Introduction

The present work studies the leadership context and its ramifications for leadership roles. The overarching context of public sector leaders, as defined by Van Wart et al. (2015) and Jackson (2004), is the cultural settings and political backgrounds at the “macro level” and the function and structure of administrative systems at the “meso level.”
Van Wart et al (2015) have further specified that the antecedents—cultural-, political-, and organizational-administrative level—factors are a myriad of multifaceted overlapping realities, inextricably intertwined, and are subject to change. Cultural setting influences and is influenced by the political system, which influences and is influenced by the administrative systems. The cultural context also influences and is influenced by the administrative system.

The foregoing antecedents determine beliefs as to how the leaders are ideally expected to act. For instance, explaining the cultural context, Jackson (2004) discusses Hofstede’s “power distance” dimension. According to Jackson, leaders in high-power distance countries are expected to “act autocratically.” In the low-power distance countries, leaders are considered as “loyal democrats.” And in those with the medium score on the said cultural dimension, leaders are expected to “act mainly as a benevolent autocrat.” Similar deductions can be made based on the political setting and organization-administrative level factors.

The broader context influences and is influenced by the content of the leaders. According to Jackson (2004:98), “The content of leadership assumes particular orientations towards acting in certain ways.” Indeed, this may not necessarily say anything about their actual conduct, but it does articulate the way they perceive their own conduct as a leader. To be sure, perception is a powerful phenomenon dictating individuals’ actions, and as such it “eventually transforms into reality” (Saha, 2008:29). Conduct of leadership refers to what people actually do. It influences and is influenced by the content of leadership and the context (Jackson, 2004). Assessment of leaders’ role conception and conduct is beyond the scope of the present work (for assessments of the former refer to Adare et al., 2018).

In assessing the leadership context, the civil service is defined as a “system.” This, according to Van der Meer (2011:4), suggests the use of an “institutional approach.” Thus, relying on the two theoretical traditions – “historical new institutionalism” and “sociological new institutionalism” (see section 1 below) – the study deals with the subject by asking a straightforward question: What are the ramifications of the Ethiopian public leadership context for leadership roles?

The study has strong pragmatic relevance because understanding public leadership in the Ethiopian context – a topic that is unaccountably missing from systematic academic inquiries – informs recruitment, promotion, and T&D practices in the civil service. It also contributes to theory by adding specificity and nuances to the existing conceptualization of leadership and civil service in the context of Africa in general.

The balance of this work is organized into five sections. It begins by elucidating the theoretical approaches and the methodology and methods
applied in the study. Next, the historical progression of the Ethiopian CSS is discussed. Afterwards, the basic features of the current civil service are presented. Finally, analysis is made along the lines of the antecedents of public leadership and their ramifications for leadership roles. The study ends with some concluding remarks.

1. Theoretical Approaches and Methodology and Methods

1.1. Theoretical Approaches

Scholars (see Lynn, 2006; Pollitt, 2008) have suggested the need to follow an institutional approach in the study of public management. The question though is which strand among institutional approaches should be used? Old or new institutionalism? As each strand has sub-strands, which particular sub-strand or combination thereof is appropriate? And why?

The full answer to the aforementioned questions requires an extensive study of each strand and its sub-strands. Yet, the objective here is not to contribute to the institutional debate but to use it as a framework to understand and explain the leadership context. The study therefore captures the main characteristics of each of the main strands and then switches to the selection of a sub-strand or combinations thereof.

Briefly, the difference between old and new institutionalism is both epistemological and ideological (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000). Although old institutionalism predominantly places a great deal of attention on the study of formal structures, new institutionalism goes further to consider informal structures and their role in molding the behavior of the participants (Peters, 1999). To reap the benefit of these new developments, the present study is informed by the “new institutionalism” analytic strand. Such a claim, however, is not enough. It requires answering a question concerning which specific type of new institutionalism is applied. Then again, the number of types means that, despite their similarities, there are heavy disagreements between them and that they paint different pictures about institutional phenomena. The differences among them further imply that often there may be a need to apply combinations of two or more of these types (Ibid).

Under the banner of new institutionalism, different approaches exist for studying institutional phenomena. For the purpose of the present study, only three of them are presented: historical new institutionalism, rational choice new institutionalism, and sociological new institutionalism (see Hall & Taylor, 1996; Peters, 1999).
Before selecting one or a combination of these analytic sub-strands, we first scanned their defining features. Our criteria for selection were based on the research design in terms of the time span privileged by each sub-strand and the underlying ways of knowing. The result of our inquiry uncovered the limited utility of rational choice institutionalism for the present study. This is because while both historical new institutionalism and sociological new institutionalism emphasize long-term institutional effects, rational choice institutionalism emphasizes short-term outcomes (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Although the first two approaches demand an inductive logic of inquiry, the latter requires a deductive logic of inquiry (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000). The present work therefore excluded rational choice institutionalism from further discussions because the study examines the CSS of Ethiopia from the beginning of modern public administration to the present. Moreover, although the study applied a mixed approach, it predominantly relies on the interpretive logic of inquiry.

In sum, in this study, the assessment of the leadership context is informed by two theoretical traditions: the historical new institutionalism and its central explanatory notion of path dependency, and the sociological new institutionalism and its central explanatory idea of cognitive and cultural links.

1.2. Methodology and Methods

Haverland and Yanow (2012:401) noted that the terms methods and methodology are not synonyms. The former refers to the “tools and techniques that are used to carry out research: surveys, questionnaires”; the latter concerns “ways of knowing or logics of inquiry”—the ‘positivist’ and the ‘interpretative’ approaches. The ‘choices of methods and their underlying ways of knowing should depend on and reflect the goal or purpose of the research—the research question’ (Ibid: 402). In this study a mix of inductive and deductive logics of inquiries is applied. That is, it focuses on contextual meaning making. And in deducing the ramifications of the context for leadership roles, it is also informed by theories and concepts in the field.

As to the methods of accessing and generating data, analysis in this study mainly relies on the documentary data. The sources comprise relevant current and retrospective public documents, such as the constitution, legislation, proclamations, directives, and circulars. Moreover, policy documents, reports, and various statistics (e.g., the civil service human resource statistics, population census data) are used.

The study also relies on various informative sources, such as IndexMundi, Global Integrity–African Integrity Indicators, the Mo Ibrahim Index, the
Transparency International corruption perception index, and so forth. The bulk of extant literature, both published and unpublished, related to the subject of investigation was also reviewed.

Moreover, in undertaking a context-specific study, “restricting the documentary evidence to written materials alone can also be limiting” (Yanow & Schwartz-Shea, 2006:122). This is because the “political, social, organizational, and cultural identities and values are embedded also in films … in folk songs … military (marching), revolutionary, and women’s songs” (Ibid:122). The present work, therefore, uses indigenous aphorisms or proverbs to extend the scope of the written documents, as needed.

Finally, sections 3.3 to 3.7 of this chapter are also informed by from the results of a recent PhD survey on Ethiopian public sector leadership (see Adare et al. 2018).

The documentary sources were analyzed using the “content analysis” recommended by Bowen (2009:32), involving “a first-pass document review, in which meaningful and relevant passages of text or other data are identified.” In analyzing the results of the survey, a univariate analysis approach, particularly frequency distribution, was applied.

2. The Historical Progression of the Ethiopian Civil Service System

In Ethiopia, the commencement of modern civil service goes back to the early periods of the twentieth century (Paulos, 2001). No doubt, in the last hundred plus years, it has been transformed several times over. Over these periods, the country was governed as a unitary feudal state during the imperial regime (-1974); as a unitary socialist state during the Dergue government (1974-1991); and currently, as a federal parliamentary republic by the EPRDF government (1991-). Below, we analyze the changes, consolidations, and stasis in the CSS under each of these administrations.

2.1. The Era of Menelik II (1889-1913)

In Ethiopia, this era is known for state formation and establishment of a modern public administration (see Paulos, 2001). The former is said to have come about through the northerners’ (aka Amhara) influence (Marcus, 1994). In the process the regime privileged the Orthodox Christian religion. It endorsed a Christian conceptualization of the state and Amharic became “a lingua franca” (Adejumobi, 2007).
In modernizing the public administration, the “European line” was followed. The first step was creating various ministries in 1907. Likewise, for the first time, the state was “divided into smaller administrative units” (Paulos, 2001:83). Gradually, many other initiatives were implemented (see Clapham, 2006; Marcus, 1994; Paulos, 2001).

Moreover, the emperor, seeing his health deteriorating (in 1904), took measures meant to ensure the continuity of his administration (see Marcus, 1994). Among these were the following:
- 1907: Established Ethiopia’s first cabinet
- 1907: Established an independent appellate court system in the provinces
- 1908: Decreed a new inheritance law
- 1908: Established the office of prime minister
- 1908: Instituted a crown council.

It is important to note that during this era individuals’ political loyalty and their ability to mobilize an army were the basis for them to assume a ministerial position. Ministers were not salaried and were all housed in a building set up within the palace compound. The civil service, in general, was small in size and principally “engaged in maintaining law and order” (Paulos, 2001:84).

2.2. The Period between Emperor Menelik II and Emperor Haile Selassie

This period was marked by confusion and significantly eroded central government authority. The progress of the CSS was briefly stalled by the coming to power of Lij Iyasu (1911-1916); and after his dethronement, of Empress Zawditu, Menelik’s daughter (1916-1930). Even Zewditu hardly made any attempt to improve the CSS founded during her father’s reign (see Marcus, 1994; Solomon, 2013).

2.3. The Era of Emperor Haile Selassie (1930-1974)

This era mainly tried to uphold the legacies of Emperor Menelik II. As such, Christianity remained important, and Ethiopia was identified as a Christian state. Amharic continued as the sole official language of the empire (see Adejumobi, 2007; Marcus, 1994).

Likewise, Haile Selassie advanced the administrative modernism begun during the era of Menelik II. He adopted Ethiopia’s first Japanese-style constitution in 1931 (see Clapham, 2006). Moreover, before the Italian occupation (1930-1935), he embarked on many reform initiatives. Progress,
however, was interrupted during the period the county was under Italian occupation (1936-1941), a colonization attempt that forced the emperor into exile (see Marcus, 1994).

Upon his return from exile (1941), Haile Selassie continued with his ambitious reforms. The following are among the prominent administrative reform measures during his reign (see Paulos, 2001).

– 1943: Defined powers and duties of ministries
– 1952: Established the Imperial Institute of Public Administration
– 1955: Revised the constitution of 1931
– 1961: Established the central personnel agency (CPA) and entrusted it with maintaining a standardized public service governed by uniform rules and principles.

Note that almost all of Haile Selassie’s attempts at modernization, like the reign of Menelik II, were based on emulation of foreign development models (see Clapham, 2006). As such, the revised constitution of 1955 reflected the adoption of “a British model of constitutional monarchy” (Ibid:112). Similarly, the CPA was mainly adopted from the personnel management system of the USA (Adebabay, 2011). These developments imply that the attempts to modernize the country’s public administration did not have a strong indigenous basis.

Moreover, the successes of the regime’s civil service reform were undermined by the shortage of a competent workforce, limited stakeholder participation, and defiance of the civil service principles (see Paulos, 2001; Solomon, 2013).


The Dergue government adopted the Marxist-Leninist ideology and declared socialism to be at the core of its economic policies. In view of this, the regime “embraced the maximalist view of the state” (Adejumobi, 2007:120).

Although the regime pledged separation of state and religion, a Christian demarcation of the state remained. And, as was the case under the previous regimes, Amharic remained the only “working language of the state” (see the Constitution of PDRE, 1987).

The Dergue regime was also known for expanding “the state apparatus,” “restructuring the cabinet,” and amending “the salary scale of the civil service” (Paulos, 2001:86). Associated with these expansion actions, the number of civil servants increased from 101,147 under the preceding reign to 216,058 when the regime left office (see National Civil Service Human Resource Statistics 2013-2014).
Despite the abovementioned changes, there were no major amendments to the legal framework of the nation’s civil service. The civil service was mainly run by “different orders and decrees issued during the reign of Haile Selassie” (Paulos, 2001:86; see also MoCS, 2013).

Furthermore, the Dergue regime is remembered for politicians’ distrust of career civil servants. This distrust led to the replacement of the latter, at almost all levels, by political patrons, thereby downplaying professionalism in personnel management. Likewise, a parallel political structure was introduced and was used to pass decisions in the civil service. Such measures, however, deteriorated its performance encouraging administrative misconduct (Paulos, 2001; Solomon, 2013).

2.5. The Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front (EPRDF) (1991–)

The EPRDF government, although overwhelmed by concern for politics (Assefa, 2015), has implemented “multiple reform interventions.” In doing this, a top-down, “big-push” approach to reform was followed (Ibid.). Thus far, the transformation measures have been implemented in three phases (see Solomon, 2013).

Phase I: From 1991-1996

Transformation in this phase emphasized political and economic reforms (Solomon, 2013; World Bank, 2013). Related to the former is the constitutional reform of 1995. The new constitution recognizes the state as “the federal parliamentary republic.” It also declared a “separation of state and religion” (see art. 11).

During this period, Ethiopia selectively implemented a structural adjustment program (SAP) and the free market economic policy (Henze, 2003; Stiglitz, 2002). However, international institutions such as IMF not only objected to the Ethiopian choice but also suspended its loan to the country (De Waal, 2012; Stiglitz, 2002).

Associated with SAP, a “retrenchment policy” meant to reduce “redundant employees” was implemented. This policy, according to the government, was based on new structures and position reviews (Paulos, 2001). In reality, the total number of civil servants increased from 216,058 in 1991 to 287,716 in 1996 (see table 1). Critics also claim that, at the time, the ratio of civil servants to the total population was low. Equally, the reduction was based on predetermined percentages (by 10 percent), not based on a call for new structures. The policy’s hidden mission was replacing the civil servants who
appeared to be associated with the previous regime. Such action further eroded the existing limited administrative capacity of the civil service. The policy also created an environment of uncertainty and distrust (Ibid).

**Phase II: From 1996-2003**
Reform during this phase is known as the “comprehensive civil service reform programme (CSRP).” CSRP was meant to address “the deep institutional constraints on basic functions such as policymaking, service delivery, and regulation” (MoCB, 2004:2). It was also encouraged by the influence of the NPM reform wave (see Peterson, 2001).

The outcome of the CSRP is mixed. On the positive side, there was the development of new legislations (e.g. a civil service law); the emergence of an “operating system for budget, procurement, and some aspects of personnel management (e.g. salary survey and record management),” and the implementation of a “prototype for expenditure management” (MoCB, 2004:2). On the minus side, the constraints that the reform purported to address continued to exist.

**Phase III: from 2003-**
Reform during this period has been labelled the “Public Sector Capacity Building Support Programme (PSCAP).” Its implementation was technically supported by leading institutions (see MoCB, 2004).

Putting the PSCAP into action encouraged the use of reform tools such as BPR, management by objectives (MBOs), the integrated performance management system (IPMS), the balanced scorecard (BSC), and the *yelawut serawit* (Amharic for “the civil service change army”) (MoCS, 2013).

Moreover, the PSCAP is backed by *gemgema*, a peer evaluation through both self-criticism and criticism tactics. Such an evaluation approach, among others, has been used to maintain political control up to the Kebele (Amharic for “neighborhoods”) level (Aalen, 2002); to shape the behavior of officials; and to give input for performance evaluation (Hagmann, 2005; World Bank, 1998). In sum, gemgema is a “politico-administrative evaluation” (Hagmann, 2005:16).

A notable success reported as a result of the PSCAP is a relative improvement of public service delivery. More importantly, BPR has brought an attitudinal change in the civil service, imbuing their operations with a client-oriented approach. It has also been praised for simplifying the work process cycle (Getachew & Common, 2006; World Bank, 2010).
3. The current Civil Service

3.1. The Internal Labour Market (ILM)

Until the collapse of the imperial regime, the nobility enjoyed the best of every opportunity in the nation. Indeed, education, historically and in modern times, was mainly made available to the progeny of nobility, who ultimately joined the civil service. As the Dergue government came to power, however, some of the individuals in this class were executed; some were exiled; and those remaining were systematically distanced from the civil service. Such actions opened the door for the middle and lower classes to enter into administration (see Adejumobi, 2007; Andargachew, 1993).

3.2. Public Sector Employment

The human resource statistics over the last fifty years shows a remarkable increase in the number of people employed by the public sector. Table 1 depicts the number of civil servants at each moment of major political change since 1962.

Table 1: Permanent Employees from 1962–63 to 2013–14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Major Events/Descriptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962-63</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>46,701</td>
<td>No. of civil servants at the time the Central Personnel Agency was established</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-75</td>
<td>82,941</td>
<td>18,206</td>
<td>101,147</td>
<td>No. of civil servants as the Dergue government came to power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990-91</td>
<td>163,090</td>
<td>52,968</td>
<td>216,058</td>
<td>No. of civil servants as the EPRDF government came to power, beginning of the implementation of the Retrenchment policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>207,358</td>
<td>80,358</td>
<td>287,716</td>
<td>The end of Retrenchment policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013-14</td>
<td>816,686</td>
<td>440,263</td>
<td>1,256,946</td>
<td>Total no. of civil servants as of 2013-2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>75,558</td>
<td>49,775</td>
<td>125,333</td>
<td>No. of civil servants working in the federal administration (about 10 percent of the total civil servants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>Ratio of civil servants to the population, calculated on a total population of 88,144,515</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of equal importance, over time, the qualifications of civil servants have been improving. For instance, of the total civil servants inherited by the Dergue government, six thousand were university graduates and twenty thousand had completed secondary school; the balance had no more than knowledge of reading and writing Amharic (Andargachew, 1993). At present, over 70 percent of civil servants hold qualifications of a “Diploma” and higher (see National Civil Service Human Resource Statistics, 2013-2014).

Of the total 1,256,946 civil servants, about 10 percent (125,333) work in the federal administration. Of these employees, 43 percent hold a qualification less than a college Diploma. The balance has a qualification of a college Diploma and above. Figure 1 shows the educational levels of the civil servants working in the federal administration.

**Figure 1: Educational levels of civil servants working in the federal administration.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Level</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&lt; College Diploma</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLB</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA/BSc</td>
<td>21.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DVM</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MA/MSc</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLM</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes illiterate, read and write, grades 1-4, 5-8, 9-12, certificate, Voc/tech. levels 1-3.
**Includes a college diploma (10+3), Voc/tech. levels 4 & 5, 1st-4th year college study.
***Percentage of employees whose level of qualification is not stated is 4.9 percent.

LLB = a first professional degree in law; BA/BSc = Bachelor of Art/Science; MD = Medical Doctor; DVM = Doctor of Veterinary Medicine; MA/MSc = Masters of Art/Science; LLM = Master of Law; PhD = Doctor of Philosophy.


What is the distribution of civil servants by field of academic specialization? Thus far, there are no organized data about the civil servants’ educational backgrounds. Yet the information displayed in figure 1 seems to indicate that employees in most organizations are predominantly generalists rather than specialists.

In what forms of federal organizations are the civil servants working? The organizations under the federal administration are hierarchically arranged. On the top of the hierarchy are ministries, offices, and applicable commissions.
These are disaggregated into diverse forms of organizations: offices, boards, centers, projects, authorities, institutes, universities, administrations, commissions, funds, and agencies. Some of these diverse forms of organizations have no executive boards while the others do and are relatively more autonomous.

### 3.3. Recruitment Approaches

The question here concerns efforts to fill vacancies for the top positions and the criteria most often used in selecting the candidates. The responses of survey participants related to this issue are summarized in table 2 and table 3, respectively.

In recruiting top civil servants (TCS), the vacancies in most cases are either internally or publicly advertised. Circulating a vacancy notice across the public sector and relying on recruitment consultants is seldom practised. Undeniably, recruiting the TCSs through public advertisement symbolizes an important influence of the scantily implemented NPM reform, if at all intended.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How often are the vacancies for the recruitment of top civil servants ... (percentage)*</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>In about half of the cases</th>
<th>In most cases</th>
<th>Always</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>... internally advertised? (n=213)</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... circulated to another part of the public sector to seek applicants? (n=208)</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... publicly advertised? (n=212)</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... filled by using executive search consultants? (n = 203)</td>
<td>62.6</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* n = Difference from 214, indicating there was a missing value to the extent of the difference.

In Ethiopian civil service, the criteria for the recruitment of civil servants, after the establishment of the CPA, was expected to be meritocratic. However, actual practices have juxtaposed the “merit and patronage approaches” (Assefa, 2015). Often, the former is practised in hiring individuals for lower positions. The higher the position, the greater the possibility for individuals to
be recruited at best on a “quasi-merit” basis and at worst on a pure patronage basis. This is confirmed by a survey we conducted on matters considered in recruiting candidates for top positions (see table 3).

Moreover, table 3 presents TCSs claim about the influence of politicians on their recruitment. The influence of politicians on their selection is quite high (44.9 percent). This figure, if added to the category of “somewhat significant” responses, climbs to over 70 percent. Such results speak to how politicized the Ethiopian civil service is (for details see section 3.7).

Table 3: Factors considered when recruiting TCSs, and the influence of politicians

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In recruiting TCSs, to what extent is consideration given to candidates’ …</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Sometimes</th>
<th>In about half of the cases</th>
<th>In most cases</th>
<th>Always</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>… political sensitivity? (n = 212)</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>… seniority (n = 212)</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>…. professional expertise (n = 214)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To what extent do politicians influence the selection of top civil servants? (n = 214, percentage)</th>
<th>Very significantly</th>
<th>Somewhat significantly</th>
<th>Not significantly</th>
<th>Somewhat insignificantly</th>
<th>Very insignificantly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<n = Difference from 214, indicating there was a missing value to the extent of the difference.

3.4. Tenure Security

The Ethiopian civil service is a system with strong tenure security offering lifelong tenure of employment. Commonly, new recruits enter the civil service with a probation period of six months and, based on their performance, progress to the status of permanent employee (Federal Civil Servants Proclamation, 2007). The same holds true for the tenure of the TCSs. The majority
of TCSs (over 80 percent) replied that their employment in the civil service is permanent. Despite this, TCSs face the highest possibility of removal by their political masters (see table 4).

Table 4: The tenure security of TCSs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The tenure of the TCSs is ... (n = 214)</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>... temporary-contractual basis – renewable based on performance (frequency, %)</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>20.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>... permanent – lifetime (frequency, %)</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>79.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In general, can politicians remove top civil servants from their positions as they deem necessary? (n = 214) (frequency, %yes) | 128 | 59.8 |

3.5. The Pay System

In the Ethiopian civil service, the pay system is guided by grades and cadres. The former denotes occupational groupings, and the latter refers to the SKA requirements of jobs in a specific cadre. The amount of pay is determined based on a civil servant’s grade. As such, a particular grade correlates to a specific salary scale, which defines the base salary, the horizontal increments, and the maximum pay for that specific grade. The pay system is summarised in table 5.

Periodic pay increases reward seniority. To date, “performance evaluation is more subjective and not yet aligned to an incentive system” (World Bank, 2013:iix). Although a pay reform has been implemented, it is stalled, partial, and ineffective. Similarly, a performance-based arrangement, although proposed, has not yet been implemented (Evans, 2008). Civil servants, including the TCSs, mainly receive a standard salary based on the pay scale (see table 6).

Although measured, there is not much linkage between the performance of civil servants and their remuneration (see table 7). The civil service, in general, does not pay much (see MoCB, 2004).
### Table 5: Ethiopian Civil Service Cadres and Grades

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Salary scale/level</th>
<th>Cadres</th>
<th>Step Salary in a Grade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Custodian and manual</td>
<td>Trade and crafts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Grade 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Grade 2</td>
<td>Grade 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Grade 3</td>
<td>Grade 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Grade 4</td>
<td>Grade 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Grade 5</td>
<td>Grade 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Grade 5</td>
<td>Grade 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>Grade 6</td>
<td>Grade 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>Grade 7</td>
<td>Grade 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX</td>
<td>Grade 8</td>
<td>Grade 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Grade 9</td>
<td>Grade 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XI</td>
<td>Grade 10</td>
<td>Grade 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XII</td>
<td>Grade 11</td>
<td>Grade 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIII</td>
<td>Grade 12</td>
<td>Grade 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XIV</td>
<td>Grade 12</td>
<td>Grade 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XV</td>
<td>Grade 8</td>
<td>Grade 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVI</td>
<td>Grade 9</td>
<td>Grade 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XVII</td>
<td></td>
<td>Grade 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Although proclaimed, a step increment in a grade has been paused since 2007/08 awaiting the approval of the performance-based increment approach. Source: National Civil Service Human Resource Statistics 2013/14*
Table 6: The pay system for TCS (n = 214)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pay System</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Standardised – based on pay scale</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>91.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexible – based on bargain between civil servant and organisation</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Both fixed and flexible scales coexist in the CS

Table 7: Performance–Pay Link (n = 214)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pay Link</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Performance is not measured.</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance is measured but has no effect on pay.</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>69.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance is measured and has an effect on pay.</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although promotion should be carried out according to the Federal Civil Servants Promotion Guideline (2008), in practice it is often based on seniority. The practice encourages fast advancement to the next scale within or across the cadres at the beginning. The progress, however, stagnates as individuals get closer to the highest grade and scale, because there remain only a few higher posts to which individuals could be promoted.

However, in Ethiopia, the stagnation at the top has often been disrupted upon regime change. At the juncture of each disruption, the new administration has distanced itself from the higher officials associated with the preceding regime (see Andargachew, 1993; Paulos, 2001; Mengistu & Vogel, 2006). Such practices, according to Mengistu and Vogel (2006:212), have fashioned a “spoils system,” which has “led to a unique brand of rent-seeking among government officials.”

3.6. Motivational Factors for Working in the Civil Service

The other question is what motivates civil servants to work in the civil service? To understand their motivations, the TCSs were asked to give their position on the matters presented in the first column of table 8. The questions begin with whether the TCSs would recommend their own children to work in the
civil service. The remaining half of the table is devoted to issues related to “public sector motivation” (items 1, 2, 3 and 5) and “public service motivation” (items 4, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10). These factors comprise extrinsic and intrinsic considerations, respectively, for working for and in the public sector (see Perry & Hondeghem, 2008).

Table 8: Motivational reasons for working in the civil service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Motivational factor for working in the civil service (percentage)</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whether the TCSs would recommend their own children to work in the civil service (frequency, % yes)</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivational factor for working in the civil service (percentage)</td>
<td>1*</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Security of tenure (1)**</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Career opportunities (0)</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Pension benefit plans (0)</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Altruistic motivation–living for more than one-self, serving citizens or others (0)</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Income level or monetary incentive</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Attraction to public policymaking (1)</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Commitment to public interest and civic duty (1)</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Compassion (1)</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Self-sacrifice (1)</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. The opportunity to take on responsibility to promote the welfare of the service users (4)</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*1 = Not important at all; 2 = Rather not important; 3 = More or less important; 4 = Important; and 5 = Very important
** Numbers in the brackets indicate the number of missing responses

The result reveals surprising and even contradictory claims. A large percentage of TCSs (60.3 percent) testified that they would not recommend their own children to work in the civil service. Yet, of the ten items about factors
motivating the TCSs for working in the civil service, only income level is reported as an unimportant motivating factor. The question is, if all items except income level are motivating factors, why did the TCSs repudiate the idea of recommending their children to work in the civil service? This is contradictory because a higher motivation for public service should imply a higher likelihood of association with that sector (Perry & Wise, 1990).

Then again, according to Bright (2005:149), high public service motivation denotes less attraction to monetary incentives. It has a positive corollary with individuals’ performance as well (Perry & Wise, 1990). Yet the need for higher pay is cited as causing a migration of talent from the civil service to nongovernmental organizations or even to employment abroad (see MoCB, 2004). Equally, the Ethiopian civil service has been blamed for inefficiency (Ibid). Briefly, except for items measuring public sector motivation (items 1, 2, 3, and 5), the TCSs’ position on items related to public service motivation seems to manifest the buzzwords and politically correct propaganda of the present Ethiopian civil service.

3.7. Politicisation

In Ethiopia, politicization has been an issue ever since the establishment of the modern civil service. More specifically, prior to the 1970s, clientelism (personal links to the emperor or his political executives) ran rampant, and after the military government came to power, “the Derg ... mattered much more than technical competence” (Assefa, 2015:110). Currently, notwithstanding the outward appearance of a “depoliticised civil service” (see Federal Civil Servants Proclamation, 2007; Corruption and Crime Proclamation, No. 881/2015), politicization continues to be common. As such, the boundary between politics and administration is extremely fluid (Assefa, 2015). The patronage arrangement in public appointments is a usual practice (see Evans, 2008). Such arrangements are not only limited to the top positions but also apply to lower-level posts (World Bank, 1998).

Moreover, during the EPRDF government, a small number of spin doctors, known as “special advisors,” have joined the federal administration, numbering one or two per civil service institution. They are appointed by the minister/commissioner/director general, as applicable, of those organizations. Their appointment is based on both merit and political criteria. They are usually members of the ruling party, and their tenure probably depends on the existence of their political masters. Based on the path-dependent experience of purging those who are associated with the outgoing government, their tenure unquestionably ends upon change of the regime.
Asked about the functions of the “special advisors,” the TCSs indicate that they predominantly provide strategic advice on policy design and reform proposals; coordinate relations with the stakeholders; offer political/partisan advice; and assist in policy implementation. They also to some degree function as media/relational and communication assistants and partake in the management of civil servants (see table 9).

Table 9: How TCSs describe the function of advisors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functions</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>Somewhat</th>
<th>Very much</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide strategic advice on policy design and reform proposals (n = 214)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>54.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinate relations with stakeholder (n = 213)</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>52.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offer political/partisan advice</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide media or relational and communication assistance (n = 214)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>43.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in policy implementation (n = 214)</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>56.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manage public servants (n = 214)</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>28.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.8. Representativeness

The Ethiopian civil service, in general, has a higher percentage of men than women in the workforce. Looking back to 1974, the period when maintaining employee data in terms of gender began around 82 percent of public employees were male. The expansion of the government apparatus during the Dergue government brought about only marginal changes (see table 1).

With the intention of remedying this prevailing gender imbalance, Ethiopia formulated a national policy on women in 1993. Since then, the issues of gender equity and equality have remained on top of the government agenda. In addition, the Constitution has incorporated equality in that “all persons are equal before the law” (art. 25). Similarly, the Labour Proclamation (2003: art. 14 [1][f]) and the Federal Civil Servants’ Proclamation (2007; art. 13 [1]) assert discrimination based on sex, among other bases, as unlawful acts. Furthermore, the Constitution goes beyond the prohibition of discrimination to proclaim “affirmative actions for women” (art. 35 [3]). Going even further, the Constitution (art. 42 [1][d]), the Labour Proclamation (art. 87 [1]), and
the Federal Civil Servants Proclamation (art. 7) proclaimed the right of “equal pay for equal work” for men and women alike.

In enacting and enforcing the above-mentioned laws and policy that promote gender equality, Ethiopia scored 59.9 (which was above the continental average [53.8]) in the 2013 Mo Ibrahim Index. Doing so also enabled the EPRDF government to increase the proportion of female TCSs to 35 percent (in the federal administration, to 39.7 percent) in 2014 (see the National Civil Service Human Resource Statistics, 2013-2014).

Despite representational improvements, gender disproportion in terms of hierarchical power persists. Briefly, in Ethiopia “women are barely represented in decision-making positions” (UN Women, 2014:39). For instance, in the federal administration, in 2013-2014 the number of women in professional science, administrative, and clerical and financial cadres was 28, 37.3, and 66.2 percent, respectively. Such figures imply uneven distributions of gender at the higher-level posts.

Similarly, if we break down job categories to grades and salary scales, a gender disparity is observable in the salary groups and level of education. That is, women largely receive a minimum wage salary, and most of them also fall into the lower level education categories (see the National Civil Service Human Resource statistics, 2013-2014).

In multi-ethnic Ethiopia, in addition to gender representation, the representativeness of various ethnic groups in the civil service has been a concern. In this regard, the three regimes discussed in the present work have demonstrated two approaches toward dealing with diversity: the assimilationist and the accommodationist policy. The former has been relegated to the past, while the latter, “despite its serious flaws” (Abbay, 2004:593), has been implemented since 1991.

The Constitution (art. 25; art. 88 [2]) underlines the equality of nations, nationalities, and people. Likewise, the Labour Proclamation (art. 14 [1] [f]) and the Federal Civil Servants Proclamation (art. 13 [1]) denounce discrimination on ethnic grounds. Furthermore, the Federal Civil Servants Proclamation proclaimed affirmative action for members of minorities (see art. 13 [3][c]). Despite these legal provisions, the federal civil service is dominated by ethnic Amhara (43 percent), followed by Oromo (17.2 percent) and Tigre (6.6 percent) (see the National Civil Service Human Resource statistics for the year 2013-2014). The balance is made up of other diverse ethnic groups. This indicates that ethnic balance in the federal civil service is an unresolved issue.
3.9. Public Opinion

A comprehensive survey about public opinion toward the Ethiopian civil service is lacking. According to the Global Integrity–African Integrity Indicators, Ethiopian confidence in the civil service for the years 2013 to 2016 was, on average, “somewhat weak.”

One of the arguments for the decrease of public trust in the civil service is corruption. In Ethiopia, a diagnostic study by the World Bank (2012) revealed the prevalence of wide-ranging corruption. Indeed, Ethiopia has often ranked on the low end of the corruption perception index (see Transparency International, 2016).

Related to corruption, some old aphorisms exist about holding a position in the government. Among others, these include “sishome yalbela sishar yikochewal,” which literally means “unbenefitted when appointed, regrets when ousted;” “shumetena mot ande new,” meaning “appointment and death come once in life,” and so on. Such sayings have at least two influences. First, they entitle officials to seek illegal benefits of all forms, including corruption and rent-seeking. They also tease out society’s tolerance for corruption. Finally, they inflame negative attitudes toward public officials and institutions, damaging public trust and support for them.

The other reason for the fall of confidence in the country’s civil service might be the autocratic (ruling) party system, which is in evidence at every turn (see Merera, 2001). In each regime considered in this chapter, the ruling party’s hegemonic aim has been to obstruct the kind of reform required to mitigate corruption. Connected to this, Ethiopia exhibits the stasis of patrimonialism (see World Bank, 2013) which inflames negative public attitudes toward government institutions.

Finally, in Ethiopia, the other reason for the drop in the support may go to what some call a “reform neurosis,” that is, public fatigue with recurring public sector reforms, which are often justified by their deficiency (see MoCB, 2004).

4. Analysis: Implications for Leadership Roles

In this section, the foregoing evidence is analysed based on the overarching antecedents of public leadership: the cultural, political, and organisational-administrative level settings. Subsequently, an attempt is made to deduce the ramifications of these antecedents for leadership roles.
4.1. Cultural Setting

It should be noted that Ethiopia, although home to many religions, was founded on conservative Orthodox Christianity. This hegemonic legacy existed from the era of Menelik II to that of Haile Selassie I. Yet its supremacy, in general, has been weakened since the downfall of imperialism. Its path dependence was visibly disrupted when the EPRDF government came to power. Under this regime, individuals are free to exercise the faith and beliefs of their choice. No matter what, “Ethiopians consider religion most important to who they are” (World Economic Forum, 2016).

Furthermore, Ethiopia is a multi-ethnic and multicultural state, an issue that has been handled differently by different regimes (see Abbay, 2004). Likewise, gender balance and, of course, the issue of the age cohort of civil servants have contributed to heterogeneity. Such diversities unquestionably challenge cohesion in the workplace (see Visagie & Linde, 2010).

The implication of the foregoing contexts for the leadership roles, therefore, is the importance of recognizing workforce diversity and their culture. Leaders need to entrench diversity and value heterogeneity in their organizations and welcome it through diversified leadership styles. Briefly, managing diversity requires leaders to adopt diversity leadership approaches (Fernandez et al., 2010; Jackson, 2004; Visagie & Linde, 2010), focus on collaborative leadership (Haruna, 2009), and develop a cross-cultural competency (Jackson, 2004). In SSA, upholding the concept of Ubuntu (see Sigger et al., 2010) is also important.

Additional insight into the Ethiopian culture could be obtained from Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (see Hofstede et al., 2010): power distance, individualism versus collectivism, masculinity versus femininity, uncertainty avoidance, long-term versus short-term orientation, and indulgence versus restraint. For Ethiopia, only the scores for the first four dimensions are available. Ethiopia scored high on power distance (70), low on individualism (20), high on masculinity (65), and about average on uncertainty avoidance (55). These respectively denote that Ethiopians are hierarchical, collectivistic, and a largely masculine society.

With reference to the implications for leadership roles, a higher power distance implies that leaders are expected to be directive; subordinates expect to be told what to do; and the ideal boss is a benevolent autocrat. Furthermore, a hierarchical culture endorses a paternalistic leadership (Aycan et al., 2013; Jackson, 2016). A lower score on the individualism dimension or a high score on collectivism denotes that management is about the management of groups; that is, it calls for cooperative teamwork (Nzelibe, 1986) and Ubuntu. The masculinity dimension implies that “managers are expected to be decisive
and assertive, the emphasis is on equity, competition and performance and conflicts are resolved by fighting them out. In short, it demands a result-oriented leadership (see Fernandez et al., 2010).

Finally, Ethiopia falls into the category of a “synchronic culture” (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1997). The issue here is about reviving the past. The past is important because, in synchronic culture, time is considered inter-connected. As such, “the past informs the present, and both inform the future.” In terms of work operation, scheduling has less importance. Individuals in such a culture perform several tasks at a time. The emphasis is on “doing things right” more than “doing right things.” Punctuality is not stressed to a great extent. Furthermore, Ethiopians are a kind of “we-oriented (communitarian)” community (Ibid:131). The implication of such a culture for the role of leaders is that they need to assume, among others, the role of storyteller (see Ready, 2002).

4.2. Political Setting

All the regimes that have ruled Ethiopia, irrespective of differences in their ideologies and corollary policies, have endorsed a maximalist view of the state. Until now, except maybe during the imperial rule, which in itself has violently ended in 1974, there has never been a peaceful transition of political power.

Likewise, the politicization of the civil service has been the hallmark of all the regimes considered here. In appointing civil servants, the patronage arrangement coexists with the merit approach. Similarly, Ethiopia exhibits the stasis of patrimonial authority. In fact, patrimonialism, although found in almost all polities, has often been described particularly as the core feature of SSA politics and bureaucracy (see Therkildsen, 2014).

The question is what are the influences of the aforementioned factors on how leaders are likely to act? To begin with, while leaders in a minimalist state hold a “marketizing trajectory” and are likely to opt for a performance-oriented style (see Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011), leaders in the maximalist-type Ethiopian civil service may tend to exhibit a more mandate-driven style, being bound by and performing prescribed roles rather than approaching tasks unconventionally.

Similarly, in the Ethiopian civil service, as politicization pushes both civil servants and politicians toward a close alliance (see Peters & Pierre, 2004), it can be assumed that TCSs in such settings will focus more on ideological consistency and salience of accomplishments with their party rather than on accountability for performance. In other words, the situation calls for “political loyalty leadership” (Tummers & Knies, 2015).
4.3. Organisational-Administrative Level Factors

In Ethiopia, as just explained, the modernism of administration had external origins. Nevertheless, over the past hundred plus years, many civil service reform initiatives have been tried and the system has been progressing. Even so, critics claim that the implementation of reform is overwhelmed by a concern for politics rather than a wish to improve the operational efficiency of the civil service.

Until now, the Ethiopian civil service has not focused much on the meritocratic appointment of civil servants. Equally, the civil service allows permanency of tenure. It does not yet inject market-type mechanisms such as contract arrangements, even in recruiting TCSs. The civil servants receive a standardised salary. There is hardly a strong performance-pay link, and promotion mainly rewards seniority. Finally, yet importantly, NPM reform-guided “agencification” measures have only been implemented to a limited extent.

The question, though is, what are the implication of the foregoing factors for the role of leaders? Despite widespread talk of reform, as just mentioned, their actual execution and resulting outcomes have been quite limited. The situation on the ground may not motivate leaders, for instance, to focus on performance excellence. Yet, the reform measures might have broadened leaders’ role preferences. Currently, for instance, change-oriented leadership (lawut tekor amerar) and result-oriented leadership (wutet tekor amerar) and so forth are fashionable catchphrases in the Ethiopian civil service.

Lastly, civil servants in Ethiopia function in a work environment with low public support. Such a situation does have an impact on staff motivation. The pressures on civil servants may call for affective leadership that underscores compassion in public service (see Newman et al., 2007). Likewise, the decline of public support for the civil service, among other factors, demands ethical leadership (Sutcliffe, 2005) and emphasis on trust and integrity, such as process “fairness and equity” (Van Ryzin, 2011). It is also important to uphold following rules, accountability, and network governance leadership (Tummers & Knies, 2015). Leaders need to be stewards of the public interest (see Selden et al., 1999) as well.
5. Conclusions

Relying on historical and sociological new institutionalism, we initially studied the evolution and current features of the Ethiopian CSS. In doing so, we mainly relied on documentary analysis. Thus, as the limitation of this method (see Bowen, 2009) could have effects on the findings of the present work, the results of this study should be understood within this limit.

The results, in general, revealed that the civil service evolved in gradual fashion both during imperial and post-revolution Ethiopia. Ever since the beginning of modern public administration, the appointment of civil servants, at all levels, has mixed merit and patronage criteria. The civil service offers lifelong tenure of employment. Likewise, civil servants obtain a standard pay based on the salary scale. The current NPM motivated a movement toward “a contract regime” for employment, and the performance-based pay system has not yet reached Ethiopia.

Undeniably, there are remarkably underappreciated influences of the old institutions. The strong dominance of a single religion and culture, and discrimination on such grounds, among others, is no longer prevalent. Despite this, issues of gender and, especially, ethnic representativeness appear to cause serious concerns for the present and the future legitimacy of the Ethiopian civil service. The legitimacy of those institutions may further be questioned because Ethiopian support for them is low.

Finally, the analysis is framed based on the contextual antecedents and their ramifications for the role of leaders. Based on what is known as a crosswalk approach, the Ethiopian setting approximately calls for the following distinct but inter-related leadership roles: (a) diversity-oriented leadership, (b) collaborative leadership (c) Ubuntu (d) benevolent autocrat, (e) paternalistic leadership, (f) result-oriented leadership, (g) storytelling, (h) political loyalty leadership, (i) change-oriented leadership, (j) compassionate leadership, and (k) ethical leadership.

It should, however, be noted that the presumed ideals of the abovementioned roles might contradict each other. Yet, this is not a problem because of a recent shift from “either ... or” to “both ... and” philosophies of leading organizations (see Quinn et al., 2011). In the present case, it means that leaders may at times be expected to play contradictory roles or make “both ... and” decisions. Moreover, those roles are not “one-size-fits-all” types. As some roles may be more appropriate in some organizations than in others, leaders are expected to make choices compatible with their work context.

Equally, we leave it to the future research to deal with the question of what does and does not work best in this setting. Future works may go further
and examine the content of the syllabuses of the public administration and related programs to understand if leaders and potential leaders are trained in context-specific leadership and how the gaps, if any, need to be addressed.

Acknowledgements

We thank the anonymous reviewers who provided critical comments and constructive suggestions that helped us in improving the chapter. We also thank the editors.

Notes

1. In Ethiopia, this qualification refers to one to two years of higher professional education, not a bachelor or post-graduate degree.
2. Oromo is the largest ethnic group (33,117,787); Amhara is the second largest (19,467,829); Somali is the third largest (5,240,226); and ethnic Tigray is the fourth largest (5,162,242) (National Civil Service Human Resource statistics, 2013-2014:1.10).

References


