Notes

Abbreviations Used in Notes

AWF  Ann Whitman File
CDF  Central Decimal Files
DDEPL  Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library
D-HS  Dulles-Herter Series
FRUS  United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States series
HCARI  History of the Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands
JFD OHP  John Foster Dulles Oral History Project
JFKPL  John F. Kennedy Presidential Library
NAA  National Archives of Australia
NARA  National Archives and Records Administration
NPM  Nixon Presidential Materials
NSCF  National Security Council Files
NSF  National Security Files
PPK  Papers of President Kennedy
RG  Record Group
RMNPL  Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library
SNF  Subject-Numeric File
TaC  Trips and Conferences

Introduction


5. See, for example, Aaron Friedberg, “Will We Abandon Taiwan?” *Commentary*, May 1, 2000, https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/will-we-abandon-taiwan/.


14. The term “hub and spoke” was coined by John Foster Dulles, the architect of the alliance system. The hub of the wheel was the United States, while its alliances with Japan and the Philippines, as well as Australia and New Zealand, were the spokes. See Percy Spender, *Exercises in Diplomacy: The ANZUS Treaty and the Colombo Plan* (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1969), 66.


16. See Andrew Moravcsik, “Active Citation and Qualitative Political Science,” *Qualitative and Multi-Method Research* 10, no. 1 (2012): 33–37; and Andrew Moravcsik, “Active Citation: A Precondition for Replicable Qualitative Research,” *PS: Political Science and Politics* 43, no. 1 (2010):
29–35. Though I do not adopt Moravcsik’s “active citation” approach, in order to assist replication I provide, where possible, the most readily accessible primary document reference. This is usually the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series, which is freely available online. Full details are included in the bibliography.


1. Alliances, Reliability, and Interdependence


3. Snyder, Alliance Politics, 8.


16. Another way of conceiving this dynamic is that entrapment occurs when a state’s desire to protect its alliance from risk is stronger than its desire to avoid costs, though the state would have preferred the situation had never arisen. Uncertainty is generated by two factors: the costs of supporting the ally might be higher than expected and the costs of abandoning the ally might be lower than expected. For example, a state might decide to fight alongside its ally out of a belief that if it does not, the ally will abrogate the alliance. But this is not certain: an alliance may persist despite such a blatant instance of abandonment.
17. However, as chapter 6 shows, in some circumstances the two fears can be held simultaneously.
19. For more on avoiding abandonment and entrapment, see Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 183–186.
37. Frank P. Harvey and John Mitton, *Fighting for Credibility: US Reputation and International Politics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 47. For an excellent discussion of the research agenda for the reputation/credibility debate, see Robert Jervis, Keren Yarhi-Milo, and...


40. Miller, *Shadow of the Past*, 51. Miller’s hypothesis—that “An unreliable state will be more constrained by the design of its alliances”—was supported in 95.2 percent of observations. See also 186–187.

41. Miller, *Shadow of the Past*, 49.

42. Miller, *Shadow of the Past*, 207.


44. Other authors also assume that observer states are monitoring allied behavior in order to make dispositional judgments. See Douglas Gibler, “The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52, no. 3 (2008): 434, for an interesting example that prioritizes interests for adversarial threats but character-based explanations for alliance promises.


46. The analysis in this book focuses mainly on how states obtain better information about the interests and intent of their ally but the alliance audience effect framework does expect that this desire for better information would also apply in circumstances when an ally’s capabilities are in doubt. See, for example, Paul Huth, “Reputations and Deterrence: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment,” *Security Studies* 7, no. 1 (2007): 76–79. Also, critiques of Mercer’s work note that even within Mercer’s theory—which allows for the prospect of allies doubting US resolve—it might be worth fighting some conflicts in order to “maintain alliance cohesion.” See Dale Copeland, “Do Reputations Matter?” *Security Studies* 7, no. 1 (2007): 33–71.

47. Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 317.


50. Miller, *Shadow of the Past*, 49.

51. It might be more accurate to say that the costs of the alliance become accepted and normalized to the extent that they do not register as being at all onerous or burdensome. The persistence of NATO and various alliances in Asia after the end of the Cold War challenges the argument that the decline of a threat will result in the dissolution of an alliance. See Stephen M. Walt, “Alliances in a Unipolar World,” *World Politics* 61, no. 1 (2009): 86–120; and Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse.”


53. Snyder, *Alliance Politics*, 356–357. I thank Timothy Crawford for reminding me about Snyder’s halo concept and for suggesting that I incorporate it into the argument.

54. It is also conceivable that, in some circumstances, a state might actually want its adversary to stand firm and fight: for example, the state might be trying to tie down the adversary’s forces in one theater, so that they cannot be used in another. Or it may simply want to completely eliminate the adversary.


56. My concept of reliability is similar—but not identical—to Miller’s, and it is explained and justified in a different way. Because my conception allows for a state’s disloyalty to one ally to relieve the entrapment fears of another ally, I argue that A’s disloyalty to ally B can actually improve C’s assessment of A’s reliability. See Miller, *Shadow of the Past*, 43–44, and Gregory D. Miller, “Hypotheses on Reputation: Alliance Choices and the Shadow of the Past,” *Security Studies* 12, no. 3 (2003): 55.
57. On this idea of intra-alliance bargaining over strategy, see the explanation of “Leader,” “Hero,” and “Protector” games in Snyder and Diesing, *Conflict among Nations*, chap. 2.

58. As defined earlier, abandonment occurs when “a state decides its interests are best served by not supporting an ally’s policy,” and entrapment occurs when “a state supports its ally’s policy despite being unsure whether the value of the alliance will outweigh the costs of this support.”


62. Of course, this does not preclude two or more states having a similar view about their common ally’s reliability. My point is that this shared perception will not be reached through judgments of national character against the standard of loyalty.

63. See Mercer, *Reputation and International Politics*, 47. In table 1, Mercer hypothesizes that an ally standing firm will lead an observer to making situational attributions because standing firm is desired behavior.


65. This sentiment is echoed in Miller’s assessment of Mercer’s book. Miller deduces three hypotheses of how Mercer’s theory should apply to reliability in alliances—all three suggest that a state’s reliability should not influence its alliance relationships. See Miller, *Shadow of the Past*, 57.


68. I first used this definition in Henry, “What Allies Want,” 53. This use of convergent or divergent interests as a way of assessing the health or reliability of an alliance is also implicit in Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” 167.

69. Of course, in some circumstances both allied interests and allied capabilities will need to be carefully scrutinized to form accurate assessments of reliability. For example, if several states share the same ally, and if there is a risk that these states might be attacked simultaneously, then demand for allied assistance may exceed the available supply. Alternatively, an adversary may embark on a sustained military build-up, and proof of an equivalent response from an ally may be necessary to prevent perceptions of unreliability, because the lack of such a response would, in itself, suggest a divergence of interests. Because interests will determine a state’s decisions on military capability, I believe that interests are the more important influence on reliability. It remains possible, of course, that a deceitful ally’s military capability decisions will hint at undisclosed changes to its interests and such situations will raise the importance of monitoring allied military capabilities.

70. Of course, this assumes that the alliance was not a secret one. Also, as noted earlier, this prioritization of interests may not have been simply private information—it may have been previously unknown information. The state may have never entertained the thought of abandoning its ally, but when the moment of truth arrived it found this course to be in its preferred response. As an analogy: few couples get engaged without a genuine desire to get married, but many engagements end not with wedding ceremonies but with heartbreak.


73. Walt, “Credibility Addiction.”


76. Miller, *Shadow of the Past*, 49.
2. Forming Alliances in Asia, 1949–1951

1. The ambassador in Australia (Jarman) to the Secretary of State, March 24, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, East Asia and the Pacific, Document 30. The quote refers to the views of the Australian foreign minister, Percy Spender.


7. This is not to endorse the view that China was ever Washington's to lose. See, for example, Warren Cohen, “Symposium: Rethinking the Lost Chance in China,” Diplomatic History 21, no. 1 (1997): 71–75.


15. For an excellent analysis on the internal US government debate about the importance of Taiwan, see Paul Heer, Mr. X and the Pacific: George F. Kennan and American Policy in East Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018), chap. 4.


17. Enclosure 2 to The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall), January 9, 1951, in FRUS, 1951, vol. 6, pt. 1, Asia and the Pacific, Document 34.


21. The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State, February 12, 1949, in FRUS, 1949, vol. 7, pt. 2, Document 25. Under the occupation, there was no American ambassador in Tokyo: Sebald, as the political adviser, was the highest-ranking diplomat.


41. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea, May 9, 1949, in FRUS, 1949, vol. 7, pt. 2, Document 239.

44. Cumings, Origins of the Korean War, 2:382.
45. Park, “Frustrated Alignment,” 221.
52. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, June 23, 1949, in FRUS, 1949, vol. 7, pt. 2, Appendix B to Document 266. The Truman Doctrine was to provide financial support to non-Communist states threatened by the Soviet Union.
57. Interview with Myun Chang, September 27, 1964, Seoul, John Foster Dulles Oral History Project (JFD OHP), Mudd Library, Princeton University.
59. Christensen, Worse than a Monolith, 54.
60. The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk), May 25, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, vol. 7, Document 42.
61. The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk), June 1, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, vol. 7, Document 45.
64. Interview with Myun Chang, September 27, 1964, Seoul, JFD OHP.
69. Cumings, Origins of the Korean War, 556.
70. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Assistant to the Secretary (Howard), April 24, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, Document 708.
72. Schonberger, Aftermath of War, 244.
73. Michael Schaller, Altered States: The United States and Japan since the Occupation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 27.
74. The Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of the Army (Reid) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Butterworth), May 10, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, Document 714.
75. The Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of the Army (Reid) to the Assistant Secretary of State (Butterworth), May 10, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, Document 714.
76. Intelligence Estimate Prepared by the Estimates Group, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, June 25, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, vol. 7, Document 82.
79. Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Japanese Affairs (Green) to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison), August 2, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, Document 742.
80. As quoted in Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of Japanese Affairs (Green) to the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Allison), August 2, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, Document 742.
81. Memorandum by Mr. Douglas W. Overton of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs to the Deputy Director (Johnson), September 15, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, Document 760.
82. Enclosure 2 to The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall), January 9, 1951, in FRUS, 1951, vol. 6, pt. 1, Document 34.
84. The Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles) to the Secretary of State, January 4, 1951, in FRUS, 1951, vol. 6, pt. 1, Document 467.
85. Schaller, Altered States, 34.
88. LaFeber, The Clash, 299.
89. Schaller, Altered States, 35.
90. LaFeber, The Clash, 291. See also Schaller, Altered States, 36 and the Editorial Note in FRUS, 1951, vol. 6, pt. 1, Document 495.
92. LaFeber, The Clash, 291.
93. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Special Assistant to the Secretary (Howard), April 7, 1950, in FRUS, 1950, vol. 6, Document 702.
97. Spender, Exercises in Diplomacy, 47.


106. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Lacy), February 21, 1950, in *FRUS, 1950*, vol. 6, Document 8.

107. The Ambassador in Australia (Jarman) to the Secretary of State, February 24, 1950, in *FRUS, 1950*, vol. 6, Document 11.

108. The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Australia, February 25, 1950, in *FRUS, 1950*, vol. 6, Document 12.


110. See The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Australia, March 21, 1950, in *FRUS, 1950*, vol. 6, Document 28.

111. The Secretary of State to All Diplomatic Missions and Certain Consular Offices, June 30, 1950, in *FRUS, 1950*, vol. 7, Document 173.

112. Intelligence Estimate Prepared by the Estimates Group, Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State, June 25, 1950, in *FRUS, 1950*, vol. 7, Document 82.


115. The Secretary of State to All Diplomatic Missions and Certain Consular Offices, June 30, 1950, in *FRUS, 1950*, vol. 7, Document 173.


117. Foot, *Wrong War*, 60.

118. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Secretary of State, October 27, 1950, in *FRUS, 1950*, vol. 7, Document 111.


120. Interview with John M. Allison, April 20, 1969, New York City, JFD OHP.

121. Memorandum by Mr. Robert A. Fearey, of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, February 16, 1951, in *FRUS, 1951*, vol. 6, pt. 1, Document 51.

122. The best and most comprehensive account of these discussions is McIntyre, *Background to the ANZUS Pact*.

123. Draft Memorandum for the President, April 5, 1951, in *FRUS, 1951*, vol. 6, pt. 1, Enclosure to Document 61.

124. The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Secretary of State, July 17, 1951, in *FRUS, 1951*, vol. 6, pt. 1, Document 85.

125. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Melby), August 2, 1951, in *FRUS, 1951*, vol. 6, pt. 1, Document 94.

126. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk), August 9, 1951, in *FRUS, 1951*, vol. 6, pt. 1, Document 100.

127. The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Secretary of State, August 6, 1951, in *FRUS, 1951*, vol. 6, pt. 1, Document 97.

128. The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Secretary of State, August 12, 1951, in *FRUS, 1951*, vol. 6, pt. 1, Document 106.


130. The Ambassador in Australia (Jarman) to the Secretary of State, March 24, 1950, in *FRUS, 1950*, vol. 6, Document 30.

131. See chapter 1 for a discussion of Mercer’s argument on this point.

133. See the Preface to Cha, *Powerplay*.


135. See Izumikawa, “Network Connections.”

### 3. Unleashing and Releasing Chiang Kai-shek, 1953–1954


2. Quemoy is now called Kinmen, but for the sake of consistency I use Quemoy throughout the book.

3. Some of the argument and empirical material in this chapter is also covered in Henry, “What Allies Want.”

4. President Dwight Eisenhower, State of the Union Address, February 2, 1953.


7. Memorandum from Mr Allison to the Secretary of State, February 11, 1953, NARA, Central Decimal Files (CDF), 1950–1954, RG 59, Box 4203, 793.00/2-1153.


10. Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews) to the Secretary of State, March 31, 1953, in *FRUS, 1952–1954*, vol. 14, pt. 1, Document 88. See also Yarhi-Milo, Lanokszka, and Cooper, “To Arm or to Ally?”


23. Letter from the Secretary of State to President Syngman Rhee, June 22, 1953, NARA, CDF, 1950–1954, RG 59, Box 4287, 795.00/6-2353.
31. Interview with Walter Robertson, July 23 and 24, 1965, Richmond, Virginia, JFD OHP. 
34. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Martin), August 19, 1953, in FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. 14, pt. 1, Document 136. At this stage, the British were told that “the 7th Fleet’s mission remained the same” (i.e., they were not tasked with defending the offshore islands).
41. Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (London: Andre Deutsch, 1974), 263.
57. Letter from Mr Drumright to the Secretary of State, July 24, 1954, NARA, CDF, 1950–1954, RG 59, Box 4297, 795.5/6-2254.
60. Mr Ogburn to Mr Drumright, S/P Paper on United States Policy in Indochina, July 2, 1954, NARA, Lot Files, RG 59, Records of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Box 46.
64. As quoted in Dower, Empire and Aftermath, 430–434.
73. Lowe, Origins of the Korean War, 130.


79. Memorandum of Discussion at the 213th Meeting of the National Security Council, September 9, 1954, in FRUS, 1952–1954, vol. 14, pt. 1, Document 289. Radford’s hawkish position would persist throughout the crisis. He believed that “a showdown with the Mao regime was inevitable,” and this led him to put forward recommendations that were “thinly disguised effort[s] to provoke war with China.” See Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles, 265.


96. Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, 170–171.


100. Garver, The Sino-American Alliance, 124, 128.

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111. Dower, Empire and Aftermath, 434.


1. This chapter’s epigraph comes from an interview with William Macomber, January 12 and 19, 1966, Washington DC, JFD OHP.


3. Some of the argument and empirical material in this chapter is also covered in Henry, “What Allies Want.”


6. Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, 177.
12. Dulles’s thoughts further support the need to consider expansive ideas of loyalty, like those suggested by Snyder’s “halo” concept. See chapter 1.
22. Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, 190.
40. Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, 205.
41. I am indebted to Evelyn Goh for suggesting this phrasing.
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67. Notes Taken During Meeting, March 11, 1955, AWF, International Series, Box 9, DDEPL.
74. Summary of remarks of the Honorable John Foster Dulles, March 18, 1955, AWF, D-HS, Box 5, DDEPL.
76. Garry Woodard, “Australian Foreign Policy on the Offshore Island Crisis of 1954–5 and Recognition of China,” *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 45, no. 2 (1991): 256. The claim that Australian public opinion would not support a defense of the offshore islands conflicts with opinion polling from that time; see Woodard, 257. However, as this chapter has shown, the Australian government worked consistently to reduce the likelihood of such a conflict.
83. Memorandum from the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Scott) to the Secretary of State, March 31, 1955, in *FRUS*, 1955–1957, vol. 2, Document 182.
84. Accinelli, *Crisis and Commitment*, 218.
86. Letter from Ernest Weir to President Eisenhower, April 1, 1955, AWF, D-HS, Box 5, DDEPL.
96. See Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, 223.
98. Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, 224.
99. Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, 228.
104. Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, 229.
106. Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 474.
108. State’s 3856 to Manila, April 26, 1955, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 3917, 793.00/4-255.
109. Manila’s 2606 to Washington, April 2, 1955, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 3917, 793.00/4-255. For the cable which requests Manila’s view of five listed scenarios, see State’s Circular 576 to various U.S. Embassies in Asia, March 30, 1955, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 3916, 793.00/3-3055.
110. Manila’s 2606 to Washington, April 2, 1955, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 3917, 793.00/4-255.
111. Manila’s 2642 to Washington, April 6, 1955, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 3917, 793.00/4-655.
114. Manila’s 2799 to Washington, April 25, 1955, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 3917, 793.00/4-255.
115. See Manila’s 2811 to Washington, April 27, 1955, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 3917, 793.00/4-2755.
123. As quoted in Accinelli, Crisis and Commitment, 234.


1. Interview with Douglas MacArthur II, December 16, 1966, JFD OHP.
7. As quoted in Schaller, Altered States, 77.
15. Tokyo’s 2508 to Washington, April 4, 1955, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 3917, 793.00/4-455.
19. Interview with John M. Allison, April 20, 1969, JFD OHP.
26. Mr Sebald to the Secretary, August 23, 1955, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 3968, 794.5/8-2355.
29. Interview with Ichiro Kono, September 30, 1964, JFD OHP.
33. Tokyo’s 942 to Washington, April 16, 1956, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 2577, 611.94/4-1656 (emphasis added).
34. Tokyo’s 276 to Washington, September 21, 1956, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 2578, 611.94/4-2156.
40. Memorandum from Parsons to Sebald, December 21, 1956, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 3968, 794.5/12-2156.
42. Tokyo’s 2256 to Washington, April 10, 1957, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 2578, 611.94/4-1057. Two other issues—territorial problems and trade restrictions—were also listed.
43. Tokyo’s 2256 to Washington, April 10, 1957, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 2578, 611.94/4-1057.
44. Tokyo’s 2257 to Washington, April 10, 1957, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 2578, 611.94/4-1057.
47. Buckley, US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy, 82.
48. Interview with Nobusuke Kishi, October 2, 1964, JFD OHP.


55. US Department of State, *Department of State Bulletin* 37, no. 941 (July 8, 1957): 52.


57. Letter from Horsey to Parsons, June 20, 1957, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 3969, 794.5/6-2057.

58. State’s 1623 to Tokyo, January 31, 1958, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 2579, 611.94/1-3158.


60. Memo from Martin to Parsons, January 22, 1958, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 2579, 611.94/1-2258. In the report, against the second part of this quote there is a handwritten notation: “This is only one aspect. I think this is too strong.” It is not clear whose handwriting it is, nor to which aspect of the paragraph it specifically objects.


63. Letter from the Ambassador to Japan (MacArthur) to Secretary of State Dulles, April 18, 1958, in *FRUS, 1958–1960*, vol. 18, Document 11.

64. Memorandum from MacArthur to Dulles and Robertson, March 8, 1958, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 3969, 794.5/3-858 (emphasis added).


66. Telegram from the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Felt) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 19, 1958, in *FRUS, 1958–1960*, vol. 18, Document 22.


73. State’s 206 to Tokyo, July 31, 1958, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 2579, 611.94/7-3158.


75. Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Secretary of State Dulles, September 12, 1958, in *FRUS, 1958–1960*, vol. 18, Document 27. This formula was directly based upon a communiqué issued by President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill in 1952.


77. The name is derived from Article III of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which gave the United States administrative rights over the Ryukyus and Bonins. The Ryukyu Islands group comprises the Osumi, Tokara, Amami, Okinawa, and Sakishima Islands. See John


81. Another issue, which was subject to political debate in Tokyo, was that if the new alliance covered the Article III islands, this could effectively create a “NEATO” (Northeast Asia Treaty Organization). This fear was due to the fact that Article III islands were mentioned in the US-ROC and US-ROK treaties. Inclusion of the Article III islands would mean that “Japan runs the risk of becoming entangled in hostilities involving the GRC or ROK if the Ryukyus and Bonins . . . were included in the treaty area.” This quote is from Tokyo’s 583 to Washington, November 25, 1958, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 3969, 794.5/11-2558. See also Tokyo’s 815 to Washington, January 26, 1959, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 3970, 794.5/1-2659.


84. Schaller, Altered States, 139.


93. State’s 2022 to Tokyo, June 20, 1959, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 3970, 794.5/6-2059.


95. State’s 2059 to Tokyo, June 24, 1959, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 3970, 794.5/6-2459.

96. State’s 2059 to Tokyo, June 24, 1959, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 3970, 794.5/6-2459.


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100. Tokyo’s 509 to Washington, August 24, 1959, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 3970, 794.5/8-2459. See also State’s 656 to Tokyo, August 24, 1959, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 3970, 794.5/8-2459.


103. Schaller, Altered States, 129. Authors such as Swenson-Wright have argued that Shigemitsu’s goal for the 1955 visit was primarily to strengthen his own political position in Tokyo: the US ambassador also regarded this as the main motivation for Shigemitsu’s trip to Washington. See Swenson-Wright, Unequal Allies?, 208. See also the Memorandum of a Conversation, August 24, 1955, in FRUS, 1955–1957, vol. 23, pt. 1, Document 42, footnote 2. Here, Allison assessed that while Shigemitsu’s trip was “primarily [an] internal political move,” it would also “of course be intended at same time to serve Japanese policy purposes, which he sincerely pursues except where his personal ambitions conflict.”

104. Memo from Parsons to Sebald, December 21, 1956, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 3968, 794.5/12-2156.

105. Memo from Martin to Parsons, January 22, 1958, NARA, CDF, 1955–1959, RG 59, Box 2579, 611.94/1-2258.


107. US Department of State, Department of State Bulletin 37, no. 941 (July 8, 1957): 52.


1. Meyer, Assignment Tokyo, 33.


5. This “homeland” nomenclature is often used to refer to all of the Japanese islands except those covered by Article III of the 1951 Security Treaty, that is all islands except for the Ryukyu and Bonin Island chains.

6. Reischauer, My Life between Japan and America, 257.


40. Memorandum from Sneider to Bundy, February 12, 1968, NARA, SNF, 1967–1969, Lot Files, Japan, Box 4. See also Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism, chap. 3.
47. Interview with Ural Alexis Johnson, June 14, 1969, Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project.
49. See Schaller, Altered States, 194. It is not perfectly clear whether this threat was intended to have the implication of nuclear coercion.
51. This odd situation—where Japan simultaneously feared both abandonment and entrapment—is also implicitly noted in Schaller, Altered States, 207. While this scenario might seem illogical, it makes sense when Japan’s unique circumstances are considered. At various points Japan has had strong preferences for an ideal level of US involvement in Asia, with any position stronger than this ideal prompting fears of entrapment but any weaker position sparking fears of abandonment. See, for example, Intelligence Note 595, August 14, 1969, NARA, SNF, 1967–1969, RG 59, POL JAPAN-KOR S, Box 2248, which explains how Japan would welcome a partial withdrawal of US forces from the Korean Peninsula but only under certain conditions.
61. As quoted in Shinkichi Eto, “Attitude of Peking and Taiwan Governments on Okinawa Issue,” Enclosure 9 to Tokyo’s Airgram 119 (date unknown), NARA, SNF, 1967–1969, RG 59, POL 19 RYU IS, Box 2458.
64. Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism, 64. The three provocations were the guerilla attack on the prime minister’s “Blue House,” the capture of the USS Pueblo, and the shooting down of an unarmed American EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft in April 1969.
65. Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism, 63.
75. Intelligence Information Cable, March 1, 1969, NARA, RG 319, History of the Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands (HCARI), Box 3.
86. Memorandum of a Conversation, April 1, 1969, Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library (RMNPL), Yorba Linda, California, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, President's Meeting File 1969–1974, Box 73.
95. During this period, an alignment of interests between the ROC and Japan was also of concern to Communist China. See Evelyn Goh, Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974: From “Red Menace” to “Tacit Ally” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 176–178.
109. Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism, 74.
130. Johnson, Right Hand of Power, 545.
131. State’s 196651 to all East Asian and Pacific diplomatic posts, November 22, 1969, Nixon Presidential Materials (NPM), National Security Council Files (NSCF), VIP Visits, Box 925, RMNPL.
134. GRC Position on Ryukyu Reversion, December 8, 1969, NSCF, Henry A. Kissinger Office Files, Country Files–Far East, Box 81, RMNPL.
137. Wakaizumi, The Best Course Available, 236.
141. Tokyo’s 5907 to Washington, July 18, 1969, NARA, RG 319, HCARI, Box 19.

Conclusion

3. It is crucial to note that from 1969 onward, two key themes can be observed in some of Washington’s alliances in Northeast Asia: these allies doubted US reliability and they moved to improve their own security through the development of nuclear weapon programs. See Alexander Lanoszka, Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018).
4. This is consistent with Glenn Snyder’s finding that states less dependent on an alliance for security have greater power in intra-alliance bargaining. See Snyder, Alliance Politics, chap. 9.
5. Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism, 61.
6. See, for example, the sources listed in the Introduction, endnote 13.
10. Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism, 71.
11. Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism, 176.
14. As quoted in Kadura, War after the War, 122. It is fascinating to note that Kissinger—the cold and calculating advocate of realpolitik—thought of credibility along the same lines as the morally minded and religious John Foster Dulles.
15. Kadura, War after the War, 153.
17. As quoted in Hensley, Friendly Fire, 267.
18. Hensley, Friendly Fire, 56.
19. Hensley, Friendly Fire, 266.


33. The aide memoire of April 3, 1961, is quoted in Background Paper: Recent U.S. Security Assurances to Thailand, May 1961, Papers of President Kennedy (PPK), National Security Files (NSF), Trips and Conferences (TaC), Box 242a, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library (JFKPL), Boston.


37. Logevall, Choosing War, 25.


40. Position Paper: Impact of the Lao Crisis on Thailand, undated, PPK, NSF, TaC, Box 242a, JFKPL.

41. Bangkok’s 2096 to Washington, May 19, 1961, PPK, NSF, TaC, Box 242a, JFKPL.

42. Thai-U.S. Bilateral Defense Agreement, May 1961, PPK, NSF, TaC, Box 242a, JFKPL.

43. Bangkok’s 2346 to Washington, June 29, 1961, PPK, NSF, Thailand, Box 163, JFKPL.

44. Bangkok’s Airgram 24 to Washington, July 26, 1961, PPK, NSF, Thailand, Box 163, JFKPL.


46. See Memorandum for Mr. Rostow, September 28, 1961, PPK, NSF, Thailand, Box 163, JFKPL.
47. Memorandum for Mr. Rostow, September 11, 1961, PPK, NSF, SEATO, Box 230, JFKPL.
48. President Kennedy's Meeting with Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, Position Paper, October 3, 1961, PPK, NSF, Thailand, Box 163, JFKPL.
49. See State's 738 to Bangkok, November 17, 1961, PPK, NSF, Thailand, Box 163, JFKPL.
50. State's 470 to Bangkok, October 5, 1961, PPK, NSF, Thailand, Box 163, JFKPL.
51. Memorandum of Conversation, October 3, 1961, PPK, NSF, Thailand, Box 163, JFKPL.
52. See State's 476 to Bangkok, October 6, 1961, PPK, NSF, Thailand, Box 163, JFKPL.
54. State's 949 to Bangkok, January 4, 1962, PPK, NSF, Thailand, Box 163a, JFKPL.
55. State's 1055 to Bangkok, January 23, 1962, PPK, NSF, Thailand, Box 163a, JFKPL.
56. Bangkok's 1076 to Washington, January 26, 1962, and Bangkok's 1101 to Washington, January 31, 1961, both in PPK, NSF, Thailand, Box 163a, JFKPL.
57. Bangkok's 1098 to Washington, January 31, 1962, PPK, NSF, Thailand, Box 163a, JFKPL.
58. State's 1134 to Bangkok, February 4, 1962, PPK, NSF, Thailand, Box 163a, JFKPL.
59. Bangkok's 1167 to Washington, February 10, 1962, PPK, NSF, Thailand, Box 163a, JFKPL.
60. Bangkok's 1177 to Washington, February 12, 1962, PPK, NSF, Thailand, Box 163a, JFKPL.
61. South Vietnam was not a full member of SEATO but a protocol state.
63. State's 1230 to Bangkok, February 16, 1962, PPK, NSF, Thailand, Box 163a, JFKPL.
64. Memorandum of Conversation, March 2, 1962, PPK, NSF, Thailand, Box 163a, JFKPL.
65. Department of State Press Release 145, March 6, 1962, PPK, NSF, Thailand, Box 163a, JFKPL.
67. See the sources listed in the Introduction, endnote 13.
69. Cha, Powerplay, 4.
70. Interview with Leslie Munro, September 10, 1964, Wellington, JFD OHP, Mudd Library, Princeton University.
71. Cha, Powerplay, 4.
72. Walt, “Credibility Addiction.”
73. Walt, “Pay No Attention to that Panda behind the Curtain.”
77. Beckley, “Myth of Entangling Alliances,” 48. For Beckley’s summary of the literature arguing against alliances on grounds of entanglement, see 7–12.
78. See Mercer, Reputation and International Politics, 226–228.