Public Administration in Ethiopia

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Terefe Gemechu, Dereje, et al.
Public Administration in Ethiopia: Case Studies and Lessons for Sustainable Development.

Bacha Kebede Debela, Geert Bouckaert, and Steve Troupin

**Box 1: Key Points of this chapter**
- The responsibilities of the institution mandated for civil service and HRM has increased.
- There is an insufficient link between NPM-inspired result-oriented performance management and pay in HRM.
- The reforms/tools were used to strengthen vertical and horizontal coordination and control and to enhance the allegiance of civil servants to political executives.
- The influence of historical factors on HRM is significant.

**Box 2: Reading this chapter will give you insights in**
- The Ethiopian politico-administrative reforms and its effect on HRM.
- The key features of HRM organizational structure, legal frameworks, and directives in Oromia National Regional State.
- The effect of administrative reform tools and legal frameworks and directives on HRM.
- The potential negative consequences of the HRM-related challenges on the UN's Sustainable Development Goal (SDGs) and African Union (AU) Agenda 2063.

**Box 3: Abbreviations**
- AU = African Union
- BPR = Business Process Reengineering
- BSC = Balanced Score Card
- CSRP = Civil Service Reform Program
- DDS = Democratic Developmental State
- EMB = Ethiopian Birr
- HRM = Human Resources Management
- NPM = New Public Management
1. **Introduction**

From the 1980s to the 1990s, the neoliberal ideal known as the New Public Management (NPM) was used as a received model to reform the public sector, including human resource management (HRM), all over the world (Ongaro & Ferlie, 2019; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017). Advocates argue the public sector should adopt the market principle and a decentralized, customer- and result-oriented approach (Lægreid et al., 2008; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017). In consequence, much attention was given to performance management and improving public servant quality through training and development and quality circles (Pollitt, Bouckaert, & Lößler, 2004; Steen et al., 2017), and staff tenure was conceived as depending on performance (Brans, 1997).

However, in the early 1990s the private sector approach to the public sector was attacked, among other reasons, for reducing trust in government (Bovaird & Lößler, 2001) and for privileging the short-term perspective (Lampropoulou & Oikonomou, 2018). To deal with unintended consequences, the West has shifted attention to the new public governance, new public service, and the neo-Weberian models, yet without dismissing the elements of neoliberal ideals (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017). The trajectory of politico-administrative reforms, however, varies, which is partly explained by the differences in politico-administrative culture (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017; Schwab et al., 2017).

Since the 1990s, Ethiopia has introduced a series of reforms. The Civil Service Reform Program (CSRP), which has an NPM element and five sub-programs,¹ was introduced in 1996 (Mengesha & Common, 2006). The country has also introduced five reform tools: Business Process Reengineering (BPR), Balanced Score Card (BSC), Change Army, Citizen Charter, and Kaizen, at all government levels and in all public institutions. Moreover, the executive agencies were restructured many times, with consequences for HRM. The trajectories of the reforms and their consequences, however, have not been well studied. A few Ethiopian studies exist but have limitations. Using an institutional perspective, Mitiku (2018) studied the Ethiopian public sector leadership profile in the federal civil service organizations. However, he did not analyze the effect of executive agency restructuring and HRM-related instruments on HRM in time and space. The World Bank

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1. **Abbreviations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSCAP</td>
<td>Public Sector Capacity-Building Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDGs</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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¹ The CSRP had five sub-programs: human resource management, corporate governance, financial management, service delivery, and performance management.
(2019) studied the implementation of reform tools; Daba (2016) studied the trends and challenges of HR dynamics in Oromia Regional State; Assefa (2017) examined professionalism in the federal institutions; and Kacho et al. (2016) investigated the implementation of HRM reform in five Ethiopian cities. However, these researches have not explored the effect of politico-administrative reform on HRM. A study by Tadesse (2019) generically focuses on public service reform.

Drawing on the historical neo-institutionalist perspective and relying on a secondary dataset, this chapter explores the continuities and changes in human resource management (HRM) in the Oromia National Regional State and the consequences of the HRM reforms.

The chapter unfolds as follows. The next section establishes the theoretical framework and research design. The third section systematically discusses the results. The last section provides conclusions and implications.

2. Historical Neo-Institutionalism and Research Design

The chapter draws on the historical neo-institutionalist perspective, for three major reasons. First, the advocates of historical neo-institutionalism focus on the structures and power relations among actors (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Schmidt, 2006). The structural-instrumentalist perspective allows exploring continuity and change, over long periods, due to administrative reforms (Christensen et al., 2019; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017). Second, the historical neo-institutionalist perspective contends that institutions are path-dependent; that administrative structures, historical factors, and memories inform the present politico-administrative contexts, including historical injustice (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2009; Schmidt, 2006). Third, the historical neo-institutionalist framework maintains that institutions provide a frame of reference for interpretation and action (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2009), allowing for the explanation of the influence of administrative reforms on HRM, civil servants’ well-being, and their decision-making behavior (Christensen et al., 2019; Pollitt, 2005).

The study is primarily empirical and descriptive in nature. We relied extensively on a secondary dataset, including relevant legal frameworks, directives, guidelines, executive agencies’ establishing proclamations, and the Federal Civil Service Commission (HR database). We also reviewed published academic resources and conference proceedings. The data were obtained through web searches and personal contact with relevant people in the Federal Civil Service Commission. Furthermore, to track the effect
of structural reforms, we analyzed the career path of a civil servant working in local government in the Oromia National Regional State. We closely looked at his placement letters, and the first author conducted an exploratory unstructured interview for clarifications. The first author also conducted an exploratory semi-structured interview with a senior staff member at Oromia State University, previously called the Public Service College of Oromia. The interviewee participated greatly in regional reform programs since 2008. The thirty-five-minute interview focused on exploring major challenges encountered by the regional technical reform team and was conducted by phone.

3. The Scope of the Civil Service and HRM

Civil servants include all employees (permanent and temporary) except bureau/office heads and deputy heads (regions, zones, and districts), members of regional, district, and Kebele council, judges and public prosecutors, members of the prison administration, the police commission, and other employees excluded by law (Oromia Regional State [ORS], 2002). The bureau and office heads and vice heads are appointed by the regional and local government administrative council. All newly hired civil servants are subjected to a six-month probation period to become a permanent civil servant, and permanent appointment depends on performance evaluation results (a minimum of a satisfactory performance).

A removed political executive, who was a civil servant before the appointment, can be assigned as a civil servant, allowing such individuals the privilege of wearing a double coat with the potential to be reappointed to a political executive position at another time. The other paradox is that appointed officials who were not civil servants may also be directly placed as a civil servant, to relevant positions, when they are removed from office (ORS, 2010). Surprisingly, the salary of a removed political leader who served for at least one year (2006-2016) and at least two years (since 2016) remains unaffected (CSC, 2006). Appointees who were civil servants and are removed before serving for one year, will be placed in their position or an equivalent position. Moreover, while they were running the office, all the removed heads were extremely privileged; they were entitled to special allowance and benefits, and per diem, which is significantly different from the civil servants (World Bank, 2019). The Oromia Civil Servant Proclamation and directives specify open vacancies, competitive selection, and performance-based placement.
4. Federal and Regional Structural Reforms

Three major types of structural reforms that affect HRM could be distinguished: The first decentralisation wave, the second decentralization wave, and executive agency restructuring.

The first decentralization wave occurred during the Transitional Government (TG) of Ethiopia (1991-1995) and continued until 2001. After outting the Dergue in 1991, the EPRDF implemented a regionalization policy, which was largely driven by political interest (Mengesha & Common, 2006). The TG of Ethiopia established fourteen ethno-linguistic regional governments (TG, 1992). The 1993 Act of the TG, among others, transferred the responsibility for personal administration to the regional governments (TG, 1993). In consequence, regional public servants administration bureaus were established.

In 1995 the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia was established, comprising nine ethnolinguistic regional states and two city administrations, implying that civil servants are expected to be proficient in the regional official language. The 1995 constitution grants regions the right to self-administration, including the right to secession.

After the 2000 national election and the devastating Ethio-Eritrean war (1989-2000) and the resulting internal EPRDF party crises, the second decentralization wave occurred, in 2001, leading to extensive public sector restructuring (Mengesha & Common, 2006). In 2001, the Ministry of Capacity Building (MOC) was established and mandated to supervise, coordinate, and guide the implementation of national capacity building and reform initiatives. There were also regional level equivalents, since 2002. Next, in 2003, the government developed the Public Sector Capacity-Building Program (PSCAP) consisting of five interrelated reform programs, focusing on result-oriented performance management, decentralized service delivery, capacity building, and increased local fiscal capacity (World Bank, 2013). The federal government also forced regions to transfer 65 percent of the resources obtained from the federal government to local governments (Peterson, 2015), allowing the federal government to systematically disperse the threat from regional governments by transferring the responsibility for service to local governments.

In 2005 another big official change occurred. In the aftermath of the relatively fair but contested 2005 election (Abbink, 2006), the government officially adopted the Democratic Developmental State (DDS) doctrine (World Bank, 2013) and committed to strengthening vertical and horizontal coordination, including controlling the society at the grass-root level (Debela & Troupin, 2016; Peterson, 2015).
Another noticeable change is the continuous restructuring of executive agencies. Since 1995 the institution responsible for HR administration management in Oromia saw seven structural changes. Table 1 summarizes the responsibilities of the institutions mandated with HR administration/management.

**Table 1: Executive agency restructuring and personnel/HRM key responsibilities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Proclamation No.</th>
<th>No. of executive agency</th>
<th>Who is responsible for personnel/HR?</th>
<th>What are the key responsibilities?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7/1995</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Public Servants Administration Bureau (1995-2001)</td>
<td>Personnel administration and legal and technical&lt;br&gt;Policy design and implementation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50/2002</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>Oromia Capacity Building Supreme Office (CBSO) (2002-2003) and the Civil Service Commission (CSC)</td>
<td>CBSO – Policy design and implementation, coordination, and capacity building&lt;br&gt;CSC – all responsibilities specified by Proclamation No. 7/1195, create enabling environment for women employment and supervise the implementation of performance appraisal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87/2004</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Education and Capacity building Bureau (ECBB) (2004-2004) and the Civil Service Commission (CSC)</td>
<td>ECBB – Policy design and implementation, coordination, education, and capacity building&lt;br&gt;CSC – all responsibilities specified by Proclamation No. 50/2002 and develop and implement HR training and development programs and take corrective measures on personnel matters attributed to illegal documents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105/2005</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Capacity Building Bureau (CBB) (2005-2010) and the Civil Service Commission (CSC)</td>
<td>CBB – Policy design and implementation, coordination, and capacity building&lt;br&gt;CSC – all responsibilities specified by CS Proclamations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132/2007</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>CBB (2005-2010) and the Civil Service Commission (CSC)</td>
<td>CBB – Policy design and implementation, coordination, and capacity building&lt;br&gt;CSC – all responsibilities specified by CS Proclamations, and conduct study on government offices with special works that deserve special salary scale, prepare domestic and foreign training policy, and issue directives on how the public sector organizations are organized and determine their HR needs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
There are three crucial issues worth discussing. First, the number of regional executive agencies has frequently changed. For instance, there were nineteen (in 1995) and forty-two (in 2016) regional level executive agencies (see table 1). The changes were due to the establishment of new agencies and the merger and separation of existing institutions, with implications for HRM. For example, the regional government established the Oromia Capacity Building Supreme Office and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) in 2002. In 2004 the Education Bureau and the Capacity Building Supreme Office were merged and constituted the Education and Capacity Building Bureau, which a year later (2005) was divided into two independent agencies, the Education Bureau and the Capacity Building Bureau. The 2007 Act did not change the number of regional executive agencies but redefined their responsibilities (ORS, 2007). The 2011 and the 2016 regional executive agency Acts, among others, respectively created the Oromia Civil Service and Good Governance Bureau and the Oromia Public Service and Human Resource Development Bureau. Interestingly, except 1995, 2004, and 2007 all Acts establishing regional executive agencies were issued after national elections.

Second, the power relationships between the institution responsible for civil service and HRM and the regional administrative council have changed over time. The Public Servants Administration Bureau was a member of the regional administrative council (1995-2002). The Civil Service Commission
(CSC) was accountable to the Capacity Building Supreme Office,\textsuperscript{3} to the Education and Capacity Building Bureau,\textsuperscript{4} and to the Capacity Building Bureau.\textsuperscript{5} Between 2011 and 2015 and since 2016, at the time of the writing this chapter, the CSGGB and the OPSHRDB were responsible for HRM and both bureaus were members of the regional administrative council.

Third, the responsibilities of the institution responsible for HRM have increased over time, particularly since 2011. As revealed in table 1, three noticeable and interrelated functions were entrusted to CSGGB. The institutional capacity dimension consists, among others, of initiating and coordinating institutional capacity-building programs and preparing special capacity-building programs for disadvantaged districts. HR functions among others comprise ensuring competency-based HRM, preparing and implementing HR policies and directives, and studying different types of benefits and special salary scale government offices, ensuring uniform HRM (ORS, 2011). The civil service and good governance dimension focus on ensuring the efficiency and effectiveness of civil services, preparing and implementing a good governance package, sustaining and ensuring effective reform programs implementation, benchmarking and organizing a public forum to achieve good governance, and institutionalizing the implementation of service delivery standards and a complaint handling system. Table 1 reveals that responsibilities of OPSHRDB have increased over time.

5. Instrumental-Managerial Reform

5.1. The Reform Approach

A systematic but top-down approach to administrative and civil service reform was started in the mid-1990s. In 1994, a special task force established in Prime Minister’s Office distinguished several weaknesses and bottlenecks in the civil service (World Bank, 2013; 2019). In response, in 1996, the country rolled out the CSRP, which is inspired by NPM doctrine, at all government levels. HRM is one component of the CSRP. The objective of the CSRP was to create an effective and efficient, fair, ethical, transparent, accountable, and performance-oriented civil service, accompanied by client-oriented service delivery (World Bank, 2019).

The full-scale implementation of the CSRP rolled out in 2002. To facilitate the implementation and follow-up and institutionalize the reform, special civil reform offices were established at the federal and regional government levels and a reform unit was created in each public institution.
5.2. The Reform Tools

To institutionalize the ongoing reform programs, and to promote the DS model, the ruling party introduced five reform tools: BPR, BSC, Change Army, Citizen Charter, and Kaizen, at all government levels and in all public sectors (World Bank, 2019), each affecting HRM-related activities. Table 2 presents the reform tools, their focus and key purpose, and key supporting institution.

The implementation of reform tools differs by type of reform tools, by government levels and by sectors, with apparent greater success at the federal level institutions (OPSHRDB, 2016; OPSHRDB, 2017; World Bank, 2019). This could be due to a relatively better administrative and coordination capacity at the federal level. While Change Army is widely implemented at all levels and in all sectors, Citizen Charter was unsuccessful at all levels of governments (OPSHRDB, 2016; World Bank, 2019). The implementation of Kaizen in the public sector has not been well studied.

The inter-sectorial variation in reform tools implementation could be explained by the nature of the task (Pollitt, 2005). The unsuccessful implementation of Citizen Charter is most likely explained by a deep-seated top-down politico-administrative and upward accountability tradition reinforced by socioeconomic and structural inequalities in public service delivery (Debela, 2017). In addition, the interviewee distinguished nine challenges in implementing reform:

- Inadequate understanding of reforms/tools by implementing organizations;
- One-size-fits-all reform across all sectors and functions (lack of contextualization);
- Lack of continuous evaluation and documentation;
- Lack of continuous engagement (considering reform as a one-time activity);
- Externalization of reforms, including by political leadership;
- High leadership turnover;
- Absence of performance-based reward and incentive;
- Misuse of reforms, including overly advancing political interests; and
- Inadequate resources and infrastructure for implementation.
Table 2: Reform tools, focus, key purpose, and supporting institution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reform tools and other supports</th>
<th>When introduced?</th>
<th>What are the focus and key purpose/s?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BPR</td>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>‒ Radically change the job and structure, public service delivery process, measurement and management, and values and beliefs of public sector.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSC</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>‒ Institutionalize strategic planning, performance measurement, management, and reporting (Markos, 2013; Tadesse, 2019).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Army</td>
<td>Rural areas in 2011 (World Bank, 2019) and all public sectors in 2014 (Miruts &amp; Daba, 2016)</td>
<td>‒ Learning, performance, and strengthening vertical and horizontal coordination and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen Charter</td>
<td>2011 (World Bank, 2019)</td>
<td>‒ Improve accountability to citizens and reinforce the standards set by BPR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaizen</td>
<td>Pilot project (2010) and full-scale implementation since 2011 (Kitaw, 2011)</td>
<td>‒ Incremental reform tool ‒ Reduce waste and improve work environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Service College of Oromia/Oromia State University (support)</td>
<td>College/university Regional reform support center (2008), University branch since 2009 (Finfine/ Addis Ababa)</td>
<td>‒ Support reforms implementation ‒ Research, training, and consultancy services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s compilation (2020)

5.3. Civil Service Legal Frameworks and Directives

The Oromia regional government issued a Civil Servant Proclamation in 2002 (ORS, 2002) and amended the proclamation three times: in 2004, 2005, and 2006. In addition, four directives and one guideline were issued. Table 3 reports the civil servant legal frameworks/directives and their key features.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal frameworks/directives</th>
<th>What are the key features?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Civil Servant Proclamation (ORS, 2002) | - CSC is responsible for HR and related functions  
- Defines the responsibility of public organizations |
| Civil Servants Revised Proclamation (ORS, 2004). | - Focuses on CSRP implementation and individual performance evaluation criteria |
| Civil Servants Revised Proclamation (ORS, 2005). | - Focuses on external transfer and distinguishes four causes |
| Civil Servants Revised Proclamation (ORS, 2006). | - Focuses on incentive schemes for district employees and specifies the responsibility of CSC |
| Civil servants directive (CSO, 2006) | - Recruitment (open vacancies) and competitive selection, promotion and placement, and transfer  
- Focus on merit rather than seniority  
- Inclusiveness  
- Internal transfer |
| Performance evaluation and reward system directive (OP-SHRD, 2012) | - Focuses on the implementation of results-oriented performance management  
- Distinguishes sources of information for individual and organizational performance evaluation |
| Reform Tools Implementation Guideline (OPSHRD, 2016) | - Focuses on BPR, BSC, Change and Citizen Charter implementation  
- Five implementation rating scales and modified scale set by performance evaluation and reward system directive |
| Job evaluation, standardization, and reward implementation directive (OPSHRDB, 2017). | - Distinguished sources organizational and individual information performance |
| Employee Placement directive (OPSHRDB, 2017) | - Performance, academic relevance and competency, experience, and inclusiveness  
- Individual performance criteria  
- External and internal transfer (placement) |
| Employee Placement directive (OPSHRDB, 2019) | - Implement the point rating job classification  
- Performance, academic relevance and competency, experience, and inclusiveness  
- More attention to direct work experience  
- Restriction on promotion level  
- Modified the placement assessment criteria  
- External and internal transfer (placement) |

Source: Author’s compilation (2020)
The legal frameworks, directives, and guidelines have implications for HRM. For example, the Civil Servants Proclamations could open windows for political executives to arbitrarily transfer (2004) and dismiss civil servants (2005). The continuous modification of the source of performance information and performance evaluation scale may increase performance gaming and affect employee decision-making behavior.

The 2017 Job Evaluation and Grading assessment by OPSHRD Bureau brought to light some realities and brought about a change in HRM. The assessment, among others, showed massive pay discrepancies for similar jobs and misplacement of civil servants. Consequently, the long-lived position-based job classification (in existence since the 1960s) was changed into a point-rating classification method, ranging from level one to level twenty. The aim was to calibrate civil servants’ salaries and ensure competency-based correct placement. The placement of civil servants was completed in 2018.

Nevertheless, due to huge financial implications, the government was unable to implement the salary adjustment, at a time of writing this chapter. A new civil servants’ placement was made, based on the 2019 directive that set a limit on promotion levels. While an employee with a sub-professional science occupational standard and its equivalent and less can be promoted to a maximum of three higher levels, an employee with a professional sciences occupational standard can be only promoted to two higher levels. Employees who are working in special salary organizations can be promoted to only one higher level. This means that performance results and competency have limited effect; promotion based on remarkable performance is impossible.

Both in 2018 and 2019 those civil servants who did not have the required competencies and were thereby suspended, and those who were out-competed, were assigned by the placement committee or the higher political executives to the same (internal transfer) or other public organizations (external transfer).

6. The Effects of Structural-Instrumental Reforms

The structural changes had four major consequences for HRM. First, based on ethno-linguistic criteria, the civil servants under the Dergue regime were transferred to the regional states, resulting in profound civil servants’ mobility. Surprisingly, despite significant staffing shortages and challenges in each region, the unwanted civil servants were removed (Mitiku, 2018; World Bank, 2019). The regional parties appeared to play a significant role in facilitating the civil servants’ mobility. Second, following the second wave of decentralization, the size of HR at the local level changed drastically and
was converted into a pyramid structure, with more number at the local than regional levels. Third, the continuous restructuring of the executive agencies has not only significantly increased the responsibilities of the institutions responsible for HRM but also the mobility of civil servants. Fourth, the creation of special public organizations having a special salary pay scale, since 2013, allowed civil servants who were working in special organizations to earn a relatively better salary than others.

The managerial-instrumental reforms (reform tools) have also affected HRM. The BPR organized HRM into a support function – not as a core function – and dismissed the seniority principle, shifted attention to merit and qualification and abandoned the behavioral elements in employee performance evaluation. As a result, qualified young civil servants were assigned to higher positions previously held by experienced but academically less qualified or unqualified civil servants (Peterson, 2015). At the levels of zonal administration and local government, the civil service pool and administration pool are responsible for HR functions.

The government also used BPR as an instrument to systematically remove senior civil servants. The 2004 Public Servants’ Pension Amendment Act was also used to remove senior civil servants. The Act reduced the retirement age from fifty-five years to forty-five years; and civil servants aged forty-five who had served for at least twenty years were entitled to receive a retirement pension for life (FDRE, 2004).

The BSC has linked strategic planning, performance measurement, and performance evaluation and reporting. Individual and team targets were linked to organizational targets since 2012 (World Bank, 2019). Individual performance accounted for two dimensions: performance (60 percent) and behavioral aspects (40 percent) (World Bank, 2019), implying the behavioral dimension has come back. However, the civil servants have a profound concern about the lack of meritocracy and objectivity in employee performance evaluation and performance-based rewards and incentives (ibid).

Change Army has a peer learning and performance improvement perspective comparable to the so-called quality circle, which according to a World Bank (2019) study of civil servants, is perceived as the most effective tool to discussing and finding solutions to corrupt practices in the civil services. Here, civil servants were organized into one to five arrangements (one group leader [model civil servant, preferably ruling party member] and other followers) and were responsible for evaluating team performance on daily/weekly bases and reporting to the lower level leadership, which in turn reports to middle-level leadership (directors) and ultimately to the top political leadership to be discussed at least once a month (Tadesse, 2019; World Bank, 2019).
Figure 1: HRM organizational structure and reform tools timeline

- TG and Regionalization (1991)
- Regional Public Servants Administration Bureau (1993)
- CSR task force (1994)
- District level decentralization (2001)
- MOC and PSCAP (2001)
- Full CSR (2002)
- OCBSO (2002)
- CSC (2002)
- Result, merit and seniority, position bases classification

1991-94

- EPRDF (1995)
- CSR (1996)
- Election (1997)
- Election (2000)
- Result, merit and seniority, position bases classification

1995-2000

- EPRDF (1995)
- CSRP (1996)
- Election (1997)
- Election (2000)
- Result, merit and seniority, position bases classification

2001-2004

- OCBB (2005)-executive org
- BPR (2005/06)
- Oromia CS directive (2006)
- Oromia Executive organ restructuring (2007)
- BSC (2008)
- Result, merit and position basesd classification

2005-09

- Election 2010
- OCSSGGB (2011)-executive org
- Change army (2011)
- Citizen charter (2011)
- Kaizen (2010/2011)
- Rearward directive (2012)
- Special Salary Organization (2013)
- Result, merit and competency position bases classification

2010-2014

- Election 2010
- OCSSGGB (2011)-executive org
- Change army (2011)
- Citizen charter (2011)
- Kaizen (2010/2011)
- Rearward directive (2012)
- Special Salary Organization (2013)
- Result, merit and competency position bases classification

2015-2019

- Election 2015
- OCSSHRDB (2016)-executive org
- JEG placement manual and directive (2017)
- JEG placement directive (2019)
- Result, merit and competency, Point Rating method (2017)

Source: Authors (2020)
However, the Change Army allowed a one-party regime to considerably fuse the party and the state (the civil service) and ultimately increased the allegiance of civil servants to political executives, allowing them to become an instrument of the arbitrary power center. Therefore, one could argue that the election result of 2015, to some extent, may be attributed to the influence of the Change Army, because all national parliamentarian seats were held by EPRDF (Abbink; 2017), leading to increased political centralism and authoritarianism (Gudina, 2007). This is in sharp contrast to the goals of NPM-inspired reform, which aims to split politics and public administration. The effect of Citizen Charter and Kaizen is not explored. Figure 1 summarizes HRM organizational structure and reform tools.


7.1. The Number of Civil Servants and Education Profile

Table 4 reports the change in the number and educational profile of civil servants.

The results in table 4 show that the number of civil servants, in Oromia, has increased drastically from 108,410 in 2001 to 515,624 in 2018. This is contrary to the trend in OECD countries (see Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017:89). Moreover, female civil servants are underrepresented in the regional public administration. Of the total civil servants, females constituted only 27.4 percent in 2001 and increased to 34.2 percent in 2018, suggesting the feminization of public administration has shown an upsurge of 7 percent.

The educational profile of civil servants has also changed. In 2001 most men (79.62 percent) and women (91.26 percent) were certificate holders had completed less than twelve grades. Conversely, in 2018, 68.2 percent of male and 58.7 percent of female civil servants held college diplomas and undergraduate degrees, suggesting remarkable progress in female civil servants’ academic qualification. As mentioned above, the reforms emphasized academic qualification, which in turn triggered the civil servants to invest in better academic certificates. Increased access to higher education also appears to play a role. On the downside, the push for better academic qualification has allegedly increased the number of civil servants and political executives having false academic and work experience credentials. This problem seems to have triggered the OPSHRDB to issue the False Academic and Professional Competency Certificate Investigation Directive in 2017 (OPSHRDB, 2017). The directive imposes serious penalties, including dismissal, if civil servants and
officials are found to have false credentials. However, against the civil service ethos, guilty civil servants and officials who officially declare themselves within one month of the directive’s issuance (mid-July 2017 to mid-August 2017) were excused from dismissal. Such individuals were reassigned to relevant posts. This is reportedly the case in Oromia; however, full data were unavailable.

7.2. Civil Servants Age Structure

Table 5 reveals that the majority of civil servants in the Oromia National Regional State public administration are young; female civil servants are relatively younger. The change in the age structure for male and female civil servants was
also significant. In 2018, the proportion of male civil servants aged less than thirty-three changed from 67.67 percent to 57.85 percent, a drop in 12 percent. The percentage of female civil servants, in the same age group, dwindled from 80.75 percent to 66.07 percent, a decrease of 26 percent. The decreasing rate of the civil servants’ recruitments explains the change in age structure.

Table 5: Civil Servants Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>2008 Male</th>
<th>2018 Male</th>
<th>2008 Female</th>
<th>2018 Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-22</td>
<td>52917</td>
<td>36.03</td>
<td>26471</td>
<td>46.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-27</td>
<td>27933</td>
<td>19.02</td>
<td>11279</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-32</td>
<td>21473</td>
<td>14.62</td>
<td>8490</td>
<td>14.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33-37</td>
<td>15004</td>
<td>10.22</td>
<td>4342</td>
<td>7.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38-42</td>
<td>12746</td>
<td>8.68</td>
<td>3454</td>
<td>6.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43-47</td>
<td>9429</td>
<td>6.42</td>
<td>2252</td>
<td>3.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48-52</td>
<td>5249</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>790</td>
<td>1.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53-57</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>1.44</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58-60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Above</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Federal Civil Service Commission Database

The age structures have implications for the civil service. The minimum official employment age, in Ethiopia, is eighteen years and the official retirement age, since 2011, is sixty years. However, a civil servant can request an extended retirement, currently, for a maximum of six years, that has to be approved by the mandated institution, presently the OPSHRDB. In 2018 there were 158 male and 24 female civil servants aged over sixty years (table 5). Given the low life expectancy, a sixty-year retirement age suggests many civil servants could die while working, and that only the survivors will receive a pension benefit payment.
On the other hand, there is a huge unemployment problem in Ethiopia, which has both economic and political implications. Freezing employment opportunities in the public sector and increasing the retirement age to control the number of civil servants, with a consequent increasing expenditure in civil service, may not be feasible. In Oromia, the public sector is the biggest sector providing employment opportunity.

7.3. Civil Servants and Job Structure

Table 6 reports civil servants by occupation in Oromia (2012-2018).

Table 6: Civil Servants by occupation (2012-2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional Science (PS) (M)</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>17.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional Science (PS) (F)</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative (AD) (M)</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative (AD) (F)</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Professional (SP) (M)</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub Professional (SP) (F)</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and Fiscal (CF) (M)</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and Fiscal (CF) (F)</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trades and Crafts (TC) (M)</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trades and Crafts (TC) (F)</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custodial &amp; Manual (CM) (M)</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custodial &amp; Manual (CM) (F)</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers (M)</td>
<td>38.7%</td>
<td>39.4%</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Teachers (F)</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Professionals (M)</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Professionals (F)</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointment (M)</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointment (F)</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Classification (SC) (M)</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>14.0%</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Classification (SC) (F)</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Stated (NS) (M)</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Stated (NS) (F)</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural professionals (M)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural professionals (F)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (M)</strong></td>
<td>229522</td>
<td>242841</td>
<td>263505</td>
<td>282933</td>
<td>301267</td>
<td>323547</td>
<td>339208</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(68.12%)</td>
<td>(69.22%)</td>
<td>(68.4%)</td>
<td>(68.4%)</td>
<td>(66.6%)</td>
<td>(66.4%)</td>
<td>(65.8%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (F)</strong></td>
<td>107412</td>
<td>107962</td>
<td>121591</td>
<td>130555</td>
<td>150851</td>
<td>163910</td>
<td>176416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(31.88%)</td>
<td>(30.78%)</td>
<td>(31.6%)</td>
<td>(31.6%)</td>
<td>(33.4%)</td>
<td>(33.6%)</td>
<td>(34.2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total (M+F)</strong></td>
<td>336934</td>
<td>350803</td>
<td>385096</td>
<td>413488</td>
<td>452118</td>
<td>487457</td>
<td>515624</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Federal Civil Service Commission Database

Until 2018, excluding teachers, health professionals, and special classification jobs, in Oromia, civil servants jobs are structured into five horizontal grades each having different levels (vertical grades): Custodial and Manual (five levels), Trade and Crafts (ten levels), Clerical and Fiscal (12 levels), Administration (9 levels), Sub Professionals (12 levels) and Professional Sciences (9 levels).

Table 6 clarifies three important issues. First, the proportion of civil servants’ occupation substantially differs by gender. Female civil servants encounter both vertical (glass ceiling) and horizontal (glass wall) occupational segregation. In terms of the glass ceiling, female civil servants are
underrepresented in professional sciences and sub-professional jobs, though there is an upward trend. Concerning the glass wall, the majority of females are working in the custodial and manual, clerical and fiscal, and health sectors jobs that are stereotypically and socially defined as suitable for females. The proportion of female civil servants that were appointed is also low. The general implication is that the influence of administrative reforms to reduce gender-based occupational inequality is modest.

Second, a substantial majority of civil servants (female and male) are working in the health and education sector. Teachers show an increasing trend, but female teachers comprise less than half their male counterparts. The third crucial observation is that the proportion of civil servants (male and female) in special classification jobs is increasing.

### 7.4. Civil Servants Pay Scale

Since 1996, civil servants in Oromia have seen several job placement and salary adjustments. For example, a civil servant whose document was reviewed during this study, was serving as a socioeconomic expert (with a monthly salary of 420 Ethiopian Birr [ETB]), in 1996. In 2005, the civil servant was serving as a head of personnel administration earning 895 ETB monthly. Next, in the year 2006, he had changed his position to record and documentation expert (salary 1040 ETB).

As a result of the BSC initiative, the civil servant became a mining license and documentation expert; his salary was 1617 ETB. The 2012 job restructuring changed the civil servant’s position to a planning, monitoring, and evaluation expert earning 2249 (ETB), which was increased to 2934 ETB in 2013, due to a civil servants’ salary adjustment initiative. In 2016, the civil servant under consideration was earning 3909 (ETB) working as a socio-economic expert. The 2017 salary adjustment initiative increased his salary to 7346 ETB. In Ethiopia/Oromia, the government is using salary adjustment to respond to an inflation problem; it has stopped issuing biannual civil servant’s salary increment specified as a right in the civil service proclamation of 2003 (World Bank, 2019). Table 7 presents the pay scale and the proportion of civil servants in each pay structure for selected years.

The results in table 7 reveal that civil servants saw three salary adjustments between 2008 and 2018. While the lower pay scale in 2008 was 235 ETB, it was nearly 1000 ETB in 2017. A significant majority of male civil servants (79 percent in 2008 and 72 percent in 2010) and female civil servants (88 percent in 2008 and 83% in 2010) were earning a monthly salary between 400 ETB to 1500 ETB. In 2013, gender-based pay inequality remained
significant; 77 of men percent and 88 percent of women earned between 400 ETB to 1500 ETB. However, in 2015 the pay gap between male and female civil servants was relatively reduced. Contrarily, in 2016, gender-based pay inequality relatively increased; 52 percent of male and 64.4 percent of female civil servants were receiving monthly salary between 1000 to 3000 ETB. In

Table 7: Civil servants’ pay scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pay scale</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M %</td>
<td>F %</td>
<td>M %</td>
<td>F %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>235-399</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400-999</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>49.3</td>
<td>64.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-1499</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500-1999</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2499</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2500-2999</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;3000</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Stated</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>Not Stated</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pay scale</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2017</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>M %</td>
<td>F %</td>
<td>M %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500-599</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>600-999</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000-1499</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500-1999</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000-2499</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2500-2999</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3000-3499</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3500-3999</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt; 4000</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;10000</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Complied from Federal Civil Service Commission Database
2017 and 2018 the pay gap between males and females earning a monthly salary between 1000 to 3000 ETB was relatively reduced.

But pay inequality is not necessarily due solely to performance results and academic qualification and gender. As already discussed, it may also be due to the presence privileged and removed political executives who were assigned as civil servants, and due to the creation of a special organization. Overall this contradicts the Civil Servant Proclamation, which mandates equal pay for equal work and competitive promotion (a minimum of satisfactory performance, all things remaining constant) (ORS, 2002).

7.5. Civil Servants Separation

According to the Federal Civil Service Commission database, between 2008 and 2018, in Oromia National Regional State, a total of 87,997 (male) and 35,760 (female) civil servants were separated from their positions. Table 8 reports the cause of civil servants’ separation for selected years.

The table reveals a great number of civil servants were separated due to transfer and voluntary departure, followed by separations due to appointments, retirement, and structural change (see table 8). Separation due to performance (inefficiency) and disciplinary cases was scant, suggesting these factors have limited effect on civil servants’ tenure. Concerning gender, the vast majority of female civil servants were separated due to transfer and voluntary resignation, while a relatively higher percentage of male civil servants were detached due to retirement and appointment.

8. Conclusions and Implications

Empirical analysis reveals that the changing politico-administrative contexts, the structural-instrumental reforms by a single-party state since the 1990s, increased the responsibilities of the institution mandated for civil service and HRM. There were also other official changes. Among others, we observed a shift from centralized HRM to a decentralized system, a shift from seniority to merit and qualification, and a shift from position-based job classification to a points-rating job classification method.

We found that the reforms reinforce the NPM-inspired customer- and result-oriented performance management rhetoric. However, we have not found a linkage between meritocracy, result-oriented performance, and competence and the separation of civil servants due to incompetence (performance). Excellent performance results and competency do not warranty
spectacular promotion and increased pay. Periodic nominal salary adjustment apply to all civil servants and pay is inadequate for civil servants’ well-being. In 2018, the vast majority of civil servants were earning monthly less than or equal to 3000 ETB. There are also high rates of gender-based occupational segregation, contributing to pay inequality. Moreover, the reform privileged ex-political executives and civil servants working in special salary organizations. And also, unlike the trend in OECD countries, the number of civil servants has spectacularly increased.

We also observed four major continuities. First, a government institution responsible for civil service is also responsible for HRM. Second, the reforms/tools were used to strengthen vertical and horizontal coordination and control (see also Gudina, 2007). Third, they were also used to increasingly politicize the civil service, particularly top civil servants – a feature common to all Ethiopian regimes – and to remove unwanted civil servants (Mitiku, 2018).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2016</th>
<th>2018</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M(%) F(%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirement</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illness</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discipline Case</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inefficiency (performance)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Case (Voluntarily)</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>43.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appointment</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Due to Structural Change)</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Stated</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8194</td>
<td>4623</td>
<td>12552</td>
<td>5322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (M+F)</td>
<td>12817</td>
<td>17874</td>
<td>16018</td>
<td>4628</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Compiled from Federal Civil Service Commission Database
Political interference in HRM also appears to be significant (Kacho et al., 2016). Fourth, fundamentally, rather than primarily serving the public and improving public sector performance, the reforms were used as an instrument to enhance the allegiance of civil servants to political executives, particularly in the aftermath of the 2005 national election. This appears to be partly due to the deep-seated, top-down and discriminatory neo-patrimonialism and authoritarian administrative tradition (Abbink, 2006; Gudina, 2007), as well as to the lessons learned from the self- and group-evaluation and compliance culture characteristic of the EPRDF party (Abbink, 2006; Mitiku, 2018). Similarly, during Emperor Hailesellassie’s regime, public servants held extraordinary loyalty to the emperor (Emperor Hailesellassie, 1961). Overall, the HRM and civil service trajectories are explained by path dependency and the diffusions of NPM ideas.

Two major implications could be made. First, notwithstanding positive gains, frequent, excessive, and improper HRM reform has a significant negative effect on the sustainability of public administration and civil service. Improper work-related relationships and actions can increasingly affect the behavior of civil servants (Perry & Van de Walle, 2008) and imperil their public service motivation (Paarlberg et al., 2008). They may also disrupt the institutional memory of the public sector. Second, the inadequate salary and increasing pay gap in general, and the underrepresentation of female civil servants and gender-based occupational segregation, in particular, have a negative consequence on Ethiopia’s to meet the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and African Union (AU) Agenda 2063, which put citizens at the center in public administration and aim to ensure inclusiveness, gender parity in public administration, and justice for all at all levels (AU, 2014; UN, 2015).

Finally, given the deep-seated top-down public policymaking approach, wherein regions and local governments are responsible for public policy implementation (Debela, 2017), we assume the results of this study can be fairly generalized to other Ethiopian regions and city administrations. However, since there is inter-regional politico-administrative cultural variation (Peterson, 2015), we suggest comparative research for the future. In addition, future research should use secondary and primary data and investigate the overall impacts of HRM instruments combining theory and practice.
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Notes

1. HRM, Expenditure Management and Control, Top Management Systems, Service Delivery and Quality service, and Civil Service Ethics.
2. Civil Service Reform, District Level Decentralized Service Delivery, Information and Communications Technology, Justice System Reform, Tax System Reform and Urban Management.
3. member of the regional administrative council (2002-04)
4. member of the regional administrative council (2004)
5. member of the regional administrative council (2005-10)
6. The public organizations were responsible for preparing their organizational structure, with detailed duties and responsibilities for each position, and the CSC was mandated to approve it.
7. (a) Preparedness to implement government policies and development plans, (b) performance results, (c) free from corruption, (d) free from participation in anti-peace and affiliation to unlawful political parties, and (5) readiness to accept structural change and practice. A civil servant can be dismissed on the grounds of failing to meet one of the criteria or combination thereof.
8. (a) when mutual agreement is maintained between the office with which the civil servants is working and to which the civil servant is to be transferred, (b) when the civil servant agrees to transfer, (c) when the CSC approves the transfer, and (d) when the regional government causes the transfer on the grounds of the necessity of work.
9. The CSC is responsible for undertaking studies on the incentive schemes for district employees working in harsh conditions and implementing it upon approval by the regional administrative council.
10. The directive gives three and four additional points for female and physically challenged applicants in job competition.
11. A civil servant who has a personal problem, on good faith and based on mutual consent, can be internally transferred to a horizontal position (without reducing his/her salary) or lower position (reduced salary).
12. Organizational BCS based-performance results (50 percent), supervisor’s evaluation (30 percent), customers’ and stakeholders’ evaluation (10 percent), and immediate leaders’ group evaluation (10 percent); and individual performance evaluation: Supervisor evaluation (30 percent), peer evaluation (20 percent), customers’ and stakeholders’ evaluation (40 percent), and self-evaluation (10%). Both are rated on four performance levels (≥90 percent [excellent], 75 percent-89 percent [very good], 60 percent-74 percent [satisfactory], and ≤59% [low]).

13. ≥90 percent (excellent), 80 percent-89 percent (very good), 65 percent-79 percent (good), 50 percent-64 percent (satisfactory), <50 percent (low).

14. BSC-based performance results (70 percent), supervisor evaluation (10 percent), customers’ and stakeholders’ evaluation (10 percent), and immediate leader group evaluation (10 percent).

15. BSC-based performance results (50 percent), peer evaluation (20 percent), customers’ and stakeholders’ evaluation (20 percent), and self-evaluation (10 percent).

16. Performance results (70 percent), willingness and commitment to implement government policies and plans (10 percent), personal record (file) quality related to disciplinary cases (10 percent), and service at higher position (10 percent).

17. Individual performance result (35 percent), competence in discharging duties and responsibilities (30 percent, assessed by employee’s head/processor), professionalism in service delivery (30 percent, assessed by employee’s head/processor), and personal file quality related to disciplinary case (5 percent).

References


Debela, B. & Troupin S. (2016). Transforming Ethiopian Public Administration for Sustainable Development: The Impact of Organizational Proliferation and Policy Coordination on Access


