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Abbott, Robert J.

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The Temporary Rules and the debate over police reform that preceded them had focused primarily on the rural police and given short shrift to the cities, to the point of reducing their police staffing and budgets to provide resources for the counties. Believing that rural unrest, not urban violence, was the more pressing threat, the central authorities with few exceptions continued to neglect the cities well after the enactment of the Temporary Rules. St. Petersburg and Moscow, however, were explicitly excluded from the places in which the Temporary Rules were to be in force. Police in both cities would experience important changes in the rest of 1860s. Because of its greater political stature, however, St. Petersburg would be a particular focus of efforts to strengthen the police. Elsewhere, as with the reform of city government, which would be delayed until 1870, reform of the municipal police would languish to the detriment of the towns and cities they served.

More Police versus More Reform

In 1865, with both the judicial and the zemstvo reforms on the books, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Commission for Reform of Provincial and County Institutions had an opportunity—and, in the thinking of some, explicit instructions—to complete police reform. Valuev, as both Minister and Commission Chairman, was doubly responsible for doing so.¹ To

¹ On Valuev’s chairmanship of the Committee, see Garmiza, Podgotovka zemskoi reformy, 167. On his sidelined of the Committee, see Yaney, The Urge to Mobilize, Agrarian Reform in Russia, 1861–1930 (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1982), 12.
assist him he reconvened the Commission’s Police Section under M. N. Pokhvisnev. The former governor of Vil’no Province, a censor, and a school inspector, Pokhvisnev was also Director of the Department of Executive Police, a position to which Valuev had named him in 1863 following a disagreement with D. N. Tolstoi. Pokhvisnev was known primarily as a bibliophile and collector of historical documents, not as a reformer. Nonetheless, under his guidance the Commission prepared a proposal for a comprehensive statute that would reform the police along the lines proposed by Solov’ev and Nikolai Miliutin. Just as under these early reformers, it focused primarily on police in the countryside.

Valuev’s treatment of Pokhvisnev’s proposal would set a pattern that would persist for the remainder of the 1860s. Rather than seeking his fellow ministers’ approval, he left it aside and concentrated on a second proposal—for a mounted police guard—that he had also instructed Pokhvisnev to prepare. In October 1861, Valuev had described a mounted guard as a needed complement to the Statute on the County Police. In 1865, in contrast, he treated it as an alternative approach. This shift most likely reflected his belief that the zemstvo and judicial reforms had gone too far. When the zemstvo reform was being prepared, Valuev had unsuccessfully tried to narrow the scope of the new institutions’ authority and the transfer of duties from police to zemstvo. Valuev also had opposed the creation of elected justices of the peace and tried to restore some police powers transferred to the investigating magistrates. In 1865, delaying legislation that would formalize the police’s loss of authority offered Valuev a backdoor route to restricting the new institutions and achieving his earlier goals.

Pokhvisnev’s proposal called for the creation of a 6,632-man mounted force—about 1,000 more what Valuev had suggested a few years before. Units of 17 men apiece were to be introduced at the district level in 36 of the

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2 *Russkii biograficheskii slovar’,* s.v. “Pokhvisnev, Mikhail Nikolaeovich, 1811–1882” and “Tolstoi, Dmitrii Nikolaeovich, 1806–1884.” Tolstoi’s biography was published in 1991 in a volume on individuals with surnames beginning with V and T, which were unpublished when the original series was discontinued in 1918. For Tolstoi’s account of his dismissal, see “Zapiski Tolstogo,” 55–56.
4 Pearson, *Russian Officialdom in Crisis,* 142–44.
46 provinces in which the Temporary Rules were in force.⁶ The commands would consist entirely of military transfers. They would report to the district police inspectors; and supplement rather than replace the village wardens, who were themselves to receive government salaries. The estimated annual cost of the new units at full strength was 2,000,000 rubles. The units were to be phased in gradually with only 200,000 rubles to be spent in the first year.⁷

As in the immediate aftermath of his appointment as Minister, Valuev was proposing something that most conservative gentry would probably have endorsed. With landlords no longer policing the peasants, the gentry-dominated zemstvo assemblies, which convened for the first time in 1865, often voiced concern over the threat from crime in the countryside. More than simply talking about the problem, county assemblies in Moscow, Petersburg, Poltava, Pskov, Smolensk, and other provinces petitioned the government to strengthen the rural police in ways that ranged from providing salaries to the peasant wardens to the hiring of guards and auxiliary police. Many zemstvos offered to cover from one-third to all of the costs. The Minister of Internal Affairs cited these requests to support its proposals for a mounted police guard.⁸ Out of what was probably a mixture of preference for his own proposals and fear of creating a zemstvo-controlled police, however, Valuev agreed to none of them.

In August 1866, Valuev submitted his plan to the State Council,⁹ where Minister of War, Dmitrii Miliutin, and Michael Reutern, the Minister of Finance, opposed it. Both were formidable opponents. Invaluable to Alexander II for their expertise, they were to be among the longest lasting of his ministers. Reutern was to serve for 16 years (1862–1878). He owed his position to his knowledge of state finance and the patronage of the Tsar’s brother Konstantin Nikolaevich. According to Yanni Kotsonis, he also benefited from a belief that as a Protestant he could be counted on to be frugal and trustworthy.¹⁰ Reutern was a rival of the Minister of Internal Affairs;

⁶ In 1863, Bessarabia Oblast had been added to the 44 provinces originally covered by the Temporary Rules. In 1865, Ufa Province would be spun off from Orenburg Province, bringing the number of covered provinces to 46. MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 3, 157.
⁸ MSVUK: OA, part 1, sect. 10 (1871): 92.
Chapter 3

Valuev in his diary accused him of aspiring to be prime minister.\(^{11}\) Although not known as a reformer, Reutern had priorities—restoring the ruble and railroad development—that disinclined him to support most of requests for spending increases.\(^{12}\)

Dmitrii Miliutin, Nikolai’s brother would serve for 20 years (1861–1881) and be Imperial Russia’s last Field Marshal. A brilliant military strategist, he was later the driving force behind the major reform of the Russian military that would include the introduction of universal male military service.\(^{13}\) Like Reutern, he had a reputation for favoring cost-effective policies.\(^{14}\) At the same time he frequently complained in his diary and elsewhere about Reutern’s tight-fistedness with regard to military requirements.\(^{15}\) Valuev described him in his diary as a “bigger red” than his brother Nikolai.\(^{16}\)

Both ministers criticized the Valuev plan as too costly. Miliutin, who was working to reduce the size of the peacetime armed forces, argued that a smaller military could not afford to transfer so many men to the police.\(^{17}\) Reutern simply maintained that the government could not afford the required expense.\(^{18}\) Valuev was able to counter Miliutin by proposing that the commands rely on hired volunteers instead of military transfers.\(^{19}\) He was, however, unable to counter Reutern who rejected his successive suggestions to allocate the funds from local taxes and then from the Treasury.\(^{20}\) In an effort to salvage the plan Valuev indicated he would not oppose creating a scaled-down version. In response, in January 1867 the State Council suggested he identify places in which to test the effectiveness of the proposed mounted patrols. Valuev recommended counties

\(^{11}\) Valuev, Dnevnik, I:153.
\(^{13}\) Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin, 66.
\(^{14}\) Miller, Dmitrii Miliutin, 66.
\(^{16}\) Valuev, Dnevnik, I: 61.
\(^{17}\) RGIA, fond 1162, opis’ XVI, delo 1, 8.
\(^{18}\) MSVUK: OA, part 1, sect. 9 (1870): 7.
\(^{19}\) RGIA, fond 1162, opis’ XVI, delo 1, 8.
\(^{20}\) MSVUK: OA, part 1, sect. 9, 14–15.
in Courland, Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Nizhegorod provinces where banditry was particularly severe, but Reutern again balked at the level and source of funding proposed. Discussion dragged on into 1868 when the Ministry of Internal Affairs requested money to cover the transfer of the state peasants to its supervision following their emancipation two years before. This request would result in the creation of 90 districts in addition to the 34 established in the aftermath of the Temporary Rules. By this time Valuev had been forced to resign because of his perceived mishandling of relief operations after a major harvest failure. His proposal for a mounted rural police guard was also rejected once again, but completion of the police reform prepared by Nikolai Miliutin and Solov’ev remained stalled as well.

Expansion in St. Petersburg

Minister of Internal Affairs Valuev, a champion of expanding in the police in the countryside, was to play a similar role with for the St. Petersburg police. Valuev had given an inkling of his plans for St. Petersburg as early as February 1862 when he successfully requested funding for an additional 200 guardsmen for the capital. In June, he obtained a credit amounting to about 40 percent of the capital police’s annual budget to allow the hiring of another 950 guardsmen. This increase was described as only “temporary.” Director of Executive Police Dmitrii N. Tolstoi maintained, however, that Valuev was exploiting the public’s concern over suspicious fires that had destroyed the offices of his Ministry in the spring of 1862 to advance his long-term goals. When the initial credit had been expended, Valuev urged the State Council to extend another 100,000 rubles to St. Petersburg and 65,000 rubles for Moscow. The Moscow funds were not to be “tem-

21 2nd PSZ, 43 (1868): no. 45996; Anuchin, Istoricheskii obzor razvitia administrativno-politseiskikh uchrezhdenii v Rossii, 157–58.
22 Tatishchev, Imperator Aleksandr II, 2: 26–27.
23 MSVUK: OA, part 1, sect. 9, 1, 3, 7–8.
24 Izhelechenie iz otcheta Ministra vntrennikh del za 1861, 1862, i 1863 gg. (St. Petersburg: Tipografija Ministstva vntrennikh del, 1865), 70–73.
porary.” Rather the city authorities were instructed to subsequently cover them from regular revenues.\textsuperscript{26}

Increasing the number of police in the two capitals need not have marked a break with the reformist policies of Solov’ev and Nikolai Miliutin. If anything, it might have been seen as criticism of former Police Commissioner Peter Shuvalov, a favorite of the Tsar’s, who had reduced the number of guards by one-third a few years earlier\textsuperscript{27} In October 1863, however, Valuev proposed a huge increase in the strength of St. Petersburg’s police and a reorganization plan that marked a clear departure from the Miliutin-Solov’ev’ approach. His proposal called for the creation of a 2,374-man police guard plus a reserve force of 150 and a 300-person auxiliary command. If approved, these increases would roughly double the size of the current guard force and the current budget. Equally if not more important, the proposal called for dividing the police into separate functional branches. One would work to prevent and suppress crime and protect public order. The other would adjudicate petty criminal and civil cases, which were scheduled to be handled by the justices of the peace in the then-upcoming judicial reform.\textsuperscript{28}

In November Valuev submitted his proposal to the Director of the Second Section, which was responsible for the codification of Russian law, the Minister of Justice, the Chief of Gendarmes, and the Governor-General of St. Petersburg.\textsuperscript{29} The replies of these officials—all of whom had a stake in the proposal—are not available. According to Valuev’s account, however, the proposal was defeated because of its perceived inconsistency with the pending judicial reforms.\textsuperscript{30} Given the nature of the proposal and the policy record of two key reviewers this explanation is plausible. Leaving judicial authority in the hands of the police would have flown in the face of the transfer promised in the Temporary Rules. In addition, M. A. Korf of the Second Section and D. N. Zamiatnin, the Minister of Justice. Korf had opposed Valuev’s efforts to limit the competence of the zemstvos.\textsuperscript{31} Zamiatnin also had been

\textsuperscript{26} Izvlechenie iz otcheta Ministra vnukrennikh del, 70.
\textsuperscript{27} Vysotskii and Frish, S-Peterburgskaia stolichnaiia politiia i gradonachal’stvo, 176.
\textsuperscript{28} Izvlechenie iz otcheta Ministra vnukrennikh del, 72–73; and “Po povodu predpolaegaemogo preobrazovaniia gorodskoi politii v S-Peterburge,” Severnaia pochta, December 24, 1863, 1149.
\textsuperscript{29} Izvlechenie iz otcheta Ministra vnukrennikh del, 73.
\textsuperscript{30} Izvlechenie iz otcheta Ministra vnukrennikh del, 73–74.
\textsuperscript{31} Pearson, Russian Officialdom in Crisis, 47–48.
campaigning to separate the police from the soon-to-be established new courts. Also, according to Thomas Pearson, he was one of three Ministers—Dmitrii Miliutin and Reutern were the others—who consistently opposed Valuev’s policies on local government.32

Rather than putting a halt to police reform in the capital, the rejection of Valuev’s 1863 proposal paved the way for a larger reform that would eventually have a momentous impact on St. Petersburg’s police. St. Petersburg, as a city and one with an elected government of sorts, was little affected by the zemstvo legislation.33 It was, however, to prove a key venue for the 1864 judicial reforms. The 1860 law on investigating magistrates already had marked a major step toward separating the police from the administration of justice in the capital and elsewhere in Russia. Initially distrusted as clones of the police, the magistrates soon won reputations for integrity and skill. Their improved image was reflected in their portrayal in novels and the press.34 Dostoevsky’s Porfiry Petrovich, Raskolnikov’s nemesis in Crime and Punishment, for example, had an intelligence and commitment to justice that set him apart from the buffoonish, corrupt, and tyrannous police that were stock figures in earlier Russian literature. He eventually would inspire non-Russian authors of detective fiction. Chesterton’s hero Father Brown and Agatha Christie’s Hercule Poirot both were modeled partly after Porfiry Petrovich.35

The creation of elected justices of the peace responsible for petty civil and criminal matters once handled by the police was another element of the judicial reforms that would have a major impact on St. Petersburg.36 Valuev had opposed the legislation establishing the new justices.37 He also had tried to restore some police powers transferred to the investigating magistrates.38 The 1864 judicial statutes, however, took away the police’s power to pass sentence

32 Pearson, Russian Officialdom in Crisis, 41–42.
on petty criminals, passport violators, and excise evaders. They also reduced their involvement in civil suits. Landmarks in the history of Russian justice, these laws also freed the police from time-consuming tasks and removed major opportunities for bribery. More important, they challenged the police to do their business in ways that they and their masters would often find uncomfortable. Rather than being themselves the law, the police were to be subject to it as the well-ordered police state gave way—however haltingly—to a system of rule by law.

**Karakozov and Treпов**

By 1866 when the justice of the peace courts opened in St. Petersburg, the capital’s police were facing problems that overshadowed their relationship with the justices. On April 4, the revolutionary Karakozov attempted to assassinate Alexander II as the Tsar was leaving the Summer Garden. In response, the current Police Commissioner was removed from office and Gen. F. F. Trepov, was named to replace him. In May a decree eliminated the position of St. Petersburg Governor-General and placed Trepov directly under the Minister of Internal Affairs on regular police issues and under the Third Section’s Chief on internal security. In October a reorganization of the St. Petersburg police was announced.

Trepov, who would serve until 1878, was a different type of police commissioner. His recent predecessors, while forced to resign for perceived police failures, had been well connected politically and familiar to St. Petersburg society. Alexander Patkul, Commissioner from 1860 to 1862, who gave up his position following the suspicious fires and student demonstrations of 1862, was a childhood friend of the Tsar’s. Ivan Annenkov, Commissioner from 1862 to 1866, was an officer in the elite Imperial Guards. One of his brothers was a city governor. Another was a famous literary critic. Despite such connections, he could not survive

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39 On Karakozov, his background, and associates, see Venturi, *Roots of Revolution*, 331–53.
40 Kornilov, *Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie pri Aleksandre II* (Moscow; A. I. Mamontov, 1909), 175–78.
41 2nd PSZ, 41 (1866): no. 43162.
42 2nd PSZ, 46 (1871) addendum to vol. 41 (1866): no. 43691a.
43 *Russkii biograficheskii slovar*, s. v. "Patkul", Aleksandr Vladimirovich (1817–1877)."
the police’s failure to have detained Karakozov, who had posted a manifesto announcing his intention to kill the Tsar weeks before his attempted assassination.\textsuperscript{45} Trepov, in contrast, was an outsider with a murky background. Reputedly the illegitimate son of a German nobleman, he was so little known in St. Petersburg society that some attributed his appointment to a dark secret.\textsuperscript{46} A probably more accurate explanation was his reputation for ruthlessness. As a young cavalry officer, Trepov had participated in the suppression of the November Uprising of 1830 in Poland. Later, in 1860 and 1861, he had served as police commissioner in Warsaw. His harsh treatment of the populace—he reportedly ordered the police to shoot into a group of unarmed demonstrators—led to his removal. After the Polish uprising of 1863, however, the tsarist government recalled him to help restore Russian rule and placed him in charge of all the police there. In November 1864, he survived an assassination attempt that would prove to be only the first of several. Ultimately his name would be linked inseparably to that of the revolutionary, Vera Zasulich, who wounded him with a gunshot in 1878 in reprisal for his order to flog a prisoner and was found not guilty of the charge.\textsuperscript{47} Throughout his tenure in St. Petersburg the press would criticize him for disregarding the wishes of the city council and imposing heavy taxes to maintain the police. But the press would also acknowledge—\textit{grudgingly}—the positive impact of some of his actions on security in the capital.\textsuperscript{48}

The reorganization announced in late 1866 for implementation the following year was more an effort to introduce the best features of contemporary foreign—particularly English—police forces than to expand their numbers and power or follow the strategy of Saltykov, Solov’ev, and Miliutin. England’s police were attractive to Trepov, not because of their purported respect for civil liberties but for their reputed effectiveness, particularly

\begin{itemize}
\item Struve, Thomas Erkman (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 8: 4.
\item Venturi, \textit{Roots of Revolution}, 344.
\item According to Ana Siljak—in \textit{Angel of Vengeance: The Girl Assassin, the Governor of St. Petersburg, and Russia’s Revolutionary World} (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2008), 119—some believed Trepov to be Alexander II’s illegitimate half-brother.
\item For more on Trepov, see \textit{Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’} (Granat), s. v. “Trepovy.” Ana Siljak, \textit{Angel of Vengeance}, 110, 110, 218, and Venturi, \textit{Roots of Revolution}, 596–97, 605.
\item See, for example, \textit{Vestnik Evropy}, Apr. 1868, 824–42; June 1869, 872–81; and Sept. 1871, 404; and \textit{Otechestvenye zapiski} 17(1867): 186–89.
\end{itemize}
against crime. To use a term favored by the late Cyril Black that has fallen out of use by historians, Trepov’s emulation of London’s police was a modernization program.\textsuperscript{49} It streamlined the police’s organization and reorganized and re-staffed them. It also increased police salaries and established—for the first time—a training academy and a detective division. The changes in police structure (see Figure 3), while hardly exciting, were overdue for a force that was organized roughly as it had been in the eighteenth century and had become less and less manageable as the population had grown. In place of the 12 districts and 52 wards, it established 18 precincts commanded by inspectors. The precinct inspectors, who were to communicate directly with the central police command, were to be drawn from the most capable of the district and ward commanders.\textsuperscript{50}

Trepov’s reorganization left the size of the police guard roughly unchanged but involved a major effort to improve its command and control and the qualifications of its personnel. It also entailed cosmetic changes such as replacing the name guards with policemen. As had been true of the guards, however, the new policemen and their counterparts in other cities, were a stationary force, that is, they did not walk beats but waited for citizens to bring complaints to them.\textsuperscript{51} The 1,350 policemen were distributed among 705 police posts and the major markets and rail stations. The posts were to be staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week by officers in three rotating shifts, with 96 two-person teams of police sergeants each responsible for several posts. Six other sergeants oversaw the markets and rail stations.\textsuperscript{52} An order of December 13, 1866 instructed Trepov to review the qualifications of the existing guardsmen, retain only the most capable, and hire qualified replacements for those dismissed. To help accomplish this, the police budget was to be greatly increased (also in Table 9), albeit not to the level of Valuev’s 1863 request.

In his report for 1867, General Trepov claimed to have dismissed—or sent back to the military—about half of the guardsmen and replaced them with

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{50} Vysotskii and Frish, \textit{S-Peterburgskaia stolichnaia politiia i gradonachal’stvo}, 177–79.
\item \textsuperscript{51} Thurston, “Police and People in Moscow, 1906–1914,” 326.
\item \textsuperscript{52} Vysotskii and Frish, \textit{S-Peterburgskaia stolichnaia politiia i gradonachal’stvo}, 197.
\end{itemize}
He also reported that the new recruits had to begin their service in a reserve division and receive training in police procedures, relations with the judiciary, and the geography and population of the capital. Trepov described this training as based on London’s, which he praised as a model. Like his liberal contemporaries, he may have exaggerated the London police’s virtues. According to police historian Haia Shpayer-Makov, the London police provided only brief and rudimentary initial instruction.

Sources: Derived from description in Vysotskii and Frish, *S-Peterburgskaiia stolichnaia politsiia i gradonachal’stvo*, 177-81 and 2nd PSZ, 42(1867):no. 44772, shtaty i tabeli.
to recruits and relied primarily on on-the-job training. Trepov probably also exaggerated the potential of the reserve division to train police recruits. According to his first annual report, to qualify for the regular force, reservists had to demonstrate skills that varied with their rank. Sergeants had to be proficient in writing, arithmetic, and the history and geography of Russia. Policemen had to be able to read printed and handwritten documents and do simple arithmetic. To judge from contemporary accounts, such skills were in short supply even in the upper ranks of the force. Trepov, however, was silent on how, if at all, the force trained police inspectors and above. In London at the time, all but two or three officers at the top of the system were promoted from the ranks of sergeants and policemen.

Table 9: Selected Statistics on the St. Petersburg Police, 1863–1867

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spending (rubles)</th>
<th>Manpower</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Authorized for 1863</td>
<td>514,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Requested by Valuev in 1863</td>
<td>1,030,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized for 1867</td>
<td>907,439</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Izvlechenie iz otcheta ministra vnutrennikh del, 71–73; Vsepoddanneishii otchet . . . za 1867 god, 141; and 2nd PSZ, 42 (1867): no. 44772, shhtat i tabeli.

*Includes 1,350 policemen and 192 sergeants.

In yet another instance of emulating foreign practice, the edict established a detective division. Reminiscent of both France’s Sûreté and even more so, London’s Scotland Yard, the division was to prove a popular element—at least with the educated classes—in an unpopular police force. Despite another change in uniforms—this one to make them appear more mod-

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56 Vsepoddanneishii otchet za 1867, 153.
58 Vsepoddanneishii otchet . . . za 1867 god, 16; and Vyostikii and Frish, S-Peterburgskaia stolichnaia politsiia i gradonachal’stvo, 195.
ern (see Figure 4)—the capital’s policemen were prosaic, familiar figures.60

The plainclothes detectives, in contrast, had a sinister glamor, because of their role in identifying the perpetrators of grisly crimes that fascinated the public in those early years of the popular press. Their most exciting operations were regular features of Trepov’s annual reports and were often well received.61 Their first chief, Ivan Putilin, became famous for locating the perpetrator of a bloody quadruple murder in June 1867. Adept at self-promotion, he later wrote a book depicting himself as Russia’s Sherlock Holmes.62

A separate law issued in July established police to patrol the capital’s rivers, canals, and offshore waters.63 Trepov may have been inspired by the example of the Thames River Police. Thanks largely to its success against crime on London’s waters and docks, this force, created in 1800, survived the elimination of many of the elements of the pre-1829 police and eventually became a division of the Metropolitan Force.64 St. Petersburg’s river police was headed by an officer assigned by the Naval Minister in consultation with the Police Commissioner. Staffed by 150 seamen and 20 non-commissioned officers, they had duties that went beyond the struggle against crime. These included rescuing people and boats in distress, certifying the safety of ferries and other passenger ships, and fighting waterborne fires. The decree establishing the new unit authorized the acquisition of two steam-powered fire boats and several small river craft. The nature of their duties and the special qualifications they required tended to win the river police greater public respect than most of their compatriots. In a single year that St. Petersburg’s official history implied to be typical, they reportedly responded to 9 fires, 15 instances of ships piling into bridges, 7 ship collisions, and 25 sinkings of cargo vessels. They also res-

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60 There would be additional changes to the uniforms in 1867; 2nd PSZ, 42 (1867): no. 443330, shtaty i tabeli.
61 See, for example, the discussions in Otechestvennye zapiski 173 (1867): 189 and Vestnik Evropy (Jun. 1869): 1877–78.
63 2nd PSZ, 42 (1867): no. 44774.
Figure 4: St. Petersburg Policemen, 1866

Source: 2nd PSZ, 41 (1866): no. 43321, chertezi i risunki

cued 116 people from drowning, recovered 83 dead bodies from the rivers and canals, and saved the cargo from 13 of the 25 sinking ships.65

65 Vysotskii and Frish, S-Peterburgskaia stolichnaia politsiia i gradonachal`stvo, 203–04.
The press’s reaction to Trepov’s changes to the St. Petersburg police was an interesting mixture of praise and calls for more reform. The latter may have reflected opportunism on the part of reformers. In post-Karakozov Russia, when the government was cracking down on assertive zemstvos and closing journals, critics of the regime may have seen police reform as a safe issue to discuss and means of discreetly broaching sensitive political issues. Shortly after the reorganization of the capital’s police, for example, Notes of the Fatherland praised the new detective division, the training program, and General Trepov’s efforts to replace military detailees with hired policemen. Trepov had identified these as key elements of his program. But while Trepov had billed the last of these elements as a move to improve police qualifications, the anonymous author described it as a move toward a civilian police force. He also reminded readers that by law all the capital’s police “not excluding the Police Commissioner” held civilian positions. While accurate, this statement bordered on criticism of the decades-old reliance on military officers and of Trepov himself.

The Herald of Europe addressed police issues in bolder fashion. In April 1868, a long article “Judicial Review: Court and Police” discussed the English police model, St. Petersburg’s progress in replicating it, and how far it still had to go. The author maintained that in the previous three years the judicial reforms had greatly reduced the police’s duties unrelated to the prevention and suppression of crime and had made them more effective. Still, he argued, the police had too many duties that were “absolutely not police business.” He urged the authorities to continue to follow the English model, which, he maintained, would enable the police to do more with less. This final point echoed arguments English critics of the new police had made—with positive results for the police. An English legal scholar has noted that calls for reducing police spending did much to shape the London police’s focus on the struggle with crime.

66 In May 1867, the government dissolved the St. Petersburg provincial zemstvo and arrested its president for petitioning it to summon zemstvo representatives from throughout Russia to consult on the economy; in June it enacted a law making the presidents of all zemstvo assemblies and boards legally accountable or zemstvo actions during their tenure. Veselovskii, Istoriia zemstva za sorok let, 3: 119–28.
67 Otechestvennye zapiski, 173 (1867): 186–89.
68 On the journal’s political line, see Ocherki po istorii russkoi zhurnalistiki i kritiki, 2: 368–69.
69 “Obozrenie sudебное: Суд и полиция,” Vestnik Evropy, April (1868), 82.4–42.
In 1869 the journal again compared the capital’s police with their English counterparts. After pointing out that the English police were not as popular—particularly with the lower classes—as their champions claimed, the author maintained that St. Petersburg’s were less popular still. He attributed this to the lack of community control over the police and to the sometimes-excessive cost of maintaining them. To illustrate this, he cited Trepov’s failure to persuade St. Petersburg’s city duma to contribute to an increase in the police budget in 1866. According to the anonymous author, the duma recognized the police’s need for higher salaries, but still rejected Trepov’s request. His explanation was that the duma’s perception of its police needs differed from Trepov’s and that achieving a consensus would require more community control of police spending. In 1867 about 80 percent of the capital police’s budget came from St. Petersburg’s taxes. The central government’s share may have increased in the next few years, but if so, it did only slightly.

The duma’s rejection of Trepov’s bid for more funds was a fascinating and rare example of a local government—albeit the Empire’s most powerful one—effectively resisting the central authorities during the post-Kara-kozov crackdown. It was not, however, the only example of successful resistance to Trepov’s plans for the police. Rather, it was matched by bureaucratic resistance to another police plan: the extension of the capital police’s authority to the suburbs. As Reginald Zelnik explained in his classic study of St. Petersburg workers, much of the capital area’s industrial work force was employed in factories surrounding, not within, the city. There they were policed not by Trepov’s force but by the St. Petersburg county police who reported to the Ministry of Internal Affairs through the provincial governor. Like Trepov, Nikolai Levashev, the Governor in the late 1860s, perceived the industrial suburbs as likely breeding grounds for unrest. Still,
while eager for more support for the suburban police, he also sought to preserve his authority over them. In 1868, the State Council agreed with him and rejected a proposal to merge the metropolitan and suburban police.  

**THE NEGLECTED CITY POLICE**

While discussing Valuev's proposals for St. Petersburg and enacting the Trepov-era changes, the tsarist authorities paid much less attention to the police in other cities. Such neglect worsened key municipal police problems that the Temporary Rules had not addressed. At the end of the 1850s spending on the police in Russia's 461 cities and towns was roughly one million rubles with another quarter million in city funds spent on the municipal guard. In 1860, the Commission on Provincial and County Institutions had proposed reducing total spending on the city police by eliminating the positions of hundreds of police chiefs in all but 69 cities and towns and placing the rest under the county sheriffs. In a proposed update to the 1853 Statute on the Municipal Guard, it also had proposed reducing the number guardsmen by about one-sixth while providing an infusion of central government funds that would double total spending on their salaries (Table 10). In addition, it included a pledge to assist the cities with the costs of transitioning to a salaried patrol force. Thereafter, the Ministry of Internal Affairs would set floors and ceilings on spending for the municipal patrols but would allow city governments to participate in deciding specific expenditures.

The Temporary Rules incorporated the Commission's suggestions for spending on the cities and towns that retained separate police forces and for those merged with the county police. No new statute on the municipal guard was enacted, however, and it is unclear what was decided on the number of guardsmen or the level of spending on them. Documents pertaining to 1865 and 1866 published by the Commission on Provincial and County Institutions suggest, however, that both numbers and spending continued to rise after 1860.

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75 Zelnik, Labor and Society, 265–66.
76 MSV/UK: OP, part 1, sect. 2, 391.
77 MSV/UK: OP, part 1, sect. 2, 150, 188.
78 MSV/UK: OP, part 1 sect. 3 (1870): 238, 345–45.
Table 10: Actual or Proposed Spending and Staffing for the Municipal Police

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Spending on Municipal Police</th>
<th>Number of Municipal Guardsmen</th>
<th>Spending on Municipal Guardsmen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1857/1858</td>
<td>970,409 rubles</td>
<td>7,014</td>
<td>251,986 rubles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>887,100 rubles (proposed)</td>
<td>5,847 (proposed)</td>
<td>512,172 rubles (proposed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1863</td>
<td>887,100–991,098 rubles*</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The Temporary Rules included specific figures on spending for the county police but not for the city police. The figure of 991,098 rubles is calculated by subtracting spending for the county police from reported total spending and may include miscellaneous spending for police such as the mounted guards maintained in some provinces.

Sources: Figures for 1858 are from MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 2), appendix, “Vedomost’ o raskhodakh gorodskoi politsii v 44 guberniakh,” 122–23; those for 1860 are from MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 2, 11, 72, 187, 262, and 321. Figures for 1863 are from 2nd PSZ, 37 (1862), no. 39087, art. 4 and shtraty i tabeli.

Limiting the number of cities with separate police forces to 69 was designed to allow the channeling of more municipal police spending to places perceived to have the greatest needs. To this end, the decree on implementation of the Temporary Rules gave the favored cities about half of all the funds provided for police in Russia’s 461 cities and towns. The 69 jurisdictions included Odessa, Taganrog, and Kerch, which had province-like status because of their military strategic importance as ports; 42 provincial capitals; 19 county capitals of economic importance; and five smaller towns and villages. These were Bakhchisaray and Karasu-Bazar in the territory of the Crimean Tatars, Radzivilov in the formerly Polish Volhynia Province; Dubovka in remote Saratov Province; and Sergiev Posad, home of one of Russia’s oldest monasteries and a favorite destination of Russian Orthodox pilgrims. The selection criteria that yielded such a mixed lot of cities, towns, and villages were precise in some cases and vague in others. Cities with populations of over

79 The edict on the Temporary Rules (2nd PSZ, 37: no. 39087, shtraty i tabeli) allocated 4,147,998 rubles to the police and specified that 1,256,900 would go to the rural police, leaving a residual of 991,098 rubles for all the urban police. According to MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 2, 11, 490,040 rubles—was to go to the 69 cities and towns with separate police forces.

80 2nd PSZ, 37 (1862): no. 39087, shtraty i tabeli.
15,000 and provincial capitals, for example, were all supposed to be chosen. Others, however, could qualify on the basis of “other conditions.”

In the few months before the issuance of the Temporary Rules the question of funding had become a potential stumbling block. In response, in September 1862 Valuev had agreed to Ministry of Finance’s request to exclude the salaries of elected police assessors from the police budget and increase city police spending gradually to limit the impact on central government funds. He also pledged to identify cities that could eventually bear all or part of the cost of increased police protection. This was to prove a difficult task for reasons Tables 11 and 12 try to explain. Table 11, which is based on official statistics for 1857 (the only year for which I could locate the needed data), lists the population and revenues of the most and least populous cities scheduled to have separate police forces under the Temporary Rules of December 1862. These statistics allow calculation of the per capita revenue for each of the cities—a rough indicator of the relative ability of each city to contribute to the support of the police. The results indicate that while some of the largest cities, presumably the most in need of large police forces, were among the best off in per capita revenue, more than half of these cities were less well off than some of Russia’s smallest cities. Odessa, a thriving port and the largest city covered by the Temporary Rules, stood at the top of the list in terms of per capita revenue. It was followed—although not too closely—by Nizhnii Novgorod, which hosted a large annual fair that accounted for as much as half of all Russian exports of commercial goods. Kiev, another city with a large population, also ranked among those with the largest per capita revenue. On the other hand, Tula and Kursk, two other of the largest cities, ranked at the bottom in such terms. Table 12 presents police spending, including spending for the municipal guard, as a share of city revenues—a rough measure of the burden of such spending on the city. Data for Odessa were unavailable, but those for Nizhnii Novgorod suggest it had the least difficulty supporting the police and the most room in its budget for non-police programs. Tula, Kursk, and Vil’no, on the other hand, had to devote more of their resources to the police than any other city.

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81 MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 2, 10.
82 MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 2, 10.
### Table 11: Population and Revenue for Largest and Smallest Cities in 1858

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Revenues (rubles)</th>
<th>Per Capita Revenue (rubles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Most Populous</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odessa*</td>
<td>101,320</td>
<td>1,101,965</td>
<td>10.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>62,497</td>
<td>233,925</td>
<td>3.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saratov</td>
<td>61,680</td>
<td>118,239</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazan</td>
<td>56,257</td>
<td>136,120</td>
<td>2.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tula</td>
<td>50,641</td>
<td>57,920</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vil’no</td>
<td>45,881</td>
<td>68,911</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kursk</td>
<td>40,771</td>
<td>42,005</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voronezh</td>
<td>37,665</td>
<td>52,862</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orel</td>
<td>35,863</td>
<td>49,897</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nizhnii Novgorod</td>
<td>35,683</td>
<td>201,736</td>
<td>5.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Least Populous</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kostroma</td>
<td>14,834</td>
<td>27,753</td>
<td>1.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vologda</td>
<td>14,159</td>
<td>25,965</td>
<td>1.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekaterinoslav</td>
<td>13,031</td>
<td>18,324</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novgorod</td>
<td>12,758</td>
<td>29,089</td>
<td>2.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladimir</td>
<td>12,608</td>
<td>18,295</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrozavodsk</td>
<td>10,144</td>
<td>15,465</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perm</td>
<td>9,484</td>
<td>25,254</td>
<td>2.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smolensk</td>
<td>9,187</td>
<td>20,142</td>
<td>2.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerch*</td>
<td>6,787</td>
<td>20,624</td>
<td>3.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernigov</td>
<td>4,279</td>
<td>20,528</td>
<td>4.80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Cities with status of provinces.

Sources: “Vedomost’ o sostoyanii denezhikh sredstv gorodov v koikh predpolagaetsia osobaia politsii za 1857 godu” and “Sravnitel’naiiaa vedomost’ o sostave i soderzhanii gorodskikh politseiskikh komand,” *Trudy komissii o gubernskikh i uezdnykh uchrezhdeniakh* (St. Petersburg: Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del, 1860), part 1, book 4.
Table 12: Police Spending as a Share of City Revenue in 1858

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Revenues</th>
<th>Police Spending, incl. for municipal guard</th>
<th>Police Spending as a % of revenue</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Most Populous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odessa</td>
<td>1,101,965</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>233,925</td>
<td>40,280</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saratov</td>
<td>118,239</td>
<td>17,356</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazan</td>
<td>136,120</td>
<td>11,927</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tula</td>
<td>57,920</td>
<td>19,083</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vil’no</td>
<td>68,911</td>
<td>19,520</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kursk</td>
<td>42,005</td>
<td>14,435</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voronezh</td>
<td>52,862</td>
<td>9,791</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orel</td>
<td>49,897</td>
<td>10,367</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nizhnii Novgorod</td>
<td>201,736</td>
<td>13,676</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Least Populous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kostroma</td>
<td>27,753</td>
<td>6,595</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vologda</td>
<td>25,965</td>
<td>6,371</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekaterinoslav</td>
<td>18,324</td>
<td>4,617</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novgorod</td>
<td>29,089</td>
<td>6,238</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladimir</td>
<td>18,295</td>
<td>2,086</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrozavodsk</td>
<td>15,465</td>
<td>4,160</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perm</td>
<td>25,254</td>
<td>3,594</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smolensk</td>
<td>20,142</td>
<td>3,534</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kerch*</td>
<td>20,624</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernigov</td>
<td>20,528</td>
<td>5,257</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Cities with province-like status.

Sources: “Vedomost’ o sostoianii denezhikh sredstv gorodov v koikh predpolagaetsia osobaia politsii za 1857 godu” Trudy komissii o gubernskikh i uezdnykh uchrezhdeniakh (St. Petersburg: Ministerstvo vnutrennikh del, 1860), part 1, book 4; and MSVUK OP: part 1, sect. 2, appendix, “Vedomost’ o raskhodakh gorodskoi politsii v 44 guberniakh.”

The crude measures in these tables, it should be noted, reflect only relative ability to pay for police, and say nothing about the absolute levels of expendi-
tures required to support a high quality police force. Nor do they have anything to say about the willingness of the cities to pay for police who worked for the central authorities rather than for the cities themselves. As historians of Russian urbanization have shown, cities experiencing rapid growth and industrialization were struggling to meet urgent non-police needs such as improving sanitation and housing and reducing disease.\(^{83}\) In Moscow the police themselves were—or tried to be—involved in such efforts in 1863 when their chief proposed the building of rooming houses for the large number of peasants moving there in search of employment. In this instance, a special commission rejected the proposal and instructed the police to focus more on suppressing crime than on addressing its presumed causes.\(^{84}\) Neither in Moscow nor in any of Russia’s growing cities, however, could the authorities ignore the tradeoff between spending for the police and social welfare and sanitation improvements.

In 1863, Valuev addressed the funding issue by asking the State Council to allow city police forces to charge fees for services, citing St. Petersburg’s and Moscow’s experiences as precedents.\(^ {85}\) Since 1858 St. Petersburg’s police had collected fees for registering passports, verifying addresses, certifying property transactions, and other actions in amounts that varied by social estate. In November 1860, Moscow’s police obtained the right to do the same.\(^ {86}\) This may have led Valuev believe to believe he would encounter little resistance to further expanding the arrangement. He may also have seen this proposal as a means of bypassing a provision of the recent introduction of a comprehensive state budget. Specifically, in 1863 for the first time revenue sources previously controlled by individual ministries and agencies became central government funds under the Ministry of Finance’s management.\(^ {87}\) For accounting purposes, the sources of funds for individual ministry’s programs often remained as they had been before. Nonetheless, and for all the obvious benefits of having a unified picture of the govern-

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84 Bradley, *Muzhik and Muscovite*, 281–82.
85 *Materialy o sborakh dlia usileniia soderzhaniia politsii* (St. Petersburg: V. Bezobrazov, 1866), 19.
86 MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 3 (1879): 508.
ment’s finances, Valuev and other non-Finance ministers probably regretted their loss of exclusive funds and were looking to restore them. When Valuev circulated his draft proposal on police fees for services to selected colleagues and provincial governors, however, it met with sharp criticism. The governors argued for larger fees.\(^88\) Other ministers and agency heads subjected the proposal to frequent procedural delays, requesting more details and criticizing specific fees as excessive. Some also questioned the basic idea of charging people for actions such as registering passports that the government required them to perform.\(^89\) The Director of the Department of State Economy made the most telling objection: that many of the activities for which fees were to be charged were to be removed from the police’s duties upon implementation of the zemstvo and judicial reforms.\(^90\) Valuev’s response—a feeble one—was that he was only proposing to charge these fees on a temporary basis—until the zemstvos and new courts were up and running.\(^91\) Valuev persisted with his proposal but to no effect. It languished in the Finance Ministry’s Commission for the Revision of the System of Taxes and Fees without attracting sufficient support and remained unapproved when Valuev resigned from the Ministry.\(^92\)

The funding and size of the municipal police forces arose again as issues in 1865, when Pokhvisnev’s proposed police statute included a municipal police budget and staffing plan.\(^93\) Excluding spending on municipal guardsmen, proposed expenditures on the city police were roughly the same as provided for in the Temporary Rules of December 1862. To keep the lid on spending, the report requested a sharp reduction in the number of municipalities with separate police forces—from 61 to 24. Fifteen of these were large cities with populations of 40,000 or more as well as commercial, industrial, and political significance.\(^94\) The other nine were smaller towns and villages that were important for their strategic location or religious significance.\(^95\) Together

\(^{88}\) Materialy o sborakh dlia usileniia soderzhaniia politii, 72.
\(^{89}\) MSVU: OP, part 1, sect. 3, 522, 524.
\(^{90}\) Materialy o sborakh dlia usileniia soderzhaniia politii, 53.
\(^{91}\) Materialy o sborakh dlia usileniia soderzhaniia politii, 66–67.
\(^{92}\) MSVU: OP, part 1, sect. 3, 571–79.
\(^{93}\) MSVU: OP, part 1, sect. 3, 202–81.
\(^{94}\) MSVU: OP, part 1, sect. 3, 214. The cities were Astrakhan, Vil’no, Voronezh, Kazan, Kishinev, Kiev, Mogilev, Nizhnii Novgorod, Saratov, Tula, Kharkov, Kherson, Odessa, and Nikolaev.
\(^{95}\) MSVU: OP, part 1, sect. 3, 214. These were Taganrog, Kerch, Narva, Sevastopol and the five villages and hamlets given separate police forces under the Temporary Rules.
the 24 forces accounted for roughly one-quarter of proposed total spending on the municipal police.

In contrast to his tight-fistedness for the rest of the city police, Pokhvisnev called for increasing spending on the municipal guards to 1,050,000 rubles. This was both higher than its current level and double what Nikolai Miliutin and Solov’ev had requested in 1860. It would allow a roughly 25 percent increase in the number of guardsmen and about a 35 percent increase in their salaries. To justify this he pointed to the growth in population in the previous few years, the changes in post-Emancipation society, and what he described as an almost universal increase in drunkenness and drink-related crime.96

Pokhvisnev’s claim that social disorder was on the rise was one that most contemporaries would have been accepted unquestioningly. The loosening of alcohol controls in 1863 had led to a huge increase in the number of taverns, more visible public drunkenness, and a surge in arrests for alcohol-related offenses.97 In 1863 alone the number of taverns grew from 90,200 to 233,000 and in some regions the press reported even greater percentage increases in alcohol sales.98 Both public officials and non-government commentators generally perceived such numbers as signals of a breakdown of law and order. In an 1864 report to Valuev, for example, Moscow’s governor complained that the new alcohol controls were leading to an “incredible increase in crime.”99 In the same year the censor Nikitenko complained in his diary that crime was reaching unprecedented levels.100 By 1866, the Tsar himself was making similar complaints.101

The widespread concern with crime augured well for the expansion of the municipal police had Valuev chosen to support this cause. For all his efforts to increase St. Petersburg’s police’s strength and to provide new revenue sources for other urban forces, however, Valuev was more committed to expanding the rural police. As we have seen in our discussion of the

99 RGIA, fond 1281, Sovet Ministerstva vnutrennikh del, opis’ 7, delo 60, “Po otchetu o sostoianii moskovskogo gubernii za 1864 god,” 111.
100 A. V. Nikitenko, Dnevnik (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo khudozhestvennoi literature, 1955), 3: 293–94.
101 Zelnik, Labor and Society, 250–51.
Metropolitan and Municipal Police

county police, rather than going forward with Pokhvisnev’s statute, Valuev chose to press the fight on creation of a rural police guard. The result was to leave the questions of urban police reform and expansion of the municipal police guards to Pokhvisnev’s successor as Chief of the Police Section of the Commission on Provincial and County Institutions. The official in question, M. I. Anisimov, had been a member of the Police Section under Nikolai Miliutin. During 1867–1869 he would prepare proposals that reflected both Miliutin’s approach to police reform and Pokhvisnev’s draft police statute. In a modest concession to the governors he proposed restoring roughly 30 provincial capitals to Pokhvisnev’s proposed list of cities with separate police forces. This gesture did nothing to advance his proposals, which enjoyed even less success than his predecessor’s.

Without even the half-hearted Valuev to champion its cause, official discussion of urban police reform virtually ceased. After years of delay, however, in 1870 the government enacted a reform of city-governments that was the urban counterpart to the 1864 zemstvo reform. Like the 1864 legislation, it transferred responsibility for regulating local industry and trade, maintaining local infrastructure and similar functions from the police to elected bodies. It also established city dumas that like St. Petersburg’s in 1866 could resist central government requests to spend more on their police. Unlike the zemstvos, the city governments received a guarantee that the police would enforce their decisions. This guarantee, however, came at a price. The statute required the city assemblies to submit proposed decrees to the local police chiefs for approval.

Similar to the zemstvo and judicial reforms, the 1870 Municipal Statute should logically have been followed by a revised statutes on the city police

102 Sbornik pravitel’stvennykh raspriazhenii po ustroistvo byt’ krest’ian. (St. Petersburg: Ministerstvo vnun-
trennikh del, Zemskii otdel, 1867), 1: 268–71.
103 On Anisimov’s dates of service and draft General Statute and Instructions on the Police, see MSVUK: OP, part 1, sect. 3, 341–57.
104 2nd PSZ, 45 (1870): no. 48498.
and on the policemen who made up their bottom ranks. Neither measure, however, was to be enacted in the 1870s. Instead the tsarist authorities took a piecemeal approach that would continue until the crisis of the late 1870s forced the government to address the cities’ law-and-order problems.