PART III

BELONGING
WE CAN ONLY imagine the rage behind the eyes of Casimiro Uriarte when he stared into those of his accusers. Certainly he considered the men not his equal. One was even in his employ and had seized the opportunity to escape a debt, humiliate a patron, and serve the interests of a new master. The allegations were grave in the political climate of the early months of 1863. Barely five months had passed since the death of a president and the proclamation of his successor, with discontent still swirling in a district with men that had dared to raise questions. Uriarte stood accused of voicing seditious sentiments against the ruling family that retained its grip on the presidency and, from the perspective of some, was also running the country into the ground. He faced the humiliation of arrest in the jail of his resident Villa de Concepción before facing his accusers in a trial overseen by the sitting military commandant of the pueblo, Francisco Isidoro Resquín, as his judge.¹ By that time, it was late April 1863, and Uriarte probably could not have imagined a downfall so complete at the instigation of a peon so humble.

Uriarte had faced political reverses before, but the machinations usually came from men of more wealth and influence, and some measure of revenge could often be had. He knew that the district of Concepción was a rowdy, frontier place, with its brazen yerba producers and their large estancias teeming with cattle. For that reason he had sought for a time, years before, to consolidate his own wealth and forge his own influence in reaches even more precarious and
wild in the Villa de Salvador (see fig. I.1 in the introduction). He had once rode proud and roughshod as a caudillo of the more marginal pueblo, enjoying the prestige of elected office and presuming that he could command the support of a president. Those—he might have reflected in April 1863—were his glory days. Meanwhile, he also probably evinced a grudging amusement at the fickleness of fortune within an environment that had long allowed people and nature to spurn those who presumed to tame and rule them.

In this chapter I follow the events of such distant places and forgotten ruffians in the wild northern reaches of mid-nineteenth-century Paraguay. Examining them challenges conventional understandings of the country’s early postcolonial past. Historians have long located the political history of nineteenth-century Paraguay in the actions of powerful despots who allegedly projected an almost unbroken radius of state sovereignty and personalized rule from their seat of power in Asunción. Few studies have considered the limitations of the despots’ power. Fewer still have taken full account of how the territory’s frontier reality produced significant degrees of fragmented, contested, and overlapping sovereignties at the local level, especially in areas well removed from the capital. Indeed, much of the countryside, despite the fictions of national borders and territoriality, remained very much “middle ground” well into the nineteenth century and beyond. These were borderlands, and it was precisely along the wide margins of this frontier society where the reproduction of postcolonial state sovereignty could still be won or lost and took on its rawest form. Such a place was the Villa de Salvador.

Salvador was the ultimate frontier town in a frontier society. It was the northernmost reach of Paraguayan settlement along the Rio Paraguay. Caught in the midst of enveloping wilderness, central state authority could be as diffuse as the haze of burning wood in the air. It was a rough place with a lawless reputation, and it occupied the long-contested overlap of free indigenous domains, imperial Brazilian encroachments, and the settler presence of paraguayos. Here formal vestures of state authority—military command, clerical authority, electoral politics, the capacity to put pen to paper—worked in tandem with more informal exercises of power—a favor withheld or given, a flogging—to build the influence of men. And here the likes of priests and caudillo-like officials fought over local command of authority, state resources, and the control of labor. The fights proved turbulent and enduring precisely because the ruling López regimes (that of Carlos Antonio, 1840–1862, and that of Francisco Solano, 1862–1870) depended on such caudillos to project the fragmented power of the
postcolonial state over the land. Meanwhile, the likes of indigenous chieftains, ex-convicts, peasant women, and peons also entered the frays looking to take advantage.

Within a historiography mostly concerned with the political center then, in this chapter I provide a needed vantage point of postcolonial state formation in mid-nineteenth-century Paraguay from the extensive margins. While mediums like official correspondence, civic fiestas, and public prayers could cast a distant aura of nationhood and patriarchal authority centered in a single autocratic leader from Asunción, the dynamics of fragmented state sovereignty consistent with colonial times persisted, and local actors fought for influence and profited as a result. For, again, the López regimes necessarily allowed clients in the countryside to build their own fiefdoms of wealth and power to sustain the premise of state rule, and subalterns relished in exploiting the open spaces and cracks in power found therein.

THE FRAGMENTED SOVEREIGNTY OF THE NORTHERN REACHES

The Villa de Salvador was a place that brought many risks and rewards. Its original settlement early in the nineteenth century was the result of a still tenuous postcolonial Hispanic-creole settler advance. At that time the gains of creole settlement overall in the northern reaches of Paraguay were still precarious. The districts of Concepción and San Pedro had emerged as hubs of the frontier-born yerba mate production in the late-colonial boom years following their founding during the late 1700s. But historical experience in the colonial province had taught that the typical predations of the frontier could reverse these gains. For the first two centuries of the colonial rule in the province, attempts to settle the reaches north of the Río Jejuy met routine reversals at the hands of autonomous indigenous peoples. That is, for two centuries, autonomous groups had been winning the wars of conquests there. Moreover, the economic disruptions of independence brought a precipitous decline in the yerba trade, and a deteriorating economy threatened any pretensions of permanence for settlements in the northern reaches. If anything, the advance of creole settlement via commercial expansion in the north was stunted by the 1820s.5

The original settlement of Salvador illustrated the potential reverses and dangers at hand. Even before its formal severance from the Spanish colonial
empire, an increasingly strident provincial government had ordered in 1812 the settlement of the area under the premise of forming an added rampart of “civilization” on a threatened northern frontier. In doing so, it manifested a crude if persistent colonial racial logic. The government mandated a settlement exclusively of free blacks created on the same communal basis as colonial-era Indian pueblos. Dozens of black residents of the Dominican cattle estate of Tavapy moved northward with the promise of land and supplies. The free black colony of Tevego, as the village was first known, did not last. It was abandoned several years later under the constant pressure of frontier attacks and internal dissension.⁶

Decades later, during the 1840s, after the long autocratic regime of Dr. José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia, a new administration under Carlos Antonio López re-founded the settlement Villa del Divino Salvador. The settlement served once again as a frontier bulwark, and substantial numbers of free blacks returned. But the López regime made it principally a destination of internal exile for convicted criminals.⁷ By the late 1840s, in a time of renewed export trade based in yerba production from the northern reaches, Salvador saw its own prospects rise. Laborers from the Villa regularly traveled south to work the yerba fields around Concepción and San Pedro, either clandestinely or with the sanction of a required internal passport.⁸ Even so, Salvador had few yerba fields in its environs and few, if any, yerba merchants and producers. External commerce there centered mostly on the extraction of building materials—timber, stones, palm branches, and bamboo stalks—from forests and creek beds, usually sent downriver to Concepción, the capital, or elsewhere.⁹ Cattle also roamed the forest pathways and riverside pastures as agents of settlement expansion.¹⁰ The state established the largest herds and ranches in the area, with animals soon numbering in the thousands. A growing collection of modest ranchers, still just a fraction of the total population, held smaller herds of livestock of usually twenty to thirty animals.¹¹

The majority of residents managed lives of itinerant labor and subsistence survival. Work in the yerba fields familiarized men with the regular attacks of unconquered indigenous peoples. So did the obligation to post regular militia duty, manning dangerous pickets among forests as far north as the Río Apá. Meanwhile women tended to the household plots, while larger fields often fell victim to neglect, pests, and heavy rains. Labor was always in short supply.¹² As one longtime resident commented, settlers hesitated to expand their small plots and rustic homesteads. They retained the “fear, insecurity, and apprehension”
burned into their minds by “those great assaults and massacres of their people seen with their own eyes, committed by the savages.” The persistent threat of encroachments by imperial Brazilian settlers added to the brunt of the wilderness’ violent predations.

The village of Salvador thus sat enmeshed among unfixed domains and conflicting territorial claims and the haunts of forest peoples. For centuries, the story in the province was not one of persistent Hispanic-creole advance but reversal, and the short history of Tevego/Salvador bore this out. In these tenuous reaches the sitting president of the republic needed clients who could cast their own aura of personalized authority. Casimiro Uriarte was one who fit the bill and who perceived opportunity in the poverty and the danger. Probably sometime in 1847–1848 he secured appointment from Carlos Antonio López as commandant of Salvador. As a Concepción rancher and slave owner who made regular visits in cattle drives to Asunción, Uriarte was known in the capital as a power broker of the northern reaches. In Concepción, however, he stood on the cusp of the local economic elite. In a society where livestock holdings were a standard measurement of wealth, his riches paled in comparison to those of rivals. But he could be a veritable giant in Salvador. This was a place for him to build political influence and wealth.

Uriarte had built his wealth along the fringes of settlement around Concepción and understood bitter frontier realities. He was in his late forties by midcentury and grew up with a colonial province making the uneasy transition to postcolonial nationhood. He knew that some experiences, especially in Salvador, would remain persistently familiar, as when during his boyhood people of the province still professed loyalty to a distant Spanish king. For as military commandant of Salvador, Uriarte engaged in military affairs. And it was the “Portuguese and Indian infidels,” as he termed them, who inflicted regular attacks. With command of some thirty regular soldiers along with those residents pulled onto militia duty, he often spent days if not weeks in the bush charting new outposts or leading punitive expeditions. He planned ambushes against hostile indigenous groups rumored to be camping at certain locations—freely exploiting indigenous guerrilla tactics—only to encounter camps already abandoned and burned. Consistent with old colonial realities in postcolonial times, imperial Brazilian settlers were still termed “Portuguese,” and autonomous indigenous peoples were still defined by their condition as religious outcasts.

Uriarte knew that control over untamed forests, riverbeds, and hillsides proved ephemeral. To lay foundations of his authority in Salvador, he too needed
liaisons among the unsubjugated peoples of the forests. Commerce was one way to extend these connections. Over the course of 1849 Uriarte further developed trade with a tribal grouping that in exchange for cattle supplied firearms and horses, items in short supply in the village. He conducted exchanges on behalf of the state in such barter, acquiring in one instance three firearms for each head of cattle and, in another, three horses for a young calf. At the same time he also negotiated acquisitions for himself and bought guns and other supplies for his estancia. Residents, too, engaged in this trade and gathered to meet the “Indian infidels” on the outskirts of the village to work out their own deals. The trade met material demands while building certain tactical alliances, and Uriarte came to rely on bonds established with one indigenous chieftain: Cacique Rubio.

Rubio was the leader of a tribal grouping of perhaps dozens of kin. His group guarded the autonomy of the forests but perceived advantages in regular engagement with Paraguayan settlers. The Hispanicized name by which Uriarte knew Rubio suggested the syncretic, creolized character of his people. He and kinsmen were frequent visitors to Salvador, where they probably proffered goods while dealing with the commandant in his headquarters. Rubio shared information about the whereabouts of other free indigenous clans in these encounters. Uriarte used the meetings to cement loyalties and extend patronage. For example, in January 1849, Uriarte advanced a request from Cacique Rubio to the president for a pair of trousers and a dress coat for the chieftain’s personal use. Rubio understood the prestige to be gained from fine textiles among his people, and Uriarte sought the cultivation of a personal client and an ally of the state. To sweeten the request, the commandant also conveyed to the president his belief that Rubio was “inclined to Religion.” Whenever Mass was said while he was in the Villa, Rubio attended, standing at the door of the church and imitating the movements of the congregants.

Cacique Rubio also understood the necessary liaisons and gestures of this unstable landscape where religious inclinations still communicated political loyalties. It is noteworthy that indirectly through the missives of Uriarte, the cacique had the ear of a postcolonial president and could expect that this chief in Asunción was listening, carefully. The activities and movements of unsubjugated forest peoples were a regular focus of the written reports issued by subordinate officials from throughout the interior and sent to the president. The president’s own written ordinances in response show that he followed these reports closely and with occasional ethnographic flair. By all means he considered most unsubjugated indigenous peoples in the provincial orbit duplicitous “savages,” but he
lent close attention to the complicated tangle of deals with different leaders and tribal groupings as he understood them. The attention reflected how critical these interactions still were for the very projection of sovereignty by the postcolonial Paraguayan state. This state had inherited the late-colonial penchant for new political imagining, with its fixation on borders and pretended rule over a contiguous stretch of defined “national” territory. Political realities, as imposed by autonomous indigenous peoples, nonetheless conformed to older models of sovereignty where pockets of Hispanic-creole settlement in the province radiated social and political control outward into the hinterlands only to have it dilute and dissipate, sometimes quickly, in the overgrowth of the untamed monte and overlap with the proclaimed domains of unaffiliated peoples and other postcolonial powers. In the north, the villas of Concepción, San Pedro, and now Salvador were crucial radial points of state presence and control. And there, quite simply, the very wealth of the Paraguayan state and its emergent provincial elite depended on an herb extracted from such contested domains of the unsubjugated monte, and the cooperation and the labor of free indigenous groups were necessary to keep the yerba mate and the money flowing. Moreover, their cooperation was also necessary to help plug a regular flow of deserters and runaways and check the advances of Brazilian settlers and the disruptions of other indigenous groups. That is, they were needed to help project the fiction of fixed borders and territorial sovereignty that their very presence disrupted. And back in Salvador, Cacique Rubio had succinctly communicated this political reality to the president, via Uriarte, with his request for a coat and trousers.

THE WORKINGS OF LOCAL POLITICS

Men like Uriarte were on the frontlines of such critical frontier interactions and were doubly conscious of obligations owed to a political patron in Asunción and the exercise of power closer to home. Local authority in this environment hung on reinforcing knots of formal public office, personal bravado, and the informal vertical webs of clientelism. Meanwhile, potential rivals who could encroach on and undermine one’s claim to power circulated both near and far.

Cacique Rubio was just one client among many that Uriarte cultivated around Salvador. Uriarte’s position as estacionero and slave owner had supplied him a handful of dependent laborers back in Concepción that through cajolery, promises, and protection could be convinced to do his will. But his position
as commandant in Salvador now gave him access to another pool of potential dependents. Convicts were channeled to labor on his estancia. Men serving militia duty could be put to work building a larger house for, say, a prominent local friend promising loyalty or for a lover. 

Public work drafts also lent Uriarte additional manpower for cattle drives or to cut bamboo stalks to sell back to the state. He could commit an orphan, cattle rustler, or wayward woman to work in the homes of other acquaintances for future favors and considerations. He also managed the resources of the state-owned estancia and its livestock. Few would question his lending of state-owned oxen out to a friend in the villa. Slaughtering a calf from the state herds for a party thrown for the peons working the state estancia would only serve to build the bonds of gratitude back to his person.

Uriarte also did not shy away from violence to show he was the boss in town. Leading a punitive expedition into the bush commanded the respect of men, but so did, back in Salvador, the wielding of the lash. The distribution of floggings was part of the personalized, patriarchal exercise of public office that had their deliberate parallels in the routine violence of Hispanic-creole households. No doubt that Uriarte resorted to having dependent workers whipped on his own estancia in Concepción for perceived infractions. In Salvador, the exercise of his official duties included such displays as well. The whipping post of the public plaza stood with the parish church and the commandant headquarters as symbols of state justice and sovereignty. More than once, following the judicial rulings of the president himself, Uriarte had recaptured penal deserters bound to the post and oversaw the application of dozens of lashes—“sharply given” as the commandant himself had notarized—on the backs of men. 

Uriarte also enjoyed formal discretion to use the post to flog other troublemakers on his own, such as cattle rustlers, gamblers, and drunks. This discretion could extend to personal affairs. It was reported that once in 1851 Uriarte had the young parda woman Ramona Romero brought before him in his headquarters, forced her to lie stretched across the floor, and whipped her twenty-five times in the presence of a gathered audience. He cared nothing that Romero was several months pregnant. She allegedly had an ongoing row with Uriarte’s rumored lover in town. This violent public ritual of racialized misogyny, however extrajudicial the application, only fed the aura of formal sanction of his command in its overlap with official practice. He also made clear in the act that his clients in the villa were not to be harassed.

Judicial authority was a crucial dimension of Uriarte’s command. Yet so much occurred outside the purview of written acts or proceedings, such as the flogging
of Ramona Romero. In addition, the regular business of issuing and receiving the written internal passports required of anyone traveling outside their legal residence occupied much of his time. More expedient was the verbal consent to travel given to resident laborers who went seeking work in Concepción and San Pedro. Such consent Uriarte was known to give upon channeling labor to acquaintances in those lucrative districts. It is also likely that Uriarte held informal judicial hearings on behalf of other residents, especially militia soldiers, who sought his justice and saw him as the main boss in town.

All these acts intentionally encroached on the jurisdiction of the appointed civil magistrate of the villa, Venancio Candia. Unlike Uriarte, Candia made Salvador his primary residence. He too was a middling rancher, though of even more modest holdings than Uriarte, most of which he had inherited from his wife in marriage. He too looked to use his position to make gains in wealth and influence locally. As juez, he was to decide on minor judicial cases not directly involving militia soldiers or church officials. Candia was also responsible for pursuing intruders, vagrants, and thieves as well as enforcing “public morality” against out-of-wedlock unions. Such enforcement was never consistent though, especially in a countryside, where extramarital adventures were common. And Candia trod carefully in the exercise of his office with Uriarte in town, knowing who had the commandant’s protection and who did not. But Candia’s position provided another potential powerbroker in the villa from whom residents could seek justice. Also, whenever Uriarte left the pueblo to attend to his affairs, he had to leave his command with Candia.

Uriarte sought his advantage in the cultivation of closer ties to the ultimate political patron in Asunción. Both he and Candia owed their appointments to the president. In 1849, however, the incidence of a national congress—the first held since Carlos Antonio López’s formal election to the presidency in 1844—provided Uriarte the mechanism to manifest his sway in Salvador as well as to further ensconce his own position in the aura of the republic and presidential authority. The district of Salvador could elect its own contingent of deputies to the then two-hundred-member congressional chamber. In the proceedings of the district electoral junta that followed—held in the parish church and overseen by Uriarte—the commandant managed to cajole the gathering of local notables to elect him as a deputy. It was another important exercise of power, both theatrical in action and with real political stakes, showing who was boss in town. In June, Uriarte proudly made his way downriver to the capital to participate in the congress. He perhaps donned new shoes, traded gossip, smoked
cigars, and eyed other more prominent rivals in the corridors of the Asunción cabildo, all before taking his place on a bench in the chamber to hear the words of the president in Spanish outline the accomplishments of the national government. Many like Uriarte were content to let the esoteric air of the discourse wash over them. Others were not afraid to take the floor and pronounce their own words, if only in awkward, slavish praise. What really mattered was to be present for the formal act of congressional approval of presidential decrees and to clamor noisily in electoral “protest” when Carlos Antonio López performed his own theatrical maneuver, proffering his resignation only to incur the unanimous rejection by the legislature. Playing his part in the charade of popular sovereignty, Uriarte reassured the president that he was his man in Salvador—sentiments that López himself likely reciprocated in a personal audience.

Meanwhile, Candia and the resident parish priest, Venancio Toubé, had not won election to the 1849 congress and remained back in Salvador—but not without also doing their part to partake in the national electoral charade. It was here that rituals of central state sovereignty took on critical local manifestations, which were particularly important in such a precarious frontier landscape. Candia and Toubé acted in Uriarte’s absence as the principal representatives of state authority in Salvador, and when news of the successful completion of the congress reached the villa, it fell to them to carry out the necessary ceremonies for the benefit of the local populace. Candia did so with due decorum, gathering what he could of the townsfolk, reading the official announcement in Spanish and explaining it in Guarani. He then ordered the national flag to be raised to the ringing of bells and firing of volleys. The priest Toubé promised to say a thanksgiving mass for the congress the following day. Candia believed that he had done his duty. But even this satisfaction Uriarte later sought to undermine. Uriarte was the one who usually oversaw the festivities of patriotic ritual with their serenades and dances in the commandant headquarters that often accompanied the masses and flag raisings. When Uriarte returned from his participation in the congress in Asunción, he spread rumors among other local notables about how weak Candia was.

Uriarte saw Candia as someone he could dominate. With the priest Toubé, however, he proceeded more carefully. It was no secret in town that Toubé perhaps did as much drinking as preaching. He entreated parishioners to supply him with jugs of sugarcane liquor often smuggled into town from ports downriver. Word had it that he also got drunk on the stores of communion wine. Toubé was from an aging generation of independence-era priests. He had spent
the bulk of his career serving various rural parishes during the time of Dr. Francia—a time of neglect for the provincial church and its clergy. Aspirations were more limited then, and priests settled with what resources they could build with sacramental fees and spiritual influence. At that time, Toubé had also provoked outcry with bouts of public drunkenness and scandalous affairs with married women. These were nonetheless not unknown vices even among the clergy. Uriarte, understanding the influence any man of the cloth could carry, turned a blind eye to the drinking by the priest. He also appreciated the opportunity to publically humiliate Toubé when in April 1850, on the president’s orders, he reprimanded the priest “for his scandalous and incessant drunkenness” before two witnesses in the commandant’s headquarters.

This was not the first time the priest had been humiliated before the local populace. Toubé conducted the ritual affairs of his office from a ramshackle chapel. He also lived in a small thatched house, offering little protection from the elements, particularly the oppressive heat for seven months of the year. In his advancing age, Toubé approached Uriarte in 1849 with the request to compel local parishioners to build him a new residence. Uriarte refrained from fulfilling the priest’s request. He understood that Toubé was hardly destitute, as the cleric controlled land and livestock and employed peons to help work his fields. Uriarte instead instructed Toubé to request the construction of the house from his parishioners straight from the pulpit. The priest did so and a year later was still waiting for the building to begin. With bitter words, Toubé complained about the alleged ingratitude of people that he claimed to serve night and day. Meanwhile his dilapidated house revealed the lack of compelling authority of an old, hard-drinking cleric.

Still, Uriarte remained wary about discounting the priest altogether. Toubé was a man who carried out his duties, saying regular mass, celebrating religious and political holidays, hearing confession, performing sacraments, and dispensing penance. In the tripartite blend of local authority and sanction among commandant, magistrate, and priest, it was ultimately from Toubé’s office that all claims and representations of state sovereignty sprung. Even more so than its predecessors, the López regimes clung to the spiritual sanction and legal regime of the Catholic Church as a fundamental arm of governance. Toubé was the physical representation of this sanction and regime in Salvador. Moreover, he was one of few in town who mastered the power of writing. In a social world of spoken Guarani and limited literacy, knowledge of the traditional written language of state, Spanish, afforded significant influence. Toubé recorded baptisms,
marriages, deaths, and even censuses that still marked parishioners’ fundamental legal identities with the state. By 1850, he also served as the ecclesiastical judge for his district to arbitrate marriage disputes among his parishioners, and he decided what to write and report back to Asunción in such cases. Finally, his ability with the quill was such that he composed biting missives directly to the president. Uriarte and Candia found his control of writing threatening.  

Finally, his ability with the quill was such that he composed biting missives directly to the president.  

Uriarte and Candia did not exercise the same power over the critical medium of writing. Although hardly illiterate, the degree of their literacy was limited enough to undermine their ability to compose records in proper legal form and write correspondence that also succored the essential link between their offices and the aura of presidential authority. For the proper recording of judicial proceedings, the keeping of accounts, and the critical discursive exchange of texts between frontier periphery and political center, both Uriarte and Candia turned to the local schoolteacher, Buenaventura Carmona. Aged, poor, and suffering from urinary incontinence, Carmona lived from the patronage of these town officials and what donations he could extract from local residents for his services as teacher. Candia later praised Carmona as a devout patriot. The praise spilled from appreciation of Carmona’s role as one of many obscure lettered functionaries that dotted the Paraguayan countryside who produced the records and letters that carried the signatures and rendered voices of others. In this fashion, he primarily served Uriarte and portrayed the commandant, in his communications with the president, as an altruistic servant of the state. A promised donation of palm branches to the government from the commandant’s personal stock, for example, spilled into commentary on international politics and praise for the sagacity of Carlos Antonio López in one April 1851 letter. It was through the hand of Carmona that Uriarte, two years after the congress, continued to cultivate ties with his distant political patron in Asunción and sustain the aura of his own authority in Salvador. Shortly thereafter, in June, Uriarte drew on Carmona’s talents in a desperate bid to hold onto public office. Animosities sowed with powerful rivals in Concepción were coming back to haunt Uriarte. He had reason to believe that Santurinino Bedoya and Blás Martínez were conspiring against him, and the two were formidable enemies to have. Martínez was the principal yerba producer of the prominent northern district. Bedoya too worked in the yerba trade as a merchant but, most importantly, had married into the ruling López family. Both men owned substantial livestock holdings. Bedoya, in particular, had the president’s ear and did not hesitate to denounce Uriarte for perceived offenses. The commandant of Salvador responded with an incredible flourish of a letter
that described both men as predatory playboys who chased after loose mulatas, scandalized homes of other married men, and had designs on Uriarte’s grown daughter, who remained back on his estate in Concepción. This was the targeted employment of salacious gossip as political weapon. The letter questioned the patriotic loyalty of his rivals and impetuously suggested that they be conscripted to serve as common soldiers on a frontier garrison. Meanwhile, it depicted Uriarte as “a loyal, patriotic servant and lover of my patria” who worked tirelessly “defending against the savages and moving this Pueblo forward.” Finally, it announced Uriarte’s intention to return to Concepción “to fix the disorder” of his home before traveling to Asunción to speak personally with Carlos Antonio López. Through the pen of Carmona, Uriarte managed quite the rhetorical stand. His influential enemies, though, got the best of him. Later that month, the president relieved him of his commandant post in Salvador and named Venancio Candia as his replacement.

THE REVENGE OF URIARTE

We are not privy to the informal exchanges that took place between Uriarte and the president in Asunción that led to the commandant’s removal. Whatever the case, the events that unfolded in Salvador over the next year and a half demonstrate that Uriarte was not ready to yield his claim as top caudillo in town and reveal just how contested local control over state resources, labor, and the exercises of sovereignty could become.

By July 1851, as both magistrate and commandant of Salvador, Venancio Candia stood poised to concentrate a preponderant amount of local power into his own hands. The realm of civil justice in the town was entirely in his domain. And he, like Uriarte, did not hesitate to make prolific use of the whipping post and the lash. Also like Uriarte, he did not hesitate to utilize his control over state resources to build his web of patronage in town. He lent state-owned oxen and wagons to poorer residents to move their agricultural produce to local markets as well as to one prominent free black, José Franco, to move his own harvest of bamboo and palm all the way to buyers in Asunción. Well ingratiated already with the local populace, Candia, it seems, was dispensing this material patronage in directions it had not previously gone—in particular to certain “honorable pardos” over whom the new commandant himself held few pretentions of racialized superiority. Meanwhile, in communications with the president, Candia
was disposed to defend local residents’ commerce with nearby indigenous clans. And during the prominent chieftain’s visits to the pueblo, he received Cacique Rubio in his own home. Finally, in January 1852, Candia extended permission to travel to the \textit{parda} to Ramona Romero so she could go to the capital to register an official complaint against the former commandant Uriarte for his extrajudicial flogging of her. Here Candia wrote the president confirming the incident and Uriarte’s own illicit sexual liaisons in town.

The replication of Uriarte’s tactics—and the attempt to turn those very tactics against him—was partially a function of his lingering influence. The ex-commandant maintained his own ties and interests in town—clients who still enjoyed the way he spun a tale and boasted, shared the mate gourd, and extended favors, and laborers who still worked his ranching lands that reached into the orbit of Salvador. There were friends that could inform and conspire, and it was here that Uriarte realized the convenience of remaining in the relative good graces of the parish priest Toubé. Whatever tensions that might have simmered previously between the two men now cooled under their mutual dislike of Venancio Candia. According to Candia himself, Toubé on several occasions marched into his home to berate him with a typical battery of “violent words.” Meanwhile the priest lent to the machinations of Uriarte, with vindictive eloquence, the pen of his sacred office. By mid-1852, the priest produced letters sent directly to the president—one on behalf of a client of Uriarte, another on his own account—denouncing the new commandant. One letter took issue with Candia’s employment of the “oxen of the \textit{patria}.” It alleged that those lent to the free black, José Franco, were returned in ruin. “The \textit{patria} needs them here,” Toubé wrote, and charged that their abuse “hurt the \textit{patria} when other residents [had to] offer their oxen and wagons” for the work of the local government. In his biting eloquence, the priest wrapped his appeal, and along with it the state-owned oxen and wagons, in the discursive sanctity of the \textit{patria}.

One factor mitigated the assault on the effective authority of Candia’s office: his extension of patronage to the schoolteacher Carmona. Already by July 1851 upon assuming control of the commandant office, Candia had sponsored (though Carmona penned) a petition to the president for a full set of new clothes, including poncho and sombrero, for Carmona. The letter praised Carmona for his work as schoolteacher that imparted on pupils “obedience to parents and superiors, devotion to the Supreme Being and religion, and respect for Your Excellency and the \textit{patria}.” It also lauded his work as a lay catechist, “indoctrinating parishioners during feast day celebrations” during the absences of the parish priest—a perhaps not-so-subtle dig at the alleged negligence of Toubé. In any case, Candia
had also recognized his need to secure the textual lifeline that tied the authority of his office to the aura of nationhood anchored in Asunción.

Carmona reciprocated with his own eloquence in the correspondence of Candia to the president. He crafted the boasts that as commandant Candia insured that “thieves, killers, and others of grave defects” who were sent upriver in internal exile became “well-behaved, settled, subjugated, and devout” as soon as they set foot in Salvador. Carmona also composed for Candia patriotic commentaries on international political developments reported by the state newspaper. In one instance from January 1852, he depicted Candia’s patriotic call for the enemy Argentine dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas, who refused to recognize Paraguayan independence, “to suffer the agony of a slow fire,” being burnt at the stake, for “his bloody deeds, bad faith, lack of religion, and terrible impositions against our Republic, our current Supreme Government, and all Americans.” Carmona described Candia announcing patriotic glad tidings in Guarani, sounding the church bell in the plaza, ordering official celebration with a flag raising, gun salutes, and, Mass to be held in the parish church.\(^\text{58}\) The schoolteacher also composed Candia’s correspondence defending himself against the accusations of the priest Toubé. Later in September, the two men collaborated on their most ambitious appeal yet to the president. They requested in the name of the “Divine Savior of the world, entitled patron of this Villa,” the construction of a new parish church “fit for the adoration of such a divine master.” The petition claimed the collective support of the townsfolk, who were willing to donate labor and materials for a construction that would “accumulate doubly immense sums of glory and honor to the patria and important services to God.”\(^\text{59}\) All that they asked was the appointment of a master carpenter to direct the efforts. In the face of Toubé and Uriarte’s machinations, Candia—upon issuing the petition and looking to oversee such a vast undertaking—sought to have more glory and sanctity of the patria double back on the figure of his own authority.

In the end, it was the loss of two ranch hands on the orders of Candia that prompted Uriarte to exact his revenge. The informal channeling of labor to his estates was a perk of office that Uriarte no longer controlled, and the convict workers had made Candia aware of their irregular situation. Carmona confirmed that no presidential orders retaining them on Uriarte’s estate existed. Candia did not look the other way and had the laborers removed from Uriarte’s charge. Thus, over the course of October 1852, Uriarte began showing up more frequently in town. In one instance, he marched into the commandant’s headquarters with an air of “supreme judge” and, in Candia’s relation, presumed to “take account and charge of my entire administration.” He then threatened
Candia that he would go to the capital to see the president, who would supposedly welcome him warmly, saying “Don Casimiro Uriarte, from where do you come?,” to which Uriarte claimed that he would reply, “From Salvador where I have seen nothing but immorality, injustice, and bad things going on.” In another instance, Uriarte interrupted a meeting Candia was conducting with Cacique Rubio. Here he greeted his old client warmly, offering him honey and an invitation to come converse at his residence in town. Rubio accepted and subsequently heard all the normal slanders against Candia—that he was weak and cowardly, that nobody liked him, but also that, because of Candia’s poverty, the cacique’s people could expect little patronage from him. The insinuation, as Candia interpreted it, was that Cacique Rubio and his people should “rise up” against the commandant and the pueblo in general.  

Yet the most dramatic assault came against Candia’s pillar of lettered strength precisely during the preparations for the celebration of the president’s birthday. It was the evening of November 1. Uriarte had left town, but he sent a trusted retainer in his stead, a man who arrived on horseback, furtively, without passport and with a scarf over his face: Donato. Later described as “mulatto and defiant,” Donato was Uriarte’s peon from his estate in Concepción. In Salvador, he hid in the house of another friend of Uriarte and bided his time. Word spread of the schoolteacher Carmona’s more difficult bouts with incontinence of late. And that evening, as the teacher walked along his usual route from the small school house toward Candia’s residence, Donato jumped from the shadows. He grabbed Carmona by the hair, pulled his head back, and drenched him with animal urine. Only when Donato released his hair could Carmona scream in terror. Inquiries revealed the perpetrator’s whereabouts in the house of Uriarte’s friend, and Candia immediately sent soldiers to the residence. Donato emerged from the house on horseback, spurned the soldiers sent to arrest him, and galloped away into the dark of the night.

THE SUBALTERN STRIKE BACK

Imagine the outrage of Candia when his missives to authorities in Concepción to track down the perpetrator were ignored. Consider too his enfeebled state when after the attack, the humiliated Carmona left town seeking justice and Candia remained lamenting his own ignorance and lack of effective ability to “make paper.” And this while all the while the priest Toubé boasted in public.
of written denunciations against Candia that he continued to send to the pres-
ident. Although weakened, Candia survived in the office of the commandant for another year, often relying heavily on the floggings of alleged delinquents to sustain his claim on legitimate authority, before he was relieved by a military man from Asunción. He nonetheless stayed on as juez long enough to witness in December 1853 one last defiant public outburst by Toubé. In this instance, the priest, while drunk, was wearing only a chiripa loincloth and poncho when he stumbled upon the new commandant and again denounced encroachments on his holy authority. The old priest died shortly thereafter, wasting away in a mere eight days from illness.

The significance of such power plays and humiliations on the Paraguayan frontier is questionable if not also for the evidence of machinations from below. People on the margins sensed the divisions of fragmented sovereignty and contests for authority and often threw themselves into the fray. While we might appreciate, for example, Venancio Candia’s attempts to extend patronage and build his influence upon assuming the charge of commandant, the initiatives of Ramona Romero, the convict laborers on Uriarte’s estate, and even the schoolteacher Carmona forced his hand. They had their own axes to grind against the bawdy estancionero from Concepción, and his removal from public office served up quite the opportunity. They pressed Candia to seek their justice and not vice versa. Similarly, we might also appreciate the machinations of Uriarte to undermine Candia and expose his lack of effective authority, but it was Donato who relished in the protection of the ex-commandant to do with impunity what countless laborers in the Paraguayan countryside often already did: to move freely through forested frontier spaces and skirt the restrictions of state surveillance and control. We can almost hear his cackle of delight when, as later reported by Candia, he told the soldiers sent to arrest him, “You all can do what you want, but I’m out of here” before galloping away and, as Candia added, “leaving the soldiers looking like fools.”

Even so, the contrivances of Cacique Rubio in the affair are most revealing of the contingent dynamics of frontier authority. Candia himself was made well aware of his precarious standing with the valuable chieftain when the latter conspicuously left the commandant headquarters in the company of his retinue to follow Uriarte back to where the estancionero was staying for obsequious talk and exchange. It was Rubio, then, who gave notice that Uriarte was still the caudillo in town. And he did so before returning to the residence of Candia to eat and tell the commandant’s wife, while Candia was away toiling in his fields,
what an impish wretch Uriarte believed Candia to be.\textsuperscript{65} Rubio was actively playing one side against the other, and his own employment of salacious gossip contributed to the nervous environment that later turned a devilish prank into a matter of state security.

Years later, after the ambitions of Uriarte in the Villa receded and Candia took up life again as a regular townsman, Salvador would remain a place of intrigue among local actors. Aspirations to build petty fiefdoms of control over local resources and labor drove the actions of pueblo officials who still cultivated both formal and extrajudicial exercises of power. The textual and ceremonial lifelines to the political center similarly remained a foundation of sanctioned authority while disputes exposed underhanded maneuvers and provided subalterns the opportunities to pull the strings of power to their advantage. Here, for example, a lover of a sitting commandant would have soldiers build her a house and get another soldier arrested and beaten, and a woman parishioner would dare issue a denunciation against another lustful, hard-drinking, violent priest.\textsuperscript{66} Meanwhile, the presence and interactions of autonomous indigenous clans among the forests stayed a part of every local political calculus in a persistent landscape of fragmented and overlapping sovereignties.\textsuperscript{67}

Casimiro Uriarte had realized some measure of revenge in the heady days of November 1852, but he never recovered his position as the main boss of Salvador. He subsequently kept his ambitions focused on his ranching interests in Concepción, and years later, when pressed, he had to admit that in the end, from the government of Carlos Antonio López he “received many benefits” and through it became a rich man. It was a frank admission of the essential and symbiotic ties that bound the early López regime with the middling landed elites of a countryside engulfed in frontier. Indeed, he had imagined the personal bond that he held with the president as his strongest measure of influence. Uriarte thus continued to berate state officials that he believed were below his stature. He questioned recruits of the growing national army as to whether their officers took care of them in proper patriarchal fashion. And he harbored quiet doubts when in 1862 old man López died and his eldest son took over the reins of power in Asunción.\textsuperscript{68}

In fact, Uriarte was probably part of the local electoral junta in Concepción that in the 1862 congress sent a deputy ready to debate the authority of a presidential office being passed from father to son.\textsuperscript{69} He and other landowners had felt the growing strains on their own resources and access to labor as a result of the national military mobilization that only intensified after Francisco Solano
López took the helm. A major division was stationed in Concepción, and soldiers labored on a myriad of projects that also required the likes of Uriarte and others to lend their livestock and wagons for the service of the state. Men like Uriarte sought official reprieves for the recruits that also worked in their employ and to whom they typically advanced wages to help secure their services and loyalty. But working for multiple masters was burdensome enough for soldiers also looking to attend to their own homes and plots. Such was the case with the soldier Manuel José Rodríguez who in March 1863 seized the opportunity to relieve himself of obligations owed to Casimiro Uriarte.  

We will never know whether Uriarte indeed said the seditious remarks that Rodríguez claimed that the ex-military commandant of Salvador made. It is suggestive that another acquaintance of Uriarte in Concepción corroborated that the estancionero was prone to complaining about the state of political affairs. The alleged remarks were also consistent with Uriarte’s well-known boastful ways. But it is almost a more exciting analytical possibility if Uriarte never said them at all. In any case, Rodríguez, a mere ranch hand and regular soldier who spoke only Guarani, was well aware of the currents of dissent buzzing through the northern districts, especially in the wake of Solano López’s election. When he relied on the intercession of Uriarte to obtain a license of leave from his military service, he had aims to work on his house and tend his fields. Rodríguez also answered numerous calls by Uriarte to help with cattle drives, as was expected for the advance on wages he received; but some calls he began to ignore when they became more insistent and overbearing. In late March, he approached one of his officers to make a deposition. Rodríguez claimed that during a recent drive Uriarte had told a gathering of workers and friends that “although the president was dead, the same government remained and they would have no relief because the same ruin continued.” These utterances came in a flourish of other laments that also expressed concern for the plight of an arrested slave and a jesting desire to soon die and be free of the worries of the world.

The deposition proved a brilliant strike from below that exploited the tensions of the upper political atmosphere. The act of the 1862 Concepción electoral junta left the entire district under suspicion by Solano López while the pressures on the local landed elite to conform continued to build. Utterances airing political discomforts that previously could travel the frontier air without much consequence now landed even an important man in jail. Meanwhile, if these utterances were not even said (certainly Uriarte denied making them), then Rodríguez artfully projected onto the estancionero sentiments that he likely
CONCLUSIONS

In nineteenth-century Paraguay under the López regimes, local politics mattered. Provincial state officials and other local power brokers were not mere extensions of the wills of autocrats; they had their own material and political interests at stake in the still tenuous business of state formation amid the frontier. Even in the more compact political geography of postcolonial Paraguay, this business remained far from finished, and the ties connecting center and periphery remained fluid, dynamic, and subject to disruption. Formal vestiges of authority carried their weight. The ceremonial and textual reproductions of the cosmological bluster of nationhood bolstered the power of officials and strongmen. But in a landscape of fragmented and overlapping sovereignties, the ability to blow hard, talk big, extend favors, build clienteles, and channel violence could make or break pretensions to bend others to one’s personal will and rule a town. Indeed, informal, personal connections to the principal autocrat in Asunción were also critical complements in contests for local power that proved persistent, heated, and multifaceted. Rival public officials could undermine. Powerful personal rivals could undercut. Meanwhile, subordinate laborers and other marginal figures actively threw themselves into frays and tried to play local political divisions toward their own profit and advantage. Even unconquered indigenous peoples had skins in the game and coaxed the divisions to keep the effective extension of state sovereignty at bay.

The proposition here is that the experiences of Casimiro Uriarte, his bid to dominate a frontier town, and his eventual downfall at the manipulations of his own peon were typical, not exceptional, expressions of local politics and state formation in nineteenth-century Paraguay. The López regimes depended on such figures to project the pretense of their postcolonial sovereignty across a broken landscape, and nearly all parties involved tacitly recognized this reality. Even so, not always does the bundle of power dynamics that these local
caudillos towed with them come bleeding through the documentary record as they did with the case of Uriarte and Salvador. Indeed, even the record of the judicial proceeding against Uriarte ends before we learn of his fate. Moreover, so much of what local officials did was left purposefully off of what was reported back to Asunción. But the hints and glimpses are numerous enough to indicate that below the veneer of unanimous loyalty and monolithic, personalist rule from the capital, contestations and machinations simmered. And it was precisely in these interactions—well beyond the direct control of fat autocrat presidents—that the postcolonial state—with all its limitations, contradictions, and exploitations—became a flesh-and-blood reality in the lives of everyday people.

NOTES


11. Candia a CAL, 8 July 1852, CS, ANA-SH, vol. 409, no. 1, fol. 451–56; Informe de José Daniel Chuna, 19 August 1854, CS, ANA-SH, vol. 409, no. 1 (II), fol. 579–80. For typical cattle holdings of inhabitants, see livestock tithe collection records, Salvador 1857, Archivo Nacional de Asunción–Sección Nueva Encuardanación (hereafter ANA-NE), vol. 3044. The overwhelming majority of estancia holders (thirty-nine in 1857, less than 10 percent of the total resident population) held less than fifty head total each.


16. Proceso a Uriarte, ANA-CJ; Uriarte a CAL, 3 June 1851.


Resquín a CAL, 1 January 1861, Correspondencia de Concepción, ANA-SH, vol. 369, no. 1, fol. 1218.

Informe seguido contra los desertores indio; Disputa en Salvador.


Potthast, “Paraiso de Mahoma” o “País de las mujeres”, 167–79.


Candia a CAL, 7 June 1849, CS, ANA-SH, vol. 409, no. 1, fol. 295.


Uriarte a CAL, 4 January 1849; Toubé a CAL, 8 May 1850; Candia a CAL, 7 June 1852; Toubé a CAL, 12 August 1852, CS, ANA-SH, vol. 409, no. 1, fol. 277–78, 314, 444–49, 458. Informe de Candia, 19 July 1851.


Toubé a CAL, 30 June 1849, CS, ANA-SH, vol. 409, no. 1, fol. 296. Solicitud de Toubé, 8 May 1850.

Candia a CAL, 19 July 1851, CS, ANA-SH, vol. 409, no. 1, fol. 390.


Uriarte a CAL, 19 April 1851, CS, ANA-SH, vol. 409, no. 1, fol. 367–70.
50. 1857 livestock tithe collection records, Concepción, ANA-NE, vol. 3044. Bedoya later served as Hacienda Minister under Francisco Solano López; see General Francisco Isidoro Resquín, Datos históricos de la Guerra del Paraguay contra la Triple Alianza (Asunción, 1875), 102.

51. Uriarte a CAL, 3 June 1851, CS, ANA-SH, vol. 409, no. 1, fol. 374–76.

52. Candia a CAL, 28 June 1851, CS, ANA-SH, vol. 409, no. 1, fol. 381–82.


55. Candia a CAL, 25 January 1852.

56. Toubé a CAL, 5 June 1852, CS, ANA-SH, vol. 409, no. 1, fol. 443. Candia a CAL, 10 November 1853.

57. Candia a CAL, 19 July 1851.


61. Ibid.


64. Candia a CAL, 11 November 1852.

65. Ibid.


68. Proceso a Uriarte, 1863, ANA-SCJ.


70. Proceso a Uriarte, 1863, ANA-SCJ.

71. Ibid.


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