The political configuration of the Spanish Monarchy: the court and royal households

José Martínez Millán
Instituto Universitario “La Corte en Europa” – Universidad Autónoma de Madrid

Theoretical schemas that historians have constructed to explain the development of the modern state, based on the premise of the progressive and uninterrupted rationalization of state power, have proved incapable of providing a systematic account of the intricate socio-political reality of the early modern age. The reason is that, behind that monolithic power, which researchers have tried to convince us is there, the projected image of the interplay of multiple powers swiftly appears, refuting any claim to total abstraction and impersonality on the part of the State. In the last few years, this view of history has changed. What has proved decisive, in this respect, has been research into concepts that do not obviously correspond to the categories of “modernity”; on the contrary, it sends us down a plurality of theoretical and disciplinary pathways characterizing the ethical and political culture of the Ancien Régime. The point is that the dynastic state, Bonney’s term for the European monarchies

---

1 This work has been carried out as part of a project funded by the Spanish Ministry of Education, HUM, 2006-12779-C-1.

2 Hegel regarded historical phenomena as essentially political since history unfolds in the State. “It is necessary to accept that a historical account, and the acts and events that take place in history, appear simultaneously: a common internal foundation gives rise to them together [...]. Only the State provides a content which corresponds to the prose of history, and which it also engenders,” see Sämtliche Werke, ed. Hermann Glockner, 12 vols. (Stuttgart: Frommann Verlag, 1927–1930), 2: 97–98. Cited by Bernard Bourgeois, El pensamiento político de Hegel (Buenos Aires, 1972), 11. Because of the sense of the universal which it demands and objectifies, the State encourages individuals to carry out universal acts and, through the narration of the past, to retain this universal efficiently in the memory; the universal cannot be presented as such, in all its permanence, in the intuition of the present moment, because this is always particular.
between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries\(^3\) – and despite the fact that it may, at times, have behaved in an impersonal and bureaucratic fashion – was orientated towards the person of the king, who was the single source of different forms of power, and of material and symbolic resources (money, honours, titles, indulgences, monopolies, and so on). Monarchs were able to use the selective redistribution of favours to maintain relationships of dependence (client networks) or, perhaps it would be better to say, personal recognition, and so perpetuate themselves in power, while at the same time keeping their kingdoms united.

**The philosophical foundation of the political system in the Early Modern Age**

In recent years, the important role of Aristotelian “practical philosophy”\(^4\) has been recognized as a fundamental characteristic of the ethical and political knowledge of the Early Modern Age, as opposed to the interpretation of the modern state as process, one culminating in a rational entity, the seat of power, situated over and above society. Of course, the Aristotelian model should not be understood as being reproduced in a fixed form down the centuries, but as a framework of essential reference points from the late Middle Ages to the eighteenth century. It should be emphasized that the origins of medieval moral discipline lay in the Peripatetic tradition, which branched, from Boethius onwards, into ethics, paying attention to the individual in the *res familiaris*, and politics, whose focus was the *res publica*.\(^5\) This subdivision did not imply defining different disciplines to guide different subjects; it was concerned above all else with specifying the boundaries and particular techniques of any single area of ethical knowledge referring to the formation of the individual at the point

---


4 For a synthesis, see Franco Volpi, “La rinascita della filosofia pratica in Germania,” in Claudio Pacchiani (ed.), *Filosofia pratica e scienza politica* (Abano Terme, 1980).

5 Roberto Lambertini, “Per una storia dell’oeconomica tra alto e basso Medievo,” *Cheiron* 2 (1985), 46.
where he has to administer justice in the various spheres of social life, or translate *virtus* into behaviours, actions and practices. In this sense, not just politics, but all practical philosophy took “man in community” as its reference point.6

Typical of the Aristotelian model and the way it was reworked during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was the view of the political sphere as a necessary outlet to channel the tendency of the individual to express a sociability which, for historical and functional reasons, was spreading outwards from the family into increasingly broader forms of social and political coexistence. If the family was the original community created to cater for everyday needs, the organization of the state arose to satisfy other, more sophisticated, vital needs that living in society involved. This division implied, on the one hand, recognizing the obvious priority of the domestic sphere and the economic discipline needed to regulate it; on the other, it pointed to the moral superiority of civil and political life as the realm of the common good and justice. The aim of practical philosophy was to subordinate human relations to the ethical principles and virtues that the father, citizen or prince, each in his respective area, was called upon to embody. The different areas of practical philosophy set out, therefore, to link functional knowledge to the establishment of various other models of action and behaviour as they affected the individual subject in the various spheres of human activity.7 It is important to point out the way in which the establishment of this model in the medieval period was followed later, in the Renaissance, by the attempt to articulate that tradition in relation to very different social actors: the prince, the cardinal, the gentleman, and so forth. The widespread production of treatises in the sixteenth century is an indication of the theoretical effort that was being made to put forward, once more, the claims of practical philosophy in response to the modification and organization of an increasingly complex and stratified society.8

It was personal relationships, rather than the institutions, that provided the political foundation for shaping power relations in the European monarchies from the late Middle Ages until the eighteenth

7 Diego Quaglioni, ‘*Civilis sapientia*: Dottrine giuridiche e dottrine politiche tra Medioevo ed Età Moderna* (Rimini, 1990), 107ff.
8 Amadeo Quondam, “La virtù dipinta: Noterelle (e divagazioni) guazziane intorno a Classicismo e Institutio in Antico Regime,” in Giorgio Patrizi (ed.), *Stefano Guazzo e la Civil conversazione* (Rome, 1990), 268.
century, given that the organizational model was based on the domestic economy (government and administration). Coupling these principles of classical philosophy onto the monarchies as a political formation had its contradictions, but made gradual progress during the Early Modern Age: in matters that had nothing to do with justice, the prince was recognized as possessing powers beyond the scope of *iurisdictio* and whose appropriate model was the “natural” authority of the father in the domestic sphere. The analogy between the power of the father and that of the prince, between household and city, between family and state, which set out to draw attention to the way the domestic dimension functioned in the aristocratic management of the life of the citizens, or the legitimization of public power deriving from an original authority figure, found here immediate political and legal application: it enabled the sovereign to intervene in some of these spheres, while dissociating his actions from the limits imposed by jurisdictional forms. Love and personal loyalty had a central role in this model of political relations; at the same time, the model for distributing functions was valid for domestic offices and monarchy alike; each depended on the final decision of the *pater familias* (the prince), based on criteria (of loyalty and merit especially) which were quite different from those of today, since the domestic model maintained an intimate relationship with the clientelist model.

This political foundation did not lead to the *Ancien Régime* being organized in Europe as states; instead the monarchies made the court their power base, that is, a powerful centre of authority where the monarch resided with his household, councils and tribunals, and

---

9 For this reason, the image of “household” was always present as the government of the Monarchy took shape. Crespí de Valldaura said that, along with the *iurisdictio*: “residet tamen in Principe alia oeconomica et politica potestas, quae ei, tamquam Reipublicae capiti et parenti, ut cuilibet patri familias in propia domo competit,” Cristóbal Crespí de Valdaura, *Observationes illustratae decisionibus Sacri Supremi Regni Aragonum Consilii* (Lugduni, 1662), 72.


from which he not only ruled the kingdom but also transmitted a model of social, cultural and artistic behaviour. This model of political organization is particularly appropriate when referring to the Spanish Monarchy from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, since it is difficult to explain in any other way the creation of such a long-lasting consensus established within it, both among the political elites and within the kingdoms as a whole. What seems to be clear is that the Monarchy opted for the court formula as the number of kingdoms increased through inheritance, annexation or conquest. In some cases it reinforced courtly spaces that already existed (as in Valencia, Barcelona, Saragossa, Naples, Palermo, Milan, Brussels or Lisbon), whilst in others it created viceregal courts of a new stamp (Lima and Mexico City) on top of the centres of the pre-Columbian empires. This wealth and variety of courtly realities, covering such a long period (from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century) and such very different spaces (Europe and America), have not only not been studied in global terms within Spanish historiography, but still, in large measure, lack specific studies using the methodologies that have arisen in our field to analyse the phenomenon. This situation seems even more paradoxical if we consider that the court in Madrid and the viceregal courts of the Monarchy served as a model for the courts of Europe throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, only being replaced as a reference point, from the end of the seventeenth until the nineteenth century, by the court of Versailles and the Prussian court.

13 The line of research I propose has been clearly marked out by Carlos José Hernando Sánchez, “Estar en nuestro lugar, representando nuestra propia persona: El gobierno virreinal en Italia y en la Corona de Aragón bajo Felipe II,” in Ernest Belenguer (ed.), Felipe II y el Mediterráneo (Madrid, 1999), 3: 215–238; Josep María Torras i Ribé, “El entorno clientelar de los virreyes de Cataluña durante el reinado de Felipe II,” in ibid., 359–376. For the Indies, the same methodological approach is followed by Pedro Pérez Herrero, “La Corte como simbología del poder en las Indias (siglos XVI y XVII),” Reales sitios 39 (2003), 28–42. A very full bibliography on studies of the viceroyos of Peru is to be found in P. Latasa, “La corte virreinal peruana: perspectivas de análisis (siglos XVI y XVII),” in Feliciano Barrios (ed.), El gobierno de un mundo: virreinatos y audiencias en la América hispánica (Cuenca, 2004), 341–373.
In dynastic monarchies, the royal household not only constituted the founding element of all those that made up the court, but also gave substance to the dynasty and legitimized dominion over the kingdom.\textsuperscript{14} From the late Middle Ages, each prince established his own household (his own form of service) and, though all of them sought originality to lend prestige to their monarchy, most had the same departments and structures by means of which the elites of the realm were taken into their service. The chroniclers and treatise writers of the time coincided in pointing out that the royal household was the essential element of the court, which has led certain present-day historians to erroneously regard the two organisms as the same.\textsuperscript{15}

The Spanish Monarchy opted to use the court to bring together the additional territories gained through inheritance, annexation or conquest, meaning that none of the structures of any of the kingdoms was eliminated. This pattern of political configuration favoured a series of features that have not always been taken into account. Firstly, incorporating new kingdoms alongside the existing ones entailed the proliferation of royal households; in view of the fact that the royal households were the elements that had given the kingdoms their political shape, keeping their autonomy also meant that their respective households had to be retained even when the king was not in residence. In the second place, it can be deduced that any change made to the political structure of the Monarchy inevitably affected the organization of the royal households, which, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, were gradually reduced to the household of Burgundy, with the others being eliminated. We will now see how this evolution came about.

\textit{The origins of the royal household of Aragon}

The organization of the household of Aragon took place between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, attaining its most complete form in the reign of Peter IV, whose \textit{Ordinacions de Cort} [Court Ordinances], issued between 1338 and 1355, fixed the offices and the order of the household, and whose basic structures endured until the seventeenth century.


century. In the *Ordinaciones fetes per lo molt alt senyor en Pere trec*, rey d’Aragó [Ordinances made by the most high lord Peter III, king of Aragon], there were four main offices in the household: *mayordomo* [=steward or seneschal], *camarlengo* [=lord high chamberlain], *canciller* [=chancellor] and *maestre racional* [=chancellor of the exchequer]. According to the *Ordinaciones* of Peter IV, slightly more than two hundred officers served in the royal household. The complex administration of expenditure remained in the hands of the *maestre racional*, the administrator of the royal wealth and revenues. The *Ordinaciones* had a much greater reach than the private space of the monarch since they sought to describe the relationships of all existing powers in the kingdom, beginning with the monarch; that is, they tried to outline the composition of the royal household and court and the integrating role it played in his relationship with the world around him: the kingdom. On this basis, it is apparent that it was only political government that was structured from the court, because in the various kingdoms that made up the Crown of Aragon, the viceroys, lieutenants or ministers were the ones who reserved full jurisdictional powers for themselves during the king’s absence.

The lengthy description of offices, courtesies, styles and ceremonial expressed in the *Ordinaciones* is, in effect, a classification showing the hierarchical structure in rank order, starting with the person of the king. Even when the distribution of this order seems merely symbolic, it is filtered through the imaginary construct of the Monarchy, which takes

---


on coherence as a body. The court-dominions nexus was established in a field foreign to institutions, by means of hierarchical bonds that were much more solid than the actual administrative or institutional ones. This link enabled two ostensibly opposing tendencies to be sustained: the strengthening of the centre by means of the household and the “forced decentralization” of royal authority through the institutional autonomy of the kingdoms, ruled by the lieutenants. As these were prominent members of the royal family, each of their residences was a replica of the royal household in the particular kingdom being governed, so that the alter ego had its corresponding alter domus. 19

In this set of othernesses, the “inorganic courts” of the lieutenants 20 were juxtaposed with the king’s so that, when the sovereign was present in the territory, they were absorbed into his household and court without any problem, recovering their autonomy once the monarch had left the kingdom. The cohesion and solidity of the Crown of Aragon was based on the interplay of presence-absence and the splitting of the royal majesty and his household into two. In this way, we realize that the royal household was the only institution common to the Crown as a whole, and also that, with the arrival of the Habsburg dynasty, the same offices of the royal household of Aragon were added to those of Castile and Burgundy, by being integrated into the unity of the new (Spanish) Monarchy in the domestic sphere. 21

The royal household of Castile

In order to explain the evolution of the household of Castile, it must be stressed that union with Aragon was carried out in the kingdom of Castile, which meant in practice the adoption of the less institutionally evolved household of Castile as the mode of service for the new political entity that came into being. 22 As a matter of fact, information about the

20 This felicitous expression is from Teresa Canet Aparisi, La audiencia valenciana en la época foral moderna (Valencia, 1986), 16.
21 The structure of the household of Aragon in the time of Ferdinand the Catholic can be found in Jaime Vicens Vives, Historia crítica de Fernando II de Aragón (Zaragoza, 1962).
composition, officers and structure of the Castilian royal household has existed since ancient times: Alfonso X, the Wise, described the main offices in the Segunda Partida [Second Part of the Seven-Part Code] and numerous references appear later in chronicles, in the Castilian Cortes and in documents about Crown property; however, until 1496, the date when the Catholic Monarchs set up a household for their son, prince John, in the Castilian style, which was essentially the same as his mother queen Isabella’s and his grandfather John II’s, there is no complete description of the composition of that household. The household of Castile, which had no ordinances, consisted of a series of modules or sections, according to Fernández de Oviedo’s description, and at the head of each, there was a designated member of the Castilian high nobility who had direct access to the king. Domínguez Casas has produced a


24 María Concepción Solana Villamor, Cargos de la Casa y Corte de los Reyes Católicos: Los modestos colaboradores de los Reyes Católicos (Valladolid, 1962); Álvaro Fernández de Córdova y Miralles, La Corte de Isabel I (Madrid, 2002); Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesada, “La Casa Real en la Baja Edad Media,” Historia, Instituciones y Documentos 25 (1998), 327–350; Miguel Ángel Ladero Quesado, “L’Hôtel du Roi et la Cour comme institutions économiques au temps des Rois Catholiques (1480–1504),” in Maurice Aymard and Marzio A. Romani (eds.), La Cour comme institution économique (Paris, 1998), 43–49; Alicia Gómez Izquierdo, Cargos de la Casa de Juan II de Castilla (Valladolid, 1968); Amalia Prieto Cantero, Casa y Descargos de los Reyes Católicos (Valladolid, 1969). The following deal indirectly with the topic of the composition of the household: Rafael Domínguez Casas, Arte y etiqueta de los Reyes Católicos (Madrid, 1993); Higinio Anglés, La música en la Corte de los Reyes Católicos (Barcelona, 1941).

25 Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, Libro de la Cámara del Príncipe Don Juan (Madrid, 1870). The description of the modules and offices that made up the household of prince John has been interpreted by historians as if they were ordinances of the household of Castile, although it never had any. The description was simply an old man’s reminiscences about the kind of service he had been a part of in his youth. Jeanne Allard, “La naissance de l’étiquette: les règles de vie à la Cour de Castille à la fin du Moyen Âge,” in Nilda Guglielmi and Adeline Rucquoi (eds.), El discurso político en la Edad Media (Buenos Aires, 1995), 11–28.
clear, precise study of the structure of the household, showing that the Chapel was run in accordance with thirty-four rules written to prevent defects and vices in the behaviour of its officers, although his description of the rest of the departments is based on Fernández de Oviedo. There is no doubt whatsoever that the lord high steward and the lord high chamberlain were the offices of greatest responsibility and standing in the household, given that the steward had jurisdiction over all the servants in the household, whilst the chamberlain controlled the chamber; that is, he watched over the most private redoubt of the king and, therefore, enjoyed the confidences of the king himself, gave him advice and monitored the people who wanted to have closer contact with the king.

The premature death of the young prince in 1497 meant that his household was dissolved so that his servants had to look for posts in the households of other members of the royal family; the result was that the only established household in the kingdom of Castile was queen Isabella’s. After the death, in 1500, of the grandson of the Catholic Monarchs, prince don Miguel, the Castilian throne passed to Joanna who came to Castile, with her husband, Philip the Handsome, to be sworn in as heir to the throne at the Cortes in Toledo in 1502. For the first time, the style of the household of Burgundy was introduced to Castile, as the archduke brought this service with him to attend his person, whereas his wife kept the Castilian style service from the time when, in 1496, she had been given a household to go to Flanders to contract marriage with Philip the Handsome.

The twin services and duality of the royal households were repeated once more after the death of Isabella the Catholic in 1504, when Joanna

26 Domínguez Casas, Arte y etiqueta, 213–233. The regulations for the royal chapel are found in Archivo General de Simancas (AGS), Patronato Real (PR), leg. 25, fol. 83r.


28 Lorenzo de Padilla, Crónica de Felipe I llamado el Hermoso, CODOIN, 8: 35–36; Domínguez Casas, Arte y etiqueta de los Reyes Católicos, 621.
took the oath as queen of Castile at the Cortes of Valladolid in 1506. In view of the fits of madness that Joanna began to suffer, her husband took charge of the government. In order to win the political support of the Castilian elites, Philip decided to include them in his household. The sudden death of Philip, however, meant that the Burgundy household disappeared from Castile, leaving Joanna with her service; but, given the delicate state of her mental health, her father assumed the government of Castile in 1507. King Ferdinand the Catholic very soon realized that ruling Castile peacefully meant having to use his own political structure, in other words, from within his own household, using it as the organizing mechanism for such a powerful kingdom. So, he divided up the servants that formed the household of Castile: half of them were left with his daughter Joanna, whom he shut away in Tordesillas, whilst the rest of the officers were taken away with him so that they could serve him together with his own household of Aragon. This decision had profound and lasting consequences on the way the Spanish Monarchy was organized, both in the “central government” and in each of the kingdoms.

A king with as many royal households as kingdoms: a model of integration

This was the situation that prince Charles found when he arrived in Castile in September 1517 to take possession of the kingdoms his grandparents had bequeathed to him. However, archduke Charles, son of Philip the Handsome and Joanna the Mad, had been brought up in Flanders under the protection of his aunt Margaret and it was she who, on October 25, 1515, had proclaimed the new regulations governing the palace domestic service of the young Charles. When Charles arrived in Castile, he found himself with another two completely organized royal households, Castile and Aragon, just

---

30 AGS, *Casas y Sitios Reales* (CSR), leg. 96, nos.1–2.
31 For a study of what the household of Burgundy signified, see Paravicini, “The Court of the Dukes of Burgundy,” 73–90. Older, but more important, documents are to be found in Frédéric-Auguste F.T. de Reiffenberg, *Particularités inédites sur Charles-Quint et sa Cour* (Brussels, 1833); Alfred De Ridder, *La Cour de Charles-Quint* (Bruges, 1889). The ordinances of the household of Burgundy of 1515 are transcribed in Martínez Millán, *Corte de Carlos V*, 5: 137–168.
as they had been left on the death of his grandfather. The Castilians who had occupied the principal posts in the kingdom and the Castilian household during the regency of Ferdinand the Catholic hastened to meet him and to offer to serve him; Charles, however, sent them on to Valladolid where the Cortes were to be held and he was to take the oath as heir to Castile, and these problems could be discussed. Indeed, at the Cortes of Valladolid in 1518, the Castilian procurators showed their disquiet at the fact that it was not possible to serve him because he had brought his own household with him, already set up and full of foreigners. Once the complaints had been heard, Charles I hinted that affairs in the royal households were, in fact, less than harmonious and that it would be necessary to make adjustments. Now, when he made this remark, he was referring only to the household of Castile (divided between his mother and his late grandfather), since in his own mind there was no doubt that his service should be provided by the household of Burgundy and Burgundians of rank; so, after promulgating ordinances that amended the household of Castile serving queen Joanna in Tordesillas in a way that would dignify it, Charles himself added the other half of the household of Castile to his Burgundian retinue, just as Ferdinand the Catholic had done. Nevertheless, whereas under the former Aragonese king, this service and its officers had played a leading role in political decision-making, under the young Charles, the officers of the Castile household played a merely secondary role to those of Burgundy. This decision turned out to be unwise since the Castilians found themselves ousted from the central government of the kingdom. They had to watch as their own interests were administered by Flemings, and, moreover, the servants of the household of Burgundy were paid out of revenues raised in the kingdom of Castile. This generated such malaise that, together with the growing climate of social discontent in Castile, it provided the spark for the rebellion known as the Revolt of the Comuneros (1520–21), which broke out when Charles was absent from the kingdom at his coronation as emperor.

After the defeat of the comunero movement, and the return of Charles to Castile as Charles V, there was speculation about the political organization that should be implemented in the collection of kingdoms and territories that the young emperor was going to govern, and about the reform of the royal households. In January 1523, Charles V sent

---

32 Cortes de los Antiguos Reinos de León y Castilla, 4: 262–282. The topic has been covered in depth by Carlos Morales, in Corte de Carlos V [see n. 19], 1: 166–168.
33 Real Academia de la Historia (RAH), C-71, fol. 29v.
a memorandum to the Council of Castile in which he submitted the concerns he had about such matters for their consideration. During the summer of the same year he proceeded to reform the household of Castile. Not only had the expenses and stipends of its servants increased, but Charles also recognized the political significance of the household and its role as an integrating mechanism for the Castilian elites; for this reason, he actively absorbed certain modules into his Burgundy household. Furthermore, he committed himself to introducing high-ranking Castilians into the service of the household of Burgundy, with the result that it gradually took on a more Spanish flavour during the time he spent in the peninsula (1523–1529). At the Cortes of Valladolid, held in 1523, Charles V presented his plan, which reflected the reforms he intended to implement both in the way the kingdoms were to be governed in general, and the royal household, in particular. It was all embodied in the political philosophy that he put to the procurators:

To this we respond to you that, as it is not advisable to separate members that God wished to be joined in one body, we have the authority, as is right, to use together all the nations of our kingdoms and dominions, allowing each one to keep its laws and customs; and holding these kingdoms [Castile] as the head of all the others, we have the authority to prefer them to all the others, receiving into our royal household a greater number of nationals from them than from any other kingdom or dominion.34

The impact caused by this political reform was recorded by Martín de Salinas,35 who, in his correspondence, confirmed the many Castilian nobles that had been appointed to posts in the household of Burgundy. This process took place gradually over the course of his reign; meanwhile, the remaining households in the other kingdoms continued to be kept up and fully organized.36 In this way, the Castilian elites, to the exclusion of those of other kingdoms, began to influence the monarch in the government of the extensive territories that he had inherited.

34 Cortes de los Antiguos Reinos de León y Castilla, 4: 366–367. A draft can be found in AGS, Consejo y Juntas de Hacienda (CJH), leg. 7, no. 203; it is identified as a holograph of Francisco de los Cobos. The evolution of this process has been traced in: José Martínez Millán, “La Corte de Carlos V: la configuración de la casa del Emperador, 1517–1525,” in Alfred Kohler (ed.), Carlos V/Karl V (Madrid, 2001), 398–408.
35 RAH, C-71, fols. 76v–87r.
36 See Martínez Millán, Corte de Carlos V[see n. 19], 5: 169–175, for the list of Charles V’s Burgundy household in 1534, where the process can be observed.
So, during the reign of Charles V, the various departments and servants of the households of Castile and Burgundy coexisted, although they retained their independence, associated with each other in the palace system; this slow process of convergence and juxtaposition became institutionalized during the reign of Philip II. Meanwhile, the Burgundian, Castilian and, to a lesser extent, Aragonese court structures were gradually combined to provide political and personal services, generating ordinances and etiquettes that corresponded to the activities of attendance and service that the king and his family demanded.

The imposition of the household of Burgundy as the model of service of the Spanish Monarchy during the reign of Philip II: 1555–1598

Given the strength of the kingdom of Castile among the territories of the Empire and the influence in government of its social elites, a service based on the Castilian model was imposed on Charles V’s son and heir to the throne, prince Philip, from the age of seven. On March 1, 1535, Juan de Zúñiga y Avellaneda, Knight Commander of Castile, received the title of tutor to the prince. This appointment established the initial nucleus of the household of Castile and the rest was completed by June of the same year. On the organization of the household, Zúñiga held talks with Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, (a servant of prince John, the son of the Catholic Monarchs), who informed him how to serve the prince. The people chosen to serve him belonged to the Castilian elites. After the death of the empress Isabella, discussions were held with Charles V about the composition of the prince’s household: its former condition, the heterogeneous provenance of the officers and the kind of agreements to be reached were all outlined; the obligatory reference was the queen’s household of Tordesillas or, failing that, the list of offices in prince John’s household. Around June 1539, various decisions were taken, but shortly after, a second series of appointments was made, increasing the number of some offices.

37 See the officers’ payroll in: AGS, CSR, leg. 59.
38 “Lo que agora se ha de consultar para lo que toca al servicio del príncipe,” AGS, CSR, leg. 35, no. 28; this document, together with others referring to the individual petitions of the various servants, have been used by José Luis Gonzalo Sánchez-Molero, “El príncipe Juan de Trastamara, un “exemplum vitae” para Felipe II en su infancia y juventud,” Hispania 59, no. 203 (1999), 890ff.
39 For this, see the proposal in AGS, Estado (E), leg. 45, no. 282. Thus, a list in 1540 is headed as follows: “Sumario de todos los oficiales de la Casa del príncipe nuestro señor que están asentados en sus libros e que sirven a su alteza, asy de los que se asentaron por el
THE POLITICAL CONFIGURATION OF THE SPANISH MONARCHY

The result of this was that, while the Castilians looked forward to a rosy future bringing up the heir according to their own ideals and instilling in him the defence of their interests in this vast Monarchy, the elites in the other kingdoms were not quite so happy. Charles V himself was of a similar opinion and, in the summer of 1548 (thinking now about his succession), he gave orders for the household of Burgundy to be established for prince Philip, ahead of his imminent journey around Europe to visit the kingdoms and territories that he would soon inherit.40 The duke of Alba was given responsibility for organizing the Burgundy household, on the understanding that the household of Castile, which had been serving the prince up till then, was not to disappear; in other words, Charles V prolonged the same complicated system of service that he had inherited and that had provided such good results in keeping his heterogeneous collection of kingdoms together.

The precise structure of the Burgundy household, as set out in its ordinances, and the variety of models for serving both the monarch and members of his family, enabled Philip II to integrate the elites of all the kingdoms and territories, united for the first time, and in such a way that they felt committed to the objectives of a new monarchy (the Spanish Monarchy) taking shape as a political entity under Philip. Nevertheless, on close inspection, it is clear that the two most important households on which his service was based were those of Burgundy and Castile and that, given the wide range of functions that the various sections of each household fulfilled, a degree of symbiosis arose between some duplicated positions and functions.41 So, in the chamber, the offices peculiar to the household of Castile, such as camarero mayor [=lord chamberlain] and escribano [=notary] were eliminated and their holders, Antonio de Rojas and Francisco de España, transferred to the household of Burgundy as sumiller de corps and grefier, respectively. Other grooms, who were carrying out tasks in the chamber of Castile, went on to occupy different offices in the household of Burgundy under the jurisdiction of the sumiller de corps and which had not existed in the Castilian service. The offices of the table (sewer, reposteros de

40 Juan C. Calvete de Estrella, Viaje del felizísimo del muy alto y muy poderoso Príncipe don Phelipe, 1549 (reissue Madrid, 2001).
41 The process has been carefully studied by Santiago Fernández Conti, “La proyección del príncipe Felipe: Viajes y regencias en la corte hispana,” in Corte de Carlos V, 2: 209–225.
estrado, carvers, and so on) disappeared completely to the benefit of the Burgundy household. In addition, the pages in the Castile household were replaced by those from Burgundy, although many of them simply changed households. The chapel also underwent important changes, although at a later date: the most important post in the chapel of the household of Castile, the capellán mayor [=dean of the chapel], merged with the post of limosnero mayor [=lord almoner], who ran the chapel in the household of Burgundy; the office of repostero de capilla [=chapel supervisor] disappeared, whereas the number of cantores [cantors], an office characteristic of the Burgundy household, increased slightly. The chaplains and preachers were, essentially, those of the household of Castile. To complete the process, the guards were brought together so that the Spanish guard was joined by the Bodyguard of the Archenos.

Finally, the household of Burgundy, which was imposed on the heir and which was destined to continue as the ordinary service of the dynasty, was charged exclusively with serving the prince directly in the significant areas of the stable, the table and providing company and private attendance, while the offices of the household of Castile that remained, such as the harbingers, were of lower rank and did not have direct contact with the royal person. As a result, in the process of reorganizing the prince’s service to bring in Burgundian etiquette, the household of Castile suffered severe depletion, its two hundred and forty servants dropping to fewer than a hundred.

At the Cortes of Toledo in 1560, prince Carlos took the oath as heir and the new queen, Isabella of Valois, Philip II’s third wife, was presented, as were their respective households. They were not the only members of the royal family with their own service: the monarch’s brother and sister, don John of Austria and doña Joanna of Austria also had a large number of servants at their disposal. Shortly afterwards, the archdukes of Austria, who came to Spain to be brought up by their uncle, joined the list of those with households. This proliferation of

42 On the adaptation of the different chapels (Burgundy, Castile, Aragon), see Véronique Gérard, “Los sitios de devoción en el alcázar de Madrid: capilla y oratorios,” Archivo Español del Arte, no. 223 (1983), 278–279.
43 Anglés, La música, 102ff.
45 María José Rodríguez-Salgado, “Honour and profit in the Court of Philip II of Spain,” in La Cour comme institution économique, 69–73.
46 AGS, CSR, leg. 64, no. 843.
households meant that the many demands by important personages to be admitted to the royal service could be met.

Once the court was finally settled in Madrid, the power groups who dominated during the reign of Philip II were formed; it quickly became clear that the Castilian elites were going to occupy a pre-eminent role, prevailing over those factions – even when some of their members were Castilians by birth – whose political ideas supported foreign interests and positions. Indeed, the distribution of the representatives of the social elites in the service of the royal family was not heterogeneous, but obeyed very precise criteria that prevailed as a result of factional infighting at court. So, in the king’s household, the major posts soon finished up in the hands of the Castilian elite, whose political ideals defended, at least implicitly, the pre-eminence of Castile over the other kingdoms, the imposition of ideological intransigence, an “intellectual” spirituality and, consequently, the practice of a formal religiosity. The Castilian factions, as well as those from other kingdoms who had not managed to connect with the previous elites because of disagreements with their political ideals or their social and economic interests, were found posts in the households of the other members of the royal family.

With this group of Castilian lawyers and theologians, Philip II began the process of turning all his inherited kingdoms into confessional states. The result was to bring into being a new political entity known as the Spanish Monarchy.47 One of the essential parts of the process was to organize the respective courts and households as fundamental political entities for channelling royal power in each kingdom. In the case of Spain, Philip II commanded ordinances for the queen’s household to be drawn up along Castilian lines, whereas he ordered Jean Sigonney, in 1575, to recoup the ordinances of the household of Burgundy that had served his father.48 In this way, the Prudent King respected the Castilian model of service (the household of Castile), but took the household of Burgundy, which was that of the dynasty, as the official model for the Monarchy. The Castilian faction had no problem accepting this as long as important members of its elites occupied the main posts in that household, which was foreign to the kingdom. Accordingly, Philip II constructed the Spanish Monarchy as a separate entity, although paradoxically, the official model for the household was not that of the

47 This process has been studied in José Martínez Millán and Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales (eds.), Felipe II (1527–1598): La configuración de la Monarquía hispana (Valladolid, 1998).
48 These ordinances have been published in Corte de Carlos V, 5: 179–211.
kingdom (Castile), which had helped to shape it, but that of the dynasty (the household of Burgundy). In recognition of the original importance of Castile, the Prudent King agreed to maintain the Castilian service, but amalgamated many posts with those of the household of Burgundy. The most significant changes related to the chapel and the chamber, departments of the royal household in which the Burgundian structure prevailed. Along with this reform, Philip II structured the administrative organization of the government of his Monarchy.

Now, the political actions of the Castilian party aroused resentment among the elites of all the kingdoms and, by the end of the reign, the ruling faction had taken on all the appearance of a real coalition. Rome was not indifferent to this uneasy atmosphere. The pontiffs, as temporal lords, felt similarly subjected to and, even, threatened by the Spanish monarchs because of the decisive influence that they had been bringing to bear in the conclaves at the time of electing pontiffs. This was done by using the temporal power that they had built up in their client network of cardinals, and through Philip II’s interference in matters of church jurisdiction and religious reform, when the monarch was wont to apply the decrees of Trent in pursuit of his interests and interpret the Catholic doctrine that derived from them for his own ends. By the end of his reign, there were sufficient symptoms to demonstrate that the Castilian faction had been ousted from power and supplanted by others.

The attempt to restore the household of Castile as the model of service of the Spanish Monarchy during the reign of Philip III: 1598–1621

By the time of Philip II’s death, the Spanish Monarchy had been constructed as an entity in its own right, although, paradoxically, the official household model was that of the dynasty, the household of

49 I refer the reader to the study by Henar Pizarro Llorente in the two volume series of La Monarquía de Felipe II and to the study by Rubén Mayoral López in José Martínez Millán and Maria Antonietta Visceglia (eds.), La Monarquía de Felipe III: La Casa del Rey, 4 vols. (Madrid, 2007).
50 Ricardo Hinojosa, Los despachos de la diplomacia pontificia en España (Madrid, 1896), 399–405.
52 For context, see the introduction to volume 1 of La Corte de Felipe III.

38
THE POLITICAL CONFIGURATION OF THE SPANISH MONARCHY

Burgundy, rather than that of the original kingdom that had given it shape. The contradictions, latent in the earlier reign, of making the dynasty and hence the specific etiquette of its household coincide with kingdoms foreign to it, came to the surface with Philip III’s accession to the throne. The members of the Castilian faction, removed from power during the final years of Philip II’s reign, began to criticize the situation openly and show their disagreement with the direction that the Monarchy was taking, the composition of the court and the royal household. At the Cortes in 1598, they made it abundantly clear to the new monarch, Philip III that:

The grandeur and antiquity of the royal household of Castile is widely known to everyone, and although, through the union with the most serene house of Austria on the occasion of the marriage of the Most Serene Queen Doña Juana to the lord don Philip, count of Flanders, the style and form of the household of Burgundy were introduced into the royal household in the names and offices and service, the Kingdom, in 1579, beseeched His Majesty King Philip, our lord, may he be in glory, to restore the service of his royal household to the customs, office and names of old Castile and which at that time ceased to be provided. Now, through the just causes that moved His Majesty in the marriage of the Most Serene Infanta Doña Isabella Clara Eugenia to the Most Serene Archduke Albert, the States of Flanders have left the crown of Castile; however, since they have retained direct control over it [the crown], it appears that what was once beseeched as advisable, has now come down to necessity. With this in mind, we beseech Your Majesty to kindly consider that it is right that, since this kingdom carries the burden of so many obligations, and at the crown of it Our Lord has seen fit to increase such a great Monarchy, its former name of the household of Castile be restored, as well as its customary offices and names; it not being fitting that this province, being the head of this Monarchy, should be governed by a name and titles foreign to it and not its own.53

53 Actas de las Cortes de Castilla, 16, 639–640, cited by Carlos María Gómez-Centurión Jiménez, “La herencia de Borgoña: el ceremonial real y las casas reales en la España de los Austrias (1548–1700),” in Luis Antonio Ribot García and Ernest Belenguer (eds.), Las Sociedades Ibéricas y el mar a finales del siglo XVI: La Corte, centro e imagen del poder (Madrid, 1998), 15, where the Spanish original can be found.
As Helen Nader has appositely remarked, during the reign of Philip III the Burgundian service began to be referred to in contemptuous terms as barbarous and foreign; more specifically, she quotes the chronicler, Fray Prudencio de Sandoval, who, describing the establishment of the household of Burgundy for prince Philip in 1548, confined himself to the laconic comment: “And likewise, don Fernando Álvarez, duke of Alba, lord steward to the Emperor and his captain general, was brought in on his orders to organize the prince’s journey and set up the government of his household according to the custom of the household of Burgundy,” without mentioning or reporting anything else. However, his contempt for the Burgundian style becomes patently obvious a little further on when he states: “He set up the Prince’s household in the Burgundian style, depriving the Castilian household of authority, which should be kept, if only for its antiquity, and more so as the Kings of Castile have nothing of Burgundy in them.”

The same xenophobia towards all things Burgundian can also be perceived in the chronicler Luis Cabrera de Córdoba, a contemporary of Philip III’s, who simply reported the same fact: “He went to Valladolid, and formed his household according to the custom of Burgundy, against the wishes and hopes of Castile.”

Criticism of the household of Burgundy became more pointed whenever the policies deployed by the Monarchy – and which the elites excluded from power disagreed with – required an increased tax burden, which seriously damaged the economy of the kingdom, precisely when the Castilian elites had been removed from positions close to the monarch, making it impossible for their voice to be heard in policy decisions. During the reign of Philip III, there was a positive mania for regulating the ordinances and etiquette of the offices, practices and ceremonies of the household of Burgundy in an attempt to cut down on expenses and avoid the criticisms of the tax system that rained down on the government. When the process is looked at more closely, we find that the copious legislation was confined to meticulously regulating the obligations of each and every office with the aim of avoiding waste, rather than changing the structure of the

54 P. de Sandoval, Historia de la vida y hechos del Emperador Carlos V (Madrid, 1956); (Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, vol. 82), 318.
55 Ibidem, 337.
household or making major modifications to the Burgundian style, whilst the household of Castile was left untouched. The Cortes of 1617 joined in the general chorus of those who wanted reforms carried out. Baltasar de Córdoba, procurator for Cordoba, presented a list of ills that were afflicting Castile, among which the most important were: the doubling of the number of servants in the royal households since the death of Philip II, the substantial outlay in grace and favour payments, and imports of foreign goods to the detriment of Castilian ones. Before his fall, Lerma sent an official note to the president of the Council of Castile asking him to free Castile from collapse. On February 1, 1619, the Council of Castile responded with its famous proposal for reform, outlined by don Diego Corral de Arellano. The reform of the royal household and cutting back on expenditure were ever present, so it seemed impossible to avoid drawing up new ordinances which – without touching the household of Castile – would make savings to the budget in the Burgundy household; however, Philip III died before he could implement them.

The household of Burgundy is finally imposed as the model for the Spanish Monarchy: reforms carried out during the reign of Philip IV

A week after Philip IV succeeded to the throne, he was presented with a written document entitled: “What His Majesty should execute as soon as possible and the main causes of the destruction of the Monarchy,” in which corruption was declared one of the major evils afflicting the

57 The scholar with the best understanding of the evolution of the royal households in the Spanish Monarchy is Luis Robledo Estaire, “La música en la corte madrileña de los Austrias: Antecedentes: las casas reales hasta 1556,” Revista de musicología 10 (1987), cuadro 5 [summary sheet 5]. In addition, in the aforementioned summary sheet, he points out that the household of Aragon, which had existed in parallel with Castile's since the time of Ferdinand the Catholic, disappeared in 1618.
59 Corral's authorship is confirmed by P. Fernández Navarrete, Conservación de Monarquías y Discursos Políticos (Madrid, 1982), 21. For the person himself, see León Corral y Maestro, Don Diego Corral y Arellano y los Corrales de Valladolid (Valladolid, 1905), 40; Junta de Reformación, 29.
60 Archivo Histórico Nacional (AHN), Estado (E), Estado, lib. 832.
Monarchy and, if he did not want a recurrence of what had happened in his father’s time, he ought to act immediately by removing from government those who formed the nucleus of all this evil. To solve the problem, the new government set up a Junta de Reformación [Reform Board] with the mission of raising the standard of public morality.\textsuperscript{61} The Board of ten members, which was supposed to meet every sunday in the home of the president of the Council of Castile, Fernando de Acevedo,\textsuperscript{62} issued one or two proposals, but was eventually wound up; even so, it instilled a good deal of fear when it ordered all those who had held office from 1603 onwards to present an inventory of their goods to see if they had enriched themselves fraudulently at the cost of the Crown. The most pressing problems, however, remained: reducing the Monarchy’s expenditure on wars, and cutting back the budget of the royal household.

The 1624 ordinances for the household of Burgundy

To solve the first problem, that is, find income with which to boost the royal exchequer, the count of Olivares proposed a series of reforms set out in a lengthy letter, dated October 20, 1622,\textsuperscript{63} which he sent to the cities with representation in the Cortes. In it, he requested, on the one hand, maintenance for thirty thousand soldiers for six years at the rate of six ducats per month per soldier and, on the other, a network of treasuries and savings banks to be established, following a different scheme from the one agreed in the Cortes held in Madrid from 1598 to 1603.\textsuperscript{64} The representatives of the cities were not persuaded, however, so that when it came to the final vote on October 4, 1623, the procurators had already resorted to the traditional means of raising money: the millones and a variety of fiscal measures left to the discretion of the Cortes. Nevertheless, the sum of money voted was unprecedented (sixty

\textsuperscript{61} Gonzalo Céspedes y Meneses, Historia de don Felipe IV, Rey de España (Barcelona, 1634), fol. 35; Biblioteca Nacional de España (BNE), MS. 18670, cédula real de creación [royal letters patent].

\textsuperscript{62} Ángel González Palencia, “Quevedo, Tirso y las comedias ante la Junta de Reformación,” Boletín de la Real Academia española 25 (1946), 43–86.

\textsuperscript{63} “The letter, transcribed by Ángel González Palencia, can be found in La Junta de Reformación, 379–408.

\textsuperscript{64} For the context, see Antonio Domínguez Ortiz, Política y Hacienda de Felipe IV (Madrid: 1983), 19–33; also by Domínguez Ortiz, Política fiscal y cambio social en la España del siglo XVII (Madrid, 1984), 41–43; Felipe Ruiz Martín, Las finanzas de la Monarquía hispánica en tiempos de Felipe IV, 1621–1665 (Madrid, 1990), 37–41.
million ducats payable over twelve years, as well as twelve million due from the previous award). To convince the procurators about the plans to be implemented, the amount to be assigned under each heading was specified: 1,200,000 ducats for the prisons; 1,300,000 for the navy; 300,000 for the salaries of ministers and officers; 610,000 for the royal households. To demonstrate the veracity of these items, Olivares announced to the Cortes, on February 8, 1623, that they would save 67,000 ducats a year on the king’s household expenses and 80,000 on the queen’s.

As for the second problem, the reform of the royal household, a solution was sought through the promulgation of new ordinances. To this end, on September 14, 1622, Philip IV ordered the Board of Stewards, consisting of the count of Arcos, the marquis of las Navas and the count of la Puebla, to convene a meeting to make changes in the expenditure of the Burgundy household. The conclusions were presented to the monarch on October 17, 1622. Despite the fact that they had seen papers concerning costs and procedures from the time of Philip III, the introduction to their conclusions stated that the household of Burgundy in the time of Philip II had been their reference and model for making changes to the above-mentioned household, that being the model they wished to impose, both in terms of the number of servants and expenditure.65

The following year, the same Board of Stewards met to discuss “the way the offices were to be governed.” The agreements were presented to the king on December 6, 1623, and provide a clear insight into the alarming state of the royal coffers. The account began with a statement by the stewards that “the steward’s office involves responsibility for reforming and supervising the offices of the table and expenditure on provisions,” but they also took the liberty of advising his Majesty “what it is best to do in each office for the good government of it.” Having said that, they stated their general rule that “for the good government of the offices of the table of Your Majesty’s royal household, it would appear advisable for the stewards to draw lots on the first day of the year for the supervision of each office so that they can order anything they deem necessary to be carried out.” This demonstration of centralization and control of economic resources by those with authority became

65 “And whenever we refer to that agreed yesterday in the meeting about the number of servants, stipends and bouche of court in the past, it is understood to mean at the time of His Majesty the King Don Philip the Second, may he be in heaven” (Archivo General de Palacio (AGP), Administrativa, leg. 928).
obvious in the warnings that were sent out to each of the specific offices with regard to what it did: “the sumiller de la panadería [=serjeant of the bakehouse] must not, solely on his own authority, order provision to be made for wheat, which is a necessary cost, but it should be done under the supervision of the appropriate steward.” “In the fruitery, the steward on duty should take care to make provision by buying in units of arrobas in the morning at the same price as those selling it in the market place, and that it should be accounted to Your Majesty at this same price.” “More is spent in the larder than in any other office of the table and, therefore, it will be necessary for the duty steward to keep a particularly careful eye on its management, ordering that everything which comes in, whether it be by number, weight or measure, should go out in the same way, and ensuring that the veedor de viandas [=food supervisor] is present in this office when the officers are there and checks the amount and provision received,” and so on. In short, it was a question of saving through cutbacks in the officers’ bouche of court. At the same time, they pointed out the little tricks that some offices employed to pilfer provisions to the detriment of the royal household: “The purveyor of this office earns a lot of money from it and it seems it would be advisable not to buy at fixed prices, but to purchase, on his Majesty’s behalf, the hens, pullets, pigeons and other fowl that are brought in from different places and sold in the market square every morning.” “Large numbers of eggs are consumed every day and the buyer’s price is fixed at five maravedís, whereas the ordinary purchase price is four and a half,” … “the cellar should not just be stocked in Esquivias, but in Valdemoro and other places nearby, because the quality of the wine will be sufficient for bouche of court and, being a fixed contract, let the pack animals from the mule stable bring it, for it will save a lot.” The reform was accompanied by changes in the main posts in the exchequer of the royal household so that the decisions taken could be implemented quickly and accurately.66

66 “His Majesty sent D. Lorenzo de Cárdenas, count of la Puebla del Maestre, to visit Francisco Guillamás Velázquez, and inspect the office he held as treasurer of the chamber, and this office was given to D. Manuel de Hinojosa, the former guarda mayor of D. Rodrigo Calderón; and since he did not accept it, it was given to captain Tomás de Carona, servant of the count of Olivares; and the aforementioned Francisco Guillamás was given the title of councillor of the Exchequer when the inspection visit was over”; Andrés de Almansa y Mendoza, Cartas (Madrid, 1886), 181–182.
In view of both memoranda, and after consulting some of the nobles, Philip IV announced the ordinances of his household in 1624. Philip IV made no secret of his intentions when he introduced the new general ordinances:

The sorry state in which I found the finances of my kingdoms when I acceded to them and the great occasions for spending which have arisen here subsequently through the need to enlarge my navies because of the many enemies roaming the seas, and to go to Italy and Germany and other necessary parts, and the lack of funds for so many things has obliged me to employ every possible means to obtain them [funds] and one of them being to reduce non-essential expenditure so as to make better provision, I have considered it advisable to begin with my household and so I have resolved that it should be reformed in the following way.\textsuperscript{67}

And yet, when it came to reforming the offices of his households, the monarch gave notice that “the servants of the household of Castile cannot be extinguished, because there is a need for fowlers, hunters, doctors following the court and who have to be in residence, harbingers for the same reason, and they have fewer stipends than those of Burgundy, foot squires, doorkkeepers of the chamber serving in the palace, the Councils and Chancelleries and other servants that there have not been in the household of Burgundy and having to give them stipends irrespective of the cost.” The reason was explained in the first point of the ordinances:

1. The households of Castile and Aragon are the foundation of the greatness of the Spanish royalty and their wealth, blood, lives and loyalty preserve and sustain the other states that have joined them. There are no words, nor is there head of any subject that wants the Royal Households of the kingdoms of Castile and Aragon to disappear and if the kingdoms knew what was being attempted, they would be very angry, since it is more just that the name of the households of Castile and Aragon prevail than to reduce everything to a foreign household. Until now, the progenitors of His Majesty have kept servants with the name of those households; the countrymen of both kingdoms want

\textsuperscript{67} Madrid, February 7, 1624, see BNE, MS. 18716/43: “Reformación de la Casa Real hecha en el año de 1624” p. 2\textsuperscript{a}, (nos. 63–70 struck out and replaced by fols. 17–24).
favours and stipends in them so as to serve their natural king as they have done in the other states.  

The promulgation of the ordinances in 1624 was followed by a series of meetings at the residence of the Count-Duke of Olivares with the aim of finding a way to apply them rigorously. This reform, like others in matters of the exchequer, enjoyed strong support from the men of letters, at least in the early years. However, from 1626, there was a sudden deterioration, both in the general economic situation of the kingdom, and in the crisis of the royal exchequer. The suspension of payments in 1627 heralded the first bankruptcy of the kingdom. The price and wage rates dictated by the Council of Castile had no effect, given the rise in inflation, so that, on August 7, 1628, a devaluation edict was issued by means of which the *vellón* coinage was reduced to half its value, at the same time as the pragmatic sanction fixing rates (proclaimed to prevent price increases) was abolished on the grounds of ineffectiveness.

In view of the economic situation, it is hardly surprising that the royal household budget should come up constantly as an area for cost cutting. In fact, this practice served more as an example for the urban elites, who were repeatedly asked to increase the *servicios* [type of tax] that they paid, than for raising substantial sums of money; of course, the reduction in costs and elimination of offices in the royal service went hand-in-hand with complaints and a feeling of unease among the nobles and other elites in the kingdom who saw their chances of being part of the court disappearing. They referred to the court of the Monarchy when the Count-Duke of Olivares was the royal favourite as “a court of petty nobles.” The fact is that what the monarch needed to maintain his estates and territories and implement his foreign policy led him to adopt a series of measures that destroyed the model of

---

68 He added: “2. The number of servants depends on the will of His Majesty which is always to honour and extend favour to his vassals according to the quality of each one to make use of them.” (Copy of the proposal made to his Majesty by the lord steward, duke of the Infantado, on September 26, 1623, concerning the reform of October 17, 1622: “Casa-reformas,” AGP, *Administrativa*, leg. 928). These are reforms, particularly from the beginning of the reign of Philip IV.


70 Domínguez Ortiz, *Política fiscal y cambio social*, 46–47.


72 The peculiarities of the Spanish court with respect to other European courts are highlighted by Carl Justi, *Velázquez y su siglo* (Madrid, 1999), 178–181.
political organization that had underpinned the Spanish Monarchy since Charles V and Philip II, that is, one based on integrating the elites of the different kingdoms into his service.\textsuperscript{73} In spite of everything, the Count-Duke of Olivares embarked on a policy of cost cutting in the royal households that led him to monitor the effectiveness of the 1624 ordinances. To this end, he set up a new Board, which met periodically, to examine how far they had been complied with. The Board met a total of nine times, and in every session, discussion centred on the immediately superior office-holder tightly controlling the activities of those beneath him; this vigilance, it was thought, would stop economic resources being squandered and bring about substantial savings.

The resolutions taken by the Board at the nine meetings, held in the Count-Duke’s rooms, were formalized in fifty-nine points which restricted the ordinances of 1624 even further,\textsuperscript{74} at the same time as another twenty-six articles were drawn up, laying down norms for the quantities of food corresponding to each office, with the aim of reducing expenditure as much as possible. However, the savings made with these measures were negligible. As a result, Philip IV issued a proclamation on January 29, 1627, in which he expressed his intention to implement the measures agreed the previous year; to confirm the savings made as a consequence of those ordinances, the expense accounts of the king’s households were presented: a total of 101,703,574 maravedís.

The report ended by warning that “during this year of 1628, costs will rise because the prices of many items in His Majesty’s household have increased, such as wheat, which last year cost eighteen reales and is now sold for twenty-three ... ”. On January 15, 1628, the list of fifty-nine points agreed in the nine Board meetings in the Count-Duke’s rooms was drawn up again and in the margin against each point the degree of compliance was written with possible warnings. Most of the annotations on the various points coincided in expressing the same succinct, “so it was done.”

The economic deficiencies did not end with this statement of accounts. The royal chamber could not meet the salaries and pensions

\textsuperscript{73} The monarch himself recognized as much, when, at the end of 1623, he ordered: “His Majesty issued a decree for the Councils, ordering that, in their proposals, they should make a list of the servants among the aspirants, or of their past service, and if they are, or have been, at Court and for how long; for he does not want their claims to be met simply by request, but on merit.” (Almansa y Mendoza, \textit{Cartas}, 164). On this topic, see \textit{La Monarquía de Felipe II}, vols. 1 and 2.

\textsuperscript{74} AGP, \textit{Administrativa}, leg. 928.
owing to the Monarchy’s servants who had received grace and favour payments for services rendered. Concern had been mounting since the death of Philip III, given that the scarcity of income was compounded by the preoccupation with honesty that the new monarch wished to convey by pursuing and removing favours obtained by underhand means. In one “list of people who have pensions drawn from the three thousand ducats paid out every month as ordinary expenses of His Majesty’s chamber, and of its other expenses and outstanding debts owing up until today, February 22, 1628,” details were shown as follows: “expenditure on pensions […] amounted to 587,279 reales and every month 3,000 ducats in total are paid out, amounting to 396,000 reales a year, so that the outgoings are 191,279 reales, which is 17,389 ducats.” Moreover, 110,149 reales, owed to the pensioners, and 155,040 in debts to private individuals, had to be added to this figure. The problem with the debts contracted by the royal chamber was not so much an economic one, as the lack of credibility offered by the Monarchy compared to earlier reigns. The courtiers and secretary themselves were conscious of this when they wrote: “What suffers, when those who depend on this money pester and insist, is not only the patience, but the credibility of those of us who have to deal with it because, accustomed to the punctuality of the chamber, they blame our time because they are not paid with the same [punctuality] and, so, the distribution is our responsibility and while Your Excellency is the master of the order, it will not be out of place to inform Your Excellency what should be remedied and how it could be done.”

The following year, 1629, the governing organ of the Burgundy household, the Bureo, reviewed the accounts of the royal household from the previous year, pointing out to the monarch at the same time, that it would be impossible to maintain itself in economic terms with the cuts that had been implemented: “As for the posts that in some offices were ordered to be reformed, they have either not yet fallen vacant so that they can be extinguished, or if they have fallen vacant, not only has

75 “List of pensions that have been consigned to the ordinary expenses of the larder, distinguishing three groups: those granted by letters patent from Philip III (Nov. 1622), which amount to 1,561,420 maravedís; by letters patent from Philip IV which increased ordinary expenditure, amounting to 1,142,500 maravedís; and by order of His Majesty that have not increased ordinary expenditure (mostly dated between 1625 and 1626) that amounted to 937,000 maravedís. To these are added 2,382,320 maravedís for 13 valets of the chamber, and 400 reales a month entered by mistake for the apothecary are struck from the account” (AGP, Administrativa, leg. 364).

76 AGP, Administrativa, leg. 939/1, exp. 12.
it pleased Your Majesty to fill them, but also to make favours of other supernumerary posts and for people to succeed to them in the future.” Together with this document, another was presented to the monarch, entitled “what the comptroller reports about the reduction in ordinary expenditure,” showing that the royal household could not possibly be maintained on such a budget.77

In general, what was more important and far-reaching in the application of such drastic economic measures was the part they were playing in the breakdown of the political structure of the Monarchy, since the integrative function fulfilled by the royal households and service to the monarch for the elites in the kingdoms was disappearing, as the monarch himself recognized in each of two cédulas sent to the Buro in 1630 and 1631. In the first one, he ordered that: “henceforward, the Buro will not propose to me any office that has not been vacated, in accordance with the reform of sixteen hundred and twenty-four, nor supernumerary posts, even if they are without stipends, nor swear anybody into a post of ayuda [assistant to a superior] with the stipend of a groom.” In the second, he insisted that, “When I resolved to reform those things held to be advisable in my household, it was with the intention that it should be carried out […] and once again, I order and command that it should be adhered to inviolably.”

The new reform in 1631

Reducing the number of officers and freezing quitaciones [wages] was not sufficient to raise the amount of revenue required to cover the cost of war. Moreover, the depression that the agricultural economy had experienced in Castile between 1629 and 1632 meant that it would not have been wise to request new taxes to pay for the war that the Monarchy was waging in Europe.78 In view of the impossibility of raising funds, Philip IV ordered a fresh reform of his household in 1631. This reform did not concentrate on reducing offices or drawing up new ordinances

77 “Your Lordship commanded me to inform him of my opinion on the reduction that His Majesty has ordered to be made each month in the ordinary expenditure of his Royal Household, and in fulfilment of that, I wish to report the following” (AGP, Administrativa, leg. 928). The date is Madrid, February 22, 1629.
of conduct in the service, but focussed on the food to be given to each officer, beginning with the king, by reducing courses and quantities of food. Control of kitchen expenditure and the amount of food for the household officers and the tables of the “estates” had been a recurring theme since the beginning of the reign; however, it had never been stipulated in such detail what each office post could consume to the extent of producing specific ordinances on the matter:

His Majesty, having seen a proposal by the Bureo of February 21, 1630, on the moderation of expenditure on his household and adjusting it to what was done in the households of the lords Emperor Charles the Fifth and King Philip II, his forefathers who are in glory, and another that the Board, which His Majesty had convened for the reform of the royal households, made on this matter on September 25 of the same year, it has pleased him to resolve both and henceforth, let the following be kept and implemented:

1 That the courses for His Majesty be henceforth, ten at lunch and eight at dinner, and if it were boiled capon and gigot, the remaining courses should not be duplicated, keeping down costs.

2 That the requirements for sugar, wine, flour and everything else that is used for His Majesty’s meal should be issued through official chits from the comptroller and in no other way, according to the food that is ordered, with no excess whatsoever and the same applies to that of the estates.

3 That the estate of the chamber be reduced to six courses at lunch and four at dinner on meat days, and on fish days, eight for lunch and four for dinner [...] or so on.79

Such measures were destroying the political underpinning on which the union of the Monarchy was based and made the monarch appear a bad paterfamilias for not rewarding the merit and service provided to him by his subjects. For example, in point 37 of this reform, it was ordered that, “henceforth no compensation should be given to the widows of sweepers unless it is once only, and that it should not be charged to the larder.” In article 38: “omit the firewood that used to be given to

79 AGP, Administrativa, leg. 928.
the Councils.” What was even more surprising was the ban on giving expense allowances to the widows of muleteers and soldiers. The reform ended by ordering a return to the times of Philip II.

The ordinances of 1635–1636: The reform of the Chamber and the appointment of the Count-Duke of Olivares as chamberlain and sumiller de corps

Overall, the economic problem that the royal household represented was not the number of officers (few could be dispensed with), nor the more or less substantial quantities of food that were served up, but the pensions that the monarch granted to individuals for services rendered. Such graces and favours were granted through the Cámara, which was the king’s most restricted and intimate section in all the households of the European monarchies. It consisted of all those important people who, making use of their friendship and daily contact with the king, advised him on his political decisions and on the appointments and favours that he granted. In the household of Castile, it was always clearly defined, to the point where, in 1588, in the time of Philip II, it was finally constituted as the Consejo de Cámara [Council of the Privy Chamber]. By contrast, the household of Burgundy was a confusing organism, with little regulation and, beyond a list of pensioners drawn up annually to pay them their wages, there was no detailed record of the favours and positions granted.

The progress of the Thirty Years War, especially when France entered the conflict in 1635, intensified the tax burden.\textsuperscript{80} It was necessary to fall back on resources of all kinds: half-annates were taken from the salaries of ministers and officers of the Monarchy, as well as from the interest on juros [bonds] and loans; a general donation was requested to replenish the royal coffers; an appeal was made to the Cortes to vote in favour of more servicios, stamped paper was introduced and finally, the vellón was devalued.\textsuperscript{81} In such circumstances, it was of utmost importance, on the one hand, to control expenditure occasioned by the royal household; on the other, it was essential to reward those vassals who were outstanding

\textsuperscript{80} The political development has been studied in detail by Elliott, \textit{The Count-Duke of Olivares}, 456–492. For the economic problems, see Ruiz Martín, \textit{Las finanzas de la Monarquía hispánica}, 109–111; Carlos Álvarez Nogal, \textit{El crédito de la Monarquía hispánica en el reinado de Felipe IV} (Valladolid, 1997), 225–239.

\textsuperscript{81} All these measures have been studied by Domínguez Ortiz, \textit{Política y Hacienda de Felipe IV}, 2nd ed., 49–53.
in their service to the king, especially at times when great sacrifices were being demanded and when not all the subjects identified with the political strategy followed by the Monarchy. In this situation, in which it was necessary to bring all the resources of the kingdoms together in one common enterprise, complete control of access to the person of the king and the granting of favours was regarded as absolutely essential.

In accordance with the economic cuts imposed on the household, the chamber had been assigned 36,000 ducats a year, the same sum as in the time of Philip II. However, the major problem was that the budget for the chamber had risen to 50,000 ducats a year because of the need to reward services rendered to the Monarchy, making new sources of income necessary. It was imperative to find out how costs had come to outstrip the budget. Consequently, on March 26, 1635, the monarch wrote to the duke of Medina de las Torres, the sumiller de corps since 1626,82 “that the monthly accounts of everything that has been received, issued and paid out, and the fund used for the Royal Chamber from the time when His Majesty succeeded to these kingdoms, should be reviewed, examined and handed to Your Excellency.” The sumiller sent the note to those who had been secretaries of the chamber during that period (1621–1635), namely, Bernabé de Vivanco, who carried out the duty for the first nine months of 1621; Antonio de Alosa, who was appointed on August 1, 1621, and Antonio de Mendoza, who was in post from September 1, 1625, until he was replaced by Garcigallo on September 9, 1644, asking them, at the same time, to present accounts of every type of revenue that had passed through their hands and of those who had been granted favours.

The secretaries responded speedily and from their replies it emerged that the household of Burgundy had no regulations whatsoever. The statement by Antonio de Alosa exemplifies what all the secretaries alleged:

The order, sir, with which this money has been collected and paid out, was the general one that all my predecessors received, based on confidence in the secretaries, in those who went before, and in me, on the orders of His Majesty or his favourites, who were usually the sumillers de corps, the principal heads of this office and in charge of appointing and dismissing and of demanding

82 AGP, Administrativa, leg. 939/1, exp. 12. The duke of Medina de las Torres left the post of sumiller de corps, which he had occupied since 1626, to go to Italy, Elliott, The Count-Duke of Olivares, 478.
whatever they liked, sometimes in writing and at other times verbally, who gave out expense allowances, alms, income and sometimes asked Their Majesties to be allowed to give secret expense allowances or alms with their own hand or to have it in their private offices, and all this in confidence, since it was obvious that His Majesty was not going to be required to give a receipt. And so, nobody will be able to satisfy this question; the rest will be easy for the person whose responsibility it is. The justifications for the collection of this money and for its distribution in the aforementioned manner are two cédulas, copies of which are attached to this paper, in which His Majesty commands that no account should be asked for, nor record made. I, sir, keeping to that style and with this security, when I took up the said office, continued to do what my predecessors had done, with the same officers, with the same books, in the same manner and same justifications, but neither do I know who the officers are, nor did I know when I took up the post, nor do I know what books these are, nor have I seen them, nor do I know what they are for, nor do I have any instruction to guide me.\textsuperscript{83}

With these reports, the sumiller de corps wrote to the monarch, pointing out the economic plight of the chamber and, to avoid this situation in the future, advised the use of a better accounting and control system so that “whenever money is requested or given, it should be accounted for formally with a legitimate justification and likewise, if it would please His Majesty, to kindly identify those pensions on the pension list which

\textsuperscript{83} AGP, \textit{Administrativa}, leg. 939/1, exp. 12, dated Madrid, March 31, 1635, and signed by Antonio Alosa Rodarte. The secretary, Antonio Hurtado de Mendoza followed the same course of action, although he added some details: “His Majesty gave the orders to the secretary verbally and, in this case, not only for assistance and ordinary expense allowances for the servants and soldiers and the guards, officers and woodland gardeners and important people in need and helped by his hand, but also for fixed incomes and individuals; and it is not found in the office book, decree or dispatch, that the secretary ordered them to be settled, His Majesty said send it […] . At the end of each month, and other times halfway through the year, on official paper, the secretary informed His Majesty of everything that had been spent and if anything was left over, he told him what was to be done with it; and if there was not enough, it was arranged for the president of the exchequer to supply it later and not only did the 36,000 ducats enter the chamber, but greater sums and extraordinary amounts which were shared out in the same secret expenditure and when His Majesty was pleased to do so, he signed in the book in his own hand.”
he had ordered to be placed there and which not.” It was essential, therefore, to carry out a thorough reform of the Burgundy household.\footnote{“Orden que se ha de guardar en la distribución del dinero de la cámara, que es en conformidad de lo resuelto por Su Majestad en consulta del conde mi señor camarero mayor de 23 de diciembre de 1638” (AGP, Administrativa, leg. 939/1, exp. 12).}

In 1636, Philip IV sent the duke of Medina de las Torres to Italy and appointed the Count-Duke of Olivares in his place. The king himself justified the appointment in the preamble to the title that he was bestowing on him:

Having recognized the problems that arise from not using the offices of \textit{gran chambelán} (=great chamberlain) and \textit{camarero mayor} (=lord chamberlain) of our households of Castile and Burgundy, as regards the appropriate respect due to our royal person, and also because experience has shown that everything dependent and attached to the exercise of this office has not had the proper method for doing things because there was nobody who could fill the post [...].\footnote{AGP, Administrativa, leg. 939/1, exp. 14. The letters patent ended as follows: “The enjoyment of everything pertinent to the said office is to be made good to you from the eighth of April of last year 1636, when I granted you the favour.”}

The impact on the court must have been enormous, to the extent that, two days later, the count of Arcos, lord steward of the household, wrote a memorandum to the Count-Duke, reminding him of the importance of the post and the great esteem in which the household of Burgundy was held among the kingdoms of Europe, at the same time as he justified the pre-eminence of this household within the Spanish Monarchy, to the detriment of that of Castile:

The office of Lord Chamberlain derives from the grandeur of the House of Burgundy and its Duke Charles, such a great prince, that he surpassed some princes and was not inferior to those of Spain or France. He possessed both Upper and Lower Burgundy, all the Low Countries and the islands of Holland and Zeeland and the rest. The status of his house was so superior that when his blood entered the Emperor’s and that of the kings of Bohemia and Hungary and Castile, the services of those households ceased and they introduced Burgundy’s.\footnote{\textit{Ibidem}, dated April 10, 1636.}
Don Gaspar de Guzmán put all his effort into regulating the Chamber with the aim of controlling expenditure and the granting of favours. First of all, he drew up new ordinances for the secretary of the chamber, the person mainly responsible for controlling those favours and the officers that served him. Then, he defined the behaviour and duties of each office of the privy chamber, laying down a new “instruction and order which is to be observed henceforth in His Majesty’s apartments,” which Philip IV proclaimed in March 1637.\footnote{Ibidem, exp. 15, Madrid, March 4, 1637. Studies of these instructions are found in: Yves Bottineau, “Aspects de la cour d’Espagne au XVIIe siècle: l’etiquette de la chambre du roi,” Bulletin Hispanique 74, no. 1–2 (1972), 138–157; Charles C. Noel, “La etiqueta borgoñona en la Corte de España (1547–1800),” Manuscrits 22 (2004), 141–150.} Finally he set about rectifying the economic imbalance affecting the royal household. The Monarchy’s economic crisis was not going to be solved by cutting down on the number of courses served to the royal household’s servants or by eliminating a few offices. For this reason, on April 7, 1638, the monarch was obliged to announce a new decree to try and cut back expenditure on the larder of his household. The decree was discussed in the Bureo and at the meetings of the board on April 10 and 13 of that year, when a series of comments were added to ensure its smooth implementation. It consisted of twenty-eight articles in which the extent to which the various departments of the royal household had contracted as a result of the budget cuts of earlier years was noticeable. However, the failure of this cost-cutting policy was recognized in article four:

Likewise, I have ordered that three thousand ducats be made available for the larder every month so that the bureo may distribute them among the merchant and menial officers of my chamber, household and stable to offset in this way the deficits that have been acknowledged up till now and the complaints that are made, apart from the fact that paying promptly may be useful for the prices of things.

In article 6, it was acknowledged that payments were not being made promptly:

And because I wish the stipends of my servants and those of the chapel and guards to be paid punctually, I have commanded the marquis of Jódar to meet Antonio Campo Redondo and, between them, to rectify whatever may remain unclear about the consignations given to the treasurer of the chamber for this payment, showing the said treasurer of the chamber the
procedures followed in the period of 30 days that have been assigned to it and the amounts that turn out to be wrong; it should then be paid out of the tax on soap and candles and the balance payable in compliance with everything owing until the end of last year, 1637, should be consigned.

But the political problems afflicting the Monarchy prevented it from turning the economy round; so, in 1639, it was decided to tackle the reform of the offices and expenditure of the queen’s household as well.\(^{88}\)

**Towards the elimination of the household of Castile: 1644**

The fall from power of the Count-Duke of Olivares, in January 1643, did not remedy the economic situation of the Monarchy, nor did it improve the situation in the royal exchequer, but it did raise the spirits insofar as the nobles who had been removed from the king’s immediate circle could now return to court. For this reason, the solutions they proposed to avoid the bankruptcy of the royal households were in no way original. On the one hand, tighter control of expenditure on the chamber and the domestic offices of the king was introduced and on the other, all the legislation to do with offices and expenditure that had been passed during the reign was gathered together in the ordinances of 1647 and published in 1651.

In general terms, the reduction in costs naturally led to the idea of reducing the number of other households that, on the face of it, served no useful purpose because they duplicated offices. The household of

\(^{88}\) “The King our Lord (glory to him), by a resolution of a proposal by the Bureo of April 16, 1639, was pleased to command that in the offices of the Household of the Queen, our lady, the number of servants that head each office in this list should be fixed, and that all the rest who exceed the appointed number, should serve and enjoy their stipends, bouche of court, apartments and other emoluments, and that as they fall vacant, they should be extinguished until they are adjusted to the reform. The publication of this resolution of His Majesty was delayed until June 20, 1642 when it was ordered to be implemented by the Bureo, and since then it has never been complied with on the grounds that in some offices certain servants were necessary, who were proposed to His Majesty on the recommendation of the Bureo, this with regard to Heads and Assistants; and also His Majesty during this same time granted various favours because it suited his royal service giving supernumerary posts, which as they have fallen vacant, have been filled again so that the number of the reform has never been complied with” (AGP, *Administrativa*, leg. 928).
THE POLITICAL CONFIGURATION OF THE SPANISH MONARCHY

Castile was a case in point. The first serious attempt at eliminating, or at least, reforming the household of Castile dates from 1644. With this in mind, a Board was formed to study the economic situation of the household and what it would mean in terms of savings if it were reformed or eliminated. The plan seemed suitable and so the Board presented it to the monarch, who turned it down. Philip IV’s response to this reform is a perfect example of the contradiction in which the Monarchy was embroiled: struggling on the one hand, to make economic savings, whilst on the other, striving to retain the structural and political organization which previous monarchs, such as Philip II, had used to build on:

Reforming expenses that can be spared was never more necessary and now could not be a more appropriate moment; but there are things (despite this) that cannot be changed either by resolutions or orders publicly proclaimed by me, either because they constitute ancient customs of my Royal Households which cannot cease to exist without a loss of authority, or, because they have considerations of gracious favours, they also have a share in justice for services having been rendered that deserve fair and proportionate remuneration, or because they are like a stipend and salary which are necessary precisely to sustain those who serve me according to their posts and quality. And so, although I am grateful that the Board has looked so closely at what could be strengthened in the Household of Castile, I find few things among those that are proposed which, from my point of view, do not oblige me to tolerate them as they are. […] They are servants who serve loyally and they and the rest that you wish to reform live on what they are given to sustain themselves, and when they are paid promptly it is less than what is necessary in these times, and so I resolve that for now no new thing be done over and above what is declared here.

The monarch’s reflections effectively prevented the elimination of the royal household of Castile, but the changes that were implemented from that time on were far-reaching and had serious consequences for its structure. The household of Castile became an irritating appendage of the royal service, whose servants were irrelevant to the government of the Monarchy. From an economic point of view, Philip IV began by suppressing the position of paymaster of the royal household of Castile.
on February 3, 1645; moreover, he placed the income for maintaining the household in those sources of Crown revenue that were difficult to collect, so that from then on the officers did not receive their wages promptly. This meant that the heads of each household section or profession were obliged to meet annually to share out the meagre income that existed.

Meanwhile, the household of Burgundy – the household that represented the dynasty – was emerging as the sole service of the Spanish Monarchy and all members of the royal family. Philip IV had confirmed this in letters to his sister, Maria Anna, when, in 1629, she set off for Vienna to marry the future emperor, Ferdinand III. In them, he told her that she was “my greatest Ambassador to her father-in-law and her husband” and concluded by:

asking Your Majesty affectionately to endeavour with particular care and attention to keep her service in the style of the Household of Burgundy, which we esteem so much here and wish our infantas not to forget it anywhere, and with great insistence, both with His Imperial Majesty and the King of Hungary, in my name, urge Your Majesty not to allow this to be abandoned nor that Your Majesty, as Infanta of Castile neglect to observe the style of the Household of Burgundy, something that I shall hold as a special favour, which doubtless for the decency of the person of Your Majesty is a great advantage and no less for that of the Emperor and King of Hungary, and for us, the contrary is of great disadvantage. And it seems that at home, where we are all one, it would not be right for me to neglect to achieve something which I desire and prize so highly, as has happened to us with feeling in France.90

89 “It has been put to me that it would be well if the paymaster of my household of Castile, whoever he may be, should be granted before a fixed notary all powers, cessions and other dispatches to do with the said office and household, and with a budget which for this reason is not to produce any cost to my Royal Exchequer; I have resolved that it should be done thus and that it be in the presence of Gabriel Rodríguez de las Cuevas, my royal notary who has been involved in this exercise for some time now. He will be given a dispatch that may serve as title but without a stipend” (AGP, Administrativa, leg. 340).