European Perspectives for Public Administration

Jann, Werner, Bouckaert, Geert

Published by Leuven University Press

Jann, Werner and Geert Bouckaert.
European Perspectives for Public Administration: The Way Forward.

For additional information about this book
https://muse.jhu.edu/book/72918

For content related to this chapter
https://muse.jhu.edu/related_content?type=book&id=2494318
The New Diversity: Increasing Ethnic Heterogeneity and its Consequences for Public Governance

Mark Bovens, Roel Jennissen, Godfried Engbersen and Meike Bokhorst

1 Public governance and the new diversity

Across Western Europe immigration patterns are changing rapidly. In the second half of the twentieth century, large groups of immigrants came from a limited number of countries. Many migrants came from former colonies, such as India, Pakistan and the West Indies to the UK, Algeria and West Africa to France, and Suriname and the former Netherlands Antilles to the Netherlands. Large groups also came as labour migrants to Western Europe, in particular from Turkey and the Maghreb. This we call the “traditional diversity.”

In the twenty-first century, smaller groups are coming from a very large variety of countries. Migrants come from all over the globe to Western Europe, from EU countries, such as Poland, Bulgaria and Germany, from Syria, Eritrea and Iran, but also from the former Soviet republics, India and China. Many come to work, others come as refugees, or as students. This we call the “new diversity.”

The traditional migrant groups were relatively homogeneous in socio-economic terms. Many were low skilled, had low levels of literacy, and came from rural areas outside Europe. The “new” migration is much more heterogeneous. Among them are well educated professionals, with high incomes and urban life styles, but also low skilled labour migrants who work in rural areas, or semi-literate refugees from Sub-Saharan Africa. Some come to stay, but large percentages leave within five years.

This “new diversity” can be observed across Western Europe (Castles, De Haas, & Miller, 2014). Steven Vertovec (2007, p. 1024) has called it “super-diversity”: the “new, small and scattered, multiple-origin, transnationally
connected, socio-economically differentiated and legally stratified” nature of international migration. This super-diversity is a new chapter in the history of migration to Western Europe, with new challenges for social cohesion and public governance.

In this paper we will use the case of the Netherlands to illustrate this transformation of migration and society. The Netherlands is fairly representative of Western Europe. It experienced post-colonial immigration in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, as did Belgium, France, the UK, Spain and Portugal. It saw large waves of labour and family migration in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, as did Belgium, Luxemburg, France, Germany, Switzerland and Austria. And from the 1990s onwards it has experienced a wave of post-industrial migration, consisting of refugees, intra-EU migrants, and highly skilled workers, as have Germany, Sweden, the UK, Switzerland and Austria (White, 1993; Jennissen, Van Wissen, & Van der Gaag, 2006). Some Western European countries, such as the UK, France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Sweden and Switzerland, are probably even more diverse than the Netherlands. Others, such as Ireland, Finland, Norway, Italy, Spain and Greece, are less diverse. An advantage of the Netherlands is also that very large and accurate data sets are available on the ethnic composition of neighbourhoods, municipalities and regions.

Firstly, we will provide more empirical details about this new diversity and show that this diversity differs greatly across the country. Some municipalities are characterised by the traditional forms of diversity, others by “super-diversity,” and some are only slightly affected by migration. This means that a “one size fits all” policy approach does not make much sense. Secondly, we found that higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity coincide with lower levels of social cohesion. In the final part of the paper, we will present an agenda for public governance and public administration.

2 Increasing ethnic diversity in the population

In the Netherlands, the proportion of residents with a migration background in the population has risen considerably in the last few decades – from 9.2% in 1972 to 23.1% in 2019. Moreover, the group of residents with a migration background is becoming increasingly diverse. These days, only one-third of migrants living in the Netherlands belong to the traditional migrant communities, while the remaining two-thirds come from a wide range of other countries of origin. In 2017, the migrants living in the Netherlands hailed from 222 different countries of origin.
Interestingly enough, people are often unaware of this increased ethnic diversity. Policy documents and studies on immigration and integration continue to focus on traditional post-colonial and migrant worker communities, i.e. on citizens with a Surinamese, Moroccan or Turkish background. A few groups of refugees and Polish labour migrants may occasionally also receive a share of the attention. Furthermore, a rather rough distinction between “Western” and “non-Western” migrants is often made in policy documents.

This traditional perspective on migration and integration does not fit the empirical reality of the twenty-first century. If we keep seeing migration through 1970s migrant-worker glasses or through post-colonial glasses, we will see only migrants from the traditional countries of origin and from poorly defined categories in which many migrants are lumped together, such as “from Western countries” and “from non-Western countries.” This is shown in the circle on the left in Figure 1. Once we let go of our traditional frameworks and look at things as they are now, we will see a multitude of new groups, as shown in the circle on the right in Figure 1.

By acknowledging that today’s migration situation is much more diverse, we can do greater justice to the wide ethnic diversity of migrants living in society. The traditional countries of origin are no longer in the top 15 countries with the most significant positive net immigration rates (more immigrants than emigrants). During the 2007–2016 period, in the Netherlands, this top 15 was as follows: Poles, Syrians, people from the former Soviet Union,
Bulgarians, Chinese, Indians, Romanians, Italians, Germans, Somalis, Eritreans, Spaniards, Hungarians, Greeks and Iranians (see Figure 2). As a matter of fact, the traditional groups had negative migration rates – they had more emigrants than immigrants.

Another reason why the Netherlands is becoming increasingly ethnically diverse is that birth rates tend to be higher for residents with a migration background than for the native population. At the same time, mortality rates for residents with a migration background tend to be lower, since migrants tend to be younger than the average resident. After a generation, the birth and mortality rates of migrant communities tend to conform to those of the country in which they have settled. However, we are still a long way from reaching that point. This means that Dutch society will continue to grow more diverse over the next few decades, even if we were to completely ban immigration starting from today.

This sustained increase in the ethnic diversity rate is reflected in Statistics Netherlands’ population projection. Figure 3 shows that the proportion of representatives of the four traditional emigration countries in the Dutch population will continue to increase slightly until the mid-twenty-first century,
after which it will stop growing. The projection mainly shows that the share of the highly diverse group of people with a non-European/non-Anglo-Saxon background will continue to increase significantly. Starting from the 2040s, this group will outnumber the traditional “big four”: citizens with a Surinamese, Moroccan, Turkish and Antillean background. The diverse group of people with a European or Anglo-Saxon migration background will continue to represent a larger share of the population as well.

Figure 3  Share of people in the Netherlands with a migration background, 1996–2060

© WRR 2018 | Source: Statistics Netherlands

3 Large variety between and within municipalities

We calculated how ethnically diverse Dutch municipalities and neighbourhoods are. We started by subdividing all the residents of the Netherlands into 18 groups, reflecting 18 different ethnic backgrounds. Needless to say, the largest of these groups consists of “native Dutch” people. This group comprises nearly 80% of Dutch society. In addition, we distinguished 17 other groups based on country of origin, e.g. Turkey, Morocco, Anglo-Saxon countries, Arab countries, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, etc. We then calculated a diversity index for all Dutch neighbourhoods, municipalities and regions, the so-called Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). This is expressed as a number between 0 and 1 that indicates the likelihood that two random sample people
from a given area belong to groups that have different ethnic backgrounds. The higher the index the greater this likelihood. In other words, a low HHI denotes great homogeneity, whereas a high HHI denotes heterogeneity. The mean HHI for the Netherlands is 0.38. However, as Figure 4 shows, the index considerably differs from municipality to municipality.

**Figure 4  Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of Dutch municipalities, 1 January 2015**

Two-thirds of all Dutch citizens live in a municipality where the odds of two residents belonging to different ethnic groups are approximately one in three or higher. In the Netherlands’ three largest cities, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague, the odds are the highest, more than two in three. In other
words, a large degree of ethnic diversity is an everyday reality for many people living in the Dutch society. However, the nature of this diversity varies wildly between municipalities. We distinguish eight categories of municipalities, in addition to the “average Dutch municipality” (see figure 5):

- **Majority-minority cities** (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague): in these very diverse big cities, the majority of residents will have a migration background, and they will hail from many different countries.
- **Suburbs** (e.g. Capelle, Diemen, Rijswijk): these towns are highly diverse as well, although the majority of people still have a native Dutch background.
- **Large provincial municipalities** (e.g. Utrecht, Eindhoven, Arnhem): these large cities are also highly ethnically diverse, but native Dutch people are in a much larger proportion here than they are in the three big cities and their suburbs.
- **Medium-sized municipalities** with a sizeable community of migrants from one particular background (e.g. Gouda, Almelo, Delfzijl): these towns are characterised by the fact that they have a large migrant community from one specific non-European/non-Anglo-Saxon background. This is typically due to these towns having recruited immigrant workers from one particular country, or to many people from the former Netherlands Antilles having settled there.
- **Expat municipalities** (e.g. Amstelveen, Wassenaar, Voorschoten): expat communities are very diverse in terms of ethnic backgrounds, with residents coming from all over the world. However, they tend to have relatively few residents from Turkish, Moroccan, Surinamese or Antillean backgrounds.
- **Horticultural municipalities** (e.g. Westland, Zeewolde, Horst aan de Maas): towns with a lively horticultural industry have a relatively high diversity rate due to the large proportion of people with a Polish or, to a lesser extent, Bulgarian background.
- **Border municipalities** (e.g. Vaals, Kerkrade, Terneuzen): in these towns, the high degree of diversity is mainly caused by people with a German or Belgian background.
- **Homogeneous municipalities** (e.g. Urk, Staphorst, Grootegast): in these rural municipalities, the overwhelming majority of residents – over 90% – have a native Dutch background.
We also conducted an analysis of ethnic diversity on the neighbourhood level. In the three big cities, there are clear differences between the various neighbourhoods. For example in The Hague, the diversity is extremely high in traditional migrant neighbourhoods such as Transvaal, Schilderswijk, Laak and Spoorwijk. The probability of two random residents of these neighbourhoods belonging to the same ethnic group is less than 20%. Neighbourhoods such as Zorgvliet are also highly ethnically diverse, but in a different way. This green upper-class neighbourhood has many residents with a variety of
different European and Anglo-Saxon backgrounds. Other neighbourhoods, such as Duindorp, on the other hand, have an HHI which is below the national average and consist mainly of native Dutch residents.

4 Consequences for cohesion

The rise of this new diversity is good news for those who worry about increasing social and political polarisation along ethnic lines in society. As heterogeneity increases, the chances of overlapping cleavages diminish. In the traditional diversity of the late twentieth century, there were a few, albeit large and relatively homogeneous, ethnic groups in society. This entails a risk of polarisation along ethnic lines, particularly when the cleavage between “natives” and immigrants overlaps with socio-economic, geographical, religious, or linguistic divides. These overlapping cleavages may give way to pillarisation and political conflict, which require major political efforts to accommodate, as has been the case in the past in Belgium, the Netherlands, Northern Ireland, the former Yugoslavia and Lebanon.

However, the increasing diversity in country of origin, socio-economic status, education, religion, and language among the “new” migrants makes it less likely that overlapping cleavages will emerge at the level of society. For example, one finds a large plurality of religions among the new migrants – Catholics from Poland, Sunni and Alevi Muslims from Syria, Copts from Eritrea, Greek and Russian orthodox from the Balkans and the former Soviet republics, Hindus from India, and Buddhists from China, to mention just a few. Also, the “new” diversity has prevented the rise of a competing national language, as has happened in the US with Spanish, and in Estonia with Russian. Migrants and their children speak a large variety of languages at home, but in school, in shops, or at work the lingua franca is Dutch or, in some instances, English. And, as we saw, migrants have been dispersed over the country. There are no ethnically homogenous migrant neighbourhoods, let alone regions. Due to this new diversity, there is even not one single neighbourhood in the Netherlands that has a majority of one single ethnic group – with the exception of native Dutch.\(^5\)

We also find a wide socio-economic variety among the new immigrants. Some are low skilled and poorly educated and work in low-paid, insecure jobs. Others, however, are highly skilled professionals, who belong at the top of the income ladder. In the case of EU immigrants from Poland, for example, one can find both ends of the socio-economic divide. Likewise, there is hardly any political contestation and party formation along these new ethnic lines.\(^6\)
So this new diversity softens some of the traditional concerns about ethnic polarisation and conflict at the national level.

However, there is more reason for concern about social cohesion at the level of neighbourhoods and municipalities. As Western European societies have become classic immigration societies, classic concerns about creating unity within diversity – *e pluribus unum* – emerge. In the United States for example, Robert Putnam (2007) in his seminal paper has argued that high levels of ethnic diversity are associated with less social trust and engagement. Residents of ethnically very heterogeneous neighbourhoods tend to withdraw socially – they “hunker down” and retreat as turtles tend to do when they feel uncomfortable.

How does this new ethnic diversity affect social cohesion in the Netherlands? Social cohesion is an umbrella term covering many aspects and indicators, such as generalised trust, participation in voluntary work, people’s perceptions of their neighbourhood, a sense of safety and registered crime rates (Van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014; Koopmans et al., 2015). In other words, it is impossible to say how diversity affects social cohesion in general, since social cohesion encompasses so many things. Increasing diversity rates may affect different aspects of social cohesion in different ways.

The relationship between ethnic diversity and social cohesion has been a hotly debated topic in the literature. Different studies operationalise diversity and cohesion in different ways and use different types of data. Neighbourhoods with a high rate of ethnic diversity generally do not perform worse than other neighbourhoods in terms of generalised trust and the extent to which people are likely to volunteer or care for others. However, they do perform worse in terms of having good relations with one’s neighbours who have a different ethnic background. In highly diverse neighbourhoods, residents tend to have less contact with their neighbours. They also tend to have a poor opinion of the people they do talk to, and are more likely to speak disparagingly of their environment. However, it should be pointed out that such diverse neighbourhoods tend to have a relatively large share of residents who are poorly educated and unemployed. Some studies show that this is more likely to affect people’s relations with their neighbours than ethnic diversity. Very few studies have been conducted in the Netherlands on the correlation between ethnic diversity and other indicators for social cohesion, such as the safety of a neighbourhood (Glas et al., 2018).
In our own study, we analysed three aspects of social cohesion, namely neighbourhood cohesion, feeling at home in a place, and experiencing a sense of security when out and about. Our analyses were based on a series of very large datasets. We observed the following:

- In neighbourhoods with a high degree of ethnic diversity, measured by the HHI, residents perceive the bonds between neighbours as being less cohesive. They also tend to feel less at home, and are more likely to feel unsafe. We found that these indicators for cohesion are more strongly related to the neighbourhood’s diversity than to each of the residents’ individual characteristics, such as their income or level of education, or the socio-economic status of the neighbourhood. These effects were not limited to native Dutch; we also found these effects for some of the traditional migrant groups.

- The aforementioned correlations are most noticeable in neighbourhoods consisting of people on medium incomes. These people in particular are the ones who will say that their relations with their neighbours deteriorate as the degree of ethnic diversity increases. It is possible that people on lower incomes have more experience of the reality of highly ethnically diverse neighbourhoods, and that people on higher incomes have more choice with regard to where they wish to live. Alternatively, middle-income people may be more likely to feel threatened by their neighbours than high-income or low-income people because they have more to lose.

- In municipalities with a high degree of ethnic diversity, measured by the HHI, people are more likely to be registered as criminal offenders than in municipalities with a lower degree of ethnic diversity. This is an independent effect of diversity – we controlled for a range of variables that influence delinquency according to the literature, such as gender, age, ethnicity, income and level of urbanisation. We also found this effect in richer and less urban municipalities. However, this effect does have an upper limit. Once a municipality hits a certain degree of ethnic diversity, its residents will no longer be more likely to be registered as criminal offenders. For instance, in this regard there is no difference between highly diverse municipalities such as Rotterdam and The Hague and moderately diverse municipalities such as Gorinchem and Helmond.
5 Challenges for public governance

Over the last three decades, the Netherlands, which used to be a relatively homogeneous society with a small number of large migrant communities, has morphed into a highly heterogeneous society with a large number of smaller migrant communities. This ethnic heterogeneity will continue to increase in the short and medium term. This transformation can be observed throughout Western Europe. Western European societies have become immigration societies, on a par with Canada, Australia and the US. How does one create some unity amongst these new diversities? How can all these groups live together smoothly and peacefully?

This creates new agendas for public governance and public administration. The wide variety of cultures and mobility among citizens makes living together more complicated. How can national and local governments help these highly heterogeneous communities to coexist more smoothly? Is it possible to reduce the feelings of insecurity and unease among the residents and to reduce the tendency to hunker down? And how can public institutions such as schools, health centres and housing associations cope with so many different languages and cultures? Is it possible to sustain a civil society with such a variety in cultures and residential mobility among citizens? We have identified a series of challenges for public governance and public policy.

Local variety instead of national models

Organising social cohesion is first and foremost a task for local government. The new migrants settle in the larger cities, but also in rural communities and in the suburbs. Moreover, as we saw, there are wide varieties in settlement patterns and ethnic composition between municipalities. This implies that national models, with a one-size-fits-all nature, will not work everywhere. Social cohesion policies will have to differ across municipalities and neighbourhoods. In some areas literacy or school drop-out will demand attention; in areas with many tertiary educated labour migrants the issue may be high mobility and residential turnover.

Gaining a better understanding of the local migrant communities

This requires, first of all, that municipal authorities and other local organisations must gain a better understanding of the various migrant communities living in their own municipalities. This is a precondition for drawing up sensible strategies designed to tackle associated issues. Therefore, it is vital that municipal governments obtain knowledge of the various migrant communities
living in their various neighbourhoods, and that they disseminate this knowledge in a readily accessible manner. They can do so by collecting demographic and ethnographic data on their residents themselves, among other methods.

**Equipping organisations**

In recent decades, schools, health centres and other public service providers have gradually managed to cope with the large cohorts of migrants from Turkey, Morocco and the former colonies. Just as these public institutions have learned how to deal with these traditional groups, new migrants from Poland, India, Syria and Eritrea are arriving with new languages, customs and habits. Public institutions will have to find new modi operandi to engage with these new inhabitants. This requires flexibility and high levels of empathy from street level bureaucrats, teachers, police officers and health workers. This also requires a much more rigorous professional schooling in police academies, schools of health and teacher-training colleges on how to deal with super-diversity among citizens, clients and pupils.

**Targeting within mainstreaming**

Public and private entities will have to be prepared for ever-changing cultural diversity among their residents, pupils, patients, customers and employees. Municipal authorities, schools, healthcare providers and businesses will have to provide their services and facilities in such a way as always to be able to help new groups of immigrants indiscriminately. This requires a combination of mainstreaming and more targeted, community-specific strategies. Back when the Netherlands had only a few immigrant communities, public institutions were able to obtain expertise, build networks and draw up strategies targeted at specific communities. Now that there are dozens of smaller communities, this is no longer feasible, particularly since many more new groups from different parts of the world keep coming to the country.

On the other hand, it is no use dealing with all communities in the same way, either. Migrants need community-specific strategies, particularly when they first enter the country. Refugees from Eritrea require a different approach from labour migrants from Poland or exchange students from India. This means that targeting is appropriate at the early stages of immigration and settlement, when the characteristics of their country of origin, such as language barriers and cultural distance, are predominant and relevant. However, at later stages of settlement and with second generations, mainstreaming policies are more feasible and appropriate.
Fair treatment for all

Traditional integration policies were directed at migrant groups. They were the target of special programmes in schools and on the labour market. The new diversity also requires policies that are directed at society as a whole. The issue of social cohesion and unity affects all groups in society, including the “natives.” This is an important finding of Michael Ignatieff (2017: 69) in his work on hyperdiverse neighbourhoods in the United States:

“The virtues of interethnic trust, tolerance, and accommodation depend on institutions doing their jobs: police and the courts grinding out a tough-and-ready equality before the law, politicians maintaining a reasonably fair distribution of patronage to all groups, real estate and job ladders remaining open to all irrespective of religion or ethnicity.”

All organisations must treat everyone in a fair and non-discriminatory manner, regardless of whether they are people who have been here for a while or have just migrated with their children. Unfair treatment undermines the trust people of different backgrounds place in each other, makes people feel discriminated against and unsafe, causes tension between communities and undermines organisations’ authority. These risks become more prominent as the degree of ethnic diversity increases, because in highly diverse areas communities will constantly compare their own situation to other communities’ situations and might feel discriminated against, while other “new” or “old” communities receive preferential treatment.

At the same time, it is equally important that people who have lived in the Netherlands for a long time also feel they are receiving fair treatment. The arrival of sizeable groups of asylum seekers has resulted in the creation of special facilities for their integration. This may be inevitable sometimes, but for reasons of equity and legitimacy education, job-market and housing-related facilities should be open to all citizens and not just to refugees.

Investing in mutual socialisation

All these ethnic groups would probably be able to coexist more smoothly if they had a better understanding of each other’s cultural backgrounds. They can learn more about each other at schools, on the shop floor and out in the various neighbourhoods. Current civic education classes in schools seek to educate pupils on their peers’ backgrounds and cultures, but there is still room for improvement in these courses. Knowledge of diverse ethnic
groups could be integrated more fully into other subjects, such as geography and history.

In addition, a well-thought-out strategy on how to ensure that all migrants are introduced to society will be vital. All newcomers, not just the refugees, but also the highly skilled migrants and the labour migrants from other EU countries, must be given the tools to join in society as soon and as smoothly as possible. It may be useful in this respect to create general public services that can be accessed by all migrants, irrespective of their legal status, plans for the future or length of stay. It is crucial that the municipal authorities, rather than the national ones, be placed in charge of these introductory services. After all, they are best able to decide on the right track for every newcomer, since they know best what kinds of people live in their towns and what individual migrants’ personal situations are like.

Public familiarity

Promoting contacts between the residents of a neighbourhood should be a major focus area. Connectedness strategies do not have to be designed to make people bond and become good friends. All they have to focus on is making neighbours familiar with each other, which is a more realistic plan anyway. The idea behind public familiarity is that a neighbourhood’s residents should recognise each other in public spaces, even if they do not actually speak to each other (Blokland & Nast, 2014). If people who otherwise have nothing to do with each other regularly see each other in public spaces, they will still end up becoming “familiar faces” to each other. This will give them a better feel for who can be trusted and who cannot, which will cause them to feel safer. Furthermore, people are more likely to feel at home in a neighbourhood if they feel known, and if they have a proper understanding of the social codes of its public spaces.

6 Challenges for the discipline

What does the rise of this new diversity in society mean for the discipline of public administration and public governance? Firstly, it requires a reconsideration of the curriculum in our bachelor and master programmes. Coping with increasing ethnic heterogeneity and turnover among residents is one of the major challenges in the public domain for the decades to come, and we have to prepare our students for this challenge. After all, many of our students will be the civil servants, policy analysts and street-level bureaucrats who have to manage the increasing variety among citizens and the tensions that come with it. This requires that we
provide them with the relevant empirical data, theoretical frames and practical skills. Some of these skills may be learned on the spot, as our own institutes are becoming much more heterogeneous due to the rapid influx of students and staff with a migration background. In the Netherlands, many departments of public administration and schools of governance have internationalised rapidly in the past decade and have many students and staff members from other EU or non-EU countries. The influx of students and staff with a more traditional migration background lags behind and varies between institutes. Universities in majority-minority cities, such as Rotterdam and Amsterdam, tend to have much higher percentages than universities in the provincial cities.

Secondly, it should have consequences for our research agendas. The challenges for public governance which we outlined above should also inform our research agenda. We should provide policy-makers and public managers with empirical evidence about what works best in coping with these challenges. This is an agenda across all subfields in our discipline, For HRM the issue is how to deal with increasing heterogeneity in the workplace, how to minimise the transaction costs of an international and diversified staff and how to maximise mutual understanding. For public management the issue is how to deal with the increasing heterogeneity and turnover of clients, how to treat everyone, both immigrants and native groups, in a fair and non-discriminatory manner, and how to socialise all newcomers sufficiently, even those who stay only temporarily. For policy studies, the issue is how to find a balance between targeting and mainstreaming, between effectively attending to the needs of specific groups and preventing stigmatisation or discrimination. For local governance studies, the issue is how to deal with the increasing variety among and within municipalities, and how to maximise social cohesion and public familiarity among residents and minimise feelings of discomfort and insecurity.

7 From new to commonplace diversity

Living together in super-diverse societies is a source of social tensions. The books of V.S. Naipaul, Salman Rushdie, John Steinbeck, Octavio Paz, Tom Wolfe and Zadie Smith attest to this. The arrival of new waves of immigrants distorts the delicate balance of power between settled groups and outsiders. This will lead to feelings of discomfort, discrimination and social conflict.

Public policy and public institutions will not be able to make all these tensions disappear. In the short run, it would already be quite an achievement if inhabitants of super-diverse neighbourhoods and municipalities were able to cope with this new diversity. Wessendorf (2010) speaks of “commonplace
diversity.” This implies that citizens do not consider super-diversity as something special, but see it as an everyday reality which is integrated into their daily routines. They pragmatically accept large differences in ethnic origin in public spaces, such as streets, shopping centres and public transport, and even in schools or at work. At the same time, they tend to live together with their ethnic peers in their private lives. Ignatieff calls this “side by side living”: in some very diverse neighbourhoods inhabitants manage to live together in the public space, but they also feel the need to live apart in communities in which they can be amongst likeminded others. The challenge for public governance is to maintain a balance in this multitude of LAT relationships.

Notes

1. This chapter is based on a study we conducted for the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (Jennissen, Engbersen, Bokhorst & Bovens, 2018).
2. The UK and Sweden also experienced a wave of labour migration in the 1960s and early 1970s. However, the labour migrants who came to these countries mainly originated from a neighbouring country with a lower level of prosperity, the Irish Republic and Finland respectively (MacLaughlin, 1993; Hammar, 1995).
3. We follow the definition of Statistics Netherlands. A resident with a migration background is defined as a person who lives in the Netherlands and has at least one parent who was born abroad.
4. According to the UN there were only 193 plus 2 (Vatican and Palestine Authority) countries in 2019. However, the country of origin is based on the country in which the migrant or one of his parents was born. Many migrants hail from countries that no longer exist, such as Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union or even Austria-Hungary. This explains the higher number.
6. There is some successful party formation among the “traditional” migrant groups, particularly among citizens with a Turkish and Moroccan background, especially in the larger cities, where parties like Denk or Nida have obtained seats on the council. The former also has two seats in Parliament.
7. See, for example, Tolsma & van der Meer, 2014; Koopmans, Lancee & Schaeffer, 2015; Abascal and Baldassarri, 2015.
8. We combined the data (Stelsel van Sociaal-statistische Bestanden – SSB) of Statistics Netherlands with the Dutch Police Statistics (Basisvoorziening Handhaving), and the Dutch Safety monitor 2014. The SSB contains data for all 17 million inhabitants of the Netherlands. The Police Statistics contain all persons who have been registered as criminal offenders. Our analysis was limited to all inhabitants between the ages of 12 and 60 (N=10.746.180). The Dutch Safety Monitor is an annual national survey regarding safety, quality of life and victimhood. In 2014 over 86,000 people were interviewed in 403 municipalities and 8,798 neighbourhoods in the Netherlands.
References


