List of Tables and Figures

All Tables and Figures are the authors’ own compilation, unless otherwise noted. The following Tables and Figures are modified from Magyar, “Towards a Terminology for Post-Communist Regimes”: Tables 1.3, 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, 2.5, 3.1, 3.3, 4.7, 5.1, 5.19, Figures 3.3, 3.4, 3.5.

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