A “‘Physics’ of Power”

Phase Transitions and Turbulence in the Antinomian Controversy

From 1636 to 1638, the Massachusetts Bay Colony was shaken by its first substantial crisis. Anne Hutchinson, who was later identified by John Winthrop as the main source of that controversy, had come to America from Boston, England, in 1634. Not a part of Winthrop’s party in the first wave of settlers, she and her husband had nevertheless very early decided to follow John Cotton, who had been the minister in the Hutchinsons’ English parish, and who had been known for his rebelliously Puritan leanings. The Hutchinsons belonged to a group that Cotton described as “some scores of godly persons in Boston in Lincolnshire . . . who entered into a covenant with the Lord and with one another to follow after the Lord in the purity of his worship” (“The Way of the Congregational Churches” 198). In Boston, Massachusetts, the Hutchinsons were admitted as church members—Anne more than a week later than her husband, which was quite an unusual practice for married couples—and built their house opposite the house of the Winthrop family, close to the house of the Cottons.

In the year that the Hutchinsons came to New England, John Winthrop, after four years as governor, had been defeated for reelection. The Massachusetts Bay Colony was anything but stable: different visions and plans conflicted with each other, not only on the civil but also on the ecclesiastical level. Serious controversy started when Anne Hutchinson voiced the opinion that Puritan ministers in the colony were actually preaching two sorts of covenants: the covenant of works and the covenant of grace. The covenant of works was based on the Old Testament contract of God with Adam, in which Adam’s obedience to God’s word was the condition for God’s love. Yet Adam had sinned, failed, and broken that covenant. God then made a new covenant with mankind—the New Testament covenant of grace based on Christ’s sacrifice and mankind’s redemption, which bestowed unconditional grace on the elect. But how could one know that one was elect? According to Puritan theology, only sanctification, the visible act of leading a righteous life [according to the law], could serve as evidence for the elects’
salvation—which for Hutchinson was a clear sign that the Boston Puritans were ultimately preaching a covenant of works, which asserted that only a person’s good deeds could earn him or her a place in heaven. Hutchinson felt that the believers should not be bound by the law set up by the ministers, but instead should rely for salvation on the covenant of grace, on Christ’s gift of free and unconditional grace. Ultimately, even if the Puritan ministers officially held that believers were saved by grace and not by works, it was only through obedience to the law that an individual could gain salvation. For Hutchinson, however, there was no intrinsic connection between the gift of grace and the righteousness of a believer. Quite the contrary, the very fact of striving after signs of grace was for her a proof that grace had not been granted. According to Hutchinson, this covenant of grace was taught only by John Cotton, whose religious doctrine she was following. Hutchinson, known and respected both as the wife of a wealthy merchant and for her knowledge of herbal medicine and her competency as a midwife, soon began to hold weekly meetings in her home to discuss the sermons she heard in Boston, most notably those of the Pastor John Wilson, who also preached a covenant of works. Although this is simplifying things, what was at stake theologically was basically the temporal sequence [and priority] of two important stages on the way to sainthood—justification and sanctification. Justification is that moment in the life of a sinner when he knows that he is redeemed, whereas sanctification is that openly visible, ‘saintly’ behavior displayed by the truly saved. This, then, according to Winthrop, were Hutchinson’s “two dangerous errors: 1. That the person of the Holy Ghost dwells in a justified person. 2. That no sanctification can help to evidence to us our justification.—From these two grew many branches” (Journal 193). Hutchinson condemned the ‘legalist’ preachers such as John Wilson and Thomas Shepard [in fact, the vast majority of Boston ministers] who held that justification was just a first step in the conversion process. Such a doctrine led to the covenant of works, which meant that mankind had to pay back its debt [the fact that Adam had sinned] by following God’s law [which for the Body|Politic meant legal regulations, a ‘pragmatic’ translation of his law into the communal laws]. Instead, Hutchinson held that the covenant of grace was based on the very individual and intimate moment of justification. The gift of free grace and the knowledge of one’s justification in Christ made abiding by the law an unnecessary step in the process of conversion.

Winthrop, in his journal, reports that Cotton claimed that the struggle between the two parties—the Puritan elite and the oppositional party, labeled Antinomian [literally, against the aw] by later historians, and also connected to the Familists¹ by their enemies—was basically over “magnifying
the grace of God; one party seeking to advance the grace of God within us, and the other to advance the grace of God towards us, (meaning by the one justification, and by the other sanctification)” (208). Thus, according to the historian Michael Winship, in one of the most recent assessments of the Antinomian controversy, “the core energizing question of the controversy was whether or not you had to know that God loved you before you could trust the signs that you loved him” (228). For Winthrop and his followers, obedience to God’s law was a guarantee that God had offered his grace to the believer, independent of the fact that the believer eventually experienced that grace directly. For Hutchinson and her followers, trusting in these signs was illusionary, to say the least, since it opened the way to hypocrisy. The only trustworthy sign that counted for them was the direct, personal, and immediately felt experience of God’s grace. Hutchinson, in her weekly meetings, which were attended by up to eighty people from all classes of Boston society, not only commented on the Sunday sermons but also interpreted them, pointing out doctrinal errors, and discussed her own way of thinking about these issues. The situation became even more pressing when the Hutchinson party proposed to put John Cotton in John Wilson’s place as pastor, and to let the newly arrived John Wheelwright, Hutchinson’s brother-in-law and a radical Puritan minister, take Cotton’s place as copastor. Winthrop and the elders saw the need to settle these questions and asked Cotton to comment and take sides. When the situation escalated further—Wheelwright preached a vehemently anti-establishment fast-day sermon, and the Hutchinson party refused to take up arms in the Pequot War—Winthrop, who returned to the office of governor in 1637, put leading followers of Hutchinson, and Anne Hutchinson herself, on trial. As a result, some of her followers were fined, disenfranchised, impeached, and disarmed. When she finally claimed that God had communicated her knowledge to her in a direct revelation, Anne Hutchinson was banned and excommunicated in March 1638. She started a new life in Roger Williams’s colony of Rhode Island, and she and her family were eventually killed by Indians on Long Island in 1643.

Later historians have variously seen Anne Hutchinson as a heretic, anarchist, rebel, and protofeminist. Although there are other important players in the Antinomian controversy than just Winthrop and Hutchinson—for example John Cotton, Thomas Shepard, John Wheelwright, and Henry Vane, the governor of Massachusetts in 1636 and Hutchinson’s most prominent follower—Winthrop, in his highly subjective account of the controversy, *A Short Story of the Rise, Reign, and Ruine of the Antinomians, Familists & Libertines,* set the direction for later histories by focusing on the conflict between the woman Anne Hutchinson and the magistrates, ministers, and elders, all male. Janice Knight has pointed out the retrospective [and retro-
active] strategy of Winthrop and the male Puritan elite of “naturalizing their own authority as inevitable, as ‘orthodox,’ and rewriting opposition as ‘heresy’” (10). In the multiplicity of conflicting visions and dissenting voices within the Massachusetts Bay Colony—apart from Hutchinson, for example, there had also been Roger Williams, who was banished in 1635—Winthrop’s dominated, and his approach came to be identified as the Puritan way. The point might be made that the Antinomian controversy in fact shaped what came to be known as Puritan Orthodoxy.3 Situating the conflict that later historians [following Winthrop] have presented as a [gendered] struggle between Winthrop and Hutchinson in a wider context, I want to follow Knight in her account of two distinct voices emerging within Massachusetts Bay Puritanism that can be traced back to its beginnings in England. Knight identifies two parties—“the ‘Intellectual Fathers’ and the ‘Spiritual Brethren’” (2),4 defying Perry Miller’s monolithic version of Puritan orthodoxy.5 In the first group, we find people such as Thomas Shepard, Thomas Hooker, Peter Bulkeley, and John Winthrop, basing theology, their teachings, and their rhetoric on the work of the English Puritan William Ames. The second group consists of people such as John Cotton, John Wheelwright, and Henry Vane, who followed the English Puritan Richard Sibbes. The “Fathers” stressed humiliation and obedience in preparing the heart for grace and good works as evidence of salvation, picturing God as a sometimes merciless sovereign. The “Brethren,” on the other hand, emphasized the emptiness and passivity of the believer; for them, human effort was neither preparation nor a trustworthy sign when it comes to grace, because a merciful and benevolent God gives grace freely. The two groups practice different brands of orthodox Calvinism, distinguished in particular in their stances toward grace, justification, and sanctification; both groups were engaged in the struggle for orthodoxy in the Massachusetts Bay Colony.6 The Antinomian problem was not due to an infection from the outside but reflected a schism in the very heart of Puritanism. Amy Schrager Lang proposes to read the conflict in terms of Raymond Williams’s distinction between the dominant and the residual aspects of a given culture, assigning Hutchinson’s understanding of grace the position of the residual—a concept, as Williams describes it, “formed in the past, but . . . still active in the cultural process, not only and often not at all as an element of the past, but as an effective element of the present” (122). Lang identifies Hutchinson’s understanding as the residue of an older piety, based on the Geneva bible, an older translation than the King James. Following Williams’s distinction, Lang points out that, “however, the ‘residual’ elements of a culture may contain the ‘oppositional’” (49). While I agree with her on that point, I see the problem as situated at a somewhat deeper level. The point is not so much that Hutchinson’s understanding, as
residual, turns oppositional. From the background I have outlined, it is clear that instead Hutchinson, aligned as she was with Cotton’s teachings and the doctrines of the “Spiritual Brethren,” was involved in a struggle for dominance: that is, both parties somehow carried the seed of the ‘residual’ in them, and the outcome of the controversy would determine which side was going to turn ‘oppositional.’ The Antinomian controversy, then, was not so much about the struggle of the opposition against an established orthodoxy as it was about the construction and emergence of such an orthodoxy, since it “engaged two legitimate heirs of the magisterial reformers, two traditions which might have coexisted as orthodoxies within the commonwealth” (Knight 22–23).

Yet it is simplifying things to claim that the controversy was about religion, politics, or even both—more to the point, it was situated at “the unstable intersection of experience and doctrine, where a broad range of unresolved theological, pastoral, and even geopolitical problems interacted and collided” (Winship 13). The power struggle inherent in the controversy, then, cannot be captured in terms of a bipolar conflict of authority and resistance, but only in a more complex framework. Here I want to refer to Foucault’s analysis and conception of power. According to Foucault, power is not an object that can be possessed by a sovereign or a political institution: “Power in the substantive sense, ‘le pouvoir,’ doesn’t exist.” It operates like “an open, more-or-less coordinated . . . cluster of relations” (“Confession,” Power/Knowledge 199). Power amounts to more than just governmental power or, in general, a system of domination. For Foucault, power is a “multiform production of relations of domination” (“Power and Strategies,” Power/Knowledge 142). The state apparatus is just a solidified ancillary construction: “Power is not possessed . . . power is always a definite form of momentary or constantly reproduced encounters among a definite number of individuals” (“Power and Norm” 59–60). It “functions like a piece of machinery” (Discipline and Punish 177). It emerges from a dynamic process of various force fields, both heterogeneous and local struggles and conflicts and is always relational in its operations, always a field constituted of differences, of various and manifold forces. In his comment on Foucault’s conception of power, Deleuze stresses that it is not just a repressive force, not just violence—it is rather a force that “defines itself by its power to affect other forces (to which it is related) and to be affected by other forces . . . The power to be affected is like a matter of force, and the power to affect is like a function of force” (Foucault 71–72). Thus, power is not only a force operating on objects and other persons, not a one-way ‘executive force,’ not a cause unaltered by its effects, but rather a set of feedback loops within a complex and dynamic system of a multiplicity of constituent elements. As
Foucault claims, “rather than ask ourselves how the sovereign appears to us in his lofty isolation, we should try to discover how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, thoughts, etc.” (“Two Lectures,” *Power/Knowledge* 97).

In a move that shows that his project will not be solely concerned with the effects of discourse on bodies, Foucault shifts from the merely discursive to materiality, to an underlying operative force field combining discursive and extradiscursive effects. He ultimately calls for the “introduction, into the very roots of thought, of notions of chance, discontinuity and materiality” (“Discourse on Language” 231). Foucault is not referring to simple randomness here, but to the notion of complexity—as developed, for example, by Michel Serres, who was a colleague of Foucault’s at Clermont-Ferrand and the University of Paris VIII at Vincennes (see Serres and Latour 37); by Deleuze; and by Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, whose groundbreaking work inspired both Serres and Deleuze, whose findings and applications Prigogine and Stengers, in turn, acknowledge.

Foucault stresses the event-character of power and of history; he wants to substitute dynamic, complex processes for notions of continuity and teleology. Here the interface of science and history is particularly fruitful, since there has been a mutual fertilization of the disciplines during the last years—following a trend in American history that reaches back at least to Henry Adams’s attempt to read history in terms of physics. Prigogine|Stengers state: “We have seen new aspects of time being progressively incorporated into physics, while the ambitions of omniscience inherent in classical science were progressively rejected . . . Indeed, history began by concentrating mainly on human societies, after which attention was given to the temporal dimensions of life and geology. The incorporation of time into physics appears as the last stage of a progressive reinsertion of history into the natural and social sciences” (208). According to De Landa, if we study an open physical system—such as a human being, or a community or society—“we need to know its history to understand its current dynamical state” (*A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History* 14). Likewise, as “much as history has infiltrated physics, we must now allow physics to infiltrate history” (15). It is with regard to this background that I want to expand Foucault's notion of a “‘physics’ of power” (*Discipline and Punish* 177), which he primarily related to the techniques and technologies of surveillance, and relate it to Serres’s claim that “History is indeed a physics” (*Birth of Physics* 179), and argue for a political physics in the sense of a systemic dynamic underlying history, power, and politics, which conceives of both politics and physics as “the science of relations . . . conventions, assemblies” (123).
In the Antinomian controversy, such a physics is first of all detectable on the metaphorical level, as a struggle almost between two phases in the thermodynamic sense, between two states of matter—the solid and the liquid. The “Intellectual Fathers” such as Winthrop, Shepard, Hooker, following their teacher William Ames, employ a metaphorical language quite different from that of the “Spiritual Brethren”—Cotton, following the rhetoric of Richard Sibbes, and Hutchinson and her followers [though it can be argued that they constitute yet another faction within this group, one more radical and more active in the political sense as well].

The covenant of works proposed by the Intellectual Fathers stresses God’s sovereignty and power. In their rhetoric, images of domination prevail. In a typical example, Ames draws up a taxonomy of God’s faculties—“the proper order for conceiving these things is first, to think of God’s posse, his power, second, his scire, knowledge; third, his velle, will” (92)—an example of a particular Puritan style that, for example, Winthrop’s “A Modell of Christian Charity,” with its dialectical composition of questions, answers, and objections, and the systematic consecutive numbering of points of interest, follows as well. Such a style translates God’s law into rational and logical structures, subdividing it into ‘operational’ closed units. According to Serres, such rational projects are just thinly veiled attempts at control and “construct a real which is a rational one, we construct a real, among many possibilities, which is a rational one, among other possibilities, just as we pour concrete over the ground” (Genesis 25). Winthrop translates this structure onto that of the Body|Politic as well, claiming the God-given necessity of hierarchical organization and differences among the Body|Politic’s members. These necessary differences—and potential flaws in the stability of the Body|Politic—are cemented into a monolithic block by the ligament of love through which all members are “knitt more nearly together in the Bonds of brotherly affection” (“Modell” 34). According to Winthrop, the perfidy of the Antinomians lay in abusing the bonds of affection as channels for indoctrination, for infecting the blood circulating in the Body|Politic: “Being once acquainted with them, they would strangely labour to insinuate themselves into their affections, by loving salutes, humble carriage, kind invitements, friendly visits, and so they would winne upon men, and steale into their bosomes before they were aware . . . and so, having gotten them into their Web, they could easily poison them by degrees” (Hall 204). As this quote shows, Winthrop introduces a new approach to the ‘corporeal rhetorics,’ distinguishing between a healthy and a poisoned body. In the following, I will concentrate on two physical metaphors employed during the Antinomian controversy: the metaphor of the body, in particular in connection with con-
tagion and infection, and the metaphor of different states of matter, of solids and liquids.

As James Schramer and Timothy Sweet have pointed out, “bodily analogies are the controlling metaphors” (6) in the Antinomian controversy. The correspondence of the best-proportioned body and the perfectly knit Body Politic was at once shaken and subsequently reaffirmed when Hutchinson and then one of her close associates, Mary Dyer, gave birth to a malformed, stillborn infant. When Winthrop became aware of Dyer’s “monstrous birth,” as he referred to it, he immediately sensed the opportunity to find evidence for the physical effect of Antinomian tendencies: “Then God himselfe was pleased to step in with his casting voice, and bring in his owne vote and suffrage from heaven . . . in causing the two fomenting women in the time of the height of the Opinions to produce out of their wombs, as before they had out of their braines, such monstrous births as no Chronicle (I thinke) hardly ever recorded the like” (Hall 214). Winthrop ordered that the corpse of Dyer’s infant be exhumed for examination. Upon viewing the corpse, he described it as monstrous and misshapen: “It had a face, but no head, and the ears stood upon the shoulders and were like an ape’s; it had no forehead, but over the eyes four horns, hard and sharp; two of them were above one inch long, the other two shorter; the eyes standing out and the mouth also; the nose hooked upward; all over the breast and back full of sharp pricks and scales, like a thornback; the navel and all the belly, with the distinction of the sex, were where the back should be, and the back and hips before, where the belly should have been; behind the shoulders it had two mouths, and in each of them a piece of red flesh sticking out; it had arms and legs as other children, but instead of toes, it had on each foot three claws, like a young fowl with sharp talons” (281)—the headless child inversing the bodily order based on Christ’s model of a perfect human body. With regard to Anne Hutchinson’s fetus, Winthrop wrote that Hutchinson gave birth not to one but to thirty monsters, several “lumps” of tissue “in the form of a globe, not much unlike the swims of some fish, so confusedly knit together by so many several strings (which I conceive were the beginning of veins and nerves) so that it was impossible either to number the small round pieces in every lump, much less to discern from whence every string did fetch its original, they were so snarled one within the another” (Journal 265, my emphasis). The perfectly knit body is endangered by its dark twin, the “confusedly knit” body. Apart from the inversion of the normal bodily order, what is striking in the description of the monsters is their noncategorizability: horns, scales, and claws make one a monster by its sheer hybridity. Hybrid bodies mock the notion of organic unity and transgress the ontological categories
upon which a comprehensive representation of reality—a political fiction in its own right—can be grounded. In their indecidability, Mary Douglas claims, such hybrid bodies “confound the general scheme of the world” (*Purity and Danger* 55).

The analogy between the proliferation of monsters and the Antinomians’ “multiplying new Opinions” (Hall 218) was not lost on Winthrop: “And see how the wisdome of God fitted this judgement to her sinne every way, for looke as she had vented misshapen opinions, so she must bring forth deformed monsters, and as about 30 Opinions in number, so many monsters” (214). In order to protect and affirm the well-knit Body|Politic, these elements had to be excluded. The bodily metaphor is used most stringently in Winthrop’s rhetorics of bodily contamination. In his account of the crisis, as well as in the reports and other document relating to Hutchinson’s trial, references to her opinions as a cancerous illness that has “straight infected” (202) and threatens to contaminate Boston’s Body|Politic abound. To those who regarded Hutchinson’s opinions as “poison” (204) and “venome” (207), she herself by analogy became a virus or “Trojan horse” (“Good News” 206), an enemy within. The seemingly fixed borders of the colonial body have proved to be porous, and Winthrop saw it as the paramount task of the magistrates and elders to cure that body and drive out the infection.

It might be fruitful to compare Winthrop’s rhetoric of epidemics and infection, as well as the strategies resulting from it, with accounts of the plague in England during that period. The spiritual infection of the Antinomian controversy occurred close to the cusp between two serious waves of the bubonic plague in England, in 1625 and 1665. In his account of the political implications of epidemics, Foucault distinguishes between two completely different disciplinary strategies, connected to the leper and the plague victim of the late seventeenth century, respectively—and it is interesting to note that Winthrop refers to Hutchinson’s opinions as both “Plague” (Hall 202) and “Leprosie” (373). The leper of the Middle Ages had been met with the strategy of banishment from the community. In order to keep the community pure, Foucault writes, “the leper was caught up in a practice of rejection, of exile-enclosure” (*Discipline and Punish* 198). Boccacio’s *Decameron* shows that this strategy did not necessary mean the banishment of the infected and their subsequent expulsion out of the city. On the contrary, due to the strict separation of the Body|Politic into the aristocracy and the mass of people, the nobles fled the infected cities in order to gather the “fragments of the elite community into a single social order, self-enclosed and pure” (Armstrong and Tennenhouse 92). Without aristocratic control, the city indulged in what Bakhtin has called the carnivalesque. In a description of the 1625 plague, the Elizabethan dramatist and pamphleteer Thomas Dekker, a Puri-
tan, describes the effect of the epidemic on those left behind in the infected
cities, who “are all merry all iocund; no Plague frights them . . . walking,
talking, laughing, in the Streets, blaspheming, selling, buying, swearing. In
Tauernes, and Ale-houses, drinking, roaring, and surfetting” (151). Follow-
ing Foucault, the strategy here is one of “massive, binary division between
one set of people and another” (*Discipline and Punish* 198). Winthrop, in
his *Short Story*, can be seen following that same model, identifying Anne
Hutchinson as the Typhoid Mary of the spiritual infection of both individ-
ual bodies and the whole Body|Politic in the Massachusetts Bay Colony:
“But the last and worst of all, which most suddainly diffused the venome of
these opinions into the very veines and vitals of the People in the Country,
was Mistris Hutchinsons double weekly lecture, which she kept under a
pretence of repeating Sermons” (Hall 207).

Apart from the theological dissent, the result of that infection [Winthrop’s
reference to the Familists, a sect believed to indulge in free love between the
sexes, points in that direction] was that it “gives way to Libertanisme . . .
Licentiousness and sinfull Liberty” (358). John Cotton, in Hutchinson’s
trial, even suspected that the “promiscuous and filthie comminge together of
men and Woemen without Distinction or Relation of Marriage, will eventu-
ally follow” (Hall 372). For the modern reader, he evokes the scenario of the
leper’s carnival of Dekker, Bakhtin, and Foucault, of Foucault’s “collective
festival, . . . laws transgressed” (*Discipline and Punish* 198), or, in Win-
throp’s words, of a world “turned upside down” (Hall 253).

In Winthrop’s account, Hutchinson and her infectious, dangerous opinion-
s become one, so much that “shee being questioned by some, who mar-
veled that such opinions should spread so fast, shee made answer, that where
ever shee came they must and they should spread” (264). By propagating
the “Leprosie” and using her victims as multipliers, Hutchinson was able to
infect almost the whole Body|Politic—but not quite: “It was a wonder upon
what a sudden the whole Church of Boston (some few excepted) were be-
come her new converts, and infected with her opinions” (ibid.). Those “few
excepted,” the bedrock of orthodoxy|morality due to God’s providence, were
“so many of the Magistrates, and Elders” (265)—the ‘head’ of the commu-
nity. And this head had to gather together, and take action—and they did,
by reelecting Winthrop governor in 1636. Hutchinson’s trial, presided over
by Winthrop, resulted in the claim to “cut off like a Gangrene” (387) the
infectious part, and ultimately in Hutchinson’s excommunication: “There-
for I command you in the name of Christ Jesus and of this Church as a
Leper to withdraw your selfe out of the Congregation” (388). As a cure for
the leprous Body|Politic, and true to the traditional organicist conception,
the head had to be separated and even safeguarded from the body, in order
to ensure the continuity of the aristocratic bloodline [or, the Puritan elite and orthodox doctrine] and to guarantee the survival of the Body|Politic.

During the ‘real’ plagues, this separation seemingly followed an almost ‘natural topology,’ since the plague more often than not struck the poor—of course, this fact was an effect of the separation and not ‘natural’ at all. Dekker, in typical Puritan fashion equating plague with punishment for sin, puts the outcome of the separation of those who govern from those who are governed in terms of an arithmetical equation. Conjuring up a divine mathematics, he comments on the marks the plague leaves on the bodies of its victims: “God will not have his Strokes hidden: his marks must bee seen . . . His Arithmetick brookes no crossing” (151–52). On the debtors’ side of God’s account book, then, there is only “the people’s mass body” (Bakhtin 255). A calculation completely different from Dekker’s was made after the 1665 plague in England, and this difference parallels Foucault’s analysis of two different strategies: “If it is true that the leper gave rise to rituals of exclusion . . . then the plague gave rise to disciplinary projects” (Discipline and Punish 198). In his tract “Of Lessening of Plagues,” William Petty, by employing a “political arithmetick” (1) that does not match with Dekker’s ‘God’s Arithmetick,’ proposes “nothing less than the presence of a new way of imagining the body politic” (Armstrong and Tennenhause 94). In contrast to the binary division between head and body [the leper strata-gem of exclusion], Petty, in connecting the effects of the plague to an economic calculation,11 rewrites the strategy of quarantine in such a way that the measures of isolation, which had been applied only to safeguard the aristocracy, are now to be applied to the whole body, by “sealing off . . . each family unit as if it were an elite community in its own right” (ibid.). Whereas the separation between head and body, “a mass among which it was useless to differentiate” (Discipline and Punish 198), had led to the uncontrolled spreading of the infection among the population, resulting in the deaths of thousands of people until the virus could find no more hosts, the Body|Politic was now regarded as a differentiated and structured body, composed of individual units. These isolated households, then, prevented the disease from spreading infinitely because contact between the isolated cells was prohibited ceaselessly by the apparatus of bureaucracy that emerged: everything was under the “absolute control of the magistrates” (196): “The plague is met by order; its function is to sort out every possible confusion: that of the disease, which is transmitted when bodies are mixed together” (197). Ultimately, Petty’s argument “rests upon the idea of economic rationality that governs king and subject alike” (Quint 140), and hence it shows the emergence of a new classification system. In doing so, it also exemplifies a disciplinary project that installed “the penetration of regulation into even the
smallest details of everyday life” (*Discipline and Punish* 198), the power to reach, sustain, and control even the farthest members of the Body|Politic—the subject becomes a numerical figure in the state’s rational invasion of its privacy.

The Antinomian controversy, as I have already pointed out, sits squarely between those two strategies. On the one hand, Winthrop saw the need to exclude the leper from the Body|Politic; on the other hand, he also employed the disciplinary strategies that Foucault connects to the “political dream of the plague” (*Discipline and Punish* 197–98), the power of classification and analysis for “meticulous tactical partitioning” (198). Winthrop and the elders identify [or construct] Anne Hutchinson as the leader of the factitious party: “(*Dux faemina facti*) a woman had been the breeder and nourisher of all this distempers” (Hall 262). Thus, during the trials of the Antinomian controversy, Winthrop classifies and divides the Body|Politic along gender lines in his attempt to further produce hierarchically striated segments of control. The Antinomians’ opinions are even more dangerous, he claims, because Hutchinson, in her perfidiousness, had chosen to first work on the weaker sex, and had not only raised “contentions . . . amongst us, both in Church and State,” but also “in families, setting divisions betwixt husband and wife” (209). As a result, “many families are neglected” (269). As one “cure of this sore” (211), this sore that had preached liberty from all laws, Winthrop and the ministers stressed the covenant of works even more and called for absolute obedience. Against one grave error of the Antinomians—“Error 49. We are not bound to keep a constant course of Prayer in our Families, or privately, unlesse the Spirit stirre us up thereunto” (232)—preaching and praying is employed to counter those “practices that so much pestered the Countrey,” to “cure those that were diseased already, and to give Antidotes to the rest, to preserve them from infection” (212). Through Anne Hutchinson’s dangerous opinions, “a great damage comes to the Common-wealth . . . , which wee that are betrusted with, as the Fathers of the Common-wealth, are not to suffer” (269). By equating the origin of this damage with a woman, by further identifying one important result of that damage as the separation between husband and wife, Winthrop proposes as an antidote the division of the Body|Politic into several households, to be controlled by the husbands: “A family is a little common wealth, and a common wealth is a greate family” (“Defence” 71). The word of God [the law of the father, from which communal law derives] is represented by “the Fathers of the Common-wealth,” the obedience to whom is in turn guaranteed by the obedience to the husband, the paterfamilias. Winthrop clearly saw this isomorphic structure when he accused Hutchinson of having broken the fifth commandment and found her guilty of the “dishonouring of parents”
(Hall 313) on all levels. The seed of her dangerous opinions was the fact that her behavior was “not tolerable nor comely in the sight of God nor fitting for your sex” (312). She had clearly overstepped the boundaries of her gender role, as well as her role as part of the community: “You have stept out of your place, you have rather bine a Husband than a Wife and a preacher than a Hearer; and a Magistrate than a Subject” (382–83). It is important to note, though, that these categories—female versus male, individual versus community—can in fact be seen to be created only within that discourse of the trial. In the same way that Foucault sees the shift of strategies dealing with leprosy or plague as instigating modernity [and with it the ‘constitution’ of categories such as subject, individual, and state], the Antinomian controversy—or, better, the struggle between Winthrop and Hutchinson—might in fact be seen as the first instance in Puritan America in which these concepts were being defined in terms of power relations. By identifying Hutchinson [and, by analogy, Antinomianism] as a virus, Winthrop carefully constructs the dangerous opinions as something that has entered the Body|Politic from the outside—he points out that Hutchinson “had learned her skil in England, and had discovered some of her opinions in the Ship” (Hall 263). Such a construction makes it easier to argue against the virus, to push it out again, out of an otherwise stable and healthy body.

Winthrop institutes a kind of scaling of the communal body in terms of patriarchal chains of representation and command—oedipalizing the whole Body|Politic—and prayer [the covenant of works] clearly involved obedience to the ‘Father’ on every level of the scale [God, magistrates, husbands].

This “mania for a sub-division that is always in complicity with power and control” (Berressem, “Serres Reads Pynchon”) finds its parallel in the palisading of towns and in the cutting up of the land into allotments for different use [forests for timber, potential fields, grassy areas, etc.] and size, according to the social rank of the owner—inscribing the orderly and hierarchical system of English society onto the territory (see Cronon 72–73).

Appropriately, the Antinomian controversy was paralleled by an intensification of what might be called alien exclusion laws: out of fear that the Antinomian party might grow because of the arrival of more followers from England as new settlers in the colonies, it was ordered in 1637 that “no towne or pson shall receive any stranger, resorting hither wth intent to reside in this jurisdiction, nor shall allow any lot or habitation to any, or intertaine any such above three weeks, except such pson shall have allowance vnder the hands of some one of the counsel, or of two other of the magistrates” (Shurtleff 1:196). The Body|Politic had to be closed off against viruses and alien intruders alike, in order to safeguard its stability. It became more and more difficult, however, to sustain the difference between inside and outside, host
and virus. Winthrop drives the point home even more clearly in a comment on an Antinomian dispute in court: “Another occasion of their discontent, and of the rest of that party, was an order, which the court had made, to keep out all such persons as might be dangerous to the commonwealth, by imposing a penalty upon all such as should retain any, etc., above three weeks, which should not be allowed by some of the magistrates” (Journal 219). As a response to that discontent, Winthrop wrote “A Defence of an Order at Court Made in the Year 1637,” where he stressed the court’s decree that “none should be received to inhabit within this jurisdiction but such as should be allowed by some of the magistrates” (79). Again, Winthrop employed the metaphor of the unitary Body|Politic to make his point: “The intent of the law is to preserve the welfare of the body; and for this ende to have none received into any fellowship with it who are likely to disturb the same” (81–82). In this attempt to close it off from the inside, and in on itself, the Body|Politic is imagined and treated as a solid object, with fixed boundaries—and it is here that the differentiations between well-knit and perfect bodies, on the one hand, and confusedly knit and monstrous bodies, on the other hand, align with physical states such as the solid and the liquid.

In identifying and giving contours to the Puritan Body|Politic, some of the orthodox players involved in the controversy even compare the community to a huge stone building. In his Survey of the Summe of Church Discipline, Thomas Hooker comments on the architecture and static nature of such a building and states that “in the building, if the parts be neither mortised nor braced, as there will be little beauty, so there can be no strength. Its so in setting up the frames of societies among men, when their minds and hearts are not mortified by mutuall consent of subjection one to another, there is no expectation of any successful proceedings with the advantage to the publike. To this appertains that of the Apostle, Every one submit unto another . . . Hence evry part is subject to the whole, and must be serviceable to the good thereof” (188, my emphasis). In this extraordinary passage, the terms mortise and mortify almost become one—the building of a stable, solid community cannot be thought of without also asking its members to humble and almost deaden their hearts and minds, their individuality and singularity, in order to combine, to mortise, or, to use Winthrop’s favorite term to knit together into a fixed Body|Politic, a “good estate” (Hall 303) in the material sense of the term.

Hooker again refers to the metaphor [is it really a metaphor?] of mortifying and humbling when he claims that “the soule must be broken and humbled, before the Lord Jesus Christ can, or will dwell therein, and before faith can be wrought therein” (The Soules Implantation 3). In a similar vein,
Thomas Shepard claims that “the gate [to heaven] is strait, and therefore a man must sweat and strive to enter . . . it is a tough work, a wonderful hard matter, to be saved” (Works 1:64). Not only is it a “hard matter” to be saved, but the believers had to turn themselves into hard matter, by hard work, to be worthy of God’s grace. The ‘solidification’ of community and individuals follows the idea of a ‘practical theology,’ a Calvinist theology of the body conceptualized by William Ames and John Robinson, in which the idea of ‘proper conduct’ or *eupraxia* is closely connected to the idea of the covenant of works in that it stresses obedience to the law, rigorous activity, and visible good deeds as proofs of the believer’s chosenness by God (see Ames 223–26). According to Robinson, man must “labor . . . in dressing the garden; and . . . eat bread by the sweat of his brow” (113). Furthermore, “labor brings strength to the body, and vigour to the mind” (114). Mixing bodily exercise, lawful discipline, and theology, the concept of *eupraxia* aimed at creating not only bodily strength and laboriousness, but also what Lyndal Roper has called the “musculature of morals” (24)—a ‘theological hard body,’ disciplining and controlling its ‘wetware.’ One way to translate this solidification into the Body|Politic was by means of the magistrates’ control. As Shepard warns apropos of the alien exclusion law, “if you would have the walls of Magistracy be broken down . . . Let every man then once one day in the year turn Magistrate, and out-face Authority, and profess ’tis his liberty . . . Would you have this state in time to degenerate into Tyranny? . . . Be gentle and open the door to all comers that may cut our throats in time” (Works 2:160). The solidity and permanence is achieved only by complete subjection to the law, to the massivity of authority that Winthrop and the Intellectual Fathers envision the magistracy to be. However, such a stone-like solidity also implies a discreteness of matter, of a society built of self-contained entities, each one ‘vertically controlled’ by authority in the hierarchical scale proposed by Winthrop. Yet, as Serres observes, “men are not stones, no community can be built in this manner” (Genesis 124). In fact, in the context of the various states of matter of the Body|Politic discussed so far, it can be argued that the solid Body|Politic favored by Winthrop, Shepard, and others is not so much something categorically other to Hutchinson’s fluid and monstrous Body|Politic, but rather the effect of differing time scales of the fluid state of matter as such. As De Landa rightly points out, some solids are in fact ‘arrested liquids,’ that is, they retain the amorphous spatial arrangement of molecules that a liquid displays but *flow much more slowly* (Intensive Science 90).¹⁵ Such a hydraulic model of physics treats solids as a case of stasis within flux, as opposed to a solid model of physics that treats liquid as a special case of solidity. Thus, Winthrop’s solid Body|Politic appears not so much built of stones as a slowed down and cooled
viscous fluid, such as magma, a liquid that appears to be solid because it “does not have a well defined phase transition from the liquid state” (ibid.). Winthrop|Shepard’s scaling and hierarchization as an act of ‘classing’ follows Serres’ definition: “Classing remains a static act: either it is the result of dynamism becoming exhausted or it is the most effective obstruction against a strong flux, to disperse it between baffles, to slow it down, to stop it, to freeze it” (Genesis 93). In Winthrop|Shepard’s case, I argue, it is both—the Puritan orthodoxy is the result of the originary dynamism exhausted, and at the same time a means of controlling those tendencies that still partake in this “strong flux.” The fluidity and turbulence are not external but fundamental to the solid Body|Politic. Thus, as Serres observes, “the solid is the multiple reduced to the unitary” (Genesis 108), the solid reduces and slows down the dynamics of the many into the statics of the one. For the unyielding stone walls of authority, Hutchinson trades the fluidity and dynamics of the whole social field.

The combined coercive power of the magistracy and ministers wanted to ensure the Body|Politic’s stability and order by closing it off and putting a stop to excess and proliferation from both outside and inside—be it of dangerous immigrants, dangerous opinions, or the people’s access to [or limitation of] that control. Up to 1634, the General Court had been composed of the magistrates and all the freemen. As the colony expanded and the settlements spread over large distances, this direct gathering of the community became too time-consuming, and the freemen were represented by the deputies, constituting a separate body in the colony’s government. In order to defend their power against the larger number of deputies, the magistrates claimed their right to have the final word—a magisterial veto, or negative vote—in controversies between the magistracy and the deputies. Seeing the danger of the magistracy’s virtually unlimited power and arbitrary government, the deputies protested. In his reply, Winthrop argued that the negative vote was not an infringement of the people’s liberty but a necessity for the welfare of the Body|Politic and its people, a means to “preserve them, if by any occatiō they should be in danger: I cannot liken it better to any thinge then to the brake of a windmill: wch hathe no power, to move the runninge worke: but it is of speciall vse, to stoppe any violent motiō, wch in some extraordinary tempest might endanger the wholl fabricke” (Life and Letters 2:434). Popular power has to be suppressed and controlled, not because of the possible limits it might set to the magistracy but because it threatens to destroy and fracture the Body|Politic, dismembering it into disordered, chaotic elements. It is a “violent motion” that is particular dangerous to the Body|Politic insofar its “wholl fabricke”—because of its stony solidity—is too static and too slow to deal with these forces.
It is this fear of the elements—of what is chaotic, turbulent, not predictable, not clearly defined—that informs the Intellectual Fathers’ discourse about the Antinomian party. Edward Johnson visualized Hutchinson and her followers as “this floud of errors violently beating against the bankes of Church and civill Government” (133). Shepard denounces their actions as “Balaamitish ravishments, and hypocritical pangs, and land-flood affections” (Works 2:172), illogical and disordered strategies that aim at God’s grace not “in way of ratiocination (for this was evidence and so a way of works), but . . . by immediate revelation in an absolute promise” (God’s Plot 65). In Winthrop’s account, metaphors of the elements abound—the Antinomian controversy is mentioned in one breath with uncontrollable meteorological events: “After we had escaped . . . the dangers at Sea, . . . our wise God . . . sent a new storme after us” (Hall 201). As Serres has stated, people are “afraid of gases and liquids” (Genesis 108) because of their unpredictability and disorderly behavior. Since “our metaphysics, metaphorically, feels the effects of our physics” (107), our metaphysics, necessarily, are “metaphorics of the solid” (108). Concepts, ratiocination, are the foundation of that solid [meta]physics.\(^\text{16}\) Winthrop, Shepard, and Hooker not only refer to the Body|Politic as a solid building, based on a necessary solid foundation—they also have to look for and destroy the foundation of the opposite party: “being driven to the foundation and it being found that Mrs. Hutchinson is she that hath deprived all the ministers and hath been the cause of what is fallen out, why we must take away the foundation and the building will fall” (Hall 318). The Antinomian foundation, however—fluid and turbulent as it is—must be “a foundation [built] in water or on the wind” (Genesis 108).\(^\text{17}\) In fact, one might argue, the ‘orthodox’ magistracy and ministers feared that the Antinomian party would erode their stable building in their attempt “to pull all that building downe, and lay better and safer foundations in Free Grace” (Hall 204).\(^\text{18}\) The Antinomians’ ultimate aim, in the eyes of Winthrop and the orthodox party, was to cause the “dissolution . . . of Church and Commonwealth” (299) and to wash away its foundation\(^\text{19}\)—“this was ever their method, to drop a little at once into their followers as they were capable, and never would administer their Physicke, till they had first given good preparatives to make it worke, and then stronger & stronger potions, as they found the Patient able to beare” (206)—simultaneously infecting and dissolving the Body|Politic. Anne Hutchinson [not least because of her claim to an “immediate revelation” (337), which rendered magistrates and ministers alike superfluous] was as uncontrollable\(^\text{20}\) and ungraspable as a liquid, even in her antipropositional logic: “she doth continually say and unsay things” (347). In her focus on turbulence and dynamic, Hutchinson comes close to that “completely other distribution” (Difference and Repetition 36).
that Deleuze mentions, countering Winthrop’s scaling and compartmentalization of the Bodily Politic—a distribution “which must be called nomadic, a nomad nomos, without property, enclosure or measure. Here, there is no longer a division of that which is distributed but rather a division among those who distribute themselves in an open space” (36)—the nomad nomos, which from the Oedipal perspective can only be an anti-nomos.

If Winthrop and the Intellectual Fathers saw the Antinomian party as a dangerous fluid, the Spiritual Brethren—in particular John Cotton, whose doctrines Hutchinson closely adhered to—equated fluidity with grace. Following the teachings of Richards Sibbes, Cotton reversed Ames’s emphasis on domination and stressed the believers’ passivity in receiving God’s unconditional grace. As Janice Knight points out, Cotton “favored metaphors of God as effulgent, a fountain of goodness overflowing, or an abundant river of graces pouring forth. The Brethren carefully qualified legalist language that might restrict the freeness of this exuberant flow” (109). In fact, flow, fluidity, the elements—all these metaphors reappear in an affirmative version in Sibbes’s and Cotton’s rhetoric. With regard to the receiving of grace, for example, Sibbes claims that “we must open as that flower that opens and shuts as the sun shines on it. So must we as Christ shines on us; and we ebb and flow as he flows upon us.” (4:298). Cotton, in a sermon that sounds almost like a reply to Winthrop’s use of the image of the windmill, employs the same metaphor, but to a completely different end: “Christ gave us our life, and he preserves it, we cannot better explain it then thus; A wind-mill moves not onely by the wind, but in the wind; so a water-mill hath its motion; not onely from the water, but in the water; so a Christian lives, as having his life from Christ, and in Christ, and further then Christ breathes and assists, he stirs not” (The Way of Life 276). This example indicates that for the Spiritual Brethren, motion—dynamics, time, history, in short, life itself—is not just something related to a first cause. Life is not just set in motion by a ‘prime mover’: life happens in time and therefore is not just temporal continuity; life is change; life is flow. For Cotton, life is infused by grace, all “naturall, vegetative, or sensitive life”²¹ is motion, change—in fact, it “is growth, for that which lives, growes” (Christ the Fountaine of Life 138). In this sermon, Cotton also contrasts two different kinds of dynamics: “A thing may move in its place, and yet move from some kind of outward respects; as a Watch, or a Clock, it moves, but it is from the weight that lyes and hangs upon it, and so it is rather a violent motion then a naturall” (129). In contrast to Winthrop’s windmill, it is the mechanical devices, the weights, that give a violent, unnatural motion to the machine, so the movement does not originate in the machine itself but is caused from the outside. Whereas Winthrop’s windmill brake was to stop the “violent motion”
of the wind [i.e., the violent disorder of the multitude], Cotton describes this very motion as the “naturall” one that is then hindered and regulated by such devices as weights and brakes. That there is a highly political dimension to it [a dimension Hutchinson no doubt picked up on and elaborated] is shown by the continuation of Cotton’s sermon: “So is it many times with men, the weight of the Law, or weight of the authority of Governours doth so carry them an end in those waies they walke in, that they goe through with it, and yet it is but from an outward principle, from some outward weights that hangs upon them” (ibid.). Another example of Winthrop’s rhetoric also shows where the physics of the Intellectual Fathers and the Spiritual Brethren differ:

Haveing already sett forth the practice of mercy according to the rule of God’s lawe, it will be useful to lay open the groundes of it allsoe, being the other parte of the Commandment and that is the affection from which this exercise of mercy must arise, the Apostle tells us that this love is the fullfi lling of the lawe, not that it is enough to loue our brother and soe noe further; but in regard of the excellency of his partes guieing any motion to the other as the soule to the body and the power it hath to sett all the faculties on worke in the outward exercise of this duty; as when wee bid one make the clocke strike, he doth not lay hand on the hammer, which is the immediate instrument of the sound, but setts on worke the first mouer or maine wheele; knoweing that will certainly produce the sound which he intends. Soe the way to drawe men to the workes of mercy, is not by force of Argument from the goodness or necessity of the worke; for though this cause may enforce, a rationall minde to some present act of mercy, as is frequent in experience, yet it cannot worke such a habit in a soule, as shall make it prompt upon all occasions to produce the same effect, but by frameing these affections of loue in the hearte which will as naturally bring forthe the other, as any cause doth produce the effect. (“Modell” 39–40)

Thus, Winthrop sets the coordinates for the foundation of a linear physics of direct cause and effect, of an outside ‘prime mover’ that makes the system work. Yet the relation between cause and effect is anything but linear: it is nonlinear, a looped, crooked path. ‘The [linear] cause’ is nothing but the representation of the function of the sovereign in the discourse of [meta] physics. This conception betrays its kinship and affinity with classical physics and classical thermodynamics, and its idea that once all the laws of mechanics and the initial conditions of a system are known, predictions can be made about what will happen and also what has already happened—since in this system, time is both reversible and fixed, timeless. Winthrop reveals himself as being devoted to a conservative system [a physical system isolated
from the surrounding flows of energy and matter, reduced and tailored to follow a linear equation]—he is a solid-state physicist [the term itself points to the political physics involved here].

But do all these physical concepts work only on a metaphorical level? In “The Geology of Morals,” De Landa has convincingly shown that these concepts function on a very literal, or material, level as well. Discussing social structures, he shows that the use of the term social strata is anything but metaphorical, since “the genesis of both geological and social strata involve the same engineering diagram,” the ‘sorting’ of raw material into a more or less homogeneous group and the transformation into something more than the sum of its parts by consolidation, by cementing. Hierarchical order and status positions are the result of a “crystallization of differential evaluation criteria,” and the subsequent consolidation [or solidification] of the different strata by the combination of “an expressly metaphysical or theological evaluation of different groups and roles with some legal or semi-legal definition of major positions and status” (Eisenstadt 71). Reading power and history [the power to make history] with Foucault, Serres, and Deleuze allows for the conceptualization of power not only as a centralized locus of control, but as the effect of a force field, of feedback loops of the connected elements involved. Thus, with Deleuze|Guattari one can distinguish two different kinds of “states, two tendencies of atomic matter,” both “stratified systems or systems of stratification [the hierarchical social strata] . . . , and consistent, self-consistent aggregates” (Thousand Plateaus 335). One we call orderly and solid—a static, closed system; the other is disorderly and fluid—a dynamic, open system.

The theory of phase transitions ultimately shows that there can be no fixed phases [or stages] at all. If a given element [or human society] can exist at different stages [gas, liquid, or solid], then, De Landa claims, there is no ultimate phase transition in the sense of “progressive developmental steps, each better than the previous one, and indeed leaving the previous one behind. On the contrary, . . . each new human phase simply added itself to the other ones, coexisting and interacting with them without leaving them in the past” (A Thousand Years of Nonlinear History 15–16). One of the pioneers of a kind of ‘materialist history,’ of connecting science and history, Arthur Iberall, comes to the conclusion that the theory that is needed to explain history in scientific terms is not classical physics, nor is it classical thermodynamics, which deals with phase transitions and the idealized, infinitely slow interactions of particles—in other words, with quasi-static processes in closed systems of near-equilibrium, systems left ‘undisturbed.’ But those idealized, closed systems are anything but the norm. Static order is just a temporal slowing down of the overarching dynamics that constitute the
world. Therefore, Iberall states, it is not equilibrium phase transitions that can approximate the dynamics involved, but nonequilibrium transitions, such as “a hydrodynamic transition, a transition like the transition from laminar to turbulent flow, and for the same reason, flow convection, a nonlinear dynamic process” (“Birth of Civilizations” 217). This transition from a laminar, orderly flow to a turbulent one occurs spontaneously. Serres, in his Birth of Physics, traces this notion, which lies at the center of hydrodynamics [and nonlinear dynamics as well] back to Lucretius and Epicurus and their materialist concept of the clinamen, the spontaneous microscopic swerve of atoms away from their vertical fall. According to Lucretius, who develops the theory of the clinamen in his scientific poem De Rerum Natura, without that microscopic deviation, there would be no collision of atoms, no impact, and hence no creation of newness. The theory of the clinamen denies divine intervention in favor of the spontaneous creativity of matter itself. In fact, as Deleuze sees it, the clinamen is not an additional characteristic of the moving atoms but coextensive with the complexity of matter itself: “It is not a secondary movement, which would come accidentally to modify a vertical fall . . . The clinamen is the original determination of the direction of the movement of the atoms” (Logic of Sense 269). Further, Deleuze characterizes the clinamen as manifesting “the irreducible plurality of causes or of causal series, and the impossibility of bringing causes together into a whole” (270)—ultimately, the impossibility of a unitary, solid foundation of a closed system. The clinamen creates turbulences in a striated order; it forms vortices and eddies that connect atoms into temporary alliances, dynamic—and unruly—Bodies|Politic. Thus, it does not come as a surprise when Wilson, in the trial of Hutchinson, implicitly connects the Antinomian turbulences with the theory of the clinamen when he claims that “if we deny the Resurrection of the Body than let us turne Epicures. Let us eate and drinke and doe any Thinge, to morrow we shall dye” (Hall 357).

To return to Winthrop and the Antinomian controversy: in order to create and establish their brand of Puritanism as ‘orthodoxy,’ Winthrop and his supporters desperately attempted to keep order and disorder—the solid and the fluid—clearly demarcated and separated: “Two so opponent parties could not contain in the same body, without apparent ruin of the whole” (Winthrop, Journal 239). Cotton, who during the Hutchinson trials joined the ranks of the Intellectual Fathers, later couched the controversy in terms of the two phase states and also claims that these cannot coexist in the same body, since this would lead to entropy: “Contrary things being divided one against another, make the whole body of short continuance, one wasting another, till all faile . . . Heat against cold, and moisture against drinesse, work continually one against the other, till all be consumed” (“Briefe Expo-
Another commentator on the controversy, however, saw an alternative to entropy as a possible outcome. John Wheelwright, Hutchinson’s brother-in-law, claimed with regard to Winthrop and Shepard that the controversy “would never have advanced so much, had not the Antiperistasis of your vehement prosecution forced them into habit” (190). *Antiperistasis* is a term from Aristotelian physics that was highly debated in the late Middle Ages. It is commonly defined as “the supposed increase in the intensity of a quality as a result of being surrounded by its contrary quality, for instance, the sudden heating of a warm body when surrounded by cold” (Clagett 79). The concept of antiperistasis reveals highly nonlinear, feedback loops in which a cause is affected by its effect. The “irrepressible dynamic”—as Philip Gura calls it (*Glimpse* 274)—of the Antinomian controversy, then, generated not only the ‘radical’ proponents of free grace, but also Puritan ultraconservatives. As Winship has pointed out, “radical orthodoxy could be just as divisive as radical heterodoxy, and even feed the latter” (227–28). Thus, “disorder was a systemic issue in Puritanism” (228) for all parties involved: Hutchinson and the Spiritual Brethren saw it as a new conception of an alternative Body/Politic; Winthrop, Shepard, and others aimed to use it for a final consolidation of rigid order. Yet despite their efforts to seal and impregnate the Body/Politic, to see and treat it as composed of two incompatible states of matter, the Antinomian controversy shows that this body was anything but solid and stable, anything but in equilibrium. Order and disorder do not exist but as ideal states or abstract extremes—all that is, is in between, in turbulence. It is tempting to see the Antinomian controversy as a *clinamen*; as Patrick Collinson has pointed out, orthodox Puritanism “represented the mainstream, ongoing thrust of the Protestant Reformation” (73). And Winship adds that “the free grace controversy demonstrates how little it took to make the currents of that stream extremely turbulent” (232).25

Against the rigid hierarchy of the Puritan orthodoxy to be, Cotton [and Hutchinson, in her more political reading of Cotton’s doctrines] pose dynamics, fluidity, growth, and nonhierarchical tendencies—for example, the members of Hutchinson’s party came from all social ranks and both genders, including simple workingmen and midwives as well as a the future governor, Henry Vane. Hutchinson and her party believed that grace was a question of individual, immediate experience, making ‘mediation’ and ‘representation’ [\(n + 1\)] through ministers and magistrates superfluous. Even after her excommunication, an exasperated Winthrop wrote, “Mrs. Hutchinson exercised publicly and she and her party . . . would have no magistracy” (*Journal* 286–87). Grace, as Hutchinson understood it, could be seen as conferring an individuality that cannot be reduced to a belonging
to a group or class. As Serres states, “transcendence had previously granted, in its mercy, election to a group; now transcendence gives identity to the singular” (“Ego Credo” 2). Grace, or faith, is reinterpreted as a strategy to live with uncertainty, with “a contingency that combines certainty and doubt” (4)—ultimately, “the contingency of grace . . . replace[s] the necessity of the Law” (6). Solidity is supplemented by fluidity and flow, necessity by chance, being by becoming.

Winthrop somehow seems to have sensed this is well. In his account of the controversy, the most often used words in connection with Hutchinson and the Antinomian party are “disturbance” and “turbulent,” which ultimately refers to the disturbance created by Hutchinson and her followers in a system otherwise visualized as stable. Yet if an event such as the weekly meetings held by Hutchinson can cause such a ‘change in the system,’ that system must have been far from equilibrium in the first place. Such a system at the edge of chaos is a multiple that cannot be reduced to a unitary concept. It is not ‘order’ in the traditional sense of a fixed and immovable hierarchy, nor is it the opposite, disorder. Serres describes it as “a more exquisite order . . . , one our banal stupidity cannot manage, stiff as a board” (Genesis 109, my emphasis). This intermediate stage between the classical concepts of order and disorder—turbulence—“is a multiplicity of local units and of pure multiplicities” (110). These multiplicities are dynamically interconnected via feedback loops, and such an open interconnectivity is capable of producing self-organization, whereas in a “near-equilibrium state of minimum entropy production . . . no new organization, no new structure, would be formed” (Lepkowski 30). Winthrop’s dream of a society at equilibrium, like Shepard’s dream of a final phase transition from fluid back to an even more rigid solid [or, at least, a phase transition that gets rid once and for all of the last drops of liquids], sees society according to the physics of solids—a physics that sees the world as a closed system, and that takes quasi-static processes at equilibrium as the rule. Neither dream sees [or wants to see] the fact that what they were dealing with are open, dynamic, and complex systems. Thus, applying nonlinear physics and complexity theory to history, society, and questions of power is not just a metaphorical game. What is at stake is not the substitution of ‘cultural laws’ for ‘natural laws’ but the application of ‘systemic laws’ that underlie both culture and nature, and that are all the more relevant, since historical events and the force fields of power are material events in a very physical sense. As complexity theory sees it, social systems and physical systems share similar operational logics: “This is perhaps the fundamental reason we pursue complexity research. Many social interventions are directed toward controlling the interaction
among types of agents. For example, segregation (and integration) . . . ; entry qualifications to religious and social organizations” (Axelrod and Cohen 21).

These two different conceptions of power—the hierarchical, solid conception of sovereign power, and the dynamic power of becoming and growth—can also be related to Spinoza, so that Winthrop can be seen in the Hobbesian and Hutchinson in the Spinozian conception of the Body|Politic. In his *Ethics*, Spinoza differentiates between two conceptions of power, a differentiation that is largely lost in the English translation. Spinoza distinguishes between *potentia* [force, strength, creative activity] and *potestas* [command, authority, ultimately sovereignty]. God’s power [*potentia*], according to Spinoza, “is his very essence,” and “whatever we conceive to be in the power [*potestas*] of God necessarily exists” (30). However, this does not just mean that since God is necessarily creative his creation, too, is necessary; it subordinates *potestas* to the continuing actualization of *potentia*: God’s sovereignty over the world is, in reality, nothing other than his world making. The political impact of this distinction emerges in Spinoza’s unfinished *Political Treatise*, where, as Antonio Negri claims, in Spinoza’s “political physics” (*The Savage Anomaly* 194) the multitude becomes “a productive essence” (195)—the *potestas* of the sovereign is actually the *potentia* of the people. Thus, the *potestas* of the sovereign, Deleuze claims, is not “a third party who gains by the contract made by individuals” (*Expressionism* 226), a power that is then solidified by the law, but the *potentia* of the multitude, a dynamics of growing, becoming, and self-organization.