Empire and Identity in Guizhou

Weinstein, Jodi L.

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NOTES

ABBREVIATIONS


JCLZ mzl  Junji chu lufu zouzhe, minzu shiwu lei 軍機處祿復奏摺, 民族事務類 (Grand Council reference copies of palace memorials, minority affairs category). Number One Historical Archives, Beijing.

JQ  Jiaqing reign period (1796–1820), used in dates.

KX  Kangxi reign period (1662–1722), used in dates.

NQX  Qingdai Jiaqing nianjian Guizhou Buyizu “Nanlong qiyi” ziliao xuanbian 清代嘉慶年間貴州布依族“南籠起義” 資料選編 (Collected materials on the “Nanlong Uprising” of the Buyi
people during the Jiaqing Reign). Jointly compiled by the China Number One Historical Archives, the Southwest Guizhou People’s Committee, and the Guizhou Buyi Studies Committee. Guiyang: Guizhou minzu chubanshe, 1989.

QL Qianlong reign period (1736–1795), used in dates.


YZ Yongzheng reign period (1723–1735), used in dates.


YZZPYZ Yongzheng Zhupi Yuzhi 雍正硃批諭旨 (The vermillion rescripts and edicts of the Yongzheng reign), 10 volumes. Taipei: Wenyuan shuju, 1965 (reprint).

ZPZZ mzl Zhupi zouzhe, minzu shiwu lei 碑批奏摺, 民族事務類 (Palace memorials, minority affairs category). Number One Historical Archives, Beijing.

1 / GUIZHOU AND THE LIVELIHOODS APPROACH TO ZHONGJIA HISTORY

1 Aibida, Qiannan shilue (A handbook of Guizhou) (1750; reprint, Guiyang: Guizhou Renmin Chubanshe, 1992), 15.

2 In this book, the term Zhongjia will be used in reference to the late imperial period, and Buyi will be used when discussing the ethnic group in the People’s Republic of China. The name Buyi and the Chinese characters used to represent it were approved by the Guizhou Nationalities Affairs Commission in August 1955, and “Bouyei” was the transcription adopted for foreign publications in 1991. See Wang Huiliang, “Lun Buyizu mingcheng ji jiancheng” (A discussion of the Buyi name and its short forms), Buyi xue yanjiu 1 (1989): 49–58.

3 Here, I use Jacob Whittaker’s nuanced interpretation of the term gaitu guiliu. As he explains, the word gui implies “both a return to former conditions and the reestablishment of proper loyalty to the ruler.” See his “Yi Identity and Confucian Empire: Indigenous Local Elites, Cultural Brokerage, and the Colonization of the Lu-ho Tribal Polity of Yunnan, 1174–1745” (PhD dissertation: University of California-Davis, 2008), 338.


6 Forsyth and Michaud, “Rethinking the Relationships,” 3.

7 Ibid.


11 The same can be said of the Khmu (of Laos), the Tai Lue and Hani (both of Yunnan), and the Tay and Tai (both of Vietnam), as well as of many other communities in the Massif. See, for example, Janet C. Sturgeon, “Rubber Transformations: Post-Socialist Livelihoods and Identities for Akha and Tai Lue Farmers in Xishuangbanna, China” in Michaud and Forsyth, *Moving Mountains*, 193–214. The Buyi—the direct descendants of the Zhongjia—have also developed strategies to preserve their identity in the face of challenges from China’s increasingly market-oriented economy. As this volume was being written, Yu Luo, a PhD student in anthropology at Yale University, was conducting fieldwork that examines how the Buyi use ethnotourism, religion, and local festivals to negotiate state development programs.


13 When using these sources, I keep a wary eye out for the political agenda imposed by China’s nationalistic ethnographers and historians, apparent in ideological flourishes and politically inspired turns of phrase. For example,
the editors of a folk narrative might put words like “oppression of the common people” into the mouth of an eighteenth-century Zhongjia teenager unlikely to have this Marxist terminology in her vocabulary. In other instances, modern-day editors might refer to the Nanlong Uprising as an example of “multinationality unity” when all historical evidence indicates that the overwhelming majority of participants were Zhongjia. The insurgents did include a handful of Han mercenaries and a few “Miao” (that is, neither Han nor Zhongjia) who were press-ganged into the rebel army.

Because these texts use Chinese characters to represent the sounds rather than the meanings of Zhongjia words, they are often incomprehensible to historians literate in Chinese (and even to those conversant in Buyi). The script was never standardized and often varies from locality to locality. See David Holm, *Killing a Buffalo for the Ancestors: A Zhuang Cosmological Text from Southwest China* (DeKalb, IL: Southeast Asia Publications, 2003), 45–48.

See, for example, Zhou Guomao, Wei Xingru, and Wu Wenyi, eds. *Buyizu Mojing wenxue* (Mojing religious literature of the Buyi) (Guiyang: Guizhou renmin chubanshe, 1996). David Holm’s *Killing a Buffalo for the Ancestors* provides an annotated translation of two texts commonly used in sacrifices. Holm’s companion book, *Recalling Lost Souls: The Baeu Rodo Tai Cosmogonic Texts from Guangxi in Southern China* (Bangkok: White Lotus, 2004), explores the myths and rituals surrounding Baeu Rodo and Mo Loekgyap, two personages often revered as the founding ancestors of the Zhuang and Buyi. Although Holm conducted his fieldwork in northern Guangxi communities officially identified as Zhuang, he discovered that the local dialect and religious practices closely resembled those of the Buyi in Guizhou. He thus refers to his research subjects as “Guangxi Bouyei.” See Holm, *Killing a Buffalo*, 12–13.


As Jean Michaud notes, economically and politically weak societies facing strong outside pressures are changed by those pressures, but also “actively and creatively use what power they have to interpret, adapt, and even subvert these pressures.” See Michaud, “Hmong infrapolitics,” 1856.

I would suggest that the Zhongjia possessed what Jean Michaud calls a “perceptive resilience . . . founded on an understanding that domination is a fact of life, that the stakes include cultural as much as physical survival, and that with each action come consequences.” See Michaud, “Hmong infrapolitics,” 1869.


2 / NATURAL, HUMAN, AND HISTORICAL LANDSCAPES


2 Xu died before he could edit the diaries, and they were published in their original form. See Richard Strassberg, *Inscribed Landscapes: Travel Writing from Imperial China* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), 319.

3 Like many of his contemporaries in late imperial China, Xu used the term “Miao” indiscriminately to describe the non-Han peoples he encountered in Guizhou. For some of Xu’s more upbeat observations about the region’s natural beauty, see his description of the mountain landscapes outside Guiyang in *Xu Xiake youji* II: 636–37, translated in Ward, 105. See also Xu’s description of the Baishui waterfalls in *Xu Xiake youji* I: 651–52. The Baishui waterfalls are located at modern-day Huangguoshu, approximately 322 kilometers (200 miles) southwest of Guiyang, and today they are one of Guizhou’s main tourist attractions.

4 During his investigation of the Pan Rivers, for instance, Xu discovered that he could not see the river source because a mountain always stood in his way. See *Xu Xiake youji* I: 660, cited in Ward, *Xu Xiake*, 109.
Based on modern ethnic patterns of the Dingfan region the people he encountered were probably ancestors of today's Buyi.

6 Xu Xiake youji I: 639–42.

7 Xu Xiake youji I: 642–45.

8 The Lolo were most likely the ancestors of the people today known as the Yi.


10 http://www.allcountries.org/china_statistics/1_18_monthly_sunshine_hours_of_major.html. Both Wenjiang and Chongqing are located in Sichuan.


11 Aibida, Qiannan shilue, 200, 222.


13 Although Yangshuo in Guangxi, and Yunnan’s Stone Forest (Shilin) claim China’s finest karst topography, southwestern Guizhou also has its share of striking landscapes. The rural areas outside the city of Xingyi (Nanlong) offer some of the most stunning vistas anywhere in China.


15 Buckwheat and millet are still common foods in Guizhou. During my 2001 visit, I dined with a Xingyi family who enjoyed their rice mixed with steamed buckwheat and millet. Another interesting feature of Guizhou cuisine is that nearly every meal includes at least one boiled vegetable, typically squash or green beans. The vegetables are flavored with chili pepper mixed in to some of the vegetables’ cooking liquid. One professor at Guizhou Normal Univer-
sity explained that this is a legacy of leaner times, when people boiled their
vegetables because they could not afford cooking oil.

17 See Tregear, 266–67; Guizhou tongzhi (Gazetteer of Guizhou province),
1741. 15: 3b, 4a–4b; Aibida, Qiannan shilue, 49. See also Claudine Lombard-
Salmon, Un Exemple d’acculturation Chinoise, Guizhou au XVIIIeme siecle
(An example of Chinese acculturation: Guizhou in the eighteenth century)

18 This section is inspired by a similar discussion in Jenks’ Insurgency and Popu-
lar Disorder in Guizhou, 18–20. Jenks uses population and cultivated acreage
data to establish a quantitative basis for the subsistence crisis in nineteenth-
century Guizhou. My aim here is to do the same for eighteenth-century
Guizhou.

19 James Lee, “Food Supply and Population Growth in Southwest China, 1250–

20 Ho Ping-ti, Studies on the Population of China, 1368–1953 (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1959), chapters 2 and 3.

21 Lee, “Food Supply and Population Growth,” 723–29. It should be noted that
in 1775, the Qianlong emperor declared a new commitment to maintaining
an accurate registration, and he ordered provincial officials to make sure that
everyone was counted. This initiative, rather than true demographic expan-
sion, accounts for the increase of one million persons between 1765 and 1775.
Lee notes that in spite of this effort, up to one-quarter of southwest China’s
population remained unregistered after 1775.

22 Yang Bin, “Differentiation and analysis of the population documents in the
James Lee suggests that the mid-nineteenth century population was around
7 million. See his “Food Supply and Population Growth in Southwest China,”
729.

23 Wang Yeh-chien, Land Taxation in Imperial China (Cambridge, MA: Har-

24 Ge Quansheng, Junhu Dai, Fanneng He, Jingyun Zheng, Zhimin Man, and
Yun Zhao, “Spatiotemporal dynamics of reclamation and cultivation and
its driving factors in parts of China during the last three centuries,” Progress
in Natural Science 14, no. 7 (July 2004): 608. These figures roughly square
with Dwight Perkins’ estimate of 17 million mu (1.1 ha) by the late eighteenth
(Chicago: Aldine, 1969), 234. According to Robert Jenks’ calculations, Per-
kins’ estimate equaled about 6.5 percent of Guizhou’s total land surface. Most
likely, peasants learned to make better use of marginal lands and hillsides,
and terracing became more common. See Jenks, *Insurgency and Social Disorder in Guizhou*, 19.


26 Lombard-Salmon estimates that more than 56 percent of Guizhou’s eighteenth-century population was non-Han. See Lombard-Salmon, *Un Exemple d’acculturation Chinoise*, 170.


28 Chapter 4 also includes a discussion of Zhongjia religion and its influence on local livelihood choices.

29 Both the Bo Y and the Giay reside in the northeastern provinces of Ha Giang and Lao Cai, and they are probably the descendants of Zhongjia refugees who fled Guizhou during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Numbering only 1,450 persons, the Bo Y rank 46th in population among Vietnam’s 54 officially recognized ethnic groups, while the Giay, rank 25th with 38,000 people. See http://www.vietnamembassy.org.uk/population.html for these 2007 population estimates. Although the Vietnamese government classifies these groups as two distinct nationalities, linguists generally agree that both are subgroups of the Buyi. See, for example, Holm, *Killing a Buffalo*, 9; William J. Gedney, “Yay, a Northern Tai Language in North Vietnam,” *Lingua* 14 (1965): 180–93; and Jerold A. Edmondson, “Change and Variation in Zhuang,” in *Papers from the Second Annual Meeting of the Southeast Asian Linguistics Society*, ed. Karen L. Adams and Thomas John Hudak (Arizona State University: Program for Southeast Asian Studies, 1994), 149.

30 One of the criminal cases examined in chapter 4 highlights the close ties between the Zhongjia and the Nong. Imperial officials usually wrote character *Nong* with the character component meaning “dog” (犭農). This study combines the “dog” radical (犭) with the homophonous character *nong* (農, meaning farmer or peasant). In a few Qing sources, *Nong* is written with the “human” character component (儂).

31 Northern Zhuang and Southern Zhuang are informal designations used by linguists and anthropologists. They are not official ethnic classifications. The Zhuang language encompasses two major dialect groups, Northern and Southern. David Holm suggests that these two dialects might be more accurately classified as separate languages, for there is greater linguistic difference between them than there is between Northern Zhuang and Buyi, or between Southern Zhuang and the Nung and Tay languages of northern Vietnam.
Furthermore, although the Nung and Tay are recognized as separate ethnic groups in Vietnam, in China, they are all classified as Zhuang. See Holm, *Killing a Buffalo*, 7–8. See also Snyder, “Bouyei Phonology,” 378.


Holm, *Killing a Buffalo*, 12.

As Patricia Ebrey writes, “We have to infer that . . . [non-Han in southern China] claimed descent from Chinese migrants either because they wanted to believe it (looking down on non-Han themselves), or because it was in their best interest to do so (for local politics, social prestige, or whatever).” See Patricia Ebrey, “Surnames and Han Chinese Identity,” in *Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan*, edited by Melissa J. Brown (Berkeley: Institute for East Asian Studies, University of California, 1996), 23.

When I interviewed a Buyi family near Xingyi in 2001, they claimed to be
the descendants of settlers who had arrived in Guizhou from Jiangsu during the Ming period. Buyi scholar Yu Luo (see chapter 1) has also reported many claims of Jiangsu descent. Personal e-mail correspondences, June 8, 2010 and June 14, 2010. For further discussion of these avowed Jiangnan origins and the accompanying genealogies, see “Tantao Ceheng Buyizu yuan” (Investigating the origins of the Buyi nationality in Ceheng), *Ceheng wen shi ziliiao* (Literary and historical materials from Ceheng) 3 (1985): 74–75. This anonymous article hereafter cited as “Tantao Ceheng.”

40 Holm, *Killing a Buffalo*, 11. Katherine Kaup suggests that Zhuang genealogies showing Jiangnan or Huguang origins may also be falsified for similar reasons. See her *Creating the Zhuang: Ethnic Politics in China* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 2000), 90. Jeffrey Barlow also notes that many Zhuang, “[who] lived sufficiently close to Han Chinese to learn their language and cultural practices . . . would later claim that their ancestors had been Han Chinese and that living in isolated districts, they had early received local influences which had rusticated them.” See Barlow’s online manuscript, “The Zhuang,” http://mcel.pacificu.edu/as/resources/zhuang/zhuang9.htm #_edn15, Chapter 9.

41 Gu Yin, “Buyizu zuyuan yanjiu zongshu” (A summary of research on the origins of the Buyi nationality), *Buyi xue yanjiu* 6 (1998): 23. Chu was a powerful kingdom based in present-day Hunan. Its territory extended into northern Guangxi. Gu notes, however, that some Qing-era local gazetteers disputed the idea that the Zhongjia descended from Ma Yan’s troops. A Miao album entry on the “Kayou Zhongjia” of southwestern Guizhou also hints at Yongguan origins. See Deal and Hostetler, *The Art of Ethnography*, 13

42 Samuel R. Clarke, *Among the Tribes in Southwest China* (London: Morgan and Scott, Ltd., 1911), 95.


44 The final “x” in *Boux* indicates the fourth tone in both Buyi and Zhuang. It is not pronounced as a consonant. See Holm, *Killing a Buffalo for the Ancestors*, 8.


46 For a discussion of the various characters used to write the name “Zhuang,” see Huang Jiaxin, *Zhuangzu diqu tusi zhidu yu gaitu guilu yanjiu* (Research on the tusi system and gaitu guilu in Zhuang nationality regions) (Hefei: Hefei gongye daxue chubanshe, 2007), 30.

47 Zhou Guoyan, “Linguistic and Historical Explanations,” 980. See also his “An Introduction to the Kam-Tai Group of Languages in China,” 6. In both pieces, Zhou offers and then rejects alternate hypotheses for the origins of
the term Zhongjia. One theory suggests that the word Zhongjia derived from homophonic words meaning “heavy armor,” a reference to the armor worn during wars of the Song, Yuan, and Ming periods. Another explanation suggests that the name derives from the character meaning “to cultivate” (zhong 種), a reference to the Zhongjia’s rice-farming livelihood.

According to Zhou Guoyan, the modern Buyi never refer to themselves as “Buzhong” or “Zhong.” See his “An Introduction to the Kam-Tai Group of Languages in China,” 6.


Holm, Killing a Buffalo, 9.

Interestingly, many residents of northern Guangxi also identify themselves as Bouyeix. In southern Guangxi, by contrast, many local residents use the self-appellations Bouxnungz and Bouxdoj. See Zhou Guoyan, “An Introduction to the Kam-Tai Group of Languages in China,” 2. See also “Tantao Ceheng,” 75. (The final “z” in Bouxnungz indicates the fourth tone in Zhuang, and the final “j” in Bouxdoj indicates the third tone. See Holm, Killing a Buffalo, 8–9, 223).

This decision, which was made at a special meeting convened by the Guizhou Nationalities Affairs Commission, was not taken lightly. There were at least twenty other names in the running, including “Buyueyi,” and “Buyue.” Some delegates at the meeting argued that “Buyueyi” was the closest approximation of the group’s autonym, but others objected to the idea of creating a three-character name because other ethnic groups employed one- or two-character names. Still others were uncomfortable about using the character yue, perhaps because of its connections to the Yue peoples of Chinese antiquity. See Thomas S. Mullaney, Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 111–12.

The character used to write the name Zhuang was officially changed from 僮 to 壮 in 1965. See Huang Jiaxin, Zhuangzu diqu tusi zhidu, 30.
According to Katherine Palmer Kaup, Guizhou Nationality Affairs officials insisted that the Buyi in that province did not want to be labeled Zhuang. See *Creating the Zhuang*, 88.


Kaup, *Creating the Zhuang*, 89.

Mullaney, *Coming to Terms with the Nation*, 88. A similar issue arose along the Yunnan-Sichuan border. The Pumi ethnic group was divided into two separate categories, according to provincial boundaries; those in Yunnan were classified as Pumi, while those in Sichuan were classified as Zang. See Stevan Harrell, “The Nationalities Question and the Prmi Problem,” in *Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan*, ed. Melissa J. Brown (Berkeley: Institute for East Asian Studies, University of California, 1996), 274–96.


During the 1950s, Chinese officials considered dividing Guangxi into Eastern (predominantly Han) and Western (predominantly Zhuang) administrative areas that would better reflect ethnic distribution throughout the province. The idea was abandoned in favor of unifying the province into the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region, one of five provincial-level autonomous regions in China. See Kaup, *Creating the Zhuang*, 92–96. For problems arising from the classification of the Zhuang in Yunnan, see Kaup, “Regionalism Versus Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic of China,” *The China Quarterly*, 172 (2002): 863–84.

Changing provincial boundaries is difficult, although not impossible. Another solution might be to maintain the Guangxi-Guizhou border but allow the Buyi category to cross it.

Holm, *Killing a Buffalo*, 11.

According to Yu Luo, however, there seems to be a growing recognition, particularly among members of the communities along the Guizhou-Guangxi border, that the Buyi and Zhuang share more similarities than differences. It seems unlikely that anyone from either side of the Buyi-Zhuang divide will mount a campaign to change the official nomenclature, but members of both ethnic groups will continue to explore their shared heritage in an informal way. E-mail correspondence and conversations, June-August 2011 and March 2012.

*Guizhou tongzhi* (Gazetteer of Guizhou province) 1697, 30: 21b; *Nanlong fuzhi* (Gazetteer of Nanlong prefecture) 1765, 2: 18.

Quoted in Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise*, 151.

*Xilong zhouzhi* (Gazetteer of Xilong department), 1673, 6: 2a.

The dog character component was also used to represent the ethnonyms of
other non-Han groups, including the Zhuang, the Miao, and the Yao. It could even be appended to the character for Hui (回), the name for Chinese Muslims. David Holm notes that the dog component originally referred to the classical Chinese myth of Panhu, the legendary canine revered as the ancestor of many non-Han peoples in southern China. Over time, this orthographic convention increasingly “reflected and contributed to a view, common in Chinese society at the time, that the southern non-Han peoples were sub-human.” See Holm, Recalling Lost Souls, 5. On the application of the dog radical to Muslim populations, see Atwill, The Chinese Sultanate: Islam, Ethnicity, and the Panthay Rebellion in Southwest China, 1856–1873 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 25–26 and Jonathan N. Lipman, Familiar Strangers: A History of Muslims in Northwest China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 41, note 54.

Here, as in Xu Xiake’s account, “Miao” is a generic term for non-Han ethnic groups.

Aibida, Qiannan shilue, 223.

For more on this, see chapter 3.

As Donald Sutton observes in his study of the Miao in Hunan Province, “Acculturation does not mean assimilation, that is, a change of identification.” See his “Ethnicity and the Miao Frontier,” in Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China, ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 220. For more on this, see chapter 4.

Clarke, Among the Tribes, 97.

Ibid., 98.

Ibid., 100. Clarke noted, however, that unlike their Han counterparts, Zhongjia women in rural areas generally did not bind their feet and often worked alongside men in the rice fields.

Ibid., 107–8.

Shi Jizhong “Qian Gui bianjiang Zhuangzu Buyizude tingmu zhidu” (The tingmu system of the Zhuang and Buyi nationalities in the Qian-Gui [Guizhou-Guangxi] borderlands) in Xinan minzu shehui xingtai yu jingji wenhua leixing (The social formations and cultural and economic types of the ethnic minorities in southwest China) (Kunming: Yunnan Educational Publishing House, 1997), 292.

For more on the mogong (called bumo in the Buyi dialects of northwestern Guangxi and southwestern Guizhou), see David Holm, Killing a Buffalo, 21–24 and chapter 4 of this book.

80 Ibid., 300.
81 *Nanlong fuzhi* 1765, 2: 20a–b. See also Li Qingfu and Xu Xianlong, *Buyizu jianshi*, 78–79.
82 Li Qingfu and Xu Xianlong, *Buyizu jianshi*, 88–89. See also He Weifu, *Qing-dai Guizhou shangpin jingjishi yanjiu*, 117–19, 238–42.
84 Both the Nanzhao and the Dali controlled territory in present-day Yunnan. See Herman, *Amid the Clouds and Mist*, chapter 1.
87 Herman, “The Mu’ege Kingdom,” 265.
88 Herman, *Amid the Clouds and Mist*, chapters 5–6.
89 The names San Miao, You-Miao, and Miao-Min appear in the Chinese classics and some early historical writings, but it is doubtful that these groups were Miao in the modern sense of the word. Jenks posits that in these earliest sources, “Miao” was simply used as a generic for the non-Han peoples of southern China. References to the Miao continue through the Qin and early Han but disappear from the historical record until the Song dynasty. Thereafter, and especially from the Ming dynasty onward, the name “Miao” appears in historical writing with increasing frequency, often in a compound such as “Miaoren” or “Miaoman.” See Jenks, *Insurgency and Social Disorder in Guizhou*, 32.
91 During the 1970s and 1980s, many Hmong fled Laos for the temporary shelter of refugee camps in Thailand. Some were resettled in third countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, France, and even Sweden. Some Hmong refugees made permanent homes in Thailand, and some were eventually repatriated to Laos. Today, the Miao of China number around 7.5 million. Their classification as a single nationality remains problematic. As Norma Diamond explains, it is difficult to see how the Stalinist criteria for nationali-
ties apply to the Miao, given that many subgroups speak mutually unintelligible dialects, and do not share a common territory, scattered as they are over several different provinces. See her “Defining the Miao: Ming, Qing, and Contemporary Views,” in Cultural Encounters on China’s Ethnic Frontiers, ed. Stevan Harrell (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995), 92.

Diamond, 99–100.


Jenks, Insurgency and Social Disorder in Guizhou, 33–35.


To the extent that Ming population statistics can be trusted, it appears that the registered Han population of Guizhou at least doubled between 1502 and 1602. According to James Lee’s estimates, there were around 265,000 registered Han in Guizhou in the former year and approximately 530,000 a century later. These figures include military populations as well as civilian households. See his “Food Supply and Population Growth in Southwest China, 1250–1850,” 715.

The six “routes” were Yuanshun (modern-day Guiyang), Bozhou (modern-day Zunyi), Xintai (modern-day Guiding), Puding (modern-day Anshun), Puan, and Wusa (modern-day Weining).

Herman, Amid the Clouds and Mist, 101. The provincial administration commissioner was the early Ming version of a provincial governor. R. Kent Guy translates this term “commissioner for the promulgation and dissemination of government policies.” See his Qing Governors and their Provinces: The Evolution of Territorial Administration in China, 1644–1796 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010), 34.

For more on the establishment of Guizhou province, see Herman, “The Mu’ege Kingdom,” 6–21. See also his “The Cant of Conquest,” 136–39 and Amid the Clouds and Mist, 94–102.

The Yuan and Ming also instituted the tusi system in Guangxi, Yunnan, Guangdong, and Sichuan, in the westernmost regions of Huguang (Hubei and Hunan), and in several other provinces with large non-Han populations.

For a list of the names for all the civil and military native offices in use during the Ming and Qing periods, see John Herman, “National Integration and Regional Hegemony: The Political and Cultural Dynamics of Qing State


105 Herman, “The Mu’ege Kingdom,” 260.


107 Jobtei (in Chinese Zhaobutai), the Manchu general in charge of southwestern Guizhou, received military assistance from the Cen native officials who controlled the Guangxi-Guizhou borderlands. See Dading fuzhi (Gazetteer of Dading prefecture) 1850, 48: 3a.

108 Jobtei received assistance from Cen Jilu, the native prefect of Sicheng in Guangxi. Until this point in his career, Wu Sangui was best known as the erstwhile Ming general who in 1644 allowed Qing forces to enter China at the Shanhai Pass, the easternmost gate of the Great Wall. As chapter 3 explains, Wu Sangui soon fell out of favor with Qing authorities, and so, in due course, did Cen Jilu’s successors.

109 Dading fuzhi, 48: 3a.


112 Ibid., 60.

3 / THE CONSOLIDATION OF QING RULE

1 The largest sub-provincial unit was the prefecture (fu). The department (zhou) was subordinate to the prefecture and usually had jurisdiction over at least one county (xian).

2 In a richly detailed chapter, Kent Smith describes the two-year campaign to pacify this small corner of Guizhou and its impact on subsequent policy in southwestern China. See Kent Clarke Smith, “Ch’ing Policy and the Development of Southwest China: Aspects of Ortai’s Governor-Generalship, 1726–1731” (PhD diss., Yale University, 1971), 26–39. For brief accounts of the campaign in Dingfan-Guangshun, see also Lombard-Salmon, Un exemple d’acculturation Chinoise, 231–32, and Guy, Qing Governors and Their Provinces, 340–43.
3 Smith, “Ch’ing Policy and the Development of Southwest China,” 26–39. See also Guy, Qing Governors and their Provinces, 334–48. Both Smith and Guy spell Ortai based on a romanization of the Manchu name. In the old Wade-Giles system it is spelled O-erh-tai. Other scholars spell it Eertai, using the pinyin romanization system.

4 Smith, “Ch’ing Policy and the Development of Southwest China,” 97–100.

5 For detailed accounts of the violence in northeastern Yunnan and southeastern Guizhou, see Smith, “Ch’ing Policy and the Development of Southwest China,” 157–71 and 256–89, respectively. For southeastern Guizhou, see also Herman, “National Integration and Regional Hegemony,” chapters 4 and 6. For a discussion of the violence in southern Yunnan, see Giersch, Asian Borderlands, 43–63.

6 Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise, 30, 119.

7 Copper was a key component of Qing coins. For more on the Yunnan copper industry, see Smith, “Ch’ing Policy and the Development of Southwest China,” chapter 4.

8 Aibida, Qiannan shilue, 229.


10 Kent Smith asserts that Han colonization and settlement were unintended effects of Qing policy rather than an underlying motive. At one point, Ortai had suggested dispossessing the Zhongjia altogether and turning their land over to soldiers under the military colony (tuntian) system. Ortai proposed to settle Chinese farmers on any land not allocated to the military, with the express purpose of preventing Zhongjia from reoccupying the area. He abandoned this scheme, although he did insist that Zhongjia land ownership be regulated according to Chinese patterns, using deeds and official seals. As Smith writes, “The Zhongjia were efficient farmers upon whom officials now had the necessary leverage to exact payment of taxes. The introduction of Chinese officialdom . . . may have put Zhongjia at a disadvantage vis-à-vis land-hungry Chinese, but this was a by-product rather than a purpose of imperial policy for the region.” See “Ch’ing Policy and the Development of Southwest China,” 98.

11 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 3, 186–87, 190. Susan Mann has also noted that, like early modern European states, the Qing showed an “increasing capacity for seeing like a state.” See her “Mann on Hostetler,” in Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History vol. 2, no. 3 (Winter 2001).
These concepts were originally put forth by the anthropologist E. R. Leach in his work on pre-colonial Burma and later amplified by James Scott. See Leach, “The Frontiers of Burma,” 185–87; see also Scott, Seeing Like a State, 186–87.

Leach, “The Frontiers of Burma,” 185–87. As James Scott notes, “Such spaces, it goes without saying, have served as refuges for fleeing peasants, bandits, rebels, bandits, and the pretenders who have often threatened kingdoms.” See Scott, Seeing Like a State, 187. It could be argued that the Prince of Gui, the self-styled Southern Ming emperor, took advantage of the non-state spaces in southwestern China to mount his resistance against the Qing.

Daniel McMahon suggests that gaitu guiliu in the Miao regions of western Hunan illustrated the Qing state’s desire to transform non-state spaces into state spaces. He suggests that “non-state spaces” are analogous to the remote mountainous regions known as aoqu. See his “Restoring the Garden: Yan Ruyi and the Civilizing of China’s Internal Frontiers, 1795–1805” (PhD diss., University of California-Davis, 1998), 333–34. Although he does not use the precise terminology, John Herman makes a similar case for the Guzhou region of southeastern Guizhou. See his “National Integration and Regional Hegemony,” chapter 4.

A fourth category could be used to describe indigenous polities that were largely independent of the imperial state, such as the Nasu Yi states of northwestern Guizhou and Yunnan. And a fifth category might describe the Tai polities of southern Yunnan that paid dual fealty to China’s imperial state and the kingdoms of mainland Southeast Asia. See Herman, Amid the Clouds and Mist, Whittaker, “Yi Identity and Confucian Empire,” and Giersch, Asian Borderlands.

During the spring and summer of 1659, Beijing renewed the investiture of more than forty tusi throughout Guizhou. See He Renzhong, et al., Guizhou tongshi. Di san juan, Qingdai de Guizhou (A comprehensive history of Guizhou, part 3, Qing dynasty Guizhou) (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 2002), 223.

This measure was originally proposed by Guizhou Governor Zhao Tingchen. See Herman, “Empire in the Southwest,” 48–49.

Herman, “National Integration and Regional Hegemony,” 54–55.

Herman, “Empire in the Southwest,” 60–66.


After Wu captured and executed the last Ming pretender (the Prince of Gui,
whom Wu pursued into Burma) in 1662, he was named a Prince of the Blood and subsequently gained control over all the provincial officials in Yunnan and Guizhou. Wu claimed that tax revenues and profits from his monopolies would be used for public works. See Tsao, “The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories,” 58–60, 68.

In particular, Wu Sangui targeted the Shuixi region, the traditional stronghold of the powerful An family. The Qing court authorized Wu to depose An Kun, the Nasu Yi native official, on grounds that An had collaborated with Ming loyalists who had straggled into Shuixi. To be sure, the native ruler had taken up arms, but only as a result of Wu’s repeated provocations. The Shuixi region was subsequently divided into four prefectures, all of them under Wu’s personal supervision. In 1683, the Kangxi Emperor restored the Shuixi ruling clan’s official titles, and this clan remained in power until 1727. See Herman, Amid the Clouds and Mist, 201–15.

Kai-fu Tsao estimates that Wu commanded 64,000 troops by 1665, costing the Qing more than nine million taels annually. See his “The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories,” 65–68. For more on Wu’s self-aggrandizing schemes, see Yingcong Dai, “The Rise of the Southwestern Frontier under the Qing, 1640–1800” (PhD diss., University of Washington, 1996), 86–93.

This rebellion, the so-called War of the Three Feudatories, began when the Kangxi emperor ordered Wu Sangui and two other feudatories, Geng Jingzhong, and Shang Kexi, to resign their hereditary governorships. Wu then killed the regularly appointed governor of Yunnan and proclaimed a new dynasty, the Zhou. By 1674, he had occupied six provinces in southern and southwestern China, and had set up a new capital in Hunan. Later that year, the other two feudatories joined Wu’s cause, bringing Fujian and Guangdong under the rebel banner. In 1678, Wu Sangui died in Hunan, leaving his throne to his grandson, who later retreated to Yunnan. The rebellion dragged on for another two years (until the younger Wu committed suicide in late 1681) and Qing armies quickly reestablished imperial control over the southwest. For a detailed account of the rebellion, see Tsao, “The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories,” chapters 2 and 3. See also Herman, Amid the Clouds and Mist, 216–18.

One official who fell under the emperor’s suspicion was Cai Yurong, governor-general of Yunnan and Guizhou from 1682 to 1686. At one time an imperial favorite for his role in suppressing Wu Sangui, Cai was eventually dismissed from office after he pushed for an aggressive policy against the native officials. See Dai, The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet, 28–29.

Smith, “Ch’ing Policy and the Development of Southwest China,” 44.

28 For example, Yongzheng legalized the tax surcharges that local officials traditionally assessed to augment their meager salaries and used the surcharges to subsidize merit increases for all officials. See Madeline Zelin, *The Magistrate’s Tael: Rationalizing Fiscal Reform in Eighteenth-Century China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). The Yongzheng emperor also created an inner court haven where he could discuss policy with small, informal committees made up of his most trusted officials, and made expanded use of palace memorials (zouzhe), confidential reports submitted directly to the throne by a select group of officials. He adopted the use of palace memorials from the Kangxi Emperor, who had originally employed the secret communiqués to establish a private channel of communication with officials in the Imperial Household Department (neiwu fu). From there, the practice spread to other government organs in the capital and then to provincial officials. Whereas Kangxi had allowed only a few favored individuals to submit memorials, Yongzheng extended the privilege to a much larger number of men. This ensured a steady flow of information from all over the realm, and also enabled the emperor to cultivate close relationships with the memorialists by writing detailed responses in vermilion ink, known as vermilion rescripts (zhupi) on the original documents. As Smith explains, Ortai’s relationship with Yongzheng flourished in large part as a result of their correspondence through memorials and rescripts. See his “Ch’ing Policy and the Development of Southwest China.” For more detailed discussions on the inner court and palace memorial system, see Beatrice S. Bartlett, *Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch’ing China 1723–1830* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991). See also Mark C. Elliot, “The Manchu-language Archives of the Qing Dynasty and the Origins of the Palace Memorial System,” *Late Imperial China* 22:1 (June 2001): 48–55.

29 Edict of YZ 2/5/17, reprinted in *Qing Shilu Guizhou ziliao jiyao* (A collection of materials on Guizhou from the Qing Veritable Records) (Guiyang: Guizhou renmin chubanshe, 1962), 305. This collection hereafter cited as QSL-GZ. Also cited in Smith, “Ch’ing Policy and the Development of Southwest China,” 45.

30 The transition from a conservative policy to a more aggressive one is summarized in Smith, 44–46. Ortai was a prime example of Yongzheng’s “new men”—officials whose loyalty and talent compensated for a lack of family
connections and scholarly credentials. The Emperor preferred such officials to men of letters, whom he considered less likely to be his willing tools. “New men” owed their career success almost entirely to Yongzheng and thus became, in Smith’s words, “eager instruments of [the emperor’s] assault against the status quo in the empire.” See Smith, “Ch’ing Policy and the Development of Southwest China,” 14–16. For more on Yongzheng’s “new men,” see William T. Rowe, Saving the World: Chen Hongmou and Elite Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), esp. 45–85.

31 The Guizhou governor expressed concern that the unlawful native officials in Dingfan-Guangshun would have a bad influence on the more quiescent ones. See YZZPYZ 1: 580–81, Mao Wenquan memorial YZ 2/10/24. Provincial officials dealing with the unrest in Nanlong also complained that the native rulers failed to hand criminals over to Qing authorities. See, for example, Yongzheng chao Hanwen zhupi zouzhe huibian (Collection of Chinese-language palace memorials from the Yongzheng reign), compiled by the Zhongguo di yi lishi dang’an guan. (Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1989) 9: 8–10, YZ 5/2/2, Han Liangfu memorial. This collection hereafter cited as YZHZZ.

32 YZZPYZ 5: 2603, Ortai memorial, YZ 4/9/19.
34 Aibida, Qiannan shilue, 43.
35 Most of the tusi in this region were Zhongjia, but a few were Miao. See Aibida, Qiannan shilue, 43, for a comprehensive list of the fan.
36 Smith, “Ch’ing Policy and the Development of Southwest China,” 49.
37 Guangshun zhouzhi (Gazetteer of Guangshun department) 1846, 5: 14a and 17a–b, also cited in Smith, 54–55.
38 YZZPYZ 1: 574–75, Mao Wenquan memorial, YZ 2/5/14.
40 YZZPYZ 1: 580–581, Mao Wenquan, 2/10/24. See also Gongzhong Dang Yongzheng Chao (Secret palace memorials of the Yongzheng reign) (Taipei: National Palace Museum, 1978), 4: 372–73, YZ 2/10/25, Gao Qizhuo memorial. This collection hereafter cited as GZDYZ. (Note: YZZPYZ is organized by memorialist, while GZDYZ is organized by date. References in this chapter are written to reflect the internal organization of each collection.) Mao Wenquan tried to hide Qing failures from the emperor for as long as possible. The true course of events came to light in Gao Qizhuo’s memorials. See Smith, “Ch’ing Policy and the Development of Southwest China,” 60–66.
There was, however, one minor setback at the very beginning of the campaign. Before the Qing expeditionary force set out from Dingfan, five hundred Qing soldiers arrived in a village inhabited by members of the Qing Miao ethnic group, not Zhongjia. The inhabitants had already fled into a nearby grove, and the troops set up camp in the village. The troops burned down this and four other friendly Miao villages. The villagers, understandably enraged by the wanton destruction, surrounded and attacked the troops, wounding several. See YZZPYZ 1: 580–81, Mao Wenquan memorial, YZ 2/10/24, and GZDYZ 774, 3/1/26, Gao Qizhuo memorial.
By the late Ming period, the Cen clan controlled seven domains in central and northwestern Guangxi, making them the province’s second-largest lineage group of native officials. The Huang lineage was the largest, with eleven domains. See Leo K, Shin, *The Making of the Chinese State: Ethnicity and Expansion on the Ming Borderlands* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 75, 82–90.

Claims to Han Chinese descent probably gave the Cens some leverage over the non-Han peoples they governed (many of whom made their own claims to Chinese ancestry, as noted in chapter 2), and enhanced their legitimacy in the eyes of Ming officialdom. See Ebrey, “Surnames and Han Chinese Identity,” 23.


Shi Jizhong, “Qian Gui bianjiang,” 292–93. In recent years, scholars have questioned both the Cens’ ancestral links to Cen Zhongshu and their purported Zhejiang roots. Although some historians still contend that the Cens moved to Guangxi from Zhejiang during the Song period, others have suggested that the family originated in Guangxi and belonged to the indigenous Zhuang elite. Still others argue for a middle ground in which the Cen family was originally Han Chinese but lived among the indigenous populations of Guangxi for so long that they internalized local culture and effectively became Zhuang. See Barlow, “The Zhuang,” chapter 9, note 15. See also Huang Jiaxin, *Zhuangzu diqu tusi zhidu*, 228–31.


It is not clear if the Cens had any dealings with the Southern Ming leaders based in southwestern China during the 1650s.
72 The first Cen native official to receive this title from the Qing was Cen Jilu.
73 YZZPYZ 5: 2627, Ortai memorial, YZ 5/1/25.
74 In 1667, Nanlong was made subordinate to Guiyang prefecture, even farther away. Twenty years later, it was placed under the jurisdiction of Anshun. See Xingyi fuzhi, 46: 9a. See also Aibida, Qiannan shilue, 219 and 227.
75 Xingyi fuzhi 46: 9a; see also edict of KX 50/8/13, reprinted in QSL-GZ, 496–97 and Aibida, Qiannan shilue, 222.
76 The Guangxi chieftain’s name was Wang Shangyi. His adversary in Guizhou was A Jiu.
77 As noted earlier, the Huangcaoba garrison had only 1,500 troops, which may explain Cai’s reluctance to use military force against the warring chieftains. Although Cai does not say as much in his memorial, it is possible that his colleagues’ repeated humiliations in Dingfan-Guangshun two years earlier had taught him that Qing commanders could not afford to underestimate the Zhongjia.
78 Yongzheng chao Hanwen zhupi zouzhe huibian (Collection of Chinese-language palace memorials from the Yongzheng reign), ed. China Number One Historical Archives (Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1989) 7: 896–97, YZ 4/8/16, Cai Chenggui memorial. This collection hereafter cited as YZHZZ.
79 YZZPYZ 5: 2627, Ortai memorial, YZ 5/1/25.
80 YZHZZ 9: 8–10, YZ 5/2/2, Han Liangfu memorial.
81 Edict of YZ 5/2/29, reprinted in Qing shilu Guangxi ziliao huibian (A collection of materials on Guangxi from the Qing shilu) (Nanning: Guangxi renmin chubanshe, 1982), Vol. 1: 245.
84 As noted earlier, Zhejiang was supposed to be the Cen family’s ancestral home, but much evidence suggests that the clan originated in Guangxi.
86 YZHZZ 10: 81–84, Ortai memorial, YZ 5/6/27. See edict of YZ 5/8/20, reprinted in QSL-GZ, 258–59 and Xingyi fuzhi 46: 13a–15b. The former Guangxi territory of Luoke was originally placed under the jurisdiction of Yongfeng department, but in 1749, it was transferred to the jurisdiction of Dingfan department. Evidently, local officials determined that the transportation and communication routes between Luoke and Dingfan were better than those linking Luoke to Yongfeng.
87 Xingyi fuzhi, 9: 1a–10. See also Li Qingfu and Xu Xianlong, Buyizu jianshi, 76–77.
See, for example, Zhupi zouzhe, minzu shiwu lei (Palace memorials, minority affairs category), 2074–15, QL 8/6/10, Guizhou surveillance commissioner Song Hou. These documents hereafter cited as ZPZZ mzl.


This chapter only includes cases on the Zhongjia found in the minzu shiwu lei category of the Palace Memorials (zhupi zouzhe) housed at the First Historical Archives in Beijing. I have also examined twenty-five murder cases from the collection of Xingke tiben, tudizhaiwu lei (Board of Punishments Office of Scrutiny, Routine Memorials, homicide cases related to disputes over land and debt). Interestingly, most of these cases involved Han-on-Han violence rather than violence within non-Han communities, or between Han and non-Han residents. Based on this small sampling, it appears that inter-ethnic aggression was rare on a day-to-day basis. This is in keeping with William T. Rowe’s observation about violence in southwestern China. As he notes, “Aggrieved parties resorted to arms to defend highly complex and specific local interests, and not necessarily along strict ethnic lines.” See his China’s Last Empire: The Great Qing (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2009), 79.


See, for example, ZPZZ mzl 2074–15. Chipin wulai is a set phrase often found in Qing criminal investigations. Mark McNicholas calls this a “documentary signpost.” See Mark McNicholas, “Poverty Tales and Statutory Politics in Mid-Qing Fraud Cases,” in Writing and Law in Late Imperial China: Crime, Conflict, and Judgment, eds. Robert E. Hegel and Katherine Carlitz (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2007), 155–56.

Lombard-Salmon, Un Exemple d’acculturation Chinoise, 182–97. See also He Weifu, Qingdai Guizhou shangpin, 166–71 and 174–77.

Lombard-Salmon, Un Exemple d’acculturation Chinoise, 199–203.

Ibid, 202. See also He Weifu, Qingdai Guizhou shangpin, 178–83 and 238–45.

Lombard-Salmon, Un Exemple d’acculturation Chinoise, 205–6. See also He Weifu, Qingdai Guizhou shangpin, 224–33.


ZPZZ mzl 1853: 1–7 and 1854: 1–2.

ZPZZ mzl 1963: 1–6.

The Qing sources cited throughout this chapter do not allow the participants in the criminal cases much room to speak. Qing officials either spoke for the
accused and the witnesses, or else the court reports heavily edited and filtered the voices of the participants. In order to understand the perceptions and motivations of the participants in each criminal case, the discussion compares the official record of each case, wherever possible, with sources relating to the indigenous Zhongjia religion known as Mo.

As we shall see, the ringleaders of the Ran Jing case of 1766 were captured in Sichuan, but perpetrated most of their criminal activities in Guizhou.

ZPZZ mzl 2074–1, QL 8/3/21, Guizhou governor Zhang Guangsi. Huang San hailed from a hamlet near Xilong, subordinate to Sicheng prefecture.

Ibid. The other men were named Wang Ali, Bu Xiujia, Wei Asan, Luo Long, and Luo Awei.

Even if they encountered someone who could not speak Nong or Zhongjia, they could always fall back on the local variant of Chinese.

ZPZZ mzl 2074–1. Duangong is a Daoist-influenced form of magic practiced by several ethnic groups in southwestern China, notably the Qiang of western Sichuan. See Wang Mingke, Qiangzai Han Zangzhijian (The Qiang: between Han and Tibetans) (Liaojing chubanshe, 2003), 253.

ZPZZ mzl 2074–1, QL 8/3/2, Guizhou governor Zhang Guangsi. See also ZPZZ mzl 2074–2, QL 8/3/26, Anlong regional commander Song Ai; and ZPZZ mzl 2074–15, QL 8/6/10, Guizhou surveillance commissioner (anchashi) Song Hou.

ZPZZ mzl 2074–1. As noted in chapter 3, even after gaitu guiliu in this region, many rural areas remained under the control of indigenous elites like Wang Li.

It is not clear when the Zhuang and Buyi began using modified Chinese characters to write their religious texts. Scholars in Guangxi cite a seventh-century stone inscription as evidence that it could have been as early as the Tang dynasty. Some Guizhou scholars, however, insist that the Zhongjia did not begin using Chinese characters until after the gaitu guiliu reforms of the Yongzheng reign, for it was only then that the Confucian education system took root in southwestern Guizhou. This Sinocentric argument runs counter to historical evidence. Confucian schools were established in Guizhou well before the Yongzheng-era reforms. Moreover, these schools were not the only vehicle for teaching Chinese literacy, for the Zhongjia had been interacting with Han Chinese settlers and imperial officials for centuries before the Qing period. See Holm, Killing a Buffalo, 46–51. The Mo texts bear striking parallels to the Vietnamese chữ-nôm script, which also used Chinese characters to represent the local language. Whereas Mo script was used exclusively for religious purposes, chữ-nôm was used to record vernacular literature. During
French colonial rule, \textit{chữ-nôm} was replaced by \textit{Quoc-ngu}, the Romanized script still used in Vietnam today.

22 As Holm explains, Mo authors sometimes used standard characters for phonetic and semantic readings; sometimes they created entirely new characters to represent words in their native tongue. The texts were incomprehensible to outsiders—and deliberately so. See Holm, \textit{Killing a Buffalo}, 47–49.

23 ZPZZ mzl 2074–1.

24 ZPZZ mzl 2074–1 and ZPZZ mzl 2074–15. Wang Ali and Bu Xiujia were the two men who died resisting arrest. The Yongfeng department magistrate’s name was Wang Yunhao, and the Nanlong prefectural magistrate was Yang Hui.

25 See chapter 2.

26 The sale of these positions provided the Qing government with an important source of revenue and also created a class of bureaucrats who helped link local communities to state entities. See Charles O. Hucker, \textit{A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China} (Reprint; Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc, 1995), 150, 303. See also Chung-li Chang, \textit{The Chinese Gentry: Studies on their Role in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Society} (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1955), 5, 7–8, 29–30; and Rowe, \textit{China’s Last Empire}, 50–54, 114.


29 ZPZZ mzl 2074–1 and ZPZZ mzl 2074–15. Wang Zuxian claimed that the mine was in Bengjia, a hamlet under the jurisdiction of Nanlong prefecture.

30 In the Buyi dialects of southwestern Guizhou, the term \textit{bumo} (spelled \textit{boumo} in some English publications) is written 布摩, while in the Zhuang dialects of northwestern Guangxi, it is written 布魔. In Qing sources, \textit{bumo} is written \textit{baomu} (報暮/抱暮) or sometimes \textit{baomo} (抱莫). See Holm, \textit{Killing a Buffalo}, 21–23.

31 ZPZZ mzl 2074–1. Unfortunately, the sources do not describe the magical acts or rituals that Baomu Bai performed, but the repertoire of \textit{duangong} specialists typically included spells, chants, and dances to ward off evil and cure disease, and sometimes exorcisms.


33 For more on Maoshan Daoism, see Isabelle Robinet, “\textit{Shangqing},” in The
34 Functional specification between the *bumo* and Daoist priests seems to vary across time and space. The distinction is clear in the old Buyi/Zhuang text, “Recitation on the Search for Water.” When confronted with an epidemic, an ancient Zhuang king was advised to consult both *bumo* and Daoist priests: “In the middle of the night recite your prayer/Have a Taoist come and conduct [the proceedings]/Invite a boumo to come and plead your case.” The *bumo*, it seems, was entrusted with communications with the spiritual realm, while the Daoist priest was asked to carry out certain rituals. See Holm, *Recalling Lost Souls*, 106–8. In some communities, however, the same person might serve as either a *bumo* or a Daoist priest, as the occasion warranted. See Holm, *Killing a Buffalo*, 172. When I asked Buyi scholar Yu Luo about the distinction in Buyi communities today, she said that the *bumo* appear to be most actively involved in life cycle rituals such as births, funerals, and ancestral worship. She added that many Buyi villagers are quick to say that the *bumo* is “not the same person” as the Daoist priest, but they cannot explain the different roles of these religious practitioners. E-mail correspondence, June 16, 2012 and July 2, 2012.

35 Cupellation is the process of applying extreme heat to ores or alloyed metals to separate noble metals like gold and silver from base metals like lead copper and zinc.

36 Huang San’s testimony, at least as it is recorded in the Palace Memorials, evinces his unwavering faith in the existence of the “spirit silver.” However, we should take this with a grain of salt. Qing officials, stymied as they were by this case, had a vested interest in portraying Huang San and other participants as foolish rustics, mired in superstition and ignorance.

37 Wang Bujiang told officials that the hamlet was called Dongmajia, but this later proved to be a memory lapse or an outright lie. Subsequent testimony from other witnesses indicated that the hamlet’s real name was Mumajia.
Huang Zuxian’s real name was Huang Yilao, sometimes written Huang A Lao. In the Zhongjia dialects of eastern Yunnan, the diminutive “Yi” was sometimes used instead of the more commonplace “A.” See ZPZZ mzl 2074–1 and ZPZZ mzl 2074–7.

38 ZPZZ mzl 2074–1.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid. See also ZPZZ mzl 2074–7.
41 ZPZZ mzl 2074–7.
42 Ibid.
43 ZPZZ mzl 2074–1 and ZPZZ mzl 2074–7.
44 ZPZZ mzl 2074–1.
45 ZPZZ mzl 2074–1 and ZPZZ mzl 2074–15.
46 Ibid.

47 These two men, Huang San and Wang Zuxian, were accessories to a crime that officials had resolved to their satisfaction during the Yongzheng reign. See ZPZZ mzl 2075–1.
48 According to Brent Huffman, curator of www.ultimateungulate.com, “Guizhou province is just outside of the current range of the bharal, so the species—if present—would likely be quite rare.” E-mail correspondence, March 7, 2012.
49 The wanderer was named Wang A’er, and his landlord was Wang Wenjia. See ZPZZ mzl 2074–5, QL 8/4/26, Guangxi governor Yang Xifu; and ZPZZ mzl 2074–6, QL 8/4/30, Guizhou governor Zhang Guangsi and Guizhou provincial military commissioner Han Dong. See also ZPZZ mzl 2074–15.
50 ZPZZ mzl 2075–3, QL 8/4/27, Zuojiang regional military commander Bi Ying.
51 ZPZZ mzl 2074–15.
52 ZPZZ mzl 2075–4, QL 8/8/6, Yunnan governor Zhang Yunsui.
53 The next six paragraphs are based on Zhupi zouzhe, minzu shiwu lei (Palace memorials, minority affairs category), 1853–1, QL 31/3/28, Fang Shijun.
54 Zhe Ruo, Li Bao, Luo Puti, and A Liu.
55 Zhu Bao and A Liu.
56 Dong Zhengyuan was probably not exaggerating his poverty. Daoists were marginalized in Qing China, for the Qing rulers practiced Tibetan Buddhism and promoted neo-Confucianism as the state doctrine. The government also tended to regard Daoism as a source of potential heterodoxy and social unrest, since its clergy tended to live in isolated monasteries, lacked a strong religious structure, and had inadequate financial support. The economic and social constraints must have been particularly acute for Daoists

57 Again, Zhu Bao and A Liu.

58 Zhe Ruo, Li Bao, and Luo Puti.

59 The next four paragraphs are based on ZPZZ mzl 1853–2, QL 31/4/1, Aertai. Aertai should not be confused with the similarly named Ortai, who had served as Yunnan-Guizhou Governor-General forty years earlier.

60 *Qianlong chao shangyu dang* (Imperial edicts of the Qianlong reign), Compiled by the Number One Historical Archives, (Beijing: Dang’an chubanshe, 1991), 4: 870, item 2452, Court letter (*ziji*) to Fang Shijun, QL 31/4/21.

61 Ran Lang was also interrogated, but Ran Jing’s confession provides the fullest account. Ran Hua had died of an illness en route. See ZPZZ mzl 1854–2, QL 31/5/12, Fang Shijun.

62 Ibid.

63 *Da Qingluli* (Great Qing code) (1740) (Reprint, Tianjin: Tianjin guji chubanshe, 1991), 22: 10–11. These crimes were regarded as much more serious than those committed in the homicide cases discussed earlier because they posed a potential threat to the dynasty. Plotting rebellion counted among the Ten Abominations (*Shi E*)—the most abhorrent offenses against persons or the state—enumerated in the preamble to the Qing Code. Plotting rebellion was one of the three capital crimes listed among the Ten Abominations, the other two being disloyalty (*moupan*) and treason (*mou dani*). Sorcery involving prophecies was also a capital offense, punishable by immediate decapitation; and the same penalty applied to treason. See Philip A. Kuhn, *Soulstealers: The Chinese Sorcery Scare of 1768* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991), 87–88.

64 ZPZZ mzl 1854–2.


66 ZPZZ mzl 1963–1, QL 31/4/7, Fang Shijun. Wei Xuewen’s friends were A Shou and Chen Ziyu.

67 Once again, “Miao” serves in these records as a generic term for the non-Chinese. Most likely, it refers to the Zhongjia and perhaps other smaller groups living in the Guiding region.


69 Wei Xuewen’s friend, Chen Ziyu, organized these activities.
70 ZPZZ mzl 1963–3.
71 ZPZZ mzl 1963–2.
73 Edict of QL 31/5/13, reprinted in QSL-GZ, 1168–69.
74 ZPZZ mzl 1963–6, QL 31/6/6, Fang Shijun.
75 Da Qing luli, 23:254. As noted earlier, treason counted among the Ten Abominations.
76 The other conspirators included Yang Guochen, Chen Ziyu, A Shou, and three others.
77 ZPZZ mzl 1963–5, QL 31/6/6, Fang Shijun.
78 Today, it appears that some Hmong villagers in Vietnam have adopted a similar stance on state-mandated education. As Michaud writes, “I suspect many Hmong are not unhappy to limit . . . cultural dilution among their youth. They stick to what really matters: passing on ancestral knowledge through customary education, and limiting formal schooling to what is needed to learn some accountancy and become proficient enough in the national language to ensure good dealings.” See “Hmong infrapolitics,” 13.

5 / THE NANLONG UPRISING OF 1797

1 See, for example, Gongzhong Dang Jiaqing chao zouzhe (Secret palace memorials of the Jiaqing reign), compiled by and held at the National Palace Museum, Taipei, 3:2, 648, JQ 2/1/27, Feng Guangxiong memorial. This collection hereafter cited as GZDJQ.
2 Wei Qiluoxu’s real name was Wei Chaoyuan. His nickname, “Seven-whisker Wei” was a reference to his wispy beard. Wang Niangxian’s real name was Wang Acong. She is sometimes called “Immortal Maiden Wang” (Wang Xiangu). For consistency’s sake, I will refer to them as Wei Qiluoxu and Wang Niangxian.
3 The Zhongjia had few guns during the early weeks of the rebellion; their arsenal consisted mainly of hunting knives. They acquired firearms later, after raiding Guizhou’s towns and cities. This point will be considered later in the chapter. On the use of magic to neutralize an enemy’s technological advantages, see Michael Adas, Prophets of Rebellion: Millenarian Protest Movements against the European Colonial Order (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1979), 151.
4 Qingdai Jiaqing nianjian Guizhou Buyi zu “Nanlong qiyi” ziliao xuanbian (Collected materials on the “Nanlong Uprising” of the Buyi people during the Jiaqing reign), comp. by China Number One Historical Archives, the
Southwest Guizhou People’s Committee, and the Guizhou Buyi Studies Committee (Guiyang: Guizhou minzu chubanshe, 1989), 52–55. This collection hereafter cited as NQX.

5 The following collections of archival materials were used in this chapter: (1.) Secret palace memorials of the Jiaqing Reign (GZDJQ); (2.) Jiaobu Dang (Record of pursuit and arrest), hereafter cited as JBD; and (3.) Palace Memorial reference copies in the minority affairs category (Junji chu lufu zouzhe minzu shiwu lei) from the Number One Historical Archives in Beijing, reprinted in NQX. A comparison of the published NQX collection against the microfilmed versions at the archives revealed no discrepancies. The NQX references each lufu it reprints. In this chapter, the lufu citations will be provided in parentheses after each NQX entry; Junji chu lufu zouzhe minzu shiwu lei (Grand Council reference copies of palace memorials, minority affairs category) will hereafter be cited as JCLZ mzl.

6 These two Zhongjia narratives, “Wang Xiangu” and “Nanlong fanbing ge,” are also included in NQX. Citations for these narratives will follow this format: NQX, page number, “Wang Xiangu” (or “Nanlong fanbing ge”).

7 In Buyi oral tradition, narrative poems are epic tales that developed from folk songs. For descriptions of various forms of Buyi folk literature, see Zhou Guoyan et al., eds., Languages and Cultures of the Kam-Tai (Zhuang-Dong) Group: A Word List, 24–32; and Huang Yiren, Buyizu shi, 187–88.

8 This indigenous account is a narrative poem in eighteen stanzas, recorded by Buyi ethnographers when they collected “Wang Xiangu.” Sung verses alternate with spoken-word explanations, a typical pattern for this genre. See Zhou, Languages and Cultures of the Kam-Tai, 24–32.

9 For reasons that will be explored in the next section, PRC historians have mostly ignored the Buyi narratives.

10 James Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 87.

As Stevan Harrell writes, “As representatives of their own minzu, and at the same time participants in this hegemonic state project, [scholars] participate in the two-way process of co-optation; their story gets told, and it is a glorious one, but it is told as a part of the larger story of the Chinese nation as a whole.” Harrell also remarks that in recent years, the strictures on minzu scholarship have loosened somewhat. Although ethnography, ethnology, and linguistics are still devoted to the state projects of nation-building and development, these disciplines are no longer held to such a rigid, normalizing paradigm. See Harrell, *Ways of Being Ethnic in Southwest China* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), 45, 55.

The preface to NQX states that Han ren signifies Han landlords. See NQX, 4. The authors of *Guizhou tongshi* (A comprehensive history of Guizhou), however, allow the original phrase tian jiang mie Han ren to stand without qualification, leaving open the possibility that the rebels attacked Han residents without regard to their class background. It is worth noting that *Guizhou tongshi* is a more recent book (published 2002), and its authors are not Buyi. See He Renzhong, ed., *Guizhou tongshi. Di san juan, Qingdai de Guizhou* (A comprehensive history of Guizhou, part 3, Qing dynasty Guizhou). (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo chubanshe, 2002), 300.

The rebels typically attacked villages inhabited by ordinary Han peasants. Several rebel confessions indicate that the Zhongjia were enticed to join the insurrection with promises that they could get rich by plundering Han villages. For many years, after Mao Zedong himself decreed that class struggle was the motive force of history, Chinese scholars had to treat “ethnic contradictions” as a sub-type of class contradictions. One scholar of the Nanlong Uprising allows that the rebellion arose from ethnic contradictions (minzu maodun) as well as class contradictions, but “ethnic contradictions” are never clearly defined. See, for example, Wu Changxing, “Qianxi Nanlong Buyizu qiyi baofa yuanyn” (A brief analysis of the reasons for the outbreak of the Nanlong Buyi Uprising), *Buyi xue yanjiu* 3 (1991): 71–78. See also Yan Yong and Fan Lixia, “Lun Nanlong qiyi sheshui beijing, jingyan jiaoxun ji lishi yiyi” (Discussing the social background, experience, lessons, and historical significance of the “Nanlong Uprising”), *Buyi xue yanjiu* 3 (1991): 229–39.

Not even the Buyi scholars who collected and edited the indigenous narratives have much to say. They note that many events described in the narratives diverge from “historical facts” (that is, the events presented in the archival record and local gazetteers) but these scholars neglect to explain where and why these divergences occur.


Huang, *Buyizu shi*, 188.

Jin may be on shaky historical ground here. The editors of NQX probably added these references to multi-ethnic participation to serve the same political aims expressed in Jin’s article. There is no evidence to suggest that the Nanlong Uprising was a pan-ethnic rebellion. The Qing documents and the two indigenous narratives all indicate that the overwhelming majority of rebels were Zhongjia. As we shall see later in this chapter, the rebel leaders did enlist the help of a local Han outlaw, but he was one of just a few documented participants from outside the Zhongjia ethnic group.


Perhaps these scholars were also reluctant to delve too deeply into the folk traditions of their own ethnic group, lest they betray support (real or perceived) for indigenous beliefs deemed inimical to socialism.


As David Atwill suggests in his work on nineteenth-century Yunnan, local resistance viewed over a long period of time reveals a sustained, logical response to external pressures. In the case of Yunnan, these pressures were “state and new-Han power groups that threatened Yunnanese cultural solidarity and economic livelihood.” See Atwill, “Trading Places: Resistance, Ethnicity, and Governance in Nineteenth-Century Yunnan,” in *Dragons, Tigers, and Dogs: Qing Crisis Management and the Boundaries of State Power in Late Imperial China*, Robert J. Antony and Jane Kate Leonard, eds. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 242.

Communities within Nanlong were divided into hamlets (*xiang*), each named after the four cardinal directions. These districts were further subdivided into hamlets. Dongsa was part of the “Northern District,” or Beixiang. The headmen in charge of these districts were directly responsible to imperially appointed local officials.
Mo priestesses were renowned for their ability to predict the future and dispel evil spirits. According to one scholar, they did not always require the special training required of their male counterparts. Some of the priestesses acquired their powers after long illnesses. Also, they usually did not learn the scriptures used by the bumō. See Zhou Guomao, ed. Yizhong teshu de wenhua dianji: Buyizu Mojing yanjiu (A unique type of ancient texts: research on the Mojing religious literature of the Buyi ethnic group) (Guiyang: Guizhou renmin chubanshe, 2006), 3.

Some sources refer to “crossing the darkness” as zouyin. The terminology suggests Daoist influences in Zhongjia popular religion, as does the use of terms such as “immortal.” See Li Rubiao, “‘Nanlong qiyi de zongjiao wenti’ (The question of religion in the ‘Nanlong Uprising’), Buyi xue yanjiu 3 (1991): 142. See also Wang Fangheng, “Nanlong qiyi zhong de wushu wenti” (The question of sorcery in the Nanlong Uprising), Buyi xue yanjiu 3 (1991): 147. The Northern Zhuang of Guangxi employ similar rituals called “crossing the passes” (guoguan) to cure children’s illnesses. See Holm, Recalling Lost Souls, 14.

Based on David Holm’s description, it seems that Wei Qiluoxu was a “ritual master” or shigong (師公), a broad descriptor for shamans, sorcerers, and exorcists who used a repertoire of magical and theatrical practices to drive away evil spirits. See Killing a Buffalo, 22–23.

Here, the Zhongjia are referred to as “Miao,” a generic term Qing officials often used for non-Han residents of southwestern China, without regard to their actual ethnicity.

Wei Qiluoxu was a social bandit in the most basic sense of the term; his aim was to steal from the relatively wealthy and redistribute among the very poor. For a discussion of social banditry in early twentieth-century Hunan, see Elizabeth Perry’s essay, “Predatory Rebellion: Bai Lang and Social Banditry,” in her Challenging the Mandate of Heaven: Social Protest and State Power in China (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), 108–33.
35 NQX, 143, Document #129 (JCLZ mzl, JQ 2/8/24, Confession of Wei Qiluoxu). See also Xingyi fuzhi, 46: 17b. I have translated “Yunnan cheng” as Kunming, the Yunnan provincial capital.

36 Wei Qiluoxu and Wang Niangxian never actually married; Wang Niangxian was already betrothed to a man in her village. According to Zhongjia custom, she and her husband lived separately for the first three years of their marriage. In any case, Wei Qiluoxu’s allegiance was instrumental to his larger ambitions. As Elizabeth Perry notes, the scope of a bandit leader’s control depended upon the kinds of outside coalitions he was able to forge. Such coalitions furnished protection for plundering purposes, and also served as “as stepping stones to a wider world of power and fame.” See Perry’s chapter, “Predators and Protectors: Strategies of Peasant Survival,” in her Challenging the Mandate of Heaven, 21.

37 GZDJQ, 3:2, JQ 2/1/27, Feng Guangxiong memorial.

38 One account suggests that Zeng Tingkui committed suicide by stabbing himself in the abdomen. See Xingyi fuzhi 46: 19a–20a. According to Feng Guangxiong, however, Zeng fell ill during the Lunar New Year and was bedridden when the rebels attacked. When Zeng learned that Nanlong was under siege, he immediately ordered local military personnel to protect the city. Several days later, just before Zeng died, he again ordered civil officials, local gentry, and local militia to protect the city. Feng was quick to assure the court that Zeng had not been negligent or careless in any way. One wonders, however, if Feng was trying to cover for his subordinate’s failure to take firmer action against Wang Niangxian’s followers—or his own (Feng’s) failure to report early activities to Beijing. See GZDJQ 3:2, 714b–717a, JQ 2/2/6, Feng Guangxiong memorial.

39 In this regard, the Nanlong Uprising might be considered a consequence of what William Rowe calls “governance on the cheap.” At its peak, the Qing standing army, including both banner troops and the Chinese Green Standard Army, employed fewer than a million men to defend China’s territory, and to protect and pacify a population of four to five hundred million. See Rowe, China’s Last Empire, 32. The small size of the armed forces army kept military expenditures to a minimum, but it also created the potential for simultaneous rebellions in different parts of the empire.

40 More than thirty-one thousand troops from Yunnan and Guizhou had been transferred to the Hunan front, leaving only a few thousand to deal with the Zhongjia. See NQX, 59. For an analysis of the Hunan Miao Uprising, see Donald Sutton, “Ethnic Revolt in the Qing Empire: The ‘Miao Uprising’ of 1795–1796 Reexamined,” Asia Major 3rd series, vol. 17, 1 (2003): 105–51. See

Le Bao’s tenure in Yunnan and Guizhou was peripatetic, to say the least. Soon after his appointment to the governor-generalship in 1795, he was ordered to coordinate the Miao suppression on the Hunan-Guizhou border. He briefly returned to Yunnan in 1796, only to be ordered back to the Miao front when Hubei-Hunan governor-general Fukang’an died. After Le Bao secured a major victory in Hubei, the court ordered him to fight the Zhongjia in southwestern Guizhou. Shortly after the Zhongjia campaign ended in November 1797, Le Bao was appointed governor-general of Hubei and Hunan and continued to lead armies against the White Lotus rebels. See Arthur W. Hummel, ed., *Eminent Chinese of the Ch’ing Period* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1943), I: 444.

As Donald Sutton rightly observes, “… acculturation does not mean assimilation, that is, a change of identification. See his “Ethnicity and the Miao Frontier,” 220. David Atwill has also suggested that comments like “yu qimin wuyi” represented “the highest possible compliment” from Chinese intellectuals or Qing officials. See his *The Chinese Sultanate*, 32

Sang’s motivations for joining the rebellion are not entirely clear. When Qing armies recaptured Nanlong in August 1797, he was too injured to make a confession. In any case, Le Bao labeled him a “treacherous Han” (Han jian) for aiding and abetting Wei Qiluoxu. GZDJQ 5:1, 269–72, JQ 2/8/23, Feng Guangxiong memorial.

During the Qing Dynasty, Anshun served as Guizhou’s military nerve center; the provincial military commander was normally stationed there.

For the death of Cui Lin, see *Anshun fuzhi* (Gazetteer of Anshun prefecture) 1851, 44: 18a.

JBD JQ 2/2/27.

For Document #63 (JCLZ mzl, JQ 2/3/2, Jiang Lan memorial).

JBD, JQ 2/1/18. Feng Guangxiong memorial.

JBD, JQ 2/1/26.

GZDJQ 3:2, 648, JQ 2/1/27, Feng Guangxiong memorial.

GZDJQ 3:2, 610, JQ 2/1/18, Feng Guangxiong memorial.
The rebels had probably seized these guns from a Han village. Their weaponry varied from battle to battle, depending on what they had been able to steal in recent raids.


GZDJQ 3:2, 838, JQ 2/2/23, Feng Guangxiong and Zhulonga memorial.

JBD, JQ 2/3/5.

NQX, 61–62, Document #70. Feng was especially concerned about Weiyuan (a key point on the eastward road to Hunan), and about Guzhou in southeastern Guizhou, which had been the locus of a major Miao uprising during the 1730s.

Ibid.


NQX, 80–82, Document #78 (JCLZ mzl, JQ 2/4/18, Le Bao memorial).

NQX, 86–88, Document #81 (JCLZ mzl, JQ 2/5/1, Le Bao memorial).

The Mabie is a small tributary of the Hongshui River.

NQX, 99–100, Document #89 (JCLZ mzl, JQ 2/5/11, Le Bao memorial). As discussed below, a highly exaggerated account of the rebels’ victory at Mabie appears in the indigenous narrative “Wang Xiangu.”


The rebel commander at Yangchang was Wang Azhan.

NQX, 106–108, Document #94 (JCLZ mzl, JQ 2/5/23, Le Bao memorial). As noted earlier, Da Wang Gong was Wei Qifuoxu’s second-in-command.


NQX, 119–121, Document #102 (JCLZ mzl, JQ 2/7/9, Le Bao memorial).

NQX, 141–144, Document #112 (JCLZ mzl, JQ 2/9/2, Le Bao memorial).

For Xingyi, see JBD, JQ 2/8/20. For Zhenfeng, see JBD, JQ 2/10/20.

JBD, JQ 2/10/6.

In Buyi oral tradition, narrative poems are epic tales that developed from folk songs. For descriptions of various forms of Buyi folk literature, see Zhou Guoyan, “An Introduction to the Kam-Tai (Zhuang-Dong) Group of Languages in China,” 29.


Ibid., 257–58.

Ibid., 258–59. Here, the hands of PRC scholars may be at work. A discussion of social banditry, which reflects a lack of class consciousness, is omitted in favor of magic, thereby demonstrating that the Zhongjia needed the guiding hand of the Communists to lead them to scientific modernity.
81 Ibid., 260. Here, Wang Niangxian speaks out against a longstanding grievance in Guizhou. The provincial treasury provided money for the requisition (caimai) of grain, firewood, and other raw materials from Zhongjia and Miao producers, but the local officials responsible for procuring these goods rarely paid for them. See Jenks, *Insurgency and Social Disorder in Guizhou*, 52.

82 Ibid., 260–61. Here, Wang Niangxian speaks out against a longstanding grievance in Guizhou. The provincial treasury provided money for the requisition (caimai) of grain, firewood, and other raw materials from Zhongjia and Miao producers, but the local officials responsible for procuring these goods rarely paid for them. See Jenks, *Insurgency and Social Disorder in Guizhou*, 52.


84 Ibid., 264.

85 The term kejia here should not be confused with the Kejia (“Guest people” or Hakka) of southeastern China. The Zhongjia often referred to Han Chinese as “kejia” or guests. Indeed, migrants throughout China were often called “kejia.” See NQX, 265, “Wang Xiangu.”

86 NQX, 266, “Wang Xiangu.”

87 Ibid., 267–68.

88 Ibid., 268.

89 Ibid., 269.

90 Ibid., 270.

91 Ibid., 270.

92 Ibid., 270–71.

93 Faith in this type of magic was common in other rebel movements. During the Saya San Rebellion of 1930–32, for example, Burman monks told recruits that they knew magical formulas that would turn twigs into war horses. See Adas, *Prophets of Rebellion*, 153.

94 NQX, 272, “Wang Xiangu.”

95 Ibid., 272.

96 Ibid., 273.

97 Ibid., 273–74.

98 “Song of the Nanlong Resistance” appears to be an antiphonal song, or a song in which two performers (or groups of performers) sing alternately, one answering the other. Antiphonal singing is common among many Tai groups of southwestern China and Southeast Asia, often featured in festivals and courtship rituals. See Holm, *Recalling Lost Souls*, 14.

99 NQX, 294, “Nanlong fanbing ge.”

100 The rhyme and symmetry of these Chinese verses suggests the hand of a post-1949 editor. NQX, 293, “Nanlong fanbing ge.”

101 Ibid., 293–95.

102 Ibid., 296.

103 This general is identified in the narrative as Jia Jiangjun. The compilers of
NQX suggest that this was a local nickname for either Chang Shan or Zhulonga.

104 NQX, 296–97.

105 Ibid., 299, “Nanlong fanbing ge.”

106 Before this point, the poem includes an episode describing the imperial rewards bestowed upon Le Bao and Jia Jiangjun, as well as the posthumous awards for the Qing officials killed in battle. This scene serves as an indirect way of boasting about the prowess of the Zhongjia rebels. That is, the Zhongjia rebels were worthy foes who exacted a heavy toll on the Qing troops.

107 NQX, 300, “Nanlong fanbing ge.”

108 Ibid., 303.

109 Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 81.


112 ZPZZ mzl 1916–1, JQ 5/6/27, Jueluo Langgan (覺羅琅玕).

6 / A LEGACY OF FRAGILE HEGEMONY


4 Millward, Beyond the Pass, 199. Evelyn S. Rawski has also demonstrated that Qing court culture incorporated many traditions from the Manchus, Mongols, Uighurs, and Tibetans. See her The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

5 One product of the demand for information on Guizhou was Aibida’s Handbook of Guizhou (Qiannan shilue). Aibida compiled this book for his own reference and for the benefit of future administrators while serving as Guizhou’s governor in the early 1750s. He condensed information from local gazetteers and other contemporary geographic writings into a single, handy volume, organizing his material according to geographic region. Each of the thirty-two chapters is devoted to the political history, economy, climate, and
population of a single administrative unit. Aside from its practical function, the handbook carried considerable symbolic value. To refer to the concepts introduced in chapter 3, the volume functioned as a catalogue of the state spaces the Qing had delineated within Guizhou. The very act of committing geographic information to paper signaled that these sections of Guizhou had become part of the world known to—and under the jurisdiction of—the Qing state. In 1847, Guizhou Governor Luo Raodian revised the book and published it as *Qiannan zhifang shilue*. Interestingly, the handbook saw little use during the eighteenth century. The original copy was misplaced sometime after Aibida’s tenure and only rediscovered in the 1820s.

Information in local gazetteers was organized topically, with each chapter subdivided according to geographic region. A chapter on local products, for example, would list all the crops grown in each geographic region. Likewise, a chapter on administrative history would list the information region by region. The disadvantage of this system was that one had to consult several chapters to find all the necessary information about a given place. Aibida simplified matters by organizing all the information on a given region into single chapters.

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12 As Laura Hostetler writes, “In essence, those who do the depicting define the peoples described. . . . [The] goal of the colonizer, or imperial authority, is precisely and unabashedly to learn about, or rather construct, the identity of those to be ruled. Such knowledge simplifies the task of governance.” See Hostetler, “Qing Connections to the Early Modern World,” 649–50.


15 In other words, they had no “emancipatory visions,” as Jean Michaud might call them. See Michaud, “Hmong infrapolitics,” 1866.

16 This is in keeping with James Scott’s comments on the hidden transcript: “By definition, the hidden transcript represents discourse—gesture, speech, practices—that is ordinarily excluded from the public transcript of subordi-
nates by the exercise of power. The practice of domination, then, creates the hidden transcript. If the domination is particularly severe, it is likely to produce a hidden transcript of corresponding richness. The hidden transcript of subordinate groups, in turn, reacts back on the public transcript by engendering a subculture and by opposing its own variant form of social domination against that of the dominant elite. Both are realms of power and interests.” See Domination and the Arts of Resistance, 27.

17 As James Scott explains, “To continue the same routine means to go under in any case and it once again makes sense to take risks; such risks are in the interest of subsistence.” See James C. Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in Southeast Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976, 26.


19 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 3, 343.

20 Or, as Scott puts it, “The progenitors of such plans [for simplification] regarded themselves as far smarter and [more] farseeing than they really were, and at the same time, regarded their subjects as far more stupid and incompetent than they really were.” Seeing Like a State, 343.


23 Here, I understand a civilizing project in terms of Stevan Harrell’s definition—an inherently unequal interaction in which one group, the civilizing center, claims a superior degree of civilization and undertakes to elevate the civiliza-


25 Scott, Seeing Like a State, 184.


27 Millward, Beyond the Pass, 199–201; Teng, Taiwan’s Imagined Geography, 239–40.

28 The distinction here is between nation and ethnic group. It carries very impor-
tant implications for politics in China today because Tibet and Xinjiang will likely never be pacified unless the CCP recognizes that the PRC is multinational and not just multicultural.

29 According to Pamela Kyle Crossley, the Manchus, Mongols, Han, Tibetans, and East Turkestanis earned their status by virtue of their contributions to the creation and development of the Qing state. See her “Manzhou yuanliu kao and the Formalization of the Manchu Heritage,” Journal of Asian Studies vol. 46, no. 4 (November 1987): 780. See also Teng, Taiwan’s Imagined Geography, 242.

30 Teng, Taiwan’s Imagined Geography, 242–43.

31 Ibid., 245, figure 34.

32 Ibid., 246.


38 Caohai’s winter wetland is a gathering ground for several species of endangered migratory birds, including the black crane.


40 Scott, The Moral Economy of the Peasant, 32–34.

41 As noted earlier, this is one of the central concerns in Yu Luo’s PhD research at Yale University.


