notes

**INTRODUCTION**

6. A mode of analysis in which I have a longstanding investment, as will be clear from, inter alia, the critical readings of literary texts and films in reneé c. hoogland, *Lesbian Configurations* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press; New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).
11. Ibid., 6.
15. Ibid., 594.
32. In the following chapters, I will nonetheless be using these terms interchangeably, depending on and determined by their usage in the works of my various theoretical interlocutors.

ONE. ARTISTIC ACTIVITY

3. These are the respective titles of two books representative of the renewed interest in


8. In ostensible conflict with Massumi’s pertinent distinction between the terms “affect” and “emotion” as discussed in the introduction, in this and the following chapters I will use these terms, as well as “feeling,” pretty much interchangeably, since this is the way they appear in the theoretical texts (Bakhtin, Whitehead, Deleuze) under discussion. It is clear, however, that the respective terms “emotion” and “feeling” in these works more or less coincide with what Massumi designates “affect.”


12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., 89.

14. Ibid., 79.

15. Ibid., 36.


19. I will discuss phenomenology at more length in chapter 5, where I take up Lambert
Wiesing's and Vilém Flusser's respective theories of the mediated/technical image in relation to so-called ruin porn.


21. Shaviro clarifies the differences by pointing out that, for Whitehead, prehension need not be conscious, and, most of the time is not; plus, neither subject nor datum pre-exist their encounter, but are produced in and by it (*WC*, 55, n. 9).


23. See note 1 in this chapter.

24. As much as un- or de-forming/-formed aspects do, as I shall argue in the next chapter.

25. Again, both theoretical models are obviously much broader in their implications than I am able to suggest or account for here.

26. I am referring to its difference from, for example, the work of Marina Abramović, whose recent retrospective exhibition "Marina Abramović: The Artist is Present" (2010), at the Museum of Modern Art in New York, clearly produced intense affective experiences in viewers/visitors, but whose interaction with the work did not include actual physical touch. For an impression of the nonetheless profoundly affectively dis/organizing poietic effects of the art/performance—the artist’s longest performance to date, see MOMA’s semipermanent multimedia website: http://www.moma.org/interactives/exhibitions/2010/marinaabramovic/, accessed March 16, 2012.

27. See note 12 in this chapter.

TWO. VIOLENT BECOMINGS

1. Various slightly different versions of the statement have since appeared in English translation, the most common being the one used here, and the alternative phrase, the "greatest work of art in the entire cosmos." I am relying on the German version as quoted in *Die Zeit*, which is “das Grösste Kunstwerk, das es gegeben hat.” Cited by Robert Hilferty, *Andante: Everything Classical* (September 2001), http://andante.com, a site that appears at the time of this writing (March 21, 2012) to have become defunct.


5. These are words lifted from the introduction to one of several volumes of essays engaging the so-called ethical turn that were published around the turn of the present century, inter alia, Marjorie Garber, Beatrice Hanssen, and Rebeca L. Walkowitz, eds., *The Turn to Ethics* (New York and London: Routledge, 2000), viii. See also, e.g., Edith Wyschorod and Gerald P. Kennedy, eds., *The Ethical* (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2003); Todd F. Davis and Kenneth Womack, eds., *Mapping the Ethical Turn: A Reader in Ethics*,


10. “Hylomorphism” is the theory derived from Aristotle that every physical object is composed of two principles, an unchanging prime matter and a form deprived of actuality with every substantial change of the object. Hylomorphism is rejected by Deleuze and Guattari, who follow the French philosopher Gilbert Simondon in exposing the “technological insufficiency of the matter-form model, in that it assumes a fixed form and a matter deemed homogeneous” (inert, passive) and thus denies the incipient energetic forces, and the “variable intensive affects,” contained in matter. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 408.


15. Ibid., 367.


19. Ibid., 11.

20. The distinction refers to the raw material of a narrative (fabula), its constituting (narrative) “events,” as distinct from the way these materials are organized, the way they are narrated (suzjet). It is interesting to note that we only ever have access to the latter.
22. Ibid., 14.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., 110.
28. Ibid., 112. To be sure, Bal’s project in this essay, as well in her subsequent work on visual art, is very different from what Patrick Colm Hogan, for example, attempts to do in his recent study *Affective Narratology: The Emotional Structure of Stories* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001). Rather than “applying” narratological methods to visual objects, Hogan links insights on emotion, largely taken from cognitive science, to narratology in order to explore the ways in which emotions organize and orient stories and, vice versa, how stories inform the development of our emotional lives.
32. Ibid., 105.
33. Ibid., 128.
36. In the context of Whitehead’s metaphysics, this is actually a misnomer, for, as Shaviro explains, Whitehead makes a strict distinction between “occasions” and “events,” where the former term refers to the “process by which anything becomes,” and the latter is an “extensive set, or a temporal series of such occasions.” Shaviro infers from this that an occasion is “something like what Deleuze calls a singularity: a point of inflection or of discontinuous transformation” (WC, 18–19).
45. Also cited in Shaviro (wc, 3).
48. “Untimely,” in the sense that, as Claire Colebrook explains, art and philosophy have the power to create new “lines” of becoming, where “mutations and differences produce not just the progression of history but disruptions, breaks, new beginnings and ‘monstrous’ births.” See Claire Colebrook, Gilles Deleuze (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 57.

THREE. NEO-AESTHETICS AND THE STUDY OF THE ARTS OF THE PRESENT

5. The “present” here thus explicitly pertains to the postmodern moment at and after which George Marcus and Michael Fischer coined the phrase “crisis of representation” to refer to the uncertainty in the human sciences about adequate means of describing social reality. Deconstructive postmodernism, as is commonly known, argues that “reality” is grounded in language and that the “natural” world, taken for granted by empirical positivist science as an object for study, could, after the “linguistic turn,” no longer be simply assumed. The world is never known directly, but is constructed, or given meaning, through discourse. Such meanings are historically and culturally contingent, dependent upon the legitimation processes of dominant discourses embodied in differing


7. Ibid., 7.


12. In their final collaborative work, Deleuze and Guattari make a point of describing these two aspects of philosophy as “qualitatively different,” yet “complementary,” in that concepts, always fragmentary elements that do not fit together, need a “plane of immanence” that “rolls them up and unrolls them.” Concepts are “events,” but the plane is the “horizon of events,” that which holds the concepts together, without losing its openness. See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 35.


15. Deleuze and Guattari distinguish “sensory becoming” as “otherness caught in expression,” from “conceptual becoming,” in the sense that the latter is “heterogeneity grasped in an absolute form,” the action by which the “common event itself eludes what is” (*WP*, 177).

16. On Deleuze’s philosophy as a form of art itself, as an art of fabulation, see Gregory Flaxman, *Gilles Deleuze and the Fabulation of Philosophy* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012).

17. See, for example, Hemmings, *Invoking Affect*, and Leys, *The Turn to Affect*.

18. It is not my interest here to launch an overall defense of the two philosophers, but the fact that Deleuze’s concepts are put to use by scholars in architecture, urban studies, geography, film studies, musicology, anthropology, gender studies, literary studies, as well as philosophy, and that Guattari, even though his solo writings are less well known, hence still relatively unmined, has been widely recognized for his contributions to fields as diverse as economics, ecology, pragmatics, linguistics, and media theory, and his radical ideas are always grounded in the practical contexts of global politics and materialist social critique, adequately proves such accusations ungrounded. For a helpful and thorough assessment of the latter’s work, see Eric Alliez and Andre Goffey, eds., *The Guattari Effect* (London: Continuum, 2011).


30. The latter phrase is, of course, a reference to Jacques Rancière’s *The Politics of Aesthetics*, whose subtitle reads “the distribution of the sensible.”


34. Ibid., 109.

35. Ibid., 122–23.

36. An impressive body of work to which I am not even trying to do justice; see, inter alia, Arthur C. Danto, *The Abuse of Beauty: Aesthetics and the Concept of Art*, 3rd. rpt. (Chicago and La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 2005); *Andy Warhol* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2009). Danto separates “aesthetics” from his “philosophy of art” because of the former’s conventional domination by the “idea of beauty”—a very different notion of aesthetics than that I have so far been employing.

37. Zepke, *Art as Abstract Machine*, 32. This (1962) is the same year in which Warhol began his first celebrity portraits—of, among others, the recently widowed Jackie Kennedy, Elizabeth Taylor, Marilyn Monroe (started immediately after her suicide), and Elvis—and the two sets are often considered companion pieces; the “death and disaster” series includes *Red Car Crash, Purple Jumping Man*, and *Orange Disaster*, as well as *Tunafish Disaster*, various suicides (including the famous one of the young woman lying on top of a car after her jump off the Empire State Building), and the first *Electric Chair* works.

Ibid.

40. Ibid., 24.

41. Ibid., 30.

42. Ibid., 31.


44. Ibid., 358.


48. Ibid., 29.

49. I am using “sadness” here in the ethical sense suggested by Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza, as one of the modes of feeling by which our power to act (a power that is “inseparable from a capacity for being affected”) is diminished or restrained, whereas it “increases or is enhanced by affections of joy.” Gilles Deleuze, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City Light Books, 1988), 97, 101.


FOUR. THE GROUNDLESS REALITIES OF ART PHOTOGRAPHY


6. The Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum and the San Francisco Museum of Modern Art recently jointly organized a comprehensive mid-career survey, featuring more than

7. Works in the exhibition were collected and published in Rineke Dijkstra, Portraits (Muenchen: Schirmer/Mosel, 2004).

8. Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994). As indicated in the previous chapter, this is a very different notion of the simulacrum from Deleuze’s use of the term with reference to art.


18. Krauss borrowed this term from Benjamin to use it as the title of her noteworthy study of modernism, The Optical Unconscious (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994).


24. These are Krauss’s words, paraphrasing Benjamin’s initial (1931) position. Krauss, “Reinventing,” 291.


28. Sontag, On Photography, 163, 167. In view of her ruthlessly negative take on the medium, it is curious to realize that Sontag spent some fifteen years of her life in a close romantic relationship with celebrated photographer Annie Leibovitz.
29. The term *objet petit a* in Lacan stands for the unattainable object of desire. The “a” refers to the French word for “other” [autre]. The small “a” differentiates the object from the “grand Autre,” or the capitalized “Other.” The origins of the term may be traced to Freud’s concept of the “lost object,” while it reappears in Melanie Klein’s notion of the “partial object.” Lacan, his translator suggests, “insists that ’objet petit a’ should remain untranslated, thus acquiring, as it were, the status of an algebraic sign.” “Translator’s Note” in Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis*, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller; trans. Alan Sheridan (Norton and Co.: New York and London, 1981), 282. I will return to the notion of the “partial object” in my concluding chapter.


34. This is in fact the central question in Elkins’ debate with Michael Fried referred to above.


37. Ibid., 15.


39. Ibid., 29.


41. Images of these works are, alas, not available for reproduction in any but Rineke Dijkstra’s own books; see, therefore, the earlier mentioned catalogues *Portraits* and *A Retrospective*.

### Five. The Ruse of the Ruins


9. Born in Prague, Flusser emigrated to London in 1939, and after he had lost all of his family in the Nazi concentration camps, he went to Brazil, where he taught philosophy and worked as a journalist. He left Brazil in 1972 and spent the rest of his life alternately in Germany and the south of France. His works are written in several different languages, but the ones I am drawing on were both originally published in German.

10. See note 7 in this chapter.

11. Julia Reyes Taubman, Detroit: 138 Square Miles, foreword by Elmore Leonard (Detroit: Museum of Contemporary Art, 2011). I will not discuss any of the photographs reprinted here in any detail. They primarily serve as an illustration of my theoretical observations, and, unlike the photos discussed in previous chapters, not as objects of examination themselves.


16. Ron Williams, “Green Detroit: Why the City Is Ground Zero for the Sustainability
Movement,” on Alternet (April 22, 2010), http://www.alternet.org/environment/146577/green_detroit:_why_the_city_is_ground_zero_for_the_sustainability_movement, accessed May 14, 2012. According to the Alternet website, Ron Williams is president of 3rdWhaleMobile and Chair of the Free Speech TV board of directors. He is the founder and former editor and publisher of Metro Times (Detroit), founder of Dragonfly Media, former board chair of the Independent Media Institute (AlterNet), and founder of happyfrog.ca.

18. Ibid., 11.
22. Ibid., 11.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., 12, 13.
26. Ibid., 8.
27. Ibid., 8–9.
29. Ibid., 9.

VI. VISUALIZING THE FACE

1. Unlike previous ones, the current chapter, sadly, does not contain any images of its main subject's work. The sole copyright holder of Johan van der Keuken's oeuvre, his widow Nosh van der Lely, refused to grant me permission to reproduce some of the photographer/filmmaker's photographs and still images. She let me know that this would not serve her and her current husband's interests, since they are preparing an exhibition and a new book of previously published and unpublished materials by her deceased husband. I have not been offered further information on this project. For a limited yet helpful resource on Johan van der Keuken's films, see the interactive exhibition/website of the Museum of Modern Art in New York, http://www.moma.org/interactives/exhibitions/2001/jvdk/.
3. Ibid., 13.

7. Ibid., n.p.
8. Ibid., n.p.
12. In a translator’s note, Elliot Ross Albert accounts for the stylistic oddity of the latter text by suggesting that, “rather than a finished paper, ‘L’actuel et la virtuel’ is a series of notes, drafts, or aides-mémoires for a paper,” in *Dialogues II*, 171.
13. Immanence, meaning “existing or remaining within” is a founding concept in Deleuze’s ontology in its general opposition to transcendence, or a metaphysical beyond or outside. The term “plane of immanence” appears as “pure immanence,” in the short work of the same title, as an unqualified immersion or embeddedness, an infinite field or “smooth space” without substantial or constitutive division. See note 8 in this chapter.
17. In his preface to *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze assigns Carroll a “privileged place,” because he has provided the “first great mise en scène of the paradoxes of sense” (*The Logic of Sense*, xii).
22. After intermittently showing them as parts of larger exhibitions, van der Keuken collected the photos taken in the course of a career that spanned forty-six years in *The Lucid Eye: The Photographic Work 1953–2000* (Amsterdam: De Verbeelding, 2001).
24. Bérénice Reynaud, “Johan van der Keuken: Fragments for a Reflection,” in
NOTES TO CONCLUSION


Reynaud, “Johan van der Keuken,” 12.


Ibid.


Ingmar Bergman, Cahiers du Cinema, October 1959 cited in Deleuze, Cinema 1, 99.

The subtitle of Bergala’s essay on Johan van der Keuken’s photography is “the art of anxiety.”


Ibid., n.p.

CONCLUSION


2. Against the “equivocity” of Platonism, that is, the supposition that only one being truly is, while all other beings are derivative, Deleuze adopts the concept of “univocity” from John Duns Scotus, Baruch Spinoza, and Nietzsche, to suggest that no being is more real than any other and therefore that being is, univocally, difference. “With univocity, however, it is not the differences which are and must be: it is being which is Difference, in the sense that it is said of difference. Moreover, it is not we who are univocal in a Being which is not; it is we and our individuality which remains equivocal in and for a univocal Being” (*DR*, 39). Contra Badiou, there is thus, for Deleuze, no one substance, only an always differentiating process, folding, unfolding, refolding. See, e.g., Claire Colebrook, “Univocal,” in Adrian Parr, ed., *The Deleuze Dictionary*, 291–93 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).


4. Ibid., n.p.


6. Ibid., 86.


9. The second half of this chapter finds its origins in earlier work on the critical role of art in the actualization of embodied subjectivity, as explored in, among others, my essay “The Matter of Culture.” That I find myself returning to these ideas so many years later suggests, in a reassuring yet startling way, that in any “adventure of ideas” somehow inheres a distinct desire for harmony, for a narrative circularity. The only explanation is the pull of the forces of the universe.


11. In Badiou’s essay cited above, the phrase appears slightly differently, but it is not clear if this is Badiou misquoting or a result of the translation of Badiou’s text; since the latter does not provide references, there is no way of determining who is to “blame” for the misquotation/deviation from an English translation of the original French text.

12. See chapter 1, note 14.

13. This is, accidentally, the reason why Whitehead’s subject is always a “subject-superject.” As he stipulates in *Process and Reality*: “An actual entity is at once the subject experiencing and the superject of its experiences. It is the subject-superject, and neither half of this description can for a moment be lost sight of” (*PR*, 29).


15. Just as the *The Concept of Nature* is made up of a series of lectures given in London
in the early 1920s, Process and Reality consists of a series of lectures delivered as the Gifford Lectures at the University of Edinburgh during the session of 1927–28.

16. See chapter 1, note 16.


19. It appears these insights have since made their way into a widening range of social scientific and other socioeconomic domains and are beginning to take concrete, material effect: while I was finishing this chapter, I came across a blog post by Daniel Isenberg, professor of management practice, Babson Global, and founding executive director of the Babson Entrepreneurship Ecosystem Project, on the rebirth of inner cities in recent years. While formerly primarily evoking images of destruction, dereliction, and decay, “inner cities” today, he suggests, are “in”—“innovative, hip hotbeds of convenient culture, commerce and connection.” Literally echoing Guattari, Isenberg defines today’s inner cities as “holistic entrepreneurship ecosystems,” which flourish as a result of an emphasis on “best processes” rather than “best practices,” inventing time, rather than money, and “experimentation,” rather than protocol. Examples include the Boston Innovation District and similar “platforms” (rather than programs) for innovation in London, Buenos Aires, and Barcelona. I would like to add Detroit to this list of urban ecosystems whose “centripetal force . . . is pulling the ambitious and educated back in, and [is] increasing cities’ innovative capacity, without sacrificing (at least some would argue) their inclusiveness.” See Daniel Isenberg, “Planting Entrepreneurial Innovation in Inner Cities,” Harvard Business Review/HBR Blog Network, June 5, 2012, http://blogs.hbr.org/cs/2012/06/planting_entrepreneurial_innov.html, accessed June 6, 2012.

20. Guattari’s reference to Schlegel, according to a footnote in The Three Ecologies, can be traced to Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy, in L’absolu littéraire: théorie de la littérature du romantisme allemand (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1978), 126. A translator’s note indicates that the reference to Friedrich von Schlegel’s famous Fragment 206 from The Athenaeum can additionally be found in Maurice Blanchot’s The Infinite Conversation, trans. Susan Hanson (Minneapolis: University Minnesota Press, 1993), 352–59 (The Three Ecologies, 94 n. 58).

21. Transitional objects find their origins in an early stage of infant development, with the child’s emerging awareness of the difference between inner and outer reality. They are at once “me” and “not-me,” and are transitional in that they facilitate the transition from the baby for whom external objects have not yet separated to the capacity to relate to “objectively perceived” objects. See Donald Winnicott, “Transitional Objects and Transitional Phenomena,” in International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 34 (1953), 89–97; additional material was added to the paper in Winnicott’s Playing and Reality (London: Tavistock, 1971), 1–30.