Maps are too important to be left to cartographers alone.
—J. Brian Harley, “Deconstructing the Map,” 1992

“Roumeli is not to be found on maps of present-day Greece,” wrote Patrick Leigh Fermor at the start of his eponymous account of travels in northern Greece, published in 1966, which has since become a classic and required reading for students of anthropology. Fermor explained that he was “perhaps seduced by the strangeness and the beauty of the name.”¹ The meaning of Roumeli is of course more obvious to those familiar with the history of the Byzantine and Ottoman empires, yet it is not one that can easily be attributed to a fixed entity. The simplest definition of Roumeli (Rumeli in its Turkish spelling) is the land of the Rum, or Romans. It does not, however, include Asia Minor or the Peloponnese or Thessaly. The term Fermor picked to describe what was essentially northern Greece was the name Ottomans gave to the province that was formed by their first major conquests in the Balkan Peninsula, which they also referred to as Rumeli. As the Ottoman territories expanded, so did the area of the province, including not only northern Greece but also parts of present-day Bulgaria and Macedonia.² As a geographical term, Rumeli did not have clearly demarcated boundaries. The elasticity and nostalgic ring of the term were precisely why Fermor found it so fitting for his “random journeys.” It was also proper for a book that described peoples and ways of life that sit uneasily within the strict confines of a nation-state, such as the transhumant Sarakatsani and the fiercely localist Cretans. In one passage a Sarakatsan lamented about the times when they could pasture their flocks

2. The province of Rumeli was divided into smaller provinces after the Tanzimat reforms and became practically a geographical name after the vilayet law of 1864. After the conclusion of the 1877–1878 Russo-Ottoman war and the Berlin Treaty, an autonomous province of Şarki Rumeli (Eastern Rumelia) was established in part of the territory that had earlier been promised to Bulgaria under the San Stefano Treaty. Şarki Rumeli united with the principality of Bulgaria in 1883, which was nominally under Ottoman suzerainty until 1908. In 1902, the Inspectorate of Rumeli was founded, which functioned as a special administrative unit directly under the Grand Vezirate.
as far as Bithynia and the “caiques sailing past in the Sea of Marmara could hear my bells.”

Now that the national boundaries had been drawn, those pasture lands were out of reach.

Empires, of course, do not have boundaries but frontiers. Frontiers are elastic and porous; they are zones of transition, not demarcation lines. People, animals, and commodities move more or less freely (if clandestinely) within and across frontiers, whereas boundaries contain, regulate, and restrict all such motion. Frontiers are defined primarily in military terms; they are areas where sovereignty is not stable and are always subject to change with the movement of armies. They cannot, however, be defined exclusively as zones of perpetual conflict; frontiers are also places of synthesis and syncretism, of heterogeneity and mingling, in contrast to boundaries, which exist precisely to correct or prevent such uncertainty. Rumeli was such a frontier zone for the early Ottomans; they were extending their realms in Europe through military conquest, often in coalition with the locals who were subsequently coopted into the ranks of the Ottoman “frontier lords.”

Physical reminders of that period are scattered across the Balkans, despite generations of benign neglect and deliberate eradication, in the vast inventory of architectural monuments (or remains thereof) endowed during the first centuries of Ottoman rule in the area by people, many of whom were recent, not to say nominal, converts to Islam. Rumeli, then, became the center of gravity of the empire as it continued its expansion west. After 1453, the capital of the Ottoman state moved east from Edirne to Constantinople, but the governor of the province of Rumeli preserved his prestigious position in the military/administrative hierarchy of the empire. As the commander of the forces of Rumeli, he was part of the imperial council directly below the Grand Vezir, and sometimes the governor of Rumeli and the Grand Vezir were one and the same person. Anadolu was Rumeli’s counterpart on the Asian side of the Bosphorus, and these two provinces, with Istanbul in

3. Fermor, Roumeli, 18.
4. The terms meaning “frontier” and “boundary” in Turkish are serhad and hudud, respectively, with further distinction for those regions at the very edge of the zone of military venture, uc, which literally means “edge” and fell from use after the first wave of Ottoman expansion into Europe. By the twentieth century, hudud and serhad had largely been fused; the former was used more often in describing state boundaries, but serhad still better carried the meaning of “military frontier.” For the historical evolution of the term frontière, see Lucien Febvre, “Frontière: The Word and the Concept,” in A New Kind of History from the Writings of Febvre, edited by Peter Burke, translated by K. Folca (London, 1973), 208–17.
6. The vast number of public edifices endowed by Gazi Evrenos, almost certainly a Christian convert and the conqueror of almost the entire region of northern Greece for the Ottomans, is a good case in point; Heath Lowry, The Shaping of the Ottoman Balkans, 1330–1550 (Istanbul, 2008).
the center, formed the heartland of the empire until Rumeli was lost by the Ottomans after the Balkan Wars in 1912–1913.

As Fremor’s account reveals, Rumeli was not a household name among the western audience in the twentieth century. Nor was it ever the term of choice in describing the Balkan Peninsula among the learned in Europe. European cartographic imagery of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century maps and atlases depicted the Ottoman Empire as a whole, under various iterations of the name *Turkish Empire*, although the Ottomans themselves never used either term in reference to their territories until the nineteenth century when the Ottoman diplomatic service started using the terms “Türquie” to refer to the Ottoman empire and “sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan” in reference to the sultan. By the middle of the eighteenth century, however, European cartographers had started to divide the Ottoman realms into “estates,” and the term *Turkey in Europe*, which took hold then and stayed the norm until the early twentieth century, covered the area the Ottomans called Rumeli. The invention of Turkey in Europe was partly an outcome of the Ottomans’ declining military might in the eyes of Europeans, but more important, it was directly related to the post-Enlightenment idea of Europe, which defined itself in civilizational opposition to the Oriental/Turkish Other.7

Most, if not all, maps of the Ottoman Empire drawn by European cartographers in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries denoted classical names for regions such as Macedonia but did not ascribe boundaries to these regions, and the way the inscriptions were printed implied an overlap among these designations. In Pierre du Val’s “Carte de l’Empire des Turcs et de les Contins,” dated 1664, for instance, “Grèce” and “Macédoine” overlapped, as did “Turcomanie” and “Arménie.”8 By contrast, Nicolas Sanson, whose 1692 “Les Estats de l’Empire des Turques en Europe [et en Asie]” was an early harbinger of the practice of representing the Ottoman Empire in separate sheets for Europe and Asia and Africa, also drew boundaries within the “Beylerbeglic de Roumelie,” demarcating “Bulgarie,” “Romanie,” “Macédoine,” “Albanie,” “Thessalie,” “Epire,” and “Achaia.” Needless to say, none of these designations corresponded to Ottoman administrative divisions, which were not, in any case, conceptualized through cartographic imagery at the time. Interestingly enough, the only inscription mentioning “Grèce” on Sanson’s map denoted the “Mer Ionienne ou Mer de Grèce.”

Ascribing boundaries to a specific region would turn into an extremely important and ideologically fraught practice in the nineteenth century as those regions became increasingly considered the exclusive domain of a certain

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“racial” group, or as they became territorialized. For the seventeenth-century cartographer, however, boundaries simply served as approximations, devices meant to divide up an unknown entity into chunks that would more easily evoke some sort of geographical order in European minds that were familiar with Ottoman lands only through the classics and a limited number of travelers’ accounts. This state of affairs changed dramatically in the nineteenth century when the domain of the “Grand Turc” became more accessible and developments in the disciplines of geography and ethnography introduced novel methods of map-making, classification, and cartographic representation. In the late nineteenth century, when the enduring presence of the Ottoman Empire in Europe was increasingly seen by liberal Europeans and local irredentists as an anomaly that needed immediate rectification, the maps of Turkey in Europe acquired an even more pronounced political weight. After 1878, that map was at the center of diplomatic debates concerning the Eastern Question, or how the corpse of the “Sick Man of Europe” would be disposed of when the time came. Rumeli was now prize territory for the small Balkan nation-states desperate to expand their borders and a zone of influence to be partitioned among the Great Powers. Macedonia happened to be at the center of this territory.

The school of geopolitics founded in the early twentieth century by Friedrich Ratzel, German political scientist and geographer of Leipzig University, and his followers described the relation among political power, geography, and territory in Darwinian terms, as a struggle for survival. Even though Ratzel himself did not place states at the center of his analysis, focused as he was on the role of the environment, similar ideas about geopolitics defined the way western European geographers and politicians discussed the future of Rumeli, which was also adopted by the Balkan national elites. The idea of Macedonia as a distinct geographical region and as a potentially independent country came into being in this context of Darwinian geopolitics. Neither of these projects survived the struggle that ensued (until they were revived in the post–World War II period); the dream of “Macedonia for Macedonians” was shattered, but the attempts to define Macedonia and its inhabitants had a lasting effect on the way the nation-states that claimed it as their own conceptualized their territory and on the relationship of the land to the people that inhabited it. This was a process that was largely carried out through the medium of maps, and as such, it was a product of the epistemological shifts in the discipline of geography and its principal visual technique, cartography. These shifts reflected current notions concerning the supremacy of science; the expanding boundaries of knowledge; and

the possibility of knowing, indexing, calculating, and mapping not only the physical world but also the “moral” attributes of people.

My starting point for this chapter was a collection of ethnographic maps of “Turkey in Europe” published from the mid-nineteenth to the early twentieth century. I did not quite understand what these maps were trying to say when I first came across them as I was browsing the stacks at the Genadion Library in Athens, but I soon realized that they were not merely images to “illustrate the Macedonian Question” to (dis)interested parties. They represented, instead, their authors’ visions of what the landscape, both physical and human, should look like; they were projections of the reality they claimed to represent. They were, in other words, political statements. They could not be read without our first understanding the context of their production and dissemination. This chapter therefore builds that context to show that these maps were essentially a grid imposed on the populations that inhabited the depicted terrain and were an essential tool in projecting the territoriality of a nation and its discontents. This is not to say that their power was hegemonic. J. B. Harley saw maps as “preeminently a language of power, not of protest.” 10 The same language of power, however, also generated resistance, effectively allowing a language of protest to use the same medium of the map.

The contextualization of ethnographic maps (or any cartographic representation for that matter) requires that we first recognize that maps are more “than the territory they represent,” to paraphrase Alfred Korzybski. 11 The notion of an objective map, especially one that claims to represent ethnic groups in situ, is pure fiction even today after the invention of sophisticated imaging techniques and access to detailed census reports; in the early twentieth century, it was fantasy dressed up as “science.” The maps we discuss here are, first and foremost, depictions and, by implication, assertions of territoriality. Territoriality, according to David Sack, signifies something far more complicated than spatial relationships drawn on a plane. It is, above all, “the key geographical component in understanding how society and space are interconnected.” A given delimited area is not “territory” in and of itself; it becomes so “only when its boundaries are used to affect behavior by controlling access.” 12

The primary apparatus of territoriality is cartography, and when applied to the principle of national determination, it created nothing less than the spatial definition of a nation—not necessarily its current shape but the territory


it should occupy. In *Siam Mapped*, Tongchai Winichakul persuasively argues that maps do not follow the social reality of a nation dispersed across delimited domains; they are not depictions of something that already exists but *predictions* of it. He presents this process as resulting from a confrontation between indigenous definitions of the realm and its modern geographical interpretations, and he calls the resulting novel concept of the territoriality of a nation its “geo-body,” which he argues, “is merely an effect of modern geographical discourse whose prime technology is a map.”

Much of the discussion in this chapter takes its cue from Tongchai’s conception of the emergence of nationhood and the field of critical geography, represented in the writings of J. B. Harley, Denis Cosgrove, Jeremy Black, Denis Wood, and Robert David Sack, among others. It does not, however, single out any one method favored by these authors and apply it to the maps of Turkey in Europe. What it borrows from this field is the notion that cartography is not, and never was, a disinterested scientific discipline but a technique of power and a perfect tool in the service of Darwinian geopolitics. The dizzying colors on maps of Turkey in Europe makes sense only when read against this background.

**Geographical Knowledge and Governmentality**

In eighteenth-century Europe, as the definition of geographical subjects of inquiry sharpened, detailed topographical surveys uprooted astronomic observation and traveler reports as the gold standard of cartography. A novel technique called geodetic survey was introduced—a technique still used today with different measuring implements. The principal method of geodetic surveys was triangulation, which can roughly be described as the application of trigonometric principles to the measurement of distance to “triangulate,” or fine-tune, the contours of Earth as they were depicted on a map and to increase the resolution of a map to the greatest possible extent. French geographers were the leaders in the practice of geodetic surveys in the eighteenth century. The survey of France carried out between 1744 and 1789 by the Cassinis, a family of astronomers, and financed by the king, resulted in the 182-sheet *Carte de France*, which depicted the entire country in a uniform manner. The *Carte de France* became a model to be emulated as other European countries followed suit.

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It is not an exaggeration to say that the Cassinis’ project was a turning point in the history of geography. The Carte de France was not only groundbreaking in its implementation of a complex survey technique over a vast territory, but it also signified a new application of geographical knowledge in the service of “governmentality,” providing the state and its expanding edifice of bureaucracy a novel technique of calculation, of control over territory. Not surprisingly, this type of survey was also perfectly suited for the purposes of the colonialist enterprise, and it was put into use in Egypt by the French and in Ireland and India by the British, to mention a few prominent examples. That the bar for scientific precision had been set too high by geodetic surveys did not prevent the popularization of the idea that all maps had to rely on the latest instruments and techniques. As a result, even those maps that did not rely on surveys boasted the method in their titles, and graticules (the grid formed by parallels and meridians) on a map became the minimum requirement for a claim to mapping precision and authority—never mind the fact that the graticules were often added to maps post-production in a completely haphazard manner.

It is important to take note of this new-found confidence in the superiority of cutting-edge scientific methods, as faulty and fraudulent as they might be, because this transformation took place during the period when European geographers had also set their eyes on the task of mapping the “lost lands” of Europe, which meant Eastern Europe. The Russians seemed amenable to reform by “enlightened” Europeans, and created their own cartographic office in collaboration with the French as early as 1719, but the project of redeeming the lost lands through cartographic knowledge met a serious roadblock at the western frontier of the Ottoman realms. The Ottomans’ reluctance to aid (and possibly their sheer neglect) of European cartographers in their quest to survey their territory became the source of much resentment and frustration among scholarly circles in Europe. Here is an excerpt from the Atlas Universel of 1757:

If in the detail of the different parts of Europe that one has traveled through to the present, we have had satisfaction of receiving aid from the savants who have worked on their countries, we can not say that we have enjoyed such an advantage in the description that we have to make of the states submitted to

16. This should not, however, lead us to the conclusion that trigonometric surveys became a common tool at the hands of an omnipotent state or colonial power. To start with, they were simply too expensive and laborious to be implemented widely. Furthermore, even in the presence of the resources and the political will to undertake such detailed surveys, they were quite limited and riddled with inaccuracies; Edney, Mapping an Empire, esp. 325–31.

17. Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe, 144, Wolff’s reference to “lost lands” was taken from Voltaire’s Charles XII.

18. This is not to say that the Russians had been incapable of, or did not care to, represent their domains through cartography; Valerie A. Kivelson, Cartographies of Tsardom: The Land and Its Meanings in Seventeenth-Century Russia (Ithaca, 2006).
Ottoman domination. We would have wished to be able to conclude (terminer) European geography with more success; but the approach to these states is difficult for enlightened people (gens éclairés), and does not permit on ever to hope for sufficient lights (lumières) to give something satisfying in geography; for the relations that voyagers give us are not of sufficient help to confirm the topographical detail of the lands that they have traveled through. It would be necessary for these voyagers to be instructed in mathematics.\textsuperscript{19}

This excerpt is an early reminder of a specific rhetoric that was better articulated and more pervasive among scholarly circles in the second half of the nineteenth century in their discussions about the deplorable state of sciences such as geography and ethnography in the Ottoman Empire. The contrast between light and darkness, symbolizing the contrast between reason and superstition, between science and ignorance and calling for the illumination of the dark corners of “states submitted to Ottoman domination” for the scientific gaze of the Europeans were common elements of this rhetoric. What distinguishes it from later expressions of similar sentiments is the tone that hinted at the notion that “Turks” did not belong in Europe, and it was precisely their presence there that made the “terminus” of the continent so dark. For the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century geographers, the presence of Ottomans in the eastern Mediterranean was not an anomaly that needed explanation.\textsuperscript{20} In the nineteenth century, this rather subtle discourse was replaced by explicit calls to chase the Turks out of Europe once and for all. It is important to note that the sudden interest in surveying the lands at the edge of Europe was taking place in the context of Habsburg-Ottoman rivalry in Eastern Europe and of the Russian expansion to the south at the expense of Ottoman territory. In the words of Larry Wolff, “the lands that the Habsburg and Russian statesmen coveted were precisely those that geographers sought to study; the two ambitions were inevitably related and arguably interdependent.”\textsuperscript{21} The inextricable link between geographical knowledge and imperial ambition became even more pronounced in the nineteenth century as European colonial projects not only charted and measured their overseas acquisitions but also created and named entire regions according to their interests.\textsuperscript{22}

It is important to bear in mind that geography is a culturally constructed realm and geographical knowledge reflects the particular intellectual milieu in which it is produced. The eighteenth-century developments outlined here


\textsuperscript{20} Manners, \textit{European Cartographers and the Ottoman World}, 36–37.

\textsuperscript{21} Wolff, \textit{Inventing Eastern Europe}, 169.

\textsuperscript{22} On the invention of India, for instance, see Edney, \textit{Mapping an Empire}. The power of naming through geographical exploration was so persuasive that a colonial invention could later be embraced by anti-colonial nationalist elites as the definition of a homeland they would liberate.
all had a role in determining the shape of cartographic representations of the Ottoman Empire and its inhabitants, and the lengthy notes that accompanied them. A final element we should mention in this regard is the Enlightenment establishment of ancient Greece as the source of “Western Civilization.” The centrality of ancient Greece in Enlightenment thought directly and indirectly influenced the production of knowledge about the European “lost lands” in the nineteenth century. For one thing, ancient Greece, as Enlightenment philosophers reconstructed it, was a largely sterilized and stylized version, completely stripped off its elements of African and Asian origin. Although we might disagree with Martin Bernal’s assertion that the “Aryan” model of ancient Greece later dominated the field of classics, it is indisputable that the Enlightenment, by defining “Civilization” as the product of an exclusive Greco-Roman lineage, not only branded the peoples that fell outside the confines of that intellectual heritage as inferior but also created a foil for the submission of the same peoples to European colonial power. Turks were definitely on the other side of this civilization divide, but Eastern Europeans were not entirely part of the inner circle either, stranded as they were between the darkness of the Orient and the light of the Occident. This notion is clearly noticeable in the writings of European travelers in the region and in the way that “scientific” works of ethnography recorded, classified, and ranked the same people.

Moreover, the notion of ancient Greece as the source of Western Civilization fueled an interest in Classical Geography, which became a curricular requirement for the educated classes. In the mid-nineteenth century, “maps of the classical world dominated other atlases,” notes Jeremy Black. The increased demand for these atlases meant that more research was needed to bring the classical world to homes and classrooms. The same quest for the ancient world for their own eyes motivated travelers, who started to explore these as yet uncharted lands in increasing numbers in the nineteenth century.

The Marriage of Cartography to Statistics and the Rise of Ethnography

The emergence of a dominant discourse among the European literati and illuminati that established the peoples beyond the ambiguous European
borders in the east and the north as fundamentally different and inferior to
the white Europeans was rooted in post-Enlightenment notions of scientific
knowledge and civilization.\textsuperscript{26} The same discourse reached its peak through
the course of the nineteenth century as it penetrated not only elite institutes
of knowledge production but popular conceptions of the Orient in the grow-
ing domain of European public opinion. As far as cartography of Turkey in
Europe is concerned, one of the crucial developments that took place in the
nineteenth century was the combination of geography with statistics and the
appearance of statistical tables on maps. All forms of basic data graphics
that we readily recognize today, such as bar and pie charts, histograms, and
line graphs, were invented during the first half of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{27}
Familiar as they may seem to the modern eye, this technique was quite un-
heard of at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Combined with the
heightened interest in the “distribution of races” across the globe, especially
in the second half of the nineteenth century, the marriage of cartography
to statistics gave birth to the ethnographic maps that we are familiar with.

Ethnographic maps essentially constitute a subgroup of “thematic maps,”
or maps that “[display] the occurrence, spatial pattern, or variation of one
or a small number of phenomena in the physical, biological, social, or eco-
nomic world, such as climate, natural resources, population characteristics
and commerce.”\textsuperscript{28} Even though their origins can be traced back to the sev-
eteenth century, it was only in the nineteenth century—after the introduc-
tion of new graphical representation methods and the transformation of
geography as a discipline into a branch of natural sciences that covered
physical elements of Earth in its entirety, including its atmosphere, climate,
flora, fauna, and geological layers—that thematic maps became widely used
tools of cartographic representation. Carl Ritter and Alexander von Hum-
boldt, the pioneers of this transformation, introduced the cartography of
physical phenomena into the discipline. Von Humboldt was also extremely
influential in popularizing the use of new graphic methods among geog-
raphers; among his disciples was Heinrich Berghaus, whose \textit{Physicalischer
Atlas} was widely copied and plagiarized.\textsuperscript{29} Superficially, the new techniques
were indeed the accomplishment of “pure” science, untainted by any sort
of measuring error or bias because they represented physical phenomena as
accurately as possible and served the purpose of expanding humankind’s
knowledge of the globe it inhabited. The mapmaker’s curatorial authority
and choices, however, were never a simple exercise of a “purely scientific”

\textsuperscript{26} For European ambiguity about the eastern borders of the continent, see Wolff, \textit{Inventing Eastern Europe}.
\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., \textit{212}.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., \textit{222–23}.
method but a reflection of the dominant weltanschauung. Consider, for instance, the folio in Berghaus’s Atlas depicting the “Geographical Distribution of the Human Races”: a Mercator projection of the globe occupies the center, while the margins are packed full of information with the aid of graphical charts and an inset map showing how population density correlates with dietary patterns. The most striking illustrations are scattered on the top and sides of the map; they are portraits representing the different human races—some rendered grotesquely ugly—and the corresponding skull shapes. The distinctions based on physiognomy (which looks even uglier than it sounds) lent the author’s racial classification the aura of scientific knowledge; it asserted the notion (accepted as fact at the time) that race was something that could positively be identified, although the criteria used for determining race still oscillated between definitions based on physical traits (such as the color of skin) and what we would consider cultural elements today (such as costumes). In any case, the purely physiognomic conception of race was not entirely dominant, and race was mostly used as a term that might correspond to ethnicity today, with the notable distinction that it was understood to be essentially fixed.

Berghaus’s map was an early example of cartographic representations of ethnographic knowledge, and it made use of tables and illustrations external to the map to explicate its subject matter. It certainly had a significant visual impact, but another technique, known as “choropleths” was an even more potent medium for communicating knowledge about the distribution of “measurable” phenomena in space. The earliest known example of the choropleth technique is “Figurative Map of Popular Education in France” (“Carte figurative de l’instruction populaire de la France”) by Baron Charles Dupin, published in 1826. Dupin’s stated purpose for his map was to illustrate the effects of public education on prosperity in France. He shaded the map such that the coloring became darker as the number of pupils in school in a given department decreased. A better proxy for representing “enlightenment” could not be found, and in fact, the map became a reference for dividing France into “obscure” and “éclairé” regions. Choropleths became a widely used tool in the depiction of social problems, such as crime and disease, and their correlation with schooling, region, and social class.

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the toolbox was complete for those who wanted to undertake the ambitious project of writing up the

30. Geographische Verbreitung der Menschen-Rassen (Gotha, 1848).
31. For a critical commentary on this map and Berghaus’s intellectual connection to von Humboldt, see Denis Cosgrove, “Tropic and Tropicality,” in Tropical Visions in an Age of Empire, edited by Felix Driver and Luciana Martins (Chicago, 2003), 197–216.
cartography of the human race. The rise of ethnography as a scientific discipline during the same period contributed to the proliferation of maps of European Turkey and its “races.” The discipline of ethnography (which many academic institutions housed in the same general department of geography), despite its claim to objective and empiricist foundations, was at the time dominated by theories that classified humans and cultures along a sliding scale that placed white Europeans at the top. The superiority of Europeans was not just an extreme position implicitly present in the sister disciplines of geography and ethnography; it was one of the premises of their methodology. The other premise was the teleology of the European model of nations. These two premises were in place well into the twentieth century, and combining forces with the concept of “natural frontiers” (another nineteenth-century invention), they helped shape geopolitics around the globe. Consider, for instance, the definition of ethnology and ethnography in the 1910 edition of *Encyclopædia Britannica*: “sciences which in their narrowest sense deal respectively with man as a racial unit (*mankind*), i.e. his development through the family and tribal stages into national life, and with the distribution over the earth of the races and nations thus formed. Though the etymology of the word permits in theory of this line of division between ethnology and ethnography, in practice they form an indivisible study of man’s progress from the point at which anthropology leaves him.”

The assumption that human races go through an evolutionary process, the ultimate result of which is organization into nations, is the central idea of this definition. We should also note that anthropology, ethnology, and ethnography constituted a continuum under the general rubric of “natural history” and that the study of the different races was determined according to their location on that continuum: anthropology for the “savages,” ethnology and ethnography for the more familiar and literate “other,” and finally national history for those who had reached the culmination point.

It is interesting to note that the Balkan national elites, whose ethnic kin was the subject matter of European ethnographers, imported and internalized similar assumptions about the relative qualities of different ethnic groups and their potential for “civilization,” as we will see later. This was not a bizarre form of self-regard but a carefully strategized method used to substantiate one ethnic group’s claim to territory over another’s because the European Powers understood the principles of popular sovereignty and national self-determination in terms of natural frontiers and “national maturity.”

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34. Bernard Cohn calls the ethnography of this period “the description of ‘primitives,’” which entailed “a theory of history which is based on the idea of a chronological ordering of types of societies interpretable as a sequence of cultural or biological evolution.” Bernard Cohn, “History and Anthropology: The State of Play,” in *An Anthropologist among the Historians and Other Essays* (Delhi and Oxford, 1987), 24.
Mapping Macedonia and Its Races

The reinvention of the term *Macedonia* owed much to the early travelers in the area, who came in search of ruins and, following cartographic custom, referred to these little-known parts of the Ottoman Empire by their ancient names, as if they were visiting Roman provinces. The most significant among the earlier explorers was E. M. Cousinéry, whose topographical descriptions are still used as a reference by archaeologists. The explorers were writing not only about geography and the ruins, of course, but also about the inhabitants of those lands or the “human geography,” influenced by assumptions about their ancestors and their geographical origins based on the classics and the earlier deliberations of historical atlases. The author of the first significant work on the ethnography of the region was Amie Boué, who published the results of his research in 1840, a decade after Cousinéry’s *Voyage dans la Macédoine*. An ethnographic map that indicated a large presence of “Bulgarians” in the area accompanied his work. The map introduced, for the first time, the notion that Bulgarians constituted the largest “racial” group in Macedonia. Ethnographic research on European Turkey became more popular during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and even the nonspecialist visitors made sure to note ethnographical peculiarities in their travel accounts as they saw fit.

Maps based on the findings of these researches also started to appear in the middle of the nineteenth century. Some of these were published as separate works, and some were included in prestigious annals and journals of geography such as Berghaus’s *Atlas* or Petermann’s *Mittheilungen*. Henry R. Wilkinson, in his 1951 book on maps of Macedonia, which is still considered a classic reference source, notes that the map published in 1842 by Pavel Schafarik, pan-Slavist scholar and an Austro-Hungarian subject of Czech descent,
“virtually revolutionized the prevailing ideas on the distribution and charac-
ter of the peoples of south-eastern Europe” and “set the fashion for nearly
all ethnographic maps of this area.” As thorough as Wilkinson was, we
take this assertion with a grain of salt because Jovan Cvijić, Serbian scholar
and another contributor to the ethnographic geography of southeastern Eu-
rope, remarked that, having been published in Czech, Schafarik’s Slovansky
Národopis “remained unknown to other cultured nations.” Nevertheless,
Cvijić also noted that the map was ground-breaking in its classification and
labeling of six major groups currently inhabiting the Balkan Peninsula: Alba-
rians, Turks, Serbo-Croats, Greeks, Bulgarians, and Romanians. The more
likely person to be credited with familiarizing the “cultured nations” of Eu-
rope with the racial riches of European Turkey for the first time was Amie
Boué, who published an ethnographic map in Berghaus’s Atlas in 1847, seven
years after the appearance of La Turquie d’Europe. Boué attributed an even
larger territory to the Bulgarians than Schafarik had and denoted Turks only
in a few major cities. When read in the context of his other writings about
the Ottoman Empire, however, this should not necessarily lead us to conclude
that he was making a visual statement, questioning the legitimacy of Otto-
man rule in the Balkans, as the majority of European geographers did. His
writings suggest that Boué was more interested in presenting policies to bring
the Ottomans on par with other European states than in supporting an eth-
nic basis for challenging their presence in Europe. His suggestions did not
involve the replacement of an imperial source of authority with a national
one defined by language but, instead, called for the reform of the existing
structure. Boué had unfaltering confidence in the potential of modernity to
change everything within the reach of railroads.

Yet Boué’s map made such a good case for the Bulgarians as the dominant
element in Macedonia that it was reproduced during the first decades of
the twentieth century several times in other ethnographic works and atlases
used as propaganda material by the Bulgarians; the scholar’s reputation no
doubt provided the stamp of scientific objectivity to these publications.
In 1861, another map that would later become a frequent reference work for
the Bulgarian propagandists was published in Petermann’s Mittheilungen,

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38. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics.
19. This article was originally published in French and was also translated into Serbian and
Russian. It immediately drew a reaction from Anastas Ishirkov, who argued that this was a
transparent attempt to prove that the Bulgarians of the Morova valley and Macedonia were in
fact Serbs; Études Ethnographiques sur les Slaves de Macédoine (Paris, 1908).
40. Boué considered the Ottoman Empire a European state rather than an aberration in
the continent, in contrast to, for instance, Bianconi. It is worth noting that he mostly compared
it to Spain, sometimes to England and France, and occasionally did so in a favorable manner.
See, for instance, Boué, Turquie d’Europe, Vol. 2: 158.
41. According to Cvijić, Vasil Kûnchov’s Makedonia: Ethnographia i Statistika (Sofia,
1900) was one such example; Cvijić, Remarks, 30–31.
a map by Guillaume Marie Lejean, a former consul of France in the Ottoman Empire.\footnote{It was later appended, for instance, to A. Ofeicoff, \textit{La Macédoine au Point de Vue Ethnographique, Historique, et Philologique} (Constantinople, 1887). Ofeicoff was a pseudonym used by A. Shopov, the Bulgarian commercial agent in Salonika and a frequent contributor to polemics about the ethnographic composition of Macedonia.} The map was based on data that Lejean had collected during two trips made in 1857 and 1858. Lejean noted in the introduction to his work that the “ethnographic study of the Ottoman Empire” was no longer an “object of purely scientific curiosity.” He separated himself from earlier ethnogeographers with his position that language could not be used as a criterion to determine nationality in “Turkey” since “religious hatred and political inequality” had caused people to adopt languages that did not correspond to their races.\footnote{Guillaume Lejean, “Ethnographie de la Turquie d’Europe” in \textit{Peterman’s Geographische Mittheilungen} (Gotha, 1861), 1–2.} Instead, he argued, the criterion of history should be used to determine nationality. Despite the change in the criterion for measuring nationality, the coloring of the map still favored the Bulgarians in Macedonia. The most striking feature of his map, in contrast with earlier examples, was a great block of Turkish settlement in northeastern Bulgaria, covering regions that were more usually attributed to the Romanians.

James F. Clarke argues in his book \textit{The Pen and the Sword}, one of the formative texts of Bulgarian history in the English language, that “the persistence of classical cartographic conventions—the dead hand of Ptolemy—together with the \textit{terra incognita} nature of the Turkish Balkans which prevailed up to the second half of the nineteenth century” contributed to the “cartographical misfortune” of Bulgarians, who, “in addition to re-educating themselves … had the task of educating Europe.”\footnote{Clarke, \textit{Pen and the Sword}, 34.} European cartographic material from 1842 to 1877, however, tells an entirely different story. Far from suffering from a “cartographic misfortune,” Bulgarians were represented abundantly in these maps. In 1869, August Heinrich Petermann, the esteemed editor of \textit{Petermann’s Geographische Mittheilungen}, published a map titled \textit{Die Ausdehnung der Slaven in der Türkei und der angrenzenden Gebieten}. The work claimed to represent the epitome of the previous three decades of work on the ethnogeography of Turkey-in Europe.\footnote{Wilkinson, \textit{Maps and Politics}, 55.} The map showed uniform Bulgarian dominance over the entire Balkan Peninsula with the exception of the coastal regions, where the Greeks were indicated, and towns, which were marked Turkish (or Muslim.)

After 1877, as ethnographic maps of European Turkey proliferated, the coloring style of the maps, the criteria used to determine nationality, and the nationality of the authors of the maps began to diversify. Even the “Bulgarianness” of Macedonian Slavs, which had been accepted as more or less self-evident, came to be questioned by new works. Although maps favoring
one particular group continued to be the norm, a few exceptions appeared that questioned the homogeneity of choropleths and used hybrid color combinations to account for ethnic variety.

In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the name Heinrich Kiepert came to the fore as one of the best-known cartographers of the time. A prolific professor of geography at the University of Berlin, Kiepert counted among his many talents expertise in the geography of European and Asian Turkey, and Bismarck among his many admirers. Kiepert published his *Ethnographische Übersicht des Europäischen Orients* in 1876. In this map, Thrace was colored as half Turkish and half Greek, and further north, a more or less similar proportion was observed between Turks and Bulgarians. This map had had such a good reception in Europe that it was used as a reference at the Congress of Berlin—presumably a testament to its objectivity.

It was not long before this apparent status quo was challenged by maps that favored Greek claims over Macedonia. Two significant examples published in 1877 were the Stanford Map and a map drafted by F. Bianconi, French engineer and geographer. The same year, A. Synvet, a French philhellene and a teacher of geography at Galatasaray Lisesi (also known as Lycée de Galatasaray, a prestigious public school in Istanbul that produced a large proportion of the Ottoman bureaucratic and literary elite) published another map that was considered pro-Greek and received considerable publicity in Europe. Synvet’s map was relatively modest in its claims about Greek territory; it did not directly negate the earlier maps showing sizable Bulgarian populations, but by stressing the existence of dense “Turkish” settlements all over the Balkan Peninsula, it showed that the Greek population of the Ottoman Empire had been grossly underestimated. His figures were largely based on the results of a two-year-old survey commissioned by the Patriarchate to determine the number of Greek Orthodox households that would be liable for a tithe for the support of bishoprics. A year later, Synvet

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47. Wilkinson notes Bismarck’s high regard for Kiepert and mentions that his map was used at the Congress of Berlin and “was regarded as part of Bismarck’s ‘honest brokerage.’” *Maps and Politics*, 67–68. It must be noted however, that Kiepert’s maps that were used at the Congress of Berlin had been prepared under Russian sponsorship; Karpat, *Ottoman Population*, 26. They were first published in Russian, and according to Paparrigopoulos, had been translated into French on Bismarck’s orders to be used at the Congress; Paparrigopoulos’s correspondence with P. Argiropoulo, in K. Th. Dimara, *Kónstantinos Paparrégopoulos, é epoché tou, ê Zōê tou, to ergo tou* (Athens, 1986), 348.


49. A. Synvet, *La Carte Ethnographique de la Turquie d’Europe et Demenombrement de l’Empire Ottoman* (Paris, 1877). He adjusted the numbers produced by community registers by referring to the records of syllogues. Kemal Karpat notes that the figures he calculated proved to be exaggerated “when the Ottoman census of 1881/82–1893 gave the first truly comprehensive account of the Greek population.” *Ottoman Population*, 49.
published *Les Grecs de L’Empire Ottoman*, where he supplemented these figures using those provided by membership registers of *syllogues* (Greek cultural organizations), which, he argued, gave a more accurate picture. Using this method, the Greek population of Macedonia, which he had estimated at 474,000 the year before, was now reported as 587,860.\(^{50}\) It is important to note that as the fight over Macedonia shifted into one carried out using guns rather than maps, the Greek side still recognized the weight of ethnography to be as significant as the guerrillas wielding weapons. So, when a crowd gathered in Piraeus to protest the events in Macedonia in August 1903 and present a memorandum to the government and the diplomatic delegations in Athens, one of the six resolutions of the memorandum was against the “false statistics published by Slavists to mislead European public opinion to the detriment of the Hellenic nationality.”\(^ {51}\)

In 1878, two new maps covering Macedonia appeared: one by Carl Sax and a new map by Heinrich Kiepert. Compared to other ethnographic maps of the era, which usually displayed different ethnic groups by clearly delineated blocks of color on the map because of their reliance on the graphic principle that favored a “preponderance” of a given “race,” Sax’s map looked like a painting by his fellow countryman, Oskar Kokoschka. Jovan Cvijić later remarked that, although there was some merit to Sax’s work, “the well-known, peculiarly Austrian, bureaucratic methods made him tear nations into atoms.”\(^ {52}\) Perhaps we should concede that Cvijić did have a point, for Sax cited no fewer than twenty-one groups in his classification and his concern with justifying Austrian intervention in the region did not go unnoticed. We might even go as far as to suggest that this was the first pro-Austrian map of the Balkans. On the other hand, Sax’s “peculiar” method was the first to question the raciolinguistic criteria that had hitherto been the norm. He pointed out that the importance of religion had been neglected and that what he called a sense of “group consciousness,” or the sum of elements that keep a community together, had not been taken into account.\(^ {53}\) It is very likely that Sax’s method was an application of the theories of Karl von Czörnig and his pupil, Adolf Ficker, who “were opposed both to the language criterion constituting the sole marker of nationality, as well as to the principle of enquiry into the nationality of individuals. They argued that any enquiry into nationality should be directed at discovering the national identity of communities, rather than the language used by individuals. They in addition regarded history, geography, anthropology and ethnography as the essential correctives of the language criterion.”\(^ {54}\)

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\(^{50}\) A. Synvet, *Les Grecs de L’Empire Ottoman: Étude Statistique* (Constantinople, 1878).

\(^{51}\) Quoted in Paillarès, *Imbroglio Macédonien,* 22.

\(^{52}\) Cvijić, *Remarks,* 24.


\(^{54}\) Z. A. B. Zeman “Four Austrian Censuses and Their Political Consequences,” in *The Last Years of Austria-Hungary,* edited by Mark Cornwall (Exeter, 1990), 32.
What seems to be a curious absence during this period, considering the Russian interest in the region, and the “protection” it offered to its Slav brethren, are ethnographic maps prepared by Russian geographers. It is difficult to attribute this to a lack of know-how or sufficient resources because the St. Petersburg–based Imperial Russian Geographical Society had been active since 1845, when it was established under the tutelage of German geographers, most notably Karl Baer, who passed the mantle on to such Russian colleagues as the influential K. I. Arsenyev [Arsenieff] (1789–1865) and P. P. Semënov [Semenoff] (1827–1914). In fact, during the tense period preceding the Constantinople Conference in December 1876, which concluded yet another Balkan crisis between the Ottoman Empire and Serbia—and by implication Russia—the Russian Embassy in London, according to a report by Ioannis Gennadius, displayed an ethnographic map of the Balkan Peninsula drawn not by one of its own but by the famous G. M. Lejean.

According to Jovan Cvijić, there were only three Russian maps that had any influence among the Slavs (even though they were not noted by European intellectuals), all published by the Slav Union based in St. Petersburg. The first, published in 1887, by Marković and Rittich, was almost entirely a copy of Lejean’s map, with certain notable exceptions, such as the island of Thasos im-

55. Semënov (also known as Tian-Shanskiy, in tribute to his expedition of Tien Shan) was also involved in the preparation of the first Russian census of 1897; David J. M. Hosoon, “The Development of Geography in Pre-Soviet Russia,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 58 (1968), 259.
58. Ibid. As noted previously, Cvijić was referring to Kûnchov’s work when he referred to “Bulgarians” finding Zârjanko and Komarov’s work exaggerated.
direction. The reaction against the “Greater Bulgaria” of St. Stefano seems to have had a sobering effect not only on Serbian authors but on their Russian counterparts, who became more circumspect about using the term Bulgarian in reference to Macedonian Slavs.

Russian geographers’ relative lack of interest in the Macedonian Slavs also had to do with their more pressing projects at the time. The outreaches of the Russian Empire were still in the process of “discovery” by strongly motivated Russian explorers, watched closely with approval by European geographers. When the Russian Geographical Society published a compendium summarizing the work it had done between 1845 and 1895 in celebration of its fiftieth anniversary, the highly condensed accounts of its explorations filled up some 1,378 pages in three volumes. The surveys stretched from the Kirghiz steppes to the Siberian tundra, from the Black Sea shores to the slopes of the Urals, and passed borders into territories within the confines of neighboring states. Russians were by no means indifferent to the geographical distribution of their Slavic brethren in Macedonia, but their geographers had bigger fish to fry elsewhere, and they were stretched thin over a vast territory that needed to be properly measured, counted, and recorded to be fully incorporated into the empire.

Spiridon Gopčević published the first significant study by a Serbian scholar to make a claim about Macedonian Slavs in 1889. This was an impressive volume of ethnographic work, illustrated with fine drawings and photographs and accompanied by an ethnographic map. Nevertheless, it was largely viewed as a “propaganda piece.” Strictly speaking, Gopčević was

60. Anastas Ishirkov, Le Nom de Bulgare: Eclaircissement d’Histoire et d’Ethnographie (Lausanne, 1918), 3–4. Verkovic was the author of Narodne Pesme Makedonski Bugara [Folk Songs of Macedonian Bulgars] (Belgrade, 1860).

61. Compare the work, for instance, of Victor Grigorović on the ethnography of Turkey in Europe, first published in 1848 and frequently cited by Bulgarian authors (such as Ishirkov, Nom de Bulgare, 35) as proof that the Macedonian Slavs were recognized as “Bulgarians” by scholars writing well before the establishment of the Exarchate. See also the writings of Iastrebov, published in 1886, which considered Macedonian Slavs to be “Serbs”; Cvijić, “Remarques,” 237, n. 1.


63. Spiridon Gopčević, Makedonien und Alt-Serben (Vienna, 1889).

64. Wilkinson notes that “it is a firm axiom of the propagandist . . . that an initial failure may be turned into an ultimate success by the simple process of reiteration,” and that Gopčević “provided the Serbs with their initial failure.” Maps and Politics, 103. To be fair to Gopčević, the volume that the map accompanied was a remarkably crafted book, full of interesting
not the first cartographer to place Serbians in the region, his most important predecessors being M. S. Miloyevitch (1873), Colonel Dragashevitch (1885), and M. Veselinovitch (1886), but it seems that he earned this reputation because his work became widely available to European scholars after its publication in *Petermann’s Mittheilungen*.\(^\text{65}\) This map was also the first one among those mentioned so far to use the term *Macedonia* in its title. Ten years later, C. Nicolaides, the Greek scholar, published another ethnographic and linguistic map of Macedonia, and maps dedicated to Macedonia, as opposed to Turkey in Europe, started to appear as the political rivalry became more concentrated in this region. The Serbians had now firmly entered the cartographic contest. An anonymously prepared “Serbian University Map” was published in 1891.

Other maps of the period worth mentioning were those of Gustave Weigand (1895); Richard von Mach (1899), who based his ethnographic representation on the distribution of Serbian, Bulgarian, and Greek schools; a map published anonymously in Sofia in 1901,\(^\text{66}\) another anonymous map showing Christian schools in Macedonia (1905); and Brancoff’s maps showing the Christian population and Christian schools of Macedonia (1905). Another significant example of maps prepared with school data is the anonymous “Carte des Écoles Chrétiennes de la Macédoine,” published in Paris in 1905.\(^\text{67}\) Brancoff’s map of Christian schools, in rebuttal, claimed that Greek schools were protected by the Ottoman government and that, in contrast, Bulgarians could not get even a permit to open up a school in areas where the population had joined the Exarchate but given sufficient time, Bulgarian schools would prevail because they offered better education.\(^\text{68}\)

This new trend of ethnographic maps based on school data was largely the invention of Greek nationalists, who were despairing at the notion, which was gaining firmer ground in western Europe, that Macedonia was largely inhabited by a Slav population. Needless to say, the sizable Muslim population (Turkish, Albanian, and Slavic speakers) of the region was entirely neglected owing to the perception that these people were “aliens” who did not belong there in the first place.\(^\text{69}\) As we have noted, this is a notion that can

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\(^{65}\) Cvijic’, *Remarks*, 29.

\(^{66}\) According to Cvijic’, there was “no doubt that this edition belongs to the Bulgarian Ministry of War.” Ibid., 31.

\(^{67}\) Cvijic’ notes, “there is nothing which represents better than this chart the gigantic efforts of the Greeks to Hellenise these two vilayets.” Ibid., 32. School statistics in favor of the Greeks were initially published in the form of statistical tables, but the visual impact of a map was certainly stronger. For the statistics see, *Population of Macedonia*; Ioanna Z. Stephanopoli, *Grecs et Bulgares en Macédoine* (Athens, 1903).

\(^{68}\) Brancoff [Mishev], *La Macédoine et sa Population Chrétienne*, 77–79.

\(^{69}\) Even in a mainstream source of general information such as Encyclopædia Britannica (11th ed.), the population of Macedonia was described as follows: “The greater part of Macedonia is inhabited by a Slavonic population, mainly Bulgarian in its characteristics; the
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be traced back as far as the eighteenth century, when post-Enlightenment philosophers were in the process of “inventing Eastern Europe,” a transition zone within the vaguely defined borders of Europe with dangerously close proximity to the anomaly of Turkey in Europe. Lacking a proper vocabulary to describe the exotic inhabitants of these “lost lands,” scholars borrowed familiar names from ancient history; Scythians served as a generic name for these people in the eighteenth century, until, as Larry Wolff observes, “Herder appropriated another identification from among the barbarians of ancient history, and gave Eastern Europe its modern identity as the domain of the Slavs.”

The first generation of ethnographic maps claiming Macedonia as Greek, however painstakingly prepared, failed to undo this perception. The school criterion was introduced as a new basis for identifying ethnic groups because it provided the mapmakers with numbers that they could compile with relative ease and that had a reliability that was harder to challenge. These figures also happened to favor Greek schools, which, despite the relatively recent rivalry of Bulgarian and, to a lesser extent, Serbian schools benefited from the authority of the Patriarchate as well as the material and personnel support of the Greek state and the Greek bourgeoisie. More important, this criterion combined consciousness and culture as the main determinants of national identity rather than racial or linguistic factors, thereby emphasizing the element of free will and invoking the charisma for liberal European public opinion of Greek culture and its classical heritage.

Three ethnographic maps published during the first decades of the twentieth century were distinguished by the influence they had over their audiences. The first was a book of population statistics compiled by Vasil Kûnchov, a former inspector of Bulgarian elementary schools in Macedonia. Kûnchov’s book, published in 1900, also contained maps based on his figures and instantly became a respected reference source not only in Bulgaria but also in France. The book was not translated into French or English, but its statistical tables were used by the popular press and geography journals.

The second, Karl Peucker’s Karte von Makedonien, Altserbien und Albanien, published in 1903 was, as its subtitle notes, drawn to illustrate the Macedonian Question, but it did not use choropleths. In fact, compared to the base maps of the other examples mentioned so far, Peucker’s map was the most sophisticated. Instead of choropleths, the map addressed questions of history, language, religion, and culture with two insets that included summary coast-line and the southern districts west of the Gulf of Salonica by Greeks, while Turkish, Vlach and Albanian settlements exist sporadically, or in groups, in many parts of the country.”

“Macedonia,” 216.

70. Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe, 11.
71. Vasil Kûnchov, Makedonia: Ethnographia i Statistika (Sofia, 1900). Kûnchov’s statistics were considered among the best and were reproduced in European-language publications. See, for instance, Routier, Macédoine et les Puissances, 267.
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Statistical tables and a color key to indicate “language zones.” It was topographically and toponymically extremely detailed. The map did not indicate a source for the toponymic survey it was based on (the cultural groups were reportedly listed according to Cvijić’s classification), but it was likely the work of Austrian engineers. The Ottoman map office had also obtained a copy of this map.⁷²

Peucker’s reference to Jovan Cvijić is a testament to the respect the Serbian geographer had garnered during this period. If Kiepert had been the pop geographer of Europe in the 1870s, that title belonged to Cvijić during the first two decades of the twentieth century.⁷³ His demographic research and ethnographic maps were considered a benchmark for other works on the populations of the Balkans, much to the chagrin of Bulgarian scholars and activists. Until the 1880s, the assumption that the Macedonian Slavs were Bulgarian had not really been questioned because this was more or less the position of the European geographical establishment. As we have seen, worries about the revival of St. Stefano Bulgaria fueled the initial reaction against this status quo, and the Bulgarian side was quick to take note and answer in kind.⁷⁴ Cvijić’s intervention, on the other hand, was a game changer. He put forth the notion that Bulgarian was not a term that denoted nationality among the Macedonian Slavs, who in any case lacked any such consciousness until well after the formation of the Bulgarian Exarchate.⁷⁵ He challenged the work of early European scholars and travelers, including François C. H. L. Pouqueville, Cousinéry, Boué, August Heinrich Rudolf Griesebach, Lejean, Georgina Mary Muir Mackenzie and Adeline Paulina Irby, and even Kiepert, who all, he pointed out, lacked the necessary linguistic skills to write authoritatively about the ethnography of the Macedonian Slavs and who therefore relied on the interpretation of their Greek and Turkish guides and ended up repeating the same errors. He held Joseph Müller, who had worked as a physician for the Ottoman army, to be the only exception and considered his book to be the most reliable among the earlier works. Müller, not surprisingly, had classified the Macedonian Slavs in the regions he traveled as “Serbs.”⁷⁶

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⁷². BOA, HRT 251.
⁷³. It helped that Cvijić wrote in an academic, seemingly objective style; published his prolific output in several European languages, including English; and was good at marketing his work. I could not but notice that all the reprints of his articles held at the Bibliothèque Nationale de France were gifts of the author.
⁷⁴. See, for instance, Ofieicoff [Shopov]’s polemic Macédoine au Point de Vue Ethnographique, in which he argues, using current political events, toponyms, historical figures, and grammar (while conceding the distinctiveness of the Macedonian dialect and its common traits with Serbian), that the Macedonian Slavs are Bulgarian.
⁷⁶. Joseph Müller, Albanien, Rumelien und die österreichisch-montenegrische Grenze. Nebst einer Karte von Albanien. Mit einer Vorrede von Dr. P. J. Safárik (Prague, 1844), 103, cited in Cvijić “Remarques,” 251. The region that Müller wrote about did not include “Aegean Macedonia” but was limited to the province of Monastir, parts of Albania, and Old Serbia.
Even more egregious, as far as the Bulgarian intellectuals were concerned, was Cvijic’s insistence that the adjective Bulgar was widely used in the Balkans simply with the meaning “country bumpkin [rustaud]” and “before the establishment of the Exarchate and the establishment of present-day Bulgaria, the word Bulgar did not signify anything other than this pejorative sense [used by] the Greek people and Turkish functionaries.” Therefore, the travelers in the Balkans saw Bulgarians everywhere because this was what their Greek and Turkish guides called the peasant populations of the Balkans. What worried the Bulgarian establishment more than Cvijic’s publications was his target audience (European scholars) and how they evaluated his writings (with respect). This anxiety was palpable in a pamphlet written by Anastas Ishirkov as a response to Cvijic: “Had Mr. Cvijic published his study on Balkan questions in no language other than Serbian, I certainly would not spend my time on the question of the name Bulgar [la question du nom de Bulgare], since, for the Serbs, this question is not a scientific question, but a question of nationalist politics.” This, alas, was not the case; Mr. Cvijic had targeted “the educated people of the whole world” by writing in French, and “since the readers of this new book on Balkan questions are not familiar with the literature on the Balkans,” they might be misled by the author, especially because he was “well known in scholarly circles as a geographer and a geologist.”

Ishirkov’s worries were not baseless. The manuscript map of Cvijic’s La Peninsule Balkanique on the geographical distribution of “races” in the Balkan Peninsula, published in 1918, turned out to be arguably the most influential of the time, demonstrated by the fact that it served as a blueprint for marking national boundaries during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, much as Kiepert’s map had been used at the Berlin Congress. Cvijic’s rise to such prominence among geographers of the Balkan Peninsula represented a clear shift within three decades in western perceptions about the ethnic make-up of the region and underscored a major defeat for the Bulgarian side in the fight for supremacy in Macedonia.

77. Cvijic, Questions Balkaniques, 22, cited in Ishirkov, Nom de Bulgare, 47.
78. Ishirkov, Nom de Bulgare, 5.
80. The attempts to distance Bulgaria from Germany in the hopes of influencing U.S. public opinion in favor of Bulgaria at the end of World War I did not really pay off. Pamphlets published in English emphasized the role played by U.S. missionaries in the liberation struggle of the Bulgarian people, the commitment of Bulgarian people to democracy, and, predictably, the majority of Bulgarians in regions claimed by Bulgaria. See, for instance, Dimitur Mishew [Dimitar Mishev], America and Bulgaria and Their Moral Bonds (Bern, 1918); Radoslav Andrea Tsanoff [Tsanov], “Bulgaria’s Case,” Journal of Race Development 8, no. 3 (1918): 296–317.
Chapter 3

Ottoman Maps, or Their Conspicuous Absence

What was the Ottoman response to this cartographic activity? Did they answer back with their own ethnographic maps? The answer is an emphatic no, but before concluding that the Ottomans were woefully behind in the game of ethnographic cartography (which is true), it is useful to consider, in broad strokes, the developments that Ottoman cartography and Ottoman imagery of their world went through after the eighteenth century. Benjamin Fortna, in *The Imperial Classroom*, his book on public education in the Hamidian era (1877–1908), argues that the translation of European works of cartography by military officials for use in schools in the nineteenth century represented a continuity with earlier Ottoman traditions of state patronage of cartography and “of incorporating the cartographic developments of other lands.”

This, I think, is a position that needs to be qualified. Fortna samples school maps and atlases used in the 1890s, which were typically organized by continents and did not have political boundaries or topographical detail except for the area in focus (e.g., Asia, Europe). He argues that this practice was, again, due to the influence of European map-makers, for whom “the continental approach ma[de] more sense,” as opposed to a more global outlook. According to Fortna, the explanation had three parts: “geographical, political, and philosophical.” Geographically, it served the “[artificial] claim [of Europe] to be a continent,” and politically it was influenced by the interests of the colonial powers in overseas territories. Finally, “the rational, positivist mode of thinking so prominent in Europe in the nineteenth century ... was bent on dividing up the things of the world, the better to analyze them.”

While Fortna is right in all three counts, none of this actually implies that there was a general trend in Europe in the nineteenth century that favored the production and export of continental maps. In fact, cartographic production in Europe was prolific and covered a wide range and scale of representation in the late nineteenth century. Maps of the globe were certainly represented among these in significant numbers, and it was precisely this Eurocentrism, the desire to project the power of Europe, and the belief in the superiority of rational knowledge that made “Great Globes” a popular item. This was the intended effect of the global (usually Mercatorial) maps in historical atlases and of the public display of outsized globes.

Elisée Reclus, anarchist and arguably the most anti-establishment of the French geographical establishment of the late nineteenth

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81. Benjamin Fortna, *The Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Oxford, 2002), 173.
82. Ibid., 182–83.
84. For a critical approach to images of the globe from the Renaissance to the recent past, see Denis Cosgrove, “Contested Global Visions: One-World, Whole Earth, and the Apollo Space Photographs,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 84, no. 2: 270–94.
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A more likely explanation for “truncated” images of Ottoman domains was that these maps were not inspired by but were exclusively based on translations of maps produced in Europe, where representing the Ottoman Empire in separate sheets and continents had been the norm since the eighteenth century, as we have already seen. While it is true that there was some continuity in the European influence on Ottoman cartography since the early modern era, a distinct divergence occurred in the eighteenth century. The exchange of comparable technical knowledge was no longer the case after this time, and the Ottoman world gradually became bereft of advanced cartographic techniques. It is difficult to explain the origins of this divergence in the eighteenth century, but by the nineteenth century, as the Ottomans endeavored to adopt these techniques, they were already in the position of “translating” rather than incorporating, or even imitating. One possible reason for this has to do with the way “governmentality” was the impetus behind technical innovation in Europe, espousing ever more sophisticated methods of knowing the land to strengthen the control of the central state over territory and human and physical resources in the eighteenth century, exactly when the Ottoman state was delegating more control over administrative practice to its provincial lords. For the Ottomans, incorporating geographical knowledge into local administration became a concern and a possibility only in the late nineteenth century. Even then, the main motivation for expanding cartographic knowledge continued to be the military, rather than provincial administration. In fact, Ottoman cartographers were trained exclusively by the military, by the Fifth Department of Science of the General Staff (Erkân-ı Harbiye-i Umumiye Dairesi Beşinci Fen Şubesi), to be precise.

The Fifth Department decided to start a geodetic survey of the Protected Imperial Domains in 1896. Two French engineers, M. M. Defarges and Barisain, were commissioned with the task and accorded military rank as


86. Ensuring the accuracy of the changing and newly established borders with Bulgaria, Russia, and Greece and their protection seems to have been the primary motive in the quest for detailed topographic knowledge; BOA, BEO 1011/75822, September 9, 1897; BEO 1164/87254, July 25, 1898; BEO 1501/112536, June 12, 1900.

87. This is not to suggest that the Ottomans did not appreciate the usefulness of graphic or cartographic representations of statistical data at the service of imperial administration. The first significant example of these novel methods of visual representation applied to statistical data by an Ottoman official was the 1895 Ottoman Social Survey compiled by Mehmet Behic; for more details about this survey see Fatma Müge Göçek and Şükrü Hanıoğlu, “Western Knowledge, Imperial Control and the Use of Statistics in the Ottoman Empire,” CRSO Working Paper no. 500, Ann Arbor, 1993.

88. BOA, BEO 783/58682, May 20, 1896.
colonel and lieutenant colonel, respectively. The survey started in Anatolia, in Eskişehir, but it was plagued with financial difficulties from the start. The salaries of the French engineers and other commission members were in arrears, and the 200,000 guruş estimated to cover the first stage of operations turned out to be an impossible amount to raise. When the Finance Ministry refused to foot the bill, the officials sought to obtain the funds from the military budget, which also failed. Finally, the military suggested that the sum be taken from the Salonika provincial budget. We do not know the response of the officials in Salonika, but in all likelihood, the money failed to materialize because the project was all but abandoned by 1899. When the Royal Geographic Society of London requested a copy of the resulting map, they were told that it was “incomplete” at the moment. There is no indication that it ever existed. The general staff published a map of Rumeli that year, which seems to have been drawn on the basis of another topographic map. The title did not mention an author, but it indicated that it had been “edited and drawn” by the Fifth Department (of Science). The prime meridian of the map was noted as Paris, which strongly suggests French origins.

In 1909, a separate map commission was established under the general staff’s Fourth Department, which was presumably to take on the task of surveying the empire. An army colonel was sent to Paris to purchase the necessary equipment. It is hard to tell how far this project went, but even after the Balkan Wars, the maps used by the Ottoman military were translations of European maps—ironically, it is not clear how reliable these maps could be, given the Ottomans’ determination to prevent foreigners from carrying out topographic surveys in the empire or around its borders.

Throughout the late nineteenth century, Ottoman officials continued to subscribe to European geographical publications, import and translate maps produced by European geographers (including Kiepert), and use them in classrooms of public schools as well as the army college. What they lacked in technique, the Hamidian bureaucracy tried to make up with practical ingenuity. Benjamin Fortna demonstrates that Ottoman officials, growing

89. Their exact names may be different; my guess is based on the Ottoman spelling as “Döfarj” and “Barazin,” and I was not able to locate these two individuals in French sources. The timely payment of their monthly salaries seems to have been a continuous source of trouble; BOA, BEO 997/74734, August 24, 1897; BEO 1139/85420, June 10, 1898. M. Barisain was also later promoted to the rank of colonel; BOA, I.TAL 151/1316, October 10, 1898.
90. BOA, BEO 993/74404, August 8, 1897; BEO, 1011/75822, September 22, 1897.
91. BOA, BEO 1232/92377, November 27, 1898.
92. BOA, BEO 1348/101064, July 31, 1899; BEO 1355/101582, August 30, 1899.
93. Rumeli-i Sâhâne Haritası, 1899, scale 1:310,000 km (from the personal collection of Heath Lowry; many thanks to Prof. Lowry for sharing this map with me).
94. See, for instance, the reaction to the discovery that some Russian cartographers were in the process of taking geodetic measurements around the Euphrates River; BOA, I.DH 881/70280, April 11, 1883.
95. BOA, BEO 9/606, May 24, 1892; BEO 1662/124647, May 5, 1901; BEO 1710/128181, August 27, 1901.
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sensitive about the pedagogical limitations of maps displaying the Ottoman realms in series of separate sheets, commissioned different maps that displayed the entire territories of the empire on one unbroken sheet. He notes that this was the “most striking change to be observed in Hamidian cartography.”96 Not surprisingly, these maps colored regions that had ceased to be “Ottoman,” or were only nominally so, with the same colors assigned to the Ottoman Empire.97 Commissioning maps from Europe that would supposedly project Ottoman grandeur and educate young Ottoman minds could lead to certain unforeseen “accidents,” such as the case when the global maps ordered for use in public schools turned out to carry the legend “Armenia” in eastern Anatolia, causing embarrassment for the Education Department, which was forced to pull the maps out of circulation.98 Even as late as 1914, a private publishing house in Istanbul used Peucker’s 1903 map as the base map for one showing “the Borders of the Balkans after the Balkan War.” In the direct translation of place names into Ottoman Turkish, the map introduced a term that would never have been used by the Ottomans to refer to Rumeli: “Avrupa-i Osmani,” or “Ottoman Europe,” which was actually an inversion of “European Turkey.” Ironically, at this instance, “Avrupa-i Osmani” was limited to eastern Thrace, only a tiny portion of what Rumeli had been.99

As for ethnographic maps, they were not part of the vocabulary of Ottoman statecraft. The Ottomans did count and classify the population according to state-defined criteria, which had the unintended result of reinforcing ethnic differences (see chapter 4), but they were not interested in picturing those numbers on maps as a countermeasure to the ones circulating in Europe and the Balkans. They did not make a case for territoriality through ethnic graphics because ethnic unity had never defined the boundaries of the Ottoman realm; on the contrary, just like any other imperial structure, the Ottomans had a lot to fear from an organization of their territory according to administrative divisions favoring ethnic homogeneity. Interestingly enough, the Hamidian bureaucracy, which attentively watched all publishing activity in Europe for the handiwork of “evil-doers” and did its best to prevent the circulation of “harmful” material, was surprisingly reticent when it came to ethnographic maps. The bureaucracy was, however, much more sensitive to another kind of map: maps that distorted the boundaries of the well-protected domains or inscribed “inappropriate” terms such as “Armenia”

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96. Fortna, Imperial Classroom, 187.
97. Ibid., 190. Note that the Ottomans were not the only ones suffering from delusional cartography; we only need to look at French maps that annex Alsace-Lorraine when it was definitely not part of France; Black, Maps and History, 57.
98. BOA, BEO 397/ 29760, May 3, 1894.
99. BOA, HRT 159, 1914.
over parts of them. These were to be kept from view, or better yet, eradicated. After all, Abdülhamid II did not have any desire to transform the empire into a nation-state; that would be the agenda of the Young Turks.

The Logic of Geography and Natural Borders

Before we move on to a discussion of the various criteria in determining “race” among the inhabitants of the Balkans, it is instructive to first consider the issue of geographical boundaries because it was often evoked to substantiate the link between the land and the people, an important element of territoriality. The discipline of geography had already established in the eighteenth century that the surface of Earth could be observed to have certain zones, regions, and subregions based on a variety of physical criteria such as climate, latitude, and topographical characteristics and the correlation of these criteria, which then could also be linked with the cultural practices or physical traits of the populations indigenous to these regions. There was an obvious logic to this kind of geographical organization; in other words, geography had a purpose. Some geographers argued, however, that such logic was entirely lacking in Ottoman Europe, whose geography seemed to be conspiring against logic and order. Élisée Reclus, the French anarchist geographer, had strong opinions on this issue:

Their [travelers and geographers] task was by no means an easy one, for the mountain masses and mountain chains of the peninsula [Haemus or Balkan] do not constitute a regular, well-defined system. There is no central range, with spurs running out on both sides, and gradually decreasing in height as they approach the plains. Nor is the center of the peninsula its most elevated portion, for the culminating summits are dispersed over the country apparently without order. The mountain ranges run in all directions of the compass, and we can only say, in a general way, that those of Western Turkey run parallel with the Adriatic and Ionian coasts, whilst those in the east meet the coasts of the Black Sea and the Aegean at right angles. The relief of the soil and the water-sheds make it appear almost as if Turkey turned her back upon continental Europe. Its highest mountains, its most extensive table-lands, and its most inaccessible forests lie towards the west and the north-west, as if they were intended to cut it off from the shores of the Adriatic and the plains of Hungary, whilst all its rivers, whether they run to the north, east, or south, finally find their way into the Black Sea or the Aegean, whose shores face those of Asia.

100. These maps were confiscated at customs and post offices; BOA, BEO 397/ 29760, May 6, 1894; BEO 430/32238, July 4, 1894; BEO 471/35273, September 19, 1899.
101. Élisée Reclus, The Earth and Its Inhabitants, Vol. 1, Greece, Turkey in Europe, Rumania, Servia, Montenegro, Italy, Spain and Portugal, edited by Ernst G. Ravenstein (New York, 1882), 89. (Emphasis added.)
The Balkan Peninsula, as Reclus saw it, was an impossibly complex, unfriendly terrain that lacked normal contours that might give it some order. More interestingly, the geography of (European) Turkey was so strange that one might even wonder if it was in Europe at all: Turkey had physically “turned its back” on Europe, while the Adriatic and Hungary had embraced it with their pleasant shores and wide open plains. But there was more, the chaotic geography accompanied (or fostered, we are invited to think) chaos of a different order, one that had yet to be sorted out:

This irregularity in the distribution of the mountains has its analogue in the distribution of the various races which inhabit the peninsula. The invaders or peaceful colonists, whether they came across the straits from Asia Minor, or along the valley of the Danube from Scythia, soon found themselves scattered in numerous valleys, or stopped by amphitheatres having no outlet. They failed to find their way in this labyrinth of mountains, and members of the most diverse races settled down in proximity to each other, and frequently came into conflict. The most numerous, the most warlike, or the most industrious races gradually extended their power at the expense of their neighbours; and the latter, defeated in the struggle for existence, have been scattered into innumerable fragments, between which there is no longer any cohesion. Hungary has a homogenous population, if we compare it with that of Turkey; for in the latter country there are districts where eight or ten different nationalities live side by side within a radius of a few miles.102

Clearly, the anomalous geography was instrumental in creating yet another anomaly with regard to the distribution of the inhabitants. Reclus showed his readers, on the one hand, how physical elements of geography could determine the moral character of the people tied to the land, and on the other, he warned about the difficult consequences that might arise when geography was simply not a cooperative partner. In this case, it had helped the warlike peoples to dominate the land, leaving the others to occupy small scattered pockets. Hungary was, again, the contrasting example. Compared to Turkey, it emerged as a country with a homogenous population that had not blocked itself from the continent of Europe and presumably its civilizing influence; Turkey was a harder (if not impossible) case for redemption.

It is interesting to note that Reclus’s characterization of Turkey as a place that was not really European, even though it was in Europe, and his use of Hungary as a contrasting example are highly reminiscent of the process Larry Wolff so eloquently describes in The Invention of Eastern Europe. This is a process that took place in the eighteenth century, when the eastern borders of Europe were still not fixed and there was room for ambiguity, intellectual and geographical, in these vaguely defined lands that did not

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102. Ibid.
quite belong to Asia but were certainly not within Europe either. The need
to define what we might call a zone of transition between the Orient and
the Occident inspired an intellectual project that invented the idea of East-
ern Europe while defining Europe itself. Wolff notes that the “paradox of
‘Turqie d’Europe,’ in Europe yet of the Orient, was essential to the emerg-
ing idea of Eastern Europe.” As the philosophes were articulating this
process, Hungary went from being classified as Asiatic and associated with
Bulgaria and Wallachia to being that liminal area between the Orient and
the Occident. Reclus’s remarks are an encapsulation of this process, which
was complete by the end of the eighteenth century. As Sir Charles Eliot
summed up the general feeling about Turkish presence in Europe at the end
of the nineteenth century, “The Turks are an Asiatic people who have settled
but not taken root in our continent, and their presence there is a question
which may be treated by itself and quite independently of their existence in
Anatolia and elsewhere.” The Englishman had not a hint of irony in call-
ing Europe “our continent.”

Even more than identifying continental borders, identifying borders of a
different kind preoccupied the geographers as well as laypeople touring the
Balkans in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and frustrated
them with their absence—namely, “natural borders” that should replace the
current irrational ones. At the time, natural borders were almost exclusively
associated with national territory and were mentioned often in notes accom-
panying ethnographic maps of Macedonia. The Carte Ethnocratique des Pays
Helleniques, Slaves, Albanais, et Roumains, dated 1878 and attributed to
Kiepert, for instance, came with a note that claimed that it used a new method,
which separated “South-Eastern Europe according to divisions or groups of
race, and, to the possible extent, natural frontiers, historical requirements,
traditional affinities, and to assign to each division or group a single color.
This color would not claim rigidly that the constituent parts of each section
are occupied exclusively by a single race, it would only indicate the race that
would be preponderant.” (This happened to be the Greeks in this case.)

Even though there was nothing natural about the way the population of
a certain area was identified, measured, and captured in color on a map
depending on the “scientific criteria” applied by the author, the assumption
was that natural boundaries did exist. This basic assumption was not chal-
lenged by the fact that the social reality rarely fit within the confines of those
natural boundaries. The real challenge was turning those natural boundaries
into actual political ones. It was only “natural” that a map be drawn for
better communicating those demarcation lines.

103. Wolff, Invention of Eastern Europe, 165.
105. Henri Kiepert, Notice Explicative sur la Carte Ethnocratique des pays Helleniques,
Slaves, Albanais et Roumains (Berlin, 1878), 5. (Emphasis added.)
Consider this description by H. N. Brailsford, British journalist and member of the Relief Mission that arrived to assist the survivors of the 1903 Uprising: “Macedonia lies confounded within three vilayets (i.e., provinces), which correspond to no natural division either racial or geographical. … The result is that no race attains a predominance, and no province acquires a national character. The natural arrangement would have been to place Greeks, Servians, and Albanians in compartments of their own, leaving the Bulgarians to occupy the center and the East.” How could we determine “natural” divisions and restore order given the current situation of unnatural mixing? Obviously, an intervention by an expert was needed, and in fact, in the obligatory ethnographic map that Brailsford appended to his book, Macedonia, Its Races and Their Future, he performed this necessary task. What he called “Bulgarians” occupied the center and east of the peninsula, whereas Chalkidiki was marked as Greek territory. Other ethnic groups recognized by the author were assigned symbols rather than colors. Not counting the random disturbances on the map, it more or less conformed to what Brailsford argued was the “natural” arrangement of races.

Natural frontiers or, more precisely, the lack thereof, in Ottoman Macedonia was an important theme in an earlier publication written in response to the British Blue Book of 1889. Its anonymous author criticized the British consul in Salonika in his failure to acknowledge their existence:

Mr. Blunt [the consul] ought to have admitted that the administrative division of Turkey is not scientific, that is to say, that is has not as a basis natural boundaries, nor is it stable, and at the same time to have recorded one at least of the many arbitrary changes in the boundaries, such as that of the department of Velisso, which eight years ago did not belong to the Vilayet of Salonica, and was annexed to it later on upon the demand of the Russian Embassy in Constantinople, in order to fictitiously strengthen the Bulgarian element in the vilayet of Salonica, which would in consequence thus acquire different geographical boundaries and another ethnological character.

The author then presented an alternative, more “scientific” approach to the boundary problem:

I confine myself to the following remarks 1) that it is both just and practicable to give to these three Macedonian vilayets such geographical boundaries as to be separated from each other by lines, parallel to the Macedonian coast on the Aegean 2) that the delimitation of the geographical boundaries of the vilayet of Salonica on such a scientific basis would include about as much Christian population as Mr. Blunt records in treating of the present vilayet of Macedonia 3)
that the principal and most heroic method for the attainment of tranquility in Macedonia, in which Mr. Blunt is interested, and, moreover, for the removal of the intricacies of the Macedonian question, for which Lord Salisbury is justly concerned, would be the scientific administrative division of Macedonia upon the basis of its natural boundaries.\footnote{107}

It is difficult to imagine how and why “parallel lines” would be any more “natural” than the existing boundaries of the Macedonian provinces.\footnote{108} A glance at a topographic map of Macedonia makes us realize that there are no unyielding mountain chains, unsurpassable rivers, and impossibly isolated plains in the geography. Assuming geographical formations would determine the demarcation lines, or natural boundaries, it is extremely difficult to argue in favor of one division as opposed to the other. But topography was not even the issue here; these natural boundaries amounted in effect to what we might today call “ethnic gerrymandering.” It was a way of imagining the geo-body of a nation on paper, sterilized and not obfuscated by blurry visions of ethnic ambiguity.

As unconvincing as it may seem, this was a project worth pursuing by the interested parties, as hindsight tells us—and not because they would finally settle on a unanimously agreed “natural” division. Obviously, the conflicting contours of natural boundaries created by European observers of the geographical and ethnic chaos that was Ottoman Macedonia was not the simple outcome of the extreme difficulty of the puzzle they were trying to solve or of the lack of reliable demographic data. The conflict was in the very premises that these projections of boundaries were built on. We have already noted the importance of the underlying ideological framework that essentially saw the construct of “Turkey in Europe” as a freakish geographical accident and proposed to replace it with a more rational spatial arrangement. We have also noted the primacy of the notion that nation-states were the only legitimate and meaningful form of human political organization. It is not a surprise that the logical conclusion emerging from the fusion of these two theses would be the projection of a new geographical order based on \textit{national} boundaries, also conceived as one and the same as \textit{natural} boundaries.

There were, however, two immense and interrelated problems with this position. The first and obvious one is the disagreement about who belonged in the nation, and by implication in its territory. The second is the less visible but no less significant issue of who was to define the shape and contents of the natural boundaries and how. We should not ignore the fact that what

\footnote{107. The \textit{English Blue Book Regarding Macedonia, Comments by A.K.} (Athens 1891), 7. (Blue Book No. 3 1889, Turkey, Official Correspondence on Eastern Affairs.)
108. It is interesting to note that the boundaries of counties (\textit{nomoi}) in contemporary Greek Macedonia are informed by the boundaries of Ottoman-era \textit{sancaks}.}
constituted natural borders was hardly something that the entire political and intellectual establishment of Europe could agree on, as the two world wars have made painfully clear. Natural borders, or the assumption that the territorial divisions between states are justified based on their conforming to certain geophysical markers such as rivers or mountains, was current in the nineteenth century.\footnote{109} This was an idea that can be traced back to the “natural frontiers” doctrine of seventeenth-century France, which was formulated by Richelieu and remained a staple of French history textbooks until quite recently.\footnote{110}

An important intervention to this notion came from Friedrich Ratzel in the late nineteenth century.\footnote{111} In Ratzel’s treatment, the “natural” element of the relationship between states and territory was not to be found in the contours of rivers or mountains. Instead, he argued, it was the nation, an organic entity, that determined the boundaries of the state and not the other way around.\footnote{112} He also introduced the concept of Lebensraum, which was based on the same idea, that the nation, the state, and the land were organically connected and that the borders of the state would change depending on the physical needs of the growing state. Geographical constraints and the need to overcome them were also determinants of culture: “A state, for example, was simply the result of a particular people’s adaptation to an environment. The form that a state or an entire culture took was therefore shaped by the relationship to Lebensraum and the struggle for it.”\footnote{113} Ratzel understood the struggle for Lebensraum to be driven by Darwinian principles. It is well known how these specific elements of his work were embraced first by German conservatives and later by the Nazis as the justification for territorial expansion. There was also something quite appealing in his theory for those who saw the nation as a linguistically homogeneous entity—a
dominant notion in the early part of the nineteenth century—as opposed to one determined by common culture, interests, and goals. This distinction also roughly corresponded to the changing conceptions of nationhood and territory in France and Germany; the French had largely abandoned the principle of linguistic unity, whereas it was still paramount for the Germans. The shifting criteria for what constituted the nation and its natural borders obviously correlated with the political interests of those making the observation, which was also true for the ethnographers trying to establish those boundaries in the Balkans. It is important to note that the double standards of their methods, as well as the idea that territorial expansion could be necessary (and justified) to ensure the coherence of the national and spatial units, informed the way Balkan national elites drew their own versions of natural borders on map.

How to Diagnose Different Races

Today there is more or less a consensus that nationalities are social constructs, with much of the academic debate and disagreement centering on the how and when of that construction process; in the nineteenth century the self-evident issue was that nationalities were objectively identifiable categories, with the academic differences stemming from alternative methodologies of “diagnosis.” Would it be language? Religion? Historical consciousness? All these elements and more figured in the ways European ethnographers defined the criteria for sorting out the population of Macedonia into “racial” groups. Some candidly noted that what worked in civilized parts of the continent was sadly irrelevant in these lands, which had essentially been cut off from their enlightened distant neighbors and forced to sustain an anomalous intermingling of races. It is interesting to note that while this degree of intermingling reportedly made the ethnographer’s task impossible, everyone except for the inhabitants of Macedonia seemed to be able to assign a race/nationality to each community—some even assigned nationalities to dogs. Although the terms race and nationality were often confounded, race as we have already noted, was akin to what we might call ethnicity today, and it was the term more commonly used to refer to the population of Macedonia; however, nationality also appeared in various texts, especially after the turn of the twentieth century.

The beliefs in the intrinsic character of national identity and in the nation as the ultimate evolutionary stage of social organization were pervasive in late-nineteenth-century Europe. Nationality was conceived as a code inscribed on every human community, and whether they were “evolved”

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enough to be conscious of it or not, it could be identified and decoded through the authoritative knowledge at the disposal of the trained observer. This also implied that it was possible, at least in principle, to access and restore the original code no matter what had been written over it through acculturation, submission, or corruption. Thus, communities could be “re-restored” and the original code “retrieved.” For instance, M. E. Picot, in Les Roumains de la Macédoine, in which he traced back a common genealogy for the Koutzo-Vlachs or Tzinzars of Macedonia and the Roumanians of the Carpathian Mountains, lamented that a good part of the Koutzo-Vlachs had been Hellenized but pointed out that it was not clear in “what proportion” they were Hellenized and whether this “Hellenization was final,” thus invoking a whole world of opportunities for the redemption of “Hellenized Vlach” peasants as “Roumanians.” In similar vein, a note accompanying the Tableau Ethnocratique could foresee a time when the layers obstructing the inner and intact consciousness of the “Musulmans” would be lifted to reveal the shining core of their original nationality because they were not racially Turks; they were renegades: “When Christian rule prevails in the Orient, when there are no longer masters and slaves[,] . . . the Muslim renegades no longer having an interest in separating themselves from their own stock [congénères], the feeling of race will take over among them its natural force.”

Ethnographers and geographers working in European Turkey might have different criteria for determining nationality, but they were united in their attachment to the ideas that nations were the only legitimate and viable form of collective identity and that the nation-state was the manifest destiny of any meaningful communal organization. In addition, they were not immune to the idea, dominant in the tomes of the period’s natural history, that racial groups were marked by innate characteristics that not only made them distinct from each other but also allowed for their ranking in a hierarchy. Consider, for instance, the observations of Auguste Viquesnel, companion to the famous explorer and geographer Amie Boué during his travels in European Turkey. Viquesnel’s main thesis in his 1868 book was that the borders of Europe ended at Dnieper based on racial categorization. In his introduction to the book, Henry Martin asserted that Viquesnel had studied “these people” with the “same scientific independence and the same investigation procedures that he used for the study of geological layers or of

116. This principle also informed policies in Europe much later in the twentieth century, such as the “re-Slovakization” of self-identifying Magyars in Slovakia after World War II, the assimilation of Macedonians into Bulgarians, the attempt to “restore” Turks in Bulgaria to their Bulgarian origins, and the redefinition of Kurds as “mountain Turks” in Turkey in 1980s.
118. Congénères: “of the same genus.”
hydrographical basins.” He summarized the findings of the scientist’s “long and rigorous research”:

the Aryan and the Touranian families tend to express their respective spirits in two completely different types of societies. The principle of individuality and moral and political liberty dominates in the Aryan race. . . . In the Touranians, by contrast . . . people do not have but a weak sentiment of personal liberty. . . . These people [Touranians] who do not have a feeling of personal liberty have an instinct for liberty of movement which results in a taste for nomadic life. They only attach themselves to the land despite themselves and leave whenever they can. The Aryan, by contrast, loves the land and [is] wedded to it, so to say. It is the agricultural race par excellence and the spirit of ownership allies itself closely with the spirit of liberty with them whereas the spirit of community and that of patriarchal authority, easily degenerating into autocracy, dominates the Touranians.120

Extreme as it may seem, ethnographic studies on the distinct qualities of the Touranian and Aryan races, demonstrating the superiority of the latter, were quite common and had been received as well-respected works of science since the eighteenth century, and they were inextricably linked to the post-Enlightenment definition of Europe through the denigration of the Oriental. The analytical categories used to rank different races were not exclusively based on those relating to political organization such as the capacity for settled life, complex political organization, and love of liberty. They also included costume, language, religious practices, and superstitious beliefs. Nevertheless, even these categories could then be checked to determine a given race’s potential for evolution, culminating in the nation form. The inferiority of the “Touranian” race, which included Turks, Tartars, Mongolians, Huns, and Bulgars, had not prevented them from penetrating into Europe during darker times, which made their expulsion from where they did not belong all the more urgent. Historical atlases published in the mid-nineteenth century tinted the “tribes of particular races” with different colors to demonstrate their movements “from their former localities to their present possessions.”121 This practical graphic tool also had the effect of giving visual emphasis to the alienness of certain races in Europe. In his Encyclopédie article on the Tartars, Louis de Jaucourt wrote, “Goths, who conquered the Roman Empire brought monarchy and liberty, the Tartars, wherever they conquered, brought only servitude and despotism [It was]

humiliating for human nature that these barbaric peoples should have sub-
jugated almost all of our hemisphere.”

The consensus on the inferiority of the Touranian race was not some-
thing that served only to justify the necessity of throwing the Turks out of
Europe. Despite the good press they received in Europe from liberal poli-
ticians, journalists, and, apparently, ethnographers, the Bulgarians found
themselves in a disadvantaged “racial” position because of their ancestry.
In addition to all the positive stereotypes depicting Bulgarians as a peace-
ful, agrarian, hard-working folk, there were a few other, less flattering ones
painting them as slow (both mentally and physically), uncouth, and unin-
spired. Among those peddling the latter stereotypes was G. F. Abbot, Cam-
bridge ethnographer, and author of several works on Macedonian folklore
published by the same university. The following is a typical excerpt from
his books; here he is recording a participant-observation in Petritch (village
in the province of Serres) of the villagers dancing at the festival of the pan-
ageia (festival commemorating the Dormition of the Mother of God):

Notwithstanding this weight of wool and metal, they danced with great persever-
ance and an air of truly Christian resignation. Bagpipes—the favorite instrument
of the Bulgarian—supplied the local equivalent for music. Round this squealing
band a wide circle footed it slowly and exceedingly stupidly. . . . The dance con-
sisted of a one step forward, one backward, and one to the side, without any
variation whatsoever. A melancholy refrain Sospita Yanno, Sospita Yanno [sic],
drawled out in sleepy and sleep-begetting tones, accompanied the sad measure.

Not surprisingly, the non-Aryan roots of the Bulgars were a favorite topic
of authors who wanted to give credence to Greek claims in the Balkan Penin-
sula. Eduard Driault, journalist, wrote effusively of the Greeks at the dawn
of the Balkan Wars, “The Greeks know that they have formidable enemies,
that the Turk is still strong, that the Slavs are more numerous in Macedonia.
But Hellenism is not a simple question of races; it is an idea, an intellectual
and moral force, made by the rational support of free men to principles that
established the grandeur of ancient Greece and that are the essential sources

122. Louis de Jaucourt, “Tartares,” in Encyclopédie: Ou Dictionnaire Raisonné des
sciences, des arts et des métiers, nouvelle impression en facsimilé de la première edition de
123. The title of an article that Leon Dominian published just as the Turks had finally
been removed from Europe sums up the general sentiment about the presence of this “race”
Dominian’s concluding remarks were written not without a certain degree of relief: “The
history of this great race of conquerors is drawing to a dishonored close before the gaze of the
whole civilized world. The casual of Asiatic geography has become the outcast of Europe” (13).
124. George F. Abbott, Macedonian Folklore (Cambridge, 1903). He was also the author
of Songs of Modern Greece (Cambridge, 1900).
of European civilization.” A few pages later, as he was writing about Bulgarians, he remarked that they were “not pure Slavs, they seem to be Slavicized Tartars.” Slavs, who used to be considered only slightly above the Tartars in the racial hierarchy, were now counted among the “Caucasian and Greco-Roman” types. Too bad for Bulgarians that they had to keep proving their Slavic credentials, most notably through references to saints Cyrill and Methodios.

In another example of attempts to rectify the racial stock of Bulgarians, Henry F. Tozer used every single physiognomic proof and detailed the various “infusions of blood” they received to dispel the notion that contemporary Bulgarians might in any way be related to the barbarian “Bulgars.” This was by no means possible because:

The Bulgarians, who form the largest element in the Christian population from Salonica to the confines of Albania, are a very interesting people, and are highly spoken of for industry and honesty. They are the most numerous of all the nationalities inhabiting European Turkey, and are estimated between five and six millions. There can be no doubt that the original Bulgarians were of Turanian descent, and near relations, if not actual descendants, of Attila’s Huns; but after they became so intermingled with the Slavonian inhabitants of that country that they adopted their language. A large number of them seem to have emigrated into Western Macedonia before the ninth century, and there, in all probability, received a further infusion of Slavonic blood. The traces of this are very evident in the present appearance of the people; for the Tartar type of face, which generally is remarkable for its permanence, has here for the most part disappeared. Notwithstanding this, you will not often find a people with such well-marked characteristics. They have straight noses, high cheekbones, flat cheeks, and very commonly light eyes; their complexions are frequently almost swarthy from exposure to the sun, but the children are generally fair.

The possible non-Aryan roots of the Bulgarians continued to pose a problem for advocates of the Slav side in the Struggle for Macedonia well into the turn of the century. H. N. Brailsford, for instance, the well-known champion of Macedonian Slavs, had to come up with the following apologetic

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127. Ibid., 286.
128. This notion inevitably affected general perceptions about the different ethnic groups of Ottoman Europe and consequently their entitlement to political sovereignty. Ravenstein, for instance, argued in a paper presented to the Statistical Society in London in June 1877 that the critical difference that legitimized the Russian Empire and disqualified that of the “Turks” was the fact that Russians were “intellectually superior to the races they govern, while the opposite is true of the Turkish Empire.” E. G. (Ernest George) Ravenstein, “The Population of Russia and Turkey,” *Journal of the Statistical Society* 40 (September, 1877), 438.
129. Tozer, *Researches in the Highlands of Turkey*, 176.
explanation about their racial purity, distinguishing them, quite unusually, from the Bulgarians in this instance:

They [Macedonian Slavs] are not Serbs, for their blood can hardly be purely Slavonic. There must be in it some admixture of Bulgarian and other non-Aryan stock. . . . On the other hand, they can hardly be Bulgarians, for quite clearly the Servian immigrations and conquests must have left much Servian blood in their veins, and the admixture of non-Aryan blood can scarcely be so considerable as it is in Bulgaria. They are probably very much what they were before either a Bulgarian and or a Servian Empire existed—a Slav people derived from rather various stocks, who invaded the peninsula at different periods. 

It was not long until the Balkan national elites internalized this discourse of racial inferiority and civilizational capacity, and started to produce their own versions of natural boundaries based on the same premises. Pamphlets and propaganda material were the obvious outlets for this rivalry, but some intellectuals went so far as to usurp the very same scientific authority of the European cartographers to support their case. The Balkan elites were late arrivals in the game of geopolitics through ethnographic maps, but they proved to be a quick study. They mastered the principles, the rules, and, more important, the shortcomings of this technique of power to project their own agendas of ethnic superiority. Even the association of Bulgarians with an Asiatic tribe of questionable provenance could be given a positive spin at the hands of a talented propagandist. Note, for instance, how Anastas Ishirkov, after naming this tribe the “Prebulgars,” not to be confused with “Bulgars,” embraced their contribution to the early Bulgarian political formation: “The nomadic prebulgars, who had cleared a path, sword in hand, from central Asia to the Balkans, distinguished themselves with their bellicose spirit, their robust discipline and their talent for organization, characteristic traits of all the nomadic peoples of the steppes.” These nomadic peoples had important redeeming qualities after all, but the way they were absorbed by the Slavs they had come to conquer would leave no doubt that their union had actually resulted in a synergy that bolstered the Bulgarian state and national character:

They [the Prebulgars] placed under their rule, either through these traits or through force, the Slavs, [who were] agriculturalists more numerous and more civilized, but less organized. During the creation of the Bulgarian state the two peoples, different with respect to their way of life and their organization mutually completed each other in a happy manner. The prebulgars, less numerous, became the ruling class thanks to their military organization in the Slavic state,

but in return lost their language and adopted Slavic, which became the official language of the state and the national church.\textsuperscript{131}

In other words, the Prebulgars served their genealogical mission as the neutral nucleus of the Bulgarian nation that took its essential racial characteristics from the Slavs. The Prebulgars had injected qualities of political and military organization into, but had not changed, the true Slavic stock that the Bulgarians were made out of; they were Slavs, only better. Lest the point was not clear enough, Ishirkov also emphasized the role of the early Bulgarian state in establishing a national church for the Slavs and in giving them the language in which they still worshipped.\textsuperscript{132}

**Questioning Cartographic Authority and Projections of Nation Space**

Ethnographic maps were primarily tools of territorial hegemony, a point not lost on the Balkan national elites. Let us now return to two maps mentioned at the beginning of the chapter—the Stanford Map and Kiepert’s *Tableau Ethnocratique*—and take a closer look at the circumstances surrounding their production to expose the ideological currents that found an ideal environment in the medium of ethnographic maps.

The map known as the Stanford Map was published in 1877. Even though luminaries such as Carl Sax and Heinrich Kiepert dismissed the map as utter nonsense, it did acquire a certain degree of attention in Britain, having been published by a respectable institution. It was translated into various languages and circulated among European geographical institutions.\textsuperscript{133} The map was often incorrectly attributed to Stanford himself, but the author was anonymous and was listed as such even in Henry Wilkinson’s widely referred 1951 book.\textsuperscript{134} There were rumors, however, that the real author was a member of the Greek intellectual elite. As a matter of fact, the anonymous author was none other than Ioannis Gennadius, who at the time of

\textsuperscript{131} Ishirkov, *Nom de Bulgare*, 14–15.

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 15.

\textsuperscript{133} Wilkinson, *Maps and Politics*, 75. Carl Sax’s verdict on this map was that “it cannot even be mentioned seriously,” whereas Kiepert said that it “extended Greek pretensions to the utmost limits possible to man.” Cvijić, *Remarks*, 23.

\textsuperscript{134} It seems that even Kiepert was not able to figure out the identity of the author; the only answer to his inquiries about this was the information that the author was Greek. See Letter from Kiepert to Paparrigopoulos, published in K. Svolopoulos, “Ο Κώνσταντινος Παππαργόπουλος και η Χαρτογραφευτική της Χερσονήσου του Άιμου από τον Η. Κυρικέ,” in *Aforismà eis ton Konymnon Vavouskon* (Thessaloniki, 1992), 366. In 1906, Cvijić did disclose Ioannis Gennadius as the author; *Remarks*, 22. But the knowledge must have remained obscure because Wilkinson in 1951 cited the author as “anonymous”; *Maps and Politics*, 71.
the publication of the map held the post of Greek chargé d’affaires in London and who later served as the minister to London and to The Hague.\textsuperscript{135}

In the pamphlet that accompanied the map, Gennadius argued that “the different nations and races inhabiting European Turkey and the western portion of Asia Minor … are all more or less marked by a confusing diversity of origin, language, national character, political condition, social status, intellectual development and religious persuasion.” Because these categories could not be matched to religious or linguistic principles either, it was, in his words “an abortive, not to say an impossible, undertaking to establish in a graphic representation the distribution and intermixture of race, language, and creed in Turkey.” Instead, Gennadius suggested that “a practically useful ethnological map” would “explain and represent the actual relations in which those nations stand toward one another.”\textsuperscript{136} These relations were revealed in Gennadius’s work through a method that employed a hybrid of historical and cultural claims, religious influence, and occasional references to statistical data. He insisted that the area north of the Balkans was characterized by long-time Bulgarian settlement, whereas the south had remained purely Greek and that even the “Bulgarians” of northern Macedonia and Thrace were Greek. In his own words:

During a period of darkness, internal convulsions and administrative prostration, the mixed Greek and Bulgarian populations of those regions were gradually merged into a new and common body, neither purely Bulgarian, nor purely Greek, but appertaining to both races. This mixed people may be appropriately designated as “Bulgarophone Greeks,” for it is easily proved that Greek is the prevalent element in its constitution. The outward features of this race differ considerably from those of the Bulgarians north of the Balkans; the latter are clearly of the Mongolian type, whereas South of the Balkans we find the Caucasian, and very frequently the purely Greek type. Their dress is identical with that of the Greeks whereas a Bulgarian is always distinguished by the unavoidable pootoor—breeches large and full to the knee and tight around the leg to the ankle—and the characteristic cylindrical-shaped cap, or calpak of black sheep skin. Their language is not only more smooth and much softer than that of the Northern Bulgarians, but it contains an immense admixture of Greek words, wholly incomprehensible to a pure Bulgarian. … In their churches, their schools, and their correspondence they always use the Greek language, which they understand and study.\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{135} Today Gennadius is remembered more as a bibliophile than a diplomat. He donated his impressive collection of books and manuscripts to the American School of Classical Studies in Athens, which keeps the collection in a separate library building that carries his name.

\textsuperscript{136} [Ioannis Gennadius], \textit{Ethnological Map of European Turkey and Greece with Introductory Remarks on the Distribution of Races in the Illyrian Peninsula and Statistical Tables of Population} (London, 1877), 2.

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., 13.
Gennadius, posing as an anonymous British scholar, managed to cover all the important elements an ethnographer should employ to establish a racial ranking: the difference in costume, the Bulgarians favoring a decidedly more “alien” or folkloric kind that required a detailed description and the definition of a foreign word; the difference in language, the Bulgarians speaking a rough-sounding language; the propensity to use Greek, which helped to identify one as a member of the bourgeois (or more refined) classes in the Balkans; and finally, the M-word—the identification of Bulgarians as a member of the larger Mongol family, those hordes whose descent on Eastern Europe was considered an aberration of history and geography. The references to costume as a distinguishing feature of the Bulgarian “race” was not at all strange because language, customs, habits, and religious beliefs were often counted among the “mental” factors that distinguished one racial group from another at the time.

Even assuming that the Stanford Map was not taken very seriously by educated circles in Europe, the pamphlet that accompanied it was quite significant in the sense that it demonstrated a mechanism through which the European rhetoric about superior and inferior qualities of races could find their way back into the discourses of self-perception generated by the subject cultures. The map may have been a flop in Europe, but that was only one part of Gennadius’s intended audience. The other, more important part was the Greek elite, and the example Gennadius set showed the Greek elite how to fight against the claims of romantic Slavophiles: by wielding the weapon of cultural and racial superiority, by invoking the powers of ancient Greece over the European elites, who considered its legacy their own source of civilization. Most of the output following this line of attack was published in Greece, suggesting it was Greek propaganda aimed at Greeks, but short pamphlets making the same point in different iterations also appeared in English and French at the beginning of the twentieth century. In one such pamphlet on the populations of Macedonia, Ioanna Stephanopoli, one of the most vocal supporters of the Greek cause in Macedonia, who also had the distinction of being the first female student of Athens University School

138. More specifically, he described them as “a mixed people formed by the fusion of Mongolian and Hunnish tribes, with much Tartaric blood in their veins. ... It is true that owing to a close contact with Slav races the Bulgarians, during their descent upon the Balkan peninsula, absorbed into a widely different dialect a large proportion of Slavonic words. But the Bulgarian language contains also a considerable Turkish element; and by a similar process the Slavs of Turkey have adopted many Bulgarian words, the roots of which are not to be found in Slavonic.” Ibid., 11. The Bulgarians had been classified among the Southern Slavs by A. Balbi in 1828 in his Atlas Ethnographique de Globe ou Classification des Peuples Anciens et Modernes d’apres leurs Langues, cited by Wilkinson, Maps and Politics, 29. This classification was more or less the norm, especially among ethnographers who gave precedence to linguistic affiliation.

139. See, for instance, Illustrations of the Principal Varieties of the Human Race, arranged according to the system of Dr. Latham, descriptive notes by Ernest Ravenstein (London, ca. 1850), 2.
of Philosophy, wrote, “Bulgarians are not Macedonians, and Macedonians are not Bulgarians,” and continued, “if they are proud of belonging to the Family of Aristotle, of Alexander, of the Diadochoi, they [the inhabitants of Macedonia] would find it demeaning in their own eyes to be confused with the ‘peoples without glory’ who have not added even the smallest stone to the edifice of civilization that humanity has been erecting for centuries.”

It is interesting to note that the rhetoric of racial and cultural superiority was not in the exclusive purview of the educated Greek national elite by the beginning of the twentieth century. The same sense of civilizational distinction could be detected in the discourse of Greek Orthodox notables in Macedonia when they pleaded with Ottoman authorities for protection against Bulgarian encroachments on their community. For instance, when the Greek notables and bishop of Salonika petitioned the Ottoman governor in March 1904 demanding that Bulgarian insurgents be punished more severely, they made extensive allusions to the superiority of Rumlar (Greeks), who “have acquired an exalted place in international opinion as well that of the Ottoman state thanks to their accomplishments in civilization and learning from time immemorial” and to the inferiority of the Bulgarians, who were “a ‘nation’ that has not benefited from the grace of civilization and learning.”

Complaints about Bulgarian bands’ transgressions emphasized the attacks on teachers and schools, underscoring the point that precisely this progress in education and civilization was targeted.

The second map is the bizarrely titled 1878 map attributed to the famous Kiepert, Tableau Ethnocratique des pays du sud-est de l’Europe. This map and the conditions surrounding its publication constitute a truly impressive example of how a clever member of the Greek national elite could employ ethnographic cartography to assert Greek territoriality while turning the authority wielded by those same maps on its head. The title, Tableau Ethnocratique, is the first and obvious clue that this map was not claiming any false pretense of representing a scientifically based (and objective, by implication) ethnographic picture of southeastern Europe. The intermediate step was completely done away with—the author of this map was not interested in displaying natural boundaries between ethnic groups as determined by population count and geographical distribution; instead, he directly addressed what other ethnographic maps only alluded to, natural boundaries between ethnic groups as determined by their relative “fitness to rule.”

If we place this map right next to Kiepert’s well-known Ethnographische Übersichtskarte, published only two years earlier, it becomes clear that they

140. Stephanopoli, Macédoine et Macédoniens, 7.
141. The Ottoman word for “nation” used here was kavm (from Arabic qaum), which may mean both “nation” and “race”; BOA, TFR.I.SL 33/3228, Greek Community of Salonika to the Inspectorate, March 6, 1904.
are the complete opposite of each other.\textsuperscript{142} Had the famous cartographer had a change of heart? Was he trying to shake up the establishment by espousing a controversial new method of determining the graphic distribution of races based on “preponderance” as the accompanying note suggested? Was it publicity he was after? The professor’s lengthy correspondence with a certain gentleman named Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos reveals that his motivations were entirely different and casts a shadow over the famous geographer’s professional integrity.\textsuperscript{143}

Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos (1815–1891) may not be instantly recognizable among a non-Greek audience, but he is in fact one of the greatest names of Greek national historiography, whose magnum opus, \textit{History of the Greek Nation}, has been called “the most important intellectual achievement of nineteenth-century Greece.”\textsuperscript{144} At the time of his correspondence with Kiepert, he was among the members of Society for the Dissemination of Greek Letters (Syllogos), which took an active interest in ethnographic maps of European Turkey.\textsuperscript{145} Feeling the need to counter the alarming prestige Bulgarians seemed to have with ethnographic cartographers—confirmed by the recent recruitment of Kiepert, the best of Europe, to their side—Paparrigopoulos took it upon himself to persuade Kiepert to draw a new and remarkably different map sponsored by the Syllogos.\textsuperscript{146} The historian left for Berlin in July 1877 with this goal.

During his stay in Berlin, Paparrigopoulos apparently convinced Kiepert to draw a new map of the region comprising roughly the Peloponnese, Thessaly, Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace, and Eastern Rumelia. At this first meeting, Paparrigopoulos provided certain specifications about the borders of the map and how it would be “colored.” During the year that passed between this meeting and the publication of the final version of the map, Kiepert and Paparrigopoulos maintained a correspondence, over the course of which the German cartographer changed his earlier depiction of the region almost entirely, in line with Greek claims, despite his initial reservations concerning

\textsuperscript{142} Heinrich Kiepert, \textit{Ethnographische Übersichtskarte des Europäischen Orients} (Berlin, 1876); Kiepert, \textit{Tableau Ethnocratique}.

\textsuperscript{143} The correspondence is in MAE, A.A.E.; C.P, Grèce, 106: Tissot (Athènes) à Waddington, March 6, 1878; March 25, 1878, Annexe à la Dépêche Politique d’Athènes, No. 35 March 25, 1878, cited in Svolopoulos, “Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos,” 361–70.


\textsuperscript{145} Dimara, \textit{Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos}, 336; Svolopoulos, “Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos,” 358.

\textsuperscript{146} Dimara, \textit{Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos}, 343 (based on Alexander Rizos Rangavis’s memoirs).
the coloring of certain regions and the name(s) to be printed on the map. The first disagreement regarded two “transition zones,” the first one around Karaca Dağ and Orta Dağ (Meson Oros or Strednagora), and the second the upper valleys of the Strymon and Vardar (Struma/Strimonas and Axios). Kiepert was in favor of drawing the line demarcating the Greek “ethnocracy” from that of the Bulgarians a little further south than Paparrigopoulos wanted it. The first region was, Kiepert asserted, “exclusively inhabited by Bulgarians,” and as for the second region: “I made it extend in a way that may seem exaggerated to you, though it is justified by the fact that we don’t find any Greeks there (except for merchants and teachers at schools established here and there in some towns) and finally because Bulgarians constitute the large majority also in the southern part of Macedonia, which is indicated as Greek territory.”

Kiepert asked to be informed if any alterations were made to the borders he had proposed, in which case, he further demanded, Paparrigopoulos’s or another committee member’s name should be cited as the “coloring author.” A later correspondence of Kiepert from Naples on October 9, 1877, reveals that the modifications he proposed had been rejected. Kiepert was surprisingly accommodating in his response; he stated that he “perfectly appreciated the reasons and the facts” presented by Paparrigopoulos to prove that the southern part of Macedonia was more than half Greek. Concerning a revised version of the map, he pointed out it was impossible to draw an exact line from memory and suggested that Paparrigopoulos send a “sample of the entire map” colored in correspondence with his corrections.

But when he found out the title that Paparrigopoulos had picked for the map, “Chart of Greek Lands,” Kiepert’s patience apparently ran out and he made it known that he drew the proverbial line right there. Finally putting his foot down, the professor wrote to Paparrigopoulos, “I have nothing to object to Pinax tôn Ellēnikōn Choρōn [Chart of Greek Lands], except for the fact that at least half of the area represented on the map includes lands that were never either Hellenic or Hellenized, like Serbia, Wallachia, Danubian Bulgaria, Montenegro, Northern Albania.”

Paparrigopoulos’s letter to Kiepert, dated February 16, 1878, from Athens, reveals that the letter and the latest color proof of the map sent by the cartographer had not settled the differences concerning the limits of Greek dominance in the regions of Thrace, Macedonia, and Epirus. Paparrigopoulos was also upset about Kiepert’s objection to the title of the map and pointed out that it was enough to take a look at Kiepert’s own proof to see that “these lands [Hellenic or Hellenized] fill up more than three quarters

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148. Ibid., 366.
of the whole map.” Moreover, the cartographer had repeated his demand that someone else’s name be published on the map as the “coloring author.” Finally, despite their previous conversations, the Kingdom of Greece had been given “a color different than other Hellenic lands.” This last “mistake” was the straw that broke the camel’s back. This time Paparrigopoulos was indignant:

As you see, Professor, your last work is far from corresponding to the first arrangements, to which you had kindly given your complete consent. It goes without saying that it is impossible to accept these modifications. We cannot but attribute them to a simple misunderstanding; we also have the firm hope that after the considerations we hereby present to you, you will kindly give M. Reimer the necessary instructions to place the different colors conforming to the basis established by you, and that we hastened to accept. We have sent a telegram to M. Reimer in order to stop all further work on the map, until an agreement can be reached between us.

It is not clear what the “considerations hereby presented” were, but Paparrigopoulos’s bluff evidently had the desired effect because Kiepert’s final letter, dated February 25, 1878, from Berlin, was almost apologetic in its acceptance of the terms suggested by Paparrigopoulos:

I did not, in any manner want to anticipate by this temporary sketch (which, as M. Reimer told me should not represent anything other than a sample of the style of coloring) the definitive decision about the frontier lines to adopt. I had thought instead with M. Reimer that the printing of the map (the corrections of which are at the moment on lithography stones) should be deferred for a short term, from what it seems, when it will be possible to present in it the new frontiers of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro established by the peace [Treaty of San Stefano]. . . . However, if you absolutely want to be in possession of a certain number of samples of the map, intended for the needs of the moment, we can print and color them, according to the instructions and corrections that you would like to send.

In the same letter Kiepert implored, yet again, that another name along with his be published as the coloring author, afraid that he would be found accountable by critics who would not know, in his words, to “distinguish between the very different trends of this map, and the ethnographic maps” that he had published earlier.

149. Ibid., 368. The title of the final and published version of the map suggests that this was the only compromise Kiepert could obtain from Paparrigopoulos.
150. Ibid., 369.
151. Ibid., 370.
In the end, it was Paparrigopoulos who prevailed, even though it seems to have taken another three to four months for him to persuade the geographer with his persistence and what no doubt must have been compelling (dis)incentives—unfortunately not documented. We do learn from a letter by Paparrigopoulos to his protégé Argiropoulos that the final agreement was reached around June. In the same letter, it is hard to miss a certain element of sarcasm in Paparrigopoulos’s style when he uses of the title “the eminent geographer” [ο ἐπιφάνης γεωγράφος] repeatedly when referring to Kiepert: “The eminent geographer (who nowadays is busy with the translation of his Russian maps of Asian borders into French for the conference [of Berlin] on Bismarck’s commission), the eminent, well, geographer, was persuaded to color our chart the way we wanted it to be from the beginning; and even better, under his name.”

These letters clearly show Paparrigopoulos’s determination to get a geographer who had been named the best of Europe by none other than Bismarck to publish a map supporting Greek claims. It was not good enough to obtain a map simply drawn by Kiepert; the map also had to have his seal of authority—and so the key issues that surfaced many times in the correspondence were “coloring” and “authorship,” which brought the project to a standstill at least twice because of Kiepert’s understandable reluctance to paint a huge chunk of southeastern Europe in Greek colors. But Paparrigopoulos’s persuasion tactics, covering the range from flattery to bribery, from criticism to outright threats, ultimately resolved the disagreements.

Paparrigopoulos’s talent in manipulating ethnographic maps surpassed that of Gennadius because he did not just deploy that map as an apparatus of power, a visual tool with which the rights of the Greek nation over an expanse of territory were asserted. He also highlighted the holes in the presumably scientific premises of the whole process and questioned the authority of ethnographic maps in principle. The literal issue of authorship was the most important symbolic element of the map, communicating to the public the scientific authority embodied in the geographer’s name. Gennadius had claimed that authority by remaining anonymous and giving the impression that the map had been prepared by a British author. By contrast, Paparrigopoulos usurped the already existing and unquestionable authority of Kiepert by making sure that Kiepert’s name was the only one printed on the map and on the text that accompanied it (written, however, by Paparrigopoulos himself), deliberately misleading the reader. The result was so convincing that even the otherwise meticulous and thorough Wilkinson did

152. Paparrigopoulos’s letter to Argiropoulos, in Dimara, Κώνstantinos Paparrēgopoulos, 348. (Emphasis added.) Colocotronis also made a sarcastic remark about the geographer’s willingness to publish a map negating his previous work: “Certainly M. Kiepert did not want to disappoint anyone.” Colocotronis, Macédoine et l’Hellenisme, 484.

153. The confusion created was enough that Dimara, as recently as 1986, cited “the famous English Edward Stanford” as the author of the map. Κώνstantinos Paparrēgopoulos, 343.
not doubt its authenticity when he wrote in his 1951 book, “In the explana-
tion accompanying the map Kiepert outlined the difficulties inherent in
the production of an ethnographic map and he maintained that the use of
such maps for drawing up political boundaries was a malpractice which no
geographer ought to countenance.”\(^{154}\)

It is difficult to gauge the exact magnitude of the impact that the Kiepert-
Paparrigopoulos map had in western Europe. It is likely that it remained
somewhat obscure in comparison to Kiepert’s previous work,\(^{155}\) but Papar-
rigopoulos’s persistent efforts had helped him kill two birds with one stone.
Paradoxical as it may sound, the first of these goals was demonstrating that
ethnography was not an exact science. He did this by making his correspon-
dence with Kiepert public and disclosing it to representatives of European
Powers in Athens months before he had guaranteed the publication of the
map under his terms.\(^{156}\) To the letters he attached a memo in which he ar-
gued that, although no one would dispute the merits of Kiepert’s geographi-
cal work, the same certainty could not be sustained for its ethnographic
component because Kiepert himself was “far from believing in the absolute
value of the data we have on the population of the diverse races of the
Orient.”\(^{157}\) Questioning the criteria whereby the ethnographic component
of a map was determined meant that one could introduce alternative meth-
ods that would result in different outcomes. This did not detract from the
power of such maps, however. To the contrary, it underscored their impor-
tance in visualizing a political objective without naming it as such and mak-
ing it available in its simplest form to the observers, which was the second,
and more conventional, goal of Paparrigopoulos’s map. The map thus con-
ceived was not intended for the audience of the geographers of Europe, for
whom it was probably too crude, but for classrooms in Macedonian schools
that the Syllogos provided with textbooks, teachers, and, apparently, maps.
“At the level of mass culture, lies and propaganda are submerged in a sea of
cultural expectations and beliefs,” observes Matthew Edney; “propaganda
maps are not so much arguments as cultural and social reaffirmations.”\(^{158}\)
Likewise, Paparrigopoulos’s “Chart of Greek Lands” gave the Greek public
a means to transform the faith they had in their stake in Macedonia and
the much needed assurance that, if maps were to be drawn to “display the
races of the Orient,” the heritage of Greek civilization was a more justifiable
principle than mere numbers in determining their colors.\(^{159}\)


\(^{155}\) Cvijic does not mention the original map, but he does refer to Nicolaides’s rendering
of it (1899) and notes that he was “astonished to see Kiepert’s name on this map.” *Remarks*, 32.

\(^{156}\) This is why we do not know how exactly he convinced Kiepert to publish the map
under his name; Svolopoulos, “Kόνσταντινος Παπαρριγόπουλος,” 360.

\(^{157}\) Ibid., 361.

\(^{158}\) Edney, *Mapping an Empire*, 338.

\(^{159}\) As N. Kasasis, president of the University of Athens and the society *Hellenisme*,
wrote, “But it is not through numerical significance that Greeks maintain their incontestable
Maps as Fiction

In an article published in the *Bulletin of the American Geographical Society* in 1913, W. L. G. Joerg compared the recent political map of the Balkans, following the conclusion of the second Balkan War, with Jovan Cvijić’s ethnographic map, which was considered the gold standard for ethnographic maps at the time. According to Joerg, “despite minor discrepancies,” this comparison showed that “at last the guiding principle of European history since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the establishment of coincident racial and political boundaries, has made itself felt in Balkan affairs.” The celebratory tone of the article and hopeful words for the future of the Balkan peoples rang hollow, and nowhere more poignantly than in the concluding remarks: “the reapportionment of Balkan territory on broad lines does satisfy the requirements of the principle of nationalities. In this lies the significance of the recent conflicts; in this, too, lies the hope of the future. Given the opportunity to work out their own destinies, the Balkan peoples, we may hope, will enter upon a new era of progress and development.”

Joerg, if he lived long enough, would learn differently. Only five years after the publication of this article, boundaries were being redrawn in the Balkans, and they would be revised several more times throughout the century, at an immensely tragic human cost. Jovan Cvijić, whose expertise on the ethnic groups of the Balkans and their geographic distribution had by now acquired near-cult status, was once again influential; his work was adopted as a reference by a group known as the Inquiry, convened by Woodrow Wilson in September 1917 “to collect data, compare competing claims to territory and to map out possible future political boundaries.”

Thanks to Jeremy Crampton’s work, we now know how the members of the Inquiry used a combination of maps and statistical data from a variety of sources to draw the map they would support and how these maps were also used by President Wilson as he was drafting the Fourteen Points. A report they prepared made the following recommendations: “i) Make a racial map of Europe, Asiatic Turkey, etc., showing boundaries and mixed and doubtful zones. ii) On basis of i) draw racial boundary lines where possible, i.e. when authorities agree; when they disagree select those we had best follow; when these disagree map the zone of their disagreement; study density and distribution of peoples in these zones.”

This excerpt summarizes in one concise paragraph all the main themes of Denis Wood’s monograph, *The Power of Maps*, which has chapter titles superiority over other races; it is also through the influence of their intellectual culture, their commercial and economic activity, briefly, through the triple privilege of seniority [l’ancienneté], intelligence and money.” Néoclès Kasasis, *L’Hellenisme et la Macédoine* (Paris, 1903), 63–64.  
162. Quoted in ibid., 739.
Plate 1: Map, G. Lejean. 1861, Gennadius Library, Athens.

Plate 2: Map, Heinrich Kiepert. 1876, Gennadius Library, Athens.
such as “Maps Are Embedded in a History They Help Construct,” “Every Map Shows This … but Not That,” and “The Interest the Map Serves Is Masked,” ending with “The Interest the Map Serves Can Be Yours.”

Incredible as it may seem, this was how boundaries were drawn in 1917, and still are to a large extent. What is even more disturbing than the hardly disguised motive of self-interest is the conviction that it was in fact possible, with the aid of comparative statistics and geographical knowledge, and the guidance from experts with a “conscientious and scientific attitude” such as Jovan Cvijić, to separate propaganda from legitimate claims and draw a map that would reflect the “real” ethnic boundaries. Once this task was complete, attaining a fair peace agreement would be just a matter of drawing lines that best conformed to those boundaries—and too bad if some outliers could not be accommodated.

This, in brief, is the fiction that conflict will be permanently resolved once the demarcation lines between groups of people coincide with their respective political entities, and it is not a thing of the distant past, when naïve politicians collaborated with ethnographers to “determine racial boundaries.” In fact, this fiction is held in high esteem to this day and surfaces time and again in commentaries on conflicts in those strangely heterogeneous zones of the world, such as contemporary Macedonia. During the late 1990s, when the (western) world observed the mounting tension in the Republic with anxiety, the two authors of an op-ed piece in the New York Times, “Redraw the Map, Stop the Killing,” argued that violence was “inevitable” given the reluctance of the Slavs to work with the Albanians. They proposed a plebiscite that would determine whether the Albanians wanted to stay or leave, and then would “partition” the Republic of Macedonia.

We do not know if the authors were (pleasantly, we hope) surprised that the apocalyptic violence they foresaw has not materialized despite the lack of partition. Redrawing maps and partitioning territory, far from preventing violence, usher it in. Population “exchanges,” the oppression of newly created minorities, killings, the uprooting of countless lives, and, at the very least, assimilation follow partitions, not peaceful exchanges of land. The lines drawn on a map are hardly just an academic exercise; they are constitutive of the reality they purportedly represent and tear through human lives in the process.

I am not arguing that the ethnographic map is a “fiction” because of my distrust in the data collected by ethnographers such as Cvijić. Nor am I

164. Not surprisingly, the Bulgarian side would beg to differ with the general opinion concerning Cvijić’s “scientific attitude.” Radoslav Tsanov, a Bulgarian émigré who acquired recognition as a professor of philosophy in the United States, called the geographer “shameless.” Tsanoff, Bulgaria’s Case, 305.
suggesting that ethnographers and cartographers were all motivated by nefarious motives of territorial domination. H. R. Wilkinson’s 1951 book on ethnographic maps of Macedonia, for example, presents them in sequence, standardized to the same scale and fully demonstrating their inconsistencies in representation, which makes it a great work of reference half a century after its publication. Nevertheless, it seems as though Wilkinson also subscribed to the assumption common to all these maps and their creators—the assumption that there is a better way to draw an ethnographic map, that ethnicity can be objectively identified, enumerated, and depicted in two dimensions. The wishful assumption seems to be: if only we had a miraculous ethno-meter that could measure and record a standardized national allegiance index for each person, and chart his or her exact location with satellite imagery, then we would have the perfect ethnographic map. And until then, we should keep trying.

To believe in the possibility—even theoretical—of the perfect ethnographic map is to ignore how people live, think, and act. “Maps collapse both space and time”; that is, the information that has been measured is captured and remains fixed on the map. Ethnographic maps and the statistical data they are based on “flatten and enclose” people. This is hardly the ideal medium to capture the essence of a concept as fluid, as contingent, and as changing as ethnicity—especially ethnicity in Ottoman Macedonia at the turn of the twentieth century. The static depictions of essentialized ethnicities on the unsophisticated base maps of southeastern Europe did not simply suffer from shoddy scholarship; they entirely masked the complexity of human experience.

Maps are practical cognitive tools that help us organize complex spatial relations in a readable format. It is precisely this feature of the map medium, translating complexity into two dimensions, that lends it so easily to ideological manipulation, and nowhere is this manipulation more consequential than in ethnographic maps. Ethnographic maps, through the dictum that national will is the ultimate principle of political legitimacy, reflect the nation-space, its reach and its boundaries, which may or may not coincide with actual political boundaries. The important point here is that these maps are drawn not only to reflect but to will that space into existence. They are, above all, iconographic representations of territoriality.

166. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics.
169. A telling example of how these maps can be used to popularize the idea of border changes is the depiction of conflict zones, such as Kosovo or, now more recently, Iraq and Syria in widely read magazines such as The Atlantic Monthly and Vanity Fair, which have published alternatives to the current map of Iraq with no self-conscious examination of the inextricable links to colonialism of this kind of exercise.
Chapter 3

The power of the map medium to create, predict, and enforce the territoriality of a nation is one of the most important political expressions of cartography. We should, finally, note the flip side of that expression—namely, its social consequences. Cartography helps to disinvest the process of nation-state formation of moral concerns by presenting map-making as an entirely scientific, benign exercise. The mapmaker drawing lines on a map, no matter how much “research” s/he puts into their drawing, cannot foresee the human cost of new boundaries. The importance of the choices available to the mapmaker and of the decisions that he or she makes is underscored by the fact that the product of these decisions does not represent merely a topographical image but a very potent suggestion as to how the territory that Harley called “a socially empty space” is to be filled: “The abstract quality of the map, embodied as much in the lines of a fifteenth-century Ptolemaic projection as in the contemporary images of computer cartography, lessens the burden of conscience about people in the landscape. Decisions about the exercise of power are removed from the realm of immediate face-to-face contacts.”

Colorful blocks on an ethnographic map do not only demonstrate how different ethnic groups “stand with respect to one another,” as Gennadius suggested, but also make a powerful statement about the discontents of those clearly demarcated territories, namely the people who did not “fit the scale.” This statement is not as loud and clear as that voiced by the guerrillas. It is not, at least at first instance, physically violent. It does, however, serve the same process thorough which homogeneity as an ideal becomes homogeneity in practice within the (imagined) boundaries of a nation.