Tempting Fate
Avey, Paul C.

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Tempting Fate: Why Nonnuclear States Confront Nuclear Opponents.

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Surveying the devastation in Japan after World War II, the United States Strategic Bombing Survey concluded that “no more forceful arguments for peace and for the international machinery of peace than the sight of the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have ever been devised.”¹ The world quickly sought to make sense of the “absolute weapon.”² Yet the power of the two bombs unleashed in 1945 would pale compared to the thermonuclear variants that would follow. The sheer speed and destructiveness of nuclear arms seemed to constitute a “nuclear revolution,” destined to upend international politics.³ Any country that lacked a nuclear arsenal would find itself vulnerable, unable to prevent becoming the target of a nuclear strike by threatening retaliation on the same scale.

Despite these weapons’ awesome power, though, countries without nuclear arms have not shied away from challenging and resisting nuclear-armed states. In 1948, less than three years after the United States had demonstrated its willingness to use nuclear weapons, the Soviet Union blockaded Berlin, directly challenging the American nuclear monopoly. The Soviets then stood firm for nearly a year against US efforts to undermine that blockade. Two years later, the young People’s Republic of China attacked US troops in Korea. Egypt and Syria combined to launch a massive assault on Israeli forces in October 1973. Iraq ignored US threats in 1990, and Serbia did likewise in 1999. In 1979, nonnuclear Vietnam fought a war against nuclear-armed China. The list goes on. According to one widely used conflict list, there have been sixteen wars between nuclear weapon states and nonnuclear weapon states from 1945 to 2010 and hundreds of lower-level militarized disputes. During that same period there were nineteen wars between states with no nuclear weapons. In other words, wars in which one side holds a nuclear monopoly occur about as often as those between states where neither side has nuclear weapons. Moreover, the nonnuclear weapon state (NNWS) frequently starts the trouble. In other cases,
the NNWS could have ceded to the demands of the nuclear weapon state (NWS) without giving up its rule or territory. Instead, it resisted.  

Why has the “absolute weapon” so frequently failed to impress states without it? This type of conflict is puzzling for both deterrence and compellence explanations. Bernard Brodie, whose early writings served as the foundation for thinking about nuclear politics, and whom nuclear strategist and Nobel laureate Thomas C. Schelling called “the dean of us all,” wrote that “certainly a monopoly of atomic bombs would be a sufficiently clear definition of superiority to dissuade the other side from accepting the gage of war unless directly attacked.” After the Cold War, Robert A. Pape argued that “when nuclear capabilities are completely one-sided . . . if the coercer’s capability is relatively unlimited, coercive success is virtually assured.”

Addressing the United States specifically, James J. Wirtz highlights that theory predicts without “the constraints of mutual assured destruction or in some cases the possibility of even weak retaliation in kind, the United States and its allies should enjoy great success in deterring weaker states or compelling them to comply with their wishes.”

In perhaps the most important statement on the nuclear revolution, Robert Jervis argued that mutual vulnerability induced restraint. He recognized that if one party gained a nuclear first-strike capability—if one side could completely eliminate the opponent’s arsenal—the situation would be vastly different. Yet his key insight that vulnerability induces caution can be applied to nuclear monopoly. The extreme vulnerability of an NNWS facing a nuclear opponent should encourage restraint. That danger should deter the NNWS from acting against the NWS. To be sure, the NWS might use nuclear weapons as a shield with which to conduct aggression against its hapless nonnuclear-armed opponents. Yet even then states without nuclear weapons should give in to all but the most extreme demands rather than risk a conflict in an environment of intense vulnerability.

A number of studies support these theoretical expectations by showing that nuclear superiority has historically provided political benefits. These include both deterrence (preventing an adversary from acting) and compellence (causing an adversary to change its behavior). Historian Marc Trachtenberg and political scientists Keir Lieber and Daryl Press have all found that US nuclear advantages relative to the Soviet Union in the early Cold War provided significant benefits during crises. Beyond the American case, Kyle Beardsley and Victor Asal argue that states with nuclear weapons facing nonnuclear opponents tend to prevail—by which they mean “either gaining concessions or having an opponent back down from its demands”—and prevail quickly. As they conclude, “the immense damage from the possibility of [nuclear] escalation is enough to make an opponent eager to offer concessions. Asymmetric crises allow nuclear states
to use their leverage to good effect.” 12 Erik Gartzke and Dong-Joon Jo show that nuclear weapons provide broad bargaining advantages to their possessors. 13 And Matthew Kroenig finds that states with larger nuclear arsenals than their opponents tend to win crises. As he puts it, “States in a position of nuclear superiority are more likely to issue compellent threats and to achieve compellent success.” 14 If correct, then complete asymmetry in nuclear capabilities should provide substantial benefits.

Even those that contend nuclear weapons are poor tools for compellence generally accept that nuclear weapons are nevertheless useful for deterrence. Thus, Matthew Furhmann and Todd Sechser argue that the “ability to destroy does not necessarily convey the ability to [compel],” but add that nuclear weapons are “useful for deterrence . . . as weapons of self-defense, they are irreplaceable.” 15 Indeed, they find that simply having an alliance with a nuclear-armed state provides benefits against would-be challengers. 16 If an alliance with a nuclear state helps, one would expect that actual possession of a nuclear weapon would deter nonnuclear opponents. 17

The coercive benefits of nuclear weapons are also at the center of strategic explanations for nuclear proliferation. According to these arguments, states facing large security threats will seek nuclear weapons. Such arguments therefore rest on the view that nuclear monopoly matters. 18 If a nonnuclear state faces a nonnuclear opponent with superior conventional capabilities, then building a nuclear arsenal to manufacture a condition of nuclear monopoly can offset that danger and provide bargaining leverage. Conversely, if a nonnuclear state faces a nuclear-armed opponent, then acquiring a nuclear arsenal is beneficial because it eliminates nuclear monopoly. That allows the formerly nonnuclear state to deter nuclear strikes and counter efforts at nuclear blackmail. As Mao Zedong noted in 1956, China needed a nuclear weapon because “in today’s world, if we don’t want to be bullied, then we cannot do without this thing.” 19 In other words, nuclear monopoly provided a potential compellent advantage to China’s nuclear-armed opponents that Mao sought to offset.

In sum, theory and evidence from a wide range of studies make NNWS belligerency toward nuclear rivals puzzling. Why, then, do states without nuclear weapons confront nuclear-armed opponents? A simple explanation would be that these conflicts occurred because no one believed nuclear weapons would be used. To begin with, I show that nonnuclear weapon states frequently did take their opponents’ nuclear arsenal into consideration. Moreover, such an explanation is unsatisfying because it does not answer the more interesting questions: why would leaders believe that nuclear weapons would not be used in certain situations? What factors lead NNWS decision makers to discount the prospects for nuclear use and be willing to challenge or resist a nuclear-armed opponent?
The Argument

I argue that the nonnuclear weapon state is able to act because it can take advantage of various strategic and material inhibitions against the use of nuclear arms to minimize the likelihood of a nuclear strike. In essence, the NNWS identifies red lines and gambles that, by its not crossing those lines, the costs of nuclear weapon use for the nuclear-armed opponent will outweigh the benefits. The precise strategies available and pursued by the NNWS will vary across cases. In general, though, the more militarily capable the NNWS is relative to the NWS, the more difficult it will be for the NNWS to reduce the incentives for nuclear strikes. This forces a powerful NNWS to behave in a consistently constrained manner, and wars in nuclear monopoly will tend to occur only in the face of large power asymmetries favoring the NWS. My argument thus shows that nuclear weapons are neither irrelevant, as some argue, nor do they dictate state behavior. There are a variety of tools available to an NNWS to challenge, resist, and even win limited victories in a war against nuclear opponents.

States without nuclear weapons can focus on raising the costs or lowering the benefits of nuclear use for the NWS. There are real material and strategic costs to using nuclear weapons that constrain nuclear-armed states. These include the possibility that nuclear use destroys valuable objectives, harms friends or neutral states, generates diplomatic backlash from those not directly affected, expands a conflict to include new actors, or encourages nuclear proliferation. The NNWS can manipulate many of these factors in different situations to further raise the costs of nuclear use. For instance, the NNWS may seek out third parties to restrain the nuclear-armed opponent. The greater the danger to the NWS, the larger the benefits of using nuclear weapons, though. As benefits go up, a set of costs that were sufficient to dissuade nuclear use at one point may no longer do so. The NNWS can therefore also prosecute the conflict in a way that it believes will not create large dangers for the nuclear-armed opponent. This lowers the stakes for the NWS and reduces the likelihood of a nuclear strike. The key for the NNWS is to act so that some level of costs from using nuclear weapons sufficiently outweighs the benefits. I discuss these costs and benefits of nuclear use as well as NNWS strategies in much more detail in the next chapter.

The stronger the NNWS is, the more constrained it will have to be; the weaker the NNWS, the more options it can pursue, subject to its own conventional limitations. The claim that wars are more likely when the NNWS is conventionally weak is counterintuitive. Yet the basic logic is that the larger the conventional threat, the greater danger the NNWS poses and the fewer conventional options the NWS has to offset that danger.20 This raises the benefits of nuclear strikes for the NWS. As such, a powerful
NNWS must sharply limit its behavior to signal restraint and reduce the incentives for nuclear strikes. This is not to claim that it is great to be weak. A weak NNWS faces its own challenges and must weigh the likelihood of success in a conventional confrontation. Numerous factors aside from nuclear weapons will influence whether a militarily weaker NNWS will act or escalate during a conflict. The point is rather that a conventionally weak NNWS can fight a war against a nuclear opponent if it believes it has a plausible pathway to a favorable settlement precisely because it poses a smaller overall danger to the NWS. Because the NNWS poses a smaller danger, the benefits to the NWS of using its nuclear weapons are lower. This in turn makes it more likely that the costs of nuclear weapons use will outweigh the benefits. In other words, a militarily powerful NNWS must behave very cautiously; a militarily weak NNWS has more room to maneuver.

My argument leads to four main predictions. First, wars involving a conventionally powerful NNWS relative to its nuclear-armed opponent should be rare. Those wars that do occur in nuclear monopoly will tend to be fought between states with large conventional military disparities in favor of the nuclear-armed state. Second, the NWS should not face major dangers to its territorial integrity, critical military assets, and regime survival during wars in nuclear monopoly. Third, during political disputes, the NNWS leadership will focus on strategic factors that it believes will result in the NWS deciding the costs of nuclear use outweigh the benefits. Finally, my argument predicts that the NNWS should then act in a consistent manner, confronting the nuclear opponent in a way that limits the incentives for the NWS to execute a nuclear strike.

My argument addresses the conduct of political disputes and wars rather than which side starts the conflict. First, as outlined above, a large amount of theory and evidence suggests that nuclear monopoly provides coercive—that is, both deterrence and compellence—benefits. Yet conflict in nuclear monopoly is fairly common. My argument seeks to address both aspects of this puzzle.

Second, the NNWS faces the prospect of nuclear strikes when it elects to challenge rather than accept an undesired status quo and when it refuses to make concessions necessary to avoid a fight.21 This is not to claim there is no meaningful distinction between deterrence and compellence. It is likely more difficult to get an adversary to act rather than not act. As Kroenig points out, though, “it is one thing to argue . . . that compellence is more difficult than deterrence. It is quite another to claim . . . that nuclear weapons do not influence compellence at all.”22 The relationship between many of the costs of nuclear strikes for the NWS is contingent on the nature of the dispute and proposed consequences. For instance, both a deterrent and compellent threat that promise to overthrow a government and liberate its people for noncompliance with a demand generate the
same costs to the NWS for nuclear use, namely that such a strike would harm the people to be liberated. To be sure, it would be unsurprising that an NNWS would, to borrow from Brodie, accept the gage of war if suddenly attacked. Yet in most cases there were clear opportunities for the NNWS to avoid a fight.

Third, many disputes contain elements of both compellence and deterrence, with different actors making the first move at different points in the dispute. Kelly Greenhill and Robert Art highlight that “compellent actions are often undertaken in a crisis by a coercer in order to shore up its deterrent posture.” Additionally, Trachtenberg points out that in “the real world . . . wars are often not simply ‘started’ by one side, and the distinction between defender and attacker can be very problematic.” For instance, Iraq invaded Kuwait knowing it would invite some form of US response and then resisted US demands. Focusing on the dispute, rather than its initiation, shows how the shadow of nuclear weapons influenced Iraqi decision making over the course of the conflict. In several cases examined in this book, NWS policies intentionally or unintentionally created intolerable situations for the NNWS, blurring the line between offensive and defensive action. Relatedly, different conflict lists apply different criteria for initiation, and the authors themselves identify reasons one could code a dispute multiple ways. Defining the status quo is often problematic, particularly in disputes where it is in flux. The participants themselves will frequently disagree on what constitutes the status quo. “What one considers an innocent deterrent,” writes Richard Betts, “the other may see as a pernicious compellent.”

I limit the scope of my study to situations where there is a political dispute between states. I avoid cases where an NNWS takes no action at all because it is so weak that it lacks any options to redress its grievances. In addition, if the NNWS has few interests at stake in an issue or no disagreement at all with a nuclear-armed state, then my argument does not apply. If the NNWS had little incentive to act in the first place, then it does not matter much if the NNWS possessed remarkably effective strategies to minimize the likelihood of a nuclear strike.

Previous studies suggest that in asymmetric conflict the weaker party will possess strong motivations to act. In the cases that I examine, the non-nuclear weapon states were highly resolved. In many of the cases the underlying political trends or actions by the nuclear-armed state were directly or indirectly threatening to the NNWS, which led to that high resolve. For example, US policies toward Germany following World War II created major concerns in the Soviet Union. With those concerns came an intense interest in reversing those policies. Similarly, the status quo facing Egypt after the Six Day War proved intolerable to Egyptian leaders. As I show, though, high resolution alone was not sufficient to cause NNWS leaders to ignore nuclear weapons.
At the same time, the cases I examine in detail are ones in which the NWS had a demonstrated interest. Though in some cases the NNWS may believe the NWS will not act at all, and therefore discount nuclear weapons, in many it is clear that both sides have interests at stake. For instance, in 1950 the United States was already fighting in Korea when China intervened. One could doubt American commitment to the Korean Peninsula in the spring of 1950; one could not by the fall of the same year. In 1973 Israel had already fought to acquire (1967) and then hold on to (1969–1970) the Sinai Peninsula. The key is that the NNWS avoids posing a major danger to the NWS’s survival or creating a situation that can lead to large additional losses beyond the immediate dispute.

This book focuses, then, on how the NNWS probes the limits of the nuclear shadow, and how conventional military forces influence the likelihood for escalation. In practical terms, this means that the universe of cases to which this argument applies is not all possible interstate interactions but rather existing disputes. In social science terminology, an NNWS has already “selected into” some form of confrontation with a nuclear-armed opponent by challenging or resisting the NWS. I do not seek to explain the underlying factors that cause an NNWS to oppose an NWS in the first place. As noted, existing research suggests that weak actors who select into conflicts are likely to be highly resolved and have some baseline ability to act. These expectations are borne out in the case studies discussed in this book, with the NWS pursuing policies that create large strategic and domestic problems for the NNWS that then contribute to NNWS determination to act. However, I do not examine cases where nothing at all happened to fully demonstrate that states without an intense interest and baseline ability to act do in fact not do so. My argument instead accounts for the planning and behavior during disputes, including those few that escalate to wars. Despite these limitations, this book nevertheless covers a large number of important cases.

Implications for Scholarship and Policy

Understanding confrontations in nuclear monopoly has important implications for scholars and policy makers. To begin with, it helps clarify the role that nuclear weapons play in international politics. How far does the nuclear shadow extend? Much of what we know about the role that nuclear weapons play in disputes is limited to when both sides have them. This is not surprising, given the reasonable focus on the US-Soviet nuclear standoff during the Cold War. Today a great deal of attention goes to the nuclear relationships between the United States and China and between India and Pakistan. Even work that explicitly deals with nuclear asymmetry often focuses on cases when one country has a large qualitative or quantitative advantage over another nuclear-armed power.
The core claims of the nuclear revolution build from situations when both sides possess nuclear weapons. According to these arguments, mutual nuclear vulnerability makes crises and war unlikely, favors the preservation of the status quo, and ameliorates the security dilemma. In short, mutual vulnerability reduces many of the traditional external pressures in international politics. This situation is thought to be relatively durable because it is difficult for any state to gain a meaningful advantage against a nuclear-armed opponent. These claims were never universally accepted. Some argued the political effects of nuclear weapons were oversold, others that nuclear advantages could be made meaningful, and still others that normative conditions generated discourses that led nuclear-armed opponents to internalize mutual deterrence as the appropriate behavior for their status. Recent work by historians and political scientists using a variety of methods and armed with access to new archival and quantitative sources has further qualified and challenged several of these contentions.

The nuclear revolution nevertheless offers a plausible account for some basic observations. Most notably, joint nuclear possession seems to deter nuclear strikes and reduces the chance for major war between two nuclear-armed states. Fortunately, there has yet to be a single instance of nuclear use by one nuclear power against another. There have also been, at most, two minor conventional wars directly between nuclear-armed states: China–Soviet Union in 1969 and India–Pakistan in 1999.

The stability-instability paradox can help explain why low-level conflict continues. The basic argument is that two nuclear-armed states are mutually deterred from using their nuclear arsenal and thus freed to fight low-level conventional wars and stumble into crises. This potential limitation of the nuclear revolution depends completely (by definition) on joint nuclear possession, thereby excluding cases of nuclear monopoly.

Left unexplained in these formulations is conflict in nuclear monopoly. Yet, as noted above, this type of conflict poses a puzzle for many existing explanations of nuclear politics. This book contributes to the understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in international politics by focusing exclusively on the comparatively understudied dynamics of nuclear monopoly, joining a small number of works that deal directly or indirectly with conflict in that context. It builds on, extends, and challenges portions of these studies that address aspects of NNWS behavior. I do not claim to provide the only explanation for the dynamics of nuclear monopoly. My aim is more limited: to expand on existing treatments to provide a fuller explanation for conflict in nuclear monopoly. To that end, I turn now to the relation between my argument and some of the most prominent studies in this area.

Insights from normative arguments help explain conflict in nuclear monopoly. By themselves, however, they are at best incomplete. The basic
normative claim is that states do not use nuclear weapons because there is a norm that arose over time proscribing nuclear use. As a result, NNWS leaders do not take nuclear use seriously and feel free to confront a nuclear-armed opponent. As a complete explanation for conflict in nuclear monopoly, what I term the “strong norms” claim, this argument is seriously flawed. Referencing the nuclear nonuse norm, T. V. Paul asks rhetorically: “If there existed neither an explicit legal ban nor a deterrent capability to prevent possible nuclear retaliation, what else could explain the belief among decision makers of nonnuclear states that nuclear weapons would not be used against them in their impending conflict?” As I show, a great deal of other factors help explain decision making in nonnuclear states. To be fair, Paul recognizes that “other possible political and strategic constraints” may operate, though he does not develop these in any detail. Similarly, Michael Gerson writes that the reason states without nuclear weapons “are not intimidated by an opponent’s nuclear capabilities” is “due in part to the perceived impact of the ‘nuclear taboo.’” Yet there is no effort to explore the other “parts” that influence NNWS decision makers. Paul Huth and Bruce Russett argue that, at least in extended deterrence situations, NNWS leaders do not think nuclear use is credible because “normative inhibitions associated with this disproportion [of nuclear destruction] made it absurd to consider nuclear use a real possibility.”

Others provide even fewer qualifications. In the most important book on the nuclear taboo, Nina Tannenwald concludes simply that “because of the taboo, a nuclear threat against a nonnuclear state is no longer credible.” The former US national security adviser McGeorge Bundy made a similar point when he noted that as a result of the tradition of nonuse, “no government without [nuclear] weapons needs to be easily coerced by nuclear threats from others, because both history and logic make it clear that no government will resort to nuclear weapons over less than a mortal question.” There is often little effort to demonstrate that NNWS leaders relied on normative factors; the mere fact of conflict is taken as evidence that the norm must be at work.

If the strong-norms claim is correct, NNWS leaders should simply identify nuclear nonuse norms as the reason that nuclear weapons would not be used and be willing to confront a nuclear-armed opponent. Leaders may not even discuss their opponent’s nuclear status at all if they have internalized the belief that norms constrain nuclear use. The taboo should also operate regardless of relative conventional capabilities. The case studies and pattern of war in nuclear monopoly makes clear that these claims do not hold.

Yet normative factors are not irrelevant, even if they are not a comprehensive explanation for conflict. NNWS leaders may believe that international opinion might lead to negative consequences for the NWS in the form of diplomatic blowback, sanctions, or even active support for the
NNWS following nuclear use. This would particularly be the case if nuclear use resulted in large numbers of civilian deaths. Indeed, this is consistent with views that harming civilians—even by conventional means—should be avoided.\textsuperscript{42} NNWS leaders at times highlight such considerations when deciding how to confront nuclear opponents. They may even attempt to manipulate international condemnation to minimize the risks of nuclear strikes. They do so in the belief that this type of negative blowback will create a strategic disincentive for nuclear use even if the NWS was willing to internally set aside normative considerations.\textsuperscript{43} My argument incorporates this insight by highlighting how evolving norms can generate strategic consequences that the NNWS can leverage. In short, the NNWS can use norms instrumentally. The focus on normative factors occurs alongside consideration of material and strategic issues.

A number of studies highlight how various costs of nuclear use, force structures, and interests influence the effects of nuclear weapons. For instance, Sechser and Fuhrmann identify several similar costs to explain nuclear compellence failures.\textsuperscript{44} Vipin Narang shows how nuclear-armed states facing conventionally powerful militaries are more likely to see the benefits of nuclear use as outweighing the costs and adopt corresponding force postures and doctrines. Moreover, wars in those situations are unlikely to occur.\textsuperscript{45} Still others contend that states will confront a nuclear-armed opponent when they have a much larger stake than their opponent does in the issue.\textsuperscript{46}

I go beyond these existing studies in several ways. First, I focus exclusively on these dynamics in nuclear monopoly. As such, I consider additional costs and benefits of nuclear use and show that many of the costs others identify have implications for both deterrence and compellence when only one side has nuclear weapons. Second, this book demonstrates that wars involving NNWS militaries with strong conventional capabilities relative to their nuclear opponents will be rare in nuclear monopoly, regardless of the specific force posture. Most importantly, I am able to demonstrate in a number of cases that NNWS decision makers explicitly considered various costs and benefits of nuclear use across discrete types of nuclear deployments. Finally, I show that even if the NNWS has a greater relative interest in the issue, that does not mean it ignores the possibility of nuclear use.

Beyond nuclear politics, some perspectives claim that power asymmetries dampen conflict by clarifying who will win. For example, Geoffrey Blainey argues that many wars start because both sides believe they could win.\textsuperscript{47} That type of mutual optimism is more likely when both sides have similar capabilities, because each can entertain hopes of victory. This insight is at the center of the influential bargaining model of war, which, as Dan Reiter notes, predicts conflict when there is “disagreement over the balance of power.”\textsuperscript{48} War thus becomes less likely when power asymmetries
increase, because the balance of power is clear. Numerous quantitative studies find support for the relationship that war is less likely as power imbalances increase.  

The inverse prediction is also true, that states are unlikely to fight if they expect to lose. These dynamics still exist in nuclear monopoly, with many weak states seeking to avoid war because they would lose, but they are counterbalanced by the reluctance of militarily powerful nonnuclear states to fight against an NWS.

Turning to more practical considerations, the world is no longer dominated by the superpower standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union. Many actual and potential conflicts involve states without nuclear weapons in confrontations with states that have nuclear weapons. Since 2000 alone, the United States has used or threatened force against Iraq, Iran, Libya, North Korea (nonnuclear prior to 2006), and Syria. Russia has invaded the territory of two of its nonnuclear neighbors. Israel continues to have serious disputes with actors, all nonnuclear, along its border. Although nuclear use in any of these conflicts is unlikely, any time conflict occurs, the risks of nuclear use increases. Understanding the dynamics of these conflicts can help minimize the chances that the world witnesses its first nuclear detonation in combat since 1945. A better understanding of conflict in nuclear monopoly is thus hardly a trivial matter.

If states without nuclear weapons simply ignore such weapons, then nuclear-armed states face an uphill battle convincing such opponents that nuclear weapons might actually be used. This can create a space for NWS policy entrepreneurs who argue for potentially dangerous policies to demonstrate credibility, such as delegating launch authority, forward deploying nuclear assets, or investing in a new generation of more “usable” nuclear weapons. A nuclear force rendered virtually incredible might also cause adversaries to misinterpret red lines for actual nuclear use. Such miscalculation could result in catastrophe.

Finally, if nuclear weapons only deterred nuclear strikes, with few other political consequences, this would strengthen calls for global nuclear-zero arguments. After all, what is the point of keeping a weapon that everyone knows no state will ever use? Ridding the world of nuclear weapons would achieve the same effect as mutual nuclear deterrence—preventing someone from striking you with a nuclear bomb—without the risks of nuclear accidents.

The rest of this book develops my argument and assesses the predictions against the historical record. I then return to broader implications for nuclear strategy and politics in the conclusion.