Words in Space and Time
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In literature, the discussion is widespread on the creation of ethnolinguistic nations by activists, who from an outside (etic) perspective can be seen as ethnic entrepreneurs or national activists, while from an internal (emic, or national) perspective as national awakeners. The latter term, rife in national histories of Central Europe’s nations, hinges on the tacit assumption—without any evidence to this end—that nations are near-eternal or near-natural entities. In this view informed by ethnolinguistic nationalism, during the period of non-national polities and empires from the late Middle Ages to the nineteenth century, many of the region’s nations “fell asleep.” This far-fetched hypothesis also assumes that the late medieval period was a nationally happy age (even with no records confirming the existence of any nations then), when Central Europe’s “nations” purportedly had a chance to establish their “national” monarchies, such as Bohemia (equated with today’s Czech Republic), Bulgaria, Croatia, Greater Moravia (equated with today’s Slovakia), the Holy Roman Empire (equated with today’s Germany), Hungary, Rus’ (equated with today’s Belarus, Russia or Ukraine), or Walachia and Moldavia (equated with today’s Romania and Moldova). This meta-national master-narrative continues with the period of “great re-awakening of nations” in the nineteenth century, which from the etic perspective, was the busy age of creating ethnolinguistically defined nations by activists through education, the printing press, societies, and statistics.

The formal decision taken in 1872 by Central Europe’s non-national empires and polities to include in censuses the “language question” as a measure of nationality (or one’s membership in a nation) furnished national activists with officially “scientific data” on the demographic sizes of the postulated nations. It was an argument that carried increasingly more weight in the region’s parliaments and regional diets, effectively coaxing the non-national ruling elites to give concessions to speakers of different languages, seen as nations-in-making with some inherent political rights. The target groups, thanks to these concessions and spreading elementary education in national languages, began to believe in this national message, facilitating the creation of postulated nations, often signaled by the rise of ethnonational parties. Gradually, this national message transformed into a novel national identity bridged the centuries-old gaping cleavage between nobles and serfs (peasants). The common national language began to trump birthright, which had firmly kept nobility separate from the serfdom-bound peasantry for over half a millennium.

Few authors and researchers, even if not enamored of the ideology of nationalism, see languages (Einzelsprachen) as artifacts, creations of humans and their groups. Most share the stereotypical and quite mythologized view of languages as near-natural, near-eternal and immutable entities (“living organisms”) that exist independent of human will. Obviously, as in the case of nations, there is no evidence that today’s languages of Czech, Hungarian, Norwegian, Romanian, Russian, Slovak, or Turkish existed a millennium ago. But this claim is equally believed by nationalists and non-nationalists. Indeed, the Finno-Ugric, Germanic, Slavic, Romance, or Turkic dialect continua—from which the aforementioned languages (Einzelsprachen) stem—were around a thousand years ago, but at that time Finno-Ugric, Germanic, Slavic, Romance, or Turkic-speakers in their vast majority were unaware of the Judeo-Graeco-Latin concept of Einzelsprache (“a language”). Furthermore, they were illiterate, and their loyalty was to a monarch and a monotheistic religion, not to a language. With few exceptions, standard languages began to be created across Central Europe on the model of prestigious Latin or (New Testament) Greek only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Literature is readily available on the subject of when the first-ever grammar or dictionary of a given language, and the earliest book or newspaper in this language, were written and published. However, this information does not seem to dispel the myth of Central Europe’s millennium-old languages, because this myth is so useful for “proving” the supposedly long-existence of the extant ethnolinguistic nations connected to these Einzelsprachen. In addition, educational systems in Central Europe’s nation-states quite unan-

mously reproduce this myth from generation to generation, because it constitutes the basis of ethnolinguistic nationalism employed across the region for creating, legitimizing, and maintaining statehood since the early twentieth century.

If Central Europe’s nations and languages are deemed to be a product of nature or divine will, the same must be true of these ethnolinguistic nations’ nation-states. In the meta-national master narrative, the rise of nation-states was seen as inevitable, thus, “naturally” contributing to the delegitimation and destruction of the region’s non-national empires and polities. Somehow, the fact that many of these non-national polities existed much longer than any present-day nation-state (for instance, the Holy Roman Empire, 962–1806) does not dispel this myth of inevitability. On the contrary, it is proposed that today’s nation-states in one way or another correspond to this or that non-national medieval or early modern polity.
It is rarely noticed that available records point to many more unsuccessful projects of building nations, languages, and states than those that were realized, and at present commonly qualified with the adjective "national." National historiographies disregard these failed projects or briefly lasting entities, or retroactively appropriate them for this or that nation. Researchers from outside Central Europe, not trained to follow the tenets of ethnolinguistic nationalism, are not any better at noticing the aforementioned short-lived or failed projects, because so much was written on the national success stories, leaving the short-lived and unrealized projects in the shadows of history. What is more, non-existent states cannot extend grants to interested researchers, while from the perspective of Central Europe's extant nation-states, research on such non-national or failed national projects is not conducive to strengthening national master narratives. Hence, grant-making agencies, as branches of their respective nation-states' administrations, do not prioritize research of this type. And in many cases such research is actively discouraged. However, the "remembrance of things past" is as much composed from what is remembered as from what is cast into oblivion. What is forgotten and repressed constitutes the "dark matter" of history. But without recovering some of this dark matter, it is impossible to understand the emergence of the sociopolitical reality as it currently obtains. This is the practical value of making an effort to look into the neglected corners and nooks of the past, which is, at present, considered taboo by various national master narratives.

Map 18 offers an overview of the short-lived polities in Central Europe whose emergence was generated by the widespread political, economic, and social instability of the "long Great War in the East," which commenced with Greece's annexation of the Cretan State in 1908 and the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), and came to an end with the conclusion of the Russian Civil War (1922) and the Turkish War of Independence (1923). The map's end caesura of 1924 alludes to the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate, which sent reverberations across the entire Muslim world during the 1920s, from Morocco and Egypt to British India and the Dutch East Indies.

During the first part of the 1908–1924 period, the aforementioned instability was at its highest in the Balkans, due to Greece's expansionist policies of irredenta and the Balkan Wars; and at the beginning of the Great War in the western borderlands of the Russian Empire, which found themselves under the Central Powers' occupation. The collapse of previous (typically imperial) administration, occupation and frequent changes in front lines and frontiers sent millions of refugees, deportees, and expellees one way or another on account of their "incorrect" religion or language. Hence, in these areas, short-lived polities emerged, be it the Free State of Icaria in the Aegean or the Republic of Central Albania in the south of Central Europe, while in the north, Land Ober Ost. However, it was the famine and economic collapse in 1916/1917–1918, painfully felt from Scandinavia to the Middle East, and from France to Russia, combined with the marauding armies increasingly left to their own devices, which triggered an entire avalanche of such short-lived polities. Map 18 records almost 80, but it is by no means an exhaustive list. Research and literature available on such polities is scant and often fully incorporated into the respective master narratives, which do not acknowledge any genuine agency to such short-lived polities' leaderships.

The total, or near-total, collapse of the old order, the virtual disappearance of statehood (understood as state administration and services) across vast swaths of Central and Eastern Europe left the inhabitants with no choice but to take care of their own villages, towns, cities, regions, or communities, into their own hands. As a result, hundreds (if not thousands) of workers', peasants' and soldiers' council emerged between 1917 and 1921. Nowadays, the history of these councils is either disregarded or wholesale apportioned to the history of the Soviet-style or Soviet-led communist movement, because the Russian-language word "council," съвет, is invariably and confusingly rendered as "soviet" in English, although to Central Europe's inhabitants who lived at that time, these councils were known as съвет савет in Belarussian, съвет savet in Bulgarian, съвет savet in Serbian, съвет savet in Romanian, съвет savet in Hungarian, padome in Latvian, tarya in Lithuanian, рада in Swedish, конseyi in Turkish, рада in Ukrainian, or вте rat in Yiddish. But prior to, or despite, any ideological choices, the councils, first of all, took care to feed, clothe, and house the populations in their self-appointed charge. For months and even years, they provided rudimentary administration, education, local (token) currencies, postal services, military defense, and a variety of other services across Central Europe. Quite a few were indistinguishable from states, but in name. Political, ethnic, and ideological entrepreneurs time and again seized such state-like organizations and proclaimed them to be polities in their own right. A single polity of this kind could, in a matter of days and weeks, change from a revolutionary (Soviet style) polity to a national one, and then to a non-national one. In most cases it hardly mattered to the population under such a polity's control, the priority being food, clothes, housing, and mere biological survival in the dead of winter.

However, from the sample of the short-lived polities depicted on the map, it is readily visible that at least half of them subscribed to a national program of sorts, over one-quarter to (Soviet-style) socialism (communism), while only one-fifth to some non-national and non-socialist prewar forms of statehood creation and legitimation. Although it is only a sample compiled from readily available sources, this allows the conclusion that the distinctive political preference was for nationalism and socialism (communism), while the traditional forms of statehood creation, legitimation, and maintenance were generally rejected. The "traditional" forms of politics and statehood, as developed in the post-Napoleonic nineteenth century, were not trusted any longer, and generally blamed, alongside the traditional (noble) elites, for the unprecedented continent-scale conflagration of the Balkan Wars, the Great War, and the related national, revolutionary, and peasant wars. The hope was that something new must be tried to stop a repeat of this tragedy, which for almost two decades, destroyed the peace and livelihood of tens of millions.
GOVERNMENT OF SOUTHERN RUSSIA (11 Feb 1920-10 Jul 1922)

REPUBLIC OF PERLOJA (5-28 Nov 1918)

UNITED BALTIQUE DUCHY (15 May 1919-9 Sept 1922)

CRIMEAN PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC (12 Dec 1917-Jan 1918 CT) RÚÇ

DON REPUBLIC (ALMIGHTY DON HOST) (18 May 1918-Feb 1922) RÚÇ

UKRAINIAN STATE (HETMANATE) (29 Apr-14 Dec 1918) Ru

FREE STATE OF ICARIA (4 Dec 1912-22 Jan 1913)

FREE STATE OF SCHWENTEN (9 Jan-11 Jun 1919)

FREE STATE OF UPPER SILESIA (30 Oct 1918-26 Jul 1920)

MEMEL TERRITORY (29 Oct-1 Dec 1918)

MEMEL TERRITORY National polity

NAISSAAR. Revolutionary or Soviet-style polity

NAISSAAR Revolutionary or Soviet-style polity

POLAND. Interwar state

SUIDETENLAND. Non-national and non-revolutionary polity

FREE STATE OF UPPER SILESIA Unrealized polity project