The main aim of this chapter, seen within the general framework of the relationship of politics and psychology, is to reconstruct prevailing ideological underpinnings of developments in psychology in the twentieth century. Given the fact that the twentieth century was substantially determined by two world wars and the Cold War, special attention will be given to the influence of war ideologies on psychology as discipline and profession. As far as the history of psychology is concerned, a socio-genetic approach will be assumed, meaning that the emergence of psychology and its subdisciplines is understood as a response to the needs of modern society organized on new assumptions. From such a perspective, psychology is seen as playing an important role in modern ideological projects.

The focus of this chapter will be on developments related to the two world wars and the Cold War, but developments in cultural psychology in the 1990s will be also addressed. Relying on critical interpretations of cognitive psychology as ideology of subjectivism and individualism as put forward by Edward Sampson, it will be asked whether cultural psychology, which has been developed as an attempt to realize promises not fulfilled by the cognitive revolution (Jerome Bruner), has sufficient means to overcome ideological shortcomings pertaining to cognitive psychology and psychology in general. While cultural psychology transcends the prevailing epistemological and ideological individuo-centrism of cognitive psychology, it remains cognition centered, even if cognition is considered to be symbolically mediated. The
consequences of that centration affect not just conceptualizations of the epistememic subject (cognition as a self-generative though mediated process); they also make cultural psychology myopic as far as insights into social conditions of possibility of meaning-making processes and interpretation are concerned.

In general, this essay will argue that these forms of centration and myopia reveal the ideological functions of cultural psychology as a discourse that positions culture within the taken for granted societal order and addresses cultural transformation rather than societal change. Such an interpretation is justified also when broadly applied to mainstream psychology.

**Approaching Psychology and Politics**

With regard to the task of looking for relationships between psychology and politics, different approaches may be used, depending on the conceptions of relationship and on general understanding of science, politics, society, and history.

Biographical approaches, which examine the influence of political events on the professional career or life of psychologists, could potentially have many advantages, as their subject is relatively easy to define and data is generally available. However, although biography appears easy at first, it is clear that the burden of selection and interpretation cannot be avoided, even when describing a single case.

Take, for example, the well-known biography *The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud* by Ernest Jones. This biography is also a political biography, or more generally, a piece of psychoanalysis’ political history, which makes it even more significant. Jones’s famous biography of Freud contains many false or misleading statements and conceals other information, e.g., when Jones stated that Wilhelm Reich voluntarily resigned his membership in the German Psychoanalytic Society (DPG) at the Congress at Lucerne in 1934, while Reich was in fact secretly expelled a year before the congress: “It was on this occasion that Wilhelm Reich resigned from the Association” (Jones 1977, 622). Jones had followers among historians of psychoanalysis who repeated his claims: “Reich believed he has been expelled from the International Psychoanalytic Association (1934), whereas to Jones it seemed a resignation” (Roazen 1976, 505). There were published reports available in which Reich confirmed that he would never have voluntarily resigned from the psychoanalytic society, and his stance should come as no surprise, as psychoanalyst
Eva Rosenfeld posited: “They could not resign voluntarily because too high a degree of masochism would be involved, as though they had voluntarily become their own executioners” (quoted in Lothane 2001, 199).

But all this has not prevented Ernest Jones from falsifying the facts, and beyond that, collaborating with the Aryanized German Psychoanalytic Society and its officers:

But even as one should not judge people and events from 1933 to 1939 only in the light of the knowledge of later developments, it is still astounding how Freud and others succumbed to their wishful impulses and illusions in striking shady deals with the devil and how the Jewish members of the IPA were disposed of as demanded by the Nazis. Perhaps Freud was too sick and too old to hear the warnings of Sandor Rado and Eitingon in Berlin and leave Vienna. Perhaps he listened more to Ernest Jones, his Gentile advisor, mover and shaker, heir to the former Gentile Carl Jung, the conformist Jones who had no problems negotiating with the “Aryan” representatives of German Psychoanalysis, Boehm and Müller Braunschweig. (Lothane 2001, 215)

Even though Jones wrote his biography of Freud after World War II, he must have been familiar with Freud’s attitude against biography. Jones (1977, 630) himself quoted Freud’s warnings: “Whoever undertakes to write a biography, binds himself to lying, to concealment, to hypocrisy, to flummery, and even to hiding his own lack of understanding, since biographical material is not to be had and if it were it could not be used. Truth is not accessible, mankind does not deserve it. . . .”

I have discussed that particular case extensively elsewhere (Jovanović 2014), but I think it is also very instructive for the present study. Evidently, the influence of political events is always mediated in different ways. But before examining any mediation, it is important to bear in mind that political events are not entities that exist independently from the ways people understand them; on the contrary, their very existence is relative to the observer, as is any other social fact in a socially created reality. John Searle (1996, 12) argued in favor of the specificity of social facts:

But from our standpoint, the standpoint of beings who are not gods but are inside the world that includes us as active agents, we need to distinguish those true statements we make that attribute features to the world
that exist quite independently of any attitude or stances we take, and those statements that attribute features that exist only relative to our interests, attitudes, stances, purposes, etc.

Additionally, in regard to the fundamental dependency of social and, for that matter, political facts on the attitudes and interests of human agents, the case in question is open to, or rather, it invites psychoanalytic interpretation. Indeed, what is the function and meaning of a reversal that asserts the opposite, that is, how did Reich’s exclusion become his supposed resignation? “In that constellation it seems as if Reich played a role of psychoanalysis, which brought the repressed to the light and thus provoked defense mechanisms. The problem seems to be that involved psychoanalysts were not aware of that and were not interested in making it conscious” (Jovanović 2014, 411).

The reconstruction of just a small piece of a biographical account that illuminates the relationship of psychology and politics has shown how difficult it might be to describe an event and how politicized descriptions may be. Even more important is the need to examine the relationship between psychology and politics on a more abstract and mediated level. Surely, this is an epistemological challenge, but it is no less political. However, the benefits outweigh the risks of such an intellectual endeavor.

The History of Psychology in a Socio-Historical Key

I approach the history of psychology from a socio-cultural perspective as exemplified by the scholarship of Danziger’s Naming the Mind (1997), Foucault’s The History of Sexuality (1978) and Technologies of the Self (1988), Jaeger and Staeuble’s Die gesellschaftliche Genese der Psychologie (1978), and Rose’s The Psychological Complex (1985) and Inventing Ourselves (1998).

A socio-historical approach to psychology and the history of psychology positions modernity as the birthplace of psychology, beyond the chronological fact that psychology was established in the modern era. Modernity as a new epoch was founded on new principles: human self-determination; individualism; models of instrumental computational rationality; new emotional economy as part of a pattern of civilized behavior; and a reflexive attitude. The new position of the individual opened space for the acquisition of new experiences in the human-made world: that is, society and individuals. Psychology and its subdisciplines constructed their subject matter from these new experi-
ences. Therefore, these historical achievements and the conditions that shaped them are part of the history of psychology. In fact, Kenneth Gergen (1973, 319) argued several decades ago that “social psychological research is primarily the systematic study of contemporary history,” but I would argue that the same applies to psychology in general.

But references to history are not made simply for the sake of acknowledging the past. Historical reflexivity is a tool that shapes approaches to any phenomena, including contemporary ones, as it makes them visible at the very moment of their development and demonstrates in that way that they are entities possibly open to further changes in the future. Historical reflexivity can be, and perhaps should be, applied to history itself, and specifically historical accounts. An example highly relevant to a political and ideological reading of psychology and its history is Stephen Toulmin’s revised account of modernity. Contrary to the standard account of the origins of modernity in Cartesian rationalism and natural sciences, Toulmin discovered a valuable agenda of modernity in the work of Renaissance humanists:

The contrast between the practical modesty and the intellectual freedom of Renaissance humanism, and the theoretical ambitions and intellectual constraints of 17th-century rationalism plays a central part in our revised narrative of the origins of Modernity. By taking the origin of Modernity back to the 1500s, we are freed from the emphasis on Galileo’s and Descartes’ unique rationality, which was a feature of the standard account in the 1920s and 30s. The opening gambit of modern philosophy becomes not the decontextualised rationalism of Descartes’ Discourse and Meditations, but Montaigne’s restatement of classical skepticism...” (Toulmin 1992, 42)

In other contexts too, an initial choice mobilized forces that reinforced certain issues that were selected and marginalized or repressed those that were not. Quite striking is the fact that even seemingly opposite forces can work toward the same goal. A very good example in the given context is the role of Locke’s empiricism in modern development. It might be surprising that both the rationalist Descartes and the empiricist Locke contribute to the same model of modern development. They both share one of the basic tenets of mainstream modernity: strong individuo-centrism. In Descartes’s rationalist philosophy, knowledge is constituted in the self-conscious, thinking individual mind: “to embrace in my judgment only what presented itself to my mind so clearly
and distinctly that I had no occasion to doubt it” (Descartes [1637] 1978, 20). In Locke, intellect operates on material provided by senses; all ideas and knowledge arise from experience, Locke assures us in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). Both Locke’s empiricism and associationism are recognized as important contributions to the pre-history of psychology (Heidbreder [1933] 1961; Murphy 1960; Woodworth and Sheehan [1931] 1975). In new histories of psychology, Locke remains an important figure: “In proposing that human knowledge comes through sense experience, Locke laid the foundation for both empirical philosophy and, much later, the human sciences, including Psychology” (Pickren and Rutherford 2010, 6).

One important feature of the modern worldview is also a mechanical picture of the world, which is a consequence of processes taking place in different domains. Nature was no longer seen as imbued with purpose; rather, it functioned as a mechanical device (the clock metaphor was widely used). Simultaneously, there were also changes in the structure of human labor, which led to the development of intensive manufacture and later on industrial production (Borkenau [1934] 1980).

Kurt Danziger reminds us that it is very important to take into account a homology among the representations of the physical, social, and mental worlds. Association of elements was a common explanatory principle.

The introduction and popularization of the term “association of ideas” involved a metaphorical transfer of meaning from the social to the psychological level. Just as societies were considered to be formed by the combination of separate and independent persons, so individual minds could be thought of as formed by the association of separate mental elements. . . . What classical associationism accomplished was the establishment of a metaphorical homology among three levels of discourse, dealing respectively with the structure of society, the structure of the physical world, and the structure of the human mind. (Danziger 1994, 347)

Such conceptions of human world and mind are related to an understanding of knowledge, which Charles Taylor (1995, 12) called representational knowledge: “as depictions that are separately identifiable from what they are of.” The next step, then, is thinking, which is identified with formal operations conducted on depictions, and the computer is welcomed as a model of the mind. Thus, there is a long developmental line which bridges domains and centuries.
In the seventeenth century, a new mechanical view of the nature was elaborated and it grounded emerging (new) natural sciences. With an instrumental attitude toward nature and a mechanical understanding of it, modernity adopted control over nature as part of its agenda. In philosophy, Descartes ([1701] 1971, 153) saw it was necessary to formulate new formal rules for directing the mind in the investigation of truth: *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*. The first rule defines the aim: gaining certain and true knowledge. But this was also an eliminative criterion, as the second rule is “We must occupy ourselves only with those objects that our intellectual powers appear competent to know certainly and indubitably.”

Even though the *Regulae ad directionem ingenii* were published only as *Opera posthuma*, the same spirit permeated, more or less explicitly, other works by Descartes, and shaped a model of formal, decontextualized rationality as described by Toulmin (1992, 200):

Whatever sorts of problem one faced, there was a supposedly unique procedure for arriving at the correct solution. That procedure could be recognized only by cutting away the inessentials, and identifying the abstract core of “clear and distinct” concepts needed for its solution. Unfortunately, little in human life lends itself fully to the lucid, tidy analysis of Euclid’s geometry or Descartes’ physics.

And Descartes was not alone in his attempt to justify his quest for certainty. “Growing up in a Germany traumatized by the Thirty Years War, for instance, Leibniz insisted more strictly than the Newtonians on the need for the foundation of philosophy to be both mathematically and metaphysically ‘provable’” (Toulmin 1992, 140).

What is indeed striking is that Toulmin (1992, 160) sees a line leading from this seventeenth-century model of modernity and rationality to the wars that defined the twentieth century: “The Second World War, then, represented the culmination of social and historical processes that began in the 1650s, with the creation of the Modern era.”

Given the origins of such a model of formal rationality in the aftermath of the religious wars of the seventeenth century, which were understood as initiating the search for certainty, at first glance, it might look strange that such a search for certainty, supported by the development of a rational attainment method, ended up in the mass destruction of life itself. But if we bear in mind that such a model began by isolating rationality from the lived context,
it should come as no surprise that isolation and alienation from life eventually led to the destruction of life. What is indeed surprising, however, is that responses to the disaster of war repeated an earlier pattern, the “move away from the historical, concrete, or psychological, toward the formal, abstract, or logical” (Toulmin 1992, 153).

Psychology and War

As far as psychology is concerned, it has not only adopted the assumptions, but also the main achievements of the modern era—its individualism, dominant model of scientific thought, goals of control and prediction. There is a close link between psychology and war as well. Within the framework of Toulmin’s revised narrative of modernity, that link is actually a logical consequence. Even though the broader framework is barely reflected in psychology, it is important to bear it in mind in order to understand the deeper motivation that sustained the mutually fruitful relationship between psychology and war.

One telling example is World War I’s substantial influence on the development of psychology. The war proved beneficial for the development of quantitative psychological technology; testing and measurement models of psychological scientific rationality are psychological exemplifications of the formal, decontextualized rationality whose genesis Toulmin traced back to the seventeenth century. Even though practical needs conditioned by war were a powerful justification for identifying methods that could offer viable solutions on a grand scale (millions of soldiers were given intelligence and personality test), tests failed to provide reliable predictions. Nevertheless, they were considered to prove the scientific status of psychology now that it had demonstrated the possibility of measuring complex psychic phenomena, even the personality, which for so long had been understood as resistant to both measurement and discursively articulated accounts. Tests have indeed become a powerful psychological technology. Beyond that, they started to influence the general public’s attitudes and ways of thinking, inducing the search for self-improvement techniques, which gained so much momentum that many movements for psychological self-improvement emerged.

However, there are other links between psychology and war, which may also be interpreted in a very affirmative, humanist way. The British Psychological Society (BPS) intended “to pay tribute to those whose contributions helped to shape our discipline” during World War I.
The centenary of the First World War provides the Society with an opportunity to commemorate a watershed in the discipline of psychology. The war marked a turning point in the development of many different areas of psychology. . . . In 2015 we will be commemorating 100 years since “shell-shock” was first described in The Lancet. The Society will recognise the contribution of C. S. Myers, as well as exploring the latest research into PTSD and combat stress today.¹

It is interesting to compare the importance given by the British Psychological Society to the context of World War I for the identification and recognition of shell shock as a psychological wartime construct, to other interpretations of the very same phenomenon. In an article published in the Journal of the History of Medicine two years before the centenary, it is argued that “shell shock did not constitute a fundamental rupture in the dominant paradigms of early twentieth-century psychological medicine, but was part of a longer process of gradual and uneven shifts in thought and practice” (Loughran 2012, 109). But why is then the British Psychological Society inclined to argue for such a strong link between World War I and the recognition of the psychological consequences of combat, which then shaped the shell shock construct, simultaneously constructing the war as a watershed in the development of psychology? This is a crucial question; without asking such questions, the ideological assumptions and implications of psychology will remain concealed though they remain in operation.

It should be added that the Vietnam War and its consequences, including the antiwar movements and other changes in existing power structures and thinking patterns also proved fruitful for the construction and professional and social recognition and explanation of some new psycho-pathological phenomena. It is because of the “nervous” breakdowns of American soldiers after their return from Vietnam that a delayed traumatic syndrome was identified and, in 1980, officially recognized by the American Psychiatric Association as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), states Edgar Jones:

Although there is no direct chain of events from World War One through to the recognition of PTSD in 1980, the shell shock episode had focused unparalleled attention to the issue of traumatic illness.

Never before had so many soldiers suffered from psychological disorder. Furthermore, their illness could not be explained by pre-war theories of degeneration, heredity or the side effects of infectious disease. Neurologists, general physicians and even surgeons, doctors who before 1914 would not have shown any interest in psychiatry, were drawn to shellshock. By bringing new ideas to the discipline, it gave a fresh impetus to the search for psychological understanding and, in this sense, PTSD can be viewed as a progeny of World War One. Whilst today we are better equipped to diagnose and treat psychological trauma, we seem no further forward in preventing the conflicts that are the cause of these illnesses. (Jones 2014)

I would argue that individual PTSD could be interpreted as individualized forms of a post-traumatic situation at the national level: a superpower lost a war against a third-world country, it lost a war waged also to prevent the spread of communism, and the war ended in victory for a communist enemy. But that individualization and psychologization of a dramatic collective experience could also have a defensive function: by focusing on individual psychological problems and mobilizing necessary resources to deal with these problems, it conceals the prior decisions and broader context that led to the war. Thus, the very possibility of drawing attention to the delayed consequences of war trauma was actually the achievement of antiwar activism. There were also changes in aetiological theory, where originally primacy was given to traumatic exposure. But in spite of that, PTSD stands mostly for individual suffering. Its diagnostic and therapeutic use is estranged from social and political critique. Obviously, no advancement in trauma expertise has prevented further wars. New wars generate new PTSDs and the question to be posed is: what might be the next interpretive turn in the conceptualization of trauma and its origins that would be capable of mobilizing effective social and political critique?

Wars affected development of psychology in many other ways, and not just by generating new human experiences, which then found their way into psychological subject matter. There were other, more indirect influences, which also affected organizational forms of psychology, and consequently the social position of psychology. Thus, James Capshew in his book *Psychologists on the March* pointed out that World War II was a turning point in the history of American psychology. He showed that there were shifts in all domains: occupational, research, teaching, which all had in common efforts to make psychology and psychologists relevant to national needs. Service to national
needs became inscribed into the self-understanding of the psychological profession. The practical, or more precisely military demands made on psychologists during the war continued to be made and followed after the war, and they eventually transformed psychology from an academic to a consultative discipline, whereby psychologists offered different services to different categories of clients. Thus, Capshew (1986) argued that World War II acted as a catalyst for the professionalization of applied psychology, fundamentally altering the relationship between science and practice in the discipline. In sum, the shift to practical services has shaped the more technological self-understanding of psychology.

The reference to national needs still operates as a justification for the involvement of American psychologists in problematic endeavors (Guantanamo, for example). This has provoked many protests within the American Psychological Association itself, which was forced to finally take action to approve new ethical rules which bar psychologists from involvement in any national security interrogations.

General Kelly’s order is the latest fallout after years of recriminations in the profession for the crucial role that psychologists played in the post-9/11 programs of harsh interrogation created by the C.I.A. and the Pentagon. The psychologists’ involvement in the interrogations enabled the Justice Department in the George W. Bush administration to issue secret legal opinions that declared that the C.I.A.’s so-called enhanced interrogation program was legal, in part because health professionals were monitoring it to make sure that it was safe and that it did not constitute torture.

Psychologists were more involved than psychiatrists in the Bush-era interrogation programs at the C.I.A. and the Pentagon, at least in part because Bush administration officials believed that officials at the American Psychological Association were more supportive of the role played by psychologists in interrogations. By contrast, Bush officials believed that officials at the American Psychiatric Association, which had tougher ethics rules, were not comfortable with the involvement of psychiatrists. (Risen 2015)

Although it is not possible to imagine a more direct political instrumentalization of psychology, dominant political ideology influenced psychology in many indirect ways, even at the conceptual level. It is difficult to trace such
influences in different forms of psychology, which, at a glance, appear purely scientific. Cognitive psychology is a good example of this. Tracing the more hidden and mediated ways of political saturation poses a significant challenge, and the very fact that there may be latent political relevance is, in itself, politically relevant.

Again, it would be helpful to situate cognitive psychology, or the cognitive revolution, within the history of psychology. It was a kind of “return of the repressed,” a return of subjectivity repressed by behaviorism due to its identification of the scientific with the external existence of the research object. In the view of one of the founders of cognitive revolution, Jerome Bruner (1990, 1),

That revolution was intended to bring “mind” back into the human sciences after a long cold winter of objectivism . . . at least in my view that revolution has now been diverted into issues that are marginal to the impulse that brought it into being. Indeed it has been technicized in a manner that even undermines that original impulse. . . . Some critics, perhaps unkindly, even argue that the new cognitive science, the child of revolution, has gained its technical successes at the price of dehumanizing the very concept of mind it had sought to re-establish in psychology, and that it has thereby estranged much of psychology from the other human sciences and humanities.

The link to technological thinking in psychology has been quickly re-established, even in the academic domain. But in support of critics of the technologization of cognition, it is worthwhile to remember warnings put forward by Stephen Toulmin: “Unfortunately, little in human life lends itself fully to the lucid, tidy analysis of Euclid’s geometry or Descartes’ physics” (Toulmin 1992, 200).

Cognitive psychology has features that are more deeply obscured and deserve more criticism beyond its technicalization. Edward Sampson in American Psychologists in 1981 analyzed cognitive psychology as an ideology of individualism and social conformism.

. . . the cognitive perspective in psychology, by virtue of the primacy it gives to the individual knower and to subjective determinants of behavior, and though appearing to reveal something fundamental and invariant about the human mind, represents a set of values and interests
that reproduce the existing nature of the social order. . . . The issue of values also raises serious questions about the nature of our psychological science itself. (Sampson 1981, 730)

Within the framework of analysis of the relationship between war and psychology, a critical reading of psychological theories of conflicts would be most helpful. These theories, mostly developed by Morton Deutsch (1973), translate social conflicts into cognitive failures: misperceptions or misunderstandings. Thus, proposed resolutions exist in the same cognitive domain. Sampson, relying on Michael Billig’s critique of these theories, claims that such an approach “serves primarily ideological functions by eliminating from our analysis the contradictions that exist among groups in the real world” (Sampson 1981, 737).

False translations at the cognitive level itself are also targets of Bruner’s critique of cognitive psychology; instead of investigating meaning-making processes, cognitive psychology was occupied with information processing (Bruner, 1990). Evidently, the computational model of cognition could be easily combined with overall technical interests. In sum, the cognitive revolution failed, and the consequences of this failure enriched the existing picture of psychology in which technology played a central role.

In the broader socio-political context of the postwar period, specifically the Cold War, there was a strong impulse to encourage rationality debates. As documented in the book How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind, the Cold War proved fruitful for the development of academic psychology. Once again, war, this time a “cold war,” shaped psychology. However, its development privileged a specific model of formal, algorithmic skeleton rationality of homo oeconomicus in contrast to a bounded, adapted rationality. In such a formal model of rationality, there was an expectation that this form of rationality could help saving humanity from annihilation. It might look strange that in the context of the Cold War, which was an ideological war, that is, war for meanings, a formal, algorithmic rationality was understood as a proper means to deal with this type of conflict. This was the very same strategy used in the seventeenth century and after World War I.

With the end of the Cold War, which people hoped would bring an end to all wars, rationality debates in the form they were known and practiced during the Cold War also disappeared. Unfortunately, war itself did not.

It is under such conditions, i.e., after the Cold War, that a new attempt has been made to bring meaning-making processes back to psychology by
launching cultural psychology programs, or more precisely, encouraging the renaissance of cultural psychology as older programs envisaged back in the second half of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century were forgotten or marginalized for decades. For example, even though Wilhelm Wundt is considered the father of psychology, his Völkerpsychologie (Wundt 1900–1920), which could be understood as a kind of cultural psychology, was forgotten for years (Jovanović 2019). Or Dilthey’s verstehende Psychologie (understanding psychology) (Dilthey 1894) was not given a place in the history of psychology. However, Richard Shweder announced in 1991: “A discipline is emerging called cultural psychology.” He went on:

Cultural psychology is the study of the way cultural traditions and social practices regulate, express, and transform the human psyche. . . . Cultural psychology is the study of the ways subject and object, self and other, psyche and culture, person and context, figure and ground, practitioner and practice, live together, require each other, and dynamically, dialectically and jointly make each other up. (Shweder 1991, 73)

Cultural psychology is evidently a program for overcoming psychological individualism, which is one of the primary vehicles of dominant political ideology of liberalism.

However, it would be challenging to ask whether cultural psychology has overcome the ideological pitfalls of cognitivism. Has cultural psychology remained prone to cognitivism (without individualism)? Is cultural psychology equipped with sufficient tools to reach all the levels of meaning making, including the possibilities for meaning making and not just methods of meaning making? These tools cannot be provided by cultural means alone; societal structures must be included, and they are not interchangeable with culture.

In regard to the above issues, I would argue that cultural psychology has maintained and carried forward the legacy of other psychological orientations as far as a turn away from societal production processes is concerned. With a pars pro toto attitude and conceptual and theoretical marginalization and repression of societal production processes, cultural psychology can be useful—as an a-cultural psychology used to be—for furthering national political needs. Indeed, it has been when it has offered consultative services in contemporary military conflicts.

Psychology’s ability to avoid or escape a new cycle of political instrumentalization poses a real challenge. Regrettably enough, it was a standard
account of modernity based on individualism, rationality, and the quest for certainty that prevailed both historically and theoretically, and it was also this understanding of modernity that shaped the development of the (social) sciences including mainstream psychology. That link can be most easily recognized in the cognitive revolution in psychology, although other psychological orientations share many of the attributes of modernity.

The historical reconstruction provided here has demonstrated that wars generated strong turns toward that which is unified, formal, certain, and pure and away from the oral, particular, timely, plural, and polisemantic. But there were times when these latter features of the human experience were acknowledged. This is worth remembering. It is also worth trying to draw the attention of psychology to them so that psychology is capable of grasping and respecting the lived experience of humanity.

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