INTRODUCTION

1. Padgett and Ansell (1993, 1263) refer to this trait as “multivocality,” which they define as “the fact that single actions can be interpreted coherently from multiple perspectives simultaneously, the fact that single actions can be moves in many games at once, and the fact that public and private motivations cannot be parsed. Multivocal action leads to Rorschach blot identities, with all alters constructing their own distinctive attribution of the identity of ego.”


3. The traditional period of mourning in Islam.

4. Conversations with Aisha and Ibrahim, author’s field notes, June 2012.

5. I follow the terminology used in Palestinian history and politics by referring to individual parties that trained and fielded armed wings focused on irregular warfare as the “guerrilla parties” or “factions.” These include Fatah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, al-Sa’iqa, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Fatah al-Intifada, and so on. The Palestine Liberation Organization is a separate, umbrella entity that fielded its own armed divisions, including both security forces and the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), a more conventionally trained force.


7. Wood’s use of the term “repertoire of violence” draws from Charles Tilly’s concept of a “repertoire of contention” or a “repertoire of collective action” (See, e.g., Tilly 1978, 1986, 2008; della Porta 2013; Hoover Green 2016; Gutiérrez-Sanín and Wood 2017). Throughout the book, I reference both “repertoires of violence” and Francisco Gutiérrez-Sanín and Elisabeth Jean Wood’s (2017) related concept of “patterns of violence,” where said patterns are “comprised of the repertoire of violence in which the organization regularly engages and, for each element of the repertoire, its targeting, frequency, and technique” (23).

8. John Padgett and Christopher Ansell (1993, 1468–69) refer to these resource-based ties as “relational flows.”

9. Repurposing and remapping closely resemble Padgett and Ansell’s (1993, 1468) concepts of “transposition” and “recombination” of social ties across network domains—processes themselves modeled via a “perspectival” comparison (Schaffer 2018) between network transformation and biochemical processes. Individual, agentive actions play a greater role in repurposing and remapping than they do in Padgett and Ansell’s approach, meaning that individual-level actors can also err, learn, and update in the process to a greater degree.

10. See, for example, Reno (1999), Nordstrom (2004), and Avant (2005).

11. This theory builds on Elisabeth Jean Wood’s (2008) analysis of the transformative effects of war on social networks. Specifically, Wood emphasizes how processes that characterize wartime environments—such as mobilization and polarization—structurally alter everyday social relations by both creating new networks and destroying others.

12. Researchers have shared increasingly robust findings on the interaction of social networks with violence, demonstrating, for example, that it is interactions between violent
victimization and victims' presence within dense relational networks—rather than the attribute of victimization or dense social networks in and of themselves—that drive political outcomes (Dorff 2017).

13. The concept of social infrastructure builds on Roger Petersen's (2001) research, which demonstrates how various degrees of overlap between distinct, everyday social networks—for example, chambers of commerce and fraternities—shape and sustain mobilization. His work, in turn, draws from threshold models of mobilization (Granovetter 1978). By contrast, recent research on insurgency portrays “networked” insurgencies as distinct from “hierarchical” armed organizations (see, e.g., Serena 2014, 3–5, 30, 42–47), treating a “networked” organizational structure as an attribute and assigning intrinsic characteristics (such as adaptability) to “networked” versus “hierarchical” groups rather than examining patterns and degrees of social and organizational network overlap and their effects on outcomes.


15. On this point, see also Schulhofer-Wohl (2020).

16. Author’s field notes, May and June 2012.

1. MEMORIES AND MYTHOLOGIES OF MILITANCY

1. Critics of structural ethnographies have noted the reductionism inherent to functionalist approaches (see, e.g., Kapferer 1972) by highlighting that they tend to gloss over meanings and subtleties and take responses to questions as providing face value “data” on ties (Wedeen 2010, 257–58; see also Pachucki and Breiger 2010, 207). Yet scholars have also highlighted how network analysis has been used to challenge structural-functionalist accounts, in particular by demonstrating “how idealized structural components stressed by the structural-functionalists—such as kinship, political, religious, and economic subgroups—are ignored [their emphasis] in the daily interactions of people” (Laumann et al. 1992, 62). Kate Meagher (2010, 23) presents an excellent critique of functionalist network and social capital approaches, emphasizing the need to move toward “an institutional problematic that reconnects networks with social and historical processes.”

2. Research on conventional militaries emphasizes the role of logistical operations in shaping strategic options and efficacy (Van Creveld 1977).

3. In the words of Soss (2018), to iteratively “case” studies as opposed to studying pre-set cases.

4. I first visited Lebanon in the summer of 2007 for language training and initial research. I returned the next summer, stayed for a year from October 2009 to the following October, and visited again for May–June of 2011, May–June of 2012, January and May–June of 2014, and for a final two weeks of archival work in 2018. A fuller description of my research methods and ethical considerations is available in Appendix A.

5. “Fly-by research” occurs when researchers spend only a few days conducting interviews at a site and then leave (Sukarieh and Tannock 2013).

6. Many of my interlocutors perceived foreign researchers and journalists as conducting interviews in the camps only to reinforce stories they had already decided to tell. For cadres and former militants, adopting the language of “Christian versus Muslim” to describe the Lebanese Civil War was usually not a reflection of their lived experience or genuine political analysis; rather, it served as a stock narrative to “give outsiders what they wanted,” when members of camp communities didn’t feel people were genuinely interested in their reflections. See Parkinson (2022) for an analysis of related research dynamics in crisis-affected spaces.

7. Conversation with Nafisa, author’s field notes, June 2012.
8. In Shatila, many of those who died during the siege were buried in the mosque in the center of the camp, where a memorial exists today.

9. I attended several large Fatah and PLO events in which politicians from Amal were featured on the program as being Lebanese supporters of the Palestinian cause. Their presence was a frequent source of tension within the organizations’ memberships. On more than one occasion, I overheard people around me—and, in one case, the elderly woman next to me—muttering with disdain during these officials’ speeches.

10. Conversation with Nafisa, author’s field notes, June 2012.

11. Author’s field notes, May 2010.

12. Similar events are detailed in Pauline Cutting’s (1989) memoir of working in the camp hospital at this time.

13. Farouq had worked with women who were smugglers from his more protected location. His primary contact in the network, a woman who acted as a bridge between cells in several neighborhoods within Beirut, had been caught and executed. He had previously facilitated multiple productive introductions to male cadres.

14. See Parkinson (2016) on memory cultures associated with Old Fatah. See McLean (2016, 7 and 8) for a broader theory of how social networks produce culture and are produced by it.

15. They all spoke to friends and colleagues about the interview; there was nothing sensitive about our conversations.

2. BUILDING A SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE

1. Interview with Abu Bakr, Saida, summer 2010.

2. Interview with Giovanni, summer 2008.

3. Interviews with Ansar Allah commander in Ain al-Hilweh, Usbat al-Ansar’s public affairs officer in Ain al-Hilweh (as told to and transcribed by a fixer), and a Fatah leader in Ain al-Hilweh, August 2007.

4. Interview with Ansar Allah commander in Ain al-Hilweh and head Ansar Allah checkpoint officer, August 2007.

5. See, e.g., Sogge (2016) for a recent example. The “imminent jihad in Ain al-Hilweh” story is a common early pitch for journalists arriving in Lebanon to the extent that it is a joke among long-term observers of Lebanese and Palestinian politics.

6. Author’s field notes, summer 2012.


8. For example, see the work of scholars such as Rosemary Sayigh (1979, 1994, 1995, 2007), Brynen (1990a, 1990b), Jaber Suleiman (1997, 1999), Bayan Nuwayhed al-Hout (2004), Diana Allan (2013), Laleh Khalili (2007a, 2005), and Nadya Hajj (2016), in addition to organizers of projects such as the Palestinian Oral History Archive at the American University of Beirut; community historians such as Hilana Abdullah (2008), Mahmud Abdullah Kallam (2008), and Ahmed Ali al-Hajali (2007); and documentary filmmakers such as Mai Masri (1998), Dahna Abourahmane (2010), and Mahdi Fleifel (2014).

9. Meaning “catastrophe” and referring to Palestinians’ dispossession and expulsion from Mandatory Palestine and the establishment of the contemporary state of Israel.

10. Rosemary Sayigh (1979, 65, 99) places the number of Palestinian refugees who arrived in Lebanon in 1948–49 at 104,000, a number close to the 106,500 that the UN published in 1951 following a census of registered refugees (al-Hout 2004, 21). Al-Hout (2004, 21) reports that the commonly held estimate of registered and unregistered Palestinian refugees at the time was 120,000. Picard (2002, 79) puts the number of refugees at 110,000; she also notes that the Lebanese government divided Christian refugees into particular camps, including Dbayeh and Jisr al-Pasha. Mar Elias (which was established
by an Orthodox convent) and al-Buss also housed large Christian populations. Approximately 87 percent of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon identify as Sunni, 10 percent as Christian, and less than 3 percent as Shi’a.

11. For local histories of Burj al-Shamali, Burj al-Barajneh, Shatila, and Tel al-Za’atar camps that cover this era, see Abdullah (2008), al-Hajali (2007), Kallam (2008), and Faris (2007). The October 1943 Lebanese National Pact was ostensibly intended to recognize the country’s unique sectarian “balance” between Christians and Muslims; Lebanon experts repeatedly point to its more instrumentalist origins as “the winning formula for specific leaders to create a coalition government in a nominally independent Lebanon still controlled by the French” (Schulhofer-Wohl 2020, 63; see also el-Khazen 1991). Salloukh et al. (2015, 15–17) emphasize that the Pact was predominantly an “unwritten gentleman’s agreement” between Maronite and Sunni elites; Schulhofer-Wohl (2020, 62–63) underscores that it “favored the interests of Maronite and Sunni businessmen and to a large extent excluded the interests of Druze, Shi’a, and other minority communities.” Based on numbers from the 1932 census, the Pact institutionalized a 6:5 Christian-Muslim ratio in the state bureaucracy and parliament. Maronite Christians were allotted the powerful presidency as well as command of the army and control of both the General Security Directorate and the Military Intelligence Directorate (the Deuxième Bureau) (Salloukh et al. 2015, 17). The Sunni community was allocated the position of prime minister, the position of president of parliament went to the Shi’i community, and the position of vice president of parliament went to the Greek Orthodox community.

12. As a point of reference, the World Bank gives Lebanon’s 1960 population (the first year for which data are listed) as approximately 1.8 million people, with a refugee population of 137,884 (World Bank, n.d.a, n.d.c). There have been two instances in Lebanese history when large groups of Palestinians in Lebanon have received nationality: up to 55,000 Christians in the 1950s (a number given to me by a Lebanese government source who requested anonymity due to the sensitivity of the topic, but also referenced in works such as Hermez 2017); and several thousand Sunnis and Shi’is in 1994, mostly from Burj al-Shamali camp (a number relayed to me by several of the camp’s leaders, as well as five residents of the camp who could show me Lebanese identity cards, and the same Lebanese government source). Palestinian women who marry Lebanese men are granted Lebanese citizenship, which their children inherit; but neither Palestinian men who marry Lebanese women nor children of these marriages receive Lebanese citizenship. When I was in Lebanon, there was noteworthy Palestinian-Lebanese cooperation in lobbying the government to change this law, though it failed in parliament.

13. Lebanese bankers’ 1966 collaboration to bring down the extremely successful and Palestinian-owned Intra Bank is only one example of how Palestinian professionals and businesses were targeted. See Picard (2002, 79).

14. Yezid Sayigh (1997, 31) and a guide published by the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) both date the ANM’s founding to 1951. Sayigh notes that the organization set up a specific Palestine committee in 1959; PASSIA says that Habash set up “Palestinian Chapters” in 1964 to carry out armed attacks; while Khaled (1973, 71), an early member, writes that activists established the Palestine “branch” in 1962. See Y. Sayigh (1997, 75–80) on the activities of the ANM, particularly its close relationship with Nasserist Egypt and Syria.

15. Yezid Sayigh (1997, 74) notes that the ANM sought to recruit teachers in the refugee camps in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan.


17. Arafat, Khalaf, and al-Wazir all came from relatively middle-class families and received at least some university education in Cairo (Khalaf and al-Wazir after their families fled Palestine in 1948, Arafat because he had grown up in Cairo in a Gazan family).
Arafat and Khalaf were cofounders of the General Union of Palestinian Students in Cairo in 1952. See Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) (2012a, 2012b, 2012c). PASSIA differentiates between the date when the first Fatah cell was founded (1957 by Arafat and al-Wazir) and the date when the Fatah party was formally founded (1959). Yezid Sayigh (1997, 87) argues that the group did not truly coalesce into a party until 1962. Many early members of Fatah had deep ties to Gaza and the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood. See Y. Sayigh (1997, 80–87).

18. Like the ANM, the PLF worked to recruit among UNRWA teachers.

19. By 1969 Fatah controlled the PLO’s apparatus and worked to fill various positions with party members. The PLFP joined the Executive Committee (EC) in 1971, left it in 1974 in protest, and rejoined it in 1981.

20. Before Fatah opened training sites in Lebanon, its training occurred in Syria and Jordan. Fatah initially did not have its own training camps and instead used sites run by other factions. My interlocutors who had been early joiners traveled to train at these sites rather than receiving instruction in Lebanon. As a result, they were much more likely to have known people both across multiple parties and in the PLA (or had served in the PLA themselves). Later training sites were frequently differentiated by party, so there was less of a chance that trainees would develop cross-organization connections.


22. These suburban shanty districts became known as the “Belt of Misery.”

23. Picard (2002, 81–82) places the number of Palestinians who left Jordan for Lebanon at over 100,000 people.

24. Interview with a member of the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee, summer 2008; interview with Abu Talib, an aid official who formerly worked in the Gulf, summer 2010.

25. Interview with Yunis (1), spring 2011.

26. The NLP was associated with the Tigers militia, which was led by Dany Chamoun, Camille’s son.

27. See Cobban (1985, 156). The PFLP’s early-1970s aircraft hijackings involved some militants from Lebanon (including Leila Khaled), though they had often trained in Jordan or in other countries.

28. One of the more spectacular acts of reprisal was the IDF’s December 28, 1968, bombing of thirteen jets that belonged to Middle East Airlines (the Lebanese national carrier) at the Beirut airport in response to a PFLP operation against an El Al passenger plane in Athens on December 26, 1968. The event became notorious for the Lebanese military’s inability to protect the airport.

29. The circumstances of the attack are highly disputed. For example, el-Khazen (2000, 286) argues that agreements between Palestinian factions and Lebanese authorities were supposed to prevent political convoys from traveling through Ain al-Rummaneh on that day, but that police directed the bus driver through the neighborhood anyway, implying a setup.

30. See Schulhofer-Wohl (2020, 96–101) for a brief summary of these events.

31. Hussein Faris (2007, 23) places the population of Tel al-Za’tar in 1972 at approximately 11,415 people. Anders Berggren et al. (1996) estimate the camp’s 1976 population to have been around 30,000 people.

32. Tel al-Za’tar’s politics and location encapsulated many of the contributing dynamics to the early stages of the Lebanese Civil War, including those related to class, ideology, migration, and sectarian cleavages. Nab’a housed many displaced, working-class Lebanese from South Lebanon, many of whom benefited from Palestinian institutions in the absence of state social services. Palestinian organizations in the camps provided
both Palestinian and Lebanese workers support for collective action, for example by backing employee strikes. In 1972, for instance, tobacco workers led significant labor actions, and employees of the Ghandour chocolate factory went on strike. However, Palestinian factions were also illicitly levying taxes in the area; Christian politicians worried that the camps provided a potential location from which to stage politician kidnappings and other military operations. Interview with Abu Tariq (1), Beirut, fall 2010; interview with Hala, Beirut, summer 2012.

33. This chain of events was brutal; at one point, soon-to-be members of the FLA executed Muslim officers in their barracks. Interview with Mina, NGO worker and daughter of one of the executed officers, Saida, spring 2010.

34. Interview with Hala, Beirut, summer 2012.

35. In other words, her family’s village in Palestine, a common means of identification in the camps.

36. Interview with Zahra, spring 2010.

37. While I did not inquire about interviewees’ experiences of sexual violence, several women voluntarily identified themselves or family members as having survived sexual assault.

38. Sayigh also notes that around 3,000 civilians and 400 fighters had fled the camp on August 9 and 10. In sum, 4,280 people died during the siege; 450 were members of militant organizations and 750 were “armed volunteers.”

39. There is considerable debate over Yasir Arafat’s role in the siege and diplomacy surrounding it. The Palestinian leadership could have told the camp to surrender when the situation proved hopeless, but did not. Arafat also ordered fighters in the camp to break various ceasefires, prolonging hostilities and potentially provoking both reprisals and the media coverage they would invite. Arafat’s deployment of moral hazard tactics became a bone of contention within Fatah and the PLO during the 1985–1988 War of the Camps.

40. Multiple accounts tell of this particular operation, known in Israel as the Coastal Road Massacre. Cobban records thirty-seven dead, including six Palestinian commandos, in an attack on a single passenger bus. Hugh Macleod (2008), a journalist who researched the incident on the occasion of a 2008 prisoner and body exchange between Israel and Lebanon, writes that the team hijacked two civilian buses, one of which later exploded during a gun battle with Israeli security forces. The cause of the explosion is disputed; Macleod notes that Israeli authorities maintain that al-Mughrabi used grenades to blow it up with the civilians on board, though Palestinian sources argue that gunfire from an Israeli helicopter ignited the bus.

41. In 1980 the FLA was rebranded the South Lebanon Army (SLA).

42. A crusader castle southeast of Nabatiyeh that overlooks the Lebanon–Israel border. Palestinian militants held the castle throughout the 1970s.

43. Interview with Hala, Beirut, summer 2012.

44. A standard US or NATO brigade comprises approximately 2,000–5,000 people. A battalion commonly includes 500–800 people.

45. By the World Bank’s measures, Lebanon’s population in 1980 was approximately 2.59 million Lebanese and 235,105 refugees (World Bank n.d.a; n.d.c). The refugee number, which the World Bank sources from UNRWA and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), almost certainly does not include Palestinians who left Jordan in 1970–1971; the World Bank numbers for refugees in Jordan consistently increase throughout the 1970s (World Bank n.d.b.).

46. To this day, medical institutions are one of the favored forms of social service provision for the militant parties because they can employ high numbers of people through part- and full-time work. Conversation with Sabah, author’s field notes, June 2010.
3. SOCIAL NETWORKS AND WARTIME VIOLENCE


2. Kalyvas (2006, 142) defines selective violence as occurring “when there is an intention to ascertain individual guilt” and indiscriminate violence as being when “the concept of individual guilt is replaced with the concept of guilt by association.” While Balcells (2010, 2011, and 2017, 6–7, 21–24) uses the terms “direct violence” and “indirect violence,” her conceptual distinction centers on the agents deploying violence, for example, either an armed group alone or an armed group with civilian collaborators, as well as on the level of intimacy involved in the tactics, such as “indirect” aerial bombardment versus “direct” small arms fire and other forms of face-to-face violence. Balcells’s analytical focus is predominantly on pathways to direct violence behind the front lines of civil war, rather than on counterinsurgent success.


4. The faction’s armed wing from the 1960s through the 1980s.

5. Mazzeh is a neighborhood in Damascus that is home to the Mazzeh Military Airport and a Syrian Air Force Intelligence base that includes detention facilities. “Qism Falastin” was Kamal’s term for the “Palestine Branch,” a name that refers to Branch 235 of Syrian Military Intelligence, which has its own detention facilities in Mazzeh. Tadmor (previously located near the Palmyra ruins in eastern Syria) and Sadnaya (located just north of Damascus) are Syrian military prisons.

6. The majority of people with whom I conducted in-depth interviews or life histories moved at least once, if not several times, throughout the wars and occupations of the 1980s. Several, like Nader and Aisha, moved both within and between cities. Zahra, Nawal, Mahmud, Dalal, Abu Houli, Kamal, and Yusif moved from city to city for their military work, personal security, and family reasons. See also al-Hajali (2007, 66), Abdul-lah (2008, 49–56).

7. Al-Safir, July 6, 1982. Interview with Dalal, spring 2011. Most of the PLO’s leadership doubted that the Israelis would reach Beirut, so few military arrangements were made for the city’s defense.

8. Rubenberg (1986, 281) and the Advisory Committee on Human Rights in Lebanon (1983). The estimated number of registered Palestinians residing in South Lebanon—both inside and outside the camps—at this time was 106,023. This number would not have included either unregistered refugees or Palestinians who had been registered in Syria or Jordan before moving to Lebanon (e.g., those who arrived following Black September or when PLA units that had trained in Syria moved into Lebanon).

9. It is traditional to decorate the bride’s and groom’s cars with ribbons, tulle, and flowers, so this was a funny statement; they were escaping a war zone in a car ostensibly covered in flowers and pink and white fabric.

10. Interview with Abu Wissam, Sur, summer 2010.

11. The conflicting destruction estimates could reflect anything from varying measurement approaches (a house still standing is not necessarily inhabitable) to different reporting time frames (before or after bulldozing).

12. White phosphorous is used as an incendiary and as a marker, as well as to screen troop movements. It is not illegal to produce or deploy in combat. However, Protocol III of the Convention on Prohibition or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) “prohibits and restricts the use of incendiary weapons in civilian populations” (Federation of American Scientists, n.d.) as do the Geneva Conventions. The
previously named Convention itself, though authored in 1980, did not enter into force until December 1983. Israel has not consented to be bound by Protocol III. Lebanon, while a party to the Convention, did not consent by be bound by Protocol II, which restricts the use of mines and booby-traps. 

13. Interview with Abu Riyad, summer 2012.


15. Abdullah (2008, 50–52). This question was partially meant to assess my respect for the camp’s community and history, in addition to sharing knowledge of the massacre with me as an outsider.


17. According to Schiff and Ya’ari (1984), officers in the Kastel Brigade, the Yarmouk Brigade, the Jarmak Battalion, and the Karameh Brigade also abandoned their posts. Shuqair (1983) notes that Colonel Saied al-Muragha (Abu Musa), who served as Commander of the Yarmouk Brigade and who spearheaded the PLO’s 1982 defense of Beirut, held one of Yasir Arafat’s key supporters responsible for the rout in Saida. My Palestinian interlocutors repeatedly referenced Kastel Brigade Commander Colonel Haj Ismail’s desertion as noteworthy because he was later the subject of an internal Fatah inquiry. Afterward, Arafat controversially reinstalled him in a high-ranking post in Lebanon, contributing to internal turmoil in Fatah that culminated in a 1983 mutiny that al-Muragha led (see chapter 6).

18. Yermiya (1984, 15) describes in detail the IDF’s harsh treatment of Lebanese as well as Palestinian residents of Saida, emphasizing that the IDF made few plans to manage civilian communities’ needs following the destruction of their homes.

19. Most authors agree that religious authorities contributed significantly to the defense of the camp. Schiff and Ya’ari (1984) reference an Iranian-inspired mullah by the name of Haj Ismail leading a group called the Soldiers of Allah. Khalidi (1985) cites “Muslim shaykhs” as helping to lead the defense of the camp. Rougier (2007) attributes Ain al-Hilweh’s resistance efforts to “Islamist networks,” on the basis that the PLO factions had “retreated north to defend Beirut.” He contends that “The Islamist militants who provided the camp’s principal defense were almost all students of the Palestinian shaykh Ibrahim Ghunaym, who was visiting Iran during the clashes but lost a son in the siege of the camp.” Khalili (2007b) specifically disputes Rougier’s account, arguing: “He writes that Islamist organizations in Ain al-Hilweh spearheaded the defense of the camp in 1982 (they did not).” The distinction pertains to the extent of specifically Islamic organizations’ involvement and leadership in the camp’s defense, rather than the participation of local religious authorities and students. My interviews indicated that local (non-Islamic) militias and camp-based cadres played more of a role than Rougier’s account implies.

20. Civilians may or may not have initially known what different forms of ordnance were. Mahmoud Zeidan’s memoir, which is based on his experience as a child in the camp during this time, simply mentions a nameless white drizzle or spray that covered surfaces following some air raids (Zeidan 2017, 254).

21. Conversations with Abu Houli, author’s field notes, June 2012; conversations with Nader, author’s field notes, June 2012; group interview with former Shatila defense men, Beirut, summer 2012.

24. Yermiya (1984, 28) notes that IDF officers quickly became aware that the collaborators (whom they referred to as “monkeys”) had accused innocent people and protected their own acquaintances. He emphasizes that the practice was allowed to continue because Israeli officers believed it would warn innocent people of “what waits for terrorists.”
25. Kalyvas (2006) extensively discusses denunciation of this sort. He notes the use of hooded informers, in multiple counterinsurgent repertoires, underscoring its deployment by invading and colonial forces such as the British in Kenya (p. 186), the Germans in Greece (p. 148), and Americans in Iraq (p. 187), summarizing: “The figure of the hooded informer fingerling the people to be arrested (the infamous encapuchado in Latin America) is common across most civil wars” (193). See Balcells (2017) on the use of civilian collaborators.
28. Interviews with Yusif, who was held at the Safa facility, summer and fall 2010; Ziyad, a former inmate of Ansar, fall 2010; Abu Riyadh, a former leader of an Ansar sub-camp, summer 2012; Mahmud, former inmate of Ansar, spring 2011. Ziyad, Abu Riyadh, and Mahmud spent several years in Ansar. A woman interviewed for this project spent a month in Ansar after being imprisoned at IDF headquarters (most likely the facility housed at Saida’s St. Joseph’s Convent) for over a week for displaying a Palestinian flag. According to her, the women’s section of Ansar was much smaller (when she was there, about twenty-five other women were with her) and the women were generally held for about a year. Abourahme (2010) also discusses the transfer of high-level Lebanese and Palestinian female political prisoners to Israel. Also see Khalili (2008), and al-Safir, October 1 and 2, 1982, and March 16, 1983.
29. “Notes on Two Interviews with Dan Friesen, MCC staff, Sidon,” September 23, 1983. Box “1983-Middle East-Lebanon-Relief/Reconstruction,” Folder 10153. American Friends Service Committee Archive. Philadelphia, p. 2. In July 2008, Israel returned to Lebanon five living prisoners and the remains of 200 Lebanese and Palestinian soldiers who had been kept in Israel, in exchange for the remains of two Israeli soldiers held by Hizbullah. Many of the Lebanese and Palestinian bodies were people taken prisoner or killed during this period. The day when trucks drove through the border bearing prisoners and caskets was treated as a somber holiday in the camps but also understood as a significant symbolic victory over Israel.
30. Original data gathered by Ayesha Durrani for the author.
31. The Italian contingent was stationed around Mar Elias and Sabra-Shatila; the French patrolled northwest Beirut, while the Americans took up positions around the airport, close to Burj al-Barajneh.
32. Fisk (2002, 350) discusses several competing sources of the actual number of evacuees. He also notes that at least 10,000 fighters remained in northern and eastern Lebanon in the zones of Syrian control. Schiff and Ya’ari (1984, 228) place the number of evacuees at 14,398 fighters (both Palestinian and Syrian), plus 664 women and children. This number jibes with Mahmoud al-Natour’s report that 14,000 Palestinian fighters battled the IDF’s 170,000 (al-Natour 2014a, I:659). Al-Hout (2004, 35–39) notes that there was considerable confusion over whether members of the PLO and guerrilla fighters who lived in Lebanon (rather than those who had transferred from Jordan in 1970 and 1971) were supposed to leave with the rest, given that they may have been permanently blocked from returning to their families.
33. Interview with Zahra (1), spring 2010. Y. Sayigh (1997, 541–42) notes that military leaders across organizations had not seriously expected—or planned for—the IDF to reach Beirut.
34. Interview with Aisha (1), spring 2010.
35. The assassination can be seen as a “triggering event,” that is, “an event or part of a chain of events that initiated a sharp escalation in atrocity violence” (Straus 2015, 10). Straus (2015, 8) notes that such moments must be historically and contextually situated, as well as being closely examined for how “influential actors manipulate and use events,” rather than being understood as singularly and independently causal.
36. Shatila has been an official—that is, UNRWA administered—refugee camp since 1949. The camp itself occupies only one square kilometer. Though the term is not technically accurate, many of my Palestinian and Lebanese interlocuters referred to Sabra, and sometimes al-Daouk, using the term mukhayyam (“camp”). See Appendix C.
37. Documents produced by the government-convened Kahan Commission demonstrated that Israeli leaders were well aware of the potential for their Lebanese allies to commit a massacre and did not work to prevent it. See Kahan Commission (1983); Anziska (2018); Khalidi (2018).
38. Interview with Abu Hassan, Summer 2012. Wathaʾiq al-Harb al-Lubnaniyya, a multi-volume collection that documents the war in detail, mentions raids and arrests occurred in mid-October in Burj al-Barajneh. The writing corroborates the detention site at the Ministry of Defense and puts the number of Palestinians, Lebanese, and other nationalities arrested at 1,441 people (al-Din 1985, 102–104).

4. BEYOND THE LINES
1. Author’s field notes, May 2010.
2. Heavily militarized, often Syrian-trained guerrilla factions such as al-Saʾiqa and the PFLP-GC tended to be smaller overall, to focus less on social service provision, and to be more dominated by men in comparison to Fatah, the PLFP, and the DFLP. The large majority of the women I interviewed were in or had been in Fatah, the DFLP, or the PFLP. While I interviewed several women who were associated with the PFLP-GC and had participated in various roles, they had not previously been scouts, nor had they received military training.
3. The PSP is a predominantly Druze party, whereas Amal is a predominantly Shiʿi party. Amal was initially founded in 1974 as Harakat al-Mahrumin (The Movement of the Deprived), to represent marginalized Shiʿa and other populations’ interests in Lebanon. Amal recruited heavily in neighborhoods in the “Belt of Misery” around Beirut where Shatila and Burj al-Barajneh are located (and where Tel al-Zaʿtar and Jisr al-Basha were also located). In the suburbs of East Beirut, Palestinian and poor Shiʿa populations often engaged in labor and political organizing together. Hizbullah, a predominantly Shiʿi militant party that follows an expressly Islamist ideology, coalesced in the 1980s with support from Iran and largely in response to the Israeli occupation. It attracted many of its members from Amal. Palestinians who had trained with Amal militants in the 1970s (see chapter 2), thus often knew people in both Amal and Hizbullah in the 1980s. I note throughout the book when people cited these connections to Lebanese parties as shaping network change in Palestinian groups.
4. Interview with Dalal, Saida, spring 2011.
5. Interview with Dalal, Saida, spring 2011.
6. Interview with Dalal, Saida, spring 2011.
7. Interview with Munadileh, Saida, spring 2011.
10. Interview with Dalal, Saida, spring 2011.
11. Interview with Yusif (4), Beirut, autumn 2010.
12. Interview with Kamal, summer 2012.
13. Interview with Yusif (4), fall 2010.
14. These particular experience jibes with Finkel’s (2015 and 2017) arguments about the role of past repression in activists’ ability to acquire “toolkits” for rebellion.
15. In Paul Staniland’s (2014, 25–28) terms, these organizations had been “integrated” prior to 1982, with strong horizontal and vertical ties between militants.
16. Interview with Hussam, fall 2010.
17. Interview with Yusif (4), fall 2010.
18. See, for example, al-Safir, on these dates in 1984: January 24, March 14, May 5 and 17, and December 9 and December 23.
22. Interview with Ziyad, fall 2010.
23. Interview with Abu Riyad, summer 2012.
25. Conversation with Mahmud, author’s field notes, June 2012.
27. Interview with Kamal, Beirut, summer 2012.
28. Interview with Dalal, Saida, spring 2011.
30. I was able to fully access nine issues of Sawt al-Mukhayyam at the Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut and also to interview one of its former editors.
31. At this juncture, repair contracts were tied to the company that sold the machine. Interview with Bassam (2), spring 2012.
32. Indeed, in my fieldwork, I frequently noticed that party officials would read their own newsletters as well as those of rival organizations, prompting me to ask people how they had previously interacted with publications such as Sawt al-Mukhayyam.
36. Interview with Munadileh, Saida, spring 2011.

5. CROSSING COLLABORATORS
1. Author’s field notes, June 2012.
2. Issues related to collaboration, infiltration, and the presence of spies surfaced in most of my interviews with former militants, with varying degrees of detail. Multiple interlocutors identified accused collaborators by name in their conversations with me, both as historical information and as a personal warning. In the interest of confidentiality and safety, I do not identify living individuals whom my interviewees accused and do not otherwise reveal accused collaborators’ names unless the material is directly quoted from a broadly
and publicly circulated source such as a national newspaper. I have provided pseudonyms for individuals identified in publicly accessible but not widely circulated archival materials, such as internal NGO reports and the POHA video archives. I never asked about specific individuals’ histories of collaboration even if multiple others identified them as collaborators. I interviewed several people whom others had accused of collaboration. None of them revealed themselves as collaborators, but people did speak openly of having held leadership roles in Ansar. Other Ansar inmates strongly believed these positions were given to collaborators and associated them with collaboration (see chapter 3).

3. Interview with Dalal, spring 2011.


5. Al-Mughrabi, Bushra. 2009. Interview with Umm Karim Abu Salim and Hala Abu Salim. Video. Palestinian Oral History Archive. https://n2t.net/ark:/86073/b3h05z. Copyright holder Al-Jana/AUB University Libraries, licensed under CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. Around m. 28:00. The term “zalama” can be used to indicate “man” or, in more colloquial usage, is roughly equivalent to “the man.”

6. Interview with Tala, Sur, summer 2012.

7. Interview with Dalal, Saida, spring 2011.


9. Al-Safir, July 10, 1982. It was incredibly difficult for Lebanese and Palestinian journalists to travel across the front lines; many international outlets covered South Lebanon during this time via their Jerusalem correspondent.


12. Interview with Chantal, spring 2010.


14. This tactic had been used from the early days of the Lebanese Civil War to request people’s ID cards, which listed their confessional background and thus could be used to target people of a particular group.

15. Interview with Yusif (2). On denunciation and violence in civil war, see Kalyvas (1999, 2006).


17. Interview with Dalal, Saida, spring 2011.

18. Fatah issued a statement directly on this point on September 30, 1982, that emphasized not only the presence in Saida of the same Lebanese Christian militias that had perpetrated the Sabra and Shatila massacre, but reported that thousands of men and youths were being held at Ansar, leaving the Palestinians in the region even more vulnerable. Al-Safir, September 30, 1982.


22. See al-Safir November 7 and December 2, 1984.
28. See al-Safir November 7 and December 2, 1984.
30. Interview with Yusif (2), fall 2010.
31. Abu Houli also chose to share this story with me after we had spent two hours drinking coffee and smoking cigarettes with the son as he shared his experiences from prison and from the Sur guerrilla underground in the latter half of the decade. His timing seemed designed to evoke the complexity of the son’s position under the occupation, especially as a former prisoner; intimidated by the Israelis both in his personal life and as a member of a different political faction than his father, he made his choice not simply as a matter of either money or revenge (though it was one that Abu Houli deplored).
35. Zeidan uses the terms “umala’a” (informants) and “jawasis” (spies) to describe collaborators.
36. Given the determination and tactics of Ain al-Hilweh’s defensive forces during the invasion, it is likely that the camp retained a reputation among IDF soldiers.
37. The implication was that the men were trying to act tough and exhibiting bravado.
m. 50:20. The word “ytzaharu” was transcribed phonetically from the original interview video; the author thanks Faten Ghosn for her assistance with precise translation.


40. See, for example, al-Safir, January 3 and May 11, 1984. Interview with Abu Houli, June 2012.

41. Interview with Fadi, fall 2010.


45. On the National Guard see al-Safir, June 15 and June 16, 1983; March 10, May 6, May 8, May 17, October 20, and November 4, 1984; on targeting accused collaborators see al-Safir August 8, 1983; September 28, 1984; and al-Safir, January 5, 1985, on the murder of Abu Maher al-Hindawi and a member of the al-Issa family. The IDF had replaced many local goods with Israeli ones, meaning that even people who were not politically affiliated had economic incentives to engage in these activities.

46. For example, see al-Safir, December 30, 1983.


48. Author’s field notes, July 2010.


50. “Rashidiye Camp Near Sour (Tyre).” March 21, 1983. Box “1983-Middle East-Lebanon-Relief/Reconstruction,” Folder 11551. American Friends Service Committee Archive. Philadelphia. What seems to be the man’s real name is printed in the AFSC reports. I have chosen to give him a pseudonym in the event that printing a name contained in rarely quoted archives held in the US could cause harm to the man’s family or community. The pseudonym I have given him cannot be mistaken for the name of a living person.


52. Interview with Abu Haytham, Sour, summer 2010.


54. I thank Jon Mercer for helping me to clarify this point.

6. THE FACE OF THE CAMPS

1. I met and interviewed several of the people who post on the page. I have thus been able to triangulate much of its content through primary and secondary sources. How-
ever, I am interested predominantly in how his former colleagues represent Abu Tawq, particularly with relation to the Fatah leadership and his status peers in other Palestinian organizations.

2. Disillusioned with the PLO and with Fatah’s elite leadership and command style, military strategy, and changing stance toward Israel, as well as Arafat’s nepotism in military appointments, al-Muragha had been building a dissident network since 1982. Following his submission of a dissenting memo to the January 1983 PLO Revolutionary Council meeting, al-Muragha led a Syrian-supported mutiny in summer 1983 against Arafat, splitting the Yarmouk Brigade, executing Fatah loyalist officers, and triggering intra-Palestinian fighting in the Bekaa and Trablous. He publicly justified the group’s actions in an interview with *al-Kifah al-'Arabi*, a weekly Beirut-based publication, in part by referencing the events of June 1982: “Arafat insisted on giving the most sensitive posts to persons known for their moral, political, and military limitations. Such persons were directly responsible for the [1982] defeat. Arafat promoted them or assigned them to more sensitive jobs. This meant that Arafat was preparing for a new defeat, with the same persons. We had no choice but to act quickly in order to stop this deterioration” (Abu Musa and Abu Salih 1983, 180). For a summary of al-Muragha’s stance and the mutiny’s dynamics see, e.g., Shuquair (1983), Rouleau et al. (1983), Rouleau (1983), and Wright (1983).

3. Conversation with Aisha and Ibrahim, author’s field notes, June 2012.


5. Interview with Aisha (1), spring 2010.

6. Interviews with Zahra (1, 2), Abu Umar, Aisha (1, 2), and Abu Tariq (2). Nader’s family was from Tel al-Za’tar camp; his mother told me that their greatest fear during was being separated as they were following the camp’s evacuation and the massacre of thousands of refugees. The experience of separation following the fall of Tel al-Za’tar was particularly trying for the women, who spent weeks trying to find news of the men. Their family consequently decided to live clustered in one camp; they were convinced that there would be more massacres and wanted to be able to find and protect each other. Conversation with Umm Nader, author’s field notes, June 2012.

7. While the majority of my interviewees were born sometime in the 1960s (give or take a few years), earlier generations of militants (those who had been born in Palestine or born shortly after the Nakba) who joined groups such as the ANM had used cell-based organizational structures to operate underground on university campuses where political organizing was banned (see Khaled 1973, 63–64). By the early 1980s, many in this older generation had moved into leadership roles in organizations that originated from the ANM, including the PFLP, DFLP, ALF, and PFLP-GC. In the 1980s, high-ranking officers in these organizations were often based in Damascus.

8. Interview with Nader, fall 2010.

9. Abu Tawq replaced the former head of the clandestine apparatus in West Beirut. The former leader had refused to leave Lebanon with the leadership and guerrillas in 1982; he was killed in early 1985. Several of his cousins were key players in the underground cell network.

10. Interview with Abu Hassan, Beirut, summer 2012.

11. Interview with Abu Hassan, Beirut, summer 2012.


13. Interview with Abu Hassan, Beirut, summer 2012.

14. Both in general and with specific regard to potential PLO negotiations with the Israeli government.

15. This comparison may have had even more salience at the time if Palestinians were then aware that the LAF’s predominantly Christian Eighth Brigade was supporting the
predominantly Shi’i Sixth Brigade, that the LAF’s command (also Christian dominated) had decided to supply the Sixth Brigade with extra ammunition, and that East Beirut hospitals had been expressly opened to wounded Amal militiamen (Aruri 1985, 8). However, none of my interlocutors ever mentioned this connection, so I was unable to empirically link knowledge of the Eighth Brigade’s involvement to contemporaneous understandings of the War of the Camps.

16. Interview with Sami Ibrahim, former member of Beirut’s building committee, June 2012.
17. Interview with Abu Tariq (2), spring 2011.
18. Interview with Sami Ibrahim, June 2012.
19. With inflation at the time, Abu Tariq noted, this amount was around US$500.
20. Interview with Abu Tariq (2), spring 2011.
21. Yezid Sayigh (1997, 583) places the number of defenders (militia members or guerrillas) in Sabra and Shatila at 250–300 and at 500–600 in Burj al-Barajneh. In the following nine months, Fatah, the PLO’s leading organization, only sent 150 guerrilla reinforcements to the Beirut camps (Y. Sayigh 1997, 589). Chris Giannou (1990, 44–45), who was in the camp by fall of 1985, estimates that Fatah had about 1,000 members (90 percent of whom were camp residents) but that the majority of groups only fielded 90–120 members, though he notes a distinction between the PFLP members, who were from the camp, versus factions that brought in members from outside, including al-Sa’iqa, Fatah al-Intifada, and the PFLP-General Command.

22. One of the fighters drew a map of the system for me; it looked like a wagon wheel with spokes and no rim, with the camp in the center. Group interview with fighters from Shatila’s defense, Beirut, summer 2012.
23. Conversation with Naji, author’s field notes, May 2011.
24. Conversation with former resident of Shatila who was present for the siege; author’s field notes, May 2012. Several families in Beirut, who were associated with multiple groups (including Fatah, the DFLP, and the PFLP), repeated this story to me (identifying the individual by name, which I do not do here); they all held the man in very high respect.
26. Conversation with Murid, author’s field notes, June 2012.
27. Conversation with Abu Husayn and Abu Jamal, author’s field notes, June 2012.
29. Interview with Aisha (1), Beirut, summer 2010. See Giannou (1990, 37–40) for a doctor’s account of treating a woman targeted by Amal militiamen with sexual violence near the camp.
30. Conversation with Aisha, author’s field notes, June 2012.
33. Interview with Zahra (1), summer 2010.
34. Conversation with Ibrahim, author’s field notes, May 2012.
35. Interview with Abu Hassan, Beirut, summer 2012.
36. Interview with Abu Tariq (2), spring 2011.
37. Interview with Abu Tariq (2), spring 2011.
38. Interview with Abu Tariq (2), spring 2011.
39. Interview with Abu Adnan, autumn 2010.
40. Interview with Aisha (1), spring 2010. Lines such as this often feed into a specific politics of memory that sees the past as a time when people were more supportive of each other. See Allan (2013, chap. 2). Yet, as Chapter 1 notes, people also contested this narrative, emphasizing that elite leaders had access to supplies and even luxury items such as chocolate. My goal here is less to adjudicate the truth claims (e.g., whether or not everyone actually shared) than to establish the presence of clearly shared narratives, norms, and expectations that constituted these networks.
41. Sami remembered salaries in Shatila being cut for several months during this time, but did not specify why.
42. The idea that certain political leaders did not “get their feet dirty” or “live the reality” of the camps was a recurring theme throughout my research. These accusations were repeatedly used to question leaders’ moral right to make policy. Once I learned to recognize Ali Abu Tawq’s picture, I started seeing it in small, carefully curated displays in the offices of leaders—but only those who had been present in Beirut during the 1980s.
43. Conversation with Aisha and Ibrahim, author’s field notes, June 2012.
44. Author’s field notes, September 2008.

7. “EVERY FACTION FOR ITSELF”

1. A bean-based dish eaten for breakfast.
2. “My dear,” a common term of endearment used between both friends and romantic partners.
3. Adapted from the author’s field notes, spring 2011. Names, titles, and other identifying details have been changed to protect confidentiality.
4. A significant number of Palestinians in Burj al-Shamali also identify as Shi’a.
5. On the IDF shelling Ain al-Hilweh, see al-Safir, April 16, 1985, and April 4, 1986.
10. Conversation with Abu Houli and Nader, author’s field notes, summer 2012. Interview with high-level PLO intelligence officer who reinfiltarted through Jounieh, spring 2010. Interview with Yusif (4), fall 2010. Also see, for example, al-Safir, September 19 and September 21 1986, which describes clashes between members of rival groups within Fatah.
11. See, for example, al-Safir, May 5, 1986 on the murder of a Fatah commander in Ain al-Hilweh.
12. Nader was actually approached by groups of officers who were organizing against the returnees from Tunis, but refused to participate in their plans. Conversation with Nader and Abu Houli, summer 2012.
13. Interview with Yusif (4), fall 2010.
15. Interview with George, fall 2010.
16. Conversation with Abu Ali, author’s field notes, spring 2010. This turn of events could be evaluated in the context of competition within organizational “domains” or “fields.” See DiMaggio and Powell (1983).


18. Interview with Yusif (4), fall 2010.


20. Conversation with Abu Haytham, author’s field notes, spring 2010; conversation with Abu Ghassan, author’s field notes, spring 2010; conversation with Assad, author’s field notes, summer 2010; conversation with Adnan, author’s field notes, spring 2010; conversation with Sabah, spring 2010.

21. Conversation with former employee of a militant organization’s recruitment office, author’s field notes, June 2012.


26. The newspaper was also heavily censored by Syrian authorities, so even if reporting was more balanced, stories that made pro-Arafat factions look good or PNSF factions look bad may not have been printed. Informal interview with a former *al-Safir* reporter for South Lebanon, summer 2014.

27. Interview with Yusif (4), fall 2010; interview with Dalal, spring 2011; conversation with Nawal and her husband, Hisham, author’s field notes fall 2010.

28. Interview with Yusif (4), fall 2010; interview with Nawal, fall 2010.

29. Interview with Munadileh, spring 2011.

30. Nofal had been criticizing factionalism within the Palestinian military effort and advocating a joint military command and better interorganizational coordination since before the 1982 invasion. See Schiff and Ya’ari 1984 (84–85).

31. Interview with Yusif (4). See also Y. Sayigh (1997, 593–94)

32. Conversation with Yusif, author’s field notes, May 2012.


36. Author’s field notes, June 2012.

37. See *al-Safir*, July 5, 1987: “Two statements accuse “Amal” for their continuous detention of Palestinians.”

38. Interview with Abu Zaki, Saida, summer 2010.

39. Interview with Tala, Sur, summer 2012.

40. Interview with Nadia (2), spring 2011.

42. Conversation with Tala, her husband, and her brothers-in-law, author’s field notes, June 2012.
44. Interview with Abu Umar, Beirut, autumn 2010.
45. See al-Safir, July 5, 1987: “Graduation of first aid session in Ain al-Hilweh Camp”
47. Interview with Munadileh, Saida, spring 2011.
48. Interview with Nawal, South Lebanon, autumn 2010.
49. Conversation with Hisham, author’s field notes, autumn 2010.
50. Interview with Nawal, South Lebanon, autumn 2010.
51. This military campaign was expressly designed to put pressure on Amal in order to lift the sieges in Beirut and Sur camps.
52. Interview with Nawal, South Lebanon, autumn 2010.
54. Interview with Ziyad, fall 2010, and interview with Aisha (1), spring 2010.
55. Interview with Abu Taha, al-Buss, August 2010.

CONCLUSION

2. An argument that complements Kalyvas’s (2003) observation that civil war violence is generally the product of local politics rather than “master cleavages.”

APPENDIX A

1. In 2007, I stayed on the American University of Beirut campus in Hamra. In 2008, I lived with a friend in the East Beirut neighborhood of Jeitawi, which is known for being a working-to-middle class, predominantly Lebanese Christian neighborhood that at the time was associated with the Kata’ib, because of the presence of a party office and several memorials.
2. Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the PFLP, the PFLP-GC, and Usbat al-Ansar were or are on the FTO list; at the time of my research, Fatah-Revolutionary Council (the Abu Nidal Organization) was also on the list; it was delisted in 2017. The DFLP was delisted in 1999.
4. For a discussion of the advantages and challenges of conducting research in the Middle East as a Western woman, see Schwedler (2006).
6. Per my IRB, I did not interview children under the age of 18 or include them in my research. I did observe youth events—events that included people whose ages ranged up to their mid-twenties—such as scout meetings and field trips.
8. The Mavi Marmara was one of six ships in a joint Free Gaza Movement and (Turkish) Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief flotilla that was trying to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza to deliver humanitarian and construction...
supplies. The IDF raided the ship in international waters, killing nine activists. See al-Jazeera (2010) and Reynolds (2010).

9. I subsequently donated the binder to UMAM Documentation and Research, an archival and artistic space in South Beirut, so that the material would remain accessible to Palestinian and Lebanese researchers. UMAM digitized the material and holds the original binder.

10. A full Fatah cadre would not have been permitted to hold the position that I did because of my supervisor’s leftist history; members were, however, allowed to participate in the classes and workshops that the association sponsored. I met several members of Fatah’s political and media apparatus at the association’s workshops and taught several in my class.

11. The PNSF included the PFLP, the PFLP-General Command, Fatah al-Intifada, the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), al-Sa‘iqa, and a faction of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF).

12. I thank Lee Ann Fujii for helping me to clarify these points.

13. Disaster researchers consistently find evidence that people act in altruistic ways and build social cohesion in times of crisis, so these memories were often not entirely romanticized. See, e.g., Solnit (2010).

14. Pre-civil war, Yarmouk was a vibrant Damascus neighborhood and unofficial refugee camp that housed over 110,000 people. The Syrian regime and its allies besieged the district from 2013 to 2014 following battles in 2012, resulting in starvation conditions that in many ways replicated those that Palestinians in Lebanon experienced during the War of the Camps. Those initial battles reduced the camp’s population to approximately 18,000. In 2015, ISIS entered the camp, prompting intense battles with the Syrian regime and the flight of the majority of remaining residents. For more details, see “The Crisis in Yarmouk Camp” n.d.; Sherwood 2014; Betere 2021.

15. See, e.g., Clark (2006); E. J. Wood (2006a; 2003, chap. 2); Blee (2007); Blee and Currier (2011); Brand (2014); Schwedler (2014); Campbell (2017); Clark and Cavatorta (2018); MacLean et al. (2018); Shesterinina (2018); Bond et al. (2020); J. Krause (2021).

16. See Parkinson (2021a) for a full account of these interactions.

17. I thank Lee Ann Fujii for helping me to clarify this point.

18. The meeting set up to discuss this proposal was the first time I met the Beirut regional leadership (mostly men).

19. The term “network sensibility” is a riff on the term “ethnographic sensibility,” coined by Pader (2006), and advanced by Schatz (2009) and Simmons and Smith (2017).

20. See, for example, Bringa (1995).

21. Unmarried and presumed heterosexual, to put a finer point on it.

22. I was told that she had hoped to get me fired from my volunteer position so that she could step into it.


24. Particularly during the 2006 July War, but also for reporting trips to locales such as the southern border zone, Ain al-Hilweh, or the Bekaa Valley, a good interpreter—known as a fixer in the media world—could make between US$150 and US$400 a day for facilitating interviews for a journalist. By contrast, a typical family in a camp might make that much money in a month. On the commodification of research assistance in Lebanon, see Sukarieh and Tannock (2019) and Parkinson (2019).

APPENDIX B

1. Author’s field notes, December 2009.
2. Informal interview with a former reporter for South Lebanon, summer 2014.
3. Reading Ilana Feldman’s (2007) work on Quaker humanitarianism in Gaza, which draws from the AFSC archives, inspired me to investigate whether the organization had also been present in Lebanon.
4. Books that focused on the camp communities themselves mimicked formats used by authors of Palestinian village books. See Davis (2010).