Rewolucja

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For the Roman Catholic Church—the only traditional "Polish" institution to survive successive nineteenth-century insurrections and subsequent waves of Russian repression—adjusting to the demands of the modern era and the new postrevolution political culture proved especially troublesome. With its independence compromised, its finances controlled, its practices closely scrutinized, and its official ties with Rome forcibly severed by the Russian autocracy after the January Insurrection of 1863, the Polish Church had, by the turn of the century, already found it increasingly difficult to satisfy the spiritual needs of its rapidly growing and changing flock. Although Russian state policies did much to restrict the church's access to that flock, the ultramontane conservatism of the hierarchy, coupled with an aging clergy's addiction to routine, had further engendered an ignorance of and an indifference toward the modern set of social problems, aspirations, and concerns confronting many Polish Catholics.1

As a result, the church was surprised by its inability to exercise any significant influence on the population at the onset of the revolution in January and February of 1905. In subsequent months, the church experienced a profound crisis that seemed to endanger its traditional relationship with Polish society. Faced with the prospect of complete political isolation on the one hand and a schismatic movement of disillusioned clergy on the other, the church was eventually forced to make room for reformist im-

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pulses based on western European models and experience. In the end, the church survived the revolutionary crisis and even emerged somewhat strengthened. It failed, however, to take full advantage of the opportunities for Catholic social action afforded by the revolution, as old methods, ways of thinking, and personnel continued to dominate clerical practices.

Church, State, and Society before the Revolution

The crisis that suddenly confronted the church during the revolutionary era was the direct consequence of a long period of intellectual and organizational stagnation at a time of rapid population growth, internal and external migration, urbanization, and industrialization. The failure of the church to adapt to the fluidly changing times had several causes, principal among them, the church’s relationship with the Russian state after the January Insurrection of 1863. The church’s supporting role during that insurrection made it a likely target of subsequent Russian retribution. The post-January crackdown subsequently devastated the church in the Kingdom, tearing apart an organization carefully constructed over centuries. The exile of members of the hierarchy along with hundreds of diocesan chaplains and monks, the confiscation of church property, the liquidation of 124 out of 176 cloisters, a decade of forced vacancies in six of seven bishoprics, the closing of the Theological Academy in Warsaw, and the placing of the hierarchy under the authority of the Theological College in St. Petersburg all had paralyzing effects on many of the church’s activities. Designed to deny the church an independent base and freedom of action in Russia’s Polish provinces, these repressive measures also created a leadership vacuum and an internal organizational instability that undermined traditional discipline.

Russian policies also attempted to isolate the church in the Kingdom from the outside world and from its own parishioners. Official contacts, not only with Rome but with Catholic institutions elsewhere in Europe (including, most significantly, Prussian and Austrian Poland), were strictly prohibited. Inside the Kingdom, contacts between bishops and diocesan clergy were carefully restricted and supervised by the Russian government after 1864. A bishop could not undertake a visitation of his diocese or appoint and transfer clergy without the permission of the state authorities.

2. By 1870, 227 clerics had been exiled, 37 sentenced to death, 200 imprisoned, and 44 forced to flee the country; see Ryszard Bender, Spoleczne inicjatywy chrześciąńskie w Królestwie Polskim, 1905–1918 (Lublin, 1978), pp. 38–39.
The nomination of professors at theological seminaries was also subject to state confirmation. Finally, the authorities created obstacles to the clergy’s access to the Catholic population. Until 1905, pastoral letters from the bishops to the faithful were prohibited. In addition, priests could not accept newcomers from other parishes on their own initiative (this at a time of dynamic migration), nor could they administer sacraments to the ill in “public places” such as hospitals and sanatoriums.

If this were not enough, measures of russification were introduced to loosen the traditional bonds tying the Catholic Church to Polish language, history, and culture. The church was required to conduct its official business and correspondence in the Russian language, which in turn justified the obligatory study of Russian at theological seminaries. Beginning in 1875, Russian also became the language of instruction for the study of history in the seminaries. Eventually, even the required prayers for the tsar and members of the imperial family had to be said in Russian.

The Vatican initially responded to the Russian assault on the Polish church by breaking diplomatic relations with St. Petersburg, but in 1882 those ties were restored when Leo XIII reached an accommodation with the Russian government which brought little relief to the Polish clergy. Terrorized by Russian repression and virtually abandoned by Rome, the hierarchy in the Kingdom was forced to make a fundamental change in its political strategies toward the Russian state, to exchange its late-1850s and early-1860s policy of moderate opposition and cautious confrontation for one based on fear of reprisal and calculated loyalism. The main fear, of course, was that even the most modest form of clerical protest could result in more drastic measures against Roman Catholics, including the closing of churches.\(^3\) Reinforcing the hierarchy’s reluctance to cross swords again with the Russian government was the fact that Wincenty Chościecki-Popiel, the titular head of the church in Russian Poland as archbishop of Warsaw, shared in the bitter experience of Siberian exile after the January Insurrection. A policy of loyalty toward the autocracy seemed the only way to provide insurance against further repression. Repeated demonstrations of loyalty, it was also hoped, might eventually win the church some breathing room in its relationship with the state.

The hierarchy’s accommodation to the post-January status quo reflected at the time a larger trend in the opinion of a traditional political elite still

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\(^3\) Such fears were not baseless. In 1905, Warsaw governor-general George Skalon threatened to close all churches that had become forums for patriotic demonstrations and the singing of national hymns; see APL KGL 1905:18, WGG to the Polish Bishops, September 30 (October 13), 1905.
unchallenged by the practitioners of modern mass politics, and not only in the Congress Kingdom but in Prussian and Austrian Poland as well. "Triple Loyalty," the conservative-clerical backlash to the failure and tragic consequences of the January Insurrection, as mentioned in Chapter 1, was intended to conciliate Poland's foreign rulers with expressions of political loyalty in exchange for modest concessions in the national-cultural sphere. Similarly, Warsaw positivism, the more liberal and progressive intellectual tendency of the immediate post-January era, also rejected political confrontation with the Russian authorities and concentrated instead on "organic work." Thus, the church's adoption of a loyalist stance and its resignation from political activity in pursuit of limited and "realistic" goals fit squarely the prevailing mood of the 1870s and early 1880s.

The embrace of a loyalist strategy by the church nevertheless restricted its activities to the performance of narrowly defined pastoral duties, and even these became increasingly difficult to fulfill because of the weak state of church finances and rapid demographic change that outstripped church resources. The population explosion of the last decades of the nineteenth century in Russian Poland, combined with migration from the countryside to industrial centers, stretched traditional parish organization beyond its limits. By 1905, gigantic and overpopulated urban-industrial parishes had become commonplace. Holy Cross parish in Łódź, frequently cited in the Catholic literature of the period as a prime example, contained 142,000 parishioners served by only eight clergy.4

To make matters worse, the demographic explosion in urban and industrial parishes came at a time when the church's independent financial base (which consisted mainly of income derived from landed property and tithes before the January Insurrection) had been largely eliminated and replaced by inadequate state subsidies. The possibilities for new capital construction in these parishes were consequently limited. For example, the Warsaw district of Powiśle in 1905 contained one hundred thousand Catholics belonging to three parishes. Yet all of Powiśle was served by only three small churches, the largest of which could accommodate only twenty-seven hundred believers at a time. Other major urban parishes suffering from severe shortages of clergy and places of worship included Resurrection parish in Łódź (90,000 parishioners); Praga (82,000), Wola (65,000), and All Saints (62,000) in Warsaw; St. Zygmunt's in Częstochowa (50,000); Radom (34,000); and Sosnowiec (31,000).5 The fulfillment of normal pas-

5. Ibid.; see also Aleksander Wójcicki, Chrześcijański ruch robotniczy w Polsce (Poznań, 1921), pp. 71–72.
toral duties in these primarily working-class parishes became nearly im-
possible, and thousands of parishioners were left with many of their
religious needs unattended. When Franciscan missionaries from Kraków
were allowed by the Russian authorities in 1906 to visit urban-industrial
parishes in the Kingdom, they were shocked to discover that most workers
had not had their confessions heard in over a year.6

Though many of the reasons for the sad situation in urban parishes can
be attributed directly to the policies of the Russian government, the needs
of urban parishioners were not the first priority of the church itself. Too
often the limited funds available to the church for capital construction were
spent instead on expensive monuments or shrines and the adornment of
cathedrals, a practice termed “building the material church.”7 Unfortu-
nately, the “material church” left many urban areas without even the most
elementary wooden structures.

Nor was the cadre policy of the hierarchy designed to meet the needs
of urban parishioners. No effort was made to redress the growing imbal-
ance between the relatively large number of priests serving in rural areas
as well as at the residences of bishops and the dramatically small number
of clergy serving in the large urban-industrial parishes. At the same time,
the ecclesiastical authorities tended to nominate as administrators to these
parishes older men whose origins and experience were far removed from
the cities and working-class elements of the population. Placement in urban
parishes had become, in fact, a reward for years of service in poor, more
sparsely populated rural parishes. Because the collection of fees (oplaty)
for the performance of certain pastoral duties (marriages, funerals) was a
major supplement to the otherwise meager income of the lower clergy, the
large number of Catholics in an urban parish could lead to a marked im-
provement in the financial status of the new parish priest.8

These older chaplains, accustomed to the long-established practice in
rural areas of sitting in their churches and waiting for their parishioners to
come to them, possessed neither the energy nor the temperament to satisfy
the more elusive religious needs of urban parishioners, let alone understand
their specific social concerns and aspirations. Evidence drawn from files
on clergymen which came across the desk of the Warsaw superintendent
of police as part of the process of state confirmation of appointments and

6. See Czesław Bogdalski, Wspomnienia z misyi odprawianych od 1906–1908 r. w Króles-
twie Polskim (Kraków, 1908).
(1906): 77.
8. Ibid., p. 80.
transfers supports this conclusion. The aggregation of data from 124 of these files for the period 1905–1907 provides, moreover, an excellent profile of the Warsaw clergy during the years of the revolution. The data demonstrate clearly that the Warsaw clergy was aging, nearly 60 percent of its members having been born before the January Insurrection of 1863. In their fifties and sixties by 1905, they had completed their seminary studies and entered the priesthood at a time of the most intense Russian repression against the church. Even more striking are their geographic and social origins: more than 90 percent originated in the provincial nobility. As might be expected, only a small minority (slightly more than 10 percent) engaged in extrapastoral social activities, which were, of course, scrupulously noted by the police. Significantly, those deemed “active” outside their churches (thirteen priests) came from a variety of social backgrounds, not excluding the nobility, and were born without exception after the January Insurrection.

In addition to the effects of age and social background, a profound intellectual inertia also left the church ill equipped to deal with major social issues once they had been so forcefully raised by the revolution. The prohibition of all official contacts with Rome and European Catholicism isolated the church in the Kingdom from the leading currents of contemporary Catholic thought. Hence, at a time when the rest of Catholic Europe (including Prussian and Austrian Poland) was discussing and putting into limited practice the social encyclicals of Leo XIII, especially Rerum Novarum with its call for adapting the church’s mission to the industrial age, the “social question” had yet to find an audience among the overwhelming majority of Catholic clergy in Russian Poland. Because of state censorship, Rerum Novarum itself was not discussed in the Catholic press in the Kingdom until the revolution, fourteen years after its pronouncement. The first bishop to comment officially on the “social question” was Tomasz Kuliński of Kielce diocese, but this came in late November 1905, ten months into the Revolution. Furthermore, the curricula of Catholic seminaries completely ignored social studies before the revolution, leaving the clergy as a whole intellectually unprepared to absorb the Catholic social teachings

10. ADK AK OA-2/9, Bishop of Kielce to the Diocesan Clergy, November 23, 1905.
of Wilhelm Ketteler, Gaspard Marmillod, Henry Manning, James Gibbons, Ludwik Windhorst, and other contemporary theologians.\footnote{11}

This is not to imply that there were no Catholic social initiatives undertaken in the Kingdom of Poland before the revolution. The indefatigable Honorat Kożmiński, father superior of the Capuchin monastery of Nowe Miasto, organized a network of semiconspiratorial assemblies of monks and nuns which acted as a substitute for the cashiered cloisters earlier engaged in social work. By 1895, sixteen such assemblies had been formed, including the Factory Sisters and the Servants of Mary, both active among urban industrial workers. At the turn of the century, Father Karol Blizinski initiated missionary activity aimed specifically at the Warsaw proletariat, organizing two religious conferences for workers attended by three thousand and five thousand people respectively in 1898 and 1899.\footnote{12} Undoubtedly these initiatives touched as many if not more Polish workers than the prerevolutionary socialist movement. Nevertheless, these initiatives were uninformed by a broader theory or plan of action and lacked the official support of the hierarchy. As such they were bound to remain sporadic, isolated, and confined to a few thousand workers.

\section*{A Church in Crisis}

This long period of organizational stagnation, political paralysis, and intellectual inertia prepared the way for a church crisis during the revolution which took several forms: the striking unpopularity of the church’s continuing adherence to loyalist policies toward the Russian government; the embrace of a new and—in the eyes of the church—“heretical” faith called socialism by tens of thousands of Polish workers; the end of church monopoly over popular opinion in the countryside as a result of the penetration and expansion of the nationalist and populist movements; and finally, internal divisions among the clergy, including the first and only schism in the history of Polish Catholicism since the Reformation.

In 1904 there already were clear signs that the church hierarchy’s position of calculated loyalism not only lacked popular support but could provoke violent opposition. The official support of the hierarchy for Russia in its war against Japan, symbolized by Archbishop Popiel’s sponsorship

\footnote{11. The problem of absorbing Christian sociology “in one gulp” was addressed by Ks. K. Max, “Działalność społeczna kapłana,” \textit{Wiadomości Pasterskie} 6 (1906): 321–328.}

\footnote{12. Bender, \textit{Społeczne inicjatywy}, pp. 46–51, 59–60.}
of a train of medical supplies and personnel to the Far Eastern front, flew in the face of popular sympathy for Japan, growing resistance to mobilization, and a general boycott of government fund-raising efforts. Hostility to the church's policy became glaring when, at the end of March 1904, windows were smashed in the Warsaw homes of Prince Włodzimierz Czetwertyński, Baron Leopold Kronenberg, Ludwik Górski, and other "conciliationists" authorized by the archbishop to collect contributions for the medical train.\(^\text{13}\)

The lower clergy, meanwhile, displayed little enthusiasm for the Russian war effort in general and for contributions to the archbishop's medical train in particular. In reports by provincial governors to the chancellory of the Warsaw governor general, the attitude of the parish clergy toward the war was described merely as "correct." Provincial governors complained that the clergy lacked fervor, expressing neither sympathy for nor opposition to the cause of Russian arms in the Far East. Typical was the behavior of Father Józef Szczęsnik, who in the Church of the Holy Cross in Łódź read imperial wartime proclamations in such a muffled voice that police constable Pilipenko, sitting a couple of rows from the pulpit, could not hear a word.\(^\text{14}\)

The hierarchy's failure to elicit support for the Russian war effort in 1904 was followed by its complete inability to influence an aroused public opinion in 1905. Appeals to striking workers in January and February to return to their jobs had no effect and displayed a woeful lack of familiarity with or concern for working-class conditions. The episcopate willingly attributed the cause of the strikes to outside agitation, completely ignoring depressed wages and exploitative practices in the factories.\(^\text{15}\) Naturally, that appearance of siding with management only fed the anticlerical propaganda mills of the socialist parties, which in turn served only to reinforce the episcopate's obsession with socialist "agitators" and "subversives."

The hierarchy's opposition to the simultaneous strike and boycott movement against the russified school system proved even more unpopular than its useless appeals to the workers. The archbishop's pastoral letter of July 27, 1905, while expressing sympathy toward the desire of Polish youth to have instruction in their native language, nevertheless called for an end to

\(^\text{13. AGAD KGGW 2280, Warsaw Superintendent of Police to the Acting WGG, March 18 (31), 1904.}\)
\(^\text{14. AGAD KGGW 2308, Piotrków Governor to the WGG, February 28 (March 12), 1904.}\)
\(^\text{15. AGAD AB 2311, plik XIII, Pastoral Letter of the Archbishop of Warsaw to the Polish People, undated; see also Archbishop Popiel's appeal, "Orędzie Arcypasterskie," Przegląd Katolicki, no. 11 (March 16, 1905): 154.}\)
the boycott of the Russian schools, arguing that "a bad school is better than no school at all." Instead of heeding the archbishop’s advice, public opinion in the Kingdom greeted his letter with protests from across the political spectrum.

The success of socialism in capturing the imaginations of thousands of Polish workers during the revolution was, from the church’s point of view, the most alarming aspect of its "troubled times." Given the weakness of the church and its mission in urban-industrial areas, the popularity of socialism during this period can be at least partly explained by its ability to pose as a new religion. The Polish socialist movement’s active and largely unconscious borrowing of religious symbols and metaphors; its self-reference as a "new faith," a "new creed," and a "new gospel"; its quite conscious use of traditional religious melodies for "proletarian hymns"—all were important, even crucial, elements in its efforts to reach industrial workers in the first years of the twentieth century. And whereas the traditional religion seemed to offer only old, mechanical sacramentalism, the "apostles" of socialism conjured up visions of "the Kingdom of God on earth," which is how they often described their final goal. In this sense, the popularity of socialism during the revolutionary era cannot be equated with a tendency toward a decline of religiosity among Polish workers. On the contrary, the spiritual needs of a still very traditional working class, although insufficiently attended by traditional religious institutions, were greater than ever before, as demonstrated by an equally enthusiastic receptivity to later Catholic missionary activity. A large proportion of Polish workers during the revolution, unlike their political and religious leaders, did not necessarily perceive a contradiction between socialism and Catholicism. Rather, the evidence suggests that socialist sympathies and tra-


17. At the same time, however, Archbishop Popiel urged the tsar through private channels to allow the introduction of Polish into the schools; see Tadeusz Krawczak, "Rewolucja a życie społeczno-religijne: Powstanie mariawitów" (Seminar paper, Institute of History, Warsaw University, 1985), p. 10.


19. In the large working-class parish of Chojny near Łódź, fifteen to twenty thousand participated in evening Masses conducted by Kraków Franciscans at the end of 1907; see Bogdalski, Wspomnienia, p. 322.
ditional religious beliefs could be and were entirely compatible in the working-class culture of the early twentieth century.\textsuperscript{20}

Yet precisely because socialism posed as a new religion that could solve not only socioeconomic problems but metaphysical ones as well, the Catholic Church treated it as the most dangerous of heresies. In the pastoral letters of the bishops to the Polish population and the diocesan clergy during the revolution, the socialists were seldom referred to by name but were labeled conversely as "false prophets," "agitators of evil," and "wolves in sheep's clothing."\textsuperscript{21} The lower clergy could be even less sparing in epithets, frequently condemning the socialists as "messengers of Satan" or personifications of the "horned enemy" himself.\textsuperscript{22} Yet simplistic condemnations of socialism in pastoral letters and from the pulpit, even the use of confessionals against suspected socialist sympathizers, could not alter the fact that the church was failing to minister to the religious needs of the urban population and only served to illuminate its ignorance of the conditions in which that population lived and worked.

The church also began to lose ground in the countryside to the competing ideologies of nationalism and populism. Lulled to sleep by its ancient position of unquestioned authority in the villages and the traditional indifference of the peasantry to national issues, the church was caught off guard by the awakening of national consciousness among rural inhabitants during the revolution. As a consequence, the village clergy exercised little influence on the movement in the communes for local self-government and the polonization of rural institutions. The leadership of the gmina action movement, especially in 1905, included surprisingly few parish priests.\textsuperscript{23} Instead there were several reported cases of active opposition of individual clergymen to the gmina movement. A few even informed the Russian authorities of "illegal" actions taken by communal assemblies.\textsuperscript{24} In retaliation, the homes of such priests became targets of local vandals.


\textsuperscript{21} ADK AK OA-2/13, Bishop of Kujawy-Kalisz to the Catholic Population, December 20, 1905; ADP PWD, Bishop of Plock to the Polish People, December 31, 1905.

\textsuperscript{22} ADK KD OD-2/1.


\textsuperscript{24} Such instances were reported in \textit{Polak}, no. 9 (September 1905); see also Stanisław
If the attitude of the church toward the gmina movement was ambivalent at best, its reaction to the agrarian strikes that swept over large parts of rural Poland in the spring of 1905 was unambiguously hostile. The church viewed all strikes, industrial and agrarian, as violations of divinely sanctioned property rights as well as of the seventh and tenth commandments. Yet the vehemence with which it greeted strikes by farm laborers, unquestionably the most impoverished segment of the entire population, can only be explained by the noble origins of the vast majority of the Polish clergy. For similar reasons, the church denounced arbitrary actions by peasants to settle long-standing disputes with noble landowners over easement rights. In a letter of March 1905 to the diocesan clergy, the bishop of Kielce portrayed the Polish countryside as a scene of wild revolutionary anarchy, a place of "vigilantism in the place of justice, hatred in the place of love for one's neighbor, violence in the place of order." This reaction from one of the more politically moderate members of the episcopate typified the church's response to the agrarian social issues of the revolution.

Such attitudes were no help to the church in its efforts to prevent the nationalist and populist movements from making significant inroads in the Polish countryside, even though the allegiance of rural inhabitants to the church in matters spiritual remained unshaken. Actually, the church shared a certain common ground with Polish nationalism and its chief exponents in the National Democratic Party. Both favored a "realistic" approach to the Russian government, seeking to move it to concessions while strongly opposing efforts to overthrow it by revolutionary means. Both despised the socialist movement and assumed combative positions toward those political parties advancing and promoting it. Both were fundamentally anti-Semitic. Still, the church distrusted the nationalist movement, particularly its secular emphasis, its past links to freemasonry, and its demagogic appeal to the masses. Despite the avowedly pro-Catholic tactical stance the National Democrats assumed during the revolution, the bishops continued to denounce the ideology of "integral nationalism" which called upon the church to play the role of a "national institution" subordinate to the "national interest." As a result, conservative Catholic


publicists did not hesitate to label Polish nationalism "areligious," "pagan," and "pantheistic," though they refrained from condemning it outright as a heresy (a charge reserved for socialism). The well-publicized conflict of the Catholic hierarchy with the National Democrats, peaking in their bitter dispute over the role of the church in a private Polish school system, and particularly in the Polska Macierz Szkolna (see Chapter 5), clearly illuminated the differences between the two camps for all those who cared to see. The church's disapproval, however, did little to undermine the growing popularity of nationalism among rural Polish Catholics, who voted overwhelmingly for the National Democrats in successive elections to the Russian State Duma in 1906 and 1907.

In its numbers, territorial range, and organizational depth, the populist movement posed a far lesser threat than nationalism to the church's traditional position in the countryside. As already noted, the Polish People's Union, the political arm of the populist movement, lasted barely two years before it was effectively suppressed by the Russian authorities in early 1907. Yet because of populism's social and class overtones, including its support for agrarian strikes and radical land reform, the church treated it as an enemy far more dangerous than Polish nationalism. In particular, the populist slogan "Sami sobie" (We by ourselves) was interpreted by church officials to mean not only "without the nobility" but also "without the clergy." The church therefore sought to remove populist publications such as Siewba (Sowing) and Zaranie (The Dawn) from peasant cottages and to eliminate schools and cooperative circles organized by the populists. In Kielce diocese, the bishop resorted to the excommunication of four populists; elsewhere, the clergy, acting on its own, often refused to administer the sacraments to readers of the populist press. This was not enough, however, to prevent the growth of a populist readership in the years after the revolution, nor was it sufficient to restore rural parish priests to their previous position of unchallenged authority in the villages.

While the church focused on the external challenges posed by the mass political movements to its traditional position in society, it remained rel-

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atively blind to the far greater danger of growing divisions and dissent within its own ranks. At one end of this spectrum, the revolution promoted the emergence of what was later called the “modernist” tendency, personified almost totally by the figure of Izydor Wysłouch.30 A Capuchin monk and a product of one of the semiconspiratorial assemblies organized by his father superior, Honorat Koźmiński, Wysłouch appointed himself the “conscience” of the church during the years of the revolution. Writing for lay publications under the pseudonym of Antoni Szech, Wysłouch subjected the church and its conservative social policies to a scathing criticism. He also expressed strong sympathies for the ideals, if not the practices, of the socialist movement and collaborated openly with various populist enterprises. Perhaps only a tiny fraction of the Polish clergy shared Wysłouch’s social radicalism, but his articulate attacks on the church’s inertia in the face of contemporary social and political questions had a much broader appeal, particularly among reform-minded members of the younger clergy.31

Alarmed by the resonance of Wysłouch’s uncensored criticisms, the church authorities finally took disciplinary action against him in the spring of 1906. In April, Wysłouch was sent to a Jesuit academy in Innsbruck for “continuing education.” At the same time, he agreed under pressure to submit all of his future writings to ecclesiastical censorship. With Wysłouch effectively silenced, the conservative Catholic press embarked on what amounted to a mud-slinging campaign against him.32 To respond to his attackers, Wysłouch returned to Russian Poland at the end of 1907, having decided once again to circumvent the censors. Within a year, however, Wysłouch was forced to leave the Capuchin order, and all of his publications were placed on the Index. Henceforth, the Polish church’s struggle against “Szechism” in the Kingdom was made synonymous with growing conservative attacks on “modernism” in larger European Catholic debates.33

30. For a popular but slanted biography of Wysłouch, see Henryk Syska, Przechodzień z góry duchu: O księdzu Antonim Szechem (Warsaw, 1955). A more scholarly approach to his career may be found in Józef Keller and Zygmunt Poniatowski, eds., Studia o modernistach katolickich (Warsaw, 1968), pp. 169–236.
31. See Marian Fulman, “S zakale, czy ludzie?” Wiadomości Pasterskie 3, 2 (1907): 124–126, for an impassioned defense of Wysłouch’s “pure and honest” intentions as well as his striving for “Catholic reform that would correct the impotence of the Polish church at a most critical moment for society.”
33. Bishop Apolinary Wnukowski of Płock, even before Wysłouch’s departure from the
At the opposite extreme from "modernism" was the Mariavite movement, led by a group of forty young priests whose rebellion against the hierarchy and traditional discipline was based on an idealized medieval model of a devout and ascetic clergy. Whereas Wysłouch inveighed against the church for ignoring the affairs of this world, the Mariavites (from the Latin *Maria vita*) believed that the clergy's preparation of Catholics for the other world was lacking in devotion. Yet the Mariavites also struck a social chord in their substitution of Polish for Latin in the liturgy, their opposition to receiving fees for the performance of routine pastoral duties, and their attacks on the "noble" lifestyles of the parish clergy. And in contrast to Wysłouch, the Mariavite clergy eventually commanded the allegiance of tens of thousands of believers in twenty-two parishes.  

The source and inspiration of the Mariavite movement can be traced to the visions of the nun Felicja Kozłowska, whose career, like Wysłouch's, began in one of Honorat Koźmiński's semisecret assemblies. Engaged in missionary and social work among the parishioners of Plock, Kozłowska by 1900 had convinced several young vicars—many of them recent graduates of the Theological Academy in St. Petersburg—of the validity of her visions. They were also attracted to the practices Kozłowska derived from those visions, which she deemed essential to salvation: continual adoration of the Most Holy Sacrament through daily personal communion and the daily intercession of Mary achieved through round-the-clock prayer shifts of believers in their churches or chapels. From the beginning, Kozłowska's followers among the clergy were characterized by an extraordinary pastoral zeal that gained for the movement many adherents, particularly in urban and mixed urban-rural parishes, where the church had not shown much initiative. The Mariavites, by contrast, served free meals to the poor, opened up shelters for the children of working-class families, and organized cooperative shops among the unemployed.  

Initially the Mariavite movement attracted little attention from the hierarchy and other members of the clergy. Only once the movement began, without the approval of the episcopate, to assume organizational form, through the creation of the Assemblies of Mariavite Chaplains and Mariavite Sisters, did the church react. In the summer of 1903, the archbishop of Warsaw transferred six Mariavite priests to less densely populated rural

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Capuchin order, banned his publications along with other "modernist" brochures, books, and newspapers that "aim at the overthrow of revealed religion"; see APD PWD, Bishop of Plock to the Diocesan Clergy, December 31, 1907.

parishes. Shortly thereafter, in a letter to the diocesan clergy, Archbishop Popiel warned against participation in the Mariavite assemblies, which, he argued, had violated church discipline and had departed from the principles of Catholic theology.\textsuperscript{36} Meanwhile, the Mariavites strove hard behind the backs of the Polish episcopate for formal recognition of their movement in Rome, and in August 1903, Pius X granted a special audience to Kozłowska and seventeen accompanying priests. The Polish bishops, nevertheless, quickly regained the pope’s ear through intensive lobbying. In August 1904, a year after his audience with Kozłowska, Pius rejected her visions and dissolved the Assembly of Mariavite Chaplains, leaving the fate of the Mariavite Sisters in the hands of the Polish episcopate.\textsuperscript{37} Formalized by a November 1904 decree of the Holy Inquisition, the papal decision also banned any further contacts between Kozłowska and her adherents among the clergy.

The following January the Mariavites issued a formal declaration of submission to the sentences of the Inquisition. Despite the submission to Rome, however, the subordination of the Mariavites to episcopal authority at home proved only superficial. Instead they redoubled their pastoral activity, spreading further the censored Mariavite cults in predominantly mixed rural-urban parishes. They also began to criticize the “depraved” lifestyles of the non-Mariavite clergy openly from the pulpit, propagating among parishioners a new model of the priesthood. As a result, the episcopate in January 1906 suspended the Mariavite priests in their functions, and both sides once again turned to the Vatican. There, the Polish bishops continued to enjoy the upper hand. On April 5, 1906, Pius X issued an encyclical against the Mariavites, giving them fifteen days to unite with the church and demanding their submission to interviews with their bishops. When Father Jan Michał Kowalski, in the name of six Mariavite priests in Plock diocese, rejected these demands, the first schism in Polish Catholicism since the Reformation became a fact, formalized by the Inquisition’s official sentence of excommunication on December 5, 1906.\textsuperscript{38}

Meanwhile, the revolution had brought laymen into the quarrel between the Roman Catholic hierarchy and the rebellious Mariavite priests. Denied a hearing in Rome, the Mariavites turned for support directly to the population, resorting frequently to the slogans of class struggle popularized by the revolution. For its part, the church also sought to mobilize public opin-

\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 15. The Assembly of Mariavite Sisters was dissolved in Plock diocese but allowed to continue a tenuous existence elsewhere.
\textsuperscript{38} ADK AK OA-2/9.
ion through pastoral letters to the faithful, agitation from the pulpit, and a series of vicious attacks on the Mariavite “heresy” in the Catholic press. With inflamed passions leading to a search for more radical solutions on both sides, Catholic loyalists and Mariavites engaged in a struggle for the control of churches, chapels, shrines, and cemeteries which at times assumed the form of fratricidal warfare. The most violent incident occurred in the Warsaw suburb of Leszno, where in April 1906 fighting between Mariavites and their Catholic opponents for control of the parish church left eight dead. The Russian authorities finally intervened at the end of 1906 to contain the religious strife and bloodletting. The Mariavites achieved legal recognition by the tsarist government in exchange for the restoration of disputed places of worship to Roman Catholic jurisdiction. For its part the autocracy gained a potential weapon to use as leverage against the church in the postrevolutionary period.

Revolution and Catholic Reform

The Mariavite controversy and schism, however costly to the church, was not entirely detrimental, for it forced a reexamination of clerical practices, lifestyles, and ethical behavior. In particular, it led to a reconsideration of the “devotionalist” direction of theological training in the seminaries, which advocates of reform held partially responsible for the Mariavite deviation. It also focused attention on the generation gap and on a lack of communication between older and younger members of the clergy. Similarly, the successes of the mass political movements during the revolution pressured the church to rethink its position on national and social issues and to build new organizational bridges to the popular classes. Ironically, the revolution, while confronting the Polish church with one of the most profound crises in its history, also created opportunities for the church to emerge from that crisis.

Most significantly, the revolution loosened some of the more stringent state controls on the Catholic Church and Catholic religious practices. The


40. Already, by the end of February 1906, the Warsaw governor-general had issued a circular to provincial and police authorities, instructing them to remain neutral in the religious quarrels of the population but firmly act to prevent and eliminate incidents of violence; see APW ZOW 1938.

most important development affecting religion during the revolution, the Edict of Religious Toleration issued by the tsar in April 1905, eased a number of the restrictions against the church which had accumulated since the January Insurrection of 1863. Designed to retain the neutrality of non-Orthodox Christian churches, if not their loyalty, during the Russian government’s struggle against revolutionary forces throughout the empire, the edict specifically conceded to the Catholic Church in Poland some much-needed breathing room. Separate statutes involving the construction of places of worship in ethnically mixed areas, clerical appointments and transfers, religious processions, missionary activity, the formation of religious brotherhoods, and the travel of clergy outside their parishes were liberalized. Legal limits were also placed on punitive action the state could take against individual priests, excluding them, for example, from hard labor camps and Siberian exile.42

The principal provisions of the edict, however, rescinded earlier measures of russification. In this regard, state recognition of the right of Orthodox subjects to convert to another Christian denomination allowed the long-persecuted Uniates, residing mainly in the ethnically Byelorussian and Ukrainian counties of the Kingdom’s eastern provinces, to join the Roman Catholic Church. As previously mentioned, the edict also restored the exclusive right of Catholic clergy to provide Polish-language religious instruction in the public schools.43 Although this latter concession could hardly satisfy the national aspirations of a society striving for Polish as the language of instruction of all subjects, it went a long way toward meeting the church’s own more-limited agenda.

Besides the Edict of Toleration with its specific concessions, other developments during the revolution were beneficial to the Catholic Church. The relaxation of press laws and state censorship enabled the church to expand its publications dramatically and to discuss previously prohibited topics, including social and national issues. Further concessions on education, eventually permitting the formation of private schools with Polish as the language of instruction for most subjects, vastly improved the church’s chances to influence the direction of youth. And finally, the October Manifesto, with its provisions on freedom of assembly and association, allowed the church to sponsor the formation of new organizational entities to reach Catholics whose needs could no longer be accommodated solely by traditional institutions and practices.

42. "Zniesienie ograniczeń religijnych," Przegląd Katolicki, no. 17, supplement (April 27, 1905).
43. Ibid., no. 18, supplement (May 4, 1905).
Meanwhile, events and an aroused public opinion pressured the church to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the revolution. As the palpable unpopularity of its loyalist policies clearly demonstrated, the church could no longer afford to ignore the national and self-governing aspirations of Polish society, especially as those aspirations were frequently expressed in patriotic demonstrations and popular protests at Catholic places of worship. Once the Edict of Toleration allowed the church greater maneuverability in its relationship with the Russian state, the church did begin to rethink its position and gradually, but ever so carefully, to identify itself with selected national causes. Although this change came about only after the October Manifesto, the shift in policy from calculated loyalism to cautious support of "national work" did produce some immediate benefits. For example, the episcopate’s quiet abandonment of its opposition to the school strikes and boycott, replaced by public calls and private lobbying for Polish language concessions, helped ensure for the church an important voice in the subsequent debate over a future private Polish school system. Similarly, the church recovered some of its lost ground in the countryside as the clergy began to involve itself in larger numbers in gmina action. But the most important consequence of the church’s shift in strategy came after the imposition of martial law throughout the Kingdom in December 1905, when a growing number of Poles, again denied the opportunity for legal and unrestricted political activity, turned to the church as a means of expressing their national identity. In 1906, the first full year of martial law, the number of pilgrims to the ancient shrine of the Black Madonna in Częstochowa jumped fourfold in comparison with the previous year (from 262,041 pilgrims in 1905 to 1,064,232 pilgrims in 1906).

Although partial accommodation to the national aspirations of society enabled the church to offer a more viable alternative to the program of the National Democrats, the crisis of the church in industrial centers as well as the challenge of socialism could be alleviated only by the adoption of a countervailing social evangelism. Given the nature of the times and the

44. Demonstrators often demanded crosses, church emblems, and banners from the clergy as well as the participation of priests in patriotic processions; see ADK AK OA-2/12, Circular of the General Consistory of the Warsaw Archdiocese to the Clergy, November 15, 1905.

45. E.g., some clergy in Piotrków Province, supported by the bishop of Kujawy-Kalisz, Stanisław Zdzitowiecki, "illegally" began to record civil documents in Polish as an act of solidarity with the gmina movement; see APL KGP 1565.

46. APL KGP 1566, Częstochowa Chief of Police to the Piotrków Governor, October 11 (24), 1906.
institution, the only available model came in the form recommended by Catholic social teachings in western Europe. This meant, above all, the popularization and realization of the social encyclicals of Leo XIII.

A group of moderate reformers, also drawn primarily from the younger ranks of the Polish clergy, emerged during the revolution to assume such a mission. Predicating their efforts on the support of the episcopate (in contrast to Wysłouch and the Mariavites), these reformers, or “social workers” (społeczni) as they called themselves, sought to use the concessions granted to the church by the tsarist government for the broad implementation of Christian Democracy on Western (particularly French, Belgian, and German) models and experience. Closer to home, they drew practical lessons from the social and political activism of the Catholic clergy in Prussian Poland, who through their involvement in institutions of “organic work” had fully maintained for the church a position of national leadership.47 Grouped around the monthly periodical Wiadomości Pasterskie (Pastoral News) and led by Marian Fulman and Bronisław Marjański among others, the clerical reformers in the Kingdom also favored wide-ranging changes in the curricula of theological seminaries, in the personnel and recruitment policies of the hierarchy, and in the financial practice of “building the material church.”48

To promote their ideas as well as the discussion of national and social issues, the reformers became vocal advocates of frequent conferences of the clergy at all levels. As an intended model, the reformers organized a nationwide congress of the clergy which convened in Warsaw on December 12, 1905. Despite the absence of the episcopate’s expressed approval, the congress was attended by 417 clerics. Here, at least a part of the clergy put itself on public record in support of ambitious political reform, calling for “the widest possible administrative and legislative autonomy [for the Kingdom of Poland], with a separate parliament in Warsaw elected on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage.”49 In the same vein, the congress also backed popular demands for the elimination of capital punishment and a general amnesty for political prisoners. In keeping with the slogan “With the Polish people—the Polish priest,” the congress justified its resolutions with the argument that the obligations of the clergy were not merely pastoral and religious but also those of general citizenship.

47. See Hagen, Germans, Poles, and Jews, pp. 118–158, as well as Richard Blanke, Prussian Poland in the German Empire, 1871–1900 (Boulder, 1981), pp. 22–26, 81.
Above all, the reformers sought to build new organizational bridges to Polish Catholics with the aims of familiarizing the clergy with the living, working, and "religious-moral" conditions of the common people and of improving those conditions through a combination of direct social action and missionary work. The most successful Catholic social initiative of the revolutionary era was the Association of Christian Workers (Stowarzyszenie Robotników Chrześcijańskich—SRCh), founded by Father Marceli Godlewski at the end of 1905. The SRCh fought adult illiteracy, created mutual-assistance funds, provided job-placement service as well as free medical care and legal advice, established savings and loan institutions, and formed cooperatives among its working-class members. To raise the moral-religious level of its membership, the SRCh not only promoted participation in religious processions and traditional Catholic brotherhoods but also organized clubs, theaters, choirs, orchestras, excursions, and other "morally uplifting" activities.50

As a result of the firm belief of Godlewski and other clerical "patrons" of the association that industrial-labor relations should be based on cooperation rather than confrontation, the SRCh refrained from developing a trade union organization. Nevertheless, it did seek to mediate disputes between labor and management while calling upon the state to create courts of arbitration. Such ideas gained currency among a growing number of industrial workers, especially once the strike movement failed to achieve the desired results in 1906 and 1907. Within a couple of years of its founding, the association counted 22,207 members organized in seventy-nine circles, placing it third among workers' organizations behind the PPS and SDKPiL but slightly ahead of the National Workers' Union (NZR) sponsored by the Endecja.51

After 1908, the SRCh experienced a decline (though not nearly as dramatic as that which afflicted the socialist parties) as the euphoria and hopes of the revolutionary years gave way to general disillusionment with all organized activity and a tendency among workers to retreat to the shelter of private lives. In the meantime, other promising social initiatives promoted by the reformers, such as a projected Christian association of farm workers modeled after a similar organization in Prussian Poland, were never realized.52 Indeed, just as their efforts were beginning to bear fruit

50. APW ZOW 667, Statutes of the Association of Christian Workers in Warsaw Province, December 8 (21), 1906.
51. Wójcicki, Chrześcijański ruch robotniczy w Polsce, p. 97.
among the population, the reformers ran into obstacles that proved insurmountable.

Understandably, the Russian government, recalling the role of the church in the January Insurrection of 1863, did not look kindly on Catholic social activity and the clergy’s involvement in mass organizations. It therefore held up the legal registration of the SR Ch until the end of 1906, meanwhile placing many of its “priest-patrons” under the surveillance of the secret police. Godlewski himself was repeatedly harassed in subsequent years, and Fathers Jan Gralewski and Józef Kownacki, both strong proponents of Catholic social work in Warsaw, were confined by order of the Warsaw governor-general to a Carmelite monastery in Płock Province. Marceli Ryniewicz, vicar of Holy Trinity parish in Warsaw, was deprived of the right to teach religion in private schools because of his involvement in a Polish teachers’ union. More frequently, the Russian authorities simply refused to confirm appointments and transfers, as in the case of Piotr Wojtkowski of St. Anthony’s parish in Warsaw when he used a state subsidy to provide food and lodging for the children of political prisoners.53 A more serious blow to the reformers came in January 1906 with the suspension of the progressive Catholic periodical Dzwonek Częstochowski (The Częstochowa Bell) for violation of martial law press codes, which forced its talented editor and eloquent spokesman for social Catholicism, Father Józef Adamczyk, to flee the country.54

Despite state persecution and harassment, the reformers might have persevered had they enjoyed the solid support of the hierarchy. The attitude of the Polish episcopate toward Catholic social action remained, however, ambivalent at best. Bishop Stanisław Zdzitowiecki of Kujawy-Kalisz was the only consequential advocate of reformist causes, exercising his authority to sponsor initiatives such as the publication of Wiadomości Pasterskie, with its pronounced social profile.55 Tomasz Kulinski, bishop of Kielce, sought to familiarize his diocesan clergy with Catholic social teachings and expressed support for society’s “just demands” in pastoral letters before his death in early 1907, but he otherwise wavered in his commitment to the cause of reform, frequently retreating to a position more in line with that of the rest of the episcopate.56 The episcopal majority, for its part, paid

53. APW ZOW 1617, 1629, 1680, 1801, and 1878.
54. APL KGP 1589, Częstochowa Chief of Police to the Piotrków Governor, December 29, 1905 (January 11, 1906).
56. The bishop of Kielce was also a prime mover behind the organization of four-day “social courses” for the clergy, which were held in Warsaw in the summer of 1907; see ADK AK OA-2/9.
lip service to the principles embodied in papal encyclicals while refusing to take the steps necessary to promote their realization beyond the formation of the Commission for Social Work in October 1905. Reform of the seminaries, including the introduction of social studies in their curricula, did not occur until 1908 and then on a much more limited scale than envisioned by the reformers.57 Meanwhile, construction of churches in urban parishes increased only marginally as available funds continued to be channeled into “building the material church.”58 The shortage of personnel in working-class parishes, and particularly of young, energetic priests, remained acute. This prompted Bronisław Marjański to complain bitterly about the episcopate’s indifference to the challenges confronting the church’s mission in factory centers, “which is why they continue to send to such places the usual old, sick, backward, and incompetent parish priests.”59

The episcopate also disapproved of the reformers’ political tendencies, particularly their ties to the National Democrats.60 The assistance of the Endecja in the organization of the Warsaw congress of the clergy in December 1905, for example, was enough to compromise the gathering in the eyes of the episcopate.61 As the hierarchy’s polemical war against the National Democratic ideological postulates and education policies gained momentum in 1906, the reformers found themselves in a most unenviable position. Those reformers who participated in the myriad organizations sponsored by the Endecja were publicly criticized and called upon to resign from whatever functions they held.62 Meanwhile, Wiadomości Pasterskie felt compelled to join, though with considerably less enthusiasm, in the chorus of Catholic press attacks against the nationalist movement.63

Contrary to their expectations, the reformers were also unable to draw effectively on the moral support of the Holy See in their efforts to imple-

57. Wóycicki, Chrześcijański ruch robotniczy w Polsce, pp. 144–145.
60. These ties can be traced to the involvement of several dozen priests in the Collegium Secretum, a circle of clergymen organized under nationalist auspices at the turn of the century, which stressed cooperation with the lay intelligentsia in national, social, and educational work; see Bender, Społeczne inicjatywy, pp. 55–56.
61. E.g., Bishop Wnukowski of Plock scolded reformers for “participating in nationalist meetings well outside their parishes and diocese”; see ADP PWD, Bishop of Plock to the Diocesan Clergy, December 23, 1905.
63. See, e.g., the moderate tone of “Stronnictwo narodowo-demokratyczne a Kościół,” Wiadomości Pasterskie 3, 6 (1907): 377–381.
ment the principles of *Rerum Novarum*. The papacy of Pius X, Leo XIII’s successor, was one of general retrenchment and emphasis on traditional doctrine that effectively blunted the edge of earlier “progressive” encyclicals. In this respect, the reformers were dealt a major blow by the pope’s December 3, 1905, letter to the Polish bishops denouncing “anarchist unions” and “the extreme nationalist party” for pushing the Polish population to “barbaric, criminal activity.” To counteract such behavior among the population, Pius called upon the Polish church to stand for law and order as well as the integrity of the Russian state. Although Pius continued to recommend the clergy’s involvement in “Catholic social action,” his interpretation of extrapastoral social and political activity lacked clear instructions for putting the doctrines of Christian Democracy into practice. The reformers were disappointed to discover that the Vatican itself was still profoundly conservative, especially once Pius made his first pronouncements against social “modernism” in 1910.

Lack of support from their bishops and the Vatican naturally left the reformers vulnerable to an assault from their older and more conservative colleagues. Known variously as “super-Catholics” or “churchmen” (kościelnicy) by their opponents, these conservatives remained generally unimpressed by the “social gospel” of Leo XIII. Grouped around the weekly periodical *Przegląd Katolicki* (Catholic Review), they intended to use the concessions granted by the tsarist government for the pursuit of more traditional goals. They believed, for instance, that the problem of incorporating the Uniates from the eastern provinces should take precedence over the needs of urban parishioners in personnel assignments and financial decisions. To deal with the religious needs of industrial workers, the conservatives preferred to rely on traditional missionary activity carried out by teams of Redemptionist and Franciscan monks brought in from Austrian Poland with the temporary blessing of the Russian government.

Not surprisingly, the conservatives deemed initiatives such as the Association of Christian Workers “too radical.” Instead, they threw their complete support behind the organization of parishioners in an all-embracing Catholic Union which, according to its statutes (and in contrast to the SRCh), was directly subordinate to the authority of the bishops. Designed to merge all existing Catholic organizations, thereby providing the church with a more viable political base in its competition with the modern mass movements, the Catholic Union instead became a tool of the

conservatives in their struggle with the reformers. The Association of Christian Workers indeed became the principal target of attacks by leaders of the Catholic Union, who did not hesitate to accuse Father Godlewski and his collaborators of "modernism." 66

The conservatives also equated the idea of frequent conferences of the clergy with "modernism," while continuing to regard the episcopal chancellory as the only reliable source of knowledge and information. They believed, moreover, that politics should be left entirely in the hands of the episcopate. Political activity of individual clergymen, especially in mass organizations, was considered degrading to the clerical profession. Such positions were naturally very much in line with the opinion of the episcopal majority.

Unfortunately for the reformers, conservative positions were also in line with views held by the majority of the lower clergy. In the spring of 1906 the chancellory of the bishop of Kielce circulated questionnaires among the parish clergy in an attempt to poll clerical opinion in the diocese on some of the key political and social issues confronting the church. Though this experiment was not repeated elsewhere in the Kingdom of Poland, the written responses from both rural and urban areas of Kielce diocese (which included the Dąbrowa Basin industrial region) provide a revealing sample of contemporary clerical attitudes. 67 The following questions, in particular, drew long essay-type responses: How should a chaplain respond to anti-clerical agitation? Should the clergy promote reading among parishioners and of what kinds of literature? Should chaplains participate in secular social, educational, and religious organizations, in recreational associations and sporting clubs, and especially, in political parties? And most important, should involvement in extrapastoral activities require in all cases the prior permission of the bishop?

Significantly, the answers indicate a limited familiarity with the encyclicals of Leo XIII and Catholic social teachings in the West, which are referred to in fewer than 25 percent of the responses studied (though one can imagine what that percentage might have been before the revolution). This minority tended to approve participation in secular organizations as another means of reaching parishioners, particularly the lower classes and youth groups. According to Franciszek Staszkiewicz of Książnica Wielkie parish, such participation was necessary "in order to measure the pulse of

67. The responses were sent to the Consistory of Kielce diocese and are contained in the collection ADK KD OD-2/1. Unfortunately, data on the age and social background of the respondents are not available.
social life and to counteract social ills." Father Józef Zalewski of Suloszowa parish agreed, adding that "in the struggle of life and death for the Faith, a pastor must act among the people, he must go to the people—to the workers, to the poor; he must seek out ways to help them, to make their lives less difficult." Citing Roman Catholic practices in western Europe, one respondent argued that clerical involvement in secular organizations did not require the permission of the bishop, as it was already justified by earlier papal appeals to the clergy.

At the same time, these priests called for the active engagement of the clergy in the fight against illiteracy through the establishment of libraries and reading rooms at the parish level, and they favored clerical involvement in the publication of a diocesan daily newspaper. They also considered that the best way to fight anticlerical propaganda and agitation was through exemplary behavior, modest living, and conscientious performance of pastoral duties, rejecting the use of the pulpit, altar, confessional, and other "holy places" for "counteragitation." Most significantly, although they agreed that the church as an institution should stand above partisan politics, they believed that priests as individuals and citizens should be permitted to exercise their political rights and participate in political parties.

The majority of respondents however, argued that the spiritual mission of the clergy ruled out involvement of its members in partisan politics. According to Stanisław Zamojski of Oleśnica parish, membership in a political party was "beneath the dignity" of a chaplain, who "must be everything for everyone." Father T. Dybowski of Bydlin parish went even further, condemning the involvement of clergymen in politics as "harmful for both the church and the country." General opposition to clerical participation in political activities, however, did not exclude the use of the pulpit to fight the church's real and imagined enemies nor that of the confessional for the "private instruction" of parishioners. "Political agitation in defense of the rights of the church," according to Father Dybowski, "does not contradict the teachings of the church nor the dignity of the clergy."

Most respondents were indifferent to participation in nonpolitical secular organizations and could not see how a priest's involvement in such activities served the aims of the church. Wawrzyniec Nowakowski of Pacanów parish thought the only safe arena for "social activity" of the clergy was the conservative Catholic Union. Others maintained that the clergy had no time at all for activity outside the church. The priority given to traditional pastoral duties was expressed most succinctly by Father M. Wilamowski of Mierzwin parish: "Participation in associations, trade unions, cooperatives, and sporting clubs should be left in the hands of laymen. Let the
chaplain take care of the altar, pulpit, and confessional." Above all, the majority of respondents stressed the absolute necessity of "unity with the bishop," which effectively translated into a willingness to abdicate all initiative—political, social, and religious—to episcopal authority.

In the end, the contest between the reformers and the conservatives in the Polish clergy was unequal, symbolized by the voluntary folding of _Wiadomości Pasterskie_ at the end of 1907 because of general lack of support and interest in its further publication. With the decline of the revolution and the pressures generated by it, the hierarchy backed away from its initial and cautious endorsement of Western-style Catholic social action, thus killing any possibility of introducing the more far-reaching changes in traditional practices called for by the advocates of reform. Conservative retrenchment in the Vatican of Pius X, indeed throughout European Catholicism in the years before World War I, could not but strengthen the hand of Catholic traditionalists in the Kingdom. The subsequent offensive against "modernism" in Poland, designed to silence radical critics like Izydor Wysłouch, was bound to have a sobering effect on the more moderate proponents of change as well. And finally, the general age and social profile of the clergy, coupled with its indifference to anything outside the performance of routine pastoral duties, denied reformers the broad support necessary to overcome the hesitation and tentative policies of the episcopate. In the final analysis, the conservatives' victory over the reformers represented the loss of significant opportunities created by the revolution for the church to expand its mission in neglected areas and to tap an undeniably deep reservoir of popular religiosity. Having survived the crisis of the emergency years of the revolution, the church in Russian Poland was inclined to retreat into its ancient shell and return to its traditional methods of saving souls.