Tempting Fate
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Tempting Fate: Why Nonnuclear States Confront Nuclear Opponents.

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Notes

Introduction


4. The Correlates of War data code the NNWS as starting the war or underlying militarized interstate dispute (MID) half the time: Korean War, 1950; Suez War, 1956; Six Day War, 1967; War of Attrition, 1969; October War, 1973; Falklands War, 1982; War over Angola, 1987; Gulf War, 1991. I found 657 MIDs between two states, or dyads, when only one possessed nuclear weapons. Although there are a number of challenges to coding initiation, as I discuss below, using the MID coding, the NNWS initiated approximately 36 percent of disputes. That number increases to 43 percent when including an NNWS that joined on the initiator’s side. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset, I found 119 overall crises (many containing multiple dyads) where only one side had nuclear weapons from 1946 to 2015. ICB identified the NNWS as the “triggering entity” in approximately 61 percent of the 87 cases that had a single state actor as the triggering entity. War data are from the Dyadic Inter-state War Data at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war. MID data are from the Dyadic MID data version 3.1, at http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/MIDs. See Zeev Maoz, Paul L. Johnson, Jasper Kaplan, Fiona Ogunkoya, and Aaron Shreve, “The Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) Dataset Version 3.0: Logic, Characteristics, and Comparisons to Alternative Datasets,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 63, no. 3 (2019): 811–35. ICB data are from the Dyadic-Level Crisis Data and System-level data, Version 12, at https://sites.duke.edu/icbdata/data-collections/.


17. To be sure, nuclear weapons may generally provide states with deterrent benefits. That nevertheless leaves a large number of important exceptions that require an explanation. Those exceptions are the focus of this book.


20. For a similar point regarding disputes between two nuclear powers with asymmetric conventional capabilities see Jasen J. Castillo, “Deliberate Escalation: Nuclear Strategies to Deter or to Stop Conventional Attacks,” in Greenhill and Krause, *Coercion*, 293. Analysts have applied this basic point to other instances as well, notably US nuclear strategy in the Cold War against the Soviet Union when the latter possessed conventional superiority in Europe, as well as to nuclear-armed states facing overwhelming conventional adversaries today.

21. I thank a reviewer for raising this point.


25. For instance, compare the initiator coding for wars from the Correlates of War Interstate War data with the list by Dan Reiter, Alan Stam, and Michael Horowitz. Specific cases are often contentious; Reiter et al. note that North Vietnam could plausibly be coded as starting the Vietnam War against the United States. Even cases where the NNWS is widely regarded as the initiator can follow very different paths. Both Argentina and Egypt “initiated” wars against a nuclear opponent. Argentina’s leaders launched an initially bloodless effort to capture the Falkland Islands, hoping that Britain would not react at all; Egyptian leaders sought to immediately engage Israeli forces in October 1973. Zeev Maoz, Paul L. Johnson, Aaron Shreve, Fiona Ogunkoyo, Jasper Kaplan, “Dyadic MID Codebook—Version 3.0,” May 24, 2018, 9. Dan Reiter, Allan C. Stam, and Michael C. Horowitz, “A Revised Look at Interstate Wars, 1816–2007: Appendix,” October 15, 2014, 18. Miscoding some cases is not problematic if the errors are (1) random and (2) there are a large number of observations. Interstate wars are rare events, and the number of nuclear-armed states few. When dealing with small numbers, changing the coding of even a few data points can easily lead to different results. On these points see Erik Gartzke, “An Apology for Numbers in the Study of National Security . . . if an Apology Is Really Necessary,” *H-Diplo* | *ISSF Forum*, no. 2 (2014): 82; Vipin Narang, “The Use and Abuse of Large-N Methods in Nuclear Studies,” *H-Diplo* | *ISSF Forum*, no. 2 (2014): 91–97; Alexander H. Montgomery and Scott D. Sagan, “The Perils of Predicting Proliferation,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53, no. 2 (April 2009): esp. 310–13.


37. Paul, Tradition of Non-use, 144.


40. Tannenwald, Nuclear Taboo, 372, see also 3. Tannenwald’s discussion of the role of normative and material considerations in accounting for nuclear-armed state decision making is much more nuanced; see esp. 53.


43. They thus focus on the regulative rather than the constitutive aspects of the norm.

44. Sechser and Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy, 45–52.


46. This draws on the basic issue of resolve discussed in “The Argument” section earlier in this chapter. I focus on existing political disputes in which both sides have demonstrated some level of resolve over the issue. A distinct but related claim is that once in a dispute, the weaker side compensates for lack of relative capability with intensity that occasionally allows it to prevail. My argument makes no claim about which side will win the conflict; I focus on the role nuclear weapons play in shaping the scope of the conflict. For discussions and applications to asymmetric conflict see Paul, Asymmetric Conflict, 16–18; Haun, Coercion, Survival, and War, 12–13, 36; Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 530–31, 550–61; Paul K. Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (1999): 34; Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), 190, 456, 529. For an excellent overview of how different approaches treat resolve, see Chamberlain, Cheap Threats, 7–13.


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Press, 1980). Many studies that include a proxy for relative power as a control variable in their analysis similarly find that increasing power asymmetries make war less likely.


1. The Strategic Logic of Nuclear Monopoly

1. This is the basis of nuclear deterrent and compellent threats. In those cases, nuclear weapons are not detonated but are used in the sense that opponents assess the consequences of detonation and alter their behavior accordingly.

2. This draws from Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), chap. 2; Glenn Snyder, Deterrence by Punishment and Denial (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Center of International Studies, 1959); Robert J. Art, “To What Ends Military Power?,” International Security 4, no. 4 (Spring 1980): 3–35; Terence Roehrig, Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence after the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), chap. 1. The authors use slightly different terminology, but the core insights focus on whether one is seeking to inflict costs by harming the civilian population or weakening military capabilities.


17. Bernstein, “Eclipsed by Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” 151. These discussions were overly ambitious at the time, but such thinking would develop over the course of the nuclear era.

18. Quoted in Bernstein, 166, see also 164–70.


26. The Gulf War Air Power Survey reports that “approximately 1,500 coalition strikes altogether were focused against Iraqi ballistic missile capabilities. . . . Roughly another 1,000 ‘Scud patrol’ sorties were planned against mobile Scud launchers but ended up attacking other targets.” *Gulf War Air Power Survey*, vol. 2, part 1, *Operations and Effects and Effectiveness* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1993), 190n98, see also 189 and vol. 2, part 2, 330–32.


29. Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear?,” 58. Talmadge was discussing a different situation, but the point applies here.


34. For instance, low destructiveness avoids problems of destroying assets but may prove ineffective and thereby weaken the coercive value of the NWS arsenal.

35. This may be changing; see the discussion on precision-guided munitions.


45. These are similar to various “soft balancing” mechanisms. See, for example, Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” *International Security* 30, no. 1 (Summer 2005): 36–37.
46. One notable exception is World War II. US conventional bombing against Japan throughout 1945 killed far more than the two nuclear bombs did. The US atomic bombs were therefore not an escalation in the level of violence. For speculation that American nuclear use prior to 1945 might have caused Japan to expand its level of violence see Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War*, 3rd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1988), 267–68.


55. Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 105.


65. Nuclear weapons might still be useful at deterring nuclear strikes by other nuclear powers, but this is outside the scope of nuclear monopoly. Of course, if nuclear weapons had no advantage relative to conventional alternatives then it is unclear why a state would need a nuclear weapon to deter a nuclear strike that provided no benefit to the first user.
69. The fear within the NWS can be mitigated if the NWS has a large and diverse nuclear arsenal and the NNWS has very limited conventional capabilities.
76. I borrow “mechanized” from Pape, *Bombing to Win*, rather than labeling the strategy conventional to avoid confusion with the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons.


78. On manufacturing superiority and defensive advantage see Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, chap. 2; Biddle, *Military Power*, chap. 3.


84. In contrast to chemical and biological weapons, nuclear weapons are effective against military forces, there is little or no defense available, and nuclear weapons can visit much greater immediate destruction. As such, facing a nuclear adversary, an NWS would have strong first-strike incentives to eliminate or at least degrade the opponent’s nuclear arsenal. Mueller, *Atomic Obsession*, 11–15; Horowitz and Narang, “Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb?,” esp. 514–16.


89. One American concern during the Cold War was that the Soviets would fight “the war in such a way as to delay NATO taking the decision to use nuclear weapons until it was too late for them to influence the outcome of the war.” Quoted in Paul Schulte, “Tactical Nuclear Weapons in NATO and Beyond: A Historical and Thematic Examination,” in *Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO*, ed. Tom Nichols, Douglas Stuart, and Jeffrey D. McCausland (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), 53. Though these dynamics are very different from nuclear monopoly, the point is that officials have at times worried a conventional conflict could proceed past the point when nuclear weapons would be effective at reversing the situation.


95. Horowitz and Narang, “Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb?,” 528, 519–20.

96. George H. Quester, “If the Nuclear Taboo Gets Broken,” *Naval War College Review* 58, no. 2 (Spring 2005): 78.


98. The key exception to this would be if a weak NWS directly attacked a stronger NNWS’s homeland. In that case the NWS would likely act in its own defense, resulting in war. Historically there do not appear to have been any such wars. See chaps. 2–5 and appendix B.


100. For details on the data see the individual chapters and appendix A.


104. See introduction chapter.

105. This resembles John Stuart Mill’s method of agreement. The analyst examines cases where a phenomenon is present (conflict in nuclear monopoly) to determine if the cases share certain underlying characteristics even though they differ in most other aspects. For a discussion see James Mahoney, “Strategies of Causal Assessment in Historical Analysis,” in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, ed. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 341–47, 351–52.

106. Conventional states fighting other conventional states cannot abstain from threatening nonexistent nuclear forces.

107. This portion of the analysis examines only cases of war. I do not examine cases of nonwar where the NNWS may have planned major operations. Comparison against a background condition can still provide useful information, though. See Van Evera, *Guide to Methods*, 46–47, 58–61.

### 2. Iraq versus the United States


14. For the claim that the Ba’ath regime was less than committed to pan-Arabism see Joseph Sassoon, *Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 9–10.


16. Brands and Palkki, 134–35. This is consistent with my broader argument. In a major war in which Iraq sought to take large portions of Israeli territory through military means and potentially threaten Israel’s survival, the benefits of nuclear use would increase to Israel. To offset that would thus require an Iraqi nuclear capability. This is discrete from Egyptian planning in 1973 that sought to take only limited territory and rely on political means to reacquire the Sinai, relying as well on the United States to constrain Israel.


25. Quoted in Gause, “Iraq’s Decisions to Go to War,” 56.


34. See, for example, Joseph E. Uscinski and Joseph M. Parent, *American Conspiracy Theories* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).


40. Quoted Brands and Palkki, “‘Conspiring Bastards,’” 657n135.

41. Aziz’s statement was in response to the question: “In April, what was your assessment of what the Americans would do—what was April Glaspie saying?” By “April,” the interviewer likely meant Ambassador Glaspie’s first name. But it is possible that Aziz was referring to a meeting in April 1990 in which Ambassador Glaspie was present. However, immediately prior to Aziz’s comment that Glaspie “didn’t tell us anything strange” he was referencing the July 25 meeting, noting that during it a call came from President Mubarak. That call appears in the American minutes of the July 25 meeting. This suggests the comment was in fact in reference to the July 25 meeting. For the Aziz interview and statement see PBS *Frontline*, “Oral History: Tariq Aziz.” For the US minutes noting the call from Mubarak see US Embassy Baghdad to US Secretary of State, “Saddam’s Message of Friendship to President Bush,” July 25, 1990.


43. Quoted in Brands and Palkki, “‘Conspiring Bastards,’” 657; Woods, *Mother of All Battles*, 95.

44. On general versus immediate deterrence see Patrick M. Morgan, *Deterrence Now* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chap. 3.


48. Quoted in Gause, “Iraq’s Decisions to Go to War,” 60.


53. “Just before the Ground War Began, Saddam Discussed His Plans to Withdraw Iraqi Forces from Kuwait,” February 23, 1991, in Woods, Palkki, and Stout, *Saddam Tapes*, 189–91, esp. 190, and 192n53; Woods, *Mother of All Battles*, 214. On February 22, Secretary of State Baker told President Bush and President François Mitterrand of France that the Soviets informed him that Iraq had agreed to withdraw from Kuwait City in four days, with total withdrawal in twenty-one days. He added that the Soviet ambassador Alexander Bessmertnykh informed him that “the Iraqis have agreed to remove the requirement that economic sanctions be eliminated. . . . There are no linkages. There are no references to other problems in the region. There are no conditions. It is a very big move.” George Bush phone call with French President (Mitterrand), February 22, 1991, 4, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/D9589C94D7604DAD8528CF714D596751.pdf.


56. Woods, *Mother of All Battles*, 210. See also the discussion in the “Iraqi Nuclear Views” section later in this chapter.


66. Ricks, *Fiasco*, 18–22. Desert Fox essentially finished off any lingering nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons programs and ambitions, most of which had already been abandoned in the wake of the Gulf War in the face of inspections and sanctions. Rovner, “Delusion of Defeat,” 495, 497–98.


70. Quoted in Woods, *Mother of All Battles*, 62.

71. Gause, “Iraq’s Decisions to Go to War,” 62.


75. Woods, *Mother of All Battles*, 125, also 137.

76. Quoted in Woods, 52. See also Pollack, *Arabs at War*, 237.


80. Quoted in Woods, *Mother of All Battles*, 16.


82. Quoted in Gause, “Iraq’s Decisions to Go to War,” 60. See also Gause, *International Relations*, 108.


85. Quoted in Woods, 115. Woods cites this meeting taking place on November 2, 1990; see notes 91 and 98 on page 123 and the document identifier on page 335. However, a slightly different translation of this passage appears in CRRC SH-SHTP-A-000-670, “Meeting between Saddam Hussein and the Revolutionary Command Council,” 25–26, which reports the date of the meeting as October 11, 1990. An excerpt from that document also appears in Woods, Palkki, and Stout, *Saddam Tapes*, 35–37, but the excerpt does not include the passage from Taha Ramadan. The document date there is listed as “circa late October 1990” in the document title but October 11, 1990, in the footnote; see page 35. Some of the information discussed during the meeting would suggest that a date of late October is most appropriate for the meeting, such as reference to statements by Vice President Cheney that were reported on October 25 and 26.


89. Quoted in Woods, *Mother of All Battles*, 112.

90. Quoted in Woods, 113.

91. Quoted in Woods, 95.


102. “Saddam and His Inner Circle Discuss Iraq’s WMD Capabilities and Deterrent Threats,” undated [circa mid-November 1990], in Woods, Palkki, and Stout, Saddam Tapes, 239. The discussion included both deterrent threats and actual use of chemical weapons. It is not entirely clear to which Aziz was referring, but if threats invited a nuclear response, then actual use would as well. Moreover, Saddam did publicly state Iraq might use chemical weapons, suggesting Aziz’s main concern was actual use. See also Baram, “Deterrence Lessons from Iraq.”
106. On Secretary Baker’s warning see Woods, Palkki, and Stout, Saddam Tapes, 221–22. In addition, Sagan and Buch highlight that in Saddam Hussein’s “post-capture interrogation, the Iraqi leader claimed not to know that Baker’s threats were even connected with the use of chemical weapons.” See Buch and Sagan, “Our Red Lines and Theirs.”
107. To the extent American threats were credible, then, this suggests it was because Iraqi leaders already considered that the use of chemical weapons would raise the risks of a nuclear strike.
109. Quoted in Woods, Mother of All Battles, 150.
111. McCarthy and Tucker, “Saddam’s Toxic Arsenal,” 70, also 68–69; Duelfer, Comprehensive Report, 1:33, 97–100; Woods, Mother of All Battles, 154–56 and 170n114. Some of Saddam’s comments can be interpreted as broadening this to include retaliation for chemical or biological strikes against Iraq, for example, “Saddam and His Advisers Discuss Iraqi Missile Attacks on Targets in Israel and Saudi Arabia, undated [circa January 17–18, 1991], 251. There is also some evidence that Saddam delegated launch authority if the United States invaded Baghdad. See Russell, “Iraq’s Chemical Weapons Legacy,” 201. However, Woods et al. report finding “no evidence in the tapes indicating that Saddam believed American fear of Iraqi chemical or...
biological weapon attacks on Israel or the United States deterred an American push toward Baghdad”; Woods, Palkki, and Stout, *Saddam Tapes*, 236.


117. Norman Polmar and Robert S. Norris report that the Pershing II was operational through 1991, with the last missile shipped from West Germany on March 13, 1991. Woods reports the United States destroyed the last Pershing missile in May 1991. Though Iraqi discussion seems to have centered on ground-launched missiles, it is possible that some Iraqi officials were referring to (or confusing the Pershing with) Tomahawk ship-launched cruise missiles. Nonnuclear variants were used during the 1991 Gulf War. The US Navy fired 288 conventional Tomahawks during the conflict from surface vessels and submarines. On these points see Norman Polmar and Robert S. Norris, *The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal: A History of Weapons and Delivery Systems since 1945* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009), 176–77, 196–98; and Woods, *Mother of All Battles*, 169–70, note 112.


119. CRRC has over one hundred pages of internal Iraqi documents discussing civil defense plans in the event of a nuclear attack in the collection SH-IDGS-D-001-431, “Correspondence between the Presidential Diwan and several other Iraqi authorities discussing an emergency evacuation plan of different Iraqi cities in the case of a nuclear attack.” I identify the specific documents when citing from this collection. See also the brief discussion in Woods, *Mother of All Battles*, 153–54; and Woods, Palkki, and Stout, *Saddam Tapes*, 236.


general discussions of civil defense preparations see Tracy D. Davis, Stages of Emergency: Cold War Nuclear Civil Defense (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007).


3. Egypt versus Israel


3. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 274.


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11. Quoted in Cohen, Israel and the Bomb, 337.
13. Secret Meeting with Hafiz Ismail in New York, February 26, 1973, DNSA, KT, item KT00682, 28. Interestingly, Ismail immediately interrupted Dr. Ghanin and stated, “We are not discussing this.” This may reflect Egyptian wariness on sharing with the United States how much Egypt knew of the Israeli nuclear capability. Alternatively, it may reflect Ismail’s desire not to discuss the issue in front of such a large group, perhaps preferring to raise the matter off the record and in private with Kissinger.
21. CINC comprises six measures, including population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy production, military expenditures, and military personnel.


36. Narang, 186.


41. Quoted in Daigle, *Limits of Détente*, 16.

42. Nasser would officially abrogate the cease-fire on April 1, 1969, while Egyptian spokesmen noted as early as March 12, 1969, that Egypt would no longer be bound by the cease-fire. See Pollack, *Arabs at War*, 92; Gawrych, *Albatross of Decisive Victory*, 107–8; Parker, *Politics of Miscalculation*, 135; Isabella Ginor, “‘Under the Yellow Arab Helmet Gleamed Blue Russian Eyes’: Operation Kavkaz and the War of Attrition, 1969–70,” *Cold War History* 13, no. 1 (October 2002), 135.
43. Parker, Politics of Miscalculation, 128.
44. Parker, 130.
45. Quoted in Gawrych, Albatross of Decisive Victory, 107.
46. Gawrych, 106, see also 103–6.
49. Daigle, Limits of Détente, chap. 2; Meital, Egypt’s Struggle for Peace, 66–67; Parker, Politics of Miscalculation, 138–39.
50. Quoted in Daigle, Limits of Détente, 119.
51. Daigle, 113–43; Meital, Egypt’s Struggle for Peace, 70–76.
52. Sadat’s appointment as Egypt’s president was confirmed by public referendum in October 15, 1970.
53. Diplomatic Relations Initiative between Egypt and Israel, February 8, 1971, DNSA, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, item KA04892. On the proposal and Sadat’s intentions see Daigle, Limits of Détente, 163; Donald Neff, Warriors against Israel (Brattleboro, VT: Amana Books, 1988), 45–46; Meital, Egypt’s Struggle for Peace, 86–89.
54. Quoted in Daigle, Limits of Détente, 171.
55. Discussion of Middle East Settlement with Mahmoud Riad, October 7, 1971, DNSA, KT, item KT00361, 2.
56. Neff, Warriors against Israel, 23.
57. Quoted in Meital, Egypt’s Struggle for Peace, 106. See also Daigle, Limits of Détente, 212; Neff, Warriors against Israel, 76, 103.
60. Quoted in Daigle, 213.
62. Quoted in Daigle, Limits of Détente, 226, see also 195, 232–34; Parker, October War, 73; Meital, Egypt’s Struggle for Peace, 108–10; Neff, Warriors against Israel, 85–87.
63. Quoted in Daigle, Limits of Détente, 233.
64. Quoted in Daigle, 283.
65. Ashraf Ghorbal remarks in Parker, October War, 36, see also 21, 36–37, 48, 53–57, 70–76; Meital, Egypt’s Struggle for Peace, 110–11; Neff, Warriors against Israel, 87–90.
68. Quoted in Daigle, 259.
70. Daigle, Limits of Détente, 179–91; Neff, Warriors against Israel, 68–69.
71. Discussion of Middle East Settlement with Mahmoud Riad, October 7, 1971, DNSA, KT, item KT00361, 1.
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73. Daigle, Limits of Détente, 259.
75. Quoted in Daigle, Limits of Détente, 259. See also Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 152; Meital, Egypt’s Struggle for Peace, 111–12.
76. Quoted in Daigle, Limits of Détente, 260.
77. Quoted in Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin, 72. Sadat recalled making a similar statement to Nasser: “even 10cm on the other side of the canal would change the situation in the western, eastern, and Arab realms equally.” Quoted in Meital, Egypt’s Struggle for Peace, 114.
81. For the timeline see Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 420–36.
82. Maoz, 427.
84. Pollack, Arabs at War, 91.
85. Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 117; Parker, Politics of Miscalculation, 150.
86. Pollack, Arabs at War, 90–98.
88. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, 155–62; Pollack, Arabs at War, 98–108.
89. Quoted in Shazly, Crossing of the Suez, 179–80. See also Gamasy, October War, 149–51.
90. Gamasy, October War, 134.
93. This paragraph draws on Pollack, Arabs at War, 108–17; Neff, Warriors against Israel, 141–46, 163–66, 173–85; Gawrych, Albatross of Decisive Victory, chap. 6.

95. Quoted in Gamasy, *October War,* 237–38. Ismail’s account of the message closely matches the American record. Gamasy would criticize the message for revealing Egypt’s “military intentions” (239–40).


102. Meital, *Egypt’s Struggle for Peace,* 114. On the importance of continuing the fight to attain greater US involvement see Daigle, *Limits of Détente,* 300. On Egyptian opposition to the status quo ante see, for example, Telcon, Kissinger-Zayyat, October 6, 1973, DNSA, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, item KA11038, 1–2.


114. Pollack remarks in Parker, *October War,* 118. There is some evidence that after the war Sadat expressed the opinion that deep attacks into the Sinai raised the risks of nuclear strikes,
though he also understood Egypt could not reconquer the Sinai given the conventional balance. For instance, Colby et al. write that in 1977 Sadat told the Israeli defense minister Ezer Weizman that “he had never intended to penetrate deeper into the Sinai because ‘he knew what Israel had,’” presumably referring to Israel’s nuclear weapons capability. Colby et al., *Israeli “Nuclear Alert,”* 10–11. In a colorful anecdote, former Israeli president Shimon Peres told the Israeli media that former deputy prime minister Yigael Yadin “asked Sadat: Why, in the early days of the Yom Kippur War, didn’t you proceed toward the Sinai passes? Sadat’s answer, according to Peres, was: You have nuclear arms. Haven’t you heard?” Dan Sagir, “How the Fear of Israeli Nukes Helped Seal the Egypt Peace Deal,” *Haaretz,* November 26, 2017, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/.premium-how-fear-of-israeli-nukes-helped-seal-the-egypt-peace-deal-1.5626679.


117. Quoted in Colby et al., *Israeli “Nuclear Alert,”* 27.

118. Israel’s nuclear posture during this period may have encouraged such thinking; see Narang, *Nuclear Strategy,* esp. chaps. 7, 9–10, though I found no evidence Egyptian leaders discussed the nature of Israel’s force posture.

119. Dr. Murhaf Jouejati remarks in Parker, *October War,* 119.

120. Heikal, *Road to Ramadan,* 76. See also the April 1969 statement by Fawzi to Kissinger during the War of Attrition that “the UAR [United Arab Republic, i.e., Egypt] knows that the US would not sit back if the UAR committed aggression. ‘How could we attack Israel, knowing all this?’” In Meeting with Mahmoud Fawzi on April 10, 1969 [document dated May 29, 1969], DNSA, KT, item KT00023, 2. Though the focus was on attacks against Israel, it reflects the belief that the United States would become involved in any major conflict.


122. For similar interpretations see Gawrych, *Albatross of Decisive Victory,* 181; and Aronson with Brosh, *Politics and Strategy,* 145.


127. There are reasons to question the seriousness of the Soviet intervention proposal; see Parker, *October War,* chap. 5.
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129. Rublee is addressing Egyptian nuclear forbearance, but the point is applicable in this instance as well. See Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 137.


132. Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, chap. 4.


134. Daigle, Limits of Défense, 8, and chaps. 6–8.


139. Rublee, Nonproliferation Norms, 115–16.


143. Pollack, Arabs at War, 481.

144. Quoted in Parker, October War, 119.

145. Israelyan, Inside the Kremlin, 14, see also 13–16, 43–45; and Parker, October War, 82, 103, 120.

146. Pollack, Arabs at War, esp. 489.

4. China versus the United States

1. Throughout this chapter I use the terms “China,” “Chinese,” and “People’s Republic of China” interchangeably. I recognize that official US policy at the time recognized the regime under Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan as the legitimate government of China. I refer to Kuomintang (KMT), Nationalist Chinese, and Republic of China interchangeably.

2. For example, Shu Guang Zhang, “Between ‘Paper’ and ‘Real Tigers’: Mao’s View of Nuclear Weapons,” in Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945, ed.

3. See chapter 5 for additional discussion of the limits of the US nuclear arsenal during this period.


11. This stands in contrast to the Soviet case discussed in the next chapter.


34. Quoted in Gong Li, “Tension across the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s: Chinese Strategy and Tactics,” in Ross and Jiang, *Re-examining the Cold War*, 144.


36. Quoted in Xia, *Negotiating with the Enemy*, 23, also 26–34; Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, 142–43.

37. On the lack of progress see Xia, *Negotiating with the Enemy*, 26–42.


40. Quoted in Zhang, “Command, Control,” 91.

41. Zhang, 91–95.

42. Donggil Kim asserts that Mao pushed for intervention on July 12, which, he argues, challenges claims that the US decision to cross the thirty-eighth parallel led to Chinese intervention. His key source is a single meeting that day between Mao and Lee Sang-jo, an envoy for Kim Il Sung. At that meeting Mao argued it was likely the United States would send more troops, and “If North Korea asks, China is ready to send troops.” Neither Mao nor China appeared in a rush; Mao only asked for Kims’ response by August 10. Aside from preparing some troops, the most direct action China took appeared to be a crackdown beginning on July 23 against domestic opponents potentially emboldened by the American intervention. Donggil Kim, “New Insights,” 247–48, and “China’s Intervention in the Korean War Revisited,” *Diplomatic History* 40, no. 5 (2016): esp. 1005–6. See also “Telegram from Mao Zedong to Filippov,” July 22, 1950, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, RGASPI, trans. for NKIDP by Gary Goldberg, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114904; “Ciphered Telegram, Filippov (Stalin) to Zhou Enlai or Mao Zedong (via Roshchin),” July 13, 1950, History and Public Program Digital Archive, APRF, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110692; Shen, *Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War*, 138–42.


53. Quoted in Li, History of the Modern Chinese Army, 85–86. See also Li, 92, and Peng Dehuai’s speech at the Conference of Division-Level Commanders of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, October 16, 1950, in Zhang and Chen, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, esp. 176.

54. Scobell, China’s Use of Military Force, 85.

55. Quoted in Scobell, 86.


58. Li, History of the Modern Chinese Army, 82–84.


60. Quoted in Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 193. Emphasis in original.


63. Quoted in Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, 238.

64. Quoted in Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 218.


67. Quoted in Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, 240. See also Sheng, “Mao and China’s Relations with the Superpowers,” 484.


70. Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, 241–42; Li, “Tension across the Taiwan Strait,” 168–70.

71. For a discussion and debate on this issue see Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, 246–47.

72. For variations of this thesis see Christensen, Useful Adversaries, chap. 6; Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), chap. 7.
74. Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, 246.
76. Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 228.
77. Quoted in Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation, 248.
78. Quoted in Chen, Mao’s China in the Cold War, 180.
80. Quoted in Chen, Mao’s China in the Cold War, 182–83.
81. Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 243–50; Chen, Mao’s China in the Cold War, 182.
84. Quoted in Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 199, also see 195–201; Li, History of the Modern Chinese Army, 187–88.
85. Quoted in Chen and Li, After Learning to One Side, 68.
86. Christensen, “Threats, Assurances;” 129.
87. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, October 13, 1950, in Zhang and Chen, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 168. For a slightly different translation with the same meaning see Telegram to Zhou Enlai Concerning [Why] Our Troops Should Enter Korea, October 13, 1950, in Christensen, “Threats, Assurances;” 153. The focus on ROK rather than US forces was consistent in mid- to late-October: see Telegram Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, October 14, 1950, in Zhang and Chen, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 170; Telegram, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai, October 21, 1950, in Zhang and Chen, 180; Telegram Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai, October 23, 1950, in Zhang and Chen, 183–84. Though Mao did note on October 14 that if small American units were “somehow cut off” the Chinese would fight them as well. See Telegram, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai, October 14, 1950, in Zhang and Chen, 171.
103. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai and Others, October 11, 1950, in Zhang and Chen, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 167.
105. Gaddis, We Now Know, 80; Weathersby, “Should We Fear This?,” 19.
107. Shen and Li, After Learning to One Side, 43–44; Kim, “China’s Intervention,” 1021.
109. Shen, Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War, 173–74. Kim cites Stalin’s October 14 commitment but argues this had little effect on China’s decision. See Kim, “China’s Intervention,” 1023.
110. Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 58.
112. Telegram, Mao Zedong to Peng Dehuai and Deng Hua, October 30, 1950, in Zhang and Chen, Chinese Communist Foreign Policy, 199.
113. Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 59–60.
118. Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 171–72. Mao would return to this option later as well; see Godwin, “Change and Continuity,” 34.
120. Li, *History of the Modern Chinese Army*, 179.
121. Li, 137–41.
123. Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture*, chaps. 7–8.
124. Quoted in Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture*, 197. See also Chang and Di, “Absence of War,” 1512.
125. Chang and Di, 1510.
128. Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture*, 236–37, 252; Li, “Tension across the Taiwan Strait,” 158.
129. Li, *History of the Modern Chinese Army*, 182; Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture*, 236; Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 251.
136. Shen and Li, *After Leaning to One Side*, 41. See also Scobell, *China’s Use of Military Force*, 88.
137. Quoted in Shen, *Mao, Stalin, and the Korean War*, 172. Shu Guang Zhang and Chen Jian translate this passage slightly differently: “If the Soviet air force can, in addition to sending a volunteer air force to support our military operations in Korean in two to two-and-half months, dispatch air force to Beijing, Tianjin, Shenyang, Shanghai, Nanjing, and Qingdao, we then will not need to fear the [American] air attack.” See Zhang and Chen, *Chinese Communist Foreign Policy*, 169n.
139. Quoted in Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 105. See also Zhang, “Between ‘Paper’ and ‘Real Tigers,’” 197; Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture*, 108; Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War*, 110; Pape, *Bombing to Win*, 172; Chen, *China’s Road to the Korean War*, 193.
143. Both quotes from Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture*, 220.
145. Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 192–94. They note that nuclear weapons may have had a deterrent effect in this crisis but highlight reasons for skepticism.

146. Zhang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture*, 224.

147. “Memoir by Wu Lengxi,” 11.


153. Quoted in Zhang, “Between ‘Paper’ and ‘Real Tigers,’” 196. See also Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 104–5; Chen, *China’s Road to the Korean War*, 192.


157. Quoted in Travel and Medeiros, 60.

158. Quoted in Zhang, “Between ‘Paper’ and ‘Real Tigers,’” 205. See also Travel and Medeiros, “China’s Search,” 61.

159. Quoted in Li, *History of the Modern Chinese Army*, 170. See also Zhang, “Between ‘Paper’ and ‘Real Tigers,’” 211.


161. Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 111. For additional discussion of Soviet efforts at disparaging the American atomic monopoly to forestall blackmail see chapter 5. This logic was not limited to the Communist dictators. For instance, George Kennan made a similar point when addressing American fears of Soviet conventional capabilities. Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 111.

162. Travel and Medeiros, “China’s Search,” 60.


167. Mao is addressing paper tigers generally here, but the thinking is applicable to nuclear weapons, which he labeled a paper tiger. Talks with Directors of Various Cooperative Areas,


170. Shen and Li, After Leaning to One Side, 48–49.

171. “Memoir by Wu Lengxi,” 8.

172. Shen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 52–53.


175. Quoted in Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 217. Note also (at 221) the public comments by the chair of Sino-Soviet Friendship Organization, intended to reassure nervous Chinese.

176. Li, History of the Modern Chinese Army, 147. See also see Gaddis, We Now Know, 249; Christensen, Worse Than a Monolith, 141–42.


180. Shen and Li, After Leaning to One Side, 149.

181. Quoted in Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 74. See also Shen and Li, After Leaning to One Side, 148–53.

182. Quoted in Christensen, Useful Adversaries, 208.


184. Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War, 77; Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 254; Li, “Tension across the Taiwan Strait,” 160–61.

185. Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture, 254.


5. The Soviet Union versus the United States


11. Precise estimates vary, but intelligence estimated 175 total divisions, and Karber and Combs note that 140 were stationed on Soviet soil in 1948, the bulk of the difference likely being deployed in Eastern Europe. In addition, they note that during this period there were 24–25 divisions in East Germany and Poland and 5–6 “located in the remainder of Eastern Europe.” See Karber and Combs, “United States, NATO, and the Soviet Threat,” 408, 416–19. Holloway writes that in war plans in 1946 the Soviets had 17 ground-force divisions in Germany. Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb*, 232. See also Ross, *American War Plans*, esp. 86, 104.


22. Early plans cautioned against fighting Soviet ground forces in Western Europe and focused on ground action in the Middle East and the southern Soviet Union, though by late 1948 operational plans began considering ground campaigns to liberate Western Europe. The discussion of war plans in this paragraph draws on Ross, American War Plans, chaps. 2–5; Kaplan, To Kill Nations, chap. 2; Trachtenberg, Constructed Peace, 89–90; Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, 239–40.

23. Ross, American War Plans, 32.


34. Quoted in Roberts, Stalin’s Wars, 293.

35. Quoted in Haslam, Russia’s Cold War, 63, also 60, 64; Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, 131, 168; Roberts, Stalin’s Wars, 271, 279–88, 293, 303.


42. Quoted in Roberts, *Stalin's Wars*, 183.


45. On evolving Soviet policies see Hopf, *Reconstructing the Cold War*, 111–17; Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind*, 54–55; Haslam, *Russia's Cold War*, 68–69; Mastny, *Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*, 24–25; Vladislav Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (2007; Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 64–72; and Roberts, *Stalin’s Wars*, 350–59. Trachtenberg argues in *A Constructed Peace* that the Soviets were willing to live with a divided Germany provided the United States limit West German freedom of maneuver. But it was an open question if that would be the end result of US policy, and, as noted below, the Soviets also feared an American-led anti-Soviet bloc.


47. Roberts, *Stalin’s Wars*, 231–32.


50. On American policy as a response to Soviet power see Avey, “Confronting Soviet Power.”


54. Quoted in Scott D. Parrish, “The Turn toward Confrontation: The Soviet Reaction to the Marshall Plan, 1947,” *Cold War International History Project*, Working Paper 9 (March 1994), 13–14. See also Novikov’s comments, 20–21, as well as his warning in September 1946 that American policy was moving in a direction in which the “preconditions would thereby be created for a revival of an imperialist Germany which the US is counting on using on its side in a future war. One cannot fail to see that such a policy has a clearly defined anti-Soviet focus and represents a serious danger to the cause of peace.” Telegram from Nikolai Novikov, Soviet Ambassador to the US, to the Soviet Leadership, September 27, 1946, *History and Public Policy*.


67. Smith to Marshall, August 3, 1948, *FRUS 1948*, vol. 2, 1001, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1948v02/d594. Stalin reiterated several times that the Soviets’ “only objection” was the formation of a West German government in the western occupation zones; see 1000–1005.


72. Quoted in Mastny, Cold War and Soviet Insecurity, 48.

73. Quoted in Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, 45.


75. Zubok, Failed Empire, 75. George and Smoke make a similar point, writing that “from the Soviet standpoint the blockade was a controllable and reversible gambit. Soviet leaders . . . could at any time find a solution to the ‘technical difficulties’ and open up ground access to West Berlin. Nor need the Soviets persist in the blockade if the Western powers threatened to overreact to it in ways that raised the danger of war.” George and Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy, 118.

76. Mastny, Cold War and Soviet Insecurity, 49.


79. Mastny, Cold War and Soviet Insecurity, 49. See also Holloway, Stalin and the Bomb, 260–61.


82. Altman, 123; Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, 54.


84. Altman, 129.


87. Stivers, 600.

88. Harrington, Berlin on the Brink, 3–4; Leffler, Struggle for Germany, 54, 60. Prior to the blockade Soviet officials concluded that an airlift would be ineffective, and many held this view well into the crisis; see Narinskii, “Soviet Union and the Berlin Crisis,” 64–65, 71–72.


95. Quoted in Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 93.
98. Quoted in Zubok, “Stalin and the Nuclear Age,” 56.
99. Zubok, 45, 60. See also Gordin, *Red Cloud at Dawn*, 143–44.
100. Quoted in Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb*, 127.
101. Quoted in Holloway, 237.
103. Quoted in Garthoff, 6.
108. There is little evidence that the Soviet Union—or the Americans, for that matter—took the B-29 deployment as a serious nuclear threat. For a recent discussion see Daniel Altman, “Advancing without Attacking: The Strategic Game around the Use of Force,” *Security Studies* 27, no. 1 (January–March 2018).
110. Quoted in Holloway, 231.
111. Holloway, 235–36.
114. Quoted in Holloway, 265.
118. Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 91.
120. Holloway, 164, see also 156–61; Zubok, “Stalin and the Nuclear Age,” 50–52.
121. Quoted in Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 95.
122. Quoted in Gaddis, 96. For a slightly different translation see Holloway, *Stalin and the Bomb*, 164. In the West, Gar Alperovitz would popularize the thesis that the United States dropped the atomic bombs on Japan to intimidate the Soviet Union, though it is unlikely this was a major component in American decision making. For a discussion see Wilson D. Miscamble, *The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
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127. For example, Gaddis, *We Now Know*, 92.

128. For example, Zubok, “Stalin and the Nuclear Age,” 60.


130. The US arsenal thus lacked most of the hallmarks of Vipin Narang’s “asymmetric escalation posture,” which he identifies as most likely to deter conventional attacks. Narang’s framework is meant to apply to regional nuclear arsenals, though at this point in history the US arsenal resembled such an arsenal. While the US nuclear arsenal failed to prevent the Soviet blockade, I argue that it influenced the shape of Soviet policies. Vipin Narang, *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), esp. 19–21.

Conclusion


2. I estimated missing values for military expenditure or military personnel by taking the average of the year before and after the missing value. In cases where one of those was missing, I used the same value as the pre- or post-data that was available. In cases where no proximate years were available the value remains missing.

3. I take the data for both military spending and total troop levels from the National Material Capabilities version 5.0 dataset at the Correlates of War, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities.


5. Beckley, 53.


9. On the declining importance of steel see, for example, Mearsheimer, *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, 67.


11. I exclude cases where both sides had nuclear weapons, because the relevant comparison for nuclear monopoly is to dyads without nuclear weapons. That allows me to isolate the effect
of nuclear monopoly compared to how one might expect the dyad to behave if neither side had nuclear weapons. I take proliferation dates from Erik Gartzke and Matthew Kroenig, *A Strategic Approach to Nuclear Proliferation* 53, no. 2 (April 2009): 151–60. I include Israel in 1967 for coding consistency in this chapter. As discussed, excluding Israel would strengthen my argument. For a discussion of the 1967 war see appendix B.


13. I relax this requirement in appendix A. The results for median capability ratios are largely unchanged.

14. COW reports that Saudi Arabia entered the war on October 14 after the Syrian front had stabilized. Iraq and Jordan entered the war on October 12 and 16, respectively. All three exited the war on October 19. The main part of the war involving Egypt and Syria versus Israel began on October 6, with an end date of October 24 for Egypt and October 22 for Syria.

15. See appendix A.


18. The percentage of unbalanced wars between nonnuclear weapon states is 1.2 times greater than the percentage of balanced wars (10.8 percent / 9 percent). In nuclear monopoly, the percentage of wars with the NWS having a large advantage is 1.14 times greater than when it does not (4.7 percent to 4.1 percent).

19. I am deliberately selecting on the dependent variable in this section. I do not consider political disputes in nuclear monopoly that did not escalate to war, nor do I compare wars in nuclear monopoly to wars involving only nonnuclear weapon states. This limits the inferences I am able to draw. I seek only to establish that in those wars that we do observe there is limited danger to the nuclear weapon state. At the same time, we know that there are wars of conquest between states that do not possess nuclear weapons, which can provide a useful background condition with which to view these results. On this point see Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 46–47, 58–61.

20. See appendix B for a discussion of Egyptian planning regarding Israel’s Dimona reactor in 1967.

21. Various British governments had considered ceding control of the islands, and they were not considered part of the core British homeland. See appendix B.


23. Francis J. Gavin, *Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012). Bracken highlights that the “second nuclear age” was
developing during the Cold War and the two eras overlapped, but concludes that “1998 was the turning point. The events in India, Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea were impossible to ignore and crystallized a new way of seeing the world.” Bracken, Second Nuclear Age, 95–106, quote at 105–6.


25. For a review see Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The Limits of the Nuclear Revolution,” unpublished manuscript, chap. 3.


27. I do this as well when I focus on whether or not war occurred.


31. For a similar point see Sechser and Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy, 5.

32. The nuclear armed state may try to leverage its arsenal in this way, but it will likely have limited success.

33. That may also explain why they ignored American warnings regarding Kuwaiti oil wells.


Appendix A

1. All data and replication commands are available at www.paulavey.com.

2. The following dyads remained in these wars: North Korea versus South Korea 1950; China versus South Korea 1950; North Vietnam versus South Vietnam 1965. The updated May 2018 Correlates of War MID and War coding identifies a militarized dispute but not an interstate war between Iraq and Kuwait in 1990. The alternative Reiter, Stam, Horowitz war dataset also does not code the 1990 Iraqi invasion, but does code those two states at war in 1991. I include that dyad as a result.


Appendix B

5. Pollack, 36.
7. Pollack, 38.
8. Pollack, 39. Egyptian losses against the British-French-Israeli forces are estimated at one thousand killed, four thousand wounded, and six thousand captured. The Correlates of War (May 2018) estimate twenty-two British battlefield deaths. See conclusion chapter.
11. This reversed an October 30 decision not to intervene. See Zubok, *Failed Empire*, 115–17.
18. On these points see Logevall, *Embers of War*; and Schuessler, *Deceit on the Road to War*, chap. 3; Clodfelter, *Warfare and Armed Conflicts*, 712–17.
27. Including the case in fact biases the results against my argument, because aggregate capability indicators discussed in the conclusion chapter code Israel’s Arab opponents as having significant capabilities relative to Israel.
37. Pollack, 295.
42. Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, 150.
43. For the argument that Israel was aware of its conventional superiority and the crisis created an opportunity for Israel to eliminate potential threats see Popp, “Stumbling Decidedly,” 299–308; and Mearsheimer, *Conventional Deterrence*, 150–53.
45. Pollack, 64–84.
47. Pollack, 313–15.
Continuing Struggle with China and Its Implications for US Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002), 53, 98–100.


52. Zhang, *Deng Xiaoping’s Long War*, 113n132. Phillips and Axelrod report that Vietnamese forces staged a “counteroffensive into Chinese territory” to which “Chinese defensive forces responded quickly and drove this incursion back, but there was widespread shock over the temerity of the invasion.” Phillips and Axelrod, *Encyclopedia of Wars*, 3:1061. It is unclear if Phillips and Axelrod are referring to the 3rd Battalion, 460th Regiment, attack. In any event, Vietnam does not appear to have “invaded” China but rather conducted a limited assault directly across the border with a small force on one occasion to disrupt the Chinese advance.


57. Quoted in Zhang, *Deng Xiaoping’s Long War*, 112.

58. As Zhang notes, Beijing “granted operational autonomy to regional commanders but kept the duration and space of the fight under the command of the central leadership in Beijing. Deng Xiaoping was determined to avoid having the invasion turn into a quagmire for China.” Zhang, *Deng Xiaoping’s Long War*, 71. See also Scobell’s account, which highlights concerns that a larger war could lead to escalation with the Soviet Union as well. Scobell, *China’s Use of Military Force*, esp. 125–29.


61. Quoted in Zhang, 112. Xu primarily commanded forces in the eastern part of the fighting next to Guanxi; Scobell, *China’s Use of Military Force*, 132, 127.

62. Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War*. The May 2018 COW dataset reverses the figures to report eight thousand Chinese and thirteen thousand Vietnamese battlefield deaths. This change would strengthen my argument.


69. Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War*, 141–42. The May 2018 COW dataset has the same start and end dates but reports twenty-two hundred Chinese battlefield deaths with one thousand for Vietnam.

70. Li, *History of the Modern Chinese Army*, 263.

71. The Correlates of War lists 255 British battlefield deaths, with nearly three times as many Argentine battlefield deaths at 746.


74. The case is sometimes cited as evidence that the nuclear nonuse norm is sufficient to explain nonnuclear weapon state belligerency or that nuclear weapons cast little to no shadow

My argument, by contrast, is that this is a case where one expects a limited nuclear shadow because of the conventional imbalance and conduct of the war but that one should not generalize beyond similar cases. The benefits of nuclear use for the NWS being low, the NNWS will have greater confidence that any costs associated with nuclear use will be sufficient to constrain the opponent. In other words, a limited nuclear shadow here does not imply a limited nuclear shadow when the NNWS is more conventionally capable or creates larger dangers to the NWS.


77. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts, 151, also 151–57.


79. Quoted in Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts, 152. See also Thornton, Falklands Sting, 84–85.


81. Thornton, Falklands Sting, 106. See also Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts, 153.

82. Quoted in Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts, 158. See also Thornton, Falklands Sting, xx, 67–70, 81, 90–91, 122; Boyce, Falklands War, 27, 54.


86. Paul, 146–47.


88. Thornton, Falklands Sting, 184–85. A third Mirage was lost to friendly fire as it returned to base.

89. Thornton, Falklands Sting, 171, 186.


92. The Sheffield would sink on May 10 while being towed outside the combat zone. Boyce, Falklands War, 110; Thornton, Falklands Sting, 207–8.
93. Dates reflect the day of the main strikes, not necessarily the day the vessel sank. All dates taken from Lawrence S. Germain, appendix, in Watson and Dunn, *Military Lessons*, 150–67.


96. Quoted in Thornton, 233.


100. For general overviews of the ground campaign see Boyce, *Falklands War*, chaps. 6–7; Freedman, *Official History of the Falklands Campaign*, 2: chaps. 37–42.


109. Minutes of Meeting Held at 10 Downing Street, Defense and Oversea Policy Committee, April 16, 1982, United Kingdom National Archives, CAB 148/211, 33. This meeting is discussed in Sechser and Fuhrmann, *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy*, 168. Despite Thatcher’s statement, there is evidence that the British government did explore possible action against the mainland; see Hannah Kuchler, “Britain Considered Bombing Argentina,” *Financial Times*, December 27, 2012, https://www.ft.com/content/fdd00d54-4dcb-11e2-a0fc-00144feab49a.

110. Thornton, *Falklands Sting*, 20, also 81–82, 90, 229.


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118. Pollack, Arabs at War, 526.
119. Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 189; Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts, 629.
120. The May 2018 Correlates of War data report the start date of the Israeli-Syrian portion of the war as June 6, 1982, and the termination as June 10, 1982. Sarkees and Wayman, Resort to War, date the conflict as April 21 to September 15, 1982. On May 2000 see Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 171.
121. On the internal Israeli political dynamics see Maoz, Defending the Holy Land, 174–206, and Pollack, Arabs at War, 524–29.
122. Pollack, Arabs at War, 531, also 529–31.
123. Pollack, Warfare and Armed Conflicts, 630.
124. Syrian combat forces continued to operate in Lebanon until 1990, mostly against Lebanese militias but also occasionally against Israeli forces. See Pollack, Arabs at War, 548.
125. Pollack, 540. Clodfelter reports Syrian losses from June 6 to September 3 as 1,350 killed, 4,800 wounded, and 450 tanks. Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts, 630.
133. George, Cuban Intervention in Angola, 210–2; Polack, Last Hot Battle, 135–36; Weigert, Angola, 88.
134. George, Cuban Intervention in Angola, chap. 10.
137. Weigert, Angola, 89–90.
140. Quoted in Liberman, “Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb,” 56.
141. Liberman, 57–58. Most sources date the test in 1987, although it is unclear if this was prior to the August South African decision to launch Operation Moduler in response to the Angolan offensive. Other sources date the activity to June–October 1988 or 1986. See Liberman, 58n43; Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, 213; David Albright, “South Africa and the Affordable Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 50, no. 4 (July/August 1994): 45; Stumpf, “South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program,” 6.
143. Quoted in Narang, Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era, 213.
144. Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflict, 582.
147. Haun, 125–32.


151. Haun, 204–5.

152. Sarkees and Wayman, *Resort to War*, 155–56. Reiter, Stam, and Horowitz also code October 7 and December 22 as the start and end date for the international phase of the conflict. The May 2018 updated COW data alter the dates to September 15 and November 15, 2001. It is unclear why this change was made.


