Cycles of Conquest

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Mayos and Yaquis

ON THE OTHER SIDE of the Sierra Madre Mountains from the Tara­humaras the Spanish conquest proceeded in a sharply contrasting manner. Two of the major tribes who maintained their identities throughout the conquest and into the twentieth century were the Cahitan-speaking Mayos and Yaquis. They were of nearly identical language and cultural background, but their reactions to the Spaniards who first encountered them were very different. The Mayos consistently sought friendly alliance with the Spaniards for the first two hundred years of contact. The Yaquis, on the other hand, resisted armed intrusion in their territory from the first, and were so successful that they were able to set their own terms for the entrance of missionaries.

The first important contacts took place in 1533. In that year, ranging up the west coast of New Spain on slave raids, Diego de Guzmán fought a brief battle with Yaquis on the banks of the Yaqui River. His force dispersed the Indians, according to his account, but he nevertheless seems to have lost heart for further conquest and did not follow up his victory. He was greatly impressed with the fighting ability of the Yaquis who opposed him. A soldier in his party laid the foundations for the Yaqui reputation as great warriors by writing that nowhere in New Spain had he seen such bravery on the field of battle.

When Francisco de Ibarra set out from Zacatecas on his major prospecting expedition through the Sierra Madre Mountains in the hope of finding new silver mines, he ended up in the Yaqui country. Received in friendly fashion, he spent part of the year 1564 in a Yaqui settlement and repaid Yaqui kindness by helping them in a battle with the Mayos, with whom the Yaquis seem to have been sporadically at war.

Thus, the earliest contacts of Mayos and Yaquis with the Spaniards were both hostile and friendly. By 1583 the city which was to become the major center of Spanish operations in the northwest was founded on the Sinaloa River nearly two hundred miles south of the Yaqui River. It was here in San Felipe y Santiago, on the site of modern Sinaloa, that Captain Hurdaide made his headquarters in 1599; from here also he waged the vigorous military campaign which resulted in the complete subjection of the Indians of the Fuerte River—the Sinaloas,
Tehuecos, Zuquques, and Ahomes. By a time shortly after 1600 these Indians, numbering some twenty thousand, were under Spanish domination, and Jesuits were at work among them. All except the Ahomes had resisted strongly and Hurdaide had had to exhibit his great ability as a military commander in order to bring them under Spanish control. They were all Cahita-speaking and were in close contact with the Mayos and Yaquis, also Cahita-speaking, to the north. As the Jesuit work developed among them, the Mayos sent delegations to inspect the new churches and to get an idea of what the missionaries were offering. The Mayo leaders were so favorably impressed that large groups of Mayos numbering a hundred or more also made visits and became acquainted with Jesuit activities. About 1601 the Mayos asked that missionaries be sent to them, and Hurdaide went to Mexico City to ask for an increase in the number of Jesuits. The additional Jesuits were not immediately available, but meanwhile relations between the Spaniards and the Mayos continued very friendly, and in 1609 Hurdaide made a treaty for both offense and defense with the Mayos.

Hurdaide, with characteristic vigor and aggressiveness, was carrying his operations northward. In 1609 he was engaged in pacifying the Ocoronis, another Cahita-speaking group of northern Sinaloa. In pursuit of a band of Ocoronis he came to the Yaqui River, where Yaquis under the leadership of a man named Anabaletei, or Ania-bailutek, refused to allow him to pass into their territory. The vigor of their defiance was enough to cause him to try a peaceful settlement. He persuaded them to agree to give up the two refugee Ocoroni leaders. However, according to the Spanish accounts, the Yaquis did not live up to their bargain to turn over the two men, Lautaro and Babilomo. Instead they killed Christian Indians who were sent to receive the two leaders.

Hurdaide was not prepared for a real battle and so returned to raise a larger force. When he did come back with two thousand Indians and forty Spanish soldiers, he was soundly defeated. He then put together all his resources and raised the largest army which had so far been put into the field in northwestern Mexico — four thousand Indian foot soldiers and fifty mounted Spaniards. Again, after a bloody battle, which lasted for a whole day and night, he was badly routed and was himself wounded and nearly captured. The Yaquis were reported to have put into the field seven thousand men who fought with great bravery and tenacity. They completely dispersed Hurdaide's army, and the captain barely got away in the company of a few of his men. For nearly a year the situation stood with Spaniards unable to renew the fighting. The Yaquis made no effort to carry the attack further.

Then suddenly, to the surprise of the Spaniards, the Yaquis asked for peace. This was an event which the Spanish in their chronicles spoke of as unprecedented in military history. The reasons for the Yaqui action remain uncertain; there were two versions current. One held that Hurdaide circulated stories about the arrival of reinforcements by sea. Another version was that the Yaquis were so impressed by the Spanish military ability and Hurdaide's miraculous escape that they thought it would be safest to ally themselves with the Spaniards rather than keep on fighting.
Subsequent events indicated that the Yaquis were sincerely anxious for peace with Spaniards and neighboring Indians, and that above all they wanted Jesuit missionaries to come and work among them. Probably they were influenced by the reports with which the Mayos had returned from their inspections of the missionary work in the Ahome and Tehuico country. The Jesuits evidently had worked in a manner that gave them great prestige with the Indians. At any rate the Yaquis began to negotiate with Hurdaide through two Mayo leaders—Osameai and Bothisuame. The Yaqui leader who carried through negotiations was not Ania-bailutek, who had initiated the resistance against Hurdaide, but another man named Conibomeai, who seems to have been influential through the subsequent period of missionary entrance into the Yaqui country. Conibomeai had to overcome the resistance of young men among the Yaquis in bringing about a peace treaty.

The Spanish accounts describe the treaty as an offensive and defensive alliance, which also required the Yaquis to give up the refugees Babilomo and Lautaro and all the arms and horses which they had captured from the Spaniards, and to agree to remain at peace with the Mayos and other Indians in the area. Hurdaide invited a group of Yaqui leaders to come to San Felipe y Santiago to complete the negotiations, where he arranged an elaborate ceremony. The Spanish accounts do not indicate that the Spaniards had to agree to anything, but it is a fact that they made no effort to establish any military or civil personnel in the Yaqui country for more than ten years afterwards, and that when they finally sent missionaries the latter entered the Yaqui communities with no military escort whatsoever. The Yaquis seem, in other words, to have successfully made the point that they regarded themselves as remaining autonomous and not under the sort of military domination which the other tribes of the region had accepted.

It was seven years before enough missionaries were on hand to fulfill the Yaqui requests for them. Meanwhile, in 1614, the Jesuits began work among the Mayos. A single missionary, Pedro Méndez, in company with Hurdaide and a number of soldiers went to Camoa where the long-expectant Mayos awaited them. The entrance was triumphal. In two weeks as Méndez moved down the river from ranchería to ranchería, more than thirty-six hundred children and adults presented themselves for baptism. Within four years sixteen thousand had been baptized and the Mayos had worked hard to build churches in seven places where Méndez set about concentrating the Indians in seven towns. Two years later in 1620 the Jesuit records indicated that thirty thousand had been baptized. Three missionaries were at work, and the Mayo country was organized into three partidos, or mission districts, with missions at Camoa, Navojoa, and Etchojoa. In addition, the two small Cahita-speaking groups upriver on the Mayo, the Tepahues and Conicaris—numbering twenty-five hundred—had also been brought under mission discipline. The Mayo acceptance of the mission system was thus complete within six years and the reduction to town life was well underway.

The Yaqui acceptance of the mission system was even more rapid. In 1617 Pérez de Ribas and Tomás Basilio, Jesuit missionaries, escorted by two Yaqui leaders and with no soldiers or other Spaniards, went to the eastern edge of Yaqui
territory. Besides the Yaqui escort there were with them only some Christian Tehuecos to serve as godparents in the expected baptismal ceremonies. They were received by thousands of Yaquis carrying small crosses of wood in their hands. Arches of cane had been erected, through which the missionaries passed leading processions of Yaquis. On the first day they baptized two hundred. Within the first six months they had baptized four thousand, including a number of the headmen, who had also submitted to marriage ceremonies. Simple buildings were constructed for the holding of church services. Throughout the length of the lower Yaqui River all the way to the sea, Yaquis came for baptism and to help with the construction of churches. Within the next two years, by 1619, nearly thirty thousand Yaquis were baptized. Seven missionaries were now at work persuading the Yaquis, who were scattered in eighty rancherias along the lower course of the Yaqui River, to come and live in eight town concentrations where churches had been built. By 1623, six years after the beginning of missionary work, a stone chapel stood in the most central of the new towns — Torim — and the Yaquis had allowed Captain Hurdaide to pay them a visit and ride with a few soldiers from Los Hornos to Belem, the full length of the Yaqui territory. In 1623 they also allowed Hurdaide to appoint officials — governors, judges, and sheriffs — for the new towns. All the officials were Indians. Torim became the seat of the rectorate for a new mission unit for Sonora; and a 120-year period of peaceful economic and religious development set in on the lower Yaqui River.

The next sixty years were ones of unusual tranquility for any northwestern outpost of Spanish civilization. No Spanish settlers came into Ostimuri, as the area of the Yaqui and Mayo rivers had been named. No towns grew up closer than the Fuerte River, where the Fort of Montesclaros was built in 1610, and this was more than a hundred miles south of the Yaqui. There were no mines in the river-bottom lands of the Yaquis and Mayos, and no mines were opened until later in the mountain country bordering them. Both the Yaquis and Mayos took to church attendance and cultivation of the Catholic ritual with an interest that the missionaries wrote of as exceptional in any Jesuit experience. There was apparently no tendency to rebel and only an occasional difficulty with what the Jesuits called witches. The new religion was undergoing a most thorough and peaceful integration with the native beliefs and practices. Missionaries like Andrés Egidiano, who was posted at Bacum, learned the language thoroughly and preached and taught in it. Egidiano himself spent twenty-seven years continuously at Bacum and came to be deeply venerated by the Yaquis. Government of the towns, except for the very top office of the captain-general, was in the hands of the Indians themselves. They worked with practically no friction with the missionaries, not only building up the churches and the religious life centered in them, but also increasing their agricultural production. Seven mission towns on the Mayo River and eight on the Yaqui became thriving communities. The only serious troubles were the appearance of epidemics, especially a widespread one in 1641, which killed many Indians. The Mayo River villages lost half their population in the fifty years following the conversion, but apparently the Yaqui towns were not hit so hard and relatively few Indians died. Thus, for two
5. YAQUI-MAYO COUNTRY ABOUT 1740

LEGEND

- Presidio
- Mine
- Mission
- Spanish Settlement

MAP COVERAGE

Scale in Miles
0 10 20 30 40 miles

Gulf of California

OPATAS

BACflater MIRAS

PIMAS

TECORIPA

CUMURIPA

OSTIMURI

LAHUM

POTAM

VICAM TORIM

BACUM

LOS HORNOS

Baroysca

COCORIT

TEPAHUES

CONICARI

CAMOA

TESIA

NAVIOJO

COHUIMPO

ETCHOJOA

SANTA CRUZ

Rio Mayo

Montesclaros

San Felipe y Santiago

MAP COVERAGE
generations there was peaceful integration of Spanish and Cahita culture.

In 1684 the situation began to change. One of the richest silver mines of northwest Mexico was discovered at Alamos at the edge of the mountains thirty miles from Navojoa. This brought Spaniards into the area and attracted some Indians away from the mission settlements. In those Mayo areas that had been depopulated by disease, Spaniards began to take up land and build haciendas. The encroachment, however, proceeded slowly. The Yaqui River lands were relatively far from Alamos, the center of Spanish settlement, and Yaqui population was still too dense to permit easy appropriation of land there. The Yaqui towns continued as thriving agricultural communities. The missionaries introduced wheat, cattle, and horses. A port was established at Medano at the mouth of the Yaqui River. Granaries were built at Bacum, Torim, and Huirivis. The people of Huirivis especially began to build up herds of cattle. From 1680 on the Jesuits were accustomed to provide wheat and livestock from the Yaqui surplus for the continuing missionary work in Lower California and to the north in Sonora. Tribute was still not required from the Indians and hence the missions were sources of real prosperity for the Yaquis and for the Mayos who still survived.

By the 1730's, however, the usual Spanish frontier difficulties began to develop. As mining increased at Alamos and northward in Sonora, Spanish settlers came into the region. With the coming of the settlers, encroachment on Indian lands took place, and the frictions between Indians and Spaniards began. Haciendas were established near Navojoa and southward along the Mayo River in the rich bottom lands, and it was apparent to the Spanish ranchers that the combination of missionary and Indian labor had developed highly desirable farm and pasture lands on both rivers. Resentment of missionary control of so much valuable land steadily grew. Friction came to a head in 1734 when Colonel Huidobro was named governor of the province of Sinaloa. He became increasingly antagonistic to the missionary program and allied himself with hacendados established in the vicinity of Etchojoa on the Mayo River. Signs of serious discontent among the Indians increased during the 1730's, culminating in 1740 in the first Yaqui-Mayo revolt.

The precise causes of the revolt remain obscure. It is obvious that the general cause was hostility between Spanish civil and religious authorities, but the nature of the situation among the Indians themselves can only be guessed at. As usual the Jesuits had one version, the civil authorities another. Some of the facts seem to be that a Yaqui named Juan Ignacio Muni became antagonistic to the missionary in Huirivis—probably as the result of an unjust whipping of a relative by the Yaqui governor of the town at the command of the missionary. Muni sought the backing of Governor Huidobro, who supported him against the missionaries. The small difficulty grew to large proportions when Huidobro failed to take action against anyone. Muni seems to have had wide influence with, and support from, both Yaquis and Mayos, but the issues remain unclear, for it also appears that Huidobro was generally disliked. Huidobro, in fact, seems to have been a very poor administrator in whom no one had much confidence—either missionaries or Indians. This is indicated by the fact that Muni with another leader, Bernabé,
in 1738 felt it necessary to go to Mexico City to lodge his complaints. He was gone for two years and the rumor spread that he had been killed or imprisoned there.

As the rumors spread, an Indian named Juan Calixto instituted a revolt. Fighting began in 1740 with the killing of a governor of one of the Mayo towns, which suggests that a focus of friction lay in the appointment of the Indian governors, a matter with which the missionaries had much to do. The revolt was carried with the battle cries of "Long live the King, Long live the Blessed Mary, Down with bad government!" Calixto raised an army of six thousand and in a short time had complete possession of all the towns on the Mayo and Yaqui rivers. The Spaniards fled the country southward, a few remaining briefly with the frightened Huidobro in Alamos, whence all fled to a point outside the Mayo country.

With Huidobro offering no resistance, the fighting shifted to the Lower Pima country at Tecoripa, where Huidobro's lieutenant Vildósola was in command. Lower Pimas, Yaquis, and Mayos all united against the Spaniards, but the majority of the fighting force were Yaquis. Led by a Yaqui named Baltazar, a furious attack on Tecoripa was repulsed by Vildósola, and another force of Indians was defeated not far away. Vildósola followed up his advantage with continuous attack, fighting southward down the Yaqui River. He defeated a large force of Indians at Cerro del Tambor at the edge of the Yaqui country and then, pushing his way to the Yaqui River, he engaged the whole Yaqui army at Otamcahui (Hill of the Bones). Vildósola reported that five thousand Indians were killed in the course of the two battles. This broke the Indian resistance. Meanwhile, Muni and Bernabé had returned from Mexico City. Muni began peace overtures, and by the end of the year 1740 fighting was over. Huidobro appointed Muni captain-general of the Yaqui and Mayo area.

The revolt was a costly one for both Spaniards and Indians. Over a thousand Spaniards were killed and more than five thousand Indians. Every mine and hacienda in the Lower Pima, Yaqui, and Mayo territories was abandoned, except Alamos itself. All the missionaries had been forced to leave. Large numbers of cattle and horses had been killed or driven off. And a new atmosphere of suspicion and distrust had been created. Huidobro was immediately replaced as governor by Vildósola and the latter began an attempt to rule with an iron hand. He accused Muni, together with his Yaqui associates Bernabé and Calixto, and a Mayo of Etchojoa named Esteban, of plotting to exterminate or drive out all Spaniards from the region and make Muni "king" of the Yaquis and Mayos. Whether this accusation was true or not seems never to have been satisfactorily determined. The four leaders were executed and all suspects were deported.

Vildósola also instituted a series of restrictive measures, requiring that no Indian be permitted to leave any pueblo without the permission of missionaries, impressing Indians for forced labor on mines and haciendas, and requiring that there be daily recitation of prayers by all Indians in the mission communities. A presidio was built at Buenavista, on the border of the Lower Pima and Yaqui territories, and a force of soldiers was sent to man it. After 120 years the typical
Spanish frontier situation had finally developed in the Yaqui-Mayo country. Also typically, Vildósola was removed from office six years later for mishandling of government funds.

After the revolt, the missionaries returned to their missions and, for the twenty-six years that intervened until the expulsion of the Jesuits, busied themselves with recovering lost ground. The missions had not been destroyed, but the spirit of the Indians was different, and the old level of prosperity was not regained. The Mayo population continued to decline, so that even before the expulsion in 1767, it was reported at about one-fourth to one-fifth of its original, or less than six thousand. The Yaqui population at this time also showed a decline, being put at about twenty-three thousand. However, much of this decline may have been more apparent than real, since both Yaquis and Mayos had begun to migrate widely. The ecclesiastical Visitor and inspector reported in 1760 that “thousands” of Yaquis were living temporarily or permanently away from the lower Yaqui River pueblos. Two thousand Yaquis, who were highly valued miners, were said to be working farther to the north on the middle Yaqui River at mines around Soyopa. Many more were scattered through other mining areas in Sonora, Sinaloa, and even in Durango and Chihuahua. Also as haciendas had developed in Chihuahua and Durango, some Yaquis had crossed the mountains to work in the irrigated areas. Parral, Santa Barbara, and other towns of the plateau reported sizable colonies of Sonora Indians. This emigration dismayed the missionaries and gave the civil authorities the feeling that an era of decline had set in in the formerly thriving Sonoran missions.

The Jesuit reaction was to intensify their work among the Yaquis and Mayos who remained. In addition to continuing their encouragement of agricultural development, they also instituted schools—one in Navojoa on the Mayo River and one in Rahum on the Yaqui River. To these each year they brought two children from each pueblo, dressed them in red and blue uniforms, and gave them instruction in Christian doctrine and in reading and writing.

The civil authorities, aware of economic decline or stagnation in the area, concerned themselves with ways and means of increasing economic activity. Reports were made, the burden of which was that sea trade needed to be stimulated because of the bad roads and the consequent isolation from the rest of New Spain, that an increase in circulating money was needed, and finally that two forms of colonization should be stimulated. The failure up to this point to stimulate Spanish settlement was regarded as a major cause of the poor economic condition. It was proposed that more Spaniards should be brought to settle in the vicinity of presidios to provide increased protection from Indians in the form of “living walls” and also to offer more example of industry to the Indians. Along the same line, it was also proposed that carefully selected Spaniards be introduced into the Indian pueblos themselves. The civil authorities were aware that Spaniards “of a certain character” would have to be selected, meaning not the sort who had tended to drift thus far in the wake of the Spanish advance, but just what kind was not specified. Nothing was done about these recommendations immediately, but they were a basis for later efforts to develop the region.
At the time the Jesuits were expelled, there were ten missionaries at work in the Yaqui-Mayo territory, one-fifth of those employed in the whole of Sonora, Ostimuri, and Sinaloa. Their enforced departure resulted in an immediate disintegration of the Yaqui and Mayo mission communities. Although four Franciscan missionaries came almost immediately, in 1768, to the Yaqui-Mayo country, they seemed unable to take hold. The Royal Commissioners set up to handle the Jesuit property did a poor job. Much of the Jesuit resources on the Yaqui River went into outfitting a campaign against the Seri Indians to the north, and all the mission property fell into a state of nonproductivity. Poor local management, probably due to the Indians’ lack of confidence in the new missionaries, together with spoilation at the hands of the civil authorities, resulted in real disorganization. Many Indian families left the pueblos and scattered. Town government was reported to be lax. This state of decline was increased as a result of great floods on the Mayo River in 1770.

The continued decline of the missions and the growing interest of the lay population of Spaniards in the Indian lands and resources led in 1771 to a program of secularization of the missions. The new personnel was, in general, inadequate both in numbers and training. The secular priests were shifted about with great frequency, so that in fact there was no stable program to take the place of that of the Jesuits. Steadily it became apparent that the new regime was designed to serve the interests of the civil arm of government. The program was inefficiently administered, and a whole new climate of relations between Indians and Spaniards was created — one which grew naturally out of the era of friction and distrust which had been initiated by Huidobro and Vildósola. The key ideas in the new program were taxation and land allotment. The first meant support for government officials at Indian expense, and the opportunity for exploitation of Indian labor under official protection. The second meant opportunity for Spaniards to obtain Indian lands either through purchase or through assignment after all Indians had been assigned.

Tribute, that is, taxes, had never been required of the Yaquis or Mayos; this had been on the basis of their being regarded as not yet ready for citizenship. Now in 1772 the governor of the province was ordered to allot land and work out a plan for getting Indians to pay tribute. The civil authorities believed that it would be dangerous to force payment. They were afraid of Yaqui military strength. Accordingly, only persuasion was used and it was not effective. Apparently neither Yaquis nor Mayos ever had paid tribute at any time to the Spanish king. Nor did the wavering government carry through division of the land among the Indians, although elaborate plans were worked out and a beginning was made. There seems to have been sufficiently strong Indian resistance to make the local officials fearful of carrying out the program. Land allotment was ordered again in 1778 and more land was surveyed and assigned, but apparently only a small proportion of the total holdings was ever thus dealt with.

The Yaquis were fortunate in one of the secular curates who was assigned to the church at Torim — Don Francisco Joaquin Valdez. He spent twenty-three years at his base in Torim, becoming widely influential among Yaquis. He was
a man of unusually high education, holding a university degree. His major interest lay in developing crafts and manufacturing as a balance to the agricultural subsistence economy which the Yaquis had developed. He instituted a program of technical assistance and set up a school in Potam. He encouraged sheep raising and cotton and indigo production. In 1774 he secured looms and a technician who knew textile manufacture and was successful in getting Yaquis to weave for commercial production. A stocking factory was set up in Potam and hatmaking was introduced. He also is reported to have trained Indians in carpentry, masonry, and metal-founding. How much further he carried this than the Jesuits had done earlier is not recorded, but it does appear that craft industry received a considerable impetus among the Yaquis as a result of his efforts.

Nevertheless, after Valdez' departure from Torim to take another church, the tendency toward economic decline reasserted itself. Reports on the conditions of the Yaquis indicated a lessening respect for authority, a decline of industriousness, and much leaving of the towns to live in the hills and rural areas. Spaniards were convinced that the Indians were reverting to their pre-mission state. Quarrels over Spanish encroachment on land took place in the eastern part of the Yaqui country at Los Hornos. Disputes arose between the town officials and the government-appointed captain-general. How much Spanish infiltration of the Indian communities there was at this time is not recorded, but some was going on steadily. The frictions and discontents to which this gave rise caused the governor to order the dissolution of the Yaqui Bow Company which had been a feature of the military organization of the area for some time. The fearfulness of the civil authorities was indicated, as earlier in the case of land allotment and tribute payment, in that this move was ordered to be undertaken with persuasion rather than force, so as not to antagonize the Yaquis. What the outcome was is not recorded.

The Yaqui-Mayo contacts with the Spaniards present a number of sharp contrasts with those between the Tarahumaras and the Spaniards. Outstanding is lack of rebellion and armed conflict during the first hundred years. The causes and the effects of this condition of peace among the Yaquis-Mayos are worth some analysis as a basis for understanding subsequent events.

Certainly as a major cause we can point to the absence of conflict among Spaniards within the Yaqui-Mayo country during the first century of contact. The conflicts of interest between mine labor-recruiters and missionaries were a feature of Tarahumara life from the beginning of contact, but such conflicts did not develop in the Yaqui-Mayo country until the 1730's. Thus, the Indians were required at first to make their adjustment only to the stable mission program. Eventually, the conflicting interests of the Spanish missionaries and the Spanish civil population did upset the mission system, but this took place only after the long period of mission discipline and reduction had altered the native life.

Both the Yaquis and the Mayos, unlike the Tarahumaras, were concentrated in relatively small areas at the time the Spaniards came on the scene. Each tribe had a population of about thirty thousand (according to the Jesuit records) which lived along the lower courses of the Mayo and Yaqui rivers. The area within which
they lived was in each case about sixty miles long and from ten to fifteen miles wide. The Yaquis, in 1617, were reported by de Ribas to live in eighty rancherías. This meant that possibly the average population of each ranchería was between 350 and 400. Furthermore, the Yaqui and Mayo rancherías were of a different type from those of the Tarahumaras. While each Tarahumara household was some distance from its neighbors, as much as a half mile and in some instances even farther apart, the Yaqui and Mayo rancherías were more compact, with houses from a few yards to a hundred yards apart. How long it took to reduce the population into the eight more compact local centers with the corresponding local group loyalties which were apparent by the end of the Jesuit period is unknown. It would seem, however, to have been accomplished fairly quickly on the basis of devotion to a particular group of Catholic images which the missionaries supplied for each of the eight churches. The point to be made, however, is that the Yaquis and Mayos were already a relatively concentrated population when Jesuits began to work. Thus, the reduction program of the missionaries was not in conflict with a developed way of life, as among the Tarahumaras, but rather was in harmony with cultural developments already well under way.

Both the Yaqui and the Mayo populations moreover already had a high degree of tribal consciousness, stimulated by the population concentration in their portions of river valley. The warfare between Yaquis and Mayos, which was recurrent before the arrival of the Spaniards, had undoubtedly also stimulated this condition. The missionaries spoke of both groups as being somewhat isolated from neighboring groups during the first years of contact. What they meant by this cannot have been wholly a geographical matter, for a number of other groups bordered on both their territories. The missionaries probably were referring to tribal exclusiveness which separated the Yaquis and Mayos from other Cahita- and Pima-speaking peoples in their vicinity.

Evidently this tribal consciousness carried with it a considerable degree of organization which linked the rancherías into tribal units capable of making war or peace with other groups. This is indicated not only in the first contacts but also throughout Yaqui history and, up to a point, also in Mayo history. One indication was the treaty which Hurdaide made with the Mayos. It is evident in this, as well as in the later Mayo reaction to missionary entrance, that the Spaniards were dealing with an organized tribe. The Mayos made and kept their treaty as a unit and there is no indication that any one village or group of villages became disaffected. The same is true for the Yaquis, as indicated at the very first in their unity in opposing Hurdaide. They seem to have fought as a unit seeking to protect the whole of the territory through which their eighty rancherías were scattered. Then even in the face of recorded resistance within the tribe (on the part of “young men”) it was possible for the Yaquis under a unified leadership to make a treaty and keep it. There is no indication that the Yaquis were split, moreover, even after the missionaries came in. What trouble the Jesuit Basilio had seems to have been with individuals who never gained followings, so far as is recorded. The kind of factionalism that was almost immediately apparent in the Tarahumara country and which increased in bitterness was a late phenomenon among the Yaquis, not
yet even apparent in the revolt of 1740, although of course there is some evidence for factionalism at that time. This occurred, however, well after the first century of contact.

It was fortunate for the Jesuit program that this relatively high degree of organization existed among the two river peoples. Among the Tarahumaras they had to work at conversion almost individual by individual. In addition, working in from the edges of the Tarahumara country they created schisms among the people by establishing mission communities in the marginal areas, while completely conservative communities continued to function in the interior without any real Spanish contact. In contrast, on the Mayo and Yaqui rivers each tribe was brought under the mission system as a whole, so that there was no division into Christian and non-Christian communities even at the very beginning. The program was accepted in each case by the whole tribe. It is true that there were individuals and families who resisted baptism and close contact with the missionaries. Possibly there were whole rancherías here and there which continued to live outside the mission system for some time, or even possibly during the whole of the Jesuit period. But these were obviously a very small minority, not important enough to concern the missionaries after the first five or six years of work. The tried leadership, which was responsible for the treaties with the Spaniards and the invitations to the missionaries, must have been very stable indeed, and capable of working together effectively from community to community. There is considerable suggestion in the data that this leadership was never dependent on particular personality characteristics, but rather that it rested on a democratic foundation through which popular desire expressed itself effectively. Despite the intimate knowledge of Indian life which the missionaries gained, they did not often mention particular leaders. Hence, it seems unlikely that the organization that was obviously there was a result of particular individual qualities in leaders.

That there was considerable compatibility between what the Indians had or were aiming at in the form of leadership and what the missionaries, in combination with the civil Spanish government, wanted is indicated in the readiness with which they took to church organization, village government, and the system of instruction introduced by the Spaniards. One of the striking features of Jesuit comment on Yaqui and Mayo reactions is their frequent statement that no Indians took more readily than the Mayos and Yaquis to both the carrying out of church activities and instruction in Christian doctrine. The missionaries spoke of the zeal with which the Indians followed the Jesuit ceremonial calendar. They were also amazed at the rapidity with which Yaquis and Mayos learned the required prayers and hymns, and at the vigor with which those who learned immediately began to teach others. It is unfortunate that more of the details of the processes of religious teaching and learning have not been preserved. As it is, we have little solid information on which to build an understanding of the points of harmony and conflict in the two systems of religious thought. We can only infer that some points of congruity must have been quickly found and that the techniques employed by the missionaries encouraged rather than interfered with the harmonious blending of the two.
It is also unfortunate that we can reconstruct nothing reliable in regard to the conditions that led the Indians to be so avid for new rituals and beliefs as to invite the Jesuits in. It is clear that the Jesuits enjoyed extremely high prestige in the general region. It is equally clear that the Mayos, after their first inspection visits to the Fuerte region, knew a great deal about the missionary work and highly approved it. But just what it was that impressed them we do not know. There is no suggestion of any current revolution in religious belief into which the arrival of the missionaries fitted, nor any special need of the time such as techniques of curing. This lack of data forces us to fall back on the hypothesis of high compatibility between what the Indians had and what the Spaniards offered.

There is, of course, the possibility that the high prestige of the Jesuits rested less upon their religious than their economic offerings. Every Jesuit was an agricultural extension worker, with new crops and new agricultural techniques to offer, and the mission was a center for the diffusion of agricultural improvements. We know that the Jesuits were unusually successful in their work in developing agriculture on the Mayo and Yaqui rivers, especially on the latter. We know also that they introduced cattle, sheep and goats, chickens, wheat, fruits and vegetables, as well as plows and carts, donkeys, and hoes. The advantages of all these for increasing and regularizing the food supply must have been even more quickly apparent to the Yaquis and Mayos than to the Tarahumaras, for the former were already intensive agriculturalists. Their habitat lent itself to large-scale agricultural production and to the development of herds of animals. The large expanses of tillable land with a fairly regular water supply from the river floods were quickly turned to account by the stimulus of the Jesuits and their new agricultural resources. The Jesuit records indicate that their work stabilized the food supply quickly, and within the first sixty years their efforts began to result in real surpluses which the Indians did not object to seeing exported. The significance of this economic revolution cannot be overemphasized. Unquestionably, the missionary enterprise raised the standard of living, and this was regarded as desirable by the Indians, especially because the efforts along this line were well integrated with the new social and religious life which the missionaries introduced. Once the mission discipline was generally accepted by all members of the tribe, agricultural development went along with it. Two distinct ways of life were not set up as a result of the mission system here, as occurred in the Tarahumara country.

The revolt of 1740 brought the Indians face to face with the deep-seated conflict between the Jesuit mission system and Spanish political and economic interests. It is significant that at times during the growth of the armed conflict the missionaries seemed to be lined up with the Indians against other Spaniards. It is also significant, however, that there were some Indians who understood the nature of the power centers in Spanish culture and who accordingly tried to employ Spanish political power in seeking their own ends. Juan Ignacio Muni seems to have been such a Yaqui. By this time enough migration out of the Indian country into the mines and haciendas near or distant had taken place so that both Yaquis and Mayos were aware of other aspects of Spanish culture than
those which the missionaries had introduced. There was a good deal of literacy, knowledge of the use and value of money, understanding of Spanish political organization, and awareness of the Spanish cultural conflicts as concrete phenomena in the actions of different Spaniards. The full impact of Spanish civilization would seem to have dated from this set of events.

Interestingly enough, the meager record of this important period in Yaqui-Mayo history does not indicate any clear eruption into factions of the Indian population of either river. Muni definitely used Spanish political power in an effort to increase his own power in relation to the missionaries; up to a point he was successful. But the records do not indicate that there was a split within either tribe—one faction backing the missionaries and one backing Muni. On the contrary, the denouement was that both tribes in unified fashion opposed all Spaniards—missionaries and political officials alike. It is true that the missionaries were treated as personal friends and there was no indication of any general or particular animus against them. They were still popular, but they were nevertheless regarded as Spaniards and were not, with one exception, asked to stay and side with the Indians. It was accepted that in the ultimate showdown they would have to go over to join the other Spaniards, and so they were given food and helped to leave their missions when the fighting turned against all Spaniards in the region.

At this point, it was clear that the Yaquis and Mayos had been brought on the path toward acquaintance with Western civilization as tribal units. They were not split asunder even at this time of heavy impact, as the Tarahumaras repeatedly were. Their society as well as their culture remained an integrated whole, and they united against the Spaniards. Muni, the leader who knew how to make use of the clerical-political split in Spanish society, remained a leader of his people.

The disintegration of Spanish organization on the northwestern frontier by the early 1800's must have been fairly clear to the Indians. Missionary activities, aimed at making the Indians feel the impact of a new and wonderful view of life, had been reduced to almost nothing. All the Indians of Sonora, even including the Seris, had now lived with the Christian teachings for one hundred years or more, and had seen them in a setting of economic exploitation, land appropriation, warfare, and political conflict. Most of the Indians, excluding the majority of Apaches and a considerable number of Seris, had accepted some Christian ideas and ritual as an adjunct to living, tying them in in various ways with their daily lives. But the missionary, as a man with great new promises and hopes, was no longer present. The mission communities no longer existed as outposts of the new way of life where new material and spiritual benefits were constantly being offered. They existed rather as made-over communities where the true and right way of life had been discovered and was now practiced. The transformation of the river rancherías in the skilled hands of the Jesuits was an accomplished fact. The blending of Spanish-Catholic theocracy and Indian democracy resulted in very stable and tightly organized communities. These communities were not, however, conceived by the Indians as units in a European nation. Rather the Yaquis and Mayos, for example, still conceived themselves as independent tribal
units holding their land from immemorial times and not by fiat of the Spaniards. It was growing clear that the Spaniards were fearful of challenging that view.

Conflict over these disparate viewpoints was postponed, however, by the War for Independence from which the Indians of the river pueblos remained aloof. It was not until the Mexican government attempted to integrate the Mayos and Yaquis into the dominant cultural pattern that actual hostilities broke out.

The weakness of the Spaniards in the face of Apache attack and their vulnerability before such a small group as the Seris were widely known by the Indians of Sonora. The fact that the Spaniards had begun fighting among themselves, as revealed when the War for Independence finally spread into the Sonora-Sinaloa theater, indicated that perhaps they were no more to be feared than any of the other neighboring tribes. From 1810 to the early 1820's, while Spaniard fought Spaniard south, east, and north of the Mayo-Yaqui area, the Indians of the river pueblos stood by and watched. This was a fight which they apparently regarded as concerning them but little. They waited until it was over, one of the clearest evidences that the issues of national independence and gachupin-criollo struggle for power meant nothing to them. It was not until independence was won and the necessity of dealing with the new Occidente State became a fact that Yaquis and Mayos ceased their passivity. When they did it was apparent that at least some Indian leaders had been aware of events during the War for Independence, that they were in sufficient communication to have learned even the nature of the symbols which the Mexicans employed.

Sonora, at first set up as an independent state with capital at Ures in 1823, was united with Sinaloa in the state of Occidente when a constitution was drafted in 1824. A provisional government was established at Fuerte in northern Sinaloa and the constitution of the state of Occidente was promulgated in 1825. The drafters of the constitution were well aware of a major problem which had been considered and reconsidered for a century on the northwestern frontier. This was the question of how to bring the large Indian population of the region into the economic, political, and social life that the Spaniards had introduced. The prevailing view was that which stemmed from the later Laws of the Indies, namely, that Indians should be full-fledged citizens and participate in political affairs like all others. The constitution of the state of Occidente was explicit in this matter. In the first place it included an article which prohibited "commerce in or sale of Indians of the barbarous nations" and provided for "setting free those slaves who at present exist in servitude as a result of that unjust traffic." This applied in Sonora primarily to the Apaches, although from time to time various other groups had also been dealt with in the same way, but it established also the foundation for full citizenship of the "less barbarous" people. Thus, the constitution stated that citizens were "all those born and resident in the state who have reached the age of twenty-one years, or eighteen years if married." This was in line with the Plan of Iguala which in 1821 declared citizens of the monarchy "all inhabitants of New Spain, without any distinction between Europeans, Africans, or Indians."

This meant, of course, in the eyes of the Mexicans that Indians, as citizens, were taxable. Accordingly, the struggling new Occidente government made tax
assessments on Mayos and Yaquis along with other citizens. In 1825, when it was found that Yaquis refused to pay taxes on the ground that they had never done so, soldiers were sent to enforce the law. At Rahum in the western Yaqui country the people fought the soldiers. A priest, Pedro Leyva of Cocorit, urged the Yaquis to resist further and within a short time there was general rebellion. A priest was killed at Torim. Other Mexicans besides Father Pedro Leyva, including a man named Casillas from Tepic, participated in the organization of troops to resist the government. A force of two thousand fighting men was raised, most of whom were armed with bows and arrows, and a Yaqui called Juan Banderas took command.

Banderas and his White advisers worked out a clear-cut program. They adopted as their symbol the Virgin of Guadalupe, as had the original rebels against Spain. The symbol was that of Indian independence of Spain, and, according to the accounts of the period, this idea was carried by Banderas to the point of planning a whole independent Indian state in northern Mexico. As fighting continued throughout the Yaqui country, Banderas sought to enlist the Opatas and Pimas on the north and the Mayos on the south. He was successful and within the year the White settlers who had come into the Yaqui and Mayo territory during the preceding fifty years were driven out. Some two hundred Yaquis joined with Mexicans to fight against Banderas' forces, but for the most part the Indians were united behind him. By early 1826 he controlled all the settlements of the lower Yaqui and Mayo valleys and began organizing his new confederacy. Fearfully, the Mexicans moved the new Occidente state capital southward to Cosala from Fuerte, but Banderas apparently was not interested in expanding his control beyond the area of Yaqui and Mayo claims and into the country of his Lower Pima and Opata allies. Once he had done this, he ceased to attack.

The Occidente government, weak as it was, made an effort to assert itself. It raised a fighting force, small but far better armed than Banderas' men, and engaged them south of Hermosillo. Banderas' force was badly defeated, but the Mexicans were not strong enough to invade Yaqui territory or to force Banderas to submit. He continued consolidating his influence in the area which he already controlled and then, as he saw that Occidente would continue to wage war, he offered to arrange peace. In 1827 he agreed to submit to the superior power of the Mexican state, apparently in the belief that Yaqui local government would remain autonomous. He was pardoned, along with other leaders, by Occidente. At the same time he was recognized as captain-general of the Yaqui towns and received pay from the state.

In 1828 the Occidente government, still deeply concerned with the problem of "integrating the Indians" into the state, enacted three laws having to do with Indian affairs. One of these set up the eight towns of the Yaqui River and the military post of Buenavista on the eastern boundary between Yaqui and Lower Pima territories as a separate political district. This act also made Buenavista the head town of the district and gave it certain jurisdiction over the Mayo towns. This put local government in the Yaqui and Mayo areas into the hands of non-
Indians who made up the population of Buenavista. Thus, foundations were laid for the extension of the municipality-state system of organization into the Indian communities.

A second decree set up regulations for government in Indian towns. Besides affirming the privileges of citizenship for the Indians, it also required them to elect local officials and serve in public offices, to serve in the militia, and to carry out the administration of schools and the public lands. It made school attendance compulsory. It suspended the usual colonial offices of captain-general and lieutenant-general in the towns, although providing that any individuals holding such offices at that time would continue to draw their stipends from the state for life. A third decree had to do with the administration of land. It provided that the towns should administer their own public lands, and required each town to assign all subjugated land to individuals and give them titles for it. Boards consisting of three Indians were to be set up for the handling of these matters in each town. Land allocated could not be alienated within six years, and various provisions sought to insure fair distribution. This was an effort to make effective the individual apportionment of land which had been ordered by the viceroy in 1769, after the Jesuit expulsion, and which had been gingerly proposed for the Yaquis and Mayos even before that.

The three decrees made very clear the nature of state policy on Indian integration. They had special relevance to the Yaquis, who had never been taxed, had consistently resisted efforts to divide their land for individual ownership, and had maintained their own local government largely distinct from provincial or state governments. At the same time they struck directly at Juan Banderas in his office of captain-general. The land distribution decree went into effect a year after its promulgation, in September, 1829.

Banderas began to make preparations for resistance. He manufactured gunpowder, acquired arms, and consolidated the alliance with the Opatas through an Opata leader named Dolores Gutiérrez. In 1832 Banderas and Gutiérrez at the head of several hundred men again established control over the Yaqui towns and sought to extend their domination into central Sonora in the Opata country. After a year Banderas’ force of one thousand Yaquis, Opatas, and Pimas was defeated near Buenavista; Banderas and Gutiérrez were captured and executed in 1833 at Arispe.

A contemporary of Banderas, Ignacio Zuñiga, commandant of Mexican forces at Pitic, in 1835 wrote of him as follows: The chief of these last two [uprisings] has been the Indian Banderas, General of the nation, a man of genius for directing and enlisting his followers, gifted with a spirited imagination, with eloquence and with a rare talent, with which he could have accomplished many more evils if his plans had been favored. . . . He conceived the plan of crowning himself king and of bringing about a general reconciliation among all the tribes for establishing his monarchy and sustaining the cause of the Indians against the whites. To this end he sent envoys to the other tribes, charging them with artful and flattering messages to invite them to join cause with him. He reminded all of them of that which should move them most, that is to say, the question of the lands: he painted
our race as ambitious and dominating, and made use of the [existing] hatreds, grudges, and [desire for] vengeance, passions common to all the Indians, to excite them to agree to the consolidation of his military movements. . . . This caudillo [chieftain], courageous and ambitious, was shot at Arispe, leaving a memory among his people which perhaps will contribute strongly to the development of his doctrines, which can one day be regrettable. They have been planted; if they are left to germinate, propagate, and grow, will they not produce their fruit? . . . the doctrines of this bandit, and the great riches of all kinds which he distributed to the Indians will be for a long time the food of frequent rebellions and raids; since he succeeded in convincing them that they are the legitimate proprietors of whatever there is; and he taught them to live by robbing, something they will not forget easily, if punishment be not exemplary and prompt, following immediately the crime.

Zuñiga also described something of the results of the campaigns of Banderas: Before the rebellion of the year 1825 there was considerable population de razon scattered in the interior of all the towns of the Yaqui and Mayo and a much larger number who populated a multitude of ranches and haciendas in the immediate vicinities. The greater part of this population emigrated, leaving deserted and in fearful desolation many leagues round about which had been cleared and the goods of the fields transported to swamps and islands of the Yaqui. It should be noted that such fear has been inspired and so little security for peace and good faith of the Indians exists that a new uprising is feared each day. For this reason the fields remain deserted, the Mexicans who had them before in the same towns of one river or the other, wandering and deprived of their property and all the State alarmed and in expectation of more calamity, which may come to make worse the public evils now so heavy and unsupportable.

Zuñiga saw the situation, as no doubt did his other Mexican contemporaries, starting from the premise that the Yaquis had in all respects submitted to the power of the Mexican government. To him Banderas was a bandit, albeit a very capable one, because he had dispossessed Mexicans of land on which they had settled and goods which they had produced. He was a rebel, as Zuñiga saw it, because he had set up his own government within the state of what was now Sonora and had fought against the state troops. Thinking in terms of the caudillismo which had already developed strongly in Sonora, he saw Banderas purely as an ambitious man trying to gain power for himself and make himself a "king." The Spaniards had previously interpreted the actions of the Yaqui leader Muni of 1740 in similar terms. Such an interpretation was entirely in accordance with the behavior of Spanish and Mexican political figures in New Spain.

In view of later developments in the century, it appears, however, that Banderas and most other Yaquis started from a different premise, namely, that they had never submitted completely to Spain or now to Mexico. They had preserved their land largely intact through the Spanish period, and had maintained a very considerable degree of autonomy in their village government. The new government of the state of Sonora, clearly in view of the decrees of 1828, proposed to establish a new regime which did not take into account either the long-existing
political or land situations. Yaquis were trying to maintain that status quo and, under the leadership of Banderas, to build an organization that would insure them against the encroachments on land and political autonomy which had increased rapidly under the Occidente government. To them the Mexican settlers in their territory were bandits, taking land contrary to the law which Yaquis recognized. To them the Mexican soldiers were invaders. To them had diffused the symbol of the Virgin of Guadalupe in the name of whom the Mexicans had achieved their autonomy. Unfortunately, the available records do not give us the Yaqui point of view as clearly as Zúñiga expresses the Mexican, but it seems safe to assume, especially in view of later developments, that Banderas’ activities were not simply those of an ambitious chieftain looking toward personal power. His ambitions were closely linked with the aims of the majority of Yaquis, nourished for two centuries by the politico-religious system of the colonial period and based in the sacred beliefs of the tribe. The military weakness of the Mexicans at the time when they forced the issues of land ownership and local government had given an opportunity for unified political expression of the tribal sentiments. Zúñiga’s presentiments of the effects of Banderas’ leadership were well founded.

Within a year of Banderas’ execution, in 1834, there was fighting again. Yaquis rose at Torim in an attempt to oust Mexicans who had resettled there. It was now clear, however, that the demonstrations of Mexican power and Banderas’ leadership had definitely split the Yaquis. Juan Ignacio Jusacamea of Torim, who had on occasion opposed Banderas and had been made alcalde mayor of the Yaqui district, fought against the rebellious Yaquis and, asking that the Mexicans send no soldiers, forced them into peace. Jusacamea, apparently accepting the fact of Mexican dominance and in favor of the land distribution program, continued for the next six years, until he was killed in an uprising of Indians near Horcasitas, to be an important leader and to work for peaceful solution of Yaqui differences with the Mexicans. Factionalism thus clearly became established among the Yaquis, as it had not been before.

However, there was little in the way of clear-cut issue in Sonora politics for the factions among the Yaquis to take hold of during the next thirty-five or forty years. Reflecting the political disorganization of Mexico generally, the state of Sonora became the scene of operation of competing political chieftains. Political principles became subordinated to personal loyalties as different caudillos vied for power. The plans for agricultural development in the Yaqui and Mayo and other Indian areas of the state, which had been set forth in the Decrees of 1828, fell into eclipse as the state government passed from hand to hand. The compulsory school program found no funds for its support. Even land distribution ceased to be carried out, except on an unsystematic and usually illegal basis. The Yaqui and Mayo towns were left practically to themselves, with only an occasional secular priest in residence, and with Mexican administrators too busy with shifting political alliances to follow up the provisions of the Decrees of 1828. What issues developed during the 1830’s and 1840’s were those of federalism versus centralism in the national organization and the Laws of the Reform during the 1850’s. From the 1830’s until 1860 one figure moved prominence and continuously in the
politics of the state. This was Manuel Gándara whose political principles are difficult to determine. He clearly sought political power and achieved it at different times by more or less legitimate election to the governorship, by appointment from the central government, or by simple usurpation. He struggled for power with rival caudillos until one of these, Pesqueira, finally eliminated him from the political scene in 1859.

Throughout Gándara's political and military machinations he found support from some groups of Yaquis, but it is difficult to know whether they supported him because of any policies for which he stood, or simply because they wished to help keep the state stirred up. It is certain that whenever it suited his political purposes, Gándara was able to stir Yaquis into battle. In his struggle for possession of the governorship with Urrea during the 1830's and 1840's, Gándara armed the Yaquis and incited them against state forces three times, in 1838, 1840, and 1842. The first of these outbreaks resulted in Urrea's invading the Yaqui country, waging vicious warfare, and taking over for state and personal revenue the salt deposits on the coast which Yaquis had used. There is no record in regard to Gándara's policies with respect to the Yaqui and Mayo interests. We may infer that he tried to let them alone except when he felt they would be useful to himself at times of election or attempted revolution. This, of course, may have been sufficient inducement for Yaquis to give him what aid they could. That Gándara was aware of need for some sort of program which would bring the Yaquis more fully into participation in Mexican life is indicated in the fact that during one of his administrations (1853) he and Santa Ana, who was president of Mexico and a supporter of Gándara, planned to send six thousand colonists to Sonora to settle among the Indians and help build up the northwestern state.

From 1857 until 1862 the Yaquis were in an almost constant state of rebellion against the state government. This was a period of bitter struggle on the part of Gándara to remain in power, after being forced out of the governor's office in 1857 by General Ignacio Pesqueira. Gándara's revolution lasted from 1857 through 1859 during which period he was strongly supported by the Yaqui leader Mateo Marquin (or José María Barquin). Fighting centered on the western margins of the Yaqui territory in the Guaymas Valley, but by 1858 extended to Cocorit on the eastern margin. In the same year, as Gándara's revolution failed elsewhere in the state, the Mayos joined forces with the Yaquis. While the Yaquis attacked and laid waste the Guaymas Valley, the Mayos attacked the lower Mayo River town of Santa Cruz and sacked it. By the end of 1858 General Pesqueira, whose troops had been busy elsewhere, turned his attention to the Yaqui and Mayo country. The fighting factions of both tribes were dealt defeats in 1859, but continued to fight. Beaten in their own territory in the following year, they nevertheless organized a joint expedition to Hermosillo, the state capital, where they were defeated by Pesqueira's forces and retreated back to their own lands. In 1862 Pesqueira found it necessary to invade both Yaqui and Mayo territory, defeating the Mayos at Santa Cruz and accepting peace offers from the Yaquis at Torim. Pesqueira established a military post at Agua Caliente in the Yaqui country, after giving pardon to the Indian leaders for their part in the revolution.
The nineteen years of the Pesqueira family's control of the Sonora state government were marked first by the vigorous attempt to establish peace by force of arms in the Mayo and Yaqui areas and second by the French invasion of Sonora. The several invasions of the river valleys by forces directed by Pesqueira and his able assistant Colonel García Morales during the Gándara revolution and its aftermath established Pesqueira, and hence the existing state government, as the enemy of the Yaqui and Mayo towns. Their hostility to Pesqueira continued throughout his regime and came to vigorous expression during the French invasion. In 1865 the French invaders defeated Pesqueira at Guaymas and began to consolidate their plans for taking over the state. This plan included capitalizing on the Mayo-Yaqui hostility to the Sonora government. Immediately after the defeat of Pesqueira, the Yaqui leader who had supported Gándara, Mateo Marquin, declared his support for the French Imperialists and carried a considerable number of Yaquis, although not all, with him. Supporters of the French had already been at work in the Mayo country and found a majority of Mayos ready to join them in an attack on Alamos. Meanwhile, in the center of the state, an able Opata military leader, Refugio Tanori, announced his support of the French and organized an army of several thousand Opatas and Lower Pimas. Alamos was quickly taken in the south; and Tanori's force, which included some Yaquis, ousted Pesqueira from his headquarters in Ures. Through 1865 and 1866 fighting continued, with the Indian allies of the French giving them strong assistance. However, the French were finally defeated and driven out of Sonora in 1866. Pesqueira then began again the pacification of the Mayos and Yaquis.

After campaigning into the Indian towns and accepting peace offers, Pesqueira appointed members of the peace-seeking factions to maintain order and administer local affairs. Two of these were promptly killed, at Bacum by the Yaquis and at Santa Cruz by the Mayos, and Pesqueira found it necessary to campaign systematically again against the Indians. The rebellious Mayos quickly capitulated in 1867, but immediately proceeded to attack the towns of Santa Cruz, Etchojoa, and San Pedro on the lower Mayo River in the following year. After this outburst, Pesqueira's troops were able to force the Mayos to accept peace again in early 1868.

The pacification of the Yaquis proved more difficult. Pesqueira placed General García Morales in charge of a determined campaign. The Mexican troops after establishing posts at various points around the whole margin of the Yaqui country, penetrated into the center where they established headquarters at the port of Medano. From here they carried on a war without quarter. They shot dozens of captured leaders, confiscated cattle and food, laid waste fields, took women and children prisoners. In 1868 an incident occurred which has gone into the Sonora history books and has become a symbol of Mexican cruelty to Yaquis. One of García Morales' colonels at Cocorit accepted the plea for peace of a group of six hundred men, women, and children. He asked them to turn over their arms and when a few were given up, he let 150 of the prisoners go and imprisoned the remaining 450 in the church at Bacum. He held ten leaders as hostages, saying that if there were any attempts at escape he would shoot all ten. During
the night he trained his artillery on the door of the church. There was a disturbance during the night. The colonel ordered the ten leaders shot and, as a fire broke out within the church, the artillery shelled the doorway. The result was that some 120 Indians were massacred.

By such relentless means García Morales obtained peace in the Yaqui towns. He then proceeded to order the systematic distribution of the Yaqui lands again, and arranged for establishment of three colonies of Mexicans to be protected by the troops in their pursuit of agriculture. In October the most serious flood ever reported engulfed the Mayo towns, destroying Navojoa, Etchojoa, Tesia, Cuirimpó, and Camoa. It was eight years before fighting broke out again on the rivers, but the continuous disturbances in southern Sonora, together with Apache raids in the central part of the state had resulted in the emigration of thousands of people. The Yaquis and Mayos, especially the former, were spoken of as the major obstacle to civilization in the state.

Pesqueira's effective methods of force had brought a short peace in southern Sonora which the Mexicans welcomed. It had also intensified the resistance of both the Mayos and Yaquis to the Mexican program for civilizing them, although the Sonorans did not become aware of this until a few years later. The Mexicans were nevertheless well aware that the program for integrating the Yaqui and Mayo towns into Sonora life had never been carried out as it had been envisioned in the decrees of the state legislature of 1828. When, during Pesqueira's regime, a new constitution was written to conform with the Laws of the Reform promulgated by Juárez and Porfirio Díaz, notice was taken of this condition. The new state constitution, which went into effect in September, 1873, contained the following provision:

Article IV. — To deprive the Yaqui and Mayo tribes of the rights of citizenship while they maintain the anomalous organization that they have in their towns and rancherías, but allowing the enjoyment [of those rights] to individuals of the same tribes who reside in the organized pueblos of the state.

In 1874, as peace continued, Governor Pesqueira appointed a Yaqui named José María Leyva, usually called Cajeme (He Who Does not Drink) by Yaquis, alcalde mayor of the Yaqui and Mayo towns. Cajeme had fought with General Pesqueira against the French. The following year was election year and opposition to the long period of successive elections of Pesqueira as governor had developed. Rebellion against the family dictatorship was brewing and when the governor's son, José J. Pesqueira, was announced as the successor of his aged father, a revolution broke out under the leadership of Serna. This seemed also to be the signal for disturbances on the Yaqui and Mayo rivers, as had elections in the old days of Gándara. Yaquis burned the town of Cocorit and Mayos burned Santa Cruz. Whites who had settled on the lower Yaqui River during the recent peaceful years of Pesqueira's administrations began to flee, as rumors of a general uprising increased. The new alcalde mayor, Cajeme, was seen to make frequent trips to the Mayo towns, where long conferences were held. The fact that his appointment also included responsibility for the Mayo towns was not regarded as sufficient
reason for these meetings. It was also rumored that Cajeme had ordered shot Mayo leaders whom he did not like. Whatever the plans, it was apparent that two towns had been attacked and steps must be taken. Accordingly Governor Pesqueira, ignoring the revolution of Serna for the time being, marched into the heart of the Yaqui country, defeating Cajeme and a troop of fifteen hundred Yaquis at Pitahaya on the way. Repeating his father's procedure, he established headquarters at Medano and began to pacify the Yaquis in relentless fashion. Pesqueira's soldiers killed indiscriminately, raided the Yaqui cattle ranches, and pillaged the towns, evidently believing that the same methods used by the earlier Pesqueira would bring the same results of peace. A fort for a permanent garrison was begun at Medano, but before it was finished, the Serna revolution gained such serious proportions under the military leadership of Colonel Lorenzo Torres that Pesqueira was forced to retire from the Yaqui country and seek to attend to it.

During 1876 the Pesqueira-Torres forces reached a stalemate and President Díaz was forced to send an intermediary to settle Sonora affairs. There were no more Yaqui outbreaks, but in the following year of 1877, two Mayo leaders, Felipe Valenzuela and Miguel Totolitogui, working from San Pedro, organized an attack on places near Navojoa. They were promptly beaten by Mexican troops, but meanwhile the fears of the Whites settled on the Mayo River below Navojoa were so great that nearly all of them fled the area.

While the Mayo-Yaqui area remained in a state of expectation of a new and devastating war under the leadership of Cajeme and his Mayo lieutenants, the Sonora state government settled its affairs in favor of the Torres family as against the Pesqueira family. In 1879 General Luis E. Torres, who had for some time held land and been interested in developing the Yaqui country agriculturally, was elected governor and began a political dynasty which lasted for thirty years, until the Revolution of 1910 ousted his family and friends along with President Porfirio Díaz.

The first administration of Governor Luís E. Torres, from 1879 through 1881, was a period of continuing rumors and alarms that the Yaquis and Mayos were on the point of a grand uprising. Settlers in the Indian country were convinced that Alcalde Mayor Cajeme was planning war. It was known that he had led Yaquis against General Pesqueira at Pitahaya when the latter had invaded Yaqui territory in 1875. Yet no steps were taken to remove him from office, so far as the records reveal. The costs of a vigorous campaign were beyond the resources of the state of Sonora, and besides there was strong feeling on the part of the state leaders that campaigns such as Pesqueira had waged did not solve the problem. Instead, the old program of colonization seemed to hold out more prospect for a permanent solution of the Mayo-Yaqui situation.

In 1880 the state legislature, Governor Torres, and General Bernardo Reyes, military commander of federal forces in the state, formulated a plan and asked the aid of the federal government for carrying it out. The legislature prepared a full statement of the problem as they saw it. After recounting how the Papagos, Opatas, and even the Seris had become peaceful and industrious citizens, the legislators went on to say: Thus, little by little, and with the passage of time, the
dominions of such tribes as populate Sonora have been narrowed, to give place to civilization and to form a people which if it is not the most learned in the Republic, is at least not the last.

Only the Yaquis and Mayos have been able to remain obstinate in their savage life, occupying a great extent of land on both the best rivers which the state possesses, masters of the most fertile lands, without any organization, without obedience to either authority or laws, completely removed from obedience to all government, and what is more, constantly making collection of war materials, as though preparing for an armed struggle, and committing continuous robberies and assassinations against the interests and persons of those who get within their reach.

The legislators explained that "war without quarter" such as had been waged in the past did not work and that a "war of the castes" would not settle the problem. They discussed the "horrible anomaly" of the Indian-controlled governments of the Yaqui and Mayo towns and pointed out that some of the Mayo towns, namely, the upriver ones of Macoyaqui, Conicorit, Camoa, Tesia, and Navojoa, had "liberated themselves from the dominion of the savages" and were living in conformity with the laws of the state under the prescribed municipal organization. They closed by throwing the gauntlet to the federal government: "Is it perhaps that the Mexican government is so weak that it cannot reduce these savages to order, requiring them to live like the other inhabitants, and making them begin the life of civilization?"

They then went on to outline their plan. They asked the federal government for one thousand soldiers to be permanently stationed in the Yaqui and Mayo country. The soldiers themselves could take up land to their own advantage and set examples to the Indians as farmers. At the same time the soldiers would constantly act as protectors of civilian colonists who could steadily penetrate the fertile river lands. Gradually the Indians would come to understand the futility of resistance and would see the benefits of civilized life as desirable for themselves. Such a plan would be the least costly that could be devised and would bring peace and economic development almost immediately. Governor Torres, emphasizing that the Mayo and Yaqui land was the most fertile in the state and could become the base for the sound development of Sonora if it were placed in the hands of civilized men, approved the legislature's report. The plan was also strongly endorsed by General Reyes, the military commander, and sent on to the national Secretary of War and Navy. General Reyes pointed out that Cajeme could raise probably not more than two thousand fighting men out of the current fourteen thousand population of the lower river valleys and that a permanent force of one thousand national soldiers, aided when necessary by National Guard and state troops, could keep the situation well in hand.

The Secretary of War replied that one thousand soldiers were not available, but that he would be glad to help in case of emergency. Governor Torres, with foreboding, then turned to an effort to distribute the land around the Yaqui and Mayo towns and began preparations for building a large irrigation canal to improve the agricultural situation in the Yaqui area. At the same time he attempted
to organize the Indian towns as agricultural colonies under state law. It was soon evident that the Indians were as resistant as ever to such measures and little was accomplished during Torres' administration.

His successor, Carlos Ortiz, was the holder of a large hacienda in the vicinity of Navojoa on the Mayo River. Immediately upon assuming office, apparently in response to the many rumors that the Mayos were preparing an uprising, he appointed his brother Agustín commander of state troops and established a large garrison at Navojoa. This action had two immediate results. One was the rousing of great hostility against him throughout the state, on the ground that he was using the state to protect his private interests. The other was the outbreak of war on the Mayo River.

Agustín Ortiz, hearing that Cajeme had come from the Yaqui towns to the Mayo to plan an uprising, gathered a force and attacked the rumored place of meeting of Cajeme with the Mayo leaders — Capetemaya. The battle of Capetemaya resulted in the rout of Ortiz' soldiers, as well as the dispersal of the meeting and the wounding of Cajeme. This took place in 1882. For two years following the Mayo towns were in a state of rebellion, and raiding of Mexican holdings around Navojoa continued intermittently. A small force of national troops came in to help. Mexicans in Navojoa and Alamos organized to protect themselves. The reputed “Chief of the Mayo Tribe,” José Zarapero, was picked up and shot. Various Mayo leaders were dealt with in the same way. Cajeme named a successor to Zarapero in the person of Jesús Moroyoqui but did not himself bring any military aid from the Yaqui towns to the support of the roused Mayos. Fighting continued intermittently until 1884, but no effective organization developed among the Mayos. There was a good deal of evidence of disunity among them, and finally the small forces which were carrying out the raids asked for peace and agreed to recognize Mexican authority.

Meanwhile Carlos Ortiz was forced out of the governor's office and one of the Torres family was made interim governor. In the Yaqui country there were also signs of dissatisfaction with the existing leadership. Cajeme had made efforts, in his capacity as alcalde, to institute a more centralized control of government than the Yaqui towns were accustomed to. He represented himself as captain-general, the title which Sonora law had abolished, but which Yaquis had long recognized and regarded as necessary in case of war. Cajeme also set himself up as judge over all the Yaqui towns, and undertook to make himself in this capacity the highest judicial authority. Accepting the town organization pretty much as he found it and encouraging the town councils to act in the form of democratic bodies as they customarily had done, he nevertheless regarded himself as wielding an over-all authority, based upon but ultimately higher than the power of the eight governors who served as chairmen of the eight town councils.

In the course of attempting to bring about this concentration of power in his own hands, Cajeme encountered both strong support and opposition. Insofar as relations with non-Yaquis went, Cajeme apparently was permitted to exercise the power he wished. Thus in preparations for war with Mexicans to protect land encroachments, he found Yaquis generally willing to accept his leadership,
for example, in carrying out the work of fortification of a place called Añil between Potam and Vicam, and in the training of cavalry and other troops. As a former captain in the Mexican Army fighting against the French and on the side of the Liberals, he was recognized by Yaquis generally as a tribal military chief. Also, he had instituted a tax on shipments of goods to and from the Yaqui port of Medano and this seems to have generally been regarded as a proper means of raising funds for military preparation by Yaquis generally. However, when he assumed judicial authority, making decisions in regard to land use and interfamily disputes, Cajeme incurred the hostility of many Yaquis. His actions began to be spoken of as arbitrary and his position of judge as an usurpation. During 1884, when he remained inactive in the Mayo uprisings, much opposition developed against him. For the most part, the opposition took the form of the departure of Yaqui families who objected to his activities. Many of these families bitterly opposed Cajeme because of his exercise of judicial power, as they thought, against them specifically. Others were opposed to what they regarded as a policy sure to increase the hostility of Mexicans, with consequent war. Among the latter seems to have been a man named Loreto Molina, who had been Cajeme's lieutenant, or teniente-general. Cajeme had deposed Molina and forced him to get out of the Yaqui country, for reasons which are not recorded. Molina then began to cooperate with the Mexicans and early in 1885, probably with full knowledge of responsible officials in Guaymas, devised a plan for ridding Sonora of Cajeme.

Molina sailed from Guaymas with a few other Yaquis to Medano near which was Cajeme's home. Here he burned the house, in an effort to kill Cajeme, maltreated his family, and returned to Guaymas with one of Cajeme's generals and several others as prisoners. Cajeme was in the Mayo country at the time, and when he came back immediately demanded of the Guaymas municipal authorities that they punish whoever committed the crime. His approach to the matter, according to Mexican accounts, was highhanded and antagonized the officials concerned. In the first place, Cajeme, without waiting for a reply to his demands, held some Mexican boats in the Medano port for ransom. When his demand for the extradition of Molina was ignored, instead of going through channels as Governor Torres suggested, he announced that he would carry out reprisals. Immediately, at both the eastern and western margins of Yaqui country, raids were carried out on haciendas. At the same time some ranches were burned on the Mayo River.

The Mexican reply was war. General Carbo, the military commander of Sonora, organized twenty-two hundred soldiers into two columns which proceeded to march from both the east and the west into Yaqui country. The western column reached the heart of the Yaqui country at Medano with only minor skirmishes; the eastern column, after reaching Torim without encountering serious resistance, engaged in battle with Yaquis at the fortified point of Añil. Here General Topete was badly defeated by a very small force of Yaquis, who utilized the Cajeme-inspired fortification of Añil to very good advantage. More fighting resulted for the most part in Yaqui defeats, especially at Omteme near Torim. Cajeme then offered peace, on condition that all troops leave the Yaqui country,
a condition which he repeated again in later months, and which the Mexicans of course would not accept. Again in December of 1885, after many Yaqui families had fled the impending warfare and the Mayos appeared very divided in regard to carrying on any hostilities, peace negotiations were initiated at Potam. During the conference, Cajeme remained in the background, actually retiring outside the town. The upshot of the talks was that all the governors of the eight towns declared that they wanted peace, no conditions being stated, and the Mexican negotiators called for signatures on a peace pact. When Cajeme was called in to sign the pact, he said that if it was the will of the eight pueblos to have peace, he would obey it. He then said, however: “My word has as much value as my signature, and they [the eight towns] have always had peace without signing the least paper.” The pact remained unsigned and both sides prepared for war.

The year 1886 opened with a determined campaign by the Mexicans. They met no resistance in the Mayo country, where the people were suffering from a serious smallpox epidemic. In the Yaqui country Mexican troops occupied point after point and finally defeated the Yaquis at Añil. Meanwhile Cajeme had persuaded most of the remaining families on the river to retire to another fortified point in the mountains—Buatachive north of Torim. Here with a reputed force of four thousand he proposed to withstand the Mexican attack. The battle of Buatachive was bitterly fought on both sides and the slaughter of Yaqui men, women, and children was great. At least two hundred Yaquis were killed, two thousand were taken prisoner, and the rest, Cajeme among them, fled with their wounded to escape without food into the mountains.

The defeat of the Yaquis seemed complete. Smallpox raged. The governors of five pueblos were prisoners. The families in the mountains, starving and without clothing, began to give up in small groups. The remaining governors gave themselves up and peace was arranged with all of them at Torim. Colonel Lorenzo Torres was commissioned to reorganize and administer the Yaqui towns. Three detachments of soldiers were stationed at Cocorit, Medano, and Torim, with headquarters under Torres’ administration at the last point.

But the fighting was far from over. Some eight hundred Yaquis who had not submitted remained in the vicinity of Bacum and raided and resisted Mexican troops whenever they were encountered. Cajeme was still at large, and Yaqui parties harassed troops from one end of the Yaqui country to the other. While the Mexican forces were still trying to mop up in the Yaqui country, the Mayos put forces in the field, attacked Santa Cruz and were not pacified for some time. In the fall of 1886, a note from Cajeme reached the Mexican commander. In it Cajeme wrote that he and all “my people” were willing to give obedience to the government, providing that within fifteen days all military forces left the Yaqui country. But he added that if this was not done he regarded it as a sacred duty to defend the Yaqui lands to the last. Branding the note as arrogant, the Mexican commander replied that the Yaqui River was not independent of the Mexican Republic and that the mopping up would continue.

Cajeme was now completely isolated from a majority of the Yaquis. Thousands had fled the Yaqui country entirely to seek work on the haciendas of the
state. Other hundreds had been shipped out involuntarily to work on the haciendas. From a population of fourteen thousand on both rivers, about four thousand Yaquis had formally submitted and put themselves in the hands of the Mexican authorities, while some sixteen hundred Mayos had done the same. The submitted Yaquis were utterly destitute, dependent on what the Mexican administration could raise for them. Ten centavos per day per person were allocated for their support until they could again plant crops. Seeds were given them, and Colonel Torres began to make Torim the center for administrative care of the Indians. As telegraph communications were established for the first time across the Yaqui country, finally linking the northern and southern parts of the state, Mexicans began to move in, taking up farm land and entering into trade with the troops established there. A later Mexican commentator wrote of this period: "... and now this was the beginning of a great and humanitarian work: the civilizing and incorporating [of the Yaquis] into the common mass of citizens of the Republic."

The chief obstacle to lasting peace seemed to the Mexicans to be Cajeme's leadership. None of the military forays was able to locate or capture him. Early in 1887 he left the Yaqui country and tried to hide in San José de Guaymas. Here he was captured, and several leading Sonorans became acquainted with him while he was being held. Among these was Ramón Corral, a high state official later to be elected governor alternately with General Luis Torres as a working member of the Torres dynasty, and still later to become Porfirio Díaz' right hand man as vice-president of Mexico. Corral, expecting to find Cajeme a taciturn and fearsome savage, was surprised to encounter a good-natured, suave, talkative man of fifty, proud of his Mexican nationality and of his having fought for the Liberal Revolution. In illustrating his Mexican patriotism, he once told Corral how he had refused an American permission to cut wood for charcoal in the Yaqui country, saying to the American, "We Mexicans do not need to have foreigners come and hold our hand to make the sign of the cross." Cajeme claimed that "the eight pueblos" had done everything voluntarily in the matter of resistance to the Mexicans, and that he had merely carried out their will, which was to keep their own land for themselves. Corral claimed that Cajeme said that now "he understood the necessity for a new existence for the Indians, based on submission to the Government."

Cajeme was executed at Cocorit in April, 1887, and Mexicans looked forward to an end to the Yaqui problem. Ramón Corral said, "The sacrifice of Cajeme has been very sad; but it will give as a result the guarantee of peace on the Rivers, the base and beginning of a period of civilization for the tribes."

The death of Cajeme, contrary to expectations, had no effect whatever on the last-ditch guerrilla fighting in the Yaqui country. In June, the moment troops retired from Cocorit, Yaquis burned the town, killed what Mexicans they could lay hands on, and sacked the ranches. On the Mayo River some Mayos rose and were not pacified until their leader Jesús Moroyoqui was killed. Anastasio Cuca, one of Cajeme's lieutenants was in Tucson, Arizona, seeking aid for the Yaqui cause. An estimated four hundred well-armed guerrillas were raiding from hiding places in the Bacatete Mountains, north of the river. It was reported that they
were working under the leadership of Juan Maldonado, called Tetabiate by the Yaquis. In the midst of continued sporadic fighting at various points in the Yaqui country, General Torres set out once again to carry through the distribution of the Yaqui lands, to both the thirty-five hundred Yaquis still remaining along the river and the many Mexicans, including the Torres family itself, which had moved into the territory.

In 1887 the Scientific Commission of the state of Sonora, working under military guard, proceeded with the survey of lands and the planning of irrigation canals to water the land on both sides of the Yaqui River. A colony of Mexicans was established between Torim and Potam on the north side of the river (later to become Vicam station), and in 1889 a canal was opened to irrigate their fields. The three to four hundred Yaqui guerrillas working from bases in the Bacatete Mountains continued to harass settlements within and at the western margin of the Yaqui country. Military detachments were in constant operation meeting their attacks and pursuing them into the nearby mountains. Every week a few Yaquis were killed and a few families were captured. By 1890 the Scientific Commission finally completed the division and distribution of all the arable land in the Yaqui Valley. At the same time they continued, in the midst of guerrilla harassment, the work on two large canals, completing one on the north side of the river, opposite Bacum, called the Bataconsica Canal. The commission also worked at laying out the Yaqui towns on the grid pattern with central plazas and streets at right angles. The military authorities made an effort in 1890 to get Yaquis who had settled elsewhere in Sonora to come back and take advantage of the new irrigation works, sending emissaries from among the Yaquis who had remained on the river. No one came back, and the rumors grew that Yaquis outside the Yaqui country were helping the guerrillas with provisions and ammunition. Finally General Carillos threatened to force Yaquis to come back and resettle on the river. A few came, but the situation continued very much as it had been for the previous three years, with no appreciable weakening of the guerrilla forces, who were still reported to number about four hundred under the leadership of Tetabiate.

The Yaqui spirit of resistance continued to be expressed in armed aggression, and thousands of Yaquis refused to surrender by simply remaining outside the Yaqui country. At the same time the latter gave some help to the Yaqui guerrillas in the Bacatete Mountains. Meanwhile, the Mayos showed an entirely different sort of reaction. Their country, like that of the Yaquis, had been occupied by Mexican armed forces. Guerrilla resistance by small groups had continued into 1887, but after that year it disappeared entirely. The Mexicans had killed the major leaders, apparently leaving none who was capable of or willing to continue armed resistance. Between 1887 and 1890 the majority of Mayos had gone to work on the Mexican ranches and haciendas which occupied the greater part of the river valley from Navojoa northward. The Indian villages downriver from Navojoa had been largely depopulated either by smallpox, flood, or warfare. Not more than sixteen hundred Mayos were reported by the Mexican military commander to have formally surrendered in the towns of Etchojoa, San Pedro, and Santa Cruz. There were, however, hundreds of other Mayos scattered in small
rancherías, or working on Mexican haciendas elsewhere in the Mayo country.

In 1890 the Mexican military became aware of activities among the Indians which they regarded as threatening peace. In the words of a military historian of the period: It should be noted that since 1888 the Mayo Indians had remained peaceful and that, better advised or less inclined to war [than the Yaquis], they devoted themselves to their planting, coming down from the mountains to their villages, even though with the distrust common to these Indians. In the month of September [1890] almost all the people stopped their labors to join together to listen to the prophecies and teachings of men and women whom they called, and were recognized as, holy people among the said Indians. Because, preceding other uprisings, this kind of meeting had been held, Colonel Rincón, military chief of the Mayo, dissolved the big gatherings and brought various of the holy men and women to the towns in which they could be under his vigilance.

The Mexicans apparently first became aware of the religious meetings in the southern part of the Mayo country near Masiaca at a place called Jambibampo. Investigation revealed that some twelve hundred Mayos were gathered at Jambibampo to listen to the preaching of a sixteen-year-old boy, whom they called “santo,” or holy one. The boy, Damian Quijano, was the son of a Mayo general who had fought with Cajeme. He spoke no Spanish, only Mayo and carried on his preaching in conjunction with the traditional ceremonial organization and officials of the Mayos. He was representing not a wholly new cult, but a religious movement which remained within the framework of existing Mayo religion. His preaching was based on the teaching of the “Saint of Cabora,” a Mayo girl, Teresa Urrea, who lived and had been preaching at the rancheria of Cabora in the northern Mayo country on the Cocoraqui Wash, the boundary line between the Mayo and Yaqui country. The message of the Saint of Cabora was that Mayos must pay special attention to right relations with God, for a tremendous flood was coming soon. If they listened to the teaching of the Saint, she could tell them the points of land which would not be flooded and where they would accordingly be saved. One such point was near the rancheria of Jambibampo, and Mayos had come by the hundreds to this point to be saved.

It was not only here, however, that the Mexican officials found Mayos gathered in September, 1890. At six other places, besides Cabora, there were “santos” preaching the new doctrine. These were in the heart of the Mayo country, in the lands which the Mayos regarded as sacred for the tribe, between the coast and Navojoa. Three of the other preachers were women, three were men: Santa Camila, Santa Isabel, Santa Agustina, San Juan, San Luis (also called La Luz), and San Ireneo. Each of these places was investigated by military parties and in each the Mexicans found that those who gathered had no arms, except for bows which they set up on altars along with flowers. The Mexican military men concluded that the meetings were merely an example of Mayo “fanaticism,” but that nevertheless steps should be taken to prevent them from becoming more dangerous. Besides, many haciendas and ranches of the Mexicans had been left destitute of workers and, as Colonel Rincón put it, the Mayos showed no inclination to save their employers, only themselves. Accordingly, San Damian along with fifteen
apparent leading adults at Jambiobampo were taken into custody by the Mexican authorities in Masiaca. Eventually most of the other saints, together with leading men and their families, numbering forty all told, were taken to Torim and sentenced to work in the mine of Santa Rosalia in Lower California at $1.25 a day. The Mayo country appeared to go back to normal, but the Saint of Cabora had not been included in the roundup.

The Mexican officials followed this up by establishing a school for Indians in Santa Cruz on the Mayo River. On the Yaqui River the program of peaceful colonization continued with some fifty families being set up at Bacum with irrigated land and agricultural implements. Similar groups of peaceful Yaquis were also established at Torim and Potam. Railroad connections were completed through the Yaqui country in 1891. Schools were opened in the same year in the lower Mayo country at Etchojoa, San Pedro, and Huatabampo. Nevertheless Yaqui guerrilla fighting, after a lull, increased, the Valley of Guaymas was harassed again, and Mexican detachments were kept busy chasing Yaquis in the Bacatete Mountains. In May of 1892, two hundred Mayos suddenly attacked Navojoa and killed the municipal officials there. All through the lower Mayo country the Indians were in arms again, attacking Mexican settlers with the battle cry of “Long Live God and the Saint of Cabora.” As groups of Indians were dispersed they fled to Cabora to be blessed by the Saint. An unidentified group swept down from the mountains of Chihuahua and attacked Cabora. Most of the Mayos who were picked up were armed with bows and arrows. The fighting was quickly put down and Teresa Urrea of Cabora, along with her father, Tomás, was taken in custody and transported out of the Indian country to Guaymas. From there Teresa went to Arizona, and the Mayo country was again quiet.

For the next five years guerrilla fighting continued in the Bacatete Mountains and on the eastern margins of the Yaqui country. In 1893 there was a notable increase in the number of Yaquis engaged in the warfare. Attempts had been made ever since 1891 to enforce the now-required registration of Yaqui workers in the haciendas of the state of Sonora. It was apparent to the Mexicans that many Yaquis, after supplying themselves with food and weapons during a period of work on the haciendas, either returned themselves to join the guerrillas or sent their provisions to aid them. It was not until 1897 that any important change took place, although the work of digging canals and encouraging peaceful Yaquis and Mexican colonists to farm went on.

In 1896 and early 1897 Colonel Peinado of the Mexican military forces entered into correspondence with Tetabiate, leader of the Yaqui guerrillas. He did this through a Yaqui family named Buitimea whom he had captured in one of the raids into the Bacatete Mountains. The Peinado-Tetabiate correspondence lasted several months. In the course of the correspondence, it became clear what Tetabiate was fighting for. He wanted, like Cajeme before him, the retirement of all troops from the Yaqui country and continued possession of arms by his troops, as he said he had heard the Apaches had been treated in the United States. Peinado appeared in one of his letters to promise the retirement of troops: “I order the detachments not to go out, but rather remain in headquarters, and when peace
is arranged we will retire them little by little and we will not return to pursue you.” In the light of later developments it would appear that Tetabiate and his lieutenants took this to apply not merely to the period of peace-making, but rather as a promise for general retirement of troops immediately after peace was made. In one letter Tetabiate wrote to Peinado, “I have taken your holy oaths; in the name of the Holy Trinity.” He said that he had made his own promises on the same basis. Tetabiate wrote frequently of the “Holy Peace” which he hoped would be established.

The result of the correspondence was the eventual appearance of the whole force of Tetabiate—about four hundred men, women, and children—at the station of Ortiz on the new railroad which cut through the Yaqui country. They came for the signing of a peace treaty with Governor Ramón Corral and General Torres, military commander of the state of Sonora. The Mexicans arranged an elaborate ceremony in which the Yaqui drummers joined in martial music with the Mexican military band, and Yaqui and Mexican soldiers exchanged hatbands. The Mexicans dealt with Tetabiate as “Chief of the Yaqui Tribe” and so designated him in the peace treaty, a title which of course was not recognized by any of the eight Yaqui town governments. The peace treaty, which it seems doubtful that Tetabiate understood fully, said simply that the “Chief of the Yaqui Tribe recognizes the sovereignty of the supreme Government of the Nation and State” and that he “should submit to obedience.” It also provided that the government would give two months’ provisions for the surrendered Yaquis and their families, and that they would be given land from that not yet occupied and which had been set aside for Yaqui use. The treaty said nothing whatever about the withdrawal of troops or Mexican settlers, or the political organization of the towns. Yet Tetabiate, along with his chief lieutenant Loreta Villa and his interpreter Julian Espinosa, signed it. No other representatives of the Yaquis were called to the meeting.

The Mexican government then set about living up to the agreement and doing all that it could to win over Yaquis and establish peace on a firm footing. Tetabiate and his men, together with other Yaquis, were put on the payroll as auxiliaries to regular Mexican troops. Tetabiate was placed in command of the auxiliaries. Lands were distributed to Tetabiate’s followers and all other Yaquis who would take them. Six thousand land titles were given out within ensuing months, but how many Yaquis received them is not recorded. Food, seeds, and agricultural implements were given out not merely for two months but for two years following the treaty. Thousands of Yaquis came back to live peacefully. Letters were sent from the Apostolic Visitor and President Diaz congratulating Tetabiate on his peaceful course. General Torres, through the authority of President Díaz, gave out grazing lands when Yaquis asked for them in addition to their farms, and even decreed that the salt beds were to be exploited by Yaquis alone. Loreto Villa, Tetabiate’s ablest aide, and another Yaqui named Hilario Amarillas were sent to Mexico City for a month to gain a better understanding of the benefits of peace and the futility of uprising. President Diaz wrote to General Torres that “we should not be tranquil until we see each Indian with his plow in his hand, behind a team of oxen, cultivating the fields.” A Mexican writer said: “In short, whatever resource
it was humanly possible to use to move and convince the Indians, such was exerted to the utmost to domesticate the wild beast."

General Luis Torres, as military commander of the state with headquarters in Torim, became the patriarch of the Yaqui country, dispensing land and justice. His approach is well exemplified in the following statement to the Yaquis: *Don't believe that the parcels of land which now have been delivered to you are all that the Supreme Government will give you. Should one of you come and say to me: "Sir, I have sons. We lack land to cultivate"—you shall have what you need; but now, seeing that scarcely a tenth part of that which you possess is cultivated, you must agree that you have more than enough to cover your necessities. Torres felt that a just peace had been arranged and that what was necessary to maintain it was a firm hand and the clear demonstration that the power of the nation, backing him in his administration of the towns, would be used to dispense land and agricultural aids under his guidance. This power was to be the ultimate authority and each individual should have access to him directly and not through any intermediary of the outworn system of town government.

General Torres proceeded to arrange for the spiritual needs of the people as well. He invited a group of the Sisters of Josephine to come and establish themselves at Bacum. With the help of a vigorous priest, Father Juan N. Beltrán, the sisters embarked on a program of reclothing the somewhat ragged images in the Yaqui churches and they together with Father Beltrán preached indefatigably of the benefits of industry and peace.

General Torres nevertheless had forebodings that everything was not working out. He deeply distrusted the Yaquis. Already after barely a year of the new regime, a careful reporter of Yaqui affairs, Colonel Manuel Gil, wrote: *A curious phenomenon: of the Indians who returned to occupy the river, ninety per cent had spent years practicing the civilized life in the towns of the state. Arriving in the Yaqui, they replaced, with pleasure, their delicious coffee with pinole; their shoes with sandals; and the women, keeping in the bottoms of their trunks, silks, laces, and stockings, returned joyously to bare feet and primitive clothes. The clothing of the children was reduced to its simplest expression.* Gil reported that at Bacum where the Sisters of Josephine energetically and constantly talked with the Yaqui women, the latter were unhappy. Instead of responding promptly to the urgings to change their personal and religious customs, they looked fearful and held that, if what the sisters said about the old ways were true, then a terrible punishment must be in preparation for Yaquis. Father Beltrán also found in his own experience that he was not welcome. The temastis (religious leaders) at Bacum told him that they got along perfectly well before without a priest, except when they wanted to take their children somewhere to be baptized, and that they saw no need for a priest now. Old men kept telling Father Beltrán that there had been no Mexicans in the Yaqui country when they were young. When a group of old men met with General Torres in the regular sessions which he held for the correction of complaints, they would say there were no complaints. Then suddenly some old man would say: "But when will the Mexicans leave?" To General Torres they appeared to be fanatics on this point.
Tetabiate's former lieutenant, Loreto Villa, who had been working hard to smooth relations with the Mexicans after his government-sponsored visit to Mexico City, and whose loyalty had been rewarded by General Torres with the command of the Yaqui auxiliaries, reported that he had made many efforts to explain to the old men the need for submitting to the Sonora government and trying to work out a peaceful life. Villa said that there was a recurrent response to his statement that all was changed from the old days. "The old man said to me: 'Nothing is changed. We cross ourselves now with the same hand that we have always crossed ourselves.'"

In 1899, two years after the Peace of Ortiz, Yaqui leaders at Bacum, where Father Beltrán and the Sisters of Josephine had been at work, appeared to be restless. El Jopo and Fluma Blanca were reported hostile to the Torres regime. General Torres did not hesitate. Putting Tetabiate temporarily in command of the Yaqui auxiliaries, carefully refraining from sending any Mexican troops, he ordered Tetabiate to disarm the Bacum dissidents. Tetabiate, along with his old lieutenants, Loreto Villa and Julian Espinosa, went to Bacum and executed the order. The next day the auxiliaries rebelled and with Tetabiate fled to Cocorit, leaving Villa to report the incident to General Torres. The general then received a letter from Cocorit, signed, "The eight Yaqui towns." It said, in effect, "What are you going to do about what happened?" Then it continued: "We don't want to fight the Federals, but we had to because Espinosa was with them." Espinosa and Villa, as supporters of the Mexican administration, were regarded as traitors.

The note concluded: What we want is that all whites and troops get out. If they go for good, then there will be peace; if not we declare war. Because the peace which we signed in Ortiz was on the condition that troops and whites would leave and this they have still not done; on the contrary, in place of complying they have taken away [our] arms. Certainly now you are behind all the business, and we have no blame for all the misfortunes that there are.

Meanwhile the rebels had killed Hilario Amarillas, who had accompanied Loreto Villa to Mexico City, but Villa had escaped to resume his command of those Yaqui auxiliaries who had not rebelled. General Torres replied:

You are not the eight towns of the Yaqui, but can be considered only as a gang of evil-doers, which, not desiring peace or honorable work and not recognizing the benefits you have received from the Government, have got together to commit robberies and assassinations.

The war was on once more. Bitter fighting against the rebels around Bacum resulted in the Mexicans taking that town. Cocorit also fell quickly into Mexican hands. The whole south bank of the river, however, where General Torres had made a large grant to the Conant Development Company, was promptly in the control of Yaquis. Fighting centered between Potam and Vicam and only slowly were the Yaquis who maintained the fighting driven back into the Bacatete Mountain strongholds. To Mexicans it now seemed that they were victims of a long-standing plot to which Tetabiate was a party. They felt that he had proved himself a traitor, incapable of living up to his word in the Peace of Ortiz, and that he had been secretly planning a general uprising during the two years of peace. It
is clear that what happened indicated a widespread readiness on the part of Yaquis resettled on the river to resort to arms to put all Mexicans out of what they still firmly regarded as their territory. How much of this action was planned and fanned as a conspiracy, and how much Tetabiate was a party to it will never be known precisely. It seems likely that the Yaqui leadership, which was out of Tetabiate's hands from 1897 to 1899, was merely behaving in accordance with the old patterns which had developed through the whole of the nineteenth century. In maintaining an organization which enabled them to rise quickly against the Mexicans, they were merely continuing the old town organization which General Torres refused to recognize and which consequently continued to operate without his knowledge. The Mexican misconception of Tetabiate's role, their treatment of him as a supreme chief of the tribe, constituted an interpretation of Yaqui affairs in terms of their own culture which inevitably led again to hostilities.

The Mexicans now planned a campaign to end the fighting once and for all. The policy makers in the state had long since abandoned any idea of extermination of all Yaquis. For many years the reports on Yaqui affairs emphasized that Yaquis were the best workmen in the state and that they constituted some 15 percent of the population of the state. They were heavily relied on for labor in the haciendas and the mines. Proposals for extermination, which came up from time to time, were repeatedly met with these facts and the reply that the state would be crippled economically if that method were resorted to. Colonization of the Yaqui country with military occupation for the protection of colonists seemed still the best method. The military occupation was now to be preceded by an effective surrounding of the Bacatete Mountains. In addition to this measure there was to be instituted a program of "espionage," that is, of constant reporting on the movements and attitudes of Yaquis working in the state outside of the Yaqui country, together with constant checks on the Yaqui settlements on the river. In addition, rebellious Yaquis were to be deported from their country to the haciendas of the state. It was believed that this would be beneficial particularly since it would help breed the good Yaqui qualities into a mixed population. It was also held that Yaquis who were deported elsewhere in the state could be educated properly and their Mexican hostility bred out of them.

In 1900 these measures were undertaken. There were at this time already about half as many Mexican and American colonists in the Yaqui country as there were Yaquis. One report enumerated 7,606 Yaquis and 3,639 colonists. Torim had become a Mexican town of some importance, both as military headquarters and seat of the patronage of the Torres family. It had an intellectual life and a growing commercial and trades class. As the organized campaign began, Colonel Penna, who had been in charge of much of the development work in the Yaqui country, voiced the viewpoint of the Mexican officials:

Convinced that it should not concern itself with the question of justice in giving pieces of land to the Indians, that matter having been well debated and perfectly demonstrated that that is not what the Indians wanted, since they have abandoned their lands to follow rebellion and their titles have served as wadding for their guns, it is clear to be seen that their sole desire is but to drive out the
Mexicans; the land in the form in which they have received it does not interest them. Their reasoning in this particular is the following: "God gave the river to all the Yaquis, not one piece to each."

In 1900 Yaquis suffered a severe defeat in the heart of the Bacatete Mountains at Mazocoba. They left four hundred dead and many captives. Captured Yaquis in some numbers were shipped out of the Yaqui country to work for wages, it was maintained, at various places in the state. As the Mexican campaign tightened, with Loreto Villa now serving as a major and fighting against Yaquis, a letter came out of the mountains to the Mexican commander. It was signed by "The Eight Towns of Yaqui" and said that all Yaquis were willing to submit to the superior authorities of the state and federal government, providing that all Mexican settlers and all troops immediately left the Yaqui territory.

The fighting in the Bacatete Mountains and the Guaymas Valley went on. In 1901 Major Loreto Villa's detachment ran across Tetabiate escorting a group of women and children into hiding. They killed Tetabiate but the fighting continued. The surrounding of the Bacatete Mountains became increasingly effective, so that groups of Yaquis attempting to come back to join in the fight were prevented from entering the Yaqui country. Gradually all Yaquis were cleaned out of the Bacatetes and fighting flared up from San Marcial, thirty miles north of the Bacatetes, to the vicinity of Ures in the central part of the state. The Yaquis who had gone out to work, prevented by troops from fighting on their own ground, were fighting wherever they found themselves. Their resistance had been fired by a new series of regulations issued by General Torres, who was again governor of the state. The new regulations provided that Yaquis might settle only in prescribed areas of the state, that they must be kept together in their own settlements on the haciendas, that they be reviewed once a month by officials wherever they settled, that any Yaqui without registration papers must be jailed, and that constant observation be made in all Yaqui settlements. In 1903 Rafael Izabal, one of General Torres' friends, became governor and began a campaign of raiding the haciendas to pick up Yaquis, and other Indians. Those picked up were jailed in wholesale lots. At the same time large allotments of land in the Yaqui Valley were given to the Torres family and to various development companies. Near Ures one group of Yaquis fighting against Mexican troops from a mountain area sent word that they would be willing to stop fighting, providing that all troops leave the Yaqui country, that the land be given to the tribe, that they be permitted to maintain their own government, and that the state government prohibit Whites from crossing their territory.

The raids on the haciendas continued. Yaqui raids were reported as far north as Magadalena, fifty miles below the United States border. Rural police picked up Yaquis wherever they found them. The campaign outside the Yaqui country had been stepped up by Governor Izabal as a result of a new program which had taken form, namely, the deportation of Yaquis to other parts of the Mexican Republic, outside of Sonora. A regular traffic in Yaquis grew up which reached its greatest proportions about 1907. Extermination, military occupation, and colonization had not solved the problem. The new program consisted of sale
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of Yaquis, both men and women, at sixty pesos a head to henequen plantation owners in Yucatan and the sugar cane fields of the Valle Nacional in Oaxaca. The federal government and the state government worked together. Yaquis who had been jailed in Hermosillo and elsewhere were shipped by boat down the west coast and then marched across Mexico to be shipped again to Yucatan by boat. Up to 1908, five thousand Yaquis were reported dealt with in this manner. Families were broken up. Mayos, Papagos, and Ópapas also fell into the net. The Yaquis, "obstacle to civilization" as they were called, no longer were able to fight. Thousands hid themselves, avoiding identification as Yaquis, and merged with the Mexican population of Sonora in cities and on haciendas. Hundreds fled across the border into the United States and settled permanently there.

By 1909 the Mexican hacendados of Sonora felt that the deportation had hurt their labor supply. They protested and General Torres who was again governor slowed the traffic down. A peace was again made with a Yaqui named Bule representing the Yaquis. When the 1910 revolution against Díaz broke out, Yaquis who were settled on the Yaqui River fought against the Maderistas at first and, as Obregón's revolutionary troops gained control of the state, also against Obregón. The Yaqui leaders, however, offered to make peace, providing that they were given full sovereignty over their land and the right to expel all non-Yaquis. To Obregón this demand seemed "atavistic" and calculated to "perpetuate barbarism" among the Yaquis. He accordingly sent General Lázaro Cárdenas to force the Yaquis into submission. After a vigorous campaign, lasting until 1917 and during which the Yaquis who had settled in Arizona made an unsuccessful effort to send arms and men to support the struggle against Cárdenas, the resisting Yaquis were beaten. Many Yaquis, believing that Obregón had made some sort of promise to restore to them lands which had been allotted to Mexicans and North Americans, agreed to join his forces in support of Obregón's wing of the revolution. Hundreds marched with his troops into Mexico City at the time of his final triumph.

In 1919, with the revolution accomplished, Adolfo de la Huerta became governor of Sonora and began again the task of rebuilding the Yaqui country. By this time Cocorit and Bucum had become Mexican towns, after the fashion of Navojoa in the Mayo country fifty years before. Belem, Rahum, and Huirivis on the west had become uninhabitable due to failing water supply as a result of changes in the river course in the delta. This left only three of the original Yaqui towns — Torim which had fallen into ruins after its flourishing period as the Torres center of government, Vicam which was overshadowed in size by the colony of Mexicans at Vicam station, and Potam. The conservative Yaquis nevertheless spoke of themselves still as the "eight towns" and sought government aid in rebuilding the lost villages. De la Huerta, with small resources, began plans for putting some of the privately owned land under government administration, and gave aid in rebuilding the ruined churches. He won much cooperation from Yaquis who began to return from the various areas of their dispersal, but became involved in a counterrevolution and left the state. As the federal government bought out the land of the Richardson Development Company on the south bank of the river and began its apportionment to non-Yaquis, the old Yaqui resistance began again
to assert itself. In 1926, during his second campaign for the Presidency, Obregón, while passing through the Yaqui country by train, was detained by General Luis Matus, a Yaqui who had fought with Obregón, for talks about the Yaqui land problem. Word went out that Obregón had been “captured by the Yaquis” and troops came in to “liberate” him. Fighting took place between Vicam, where Obregón was held, and Potam. Yaquis settled in the towns began to flee into the mountains. A military campaign, designed to get the Yaquis down out of the mountains, lasted for nearly a year, and prominent Yaquis fled seeking political asylum in the United States. Captive Yaquis, including some important leaders, were impressed into the Mexican army and sent to far-away posts in Vera Cruz, Yucatán, and central Mexico. Military occupation of the Yaqui country was ordered and posts were set up in the principal towns and at all the important water holes in the Bacatete Mountains. More Yaquis fled to the United States in the half dozen settlements which had grown up in southern Arizona. At the same time various companies of Yaquis who had fought with the Mexican troops during the 1926-27 disturbance were allotted lands and settled as part of the occupation Army on the river. “The Yaqui problem” was still not settled. Slowly, however, more Yaquis who had spent periods in other parts of Mexico as a result of the Army impressment policy came back to Resettle. During the 1930’s the Yaqui population steadily increased, but it was confined almost wholly to the north bank of the river. The vast fertile farmlands of the south bank, having at last been brought under an effective irrigation system, were permanently in the hands of Mexicans and North Americans. A large city, Ciudad Obregón, rivalling Hermosillo in size, was booming in the midst of the extensive agricultural developments on the south bank on the site of the former hamlet of Cajeme.

In 1936 President Lázaro Cárdenas, who had beaten the Yaquis in 1917, sought, in line with his policy of government aid for Indians all through Mexico, to do something about the “Yaqui problem.” His government under the auspices of the Department of Indian Affairs set up a school near Vicam for the agricultural training of young Yaqui men. Cárdenas himself entered into correspondence with the governor of Vicam, which, like the other Yaqui towns, still maintained its own colonial-period system of organization apart from the municipal state organization. In response to complaints over land encroachment, especially on the north bank of the river and to various types of exploitation of Yaqui resources by Mexicans, Cárdenas set forth a plan. It included the building of a large dam on the Yaqui River, the water of which was to go first to irrigate the north bank of the river where Yaquis were concentrated. It also set aside by presidential decree the whole north bank, a small portion of the south bank, and the Bacatete Mountain area exclusively for Yaqui control. Cárdenas also promised to help with the establishment of the lost towns within the north-bank territory and to give government aid in agricultural development. He refused a Yaqui request for help in rebuilding the churches on the ground of separation of church and state in Mexico. He refused to do anything about land already lost on the basis that he could do nothing about commitments of previous governments. These promises were made at a meeting with town governors in Potam in 1939, in which there
was at least tacit recognition of the existing governmental system, and Cárdenas' letters and decree spoke of the "Yaqui Tribe." A system with some similarities to the reservation system in the United States was set up.

It was some fourteen years before the waters of the new dam began to be usable on the north bank. Meanwhile military occupation continued, Mexican land encroachment went on, and the Yaqui population increased to some ten thousand.

The Mayos had meanwhile pretty much disappeared from Sonora history as a distinct tribal group. While Yaqui armed aggression continued as late as 1927, no fighting took place in the Mayo country after 1893. The Mayos were pacified thirty-five years sooner than the Yaqllis. Nevertheless, by 1950 Mayos in their own territory slightly outnumbered Yaqllis in theirs. Forty percent of Mayos still spoke only the native Mayo language, while only an insignificant number of Yaqllis spoke no Spanish. The widespread and long-standing dispersal of Yaquis throughout Mexico and the United States accounted for their greater use of Spanish. The Yaqui language continued, however, to be the language of home and village affairs as late as 1960. Mayo village government no longer functioned in the colonial-period manner, while every Yaqui town, including the ones in process of being rebuilt, such as Torocoba (replacing Cocorit on the north bank of the river), Bataconsica (replacing Bacum on the north bank), and Rahum and Huirivis (in new location), maintained the functioning colonial-type officials and the town governing council. Yaqui town ceremonial organizations had also been established in four Arizona settlements, although without the accompanying political organizations.

Mayo and Yaqui history during the Mexican period can be summed up as a struggle on the part of very much Hispanicized Indian communities to maintain control over their lands and local affairs in the face of a determined attempt to force them to change these patterns. The patterns which they sought to continue were those which they had developed under Jesuit tutelage during the two previous centuries. As Eduardo Villa, the Sonora historian has said: "... he [Cajeme] wanted to sign a peace more or less identical to that which in past centuries his elders had concluded with the Spanish Captain Martinez de Hurdaide. . . ." What Cajeme wanted to do, it is very certain from the record, was what Yaqui leaders generally through the 1950's have wanted to do; they have repeatedly shown that they want an independent local government, and jurisdiction through town management over lands which they believe were given them by supernatural fiat. The Mayos were only less determined than the Yaqllis in these aims. To the Mexicans these objectives were not at first clearly seen, but, when it was realized what the source of Yaqui resistance was, they came to be regarded as signs of barbarism. The "horrible anomaly" of the colonial-type town government was not compatible with the nationalism identified by the Mexicans with civilization. A combination of circumstances, the most important of which was governmental disorganization among themselves, did not allow the Mexicans to force their land and political systems on the Yaqllis for some eighty years. Even by the 1960's, despite dispersal and deportation, this had not been accomplished.