Nation and Migration

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CHAPTER 1.

THE RISE OF NATIONS:
MODERNITY AND NATIONS COMING INTO EXISTENCE
It has taken a long time for the communal societies of the world to turn into modern ones—this historical process has been slow, gradual, and unevenly distributed in geographical space. The decisive factor of this shift was literacy, the written word released ideas from the constraints of orally transmitted tradition. Written texts opened up new vistas for the accumulation of knowledge, thus creating the possibility of limitless cognitive growth. Interpersonal relationships became bifurcated by modernity based on whether the actors encountered one another in formal (non-elected) or informal (elected) roles. Up to the present day, the incest taboo related to us through King Oedipus's tragic fate admonishes humans of the fault line between the two types of role relations marking the origins of the modern western individual—one who is free and accountable for their deeds. And while inclined to live by the pleasure principle, they cannot do so under the pressure of the reality principle. Modernity has recreated the social world, laid the grounds for new values, and set off new processes and institutions that blocked the paths of return to the communal structures of society.

In antiquity, three values fundamental to modern societal development were born. The individual's freedom redefined their nexus with the community formerly grounded in the oppression of individual will. Each person can choose to act but is held accountable for the consequences of their actions. The right choices lead to success, and the wrong ones to defeat. Freedom is inseparable from the social value attributed to property, providing its owners with the security to choose one action over another. Finally, the third value is equality, the realization of which prevents individuals from exercising undue power over others.

The sustenance of modern society depends on three institutions. The marketplace released the economy from the restrictions of chance individual transactions, thus establishing the framework of trade based on the universal exchange of goods and services. The nation-state created the structures of political power responsible for maintaining order within the physical, social, and symbolic space controlled by the national imagination. Finally, the social class system, as construed in Gellner's theory (2009), liberates individuals from the forced trajectories of collective determinations operating beyond their control and opens up the opportunity to occupy a place in society based upon their performance, knowledge, and merits. This entails the possibility to either rise or fall on the social ladder, but since the subjects of these movements are free, society as a whole is in continuous flux, with ever-shifting social structures.
In the center of modern society is the autonomous individual whose choices are shaped by considerations of attainability and desirability. Rationality implies the simultaneous reckoning with the attainability and favorableness of one’s aspirations in relation to which all other configurations would lead one into the realm of the irrational. Reason guides the free individual who no longer needs guidance from churches that infantilize the adult actor by subjecting them to authority.

Modernity came into being as a protracted and a step-by-step process concentrated in particular geographical regions. Its onset can be traced back to antiquity, yet this project has never been completed. From time to time, modernization set off at some location but faltered and reversed. Yet on a global scale, modernization cannot be stopped. As the psychological burden of becoming economically, politically, and culturally uniform overtaxes the individuals released from the ties of communal societies, many would seek refuge in the past, if only they could.

The Three Historical Developmental Regions of Europe

Europe is the birthplace of modernity. The values of freedom, property, and equality were formed here—along with the institutions of the market, the nation state as well as the processes of individualization, rationalization and secularism, set out to conquer the world but have not yet succeeded. As yet the entirety of the world is far from modern. All societies still have to face the challenges of global modernization.

In the early 1980s (1983), Szűcs formulated a thesis about Europe’s three developmental regions, claiming that the geopolitical status quo following the demise of the Roman Empire had proved enduring. Up until the present time the political, cultural, and social psychological boundaries evolved in the aftermath of the breakup into a Western and an Eastern Roman Empire have persisted.

It was in the Carolingian Empire established on the Western Roman territory where Szűcs identified a combination of ancient, Christian, barbarian, and German features construed ever since as the “West.” With the border situated along the Elbe-Saale and Leitha rivers, the eastern half fell under the reign of the Byzantium and held rigidly onto its Roman legacy.
The third region lay between the West and the East. Regarding this region, Szűcs stated:

In between the twofold influence and parallel to the first boundary, another no less marked eastern separation line evolved reaching from the Lower Danube’s area to the eastern Carpathians and northward along the woodlands separating the western from the eastern Slavs as well as the Polish from the Russian lands, ending eventually in the Baltics in the 13th century. The territory west from here had already been broadly named by contemporaries around 1100 and 1200 as *Europe Occidens* (Occidental), apparently ignoring the former Elbe-Leitha border. As soon as Europe had grown from a mere geographical entity into a cultural and even structural identity synonymous with the *Christianitas*, it bifurcated along the lines of the Roman versus the Byzantine influence. The zone situated from the river Elbe to the Carpathian range and from the Baltics to the Adriatic Sea, that is, the new region attached to the vestiges of the former “Caroling Europe” with an expanse close to half of it, became less and less hesitatingly referred to—not unlike Scandinavia—as “Western Europe.” (Szűcs 1983, 2)

It thus appeared that the West would encompass the middle part of Europe as well. The new boundaries were marked by the exemplars of Roman, Gothic, and Renaissance architecture. The absence of such architecture beyond the territories once possessed by the Hungarian and Polish kingdoms and the Knights of Prussia signified the edge of the East.

Central Europe, however, only became incorporated into the West temporarily. As Szűcs explained:

The sharp demarcation line of economic and social structural difference dividing Europe into two parts after 1500, and marking the predominantly more spacious eastern half to be the site of the “second serfdom” in effect reproduced with stunning exactitude the earlier Elbe-Leitha border of circa 800. Moreover, following nearly half a millennium—in the present day—Europe finds itself, once again, cut more definitely than ever, into two “camps” practically by the same geographical boundary—with some minor deviations around Thuringia. One might wonder if Stalin, Churchill, and Roosevelt had studied carefully the status quo in the era of Charlemagne on the anniversary of the 1130th anniversary of the emperor’s death. (Szűcs 1983, 3)

The end of the cold war finally lifted the iron curtain. Within the European Union’s organizational framework, Central Europe once again became part of Western Europe, leaving behind Russia, Eastern Europe’s most significant country.
The differences between the three regions, however, have persisted. In Western Europe, societies since the Carolingian era have developed in an organic fashion, gradually broadening individual freedoms and the autonomous associations built on those freedoms. This was the foundation on which modern political, economic, and cultural progress took place. Eastern European social development, on the other hand, carried the mark of the Byzantine model from the start, involving an overbearing state, the centralization of power, and a lack of recognition of individual freedom. Even though the Byzantium fell, new empires rose in its place, built upon similar principles.

The Western model of societal organization premised upon autonomous networks enabled the continuous increase of goods, the flourishing of culture, urbanization, industrialization, and the solidification of civil society. In contrast, the Eastern model, centralized and inimical toward individual and collective autonomies, as it was, has permanently lagged behind its Western counterpart, which necessitated reforms to modernize. Once launched, the reforms came to a standstill. No organic modernization has ever transpired.

Drawing on István Széchenyi’s (2002) ideas, one could describe the social-psychological effects of Western versus Eastern societal trajectory by reference to the paradigms of “credit culture” as opposed to the “tribute culture.” In Széchenyi’s understanding, credit is far from merely an economic category; it is a social-psychological construct allowing for a person to have trust in another and in the law. Credit is predicated upon the creditor’s belief in getting paid back. Tribute, on the contrary, is an act of taking away or dispossession breeding suspicion and distrust.

The dynamism and growth of Western European society is rendered possible by the credit culture that shapes institutional and personal relationships, implying that the parties of a transaction trust one another, present themselves favorably, and have faith both in themselves and in others. All of this works as a self-fulfilling prophecy as it improves the quality of interpersonal relationships. The culture of tribute operates inversely in effecting a negative psychic spiral. In Central Europe a combination of the two ideal types can be found ensuring either one or the other’s dominance at different points in time and geographical space. Discussing the Slovaks’ position in Europe, Rudolf Chmel observed a phenomenon applying to other Central European countries as well, namely, that the Slovaks have alternately displayed behaviors characteristic of the closed authoritarian, antidemocratic, and oligarchic East, on the one hand, and the open, more liberal and democratic West,
on the other (Chmel 2016). Comparative research into the values held in different nations compellingly suggests that the past has not been bypassed in Europe. Marx was correct to contend that “men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living” (1852, 1).

**THEORIZING THE NATION**

Nations are pivotal formations of social life, which help people place themselves and others in the immensity of the world and find meaning and purpose in the post-traditional age following the “death of God” (Nietzsche 1887, sec. 108). Not until the second half of the twentieth century was the concept of the nation subject to sociological inquiry. Before then, sociologists tended to focus on social class issues without considering their national context. However, they had to confront the reality of classes existing within nations.

Sociological thought about the nation is fraught with controversy. Theorists disagree whether the nation should be viewed as a modern or a historically long-standing formation. Those who claim that the nation is historically “old” would also argue that “nothing is new under the sun,” therefore everything to study in a nation’s life has been around for a long time. On the other side of the trench, theorists construing the nation as a modern formation would claim that the habitual behaviors observed in earlier formations have little in common with those shaped by contemporary national frameworks.

The perennialists approach the diversity of nations as an essential response to the indeterminacy that intrinsically characterizes the human condition, enabling the members of such groups to self-identify as a nation and to carve their own time and space out of Nothingness. In this way, they forged a unique formation unmistakable for any other group in the human world. Modernists, on the contrary, believe that national uniqueness is merely imagined and was invented by an intellectual elite in order to restrain the limitless drive for individualism as well as to strengthen social cohesion that had been shattered by the dissolution of communal ties rooted in tradition. The nation, according to this perception, is but a mere construct without any essential qualities to it.
Further dimensions may be added to this debate. One may ask what is essentially collective or supra-individual about the nation—a question which can be undermined by claiming there is nothing preexisting the individual choosing by his or her own will to become a member of the community of a nation. This dilemma is fundamental to theorizing about the nation, allowing one to argue either that the nation is a cultural community or, alternately, it is a political one.

Each of these standpoints is present in the literature. Yet most authors attempt to reconcile the opposing arguments. Stalin's definition of the nation is intriguing since in the empire under his rule he had the opportunity to adjust his policies to his conception. Even by contemporary standards, Stalin's approach is valid, even though precisely the element of the political is absent from it. It asserts that “A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common culture” (Stalin 1953, chap. 1). More than seven decades later Anthony Smith, in essence, replicated Stalin’s idea. Smith opines that the nation is a historical and cultural community with a name of its own, inhabiting a unified territory, and instituting mass public education and common rights for its people (1991).

A crucial dimension of the clashing definitions is the historicity of the nation’s concept, setting the so called “perennialists” against the “modernists.” The former construe the nation to be continuous with the ancient and medieval formations, explaining it in reference to the endurance of the community’s name, its semantic space thus created, its symbols, historical narrative, dwelling space, and the traditions incorporated into the culture. As a result of these long-standing features, the pronoun “we” became the time-transcending psychosocial core of communal imaginaries as opposed to “strangeness.”

According to the modernists, the intellectual procedures and contents presented the nation as an imagined entity. The contents and symbols of national identity were knowingly invented and propagated by the intellectuals’ and politicians’ discontent with the feudal order. The nation, in this approach, is the outcome of modern social developments that produced a unified marketplace, an all-encompassing legal system, and a universal school system furthering cultural uniformity within the country’s territorial boundaries. The protagonist of this process is the individual bound to others via their national consciousness and national sentiments, which in turn are grounded in civic rights and duties.
The modern nation state did not inherit but simply utilized the identities that had been forged on ethnic and religious bases. The crux of national development is sovereignty deriving from the nation’s will. It was up to the pattern of national development, that the concept of the nation implied the “Volk” or the “People.” National sovereignty involves total control over the territory and its residents exercised by governmental leaders whose power is earned through elections.

Owing to the meaning-making potential of national ideology, the land vindicated by the nation thus becomes “homeland,” a site of shared destiny demarcated by “natural” borders. The nation is not a naturally given group of people, yet it can be made to seem like one by “translating” the national ideology into the individual’s lifeworld.

Max Weber has integrated successfully the opposing poles of the theories of nation pointing out that the “nation” is nothing else than a realm of common values, patterning uniquely the collective experiences and meanings, seen as a community, and simultaneously increasing the internal assimilation of its members and the external differentiation from the other national groups (Fleet 2011, 38). Weber is right to emphasize the role of beliefs in common descent in the formation of national consciousness warning that “it does not matter whether or not an objective blood relationship exists” (1968, 389).

Gellner (2009) argues that nationalism, inevitably, is the ideological product of the transformation from agrarian into industrial society, offering rights even to those lacking them prior to societal change. The expansion of such rights offers equal opportunities for success to all ethnic, religious, and regional groups and orders. National society in a sense is the “melting pot” of feudal society randomly redistributing members of the preexisting groups into the newly forming social classes. National unity, predicated upon general schooling and a unified cultural canon producing workable psychic effects, has the capacity to override the inequalities generated by a class system.

Taking either perspective, it is evident that the nation is part of a human drama animated by language. The name of a nation engenders the semantic space nurturing the national imaginary, which enables the nation’s members to inhabit the drama’s space and time setting.

Nationalism cements the goals of national existence. This ideology is more aggressive when national existence is merely willed as opposed to it being an attained reality. The difference is theorized by historian Miklós Szabó who distinguishes between the “ideology of a program” and the “ideology of a situation” (Szabó 1977).
As a secular religion, nationalism filters into the semantic space emptied by secularization providing meaning, goals, and a sense of mission to the orphans of the slayed God. Nietzsche powerfully evokes the imagined moment when the “madman” warns his ignorant fellows that God no longer exists. “Where has God gone?” he calls out:

I mean to tell you! We have killed him, you and I! We are all his murderers! But how have we done it? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the whole horizon? What did we do when we loosened this earth from its sun? Whither does it now move? Whither do we move? Away from all suns? Do we not dash on unceasingly? Backwards, sideways, forwards, in all directions? Is there still an above and below? Do we not stray, as through infinite nothingness? Does not empty space breathe upon us? (Nietzsche 1887, sec. 125)

Nationalism as a secular religion (Gerő 2006) embeds humans in historical time, offers them a place, a perspective, and ties to those akin to them, besides ensuring the security of challenging other people perceived as different. It is through symbolism that the nation's historical chronology and the spaces of its holidays are created: rituals, ceremonies and speech acts are performed according to the dictates of role expectations concomitant with national membership.

The citizenry made legally and mentally uniform through realizing the nationalist project is called the “people,” who is the carrier of sovereignty and the communicator of the nation’s will. Nation states differ in terms of the manner they let the will of the people find expression through the periodical election of individuals into decision making bodies. In liberal democracies the legislative, executive, and juridical functions are separate, and it is through the power of the constitution that human and civil rights such as the right to property, freedom of speech, and religion are guaranteed as the unalterable and inalienable rights of every citizen. In the so called “people’s” democracies the branches of governance are not separated as the legal arrangement is subject to lineage, social psychological, and cultural inheritance. Election is but a periodical act of voting confidence to a leader.

The infrastructure of the modern nation state includes a capital city, a centralized bureaucracy, an army and police, a uniform cultural and historical canon, a national bank, a currency and a legal system. Yet the most important aspect of the nation state’s existence is international recognition, since if it is not recognized by other states, it does not amount to more than an idea or a dream.
THE RISE OF NATIONS

THE FULFILLMENT AND FAILURE OF SOCIAL ENTROPY

Gellner (2009) deems the rise of nations to be the necessary outcome of the transition from agrarian to industrial society. In the agrarian society there is no social mobility. No movement is possible between the agrarian workers and the ruling elite of the society. The division between the rulers and the ruled is sustained by political and cultural power warranting the reproduction of this system from generation to generation.

In contrast, industrial society is predicated upon change. The economic and cognitive products of industrial society continuously proliferate, which implies that new generations cannot continue whence their parents left off. Even though goods are distributed inequitably in society, theoretically the opportunities for success are equal. The foundation of social stratification is merit rather than inherited privilege. Continuous economic growth inspires new forms of activity and professions requiring knowledge, expertise, and skills. This is only rendered possible by a universal, mandatory public school system which provides the opportunity for all students to acquire the factual and cultural knowledge needed to move ahead in the national society.

The national society is a knowledge and communicational community, ideally every member of which is capable of having him or herself understood by all other members. Karl Deutsch was one of the first theorist of nation highlighting the theme of communication binding the members of nations. As Deutsch observes “people are held together ‘from within’ by this communicative efficiency, the complementarity of the communicative facilities acquired by their members” (Deutsch 1966, 98). Entropy in physics means a transition from the orderly to the disorderly, from regular to irregular states. Entropy in sociology is a metaphor meaning that, in the course of the transition to industrial society, the groups and strata of agrarian society did not stay together. Instead their members randomly found their new social position in the entirety of the continuously growing economic and cognitive structures of labor division. Social entropy is the individuals’ social movement dictated by the dynamism of industrialization, which privileges personal capabilities, motivation, and goals to succeed.

As opposed to the collective determinations prevalent in agrarian society, the new social stratification based on the indeterminacy resulting from a multitude of individual wills is an ideal type. A resistance to social entropy developed in
societies where, within the framework of industrialization, the collective social trajectories of the agrarian era stayed in place, keeping together groups apparently based on ethnicity, religion or race. For the majority of the populace structured according the laws of entropy, the entropy resistant groups seemed like the “other” or the “stranger.” Such perceptions called forth stereotypes and prejudices further deepening the divide between the majority and the minority groups.

Gellner (2009) gives the following example to illustrate how groups resisting social entropy are formed. Let us assume that there is a collection of people in agrarian society whose members have genetically inherited blue skin. Despite policies offering equal opportunities to everyone, most of the blue-skinned end up in the upper echelons of society as it transitions into an industrial one, leading the non-blue-skinned to believe that an undue number of blue-skinned have gotten into privileged positions. Being “blue” therefore becomes the source of prejudice and stereotypes, which will cause these people to be seen as “intruders,” “parasites,” and “exploiters.”

There might be another group whose genetic inheritance is yellow skin. Despite policies ensuring equal opportunities to all, most of the yellow-skinned would end up in the lower social classes in the wake of transition into an industrial society, prompting the non-yellow-skinned to think that an inordinate number of “yellows” are in the lower classes. This will spawn stereotypes and prejudice towards “yellowness” associated with traits such as being “lazy,” “averse to work,” or “dumb.”

Stereotypes and prejudices afflicting given social groups in industrial society are only produced by resistance to social entropy if the original group-forming category appears to be naturally given. Such traits may include skin color, body type or facial characteristics. Stereotypes and prejudice require visibility as a basis for discrimination.

The conflicts arising from resistance to social entropy mask the class structure of industrial society whose fundamental feature is the concentration of resources in the hands of a few, while many are deprived of economic, cultural, and political goods. If there were no entropy resistant groups in industrial society, each generation would start anew the class struggle to acquire these possessions, assuming that the distribution of goods was independent of preexisting social ranking. In such a scenario, the essence of these struggles would not be concealed by stereotypes and prejudices affecting groups that resist social entropy.

An industrial society exempt from entropy resistant groups, however, is a
utopia. Immigration involves the continuous influx of “strangers” who, due to their cultural, religious, and ethnic differences, would not become included in the “social melting pot.” Along their given determinations, the members of immigrant groups tend to organize themselves into networks whose potency is multiplied by the opportunities offered by new information and communication technologies.

In the modern globalized world, wealthy countries attract like a magnet the citizens of poorer countries. The less these immigrants are willing to assimilate themselves along the spectrum of the host society’s structures, the more acute forms of xenophobic attitudes, stereotypes, and prejudices they will face from the majority population. In that case they become ghettoized and involuntarily excluded from the division of labor. If they remain outsiders to the economic, cultural, and political system as a whole, their existence will spark severe majority versus minority conflicts.

**Ethnonational Minorities in the Modern Nation State**

Minority is a relational category. A group may be considered a minority if there is a majority in relation to which a minority is separated by a category relevant to both parties. Only in the modern nation state does the majority vs. minority relationship present itself as an issue, since the nation state cannot operate its economic, political, and cultural institutions unless its members are psychologically alike. Moreover, their image of the national group to which they belong makes it possible for everyone to have that invariable and constraining imaginary construct of reality rooted in a national knowledge base. Those situated outside of this imaginary group are considered strangers threatening the unity of the nation. Discussing the sociological processes characterizing the European nation states, we have established that, in the course of national development, the members of all the various groups within the feudal social structure end up “distributed” randomly, according to the law of entropy, in the emergent social structures within the geographical, economic, and cultural space defined by the nation state. Earlier ties based in locality, profession, order, religion, and ethnicity give way to a new
bond with the nation state, a national identity that everyone can accept as their own, which helps make sense of the world for those carrying the identity.

A minority may be regarded as a group whose members in the process of nation formation do not randomly find their place in the new structure but hold together more or less collectively in one strata. In the eyes of the national majority, they appear as a minority and this affects their members disadvantageously in several respects.

The first disadvantage is semantic in nature. The term “minority” connotes “smallness,” “weakness,” and “sporadic” as opposed to “largeness,” “strength,” and “multitudes” associated with the term “majority.” In everyday language use, “minority” is laden with negative value judgments, while “majority” is laden with positive ones. In a 1970s experiment we asked six-year-old Hungarian children (not yet attending school) to draw a picture of their own country and of the Soviet Union, the United States, and China next to it. At this age, children imagined Hungary as big and, accordingly, the drawings showed Hungary at least the size of the Soviet Union, the United States, and China. By school age, this tendency was no longer observed. The children depicted their country in its actual proportion, that is, small.

The semantics of the word “minority” evidently played a role in Lenin’s decision when, in breaking his faction away from the Russian Social Democratic Party, he called it “Bolshevik,” meaning “of the majority” as opposed to the other faction designated as “Menshevik,” meaning minority, overlooking the actual numerical proportions of the two factions.

To belong to a minority entails disadvantages in perception as well. Studies by Hamilton and Gifford showed that when the subjects of an experiment had to describe groups “A” and “B,” of which one group’s members were half as many as the other groups, the smaller group’s members were more negatively characterized by the respondents than those of the bigger group. Fewness and negativity forms an illusory correlation in the mind, a tendency more pronounced when it comes to actual minorities. This explains why phrases like “Gypsy crime” or “migrant rape” catch on in the majority’s consciousness (Hamilton and Gifford 1976).

Discriminatory practices occur on different spheres in the society. In everyday life the most common forms of discrimination on social and mainstream media sites are hate speech, offensive jokes, and slurs. Of particular significance is discrimination by police officers, health care providers, teachers and other pub-
lic service personnel. Another social sphere is legislation rejecting human rights such as the case of Jewish laws enacted in Germany and other Central and East European countries between the two world wars or the apartheid regime of South Africa sustained as recently as until 1994.

Minority existence means not only an inequitable share from the socially produced goods and services but political and cultural barriers as well. Semantic and cognitive difficulties tend to justify social disadvantages, concealing the injustice involved. Only by removing the stigma attached by the majority group can the minorities stand up for themselves to restore justice. This necessitates the finding of their voice, empowering themselves, and connecting with an authentic leader like Martin Luther King. Kurt Lewin identified the obstacles of minority emancipation as self-loathing, the difficulty of finding a credible leader, and self-effacing assimilation (Lewin 1948).

The “pure” nation state without minorities in the strict sense of the word is near to a utopia. Even though some entropy-resistant minorities have ceased to exist as such via assimilation or evacuation, new groups have kept arriving via immigration whose religion, language, ethnic origin, and value system have been different from those of the majority. In addition, there are sexual minorities and deviants stigmatized and ostracized by the dominant group.

During World War Two, Bettelheim and Janowitz examined the majority representations of Jewish and African American (or, in the language of those times, “Negro”) groups in the US army. They found that it was “success” with regard to the Jews and “failure” regarding the African Americans that came up as the excuse for discrimination (Bettelheim and Janowitz 1950).

The success of a minority provokes collective jealousy or resentment among members of the majority who, in assessing the achievements of the minority group members, do not see them as the result of high performance, diligence, and effort but instead group loyalty, exclusion of the majority members or, in the lingo of the anti-Jewish Laws in Hungary, “taking up living space” (térfoglalás).

The failure, on the other hand, of a minority group is an admonition for the majority group as to the precarity of their own position and the possibility of downward mobility, which is held at bay by mentally maximizing the distance from the given minority. An example of this is the majority’s perception of the Roma in European societies as a dirty, lumpen, crooked, and sexually licentious underclass, a perception expressing the repressed anxieties of the majority.
Discrimination, which is unjust toward minorities, may be eliminated by altering the relationship between the majority and the minority groups, which demands efforts to be made by both parties. The minority group needs authentic leaders, finding a voice of their own, and a strategy for social mobility. The majority must be led by an elite that makes no concessions to racism. In public service there must be zero tolerance for violating human rights. Segregation in preschools and public schools is forbidden by the law. Civil movements must work to enhance tolerance between social groups exemplified by organizations like the Not in Our Town movement in the United States\(^1\) or the Theatre of Witness in Northern Ireland.\(^2\)

**ETHNOPOLITICS AND GLOBALIZATION**

In general, globalization seems to be a process that incessantly and unstoppably homogenizes the societies of this world, erasing its differences and realizing the free movement of people, ideas, goods, and services. On the other hand, we can argue that the process of globalization is far from linear, there are recessions, counter tendencies, increasing resistance and other serious pitfalls. It has been disputed when this phenomenon began. Some trace it back to antiquity, while others believe it started with the colonizing expeditions of Western and Southern European states. All the authors concur, however, that capitalism has accelerated globalization, turning it into a process that indeed traverses the entire world (Wallerstein 2005).

Recognizing the intrinsic connection between capitalism and globalization, Marx surmised that as a result of the internationalization of the economy the social structure of national societies would emerge everywhere in the world creating an international bourgeoisie and proletariat. He predicted that, with the class struggle transposed onto the international level, the existing national, religious, ethnic separations would be transcended, the nation states would be politically meaningless, and a world government of the proletariat triumphant in the global revolution would come into being.

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\(^1\) See https://www.niot.org/.
\(^2\) See https://www.culturenorthernireland.org/features/performing-arts/theatre-witness.
Contrary to Marx’s position, globalization did not eliminate but rather intensified the ethnic, national, and religious differences on a global scale. In the new world order of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the battle is waged not between classes but, in Huntington’s phrase, between “civilizations” (1996). Sociologists had to come to terms with the reality that their concepts, theories, and methodologies, which were tailored to the study of capitalist societies’ class structure in a national context, unsuitable for inquiry into the international and intercultural processes spawned by globalization. The interpretative space of human activities has been irreversibly transformed (Tomlinson 2007).

The space that appears meaningful to people is a cultural product which, given the semiotic uncertainties brought about by globalization, is the sole reference in answering the existential question “who am I?” It seemed that modernization rendered this question moot by foregrounding the rational, free, and responsible individual who presumably rid themselves of the prejudices called “idols” by Francis Bacon (2000). The events of the twentieth century, however, have refuted this expectation. Two world wars and a cold war made it clear that multitudes of individuals disillusioned by modernization would seek refuge in autocratic regimes deploying buzzwords like race, nation, or “the people” (Fromm 1994).

With the end of the Cold War, the security offered by a bipolar world evaporated. The West found itself on its own. New centers of power emerged reordering the state of affairs. Yet the distribution of goods required for material well-being continued to follow Pareto’s rule even in the new world order: 80 percent of the goods are consumed in regions inhabited by 20 percent of the global population, while the remaining 20 percent of goods are distributed to 80 percent of the world’s population (Pareto 1897).

Some of this disproportion is due to the drastic growth of the world’s population. The following table (1.1) regarding growth trends was published by Péter Kende, based on the summer 2015 issue of the Paris periodical Commentaire (Kende 2016, 56):
Table 1.1. Changes in the world’s population between 1900 and 2050
(in millions and percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>2020*</th>
<th>2030*</th>
<th>2050*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The entire world’s population (in million)</td>
<td>1625</td>
<td>6067</td>
<td>7238</td>
<td>8444</td>
<td>9683</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe (in percent) (1)</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The broadly understood “West” (in percent) (2)</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Russian Empire (in percent) (3)</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Muslim-majority countries (in percent) (4)</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) projected  
(1) EU-28 + Norway and Switzerland  
(2) The same group complemented with North and South America, Australia, and Israel  
(3) In 1900: Czarist Russia; from 2000 onward: The Russian Federation  
(4) Muslim countries of Africa and Asia only.

The figures of the table show that in the twentieth century the West’s and, within it, Europe’s share of the world’s population significantly decreased, and will continue to do so, unless millions migrate from the Muslim countries to the West. The direction of migration will be discussed in detail later in the book. At this point we would merely like to state that the Western countries’ level of material well-being may be sensed as an injustice by the countries failing to provide for their populations—an issue addressed by colonial independence wars and, subsequently, by the radical Muslim movements.

All the countries on Earth have had to face the challenges of modernization, to which local societies responded with various degrees of resilience. Following the end of colonial dominance, new countries were established on the former colonies’ territory whose borders became drawn—with calipers and rulers—by the ex-colonial states, irrespective of the inhabitants’ religious, cultural, and ethnic traditions. The citizens of the new states could not always develop a solid sense of identity, the majority continuing to define themselves while the other groups were seen as strangers according to the religious and ethnic categories of the pre-colonization era. After being forced into the new states, these societies responded to modernization in diverse ways.
Eisenstadt (1973) believes that some societies reacted to modernization with completely passive and negative attitudes. Other societies chose the path of active organized resistance, in the course of which they strove to preserve traditional values as much as possible. Finally, there have been societies capable of transformation, creating the new economic, political, and cultural conditions necessary for modern life.

Huntington’s (1996) typology as to how non-western societies responded to modernization is quite similar to Eisenstadt’s model. Huntington also discusses rejection as being the most extreme fundamentalist answer to modernization. Fundamentalists revolt against the most basic prerequisites of modern development, with the exception of the armament, of which they, unmistakably, would prefer the most technologically advanced. The fundamentalist rebels speak the language of terrorism, the only one with which they can communicate.

According to Huntington, another trajectory is Kemalism, which persecutes all possible manifestations of traditional society in working towards total societal modernization. This was a path taken by Peter the Great in eighteenth century Russia, followed by many other modernizing dictators in the twentieth century. In the absence of the social reforms needed to fully realize the modernization project, the idea of “progress” as interpreted by the dictator would not necessarily overlap with the will of the majority upon whom the changes are imposed. Sooner or later such a scenario would induce fundamentalist reactions, bringing about the fall of the ruler and the emergence of a new “people’s” dictatorship in its place (Kapuściński 1992).

The modernization puzzle can best be solved via reformism, carrying out social change gradually, one step at a time, thus leaving traditional values intact. Huntington argues that reformism accepts modernization but refuses overt forms of Westernization (1996). Singapore might serve as the best example of this model (Magasházi 2019).

The countries incapable of the reformist solution have faced political crises inducing conflicts between social groups identifying themselves along ethnic and religious categories. While some conflicts stayed within the boundaries of the nation state, others inflamed into wars between them, leading in turn to the splintering of existing countries and the emergence of new ones. Where the government’s authority was shattered or destroyed entirely, genocidal forces were more easily unleashed (Snyder 2015). Failed states can seldom restore order from chaos, resulting in escalating fights via the revival of former ethnic and national identities.
The endless wars urged new migrations, with masses of people seeking out regions believed to be safe.

Of the civilizations that reacted poorly to the challenge of global modernization, Islam, which comprises one fifth of the world’s population, must be noted. Kemalism in Turkey seemed to be a successful mode of adaptation in the twentieth century, but the events of the twenty-first century suggest otherwise. In other Islamic countries adaptation failed from the start. Various explanations can be offered for the cause of failure. A most compelling one is the resistance of social organization premised on Islamic principles of secularization, an essential facet of modernization. This resistance makes Islam-based societies impervious to the establishment of modern nation states with its separation of the secular political realm from organized religion. In the wealthy Islamic states, the merging of the religious and the political realms does not present potential for conflict, at least not as long as there is enough wealth to go around. In contrast, countries with populations in the tens of millions may hold a grudge against the West for dominating and exploiting some of the Muslim societies, including a minority of twenty-first century Muslims who believe it to be their duty to restore justice by re-arranging the world’s regions (Huntington 1996).

Our initial hypothesis in this book draws on Hans Kohn’s (1965) theory of the nation, distinguishing between its “political” and “cultural” variants. The “political nation” overlooks ethnic ties, considering everyone as the citizen of the nation state. The “cultural nation,” on the contrary, rests on ethnic bonds. We will see that in reality the two types do not differ very sharply at all. The insecurities produced by globalizing processes favored the ethnic principle, reviving it even in countries where nation building originally had followed the principles of “political nation.” Aktürk (2012) classifies nation states in terms of their relationship to the ethnic principle.

The identity policy of par excellence political nations does not recognize ethnic principles. The United States represents the classic example of this, granting citizenship to every individual born on its territory, irrespective of their native language, religion, and ethnicity. A similar national policy characterized the French Republic from the earliest times.

Our sociological data concerning national identities suggests that in the European Union’s nation states both models—the political and the cultural nation—are present. In the past one could observe the growing prevalence of the political national
principle at the expense of the cultural one in all of the EU’s’ member states. Yet the massive and continuous migration has been a challenge for both the monoethnic and multiethnic national policy regimes. In the former regimes relying on the cultural national concept, the assimilation of minorities has always been a vexed and slow process involving, in the past, evacuation, cultural discrimination, forced assimilation, and the majority’s intolerant behaviors toward minorities. To remedy the “minority-problem” caused by migration, monoethnic nations had no other option but the expansion of legal space to obtain citizenship, a move exemplified recently by Germany (Aktürk 2012).

As a result of the migration to Europe accelerating in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, the European nation states rejecting the ethnic principle are less and less able to maintain a national identity centered merely on citizenship, which is seen as threatened by immigrants of diverse cultural, ethnic, and religious backgrounds.

The example of Germany shows that the monoethnic national regime is, evidently, not suited to the needs of the new minorities arising from migration as they do not want to assimilate themselves to the majority population’s culture, history, and religious traditions not their own. The case of France indicates that the monoethnic regime does not work either since many of the immigrants cannot or do not want to live in a secular modern society where they are forced to shed their communal ties, they cannot fare merely as individuals.

The large numbers of immigrants arriving from non-Western civilizations pressed by global modernizing forces entail problems of identity which are rarely resolved through the act of immigration. In numerous cases these individuals would carry along the traumas of wars waged in the border zones of civilizations, thus further aggravating the process of their integration into the European majority society that they have chosen to be their new home.

For the nation states of the European Union, an obvious solution could be the multiethnic national policy regime. For the people dwelling in the EU’s territory that would imply the cultivation of an identity which would produce a sense of belonging via the category of “Europeanness,” while also retaining their specific national and ethnic heritage integral to their identities.

The multiethnic national policy regime of the Russian Federation exemplifies that the category “of Russia” ensures identification for all the citizens of the Federation, irrespective of whether one self-identifies as Russian or not. The frames of
identification for the non-Russians are provided by the 21 republics formed on the Federation's territory on the basis of ethnic and cultural parameters. This system was not known in the Russian Empire where social mobility required from one to join such outspokenly Russian state institutions as the army, the police, the public administration, jurisdiction, the railway or the postal service. The Soviet Union eliminated this legacy of assimilation, which led to the establishment of a network of formally autonomous republics grounded in ethnic and cultural categories within the territory of the Russian Empire. These republics operated as the vehicles of social success and mobility with no pressure on assimilation. Some republics were among the member states of the Soviet Union, while others formed part of the Russian Federation. In the wake of the Soviet Union's fall and the secession of the member republics, the Russian Federation stood by itself while preserving the ethnic and cultural frameworks developed in the Soviet era. The unity of the Federation was successfully secured by the multiethnic organizational regime.

The multiethnic state, however, can only operate if there is a mediator language understood by all the people inhabiting it. In the Russian Federation this is the Russian language. While the integration of the different ethnic and religious group under the banner of the Russian Federation can be successful, we should not forget about the deeply rooted character of the pattern of coexistence which is conspicuously impressive. Aside from this political difference, the greatest practical problem hindering the transition of the EU into a multiethnic state is the absence of a mediator language. No doubt that the European Union has a very strong democratic foundation, while the Russian Federation is lacking democratic legitimacy. Nevertheless, the means of providing a strong European identity, like a common language, a common stock of knowledge of European identity, and symbols of unity are missing in the European Union.