Placing Empire

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A young Korean man waited patiently on the deck of the Kōrai-maru. Three policemen stood between the third-class crowd, many of whom had emerged on deck two hours before, after a long and unpleasant night below, and the upper-class passengers, who paraded off the ship and into the waiting room of the neighboring train station. Finally, the third-class passengers were allowed to leave. The young man walked down the gangplank, searching for the detectives he suspected would be waiting for him. He tried to blend in with the Japanese passengers. He tried to not hold his breath. To no avail. Calling out “Yobo!”—a derogatory name for Koreans—the Pusan port police pulled him aside. The young man, a student at a prestigious private university in Tokyo, recognized that he could not be as brusque as he had been with the customs police in Kōbe. He silently handed over his luggage and sat down to await permission to continue on his way.1

The previous chapters laid out a case for treating imperial travel as both a methodology for analyzing the spatial politics of empire and a manifestation of that phenomenon. In chapter 1 we explored how the ideological work of observational travel revolved around the use of historical reenactment to produce a homogenizing and hegemonic “national” memory of and affect toward the “national land.” In chapter 2, we looked at how colonial boosters used tourist guidebooks to represent colonized land as part of the space and time of the nation while dis-placing colonized subjects from that same land. In both cases, imperial tourism produced particular fictions that made possible travelers’ internalization of a sense of self and nation that incorporated colonized lands as places within the nation and that produced affective ties to the nation as a place that contained colonized land.
The story of the Korean student on the Kōrai-maru illustrates the way in which the representation of the empire as a space of circulation—a circulating mission—elided the increasingly restrictive and unevenly applied terms under which that circulation was allowed. In 1918, the Japan Tourist Bureau, whose mission had previously been restricted to the enticement and facilitation of European and American travel to Japan, began to offer services to Japanese travelers. In subsequent years, the Japan Tourist Bureau was joined by a number of organizations, such as the South Manchuria Railway Company’s Korea-Manchuria Information Bureau, which likewise sought to facilitate the travel of metropolitan residents to the so-called new territories. An imperial tourism industry was born.

In terms of its central methodology—the observation of colonized lands through the particular categories of colonial modernity—the kind of travel practices that the imperial tourism industry promoted were not significantly different from those of the observational travel that came before. Yet in another sense, tourism differed sharply. Whereas the founders of observational travel had understood its ideological work to be intimately connected to the elite status of the travelers, the mission of Japan’s domestic tourism industry was to promote the travel of the masses. Financial considerations meant that this ideal was never achieved, but the shift in rhetoric and orientation was profoundly significant in shaping the meaning of imperial tourism in the context of an empire in which the distinction between being a “subject” and being a “citizen” was increasingly drawn in motion.

National belonging in imperial nations was a complex process that involved the negotiation of legal and subjective notions of nationality, subjecthood, and citizenship. As Tessa Morris-Suzuki writes, the post–World War I years saw “the tendency for most colonial empires to develop an increasingly sharp distinction between the formal status of nationality (shared by all or most inhabitants of the empire) and substantive citizenship (rights to participate in the political process, which were unequally distributed between colonizers and colonized).” In the Japanese Empire, one of the key ways in which this growing divide was experienced was through mobility. This is perhaps best illustrated by the Japanese state’s work to deny Korean independence activists access to the Paris Peace Conference, where they were expected to press their case for Korean independence. In December 1918, Syngman Rhee, future president of the Republic of Korea, and Chŏng Han-gyŏng (Henry Chung), applied to the U.S. State Department for passports in order to travel to Paris. The State Department recognized that, under international law, the men were subjects of the Japanese state. The State Department then forwarded their application to the Japanese consulate, where it was promptly denied. Rhee and Chŏng were simultaneously recognized as Japanese nationals and denied the rights of Japanese citizenship. Indeed, activists in other contexts also articulated the difference between imperial subjecthood and citizenship on precisely this axis. Addressing his writing to the population of newly enfranchised
voters in the metropole following the passage of universal male suffrage in 1925, Taiwanese Chinese activist Cai Peihuo complained that Taiwanese Chinese—and only Taiwanese Chinese—were not allowed to travel directly from Taiwan to China but instead had to route their travel through the inner territory.5

The ideological work of tourism emerged in conversation with its denial of the differential mobility of colonized subjects. In this way, mobility came to serve as one of the axes along which travelers experienced the difference between subjecthood and citizenship as well as an axis along which the boundaries of citizenship were enforced. In its promotion of tourism as the work of all national people, the imperial tourism industry defined free mobility within the empire as one of the core or shared values of the nation.6 Yet the frustrations of immobility became a common theme through which colonized subjects articulated their own experiences of disenfranchisement and racialization. It was in motion that they encountered this new understanding of colonial difference. In contrast, it was in motion that imperial travelers came to see themselves as “at home” anywhere in the empire.

FROM A GEOGRAPHY OF CIVILIZATION TO A GEOGRAPHY OF CULTURAL PLURALISM

Practices and experiences of movement defined the contours of national identity in the context of an empire rapidly shifting from a project of territorial acquisition to one of territorial maintenance. Indeed, movement is particularly important to our story, because it is here—in motion—that we begin to see the transition from a geography of civilization, which conceptualized colonial difference primarily in terms of the expansion of the space of the nation over time and the concomitant erasure or “assimilation” of colonial cultures, to a geography of cultural pluralism, which envisioned Japan as a variegated nation of diverse cultural regions. If, under the geography of civilization, the social imagination of the imperial nation was one that equated the Japanese nation with Japanese culture and Japanese history, the dominant social imaginary of the geography of cultural pluralism was of Japan as a multinational state and the Japanese people as a multiethnic nation.7

Around the world, cultural pluralism was a response to competing, often oppositional positions as migrants and colonized subjects challenged nativist discourses of assimilation. For this reason, Mae Ngai refers to it as an “immigrant intervention” in the case of the United States.8 But cultural pluralism was also an imperial intervention to stave off self-determination’s threat to the legitimacy of an imperial imaginary grounded in assimilationist models of civilization and national culture. The post–World War I era saw a turn to regionalism and cultural pluralism around the globe as empires struggled to address the intertwined crises of economic depression, labor activism, and anti-imperial and anticolonial activism.9 In interwar
France, as in Japan, the nation was increasingly understood as a matter of “unity in diversity,” which, in the words of Gary Wilder, both “reflected the confidence of an organized empire at the height of its power” and “revealed the anxiety of a colonial project . . . facing an imminent crisis of colonial authority.” In the Soviet Union, planners debated how to articulate the relationship between Russia and its multinational peripheries, shifting between what Francine Hirsch has termed the “ethnographic” and “economic” principles of administrative-territorial division. The former argued that internal territorial divisions should follow ethnographic boundaries—in essence, arguing for a multinational state. The latter, by contrast, suggested organizing the empire in terms of economic expediency and a dismissal of national rights, such as self-determination. Uniting the two was the common vision of a state defined by regional diversity rather than homogenizing national expansion.

Within the framework of the multinational state and the culturally pluralistic nation, one of the key terms for both imperialists and anticolonial activists was mobility. Under the terms of the post–World War I geography of cultural pluralism, national belonging increasingly revolved around intersubjective claims to “in-placeness” in the empire and its opposite, the official and unofficial denials of the mobility of colonized subjects. Imperial tourist literature and imperial travelers expressed these claims through representations of the national subject as a traveling citizen and themselves as deracinated national people (kokumin). In contrast, colonized subjects, particularly those who circulated within the elite institutions of imperial society, pointed to the state’s denial of their own right to circulate freely within the empire as a defining feature of their status as colonized subjects. It exposed the lie at the heart of the assimilationist ideal—speak Japanese, orient your life around circulation and exchange, think of yourself as Japanese, and you will become Japanese. Instead, the contrast between the free mobility of ethnic Japanese subjects and the restricted mobility of colonized subjects showed an empire that was quickly moving from treating colonial difference as a matter of time and development to treating colonial difference as a matter of race and place.

A CRISIS OF EMPIRE

The end of World War I brought political and economic challenges to empires around the world. In the British Empire, deflation lowered the value of the raw materials the empire extracted from its colonies, while, in the aftermath of the destruction caused by the war, the military and financial cost of maintaining colonial rule appeared suddenly steeper and, for some, undesirable or even unsustainable. The economic crisis felt around Europe was matched by an equally powerful challenge to the rhetoric and legitimacy of imperialism’s civilizing missions. While Woodrow Wilson did not invent the principle of nationality, his 1918 Fourteen
Points speech suggested a framework—a league of nations—within which such an ideal might be translated into a reality. Anticolonial activists around the globe quickly incorporated the ideal into their movements.\textsuperscript{14}

It is important to recognize, however, that the principle of nationality appealed to imperialists as well as to anti-imperial nationalists. As Susan Pedersen writes, the establishment of the League of Nations was not the end of the question of empire but rather the beginning of a new era of its discussion.\textsuperscript{15} The early years of the league were dominated by high-stakes discussion about how to reconcile wartime territorial conquests with the ideal of liberal internationalism. The crisis of empire was not so much whether imperialism would continue but of what form it would take. Territorial conquest and direct rule, as in France and Italy? Or the establishment of imperial commonwealths that fostered semi-independent governments whose economic and foreign relations were largely determined by the demands of the imperial metropole, as was advocated by the United States and Britain? The distinction was a bit facetious, as each empire maintained colonial holdings that were territorialized in multiple ways. The League of Nations even added a new category, that of “mandated territory,” to the menu of imperial options.

The World War I years and their aftermath were a time of intense social and political turmoil in Japan. Japan emerged from the war much stronger—economically, politically, and territorially. Japan was now a global military power and a creditor nation with a primarily industrial economy. At the same time, Japan’s rise to Great Power status did little to quell the discomfort with imperialism that had shaped discourses of Japanese colonialism since the colonization of Taiwan in 1895. If the need to differentiate the Japanese Empire from Western empires had initially kept the Japanese government from formally designating Taiwan, and later Korea, as “colonies” (shokuminchi), the economic and political crises of the post–World War I era brought to the fore the contradiction between the designation of Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria as unique administrative territories in name and their treatment as colonies of exploitation and settlement in fact. Moreover, institutions such as the colonial education and legal systems, which had been established in the name of assimilation, were increasingly glaring markers of colonial discrimination. Ironically, colonial tours of the metropole, which were supposed to make colonized subjects see themselves as a part of Japan, sometimes led them to recognize the degree to which they were not.\textsuperscript{16}

If, in the first years of territorializing a Japanese national identity on colonized land, it had been possible to imagine that assimilation would simply disappear colonized peoples from colonized lands, in the years during and after World War I, anti-imperial and anticolonial activism made such a vision increasingly hard to sustain. In Taiwan, Taiwanese Chinese activists pursued both violent and nonviolent strategies. The Government General suppressed the violent rebellions brutally.\textsuperscript{17} Nonviolent movements were allowed more leeway. Inspired by the contradictions
between the imperial rhetoric of “all subjects are equal under the emperor’s gaze” and the reality of colonial discrimination, Taiwanese Chinese elites began a campaign for full assimilation into the institutions and opportunities of the metropole in the mid-1910s. When the assimilation movement was unsuccessful, they shifted to an even more vociferous campaign for self-rule, which became known as the Movement for a Taiwan Parliament (Taiwan gikai).  

In Korea, activists rejected the deferred promises of imperial assimilation and instead launched an anti-imperial independence movement in the name of the Korean nation. The 1919 uprising, known as the March First Movement, took Japanese colonial authorities completely by surprise. On March 1, 1919, a day set aside to commemorate the recent death of the Korean king, Kojong, Korean students and activists submitted a declaration of independence to the Government General. The language of the declaration was the language of self-determination, which tied the Korean nation to the Korean territory: Korea was a nation of “twenty million united people” who had a history of over “forty-three centuries.” As they read the declaration out loud in Keijo’s Pagoda Park and elsewhere in the city, the crowds grew into massive protests around the peninsula. The Government General responded with a violent suppression campaign that left 150 Koreans dead and five hundred injured in the first six weeks alone.

In China, students challenged Japan’s economic dominance and foreign impingements on China’s economic and territorial integrity. In 1919, not long after the March First Movement touched off battles in Korea, student leaders demanded an end to the Great Powers’ infringement on Chinese sovereignty through such practices as extraterritoriality and concessions. They made Japan a specific target of their activism, demanding that the League of Nations refuse Japan’s Twenty-One Demands—through which Japan had converted its twenty-five year leasehold in southern Manchuria into a ninety-nine year lease in 1915—and compel Japan to return the former German concession of Shandong to full Chinese sovereignty, which the Treaty of Versailles had transferred to Japan after Germany’s loss in World War I. When the Paris Peace Conference refused to acquiesce to Chinese demands, what had been a single protest on May 4 exploded into a full-fledged nationalist movement whose influence extended long into the twentieth century.

In the face of anticolonial and anti-imperial activism in the colonies, the colonial and imperial governments searched for ways to defuse the political conflicts that the structure of colonial rule created without ending colonialism itself. One approach was the liberalization of rule. In 1918, Hara Takashi took office as the first “party” prime minister, the first prime minister to be chosen by the majority political party in the Diet. Hara had long critiqued the Government General system and its institutionalization of the colonies as territorial-administrative exceptions to the Constitution. As prime minister, Hara advocated a policy of “extending the metropole” (naichi enchō) in order to normalize the position of
Korea and Taiwan within the Japanese political and legal systems. By promoting liberal institutions throughout the empire, Hara argued that the policy of extending the metropole would “[turn] Koreans from the Koreans of old into new Japanese citizens (kokumin), which will bring about their happiness and development.”

Similarly liberal policies were applied in Korea and Taiwan. In Korea, the Government General pursued a policy of “cultural rule,” which replaced the previous policy of military rule. Colonial officials opened the door for Korean participation in and advancement within the colonial system through a vernacular press, schools and universities for Koreans, and the admittance of Koreans to the colonial police force. As Michael Robinson argues, these measures were designed to function as an “escape valve” for anticolonial sentiment amongst the Korean population. It also delimited the boundaries within which Koreans could express a distinct cultural and political identity.

In Taiwan, the policy of extending the metropole led to the appointment of Den Makoto, the first civilian governor general, in 1919 and the revision of Law 63 by the Diet to allow for the wider application of inner territory laws to Taiwan and a reduction in the number of ordinances issued by the Government General.

The second approach to the growing political conflict within the empire was a kind of cultural pluralism, known as “harmony” (yūwa). In its ideal form, harmony suggested the peaceful coexistence of the many ethnic groups within the Japanese Empire. First introduced by the Governor General of Korea as naisen yūwa (Japan-Korea harmony) in the aftermath of the March First Movement, it quickly became associated with the post–World War I civil morality of the imperial state. Japanese students in the metropole wrote essays on how best to achieve Japan-Korea harmony; Japanese settlers in Keijō established a Dōminkai (Association of same people) to further harmonious interactions between Koreans and the Japanese in the colony; and the colonial governments began promoting intermarriage as a way of achieving, on the level of the family, ethnic harmony and integration. In practice, colonized subjects saw quickly that harmony was a new ideological tool for compelling colonial subservience to imperial rule rather than a commitment to actual multiculturalism. One Korean member of the Dōminkai wrote in 1924, “The Japanese constantly harp on naisen yūwa and urge Koreans to promote harmony . . . while flaunting special privileges and a sense of superiority.”

Hamada Tsunenosuke, a former chief of the Bureau of Colonial Affairs who traveled around the empire in 1924, exposed a similar logic of cultural pluralism operating in Taiwan. Noting most shops had closed for the New Year’s holiday, Hamada was surprised to find a number of shops still open. They were operated by Taiwanese Chinese, and, while bright and well run, such a failure to observe a national cultural holiday was “yet another example of how inner territory–Taiwan harmony has yet to be achieved.”
BREAKING BOUNDARIES

The transition from observational travel as a self-consciously elite activity to imperial tourism as a practice for all national subjects took place in the context of increasing challenges to the core-periphery structure of the empire. As anti-imperial and anticolonial movements demanded new ways of drawing boundaries within and without the empire, the imperial tourism industry began suggesting to Japanese travelers that the empire was in fact a border-less space.

Imperial tourism trafficked in boundary narratives, that is, in stories that travelers used to make sense of the social collective to which they belonged and to define the boundaries of that sense of self and collective identity. Unlike the traditional formulation of boundary narrative, however, tourism’s narratives did not focus on boundaries as borders between different peoples or customs. Rather, tourism’s boundary narratives told the story of how the infrastructure of tourism broke the social and topographical barriers that divided the Japanese nation. In this sense, imperial tourism offered a sense of self, social collective, and space that mapped neatly on to the notion of the nation as a horizontal community of national people who occupied a particular place on the globe.

The vision of the nation as a horizontal community undergirded the liberalization of Japanese government in the 1910s and 1920s. It also reflected the dramatic change in the economic structure of the country over the course of World War I—from primarily agrarian to primarily industrial, which sparked its own new industry of leisure and consumption. This culture of play did its own boundary work as it drew heavily on the notion of the “masses” to transform what had been considered uncultured amusements into commercialized experiences of “the leisure of the masses” (minshū goraku). Even the higher-end palaces of consumption packaged their services in the architecture of boundary breaking. To encourage frequent visits to its Nihonbashi Mitsukoshi department store Information Bureau, for example, the Japan Tourist Bureau and Mitsukoshi revamped building policies to allow patrons to enter the store without taking off or covering their street shoes.

Colonial boosters’ tourist guidebooks and itineraries emphasized the boundary-breaking work of infrastructure. The Government General of Korea heralded, for example, the Shimonoseki–Pusan Connecting Ferry, whose departure times were coordinated with the arrival and departure of the Shinbashi (Tokyo)–Shimonoseki Special Express Train and the Pusan–Keijō Express Train. “More than the danger of one thousand mountains and ten thousand valleys,” the 1923 Chōsen tetsudō ryokō benran stated, “in the distant past, the hundred-ri [240-mile] sea route had a danger disproportionate to its distance. Between Shimonoseki and Pusan, there was an insurmountable 121-kairi [nautical mile] border.” “But,” the guidebook continued, “now it is one pipeline between the same national
land—the progress of science has overcome the power of the natural world and the path hardly takes eight hours.”

The text emphasized the parallel history of the removal of the topographic and geopolitical boundaries between Japan and Korea and the incorporation of Korea into the space of the Japanese nation. For “border,” the guidebook used the word kokkyō, which signified a border between states. For “land of the same country,” the word was kokudo, “national land.” The connecting ferry had consolidated Korea and Japan into the same national land.

Colonial boosters likewise made the Yalu River Rail Bridge speak to the destruction of the border between Korea and Manchuria: “In addition to increasing the economic relationship of the two countries (ryōkoku) year by year, the transportation between the two cities of Shingishū [K. Sinŭiju] and Antō [C. Andong] has become remarkably convenient because of the footpath built into the bridge. The border has been mostly broken down and the two cities have become one.”

The editors of the magazine Chōsen oyobi Manshū (Korea and Manchuria) looked forward to building a “new Japan” now that the bridge had “completely obliterated” the biggest waterway that “isolated” Korea from Manchuria. In Taiwan, the completion of a railway line that ran the entire north-south distance of the island in 1908 led the new governor of Tainan, Tsuda Sōichi, to declare that the so-called Main Line railway had “assimilated” (dōka) Taiwan into the metropole.

Twenty-four years later, Tanaka Keiji, a prominent geographer and the leader of a group of geography and history teachers on an observational tour of Taiwan, used similar language to praise the Osaka Mercantile Shipping Company’s new 10,000-ton class ships. Though they would operate on the Japan–Taiwan line, the ships were powerful enough to make the trip between Europe and the United States. From his perspective, “it is clear that the contribution of these ships to bringing the inner territory and Taiwan closer together is not small.”

The discourse of technological and infrastructural boundary breaking was mirrored by the discourse of tourism itself, which advocated for a new travel culture that broke down the barriers between elites and the masses. As Miriam Silverberg argues, the mass culture that dominated the era “presumed and produced” individuals as “consumer subjects” who engaged in subjective formation through the consumption of mass media. This act of consumption contributed to the production of subjects because media content was shaped, in more and less subtle ways, by state ideology. Tourism likewise presumed and produced the individual as a citizen-traveler, who enacted his or her participation in and belonging to the nation through the practice (that is, the consumption) of travel.

Colonial boosters emphatically rejected earlier representations of imperial travel as the purview of elites. Instead, they insisted that imperial travel was the duty of all national subjects. Hayashi Takahisa, principal of Miyakonojō Higher Commercial School, articulated this sentiment in his 1931 preface to the school’s report on their journeys to Korea and Manchuria. “The need to know about the
colonies is not a problem that is confined to a few special people. Rather, in these days of enlightenment, it must be part of the common sense we have as national people.” In this phrasing, “common sense” had two meanings: one, a shared basis for making good judgments; and two, a shared sensibility of what it meant to be a national subject of Japan. Both would be facilitated through travel to the colonies. Yet Hayashi’s use of kaika for “enlightenment,” in contrast to Kanō Shigoro’s use of keihatsu in 1906, also illustrated the shifting meaning of “national subject.” In contrast to Kanō’s keihatsu, which was associated with education, kaika was more closely associated with the concept of (Western) Enlightenment, and the opening of Japanese society to that Enlightenment in the late nineteenth century (known as bunmei kaika or “civilization and enlightenment”). In Hayashi’s formulation, the “common sense we have as national people” was not a common sense that would be communicated from elite travelers to the masses, but rather a kind of knowledge that every national subject should gain for himself or herself. In this formulation, the community of national subjects was horizontal rather than hierarchical.

Indeed, one of the interventions that the Japan Tourist Bureau and its associated agencies sought to achieve with the opening of services to Japanese travelers was the democratization of travel knowledge and culture. Contributing to the fledgling industry were a host of organizations devoted to disseminating what became known as “travel culture” (ryokō bunka), such as the JTB’s Japan Traveling Club (Nihon ryokō kurabu) and the Ministry of Railways’ Japan Travel Culture Association (Nihon ryokō bunka kyōkai) and its flagship magazine, Tabi (Travel). In the first issue of Tabi in 1924, Arai Gyoji, the head of the services department at the Ministry of Railways and future head of the Japan Tourist Bureau, defined the travel culture of the era as the idea that all national subjects should and could travel. He referred to the mission of the tourism industry as one of disseminating an elite travel practice to the masses. Making reference to two of the country’s most famous literary travelers—Matsuo Basho, author of the late seventeenth-century haiku collection Oku no hoso michi (The narrow road to the deep north), and Saigyō Hōshi, a twelfth-century poet whose poetic journeys to the north inspired Basho’s—Arai contrasted the travel cultures of earlier eras with the current moment, in which the combination of the liberalization, industrialization, and mechanization of Japanese society placed new constraints on travel at the same time that it made possible a new form of mass travel. “In a world in which the struggle for existence is so clamorous as to be blinding,” Arai wrote, “traveling like Saigyō or Basho is not something that most people are allowed. It is a pleasure that only one part of the people can enjoy.” It was time, he argued, to use the power of science and civilization to make the pleasure of travel available to a great number of people, rather than the elite few. It was time not only to “democratize” (minshūka) travel but also to “socialize” it (shakaika).
TOURIST MOBILITY, COLONIZED MOBILITY

The rise of the imperial tourism industry coincided with practices that placed uneven restrictions on mobility within the empire, and it is here that we must interrogate how tourism contributed to the maintenance of empire and the reproduction of an imperial social imaginary under the new conditions that internationalism, anticolonial activism, and anti-imperial nationalism presented.

Much of the actual work of containing the threat of anti-imperial and leftist activism took place through restrictions on the circulation of people and information within the empire. The Government General of Korea imposed travel restrictions on Koreans in the immediate aftermath of the March First Movement. The restrictions, which included language-proficiency examinations, cash-on-hand requirements, and the requirement that Korean travelers present letters of certification from both their local authorities and the port police in Pusan, were sustained in official and unofficial forms until 1939. The Government General of Taiwan restricted information about the Korean uprising, leading Taiwanese Chinese activist Cai Peihuo to complain: “Since March 1, 1919, you can’t even say the word ‘Korea’ in Taiwanese media.” The Government General of Taiwan sustained the Taiwanese Chinese passport system, originally established in 1897 by the Qing provincial government, and imposed further measures, such as police surveillance, to track the activities of Taiwanese Chinese people in southern China. Police crackdowns on the circulation of communists and communist-related materials even led to the establishment of what Annika Culver has termed an “underground railroad” between Korea and Moscow. Wary of being stopped and searched on the railway, Korean communists traveled on foot along the route of the South Manchuria Railway to bring the annual report of the Korean Communist Party to the Comintern in Moscow. Nakano Shigeharu described the route in a short story, called “To Moscow” (Mosukowa sashite), which was published in the Musan shinbun (Proletarian times) in 1928. Though the story was critiqued for romanticizing Korean resistance, it illustrated the way in which the representation of the empire as a space of circulation—a circulating mission—elided the increasingly restrictive and unevenly applied terms under which that circulation was allowed.

The routes and itineraries that the tourism industry offered, however, hid these distinctions and instead represented the internal borders of the nation as gateways to be passed through on the way to one’s destination. The Japan Tourist Bureau’s 1923 itinerary for a two-week trip through Manchuria and Korea, for example, noted that travelers would undergo a customs examination at three places: at Dairen Station, when departing on northbound trains (which, although part of the Railway Zone, were covered under different tariff agreements with the Chinese government); at Antō Station, when crossing into Korea; and on the connecting
ferry from Pusan to Shimonoseki. The latter was to enforce internal tariffs on items such as tobacco, which were cheap in China and Korea but taxed as luxury items in the metropole.

A subsequent edition of the Japan Tourist Bureau’s itinerary compendium emphasized that these examinations were necessary and were “not an inconvenient, complicated process.” The accuracy of this statement depended, however, on the experience of the traveler. One of the diarists on the Hiroshima Higher Normal School trip in 1915 grumbled when he could not get his tobacco through customs on the connecting ferry from Pusan. He had carefully counted his cigarette and cigar purchases and had bought less than the maximum amount in Shanghai. Yet when he presented his bag to the customs official on the ferry, the official pulled out the cigars and threw them in the garbage bin. The student was furious. “What are you doing?” he asked, his voice, according to his own report, “full of both utter amazement and anger.” The customs official replied, “It is fine to bring up to one hundred cigarettes. It is also fine to bring up to fifty cigars. I am throwing one of them away.” The student noted that the official delivered this news “with a cold smile.” Feeling defeated, the student went back downstairs to his cabin. “When I came back up to the deck a second time,” he wrote in conclusion, he saw the garbage bin, “full to the top with various kinds of tobacco.”

Hayasaka Yoshio, who traveled through Korea, Manchuria, and China in 1922, had a rather different experience, one much more in line with the statement about customs examinations in the Japan Tourist Bureau’s suggested itinerary. In a section of his travelogue entitled, “Kind Customs” (Yasashii zeikan), Hayasaka described his encounter with customs officials at Antō as he entered Manchuria from Korea. “I worried, because there were five or six boxes of Korean tobacco in my bag,” but the customs official waved him through. He had a similar encounter at Shimonoseki at the beginning of his trip as he waited to board the connecting ferry to Pusan. It was a completely mundane experience: “As the customs official opened my bag, he asked, ‘Have any tobacco?’ ‘No.’ ‘Do you drink?’ ‘Sometimes.’ And that was that.” For Hayasaka, the bigger story was his own seasickness—he was relieved to be through with the examination so that he could lie down.

For both the Hiroshima student and Hayasaka, the examinations were uncomfortable experiences (at the very least). At the same time, neither of them imagined that their experience was shaped in any way by ethnicity. The Hiroshima diarist’s status as an student in an elite school afforded him a certain amount of leeway when interacting with officials, and it was this sense of entitlement that allowed him to question the customs official with an angry tone of voice—he even used a grammatical construction that was somewhere in between polite and impertinent (nani suru desu). For Hayasaka, the customs experience was simply something to be suffered through along the way to something else.
In contrast, Korean novelist Yŏm Sangsŏp painted a picture of Kōbe–Pusan travel shaped entirely by his status as a Korean. In his short story “On the Eve of the Uprising” (Mansejŏn), which formed the basis for the vignette that opened this chapter, the protagonist, Yi Inhwa, attempts to board a ship bound for Pusan at Kōbe only to be hassled by a plainclothes customs officer on the docks. The officer peppers him with questions: “Your age? School? On what business? Destination?” “Helpless and irritated,” the protagonist writes, “I wanted to ask out loud why on earth he needed to know.”

Retiring to the third-class bathing area on board the ship, Yi finds himself surrounded by Japanese people, who, after an initial period of attempting to determine whether the poorest-looking member of the group is Korean, strike up a conversation about the laziness and gullibility of Koreans, using the derogatory term yobo. Soon a Korean working for the port customs office arrives to order him off the boat with all of his belongings, so that he might be inspected and interrogated by the port police. Throughout this, Yi negotiates constantly with the customs officials, who describe their own constraints—they can only open the bags in his presence, for example—alluding to the way in which the singling out of Korean travelers for special scrutiny was enacted within the confines of professional identity and respect for the rule of law. Ultimately, the officials allow him to re-board the steamer two minutes before it departs. After a journey marked by contention and conflict, Yi arrives in Pusan a day and a half later. As told at the beginning of this chapter, he attempts to disembark without drawing the notice of the port police in Pusan, but the police find him anyway and harass him one more time. In contrast to the Hiroshima student’s comfort in expressing anger and disbelief at the arbitrary nature of customs enforcement on his return from Pusan to Shimonoseki, Yŏm’s protagonist felt the need to adopt a strategy of conciliation at Pusan, where he felt more vulnerable than he had in the metropole.

The story of Yi Inhwa was fictional. But Yŏm’s underlining of the differential mobility of travelers within the empire contained important kernels of truth. On the one hand, Yŏm Sangsŏp was a Korean nationalist and socialist, who spent four months in prison for organizing protests of Korean students and laborers in Osaka in support of the March First Movement. “On the Eve of the Uprising” was a work that presented an anti-imperialist nationalist challenge to Japanese colonial rule. Yŏm also portrayed the colonial government’s exploitation of class differences; Yi expresses his rage at the thought of Japanese labor recruiters deceiving Korean laborers about the wages and conditions they could expect if they contracted to work in the metropole. In this sense, the story might be read more as a manifesto than a documentary account of cross-straits travel. On the other hand, Yŏm’s turn to mobility in this moment to expose the fundamental contradictions of the colonial assimilation policy and its geography of civilization illuminates how the ability to move freely throughout the empire was seen by at least
some colonized subjects, particularly those who moved within the elite institutions of imperial society, as the sine qua non of full membership in the imperial nation. He attended Keio University in Tokyo, one of the most prestigious private universities in the empire. This pathway was facilitated by his brother, who was a lieutenant in the Japanese imperial army. For Yŏm, then, it was apparent that no matter how well they spoke Japanese or what prestigious institutions they belonged to, colonized subjects would be treated differently by colonial and metropolitan institutions.

Yŏm was not alone in this assessment. Writing under the name Priest Go, a Taiwanese Chinese author protested the discrimination that Taiwanese Chinese students experienced at the borders of the inner territory. Seeking to demonstrate his willing participation in the colonial regime of Japanification, one Taiwanese Chinese student—whose surname was 林, which was “Lin” in Chinese and “Hayashi” in Japanese—identified himself to customs officials at Kōbe as Hayashi. In response, Priest Go reported, the customs official rejected the student’s claim to Japanese identity with the retort, “Don’t try to fool me. Aren’t you really a Rin?” By offering a Japanified pronunciation of the Chinese reading of the student’s last name—changing “Hayashi” to “Rin”—the official insisted that the student’s authentic identity was Chinese. It was incidents like these, Priest Go argued, that illuminated the contradiction in Japanese imperial society. Why should the student bother to demonstrate Japanification when people like the customs official at Kōbe would never recognize him as Japanese?

At the heart of imperial tourism’s ideological function was its representation of the traveling-citizen as a free subject and of space as absolute—the nation and empire as a space that one passed through regardless of body or perspective, space that existed rather than was produced. Although border officials harassed colonized subjects or sometimes even denied them passage, imperial tourist promotions described the routes of travel within the empire in universal terms, erasing the empire’s internal and embodied borders. When the Osaka Mercantile Shipping Company inaugurated its new travel magazine, Umi (The sea), in 1924, it included a number of articles designed to teach travelers the how-tos of Taiwan travel. Articles such as “To China! To the South Seas!” advertised the company’s routes between Taiwan and southern China—precisely the route that was forbidden to Taiwanese Chinese travelers without prior government permission. The article made no mention of how travel requirements differed for different populations. One might object that these were materials directed toward a particular touring audience, one from the inner territory. Yet tourist guidebooks and route advertisements were multipurpose items. The Government General of Taiwan’s 1927 Taiwan tetsudō ryokō annai, for example, contained information on how to travel with a corpse (tip: it costs 50 percent more to travel with a corpse if you opt for an express train service).
Other how-tos and travelogues for Taiwan emphasized the ease with which travelers could pass through the island’s internal border between the plains areas and the Government General’s special administrative zone in the central mountainous region, the so-called Savage Territory. For the indigenous peoples residing inside the special administrative zone, the border marked a line they could not cross without police permission. Colonial authorities worked hard to communicate this fact to indigenous leaders. As part of a “savage tour” (banjin kankō) of the island, colonial police screened a film that showed an indigenous man being electrocuted by the electrified border fence. The representation of the guard line as a strict and impassable boundary elided the way in which, as Paul D. Barclay has argued, the line also worked as a “contact periphery” between Japanese officials and indigenous residents of the highlands. At the same time, passage through the boundary was at the whim of and in the service of Japanese colonial rule. As Kirsten Ziomek relates in her accounting of the life of Yayutz Bleyh, even indigenous people who participated in the colonial regime found themselves stymied at times by the vagaries of the police. Bleyh—an Atayal woman who had served in the Aboriginal Affairs division of the Government General and as a translator for a group of indigenous leaders touring the metropole—applied to the Government General for permission to travel to the inner territory, where her common-law husband, a Japanese man, lay on his deathbed. The Government General dragged its feet and demanded more documents, delaying her travel by three months. Her husband died shortly after her arrival.

Quite in contrast, Japanese travelers experienced the “savage border” as a line to be crossed. One of the most popular tourist sites in Taiwan was the village of Kappanzan, which was relatively close to the main railway and offered the chance to “survey the state of life of the savages (banjin).” Ogi Zenzō described his experience of the border as one of frictionless passage: “Those of us who were going up [to Kappanzan] stopped at the Taikei ward office to request permission to enter the Savage Territory. As we applied, the officer called up to Kappanzan to let the office there know we were coming, and instructed us where our lodging was for the night.” The Japan Tourist Bureau’s compendium of tourist itineraries described such an experience as the norm. Under the heading, “Observing the Savage Territory,” the compendium explained that “the process is very simple—just report orally and permission will be given immediately.”

If touristic representations differentiated the nation of traveling-citizens at all, it was by class—first class, second class, and third class. Yet such representations also elided the common practice of ethnic differentiation that structured the railway car and steamship cabin. The third-class cabins located under the stairs on the Shimonoseki–Pusan Connecting Ferry were designated for Korean travelers. Though the ship was technically divided into three classes, Japanese travelers referred to these cabins as “fourth class.” As Kō Sonbon points out, even if unofficial
policy did not differentiate cabins by ethnicity, income did the same work. First- and second-class cabins were extraordinarily expensive, and as Akimori Tsunetarō noted in his 1935 account of travel in Korea, the Government General’s policy of encouraging lower wages for Korean workers and granting “colonial bonuses” to Japanese workers meant that even third-class fares were largely unaffordable to Korean travelers. Such a system was enforced in Taiwan and Manchuria as well, where railway conductors and railway guards expected Taiwanese Chinese and Chinese passengers to ride in second or third class.

Imperial travelers were cognizant of this expectation, even if tourist guidebooks did not make it plain. Indeed, in one incident, it was precisely because they were riding in second or third class that a railway guard mistook a group of Tokyo Number One Higher School students for Chinese exchange students. On board a second- or third-class carriage at Eikō Station, a Japanese soldier boarded to check the cabin. “Are you all Chinese?” he asked. “We’re Tokyo Number One Higher School students!” they responded, “in a high-handed manner.” The soldier, determined to find out if there were in fact any Chinese people aboard the car, kept up his questioning: “Well, are you foreign students then?” The question suggested that the students were Chinese students studying at Tokyo Number One Higher School on exchange. The students just burst out laughing, for, they said, “What else could we do?” For other imperial travelers, riding the third-class cars represented an off-the-beaten-path experience of imperial travel. Matsuda Kiichi, a middle-school student from Osaka, congratulated himself for riding “with the islanders” in third class as he traveled south from Kagi in 1937. The sleeping cars were full, and, he declared, he had little interest in “ordinary travel” anyway.

It is possible to suggest that all of these travelers were different types of travelers—that a Taiwanese Chinese person would not consult a Government General tourist guidebook or an Osaka Mercantile Shipping Company advertisement to find out how to travel to southern China, nor would a Korean traveler consult the Japan Tourist Bureau’s itinerary compendium to look for which cabins they were eligible to reserve on the connecting ferry. But the colonial governments themselves engaged in ideological work to teach colonized subjects to imagine the space of the nation as one of free movement and themselves as national subjects with the right to move freely. In that sense, imperial tourism’s boundary narratives were directed at the national people as a whole even if, in practice, they applied only to a subset of national subjects. Elementary school Japanese-language textbooks produced for the Governments General of Taiwan and Korea, for example, included travelogue and letter-from-abroad readings, such as “Letter from Keijō” (Keijō dayori), “From Kiryū to Kobe” (Kiryū kara Kōbe), and “I Rode the Connecting Ferry” (Renrakusen ni notta). The texts represented the territory of the state as a space within which social and topographical borders had been
eliminated. "I Rode the Connecting Ferry," for example, described the journey of a Korean student and his father between Pusan and Shimonoseki. Even though the text was published in 1924, one year after the end of the official travel certification system and the beginning of unofficial restrictions on Korean movement to Japan, it did not address the common conflicts that Korean travelers and migrants faced on the connecting ferry. Instead, "I Rode the Connecting Ferry" represented the journey between Korea and the inner territory in the way that imperial travelers experienced it. The story reported none of the restrictions and interrogations that Yŏm’s Yi Inhwa endured. Rather, the student’s narrative described their arrival at Pusan Wharf at ten o’clock in the evening and how they quickly boarded the Tokuju-maru, one of the three sister ships that formed the third generation of connecting ferries. The story ends with their arrival in Shimonoseki at seven the next morning and their quick transfer to the local inn. Like the first colonial tourist guidebooks, the elementary-school primer situated this moment of Japan-Korea travel within a progressive history of imperial transition and ever-increasing speed. They meet a friend of his father’s aboard the ship who says, “When this connection was done on ships such as the Iki-maru and the Tsushima-maru [the first generation of connecting ferries], it took twelve whole hours. Now, though, they got the three ships—the Keifuku-, Shōkei-, and Tokuju-maru—and it only takes eight hours. The trip is convenient.”

THE BOUNDARIES OF BOUNDARY BREAKING

For the fictional Yi Inhwa, as for real colonized travelers, the experience of internal borders within the empire was one of the rejection of shared nationality through the denial of recognition; it was one of reinforcing, or perhaps even constituting, a sense of their own place within the imperial nation. This sense of place was based not on eventual cultural assimilation but of ethnic difference. Nor was it limited to colonized subjects. Rather, when faced with boundary breaking by colonized subjects, imperial travelers reinforced the distinction between the Japanese ethnos as the empire’s traveling citizens and colonized subjects as those who still required constraints. To put it bluntly, they put colonized subjects in their place.

When combined with the rhetoric of expanding the metropole and imperial harmony, ethnic discrimination in border crossing and travel fostered both a sense of collective identity among colonized subjects and a sense of the need to maintain institutional policies of ethnic differentiation among imperial travelers. One observational travel group’s story illustrates how this process unfolded. The spread of travel culture to Taiwanese Chinese children impressed Tsukahara Zenki, a teacher traveling with the 1932 All-Japan Geography and History Teachers’ Association trip to Taiwan. He noted, “Taiwan’s islander children also enjoy
playing deck billiards [shuffleboard] back and forth. His fellow travelers Urakami Shūe and Yamaguchi Shunsaku recorded a rather different experience of Taiwanese Chinese travel culture with the Japanese Empire, however. Upon boarding the Yoshino-maru in Kōbe, Urakami’s group noticed that the cabin that had been reserved for their party had, in fact, been “occupied” (senryō) by Taiwanese students (Taiwan gakusei). The word that Urakami used for “occupied” was the same word associated with a military occupation, though he did not register the irony. More interesting was the students’ reaction to the ship’s secretary’s insistence that they vacate the cabin. “When the ship’s secretary tried hard to get them to change rooms, I saw the attitude of the students get very threatening. They all stood up and roared things like, ‘We are also Japanese (Nihonjin)! We paid the same fare so what are you doing differentiating us?’ while they held their canes in their hands and beat the columns and stomped their feet. Their manner was ghastly.” Discussing the incident afterward, the travelers searched for explanations. One, based on a discussion with a Japanese official in Taiwan, was that “educating Taiwanese requires extremely careful consideration” because of the rise of anticolonial thinking among Taiwanese Chinese scholars. For others, however, the reason for the outburst was not that difficult to locate. “It wasn’t a mystery at all why they did something like this,” Yamaguchi Shunsaku wrote. “Afterward, I heard that islanders are prejudiced against inner territory people.”

CONCLUSION

In the midst of a crisis of empire and nation, the Japan Tourist Bureau and other imperial transportation enterprises set about representing the empire as a space of free movement and the empire’s subjects as traveling citizens within that space. Their representations elided, however, the internal and embodied borders that shaped the travel of colonized subjects within the empire. Despite imperial travelers’ own embrace of boundary breaking as the foundation of observational travel, they found ways to turn a blind eye—or, in some cases, exploit—the boundaries that travel within the empire imposed on colonized subjects. Movement, in other words, should not be considered an afterthought in the history of tourism but rather a central site in which its politics, both of practice and representation, emerged.

In telling the history of imperial tourism from the perspective of the kind of spatial experiences it presumed and produced, I have sought to avoid what Saskia Sassen has called the “endogeneity trap” of trying to explain the significance of a phenomenon solely by the studying the phenomenon itself. Indeed, a central aspect of the ideology of imperial tourism was its representation of the national people as traveling citizens. Writing, then, of a history of tourism that focused solely on the experiences and movements of the empire’s most powerful subjects
would re-create rather than challenge the spatial politics of empire. Instead, this chapter has shown how the ideological work of tourism emerged in conversation with its erasure of the differential mobility of subjects. In this way, mobility came to serve as one of the axes along which travelers understood their own status as “citizens” as well as an axis along which the boundaries of citizenship were enforced.

Though imperial tourism represented mobility as a project of increasingly convenient point-to-point travel, the uneven experiences of intra-imperial borders illuminate the fact that “contact zones” do not occur solely at a traveler’s destination. The differentiation of space into discrete and internally homogenous “familiar” and “alien” places is its own kind of fiction. Yet it was one that would become increasingly central to the work of territorializing a Japanese national identity on colonized land—and to the conceptualization and enactment of colonial difference. Imperial tourism’s erasures expose how everyday practices of distinction increasingly marked Korean, indigenous, Taiwanese Chinese, and Chinese bodies as subject to special scrutiny. While in their journeys to battlefields and other sites in the nationalist mode, imperial travelers treated national membership as a performative and affective category, through their own encounters with the growing internal borders of the empire, colonized subjects demonstrated that membership in the nation was a matter of recognition as well.

The differentiation of travelers based on ethnicity and place was the underside of the liberalization policies and “harmony” rhetoric that Japanese officials deployed in the face of growing anti-imperial and anticolonial activism. As harmony activists envisioned it, ethnic difference was a value if it could be contained within the nation. What was required was the recognition of the different strengths that each ethnic group brought to the nation and the embrace by all groups of certain shared values. Those promoting liberalization policies likewise recognized the existence of distinct ethnicities within the nation, arguing that the extension of the legal and political institutions of the metropole would create a homogenous space of the nation within which local ethnic populations could achieve “happiness” as Japanese nationals while retaining their ethnic identities.

As colonized travelers experienced it, however, the rhetoric of the nation as a homogenous space encompassing the entire empire did not live up to the reality. Ethnicity and place were linked—it was not only their identity as Taiwanese Chinese that made Taiwanese Chinese travelers subject to special scrutiny. It was also their attempt to travel from Taiwan to the inner territory—to move from the place that official policy insisted they belonged, to a place where official policy and unofficial practice constituted them as alien. Likewise, it was not just in movement that Korean travelers found themselves relegated to a lower class of service. It was in movement along the empire’s rail and steamship lines, which the “circulating mission” discourse of Japanese colonialism constituted as the space of a civilized
Japanese nation in contrast to that of colonized subjects, who were out of place in the space of civilization.

The geography of cultural pluralism was thus both a weapon and a tool. For anticolonial and anti-imperial activists, the idea that Taiwan and Korea were distinct cultural regions with distinct ethnic populations served as the basis for powerful challenges to the structure of Japanese imperial rule. For colonial boosters and imperialists, however, the same concept became a way of envisioning a future Japanese imperial nation that fully integrated the new territories and their peoples at the same time that it used notions of place to reinforce an ethnic and cultural hierarchy within the nation.