of territorial incorporation that relied on the core-periphery idea, but each represented distinct spatializations of the Japanese nation. See Howell, Geographies of Identity in Nineteenth-Century Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 3, 131–54.

24. In formulating this concept, I draw inspiration from recent studies of the spatial history of imperialism, such as those by Sylvia Sellers-García and Paul Kosmin, which demonstrate that spatial concepts such as “distance” and “territory” have served as powerful methods for naturalizing empire across a broad span of human history. Sylvia Sellers-García, Distance and Documents at the Spanish Empire’s Periphery (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014); Paul Kosmin, The Land of the Elephant Kings: Space, Territory, and Ideology in the Seleucid Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).

25. Lauren Benton, “Spatial Histories of Empire,” Itinerario 30, no. 3 (2006): 20 suggests, for example, that “micro-regions represented a grammar for spatial organization in European empire” that can be approached by historians within the framework of a non-completist, non-jigsaw puzzle, non-universalizing approach to imperial geographies.


28. The history of imperial tourism’s spatial politics elucidates how the theories of multiethnic Japanese national identity and culture that circulated in the realm of intellectual debate and policy were made tangible to a popular audience. Komagome Takeshi, Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon no bunka tōgō (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1996) and Komagome Takeshi, Sekaishi no naka no Taiwan shokuminchi shihai: Tainan chōrōkyō chūgakkō kara no shiza (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 2015); Haruyama Meitetsu, Kindai Nihon to Taiwān: Musha jiken shokuminchi tōchi seisaku no kenkyū (Tokyo: Fujiwara shōbō, 2008); Oguma Eiji, ‘Nihonjin’ no kyōkai: Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan, Chōsen, shokuminchi shihai kara fukki undō made (Tokyo: Shin’yōsha, 1998); Morris-Suzuki, Reinventing Japan: Time, Space, and Nation;
and Oguma Eiji, *A Genealogy of “Japanese” Self-Images*, trans. David Askew (Melbourne, Australia: Trans Pacific Press, 2002), 133, 134–37. It is, in fact, in Oguma Eiji’s famous study of concepts of Japanese ethnicity and national identity under empire that we get a glimpse of the centrality of place to the history of empire. Oguma specifically highlighted how changes to the spatial representation of Japan in the 1920s were part of the broader embrace of a multiethnic imaginary of the Japanese nation. The “most marked transition” in descriptions of the Japanese Empire was found in geography textbooks, he writes, which, after 1918, “clearly adopted the view that Japan was a multi-national empire.”

29. Peter Jackson and Jan Penrose, “Introduction: Placing ‘Race’ and Nation,” in *Constructions of Race, Place, and Nation* (London: University College London Press, 1994); Tracey Banivanua-Mar and Penelope Edmonds, “Making Space in Settler Colonies,” in *Making Settler Colonial Space: Perspectives on Race, Place, and Identity* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 2. Though we arrived at the term separately, Banivanua-Mar and Edmonds also use *spatial politics* to describe how settler colonial societies used representations of space to facilitate the dispossession of indigenous populations and the possession of these lands by expanding nation-states. They also caution against conflating the spatial politics of settler colonialism with other kinds of colonialism. Here, I have opted to focus less on the specifics of settler colonialism within the Japanese Empire in favor of an approach that highlights how spatial politics operated in the heterogeneous colonial formations of Japanese imperialism. Indeed, one of the most significant elements of spatial politics was the way in which it sought to transform these heterogeneous formations into the singular space of the nation. On settler colonialism in the Japanese Empire compared to settler colonialism elsewhere, see J. Uchida, *Brokers of Empire*, 11–25. For a global perspective, see Caroline Elkins and Susan Pedersen, eds., *Settler Colonialism in the Twentieth Century: Projects, Practices, Legacies* (New York: Routledge, 2005).


53. Asada, Nihon shokuminchi kenkyū shiron, 32.


57. See, for example, Peter Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie, The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895–1937 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). More recently, Louise Young argues that Japanese imperialism contained both formal and informal elements. The point I make here is that the field of Japanese Empire studies treats Japanese Manchuria as a different historical phenomenon than that of “formal” Japanese colonialism in Taiwan and Korea. Young, Japan’s Total Empire, 11.

58. The government held a 50 percent stake and the Imperial House held a 1 percent stake. Y. Tak Matsusaka, The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904–1932 (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2001), 71, 90.

59. Manshū senseki hozonkai (1914) at Japan Center for Asian Historical Records (A14080166600).


1. SEEING LIKE THE NATION


2. Andre Haag describes Nakanishi as a “one-man contact zone” for his role in facilitating connections between Japanese and Korean writers. See Haag’s insightful chapter on Nakanishi’s “anti-travelogues” in “Fear and Loathing in Imperial Japan: The Cultures of Korean Peril, 1919–1923,” PhD diss., Stanford University, 2013, 200–69. For more on Nakanishi’s writings on Korea, see Nakane Takayuki, “Chōsen” hyōshō no bunka shi: Kindai Nihon to tasha o meguru chi no shokuminchika (Tokyo: Shin’yōsha, 2004). Haag’s characterization of Nakanishi as being particularly attuned to the way that “the system of colonialism warps the inner world of Japanese settlers” is in contrast to Kawamura Minato’s reading of his work—Kawamura suggests that Nakanishi “lacked any self-reflection on how the Japanese self appeared to Koreans.” Kawamura Minato, “Puroreteria bungaku no naka no minzoku mondai,” *Kokubungaku kaishaku to kanshō* 75, no. 4 (2010): 63, quoted and translated in Haag, “Fear and Loathing in Imperial Japan,” 265. From my readings of Nakanishi’s later travelogues for Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan, I am inclined to follow Haag’s reading of Nakanishi as particularly insightful, if unruly, critic of colonialism’s cultural politics. For more on Nakanishi’s writings in the contact zone, see Karen Thornber, *Empire of Texts in Motion: Chinese, Korea, and Taiwanese Transculturations of Japanese Literature* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009).


26. Ibid., 54.
27. Ibid.
28. Ruoff, Imperial Japan at Its Zenith, 8.
33. The word that I translate as “observation” here, shisatsu, has also been translated in this context as “investigation” and “inspection,” as in “tours of inspection.” I use “observation” in order to situate it within the wider context of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century turn to the production of knowledge through visual rather than textual or metaphorical means, as well as to emphasize the eyewitness or first-hand nature of the knowledge travelers were meant to gain. The idea of travel as the observation of the real was also implicated in the construction of the individual self within the shifting frameworks of self-knowledge of the day, in this case, the idea of a national subject. Thus, as Jilly Traganou argues, “looking with ‘one’s own eyes’ is not a spectator’s natural capacity, but rather a constructed condition that has been valorized through the modern faith in the power of individuality.” This individuality was constituted within, as Noriko Aso has argued, a “exhibitionary complex” that


35. Ibid.


43. Quote is from S. Tanaka, “Childhood,” 25. He is referring specifically to the function of childhood in the construction of the temporality of the nation here, but the context more broadly is the “convergence of nature and thought in the construction of the nation-state” (24).


47. Duara, *Sovereignty and Authenticity*, 44–47.
50. Entrikin, *The Betweenness of Place*.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid., 122.
56. Ibid., 140.
57. Ibid., 50.
59. *Ryōtō shūgaku ryokō ki*, 217–18. The phrase “fast gathering darkness” is confusing in the context. It is possible that he elided the passage of an entire day’s worth of time between this sentence and the previous one. It is also possible that the student made a mistake in his word choice. The student, who was part of the English Club, published his account in English.
60. Ibid.
62. Moto Jun, “Dairen Ryōjun,” in *Kōyūkaishi (Keijō chū)* (March 1, 1935): 247. This particular student was probably Korean; one way to read his surname is Ho. In this case, however, his recollection differs little from that of his Japanese colleagues. On the experience of Korean students at these sites, see Woo Miyeong, “Trip to Empire on Display and Colonized Subjects,” *Tong-Asia munhwa yŏng’u* 48 (2010): 33–68.
63. “Manshū senseki hozonkai no jigyō ni kansuru kengi” (1914), Japan Center for Asian Historical Records. A14080166600.

66. Schmid, Korea between Empires, 72–78.


69. Kikuchi, Kunisaku kihi no kenkyū, 111, 176–78, 197, 427.

70. Konishi, Anarchist Modernity, 184.

71. Ibid., 183–87. Though the Heimin shinbun printed a translation of Tolstoy’s “Bethink Yourselves,” a critique of the Russo-Japanese War, the newspaper’s editors also challenged Tolstoy for portraying the cause of the war as lost religious faith. In an article published in the following issue, editor Kōtoku Shūsui argued that the cause of war was rather “the intensifying economic competition between major powers.” For that reason, “if we wish to eliminate wars between nations, . . . we must overthrow the capitalist system and put a socialist system in its place.” Kōtoku Shūsui, “A Critique of Tolstoy’s Pacifism,” Heimin shinbun, August 14, 1904, quoted in Robert Tierney, Monster of the Twentieth Century: Kōtoku Shūsui and Japan’s First Anti-Imperialist Movement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015), 111. On the Heimin shinbun and the people’s (heimin) movement, see Tierney, Monster of the Twentieth Century, 96–114.


74. Shimazu, “Myth of the “Patriotic Soldier.””


76. Zheng Zhengcheng, Ren shi ta che de tian kong: Ri zhi shi qi Taiwan yuan zhu min de guan guang xing lü (Taipei shi: Bo yang wenhua shiye youxian gongsi, 2005), 37–77.


78. Zheng argues that the emphasis on military might and submission continued until the 1930s, when the itineraries shifted to inspiring political loyalty. These later itineraries devoted only a few hours to military sites and instead focused on temples, shrines, and agriculture. Zheng, Ren shi ta che de tian kong, 78–129.

79. “Dai 4-kai naichi kankō banjin kansō hōkoku” (1913), Japan Center for Asian Historical Records, Co8020372800, frames 3–4; also cited in Sand, “Imperial Tokyo As Contact Zone.” Following the annexation in 1910, members of the Korean aristocracy also undertook widely publicized tours of the metropole, where they met with the members of the Japanese
imperial family and government officials and toured local sights. In bringing members of
the two aristocracies together, these tours “demonstrated Korean acceptance” of the new
Japan-Korea relationship and, in particular, its “hierarchical construction.” Mark Caprio,

80. “Dai 4-kai naichi kankō banjin kansō hōkoku” (1913), Japan Center for Asian His-
torical Records, Co8020372800, frames 3–4.


82. Tōyō takushoku kabushiki kaisha, ed., *Chōsenjin naichi shisatsu Taishō 2-nen shūki*
(Keijō: Tōyō takushoku, 1913), 14–19, 27. At the Ishimori co-op, the travelogue reported that
the travelers were impressed with the savings and stability of the co-op, and argued that the
stable development of Korean villages would have to be based on such organizations.

83. Howland, *Translating the West*, 38–40. *Bunmei kaika* did not equal “civilization and
enlightenment” really until the advent of modernization theory in the 1950s; until then, it
was simply translated as “civilization.”


85. Ibid., 38. For example, the Tokyo Prefectural Legislature voted unanimously to fund
the travel of students and teachers at prefectural schools, a total of 2,022 yen. In Mie Prefec-
ture, the government offered each elementary school teacher who traveled a 15-yen fellow-
ship and each prefectural school principal a 25-yen fellowship.

86. This, for example, is Urry’s description of tourism. Buzard points out though that
even the Grand Tour, often used to contrast early modern “travel” with modern “tourism,”
was undertaken primarily by members of the middle class, who embarked on more or less
standard itineraries that were designed to increase their knowledge of Europe and forge po-
tential commercial connections. In this, it was not unlike imperial tourism in Japan. Urry,
*The Tourist Gaze*; James Buzard, *The Beaten Track: European Tourism, Literature, and the
Ways to Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). For an overview of the debate, see

87. Gao Yuan, “Kankō no seijigaku: Senzen sengo ni okeru Nihonjin no ‘Manshū’
kankō” (PhD diss., University of Tokyo, 2004), 65–66.

Bureau, 1923), 259. The estimated cost included a Japan-Korea-Manchuria Leisure Ticket
(*Nissenman shūyū ken*), two round-trip fares from Dairen to Ryojun and Hōten to Bujun
(not covered by the discount ticket), hotel, sleeper car and carriage expenses, and meals.

89. Shūkan Asahi, ed., *Nedanshi nenpyō: Meiji, Taishō, Shōwa* (Tokyo: Asahi shinbun-
sha, 1989 [1988]), 116. The tuition figures do not include lab and other fees (*jisshūryō*).

90. “Taiwan e no tabi,” *Umi* 1924, no. 8, 31–32. Japan Tourist Bureau, ed., *Ryotei to hiyō
gaisan Taishō 12-nen*, 287–95. First-class travel was 326.42 yen; second class ran 232.96 yen
(no third class yet offered).


92. Abe Yasunari, “Tairiku ni kōfun suru shūgaku ryokō—Yamaguchi kōto shōgyō


96. Ibid., 155.

97. Ibid., 35. The South Manchuria Railway also inaugurated the practice of sponsoring the travel of influential writers to Manchuria, beginning with Natsume Sōseki in 1909. Sōseki published his lightly critical account of the Railway Zone in the *Tokyo Asahi Newspaper* as “Man-Kan tokoro dokoro” (Here and there in Manchuria and Korea). It subsequently became one of the most famous travel accounts of Korea and Manchuria. Although Sōseki is considered the “father of modern Japanese literature,” in the aftermath of empire, “Man-Kan tokoro dokoro” was written out of his oeuvre and the canon of modern Japanese literature as part of a larger project of casting the story of modern Japanese literature as one of Japan encountering the West, rather than of Japan colonizing Asia. James A. Fujii, “Writing Out Asia: Modernity, Canon, and Natsume Sōseki’s *Kokoro,*” *positions* 1, no. 1 (1993): 194–223. For an excellent English translation of Sōseki’s account, see Natsume Sōseki, *Man-Kan tokoro dokoro,* reprinted in *Rediscovering Natsume Sōseki,* with the First English Translation of Travels in Manchuria and Korea, trans. Inger Sigrun Brodey and Sammy I. Tsunematsu (Kent, England: Global Oriental, 2000).


104. Ibid., 128.


106. Ibid., 100.


2. THE NEW TERRITORIES


2. Johannes Fabian, *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 31. Paul Barclay argues that allochronic discourse provided the “governing metaphor” for photographic representations of indigenous people in Taiwan during the 1930s. While I agree in principle, my research suggests that allochrony dominated the 1910s and 1920s but was then superseded by a geocultural discourse of identity, which synchronized difference by ascribing culture to territory rather than people. See Barclay, “Peddling Postcards and Selling Empire,” 86. Allochrony also structures Stefan Tanaka’s interpretation of how Orientalist historians produced a modern history of Japan that distinguished Japan as a historical nation from China by locating China as Japan’s past. Here I argue that while allochrony did and would continue to structure discourses of Chinese difference (China as *Shina*) allochrony did not and could not hold for Korea, Taiwan, and, somewhat ambiguously, Manchuria, as the state sought to consolidate and maintain its imperial territory as the space of the Japanese nation. Tanaka, *Japan’s Orient*, 244–55.


6. Wolfgang Schivelbusch calls this “railway space” and describes how the railway transformed landscape by embedding the traveler in a systematized, network space removed from any organic sense of duration or sequential topography. In the colonial context, however, place was temporal as well as spatial. Wolfgang Schivelbusch, *The Railway Journey: The
10. ”National-historical space” comes from Hill, National History and the World of Nations, 50.
16. Emer O’Dwyer, Significant Soil: Settler Colonialism and Japan’s Urban Empire in Manchuria (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2015), 72.
17. Itō Hirobumi to Prime Minister Prince Saionji at an interministerial conference in May 1906, quoted in Matusaka, The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904–1932, 84. Itō Hirobumi drafted the 1889 Constitution, served as Japan’s first prime minister, and, from 1905 until his assassination in 1909, served as the first resident general of Korea.
18. We see this most clearly in the 1922 Washington Conference and the Nine-Power Treaty’s insistence on protecting the ”territorial integrity” of China, which, since it did not come with the return of tariff autonomy to China, was also seen as an excuse for blocking Japanese expansion into Asia in the name of maintaining China as a territory of exploita- tion for the other Great Powers. Akira Iriye, After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921–1931 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965); Susan Pedersen, ”Back to the League of Nations,” American Historical Review 112, no. 4 (2007): 1091–117.
21. Settlers particularly chafed against the Company Law, which required companies to receive the approval of the Government General before they could be formed. The Government General implemented the policy in the name of preventing “frivolous” Korean companies from wasting capital that could otherwise be used more productively, but a joint Korean-Japanese Chamber of Commerce argued that it was having the effect of preventing the industrial development of the peninsula as a whole. J. Uchida, *Brokers of Empire*, 231–33.


26. See the Fūzoku gahō special issues on the invasion of Taiwan: issues 98, 101, 103, 105 (1895); 109 (1896); on the pacification of Chinese rebels (dohi), issue 111 (1896); and on “savage customs” (banjin fūzoku), 129 (1896). At least one of these representations borrowed explicitly from woodblock prints from the late Tokugawa period, which depicted Commodore Perry groveling before a triumphant samurai general. At the same time, they made slight changes to fit Taiwan and civilization within the context of European modernity rather than Japanese civilization. One anonymously published print from 1874, rendered a Japanese general as a samurai leader receiving the scraping bows of the indigenous leaders. Though in almost all respects a repurposing of the Perry image, in this case the samurai general sat upon a chair rather than a stool. The chair, which was a ubiquitous symbol of the “civilization and enlightenment” discourse of the early Meiji period, situated indigenous people and the Japanese in a universalized hierarchy of civilizational development. Robert Eskildsen, “Of Civilization and Savages: The Mimetic Imperialism of Japan’s 1874 Expedition to Taiwan,” *American Historical Review* 107, no. 2 (2002): 410, 418.


29. Ibid., 213. The image of Taiwan as a lawless place was further underscored by a violent rebellion of Taiwanese Chinese in the village of Tà-pa-ni in 1915. Brought about by the pressures of colonial economic policy, especially the Government General’s land taxes,
sugar monopoly, and the practice of confiscating forest land, the colonial administration and metropolitan media nevertheless portrayed the uprising as the work of “bandits” (dohi) out to upset the law and order of the colony. In the aftermath, members of the Japanese parliament called (unsuccessfully) for the resignation of colonial authorities. Paul Katz, _When Valleys Turned Blood Red: The Ta-pa-ni Incident in Colonial Taiwan_ (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2005), 2–8, 210.


31. The settlers who are quoted in J. Uchida, _Brokers of Empire_ do this, though the book does not address the distinction directly.

32. Gao Yuan, “Kankō no seijigaku,” 290–96. The numbers jumped higher after 1918. By the mid-1920s, the improvements in the speed of steamship travel made Taiwan a more popular destination as well, though the numbers of travelers to Taiwan would never rival those of the continent.


37. Chōsen sōtokufu tetsudōkyoku, ed., _Chōsen tetsudō ryokō annai: tsuketari Kongōsan annai_ (Keijō: Chōsen sōtokufu tetsudōkyoku, 1915), preface (n. p.).


40. Kate McDonald, “Imperial Mobility: Circulation As History in East Asia under Empire,” _Transfers_ 4, no. 3 (2014): 68–87. Aaron S. Moore argues that the “technological imaginary” undergirded the pan-Asianist visions of Japanese engineers in the 1930s. Here I show that colonial boosters used the idea of circulation as civilization to justify Japanese colonialism and to define the space of the Japanese Empire as early as the 1910s. See Moore, _Constructing East Asia: Technology, Ideology, and Empire in Japan’s Wartime Era, 1937–1945_ (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013). See also Daqing Yang, _Technology of Empire: Telecommunications and Expansion in Asia, 1883–1945_ (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
41. Chōsen sōtokufu ed., Chōsen tetsudō ryokō benran (Keijō: Chōsen sōtokufu, 1923), 1.
42. Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha Keijō kanrikyoku, ed., Chōsen tetsudō ryokō annai (Keijō: Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha Keijō kanrikyoku, 1921), 9.
44. Japan Tourist Bureau, ed., Ryotei to hiyō gaisan Taishō 12-nen ban, 287–92.
45. Taiwan sōtokufu, Taiwan tetsudō ryokō annai (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu, 1921), 12.
49. Soyama, Shokuminchi Taiwan to kindai tsūrizumu, 190–91.
50. Taiwan sōtokufu, Taiwan tetsudō ryokō annai (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu, 1916), 52.
51. Ibid., 39.
52. Taiwan sōtokufu, Taiwan tetsudō ryokō annai (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu, 1927), 203.
53. Ibid., 135–36.
54. Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, Minami Manshū tetsudō ryokō annai (Dairen: Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, 1919), n. pag between pp. 8–9.
56. Anshan Iron and Steel Works, which was built in 1918, would become another major site.
57. Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha, Minami Manshū tetsudō ryokō annai (1919), 141–42.
58. Aoi Akihito, “Transplanting State Shintō: The Reconfiguration of Existing Built and Natural Environments,” in Constructing the Colonized Land: Entwined Perspectives of East Asia around World War II, ed. Izumi Kuroishi (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014), 100. In a discourse similar to that directed at commodity production—that Japanese imperialism was allowing the essence of Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria to become part of the global market—Aoi argues that in the context of Japanese colonialism and the Shintō discourse on nature, the built environment was what made the natural environment possible. Although Shintō shrines were clearly the product of human hands, the inner shrine environment was the true “natural” (shizen) environment to which the “built” (kōchiku) environment was compared. Aoi Akihito, Shokuminchi jinja to teikoku Nihon (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2005), 10–12.
59. In this, the prince provided a nearly perfect vehicle for promoting the humanitarian nature of what Gotō Shinpei called Japan’s “scientific colonialism” in Taiwan. The Government General targeted cholera, and later malaria, in large-scale efforts to eradicate these diseases on the island. While the impetus was largely self-serving—it was hard to exploit the camphor and sugar resources of the island if the labor force was constantly getting ill—the Government General used these campaigns to emphasize its desire to improve the welfare of the “entire island,” in contrast to the previous Spanish, Dutch, and Qing colonial regimes,
which had only sought to extract resources from the island or improve the plains areas where colonial officials resided. Travelers also visited shrines in Korea. But in contrast to the trail of Prince Kitashirakawa, Korean shrines did not draw their meaning from the experience of the “actuality” of a national past, but rather in the planting of deities associated strongly with the Imperial House on Korean soil. In Korea, travelers stopped at Keijō Shrine and, after its construction in 1925, Chōsen Shrine, where they could pay their respects to the deities Amaterasu, the mythical mother of the Japanese imperial line, and the Meiji Emperor, who had overseen Japan’s industrialization and imperial expansion before his death in 1912. Todd A. Henry, *Assimilating Seoul: Japanese Rule and the Politics of Public Space in Korea, 1910–1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 62–64.

60. Taiwan sōtokufu, *Taiwan tetsudō ryokō annai* (1921), 21.
63. Ibid., 66–67.
64. Ibid., 63.
65. Ibid., 62–63.
68. Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha Keijō kanrikyoku, ed., *Chōsen tetsudō ryokō annai* (1921), 58.
70. Minami Manshū tetsudō kabushiki kaisha Keijō kanrikyoku, ed., *Chōsen tetsudō ryokō annai* (1921), 101, 105.
71. Ibid., 105.
72. Ibid., 111.
73. Ibid., 111–12.
74. Ibid.


82. Ibid., 114.


89. Ibid., 334–35.


3. BOUNDARY NARRATIVES


2. Rather than distinguish here between “ethnic” and “civic” nationalisms, as Kevin M. Doak has suggested, I am drawing on Tessa Morris-Suzuki’s argument that national belonging operated in multiple realms in this era. I also draw on Naoki Sakai’s notion of imperial nationhood, in which he points out how ethnic and civic nationalism were necessarily intertwined in the context of cultural pluralism and multiethnic nationalism. While there were, of course, actors who articulated one kind of nationalism over or against the other, it was the slippage between the two that defined the everyday experience of empire. Tessa Morris-Suzuki, “Migrants, Subjects, Citizens: Comparative Perspectives on Nationality in the Prewar Japanese Empire,” The Asia-Pacific Journal 6, issue 8, number 0 (August 2008), 2; Naoki Sakai, “Subject and Substratum: On Japanese Imperial Nationalism,” Cultural Studies 14, no. 3–4 (2000): 462–530; Doak, “What Is the Nation and Who Belongs?”


6. Tim Cresswell, “Citizenship in Worlds of Mobility,” in Critical Mobilities, ed. Ola Söderström, Shalini Randeria, Didier Ruedin, Gianni D’Amato, Francesco Panese, 105–124 (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2013). On the reliance of cultural pluralism on a set of “common terms” that are coded as the culture of public life but, in fact, represent the ethics and mores of the dominant cultural group, see David Theo Goldberg, “Multicultural Conditions,” in Multiculturalism: A Critical Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 6. Goldberg contrasts the cultural politics of “integration” with “incorporation,” which involves “dual transformations that take place in the dominant values and in those of the insurgent group as the latter insists on more complete incorporations into the body politic and the former grudgingly gives way” (9).


9. On the post–World War I “crisis of empire,” see J. Adam Tooze, The Deluge: the Great War, America, and the Remaking of Global Order, 1916–1931 (New York: Viking, 2014); and Pedersen, The Guardians. I refer to those movements that sought independence as “anti-imperial” and those that sought the complete incorporation of the colonies into the metropole as “anticolonial.” In the Japanese Empire, the paradigmatic example of the former is the Korean independence movement, while the latter is represented by some aspects of the Taiwanese Chinese assimilation and self-rule movements in colonial Taiwan.


16. Bang, “A School Excursion of the Middle School Managed by Korean to Japan, Manchuria in 1920–30s.”

17. The Government General of Taiwan responded, for example, with extreme force to a rebellion of Taiwanese Chinese residents of southern Taiwan in 1915, an incident known as the Ta-pa-ni Incident. Led by Yü Ch’ing-fang, a former police officer, and Chiang Ting, a former district head, the uprising involved both Taiwanese Chinese and indigenous rebels and lasted for over a month. Over one thousand villagers and Japanese people died in the fighting at the village of Ta-pa-ni. Nearly two thousand individuals were arrested in conjunction with the uprising and 915 were sentenced to death. Over one hundred actual executions took place, with many more individuals dying in prison. Katz, *When Valleys Turned Blood Red*, 1–2.


22. Jonathan D. Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), 310. Spence notes that the term “May Fourth Movement” refers to both the immediate events of May 4, 1919, and to the broader anti-imperial nationalist movement that followed.


32. Chōsen sōtokufu tetsudōkyoku, ed., *Chōsen tetsudō ryokō annai* (1915), 97.


34. Taiwan sōtokufu kōtsūkyoku tetsudōbu, ed., *Taiwan tetsudō shi*, vol. 3 (Taihoku [Taipei]: Taiwan sōtokufu tetsudōkyoku, 1910–1911), 489–90, 506–8, 537, 543.


37. Hayashi Takahisa, Preface to *Shiroi kimono to kuroi ishō*, ed. Miyazaki kenritsu Miyakonojō shōkō gakkō (Tojō: Miyazaki kenritsu Miyakonojō shōkō gakkō, 1931), n. pag.

38. Nihon kōtsū kōsha, *Gojūnen shi*, 77–78. The Traveling Club (Nihon ryokō kurbu) was established to interface between local travel clubs and transportation and hotel enterprises. It was founded by several famous members of the Tokyo Arukōkai (Let’s walk society), including novelist Tayama Katai, poet Ōmachi Keigetsu, and the noted conservative scholar of law Uesugi Shinkichi. The first president of the Travel Culture Association was Nomura Ryūtarō, the former president of the South Manchuria Railway. The Bureau of Railways became the Ministry of Railways in 1924.


43. Nakano Shigeharu, “Mosukowa sashite,” *Musan shinbun* (October 5, 1928); and
Annika A. Culver, Introduction to “Heading to Moscow” (Chicago: University of Chicago,
The Center for East Asia Studies, 2012), https://ceas.uchicago.edu/sites/ceas.uchicago.edu/
45. Japan Tourist Bureau, *Ryotei to hiyō gaisan Shōwa 6-nen ban* (Tokyo: Hakubukan,
1931), 546.
48. Ibid., 12.
50. Ibid., 37–42.
51. The phrase “differential mobility” comes from Ginnete Verstraete, *Tracking Europe: 
52. Like most of our colonial interlocutors, Yŏm Sangsŏp’s life and sense of self are not 
reducible to a binary of Korean (resistance) versus Japanese (empire). Yŏm Sangsŏp, “Yŏm 
Sangsŏp,” in *On the Eve of the Uprising and Other Stories from Colonial Korea*, translated by 
Sunyoung Park, with Jefferson J. A. Gattrall (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010),
1–3.
quoted in Go Kōmei, “Kindai Nihon no Taiwan ninshiki,” 234.
54. Taiwan sōtokufu, *Taiwan tetsudō ryōkō annai* (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu, 1927), 
55. Matsuda Kyōko, “Shokuminchi shihaika no Taiwan genjūmin o meguru ‘bunrui’ 
from the Taihoku Prefectural Police. Matsushita Kentarō, ed., *Taihokushū ribanshi gekan* 
(Taihoku: Taihokushū kenmubu, 1923), 64.
56. Paul D. Barclay, “Cultural Brokerage and Interethnic Marriage in Colonial Taiwan: 
Japanese Subalterns and Their Aboriginal Wives, 1895–1930,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 64, 
no. 2 (2005): 345.
57. This is a shortened version of the story of Yayutz Bleyh. Kirsten L. Ziomek, “The 
123–50.
59. Ōgi Zenzō, “Taiwan kengaku nikki,” *Umi* 1924, no. 9: 27.
60. Japan Tourist Bureau, *Ryotei to hiyō gaisan Shōwa 6-nen ban*, 534.
174.
62. Ibid.
64. Even though this policy was most likely unofficial, I say “enforced” because there 
is evidence that the conductors attempted to prevent Taiwanese Chinese from entering 
second-class cabins. Kō Sonbon describes one June 1929 case in *Shokuminchi no tetsudō*,
174. See also Soyama Takeshi, “Nihon tōchiki Taiwan no tsūrizumu saikō,” *Tamagawa
Soyama’s account is based on interviews with Taiwanese Chinese who traveled during the colonial era.


68. “Renrakusen ni notta,” 78, 84.

69. Ibid., 82.


72. Ibid., 349.


74. I am indebted to Kapil Raj, whose proposal to treat “circulation as a site” helped me to conceive of this approach of tourism’s history. Kapil Raj, Relocating Modern Science: Circulation and the Construction of Knowledge in South Asia and Europe, 1650–1900 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007).


4. LOCAL COLOR


4. This suggests that under the geography of cultural pluralism, observation not only produced knowledge of the colonized but was also seen as a way of knowing the imperial nation. Cf. Cohn, Colonialism and Its Forms of Knowledge, 6–7.

5. This is the fundamental feature of what Pierre L. van den Berghe and Charles F. Keyes term “ethnic tourism,” in which “the native is not simply ‘there’ to serve the needs of the tourist; he is himself ‘on show,’ a living spectacle to be scrutinized, photographed, tape recorded, and interacted with in some particular ways.” See van den Berghe and Keyes, “Introduction: Tourism and Re-Created Ethnicity,” 345.
6. Charles Taylor, “Modern Social Imaginaries,” *Public Culture* 14, no. 1 (2002): 101. For Taylor, the key difference between these premodern social imaginaries and the modern social imaginary is the question of the basic unit of differentiation within relations of exchange and mutual benefit. If, in the medieval period, the social order imagined these relations by type—the clergy prayed for the laity, the laity work for the clergy; the peasants farmed for the samurai, the samurai fought for the peasants—in the modern period, “we start with individuals and their debt of mutual service; the divisions emerge as a way to most effectively discharge this debt” (96). Yet, as the history of local color shows, a notion of the hierarchical complementarity of ethnic groups played a key role in defining the hegemonic imaginary of social relations within the culturally pluralistic, imperial Japanese nation of the late 1920s and 1930s.

9. Though generally known as one of the most famous early Korean nationalist historians, in the mid-1920s, Sin Ch’ae-ho began publishing anarchist histories instead. See Henry Em, *The Great Enterprise*, 107–9.
18. See chapter 2.
23. Officials were particularly concerned about ethnic tensions in the aftermath of the massacres of Koreans that had followed the 1923 Great Tokyo Earthquake.
25. Ibid., 30–32.


30. Taiwan sōtokufu, *Taiwan tetsudō ryokō annai* (1927).

31. See, for example, the Government General of Korea’s new guidebook series, *Chōsen ryokō annai ki*, which debuted in 1929, the 1929 *Minami Manshū tetsudō ryokō annai*, and the Ministry of Railway’s nine-volume *Nihon annai ki* series, which replaced the older *Tetsudō ryokō annai* series, beginning with a volume on Hokkaidō in 1929.


34. Kobayashi, “Hakui no Chōsen,” 15


42. Miyazaki kenritsu Miyakonojō shōkō gakkō, ed., *Shiroi kimono to kuroi ishō*, 124.

43. Ibid., 117.

44. Ibid., 129–31. This account was from 1926.

45. Ibid., 130.

46. Ibid., 141.


48. Ibid., 110–11.

49. Taiwan sōtokufu, *Taiwan tetsudō ryokō annai* (1927), 22.

50. Chōsen sōtokufu tetsudōkyoku, ed., *Chōsen ryokō annai ki* (Keijō: Chōsen sōtokufu tetsudōkyoku, 1929), 5.

51. Chōsen sōtokufu tetsudōkyoku, ed., *Chōsen ryokō annai ki* (Keijō: Chōsen sōtokufu tetsudōkyoku, 1934), 44.

53. L. Young, *Japan’s Total Empire*, 29.
58. Ibid., 281.
59. Ibid.
62. Ibid., 24.
65. Morishige, “Taiwan no konjaku,” 50.
66. Go, “Kindai Nihon no Taiwan ninshiki,” 236–37. On the self-rule movement’s attempt to distance itself from the image of Taiwan’s indigenous peoples, see Wakabayashi Masahiro, *Taiwan kōnichi undōshi kenkyū* (Tokyo: Kenbun shuppan, 1983). Aso, *Public Properties*, 103–7, also notes that the colonial government museum’s emphasis on Taiwan’s natural resources was part of a move to “de-Sinify” Taiwan, especially after the Manchuria Incident in 1931.
68. Jason Ruiz argues that travelers’ emphasis on the figure of the “burden bearer” played a central role in facilitating the U.S. “economic conquest” of Porfirian Mexico, because such images served as evidence that “a large and docile pool of labor resided south of the border.” Ruiz, *Americans in the Treasure House*, 49–50.
70. Chōsen sōtokufu tetsudōkyoku, ed., *Chōsen ryokō annai ki* (1934), 12.
71. Ibid.
72. “Utsukushii shima’ Taiwan o nozoku,” *Tabi* 1939, no. 5: n. pag.
76. See, for example, the title of the Miyakonojō Higher Commercial School’s 1930 account of their trip to Korea and Manchuria: *Shiroi kimono kuroi ishō*, “White robes, black robes.”


81. “Life of the Poor Classes,” *Manshū gurafu* 4, no. 5 (May 1936), 91. A special thanks to Kari Shepherdson-Scott for pointing me to this source.


84. For example, the lack of middle management is evident in the following report by Hashiguchi Minato, director general of Yalu Lumber Company. Hashiguchi told the *Manchuria Daily News* (Manshū nichni nichi shinbun), that in 1909 that his company employed forty-five corporate staff members—twenty-three Japanese and twenty-two Chinese—and thirty thousand North Chinese migrants. He intended to expand that number to fifty thousand in the coming years. *Manshū nichni nichi shinbun*, January 10, 1909, quoted in Driscoll, *Absolute Erotic, Absolute Grotesque*, 39.


86. Aoi Ikko, “Han Nihonka no Keijō,” *Tabi* 1929, no. 6: 76.


89. Sakai Toshio, Osaka City Bureau of Labor, quoted in Kawashima, *The Proletarian Gamble*, 47.


91. While Maruyama Hiroshi points out that the heyday of national park designation in Japan and around the world was the high point of ethnic nationalism, it was also during this period that empires and settler colonial nation-states found ways to transform the scenery of colonized lands into paradigmatic examples of national identity. During the 1920s and 1930s, states established over 150 national parks, nearly half of which were located in colonized territories or in U.S. Commonwealth or British Dominion territories. In the United States, national parks were established in Hawai‘i in 1916 and in Alaska in 1918, long before these territories became states. Likewise, the French established national parks in Cambodia and Singapore, and the British colonial governments established national parks in India and Sri Lanka, while the settler colonial dominion governments established dozens of parks in the Union of South Africa and Australia. Maruyama Hiroshi, *Kindai Nihon kōenshi no kenkyū* (Kyōto: Shibunkaku shuppan, 1994), 298–99. See also International Commission on National Parks, 1973 *United Nations List of National Parks and Equivalent Reserves* (Morges: IUCN, 1973), https://portals.iucn.org/library/node/6229.


104. Quoted in Nishida, “Nihon tōchi jidai ni okeru Taiwan no kokuritsu kōen,” 128.
111. As in the Japanese case, these “local colors” were curated to fit the needs of the colonizing power. Thus, in the case of California, the cultivators of California’s “regional identity” emphasized its Spanish imperial past—signified primarily through architectural codes that required red-tile roofs—rather than its indigenous or Mexican pasts. See Phoebe S. Kropp, *California Vieja: Culture and Memory in a Modern American Place* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).

5. SPEAKING JAPANESE


7. Arakawa, Sen-Man jitsugyō shisatsu danshi, 42.

8. Ibid., 25.


10. Ibid., 127.


15. Ibid., 115.


21. Ibid., 18. See also Yoshino Hidekimi, Taiwan kyōiku shi (Taihoku: Yoshino Hidekimi, 1927).

22. Matsuda Y., Taiwan genjūmin to Nihongo kyōiku, 48.


27. Taiwan sótokufu keimukyoku, *Takasagozoku no kyōiku* (Taihoku: Taiwan sótokufu keimukyoku, 1936), frontispiece graph of “Shuzoku betsu jidō tsūgaku buai nami kokugo fukyū oyobi buai.”


31. Ibid., 315.


38. Quoted in Yeounsuk Lee, *The Ideology of Kokugo*, 51. This is Hubbard’s translation.


41. Ibid.

42. Miyazaki kenritsu Miyakonojō shōkō gakkō, *Shiroi kimono to kuroi ishō*, 143.

43. Ibid., 124.

44. The term Sengo is a derogatory term for the Korean language, similar to the use of Senjin rather than Chōsenjin when referring to Korean people. While the term Chōsengo—go being the character that denotes language—would have been the official term for Korean at the time, it is possible that the emphasis on national language in Korea led the guidebook editors to diminish the status of Korean through derogatory terminology.


52. Tetsudōshō, ed., *Nihon annai ki Kyūshū hen* (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1935), 27. The volume on the Chūbu region (the central mountainous region of the main island of Honshū) describes the dialect as broken up into east and west but puts no temporal reference on the two dialects. “In Kyūshū, a dialect different from that of Honshū or Shikoku is used. In Honshū, ‘ji’ and ‘zhi,’ and ‘zu’ and ‘du’ have come to be confused. Yet in the greater part of Kyūshū, these are pronounced distinctly, taking the figure (sugata) of ancient language.”


65. Ibid., 31.


68. “Separate but equal” is from Michael J. Seth, *Education Fever: Society, Politics, and the Pursuit of Schooling in South Korea* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 2002), 20, 22. Private academies continued to operate in both Taiwan and Korea. In Korea, they were required to teach in Japanese. Missionaries also operated schools in colonial Korea.

70. Byron K. Marshall and other historians of Japanese education emphasize “centralization, nationalism, and elitism” as defining features of the prewar Japanese education system. This critique replicates the immediate postwar analysis of the Japanese education system promoted by U.S. military personnel working for the U.S. Occupation, who, in their eagerness to correct “what went wrong” with Japan, found in the education system a useful scapegoat. Yet, as scholarship on modern education in the United States, Britain, and France has shown, elitism, nationalism, and the tension between centralization and local autonomy are a feature of modern public education as such, not a pathology unique to Japan. Indeed, it is Marshall himself who points to the relatively meritocratic rather than elite nature of prewar Japanese education when he shows that Japanese higher schools enrolled a considerably higher proportion of the student population than did the British or French higher schools. Marshall, *Learning to Be Modern: Japanese Political Discourse on Education* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 2, 40–47.

71. The difficulty of getting in to higher schools in Korea and Taiwan had the paradoxical effect of pushing more Taiwanese Chinese and Korean students to study at higher schools in the inner territory, where the competition was less steep and the ethnic discrimination less stark. See Thornber, *Empire of Texts in Motion*, 34–41.


73. Tsurumi, “Colonial Education in Korea and Taiwan,” 304.

74. Lo, *Doctors within Borders*, 60.


76. Tai, “Kokogo and Colonial Education in Taiwan,” 516.


78. Fujitani defines the shift as a shift “from treating these [racialized, colonized] populations as simply objects of rule, without significant interiority, to attempting to constitute them as self-reflexive and knowledgeable subjects who would participate at least to some extent in their own regulation.” I should say that I am in agreement with Fujitani’s conclusion, if not with the vulgar/polite terminology. Fujitani, *Race for Empire*, 25.

79. It is closer to what Todd Henry describes as “affective racism” in the context of colonial Korea: “the insidious practices of differential incorporation that relied on ethnic proximity and the lure of cultural assimilation as the basis for temporarily, if not permanently, marking the inherently porous boundaries between model Japanese subjects and colonized Korean others.” Henry, “Assimilation’s Racializing Sensibilities,” 14.


87. Michelle Z. Rosaldo famously argued that speech act theory is itself a local language ideology in her seminal article, “The Things We Do with Words: Ilongot Speech Acts and Speech Act Theory in Philosophy,” *Language in Society* 11, no. 2 (1982): 203–37. On speech act theory, she writes, “our theoretical attempts to understand how language works are like the far less explicated linguistic thoughts of people elsewhere in the world, in that both inevitably tend to reflect locally prevalent views about the given natures of those human persons by whom language is used” (203).

88. Matsuda Kiichi, *Taiwan Okinawa no tabi*, 120.


90. Ibid., 155.

91. Taiwan sōtokufu, *Saikin no Taiwan* (Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu, 1925), 30.


93. See chapter 2.

94. Japan tsūrisuto byūrō Taiwan shibu, ed., *Taiwan tetsudō ryokō annai* (1935), 143.


97. Ibid.

98. Ibid.


100. Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper argue for this broad definition of empire across world history. See Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History*.

CONCLUSION


4. Here, I register my disagreement with narratives of modern history that pinpoint specific moments as “crises of territoruality,” rather than a human geographic approach to territory in which territoruality is understood as a process of creating territories. Such a process is always in some sense in crisis, either in the geopolitical sense of contested territories or from the phenomenological perspective of trying to make the state’s territoruality dominate over the multiple “geographic arrangements and understandings” that constitute the lived reality of human social relations. On definitions of territoruality, see Alexander B. Murphy, “Entente Territorial: Sack and Raffestin on Territory,” *Environment and Plan-


9. There were dozens of first-hand accounts of North Korea published by Japanese and Korean travelers in the early postwar period. The earliest was published by the Nagano Branch of the League of Korean Residents in Japan, which translated one Korean journalist’s account of his 1948 trip north of the 38th parallel. See Jo Kōsei, *Kita Chōsen kikō: Nichōgo ban* (Nagano: Zainichi Chōsenjin renmei Nagano honbu shuppanbu, 1948).


13. Ibid., 56.


19. Letter to CIS, June 1948, GHQ SCAP, Box 8649, Folder title: “Japan Travel Bureau (1); Translation of Shinbun no shinbun article, 20 May 1949, GHQ SCAP, Box 8613, Folder title: “Japan Travel Bureau (Kotsu kosha) (27).”

20. ESS, Chief of Staff, “Northwest Airlines’ Proposal for Initiation of Limited Tourist Travel into Japan,” March 25, 1948, GHQ SCAP, Box 9412, Folder title “Japanese Hotels—Tourist Travel, Trade, etc., #1 (1949–1950).” The memo references a letter to ESS from Northwest Airlines on January 15, 1948 containing a proposal for tourist travel. I have yet to find the original letter, proposal, or subsequent staff study.


25. “Special Overland Tour 29 Dec, 4-day,” GHQ SCAP, Box 230, Folder title: “Japan Tourist, November 1949–January 1950.”

26. “9,000 Tourists Visit Japan During Past Year,” Travel News 5, no. 2 (January 15, 1950), GHQ SCAP, Box 8334, Folder Title: “Program for Promotion of Tourist Trade.”


28. “Welcome to Japan,” GHQ SCAP, Box 8334, Folder Title: “Program for Promotion of Tourist Trade.” See also “Peaceful Japan: Land of Color, Charm and Courtesy” in same folder.


30. “Tours in Japan: Shore Arrangement by Japan Travel Bureau,” GHQ SCAP, Box 8334, Folder Title: “Program for Promotion of Tourist Trade.”


34. Mizuno M., Futatsu no Chiigoku, preface (n. pag.). This book was the fiftieth in the series, “Citizens’ university library” (Kokumin daigaku bunko) and the only one to offer place-knowledge. Other volumes offered introductions to the constitutions of the United
States and Great Britain and to political problems such as spreading democracy to rural areas. They were published by the Association for Political Education (Seiji kyōiku kyōkai), which had also published an early work on international relations by Kamikawa Hirokatsu in 1927.

36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., 87.
40. Ibid.
42. Ibid., 17.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
48. Ibid., 152–53.
49. Ibid., 155.