1. In this and following instances, the title Liangshan Prefecture refers to Liangshan Yi Autonomous Prefecture.

2. Most of these Tibetans are not Tibetans in the sense in which we use the term, but rather members of Qiang-speaking groups such as Ersu, Duoxu, Nameze, and Prmi.


4. For more on the economic situation in Liangshan, see Heberer 2001b.


7. See also Peter Chen and Evers 1978; Hsiao 1993; Robison and Goodman 1996; Jones 1998; Rüland 1998; in a critical vein, see Bell, Brown, Jayasuriya, and Jones 1995.

8. Some of the most important work on the private sector includes Zhang Xuwu, Li, and Xie 1994, 1996; Zhongguo siyou qiyezhu jieceng yanjiu ketizu 1994; Zhang Fuchi and Guo 1997; He Zhenguow 1997; Wu Guangbin 1998; Zhongguo qiyejia diaocha xitong 1998a, 1998b; Zhang Houyi and Ming 2000; Li Ding and Bao 2000; Zhang Houyi, Ming, and He 2002; Zhang Houyi, Ming, and Liang 2002; Zou Tieli 2003. In recent years there has been an emphasis on the crucial role of the private sector in developing minority areas, see, for example, Xiao Zhuoji 2000; Wei Xianjin 2001.


10. Managers of state and collective enterprises, i.e., those in the sphere of “intrapreneurship” (innovative managers), are not included in my use of the term.
Carsrud, Olm, and Eddy 1986: 367–68 make a similar argument about not collapsing the two spheres.


14. For instance, both Uighurs and Hui have long valued entrepreneurship whereas Mongols have traditionally disdained trade as parasitic.

15. See Gongshang xingzheng guanli tongji huibian 2001: 47.


18. The term “cadre” (Ch: ganbu) has two meanings. In one sense, it comprises all Party officials, civil servants in administrative institutions and public organizations, as well as members of the army. In the second sense, “cadre” stands for persons in leadership positions. One has to differentiate between Party cadres, administrative cadres, and military cadres. As the term covers all Party leaders—state leaders as much as village cadres or policemen—it does not stand for a homogeneous group. To become a cadre who is a civil servant paid by the state (state cadre), someone would have to be put on the official staffing schedule by the appropriate personnel offices. Organization departments are responsible for the Party cadres. State cadres are paid out of the official household expenditure. Their salaries are part of the regular budget, approved by the local People’s Congresses, whereas the other rural cadres have to be paid by extra-budgetary means.

19. The social and political roles played by the “others,” i.e., by ethnic minorities, has meanwhile become a topic of research in China. See, for instance, Zhou Daming and Qin 2003.

20. For instance, Yang Zhong (2003: 8–9), who has conducted research in Han areas, has argued that in the eyes of the rural population local officials primarily were perceived as representatives of the central government in Beijing.

21. See Barth 1963; for the relationship between industrialization and ethnicity, see Hechter 1976.

22. This analysis does not include the questionnaires from Leibo County. This is because our Chinese partners had used a different questionnaire in Leibo than the one we used in other counties, and, further, no interviews were conducted there, so that we did not obtain the information necessary for an in-depth analysis. Our analysis in this volume, therefore, is based on the 123 interviews that we carried out together with our Chinese colleagues.
1. See Lu Hui’s (2001) material on the Jiddu and Bibbu in Jinyang, for example.
2. I am grateful to Stevan Harrell for this information.
3. For more on ethnic classification in China, see Mullaney 2004 and Mackerras 2004.
5. See, for instance, the case of the persecution of a Nuosu scholar’s father, in Mgebbu Lunzy and Stevan Harrell 2003.
6. Interview, Zhaojue County, 16 August 1981.
8. The law was published in *Renmin Ribao*, 2 March 2001.
11. He Yaohua 1998, for instance, speaks of different histories—an official Chinese one and various versions offered by the Yi, differing according to strata or Yi group.
12. The interviews with the Yi scholars were conducted in Beijing and Kunming in October 1998; the informants asked not to be named.
13. See, for example, Lü Qing 1996: 59–65.

2 | THE LIANGSHAN ECONOMIC SETTING AND PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS

5. Discussion in Jinyang County, 22 August 2002. The so-called laziness of the Yi, which Han officials complain about, is in fact not extraordinary. Marshall Sahlins
has shown that the majority of hunter and gatherer societies can subsist with working two and a half days a week (Sahlins 2000: 95ff.). Also, women work harder than men, and we think that the stereotypes of Yi laziness are based on the Han looking only at Nuosu men and holding them in disdain.

6. Compare this, for instance, with the question, “Why do nations have unproductive cultures?” (Porter 2000: 22), which is in fact a moral and pejorative evaluation.

8. Both counties had less than 25 percent Nuosu population.
9. Interview with a Yi scholar, Ganlumo County, 19 August 1999.
10. This information was provided by the Bureau for Administration of Industry and Commerce of the Liangshan Autonomous Prefecture in Xichang, on 24 August 1999.
11. According to official classifications, urban here means businesses located in the city of Xichang, in the county seats (county towns), or in towns with urban status (Ch: zhen).
12. Rural laborers do indeed migrate into the urban areas, but until now, they do so less with the intention to reside for a long period than to obtain a higher income in order to support their families and acquire starting capital for self-employment in their home area.

3 | PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IN NINE LIANGSHAN COUNTIES

1. Discussion with the county government and the Party Secretary of Jinyang County, 22 August 2002.
5. See Bai Shige 2001 for a case study on AIDS in Zhaojue County.
8. See the investigative report Lai and Mujie 1996.
10. Interview, Butuo County, 31 August 2001. The interviewee preferred to remain anonymous.
13. The Institute of Bimo Research in Meigu (Ch: Bimo Wenhua Yanjisuo) in Meigu estimated that there are 8,400 bimo in Meigu, including students. However, Wei Anduo 2000: 13–14 and Minzu October 2002: 46–47 suggest that there are only about 6,000 of them.
15. Interview, Ganluo County, 13 August 1999.
16. Interview, Ganluo County, 14 August 1999.
18. Interview, Jinyang County, 22 August 2002.

4 | COMPARATIVE PROFILES OF NUOSU AND HAN ENTREPRENEURS

1. See Heberer 2003b for findings from surveys in other regions.
2. Government or state cadres (Ch: guojia ganbu) are included in the official staff plan of the state and their salary is paid by the state.
4. Wu Jinghua is the highest ranking Yi in the Party hierarchy. Among other positions, he was vice minister of the State Nationalities’ Commission and Party Secretary of Tibet.
5 | THE EFFECT OF ENTREPRENEURS ON LOCAL POLITICS

1. These figures are from our survey conducted in the period 1999–2002.
2. Li Ding and Bao 2000: 363. According to a 2002 official national survey of 2.03 million private-business owners conducted by Communist Party United Front Work Department, the All China Federation of Industry and Commerce, and the China Private Economy Research Institute, 29.9 percent of the owners were Communist Party members; see Lawrence 2003: 30.
5. Discussion with officials of the Bureau for the Administration of Industry and Commerce, Mianning County, 19 August 1999.
6. This was demonstrated in Heberer 2001a: 381ff.
8. Interview, Puge County, 16 September 2001.
10. See, for example, a contribution of the Organizational Department of the Central Committee of the CCP, Lingdao weihe bang dakuan (Why do leading officials help the rich?) in: Jingji Ribao (Economic Daily), 6 December 1995; Yin 1996: 11–15; Shi and Pang 1996: 210–36.

6 | ENTREPRENEURS AND SOCIAL CHANGE

1. We differentiate between “clan,” a unilineal kin group claiming descent from a common ancestor, “lineages” as branches of descents from a common ancestor (i.e., branches of a clan), and “kin” (groups of persons related by blood).
2. To work without wages in order to support clan members economically is a tradition among Yi clans; see, for instance, Ma Erzi 2001.
3. Li Fang made a similar observation; see Li Fang 1998: 168ff.
4. This movement from family or clan business to more corporate business models is probably nearly universal as business grows.
5. See Yao and Wang 2002 and Huang Xiangyuan 2000; Wang Yang 2002 and Huang Yan 2002 argue against the claim that employing clan members reduces a company’s troubles in times of crisis.
6. See also Krüsselberg 1986: 184–85. Employing family or clan members who are less industrious or lazy is socially evaluated as positive behavior, as it enables the persons in question to become fully accepted members of their group.
7. This was true for every county and during the entire survey period, 1999–2002.
8. Interview, Mianning County, 17 August 1999.
10. Discussion with Ma Erzi in Mianning, 17 August 1999.
11. Discussion in Mianning County, 17 August 1999.
12. For more on the change in women’s role during the reform era, see Wu Ga 1997, 2001.
13. For more on the role of the headman, see Liu Yu 2001: 116–17.
14. I am grateful to Stevan Harrell for this information.
15. Interview, Xichang County, 23 August 2002.

7 | ENTREPRENEURS AND ETHNIC RELATIONS

1. Interview, Puge County, 16 September 2001.
3. Interview, Zhaojue County, 18 August 2000.

8 | ENTREPRENEURS AND ETHNIC IDENTITY

1. Interview, Butuo County, 31 August 2001.
3. A similar perspective is put forward by Yi scholar Qiesa Wuniu (2002), who argues that in ancient China there existed two civilizations, one in the catchment area of the Yellow River, considered by Han to be their place of origin, the other one in the catchment area of the Yangzi River, considered by Yi to be their place of origin. Such a statement challenges Han history.
5. Arguments like this one were frequently cited and refer not only to the Yi as an ethnic group and minzu but include also minzu who do not belong to the Yi groups such as the Bai, the Naxi, the Lisu, the Lahu, the Jinuo, and the Hani, i.e., groups that do not perceive themselves as part of a larger “Yi nationality” but are perceived by the Yi as belonging to their ethnic group.
6. The production responsibility system has been part and parcel of the reform effort in rural areas since 1979. The claim that such a system had existed in the Nuosu
areas prior to 1956 implies that the traditional agricultural production system of the Nuosu was more sophisticated than the one in Han areas.

7. Interview, Xichang County, 27 August 2002.
8. Interview, Meigu County, 6 September 2001.
10. Interview, Puge County, 16 September 2001
11. Tusi were appointed hereditary headmen in the Yuan, Ming, and Qing Dynasties.
12. Parallel cases are found in Harrell 2001b: 183–88.
13. I am grateful to Stevan Harrell for this information.

CONCLUSION

1. Frederik Barth (1967: 664) was among the first to state this view.
2. For more details on this, see Liu Yu 2001.